WORDS BEYOND THE PANDEMIC:

A HUNDRED-SIDED CRISIS

Coord.: **José Reis**
A collective work by CES

ces
Centro de Estudos Sociais
Universidade de Coimbra

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Universidade de Coimbra – Alta e Sofia inscrita na Lista do Património Mundial em 2013

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INTRODUCTION

José Reis

The crises, the convulsive times, the moments of amazement, the situations of collective perplexity, the will to act, have a thousand sides… This collective work from Centro de Estudos Sociais (CES) has but one hundred. Researchers from different areas and perspectives of the social sciences and humanities accepted the invitation to react to the personal, civic, political and intellectual clash of the pandemic, choosing themes that constitute problems and challenges of the times we live in and justify the development of alternatives. They did so in view of their research work, their working contexts, their most immediate impulse or, finally, their deeply felt concerns.

The many reasons why the pandemic has placed us before the unexpected and feelings we had never experienced in such a way before have been repeated over and over again. The shock, the restlessness, the profound feeling of the magnitude of the vulnerabilities, all this took on a density that crushed us. This is clear. However, it is also true that the critical social sciences, capable of challenging and interpreting the world, did not ignore the tensions on which collective life has been based, the inequalities generated by the profound imbalances of our societies, the spread of increasingly asymmetrical powers, the predation on the environment, sociabilities, resources and processes which should be sustainable. Beyond the voyeuristic shallowness of the "predictions" and prophecies or the anxiety of easy explanations, there was already, and always has been, a deep, restless knowledge, characteristic of those who study the multiple dimensions of life and recognise problems, well aware that most of them are the result of institutional constructions, political deliberations and undesirably unbalanced relations. And there was, of course, a clear notion of the central points of building a good society, a society where access to well-being, knowledge and culture would be based on an idea of justice and permanent principles of action geared towards care and the vitality of inclusion mechanisms which could not be expected to arise spontaneously, but rather must rest not only on forms of government resulting from democracy and the legitimacy it confers, but also on solid institutions.

What is presented here is perhaps the sum of what we were already concerned about and what has come to disturb us. The pandemic did not invent us, but it did mobilise us and perhaps recreated our work processes and our position in science, the university, and society. The themes gathered here are the result of what I have described above and do not need to be rationalised, which would certainly distort them. But they admit varying interpretations. Much of our material, institutional and political life is present here: the economy, financialisation, work and professions, the various manifestations of inequality, the environment, the different spaces of power, in short, capitalism, socialism and democracy. But here too is that which is part of the sociabilities, the public space, the multiplicity of relationships that are created in each society and in the world, that which is part of politics, rights, meanings and representations, intimacies, as well as the personal and its contexts. Similarly, we find in these themes issues of ethics, knowledge, poetry, humanities, arts and culture, in a call to complexity and our capacity to feel complete and whole. The contributions gathered here do not seek to be representative of what is done at CES nor of all that needs to be inventoried for a debate which would encompass

everything that needs to be discussed for us to reorganise. They are examples of multiple ways of feeling and understanding. And suggestions for action. Not messianic, but democratic actions.

Beyond what is expressed in each theme, one can sense the radicality of the pandemic in the face of what has imprudently become intrinsic to our societies and which has now been questioned like never before: capitalism's cumulative and predatory frenzy and its incessant tendency to accentuate mobilities and break all sense of belonging, to uproot the material life of communities – whether national, regional or local –, which should be their basis and purpose; the narrowing of institutions and life contexts; the segmentation of knowledge and practices; the emergence of violent forms of subjection of sociabilities; the power of discourses; the need to challenge institutions and reconfigure one's access to what is essential. In sum, all that is incompatible with what the pandemic suggests to us when there is a need to safeguard life, rebuild relationships, strengthen society through its most elementary mechanisms, reorganise the economy as the capacity to respond to essential needs, benefit from the State and public action carried out in the general interest, or remake the world in its complexity and with respect for all that constitutes it – rather than out of some globalist illusion that ignores life and only seeks to promote interactions devoid of substance. Instability has been created, vulnerabilities have been produced, that which gives solidity to the economy, society and life has been exploited to exhaustion, and we have received back a pandemic. This strong notion must accompany us as we do not wish a return to a "normal" which no one has ever defined for the benefit of all and which is the word that best describes the opacity hanging over the world that collapsed with the pandemic and cannot continue, so that we can think of a future still to be built.

These texts have authors and are signed by them, as is obvious in academia, and they represent the thoughts and proposals of those who wrote them. There is an implicit structure in each of them: they identify a problem and suggest an alternative. But they do not close the argument. On the contrary; as is natural in short texts, they leave matters open, inviting a continuation of the diagnosis and the search for alternatives.

ACADEMIA AND THE ETHICS OF CARE

Adriana Bebiano

The university is still imagined as a place of privilege, chosen for love and devotion to knowledge. Contrary to this representation, it actually obeys a business logic, with clients, financing agencies, sponsors, production goals and funding. Since the 1990s, this neoliberal model of university has taken root at a global level, breeding a culture of performance rigorously monitored by mechanisms that have become autonomous, apparently without subjects or agency, and from which the consideration for the human, materialised in the singular body of each academic, was erased, as Andrew Sparkes has been discussing. Expressed in outputs – a sacred word of academic newspeak – the narrative of success reigns, functioning as an instrument for disciplining the body. This has high costs both for the health and the emotional balance of each one of us. Furthermore, leisure is no longer a right. A moral discourse which values performance as quantified by meaningless metrics prevails, engendering a culture of blame if time is not spent in a “useful” and “productive” manner.

The COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to create an opportunity to rethink this paradigm. Confined, in the company of the people close to them, freed from commitments in the workplace, academics now seem to have “time”: time for care and affection; and also time to read, listen, think, reflect, write, create, indeed fulfil the social function of universities at their origin. This is a unique opportunity to choose the slow science model, first proposed in 2010 by the Slow Science Academy collective: solid, in-depth knowledge, built on a slow time scale and in the long term. However, the first weeks of confinement tell us this paradigm shift is very unlikely to happen. Time at home cannot be “wasted time”: there is great pressure to produce more – to publish articles, conduct surveys, or participate in webinars that unequivocally prove that academics are still useful and go on producing. The webcam has become the undisputed proof that academia is productive, that it deserves its salary. The moralistic narrative of success has been transferred to the digital environment, presented as a liberation when, in fact, by its omnipresence, it tends to function as another instrument of oppression that produces “docile bodies” – a concept that shows how relevant Foucault still is.

The alternative is the permanent combat for slow science; for the right to leisure, indispensable for creativity; the right to have time to care for ourselves and those we hold dear. The alternative is an ethics of care – first proposed by Carol Gilligan in the 1980s – in the workplace, in the collective and solidary development of knowledge; in human solidarity, in the return to time where there’s time for “useless” conversations, for laughter and for crying – as advocated by Daphna Hacker –, human manifestations expressed in the materiality of bodies. Only the option for slow knowledge can restore the human in academia.

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

Tiago Castela

In Portugal's Higher Education institutions (HEIs), increasingly scholars teach and research within the framework of temporary contracts, with no access to tenure. Among scholars in teaching positions, the importance of adjuncts has greatly increased: in 2012, 30 percent of lecturers were adjuncts; by 2018, adjuncts accounted for 42 percent of all lecturers in public HEIs. There is no precise data on scholars in research positions; many work at public HEIs while being hired by private associations owned by the HEIs, and the overwhelming majority of researchers have temporary contracts. There is a gender and generational divide: most tenured scholars are male and over 50. Most scholars under the age of 50, women being in the majority, are not on permanent contracts. Among doctoral students, the situation is worse: they rarely have access to teaching (which, in reputable HEIs in other States, is expected and paid), competitive funding is scarce, and intramural funding is virtually non-existent. In fact, in contrast to HEIs in other countries, Portugal's HEIs accept many doctoral students with no prospect of financial support, ultimately promoting the reproduction of inequalities. This situation has various undesirable effects for teaching and research, starting with the low attractiveness of Portugal's Higher Education system for scholars trained in other national systems. Moreover, it reinforces the disconnect between teaching and scientific research, which in turn impairs rigour and creativity in both activities, affects the creation of long-term teams (since the social space-time of scientific research, especially basic research, is made impossible by temporary contracts), and prevents access to collective deliberation in HEIs for scholars without permanent contracts, who tend to be female and younger.

The alternative entails abandoning the conceptual model of "excellence" supposedly brought about by competitive temporariness, which sustains the above-mentioned forms of erosion of academia, and opting for a model of collaborative careers. While the use of temporary contracts in HEIs is justified, it is urgent to reverse the increase in adjunct lecturer contracts and define a maximum percentage of researchers with temporary contracts identical to that of the teaching career, not to exceed 30 percent. In consequence, it is crucial to define national evaluation criteria, notably for the granting of tenure. It would also be important to consider the possibility of progression within the career, again within a national framework, as happens with other kinds of experts in the Portuguese State apparatus. If there is a role for private associations owned by HEIs, namely in the invaluable promotion of interdisciplinarity, the possibility of not employing such associations for hiring scholars should be explored, notably to strengthen the deliberative processes within HEIs. It is also necessary to give doctoral students access to teaching, freeing scholars in teaching positions from part of their excessive lecturing load, and to begin the transition to a system where hiring doctoral students is common. It is urgent to reflect on the future of HEIs in Portugal as a whole, driven by an academic ethics of collegiality and collaboration.

ACCESS TO WATER

Paula Duarte Lopes

The 2010 recognition, by the United Nations, of the human right to water confirmed the right of every person to have access to a sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable quantity of water for basic needs, including hygiene and food. In countries where physical access to water is practically 100 percent guaranteed, as in most so-called developed countries, which include Portugal, the main issue is to ensure access to drinking water at affordable prices. In many countries, as is the case with Portugal, water service charges can result in disconnecting the water supply for lack of payment. There are several instruments to prevent this measure, from subsidies to special payment plans to social security support and social tariffs, among others. However, none of these instruments is automatic, and in emergency situations the system is not flexible enough to timely respond to cases of lack of financial capacity to pay the water bill. In the current pandemic context, several municipalities and water supply entities have adopted measures to avoid this scenario, and several countries (such as Portugal, Brazil and, in the United States of America, states such as California or Texas) have adopted emergency legislation temporarily prohibiting water supply cuts, since the fight against contracting and spreading COVID-19 is structurally based on hand washing with water and soap. However, this is a temporary and exceptional solution.

Water supply must be seen once again as a public responsibility: water must remain a public good for social and environmental reasons, and it must be provided as an essential public good. The supply of water to the population for domestic use must be ensured on a permanent basis, without interruptions resulting from non-payment or inadequate bureaucratic-administrative schedules. Several measures ensure this unconditionally: the absolute prohibition of water disconnections for non-payment (in force in several countries, such as Austria and France); the provision of a certain number of cubic metres of water free of charge, based on household size (as in Ecuador); no charge for the water service (as in Northern Ireland). In all of these cases, water service is assumed to be a public service, wholly or partially financed from the State budget, i.e., from national taxes. This is the only way to ensure unconditional access to water for domestic use, and it is not an innovative option, given that it has already been the case in the past – before water metres and the widespread dissemination of water charges – and is also the case today, although in exceptional cases, in some parts of the planet.

ANTHROPOCENE

António Carvalho

The Anthropocene is a proposed geological epoch to illustrate the inseparability between human actions – starting with the Industrial Revolution – and planetary phenomena such as climate change, global warming and extreme meteorological events. Global capitalism has reacted to the Anthropocene with a hypermodern response, deploying instruments such as carbon markets, the development of emerging technologies to control and manage solar radiation, and multiple legal and bureaucratic devices that increase the North//South divide, naturalising the extractivist drive of global capitalism.

The Anthropocene marks a new phase of global capitalism, in which nature and terrestrial systems are turned into commodities, creating new challenges for social movements. While the meta-narrative of climate change mobilises governments and supranational institutions to promote the hegemony of planetary capitalism, social movements have to resort to scientific and technical expertise to justify their struggles.

The Western technological and scientific matrix is strongly linked to the expansion of capitalism. Escaping the narrative of green capitalism is a complex challenge, as it manifests itself through apparently emancipatory material politics enlisting renewable energies, electric cars and "sustainable" forms of consumption. The very resistance of populist regimes – as in Brazil and the United States – to recognising the climate emergency reinforces the technical-scientific narrative that sustains these new forms of capitalism, making it all the more difficult to adopt alternative ecologies of knowledge.

Social movements must critically position themselves in face of the transition to low-carbon societies, bearing in mind that the climate change narrative should not naturalize top-down decision-making processes. Also fundamental is the establishment of bridges with collectives from the global South, thus decentring the Anthropocene from its white and Western matrix, bringing visibility to the experiences and narratives of those who are actually affected by climate change.

Furthermore, it is urgent to involve "lay citizens" in participatory exercises regarding technological solutions aimed at addressing the Anthropocene, such as geoengineering. This will help avoid the trap of double delegation, which hinders citizens' ability to have an impact on the design of contemporary sociotechnical assemblages.

The social sciences should focus on analysing the material politics of climate change and related transitions, abandoning a dualistic heuristic matrix that does not take into account the material agency of non-humans. In light of this, new ontologies and methodologies need to be developed to pave the way for wider forms of political participation beyond the human.

ARTS

Giuseppina Raggi

Understanding creativity and artistic output as "gratuitous", an activity engaged in for its own sake, is the leitmotiv of artists' lives. When they introduce themselves ("I'm a musician", "I'm a ballet dancer", "I'm a director"), the most spontaneous question that follows from their interlocutor is: "Yes, but what do you do?" I refer, of course, to the high number of artists who conduct their activities without ever becoming stars.

The COVID-19 pandemic crisis has evidenced even more the fragility of those working in the artistic sector and the difficulty the political class has understanding the importance of artists as workers and agents playing a crucial role in society. During the first weeks of the pandemic, "art" and "culture" were forgotten words.

Faced with this situation, creative self-production on social platforms as a personal initiative has highlighted the vitality of the arts, but at the same time it has conveyed the idea of it being inconsequential, that is, a reality removed from the problems of "workers". As the lockdown dragged on, the sector's economic and social fragility ended in collapse, demonstrating the complexity of the instability that artists have to deal with, even in non-pandemic times.

More than a month after the crisis began, meetings between trade unions and the government were still inconclusive, in a situation of extreme labour emergency for artists. The availability of digital platforms to enable artistic production and the hiring of artists was one of the answers, without, however, going to the heart of the problem.

After their initial use of social networks as stages for continuing their own creative activities, artists – mainly those involved in the field of performing arts – chose silence and the white screen, radically changing their message: the arts are not "free" leisure, nor can artists be excluded from the dignity accorded to "other workers". Thus, the manifesto "Unidos pelo Presente e Futuro da Cultura em Portugal" (United for the Present and Future of Culture in Portugal) was born, as well as the Culture and Art Vigil which took place on May 21, 2020.

The solidarity among artists that emerged from this pandemic time also demonstrated the strength and value of joint initiatives and the cohesion among arts professionals, but most of all it highlighted the lack of government attention and of a structural solution.

Given the sense of freedom that drives artistic creation, the pandemic shows that, in addition to the need to improve social and labour support structures for artists, the post-pandemic times could be an occasion to radically review the way society looks at the arts.

Thus, policies and action plans need to be implemented, aimed at shifting our understanding of the arts from the field of leisure to that of "structural creativity", because – and this is not to deny their role as entertainment – the arts represent much more than complementary events of social life. On the contrary, they are (or should be) one of the main pillars of contemporary societies.

It is therefore necessary to sharply focus on the political vision and the national educational system, recognising that the arts play a central role in weighing, framing and overcoming the social, historical and political challenges laid bare by the pandemic, as shown by the global Black Lives Matter movement.

If the arts and culture are the first fields to disappear in emergency situations, the post-pandemic represents an improbable but unmissable opportunity to implement a new political vision for these sectors, because to care for, preserve and defend creativity (whatever the situation and whatever the cost) means to defend the plurality and democracy of Portuguese, European and world society.

AUTHORITY FOR WORKING CONDITIONS

Hermes Augusto Costa

The *Autoridade para as Condições de Trabalho* – ACT (Authority for Working Conditions) is a public service that oversees compliance with labour legislation and aims to improve working conditions in all sectors of private activity. Its mission is to prevent (the occurrence of incidents, conflicts, workplace accidents and occupational diseases), supervise (the conditions under which work is performed) and fix (by fomenting legislative improvements).

In times of pandemic, the ACT is faced with a worsening of the problems that were already there and which, to a large extent, are a challenge to its enforcement role. Problems such as: situations where workers are forced to work in poor health conditions (for example, call centre workers), to accept contract cancellations by mutual agreement, or to have their contracts terminated (even in cases where companies benefit from State support during the lay-off period); the real risk of unlawful collective dismissals; the profusion of precarious work in more vulnerable sectors of the workforce (temporary workers, outsourcing, freelancers, probation period); increasing demands from a non-regulated digital; the insecurities of teleworking, etc. These and other examples have highlighted the ACT's scarcity of human and technical resources, a long-time complaint only recently (May 2020) corrected with the inclusion of 80 inspectors admitted by open competition (starting in 2016) and a further forty inspectors admitted by internal competition (in 2019).

The usefulness of the 19 recommendations issued by the ACT at the end of April 2020 as a means of (re)adapting to workplaces in the framework of a return to "normality" is unquestionable. But it would be desirable that the "transfer" of powers from the Labour Courts (in relation to the suspension of dismissals that show signs of illegality) to the ACT receive increased political trust rather than being treated as a merely transitory measure. Equally, the promotion of law-trained labour inspectors should take priority over the recruitment (even if temporary) of inspectors in other services. It is also crucial that the inspection actions take the form of actual visits to companies instead of being conducted by phone or email.

Since the health crisis is a global problem, it is also time to make the European Labour Authority effective. COVID-19 has stimulated processes of confinement within national borders, but transnational mobility processes (over 17 million between EU Member-states) cannot fail to mobilise governments to strengthen joint inspections, enabling safe mobility rights and unrestricted access to social protection mechanisms.

BASIC ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

Alexandre Oliveira Tavares

Basic services are constitutionally described as those needed for the safety and maintenance of equipment and facilities, as well as those indispensable to meet overriding social needs. In the legal field they take the form of a law (Law No. 23/96 and its successive amendments until the 2019 version) which defines the framework and mechanisms aimed at protecting the users of basic public services. The definition and operation of these services must be compatible with the theory of fundamental rights, both in regard to access and disruption of services and the right to strike by the workers who provide them. Legally, it is believed that this is a markedly technical definition, aimed at establishing metrics for minimum levels of activity, as opposed to safeguarding rights.

Basic environmental services include, in the broadest sense, those related to water, energy, sanitation, waste or mortuary, and are based on assumptions of access and quality. In addition to their relevance and indispensability, they provide for vital needs, both individual and collective, and determine the duty of continuity in the provision of services, in abundance and with respect for environmental and public health values. These services can be analysed from three distinct perspectives: a technical-operational approach, based on the interrelationship between technical infrastructures and people and institutions; a socio-natural approach, based on the balance between resource mobilisation and the flows of environmental sustainability; a social-legal approach, based on the rights of freedom or social rights in accordance with a citizen's or community's right to life, safety and health.

An alternative vision for basic environmental service management must be based on the primacy of collective over individual interests, the public over the private domain, obligation over contractual exceptionality. The ensuring of basic services must rest on the principles of proportionality or reasonableness, for example with regard to the right to strike or mobilise workers, or on flexibility and the capacity to adapt to practical realities, as opposed to the inviolability and non-waiverability of individual and collective rights.

Conformity between collective and individual interests makes it possible, for example, to prohibit suspension of access to basic services and goods and to allow deferral of payment with no need for a contract release, according to the principle of objective good faith in contractual relations.

In a contingency situation, collaborative forms of mobilisation are required to carry out the duty of service provision or readiness, based on consistency of approach and on the proportionality of the measures. In this context, it is fundamental that responsibility be shared and that transparency be guaranteed with regard to how decisions are taken and what the resulting implications are.

BIODIVERSITY

Rita Campos

In the vast majority of human societies, an anthropocentric view of the world dominates, placing the human being at the centre of the universe and, as such, giving precedence to human needs over the needs of other species and the balance of ecosystems. The current patterns of production and consumption in a markedly capitalist global system are based on a premise of accumulation and require intensive extraction of the planet's natural resources. But these resources are not infinite, nor is this extraction done without causing massive, and often permanent, imbalances in ecosystems, endangering the survival of species or causing them to become extinct. Human activities are thus strongly associated with this "biodiversity crisis", which is also inherently a crisis that threatens humanity – because we depend on other species for survival – and accentuates social imbalances – because not all people are being or will be affected in the same way.

A complex problem will have no simple alternatives. Let us think of three, which imply profound changes in the way we look at the world and live our daily lives. The first: identifying the place of humanity in nature. We are humans, primates, mammals, animals, living beings; we deserve no more of this planet than any other species, we have no business exploiting, destroying or drastically altering ecosystems. This ecocentric vision of the world, obliterated in many human societies, brings people and nature closer together and helps rethink the local and global impacts of the current environmental crisis. To recognise ourselves as part of biodiversity is to realise that our health is intrinsically associated with the health – balance – of ecosystems. Disturbances to that balance endanger human health. The COVID-19 pandemic appears as a result of these disturbances and forces us to reflect on the multiple causes of the origin of the disease. And this reflection leads us to the second alternative: reducing consumption. Our actions have social and ecological impacts; individual actions can be taken as collective and political acts. Consumerism seems to be widespread and seems to be something innocuous: in many cases, it occurs in clean and appealing stores or on digital platforms. But the production chain is not innocuous, it is strongly associated with climate change and severe social injustice. We must therefore stop and define how much is enough and how much is too much, or excessive. The third alternative is linked to this issue and calls for a change in consumption habits. Thus, the appeal is for conscious consumption, within the limits of what is considered necessary. Only consume what has been produced with minimal social and ecological impacts, respecting the health (and well-being) of people and the environment along the production and distribution chain.

BIOPOLITICS

Susana Costa, Filipe Santos

COVID-19 appears as the "invisible enemy" which, among other restrictions, has justified a long period of confinement for the population. If little is new regarding the need to control and discipline citizens through surveillance, technological development and the willingness to use and wear artefacts (increasingly embedded in one's own body) not only makes it easier for citizens but also compel them to keep themselves and their neighbour under surveillance.

In the wake of Foucault, old and new surveillance apparatuses are (re)invented, which gain more and more prominence in the face of pervasive fear and make bodies more docile. The virus cannot be domesticated, but bodies can. And everybody is (a) suspect. At the end of the confinement period, the mandatory wearing of masks reinforces the call for social (or physical?) distancing in public spaces, making it difficult to recognise "the other" while making it easier to identify the non-compliant.

Tests are done to identify those infected and to check their immunity. Masks are worn. Hands are disinfected. Temperatures are taken. Spaces are divided into clean and contaminated areas. At the same time, governments and technology giants join forces to collect and store citizen data – from personal and cellular location data, such as CDC (contact digital tracing) mobile phone applications, to wearables or massive biological sampling. Not only to make each of us feel safer, but to make "the other" feel safe too. In order to be a "good citizen" as well as a compliant one in pandemic times, or simply to be able to return to life after the virus, one must be subjected to the control imposed by each State, accepting to be monitored and scrutinised in the most basic activities of daily life.

If restrictive biopolitical surveillance measures can be justified in a state of exception generated by a pandemic, a return to what was once thought to be a state of normality seems unlikely. What will become of this surveillance apparatus in the post-COVID-19 era? Will it serve to provide resources and infrastructure to combat future pandemics, or will it be used to divide and classify citizens according to a biopolitical risk model?

If a state of exception is extended long enough, it becomes the "new normality". In the current context, even if a vaccine or effective treatment is found, it is unlikely that social and physical restrictions will be relaxed or lifted. Quarantine, fear, suspicion, empty streets, economic and social depression will remain in our collective memory, and thereby justify any measure that restricts citizenship rights and individual and collective freedom.

The alternative to surveillance and the datafication of public life, be it realistic or utopian, is to raise awareness of individual and civic responsibility. The temptation to maintain and expand the apparatus of surveillance will be enormous. We must stay alert.

BLAME AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE

Tiago Pires Marques

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, cases of verbal and physical violence against individuals of Asian phenotype have been reported. Even though the World Health Organisation eliminated references to places, people, animals and occupations from the names of new diseases, the new coronavirus is associated with China – an association politically capitalised by leaders such as Donald Trump. The creation of false information, amplified by the social media, globalised this stigmatisation phenomenon and the need to find scapegoats. In a speech that went relatively unnoticed, the United Nations Secretary-General spoke of a "tsunami of hatred" directed, among others, at Asians. Every major epidemic has led to scapegoating, so this one is no exception. In addition to the example presented above, processes of stigmatisation and violence – verbal, physical and/or in the form of abandonment – against the elderly, refugees, residents of peripheral neighbourhoods and slums, the LGBTQ population and ethnic and religious minorities also occur. The most serious example seems to be that of India, with the violent harassment of Muslims, to whom the spread of the epidemic is attributed.

In responding to scapegoating phenomena, two lines of action can be considered, prevention and protection, and, within each, different levels, since this type of blaming is a reflection of social structures and political-cultural configurations and circumstances.

Prevention has mostly to do with the structural dimension, since the most unequal societies in terms of the distribution of power, wealth and symbolic capital are the most susceptible to scapegoating. Reducing inequalities is therefore a necessary condition to eliminate these phenomena. Prevention also requires action at the political and cultural level: expanding human rights to all people, regardless of their social position or their differences in relation to the dominant groups, is equally fundamental. The affirmation of universal rights is not enough, there must be an active fight against all forms of exclusion of individuals and groups from the scope of human rights. Perhaps one must even rethink the notions of rights – because they are part of a logic of access conditions – and of humanity – since humanity implies the possibility of non-humanity, attributable to an-other. Finally, we need to be vigilant of the early signs of scapegoating, with educational interventions and the promotion of cultural and health literacy among the population and target groups. Public authorities, media and teachers have a particularly important role to play here.

Victim protection requires a broad recognition of the problem and the promotion of institutions and attitudes of hospitality and solidarity. This is the responsibility of the States and intergovernmental organisations. It is fundamental to elevate the status of refugees by promoting hospitality and solidarity as values, and even as duties, of fully developed societies and by creating political-legal and material conditions to ensure the dignity of refugees. Social services, health institutions, the police, schools and universities, churches, cultural institutions and economic actors should all be called upon to strengthen the political culture of solidarity.

BODY AND RISKS

Rui Gomes

Safety is a symptom of 18th-century biopower. Making death an object of unease, disciplinary power concerned itself with survival, with prolonging life and protecting public hygiene. Affiliated to new political technologies of the body, it extended its action to the whole population with regard to such issues as birth, fecundity, old age and the control of endemics. The issue of safety is an old one and cuts across various spheres of life – from the body to the environment, to road safety and financial risk – but now the responses have been anchored in prevention and in personal accountability for the control of risks and health. Over the last 25 years, prudential socialisation has created a mentality conducive to swift compliance with all the confinement measures following the COVID-19 pandemic. In many cases, these paved the way for the State's exceptional measures, which are typical of health authoritarianism and ultimately gave specialists extra power.

Alongside the safety brought about by new technologies, which reduce the fears that used to characterise corporeal existence, there has been an increase in the uncertainties related to the risks looming in the future. The greatest risk of all was made plain by the amplifying effect that the variability of pre-existing health conditions tends to have on the probability of sickness and death. In the end there will be, in addition to the statistics of the infected and the dead, a curve for risk inequality: the poorer will have died more, minority ethnic groups will have been more seriously affected by mortality rates, the most vulnerable will have been the first to lose their jobs and fall below minimum subsistence levels, and the situation of those with already precarious housing conditions will only have gotten worse. "Letting live" and "leaving to die" will have resonated throughout the crisis.

The alternative is to establish participatory policies and care for others, valuing the National Health Service, public health and all social organisations that, through their intervention, recognise the asymmetric prevalence of health risks according to social groups and the living and working conditions provided to them, and promote solidarity towards the most vulnerable.

A part of salutogenic discourse is based on the metaphor of body *contamination*, intensifying both our susceptibility and aversion to bodily decay. The diseased, the old, the contaminated and those with marks of physical decay on their bodies tend to be excluded or neglected. It is important to limit prudential social practices that subject bodies to an unprecedented degree of risk monitoring. Insurance companies, experts and politicians will extend safety to ever larger domains of life, amplifying not only administrative control policy of and individualised thinking on risk, but also the responsibility for controlling it. A new notion of public space is at stake here, where the figure of the *public body* and care for the other can assert themselves.

CAPITALISM

José Castro Caldas

No author is as precise as Karl Polanyi in dating the origin of modern capitalism – 1834, the date on which the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed the Poor Law Amendment Act. For Polanyi, this moment marks the introduction of the 'free' labour market that capitalism in its industrialist form so badly needed. In fact, this piece of legislation put an end to the old regime of poverty mitigation and replaced it with a strictly conditional one which subjected applicants for support to admission in workplaces intentionally degraded and degrading, to a point where they would be forced to 'freely' seek and accept to work elsewhere for any salary.

Without overlooking the remote origins of capitalism deep within feudal societies, by setting this date Polanyi highlights capitalism's newness in the long haul of history and one of its main characteristics in relation to other modes of production – the predominance, in production, of wage labour over all other types of social relations.

Capitalism began to be recognised as a problem by those who suffered most directly from the expropriation of land and work tools and were thrown into the emerging industry with nothing of their own but the ability to work. Frequently on the verge of collapse as a result of cyclical crises and revolutions, capitalism withstood everything until the Great Depression, which began in 1929 and was not resolved until the end of the Second World War. In most European countries of the post-war period, capitalism went through a "golden age" – which would prove to be ephemeral – of relative stability and the parallel growth of profits and wages, high levels of employment and cohabitation with political democracy.

After being immersed in a new global crisis since the early 1970s, from which it was to emerge at the end of the 1980s as a system for which there was no alternative on a global scale, in the eyes of a broad social majority (with scarce political representation) the capitalist mode of organising society is now, once again, a problem, presenting three types of unsustainability: social (due to rising inequalities within countries and the persistent impoverishment of the popular classes), environmental (due to the growing conflict between the imperatives of accumulation and the requirements of life on the planet) and political (due to its increasingly clear difficulty in coexisting with freedom and democracy).

The alternative to capitalism was either imagined or desired by the most politicised of those who first suffered it as a problem, in the form of a society that produced for them and not for a privileged class or caste. Such a desire for most was called socialism. In its revolutionary and reformist manifestations, the desire for socialism took on rather diversified forms and nuances. Most viewed it as an association of producers. But there have always been those who did not go that far. For Polanyi, with whom we opened this text, socialism was nothing but democracy – the conscious subordination of the market to democratic politics. In these two forms – as an association of free producers or as tamed capitalism – we still find today, whether under this or other names, the desire for socialism.

THE CARE ECONOMIES

Teresa Cunha

By placing profit at the centre of economic activities, capitalism pursues the commodification of all things and all social relations. By turning labour into a commodity, it actively made a great number of human activities invisible and precarious. Although unpaid, these generate and secure life in many ways, are not designed for accumulation and are largely carried out by women of all ages in every corner of the planet. This is care-related work involving hygiene, feeding, shelter, clothing, i.e., creating the fundamental conditions for biological survival. Also included is work in agriculture, fishing and small-scale forestry; the circuits of reciprocal exchange in the community or neighbourhood; commercial proximity circuits; the pedagogies that serve to educate and to preserve one's identity and social memory, spirituality or language. They are, in general, the strategies of face-to-face interaction and all the emotional work of ensuring the immanent and transcendent conditions of a pleasurable life. I argue that, contrary to dominant common sense, care is the most productive of human activities.

OXFAM's 2020 report estimates that care work carried out by women around the world represents an economy larger than that of the technology sector. Translated into numbers, these activities correspond to 10,8 trillion US dollars in wealth per year. This means that a great part of the accumulated wealth of the tiny elite made up of 1 percent of the people on the planet would not be possible without the unpaid work of women of all ages. An alternative to this can include the following measures: (1) recognising that care is productive work, as it incessantly creates and nurtures a life worth living; (2) placing life, in all its forms, at the centre of all social interactions and all economies; (3) acknowledging that care is everybody's responsibility, not second nature to women; (4) valuing the knowledge generated by care in order to develop substantive sustainability of life in the world; (5) recognising as critical all the work involved in care, with due pecuniary compensation; (6) claiming that, in times of crisis or pandemic, it is wrong to maintain that the economy is at a standstill. On the contrary, the economies of care, those that produce life incessantly, are operating at maximum capacity to protect, feed, shelter, heal, care, provide food, clean, support and love. The economies of care are not large in numerical terms alone. They are a powerful force to counter the colonisation of our sociabilities by non-convivial technologies and they are the original source of life, without which it will be impossible to be, to exist, to resist and to live on.

CENTRALITY OF WORK

Manuel Carvalho da Silva

Unexpectedly, a virus highlights the irrationality of the dominant socio-economic model and screams at our consciousness the centrality of work. We must reflect on the value of all human work, on the values in which it must be anchored, on its social and international division. Precariousness and non-regulation of labour are forms of violent unilateral regulation that ultimately favour selfishness, utilitarianism and the unjust and sterile concentration of wealth.

Work has a central place in society and the economy. It provides support to the production of goods and services, has strong social value and is paramount in socialisation, enables access to consumption, is a source of social rights and citizenship, gives people qualifications and a position in society, and is relevant in solving environmental and ecological problems. This centrality was shaped in the course of a complex struggle for the dignity and against the alienation of workers, through a balance between the individual and the collective and the affirmation of labour as a universal right.

The centrality of work has always been subject to pressures which, due to multiple factors, increased with time and generated the false idea of a devaluing of work in the lives of people and societies. Some aspects are worth mentioning in this regard: the changes to the structure of the economy and its financialisation, which extended to work itself; the glorification of credit-fuelled consumption, as if to substitute for a salary; false technological determinisms that lead to the adjustment of workers to machines rather than the adjustment of machines to the work process; the camouflaging of hierarchical and functional dependencies that create the illusion of a proliferation of casual "activities" in place of employment – a process made easier not only by the fragmentation of production and the proliferation of precariousness, but also by the information and communication technologies and by mobility; social identities misleadingly portrayed as a replacement for the "old", labour-based identity; the appropriation of Labour Law by privileged groups that manipulate it against those it has historically covered.

It is essential to reclaim the centrality of work in order to transform society, making it more just and humanised; to ensure work protected by law and by contractual ties established through collective bargaining; to reclaim full employment as a goal and to guarantee wages that provide the material means indispensable to lives lived to the full; to strengthen, through more jobs and better salaries, universal welfare and social protection systems, so that no one is left dependent on the charity of others.

Work must be at the centre of a country's development matrix, of cohesion policies, of macro-economic options and their ramifications, of the application of scientific and technological advances in the prevention of catastrophes. Labour law and ethics must provide the framework for labour relations systems, freeing them from submission to the dictates of the markets, from "competitiveness" and from the centrality of the machine.

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY: STATE OF EMERGENCY IN INTERMITTENT PANDEMIC TIMES

Boaventura de Sousa Santos

From the 1980s onwards, the global wave of privatisation of social assets – such as health, education, running water, electricity, postal and telecommunications services and social security – was only the most visible manifestation of the priority given to the commodification of collective life. The State itself, together with civil society, began to be managed and evaluated according to market logic and return on capital criteria. The growing promiscuity between economic and political power reconfigured the State's practices and policies, and hence citizens' perception of the State. Despite the marked differences among countries, it was possible to notice some transitions from one period to the next: from welfare State to ill-fare State, from protective State to repressive State, from regulation of the economy by the State to regulation of the State by the economy. These transitions occurred at the same time as liberal democracy was promoted as the only internationally legitimate political regime. The new coronavirus pandemic clearly highlighted two dissonant realities. On the one hand, States were called upon to protect citizens from the health, social and economic consequences of the pandemic. This was not the citizens' choice, it was the only recourse open to them. On the other hand, when the pandemic broke out, in early 2020, most States were completely unprepared to address it and protect their citizens. The growing tension, and even incompatibility, between the needs of capital accumulation and a political regime that tends to be dominated by the opinion of the majority caused democracy to suffer successive distortions, leading to what I have called low-intensity democracies. The pandemic dramatically amplified two major imperatives. The first, and more pressing, imperative is to change the economic and political logic underlying public policies (health, education, pensions, workers' rights, infrastructure). These are not costs, but investments in the well-being of populations that will be increasingly hit by extreme events. The second, a medium-term imperative, is to reform the political system in order to complement representative democracy with participatory democracy. The increasing incompatibility between the needs of accumulation and majority governments is distorting and hijacking representative democracy. This can only be overcome through anti-capitalist, anti-racist and anti-sexist policies supported by citizens politically organised into forms of participatory democracy, in autonomous complementarity with political parties and representative democracy. In time, these should turn into movement-parties with citizen control over party oligarchies.

CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO LAW AND JUSTICE

Patrícia Branco, Paula Casaleiro

Although children as a group seem less likely to be infected by COVID-19, according to World Health Organisation and UNICEF data (even though, by the end of 2020, up to 1.2 million children in 118 countries are expected to die from poor health care), their access to law and justice in the broad sense has been particularly affected, which makes them more vulnerable to the social and economic inequalities caused by the pandemic.

The context of public health, social and economic crisis threatens children's right to survival (their right to adequate care and food), development (right to education, health and socialisation), protection (right to be protected from abuse and exploitation), and participation (the right to express their own opinion).

For many children, access to justice was also affected by the exceptional and temporary measures in the justice field, with the suspension of non-urgent judicial cases – such as those regulating custody, visits, child support and parental responsibilities. These postponements may aggravate other problems and condition the right to survival and protection. At the same time, the measures taken to prevent contagion during and after the state of emergency also indirectly conditioned access to justice in cases of children at risk or in danger, by suspending the work of the various child and youth protection commissions and by closing schools, which are the main reporting entities.

In this context, while several sectors of society were represented in the discussion of preventive measures and pandemic containment, children found themselves confined, unconfined, their right to education (tele)confined, without being able to make their voice and opinion heard at any time. Children thus emerged as one of the least visible groups of all.

Promoting children's access to rights and justice should, in our view, be based on three fundamental aspects:

1. Procedural digitalisation and dematerialisation, so as to avoid the suspension of cases and proceedings in critical areas and to facilitate access to justice for children and families;
2. Universal access to digital media and the Internet, so as to ensure the right of access to education and protection. Also, the creation of special support and information hotlines;
3. Promotion of children's participatory democracy, so as to implement their right to be heard in relation to their particular needs, with the involvement of children's, young people's and families' associations in defining measures directly affecting them (as in matters of a pedagogical nature or special educational needs, forms of sociability with family members and peers, and family support).

COVID-19 has not only exposed, but also aggravated, some of the already existing fragilities in the access of children to law and justice in Portugal. Thus, the importance of these measures extends beyond the pandemic crisis.

CITIES

Carlos Fortuna

The effect of COVID-19 on cities is profound. It has paralysed the economy and social coexistence. It has stopped transport and threatened employment. It promoted learning without a social environment. It interrupted music, suspended cinema, killed street life. It filled the hospitals. Fear set in and the urban death scene made itself felt.

Cities do not die easily. Only 42 cities have disappeared from the map from the year 1100 to the present. Although they are vulnerable expressions of human organisation, cities have been able to cope with their own decline. Whether such decline is caused by urban space disputes, war devastation or political, financial or geographical and environmental calamities, cities have sought resilient and sustainable solutions. Always with enormous asymmetries and disparities, visible in the global North and South. On their different scales, *Detroitism* and *Aleppism* are examples of the urban regeneration effort.

Cities insist on being the basis of modern society. Is this enough for a post-pandemic regeneration of the city to be expected? What other languages will have to be invented?

In the city people are together, and it is estimated that two-thirds of humankind will be urban by the year 2050, with the indelible mark of the demographic tragedy of poor cities in the global South. Only cities have the resources to focus on solutions to the crises we will be facing. Other political languages will have to emerge in the crucible of city innovation and urban culture:

- The language of *the street*, with greater intergenerational respect and easy coexistence with differences;
- The language of human-scale *mobility* and green spaces, with more cycle paths, more walking spaces and less waste;
- The language of public *transport*, with a public system that is less polluting, close by and accessible;
- The language of *buildings*, with new environmental precautions and other means of safety and internal circulation;
- The language of *work and employment,* with greater autonomy and easier adaptation to innovative production systems;
- The language of *education*, with more information and more digitality alongside social contextualisation;
- The language of *cultural health*, with consistency and openness to groups and native places of creation;
- The language of moderate, environmentally sustainable and socially responsible *consumption*;
- The language of *spatial deconcentration* of facilities and resources, with light, functional urban structures.

The perverse logic of *accelerationism* and urban *instantaneity* has to be reversed, so that new slow and collective languages of doing and being in cities can be tried out.

It is necessary to surprise the urban future, just like COVID-19 caught cities by surprise and made them inactive.

Rijeka's example is a powerful one. All of a sudden, the city saw its European Capital of Culture 2020 plan ruined. It has reinvented itself and is now offering alternative cultural languages: ballet without physical contact, concerts in unfinished buildings, conferences in ancient monuments, theatre with safe physical distance.

Other cities soon put into action urban projects planned for 2030. The confrontation with the coronavirus should serve to forge new *urbanities* and create *other* cities, different from the known urban "normality".

CIVIC PARTICIPATION

Giovanni Allegretti

Among the activities paralysed by the COVID-19 outbreak are many civic participation processes. In the last decade Portugal has entered the world map of institutionalised participation, as one of the few countries to adopt not only hundreds of local participatory budgets, but also experiments promoted by the central government in this area. In addition, there is a Network of Participatory Municipalities (NPM) that encourages mutual learning of innovative processes centred on social dialogue. While these experiments remained on standby, forms of spontaneous activism emerged that conquered the digital social networks, our balconies and our streets. The suspension resulting from the pandemic raises four interrelated issues: 1) the risk that the wave of institutionalised participation processes will not be able to resume its dynamics and that the loss of one of its annual cycles will lead to the end of many of these experiments; 2) the choosing of the best instruments to relaunch and update dialogue between institutions and communities; 3) the renewal of participation methodologies and the very topics under discussion; 4) the experiments that can serve as a guide in this "updated recovery" of participatory processes.

With the end of the state of emergency, the stage of "obedience" is over and it is necessary to build environments of collective responsibility to value common social capital in the reconstruction of a "new normal". To avoid the paralysis of forms of participation "by invitation", a dialogue between citizens and administrations needs to be restarted rapidly, refocusing participation on two fronts: the methodological and the substantive one.

Methodologically, the solution lies in hybrid forms that bring together small discussion groups and a greater use of technologies that connect and harmonise micro-deliberation spaces. The physical contact suspended by COVID-19 for fear of large agglomerations must be recovered. The "cold" technologies and digital staging have already invaded our lives too deeply not to create rejection. A balanced compromise of bodies engaging in dialogue, with appropriate safety distancing, can bring enduring solutions. It is also necessary to do away with the administrative fragmentation of processes, by creating interscale participatory pathways where citizens' ideas can be channelled into immediate solutions at different levels of public policy.

The pandemic has made us more ambitious about the substance of the debates: we want to help restructure the welfare state destroyed by decades of neoliberal policies, reduce the new inequalities and exclusions, and rethink concepts and standards of quality of life (such as public space and housing as a multifunctional place, capable of accommodating diverse demands). Civic participation in the "new normal" needs public investment in order to function. It also needs to be shaped around the forms of playful activism and solidarity – which have multiplied during lockdown – and to be attractive and entertaining, to respond to a great variety of needs that politics and technocracy find difficult to imagine.

There are examples to follow. In Galicia, young architects are helping families to remodel their homes; in France, mayors have negotiated with the President of the Republic the creation of citizen panels to oversee the reconstruction of everyday life; and in Italy several municipalities are co-designing with citizens the new participatory processes. Let us also not forget the fact that cities such as Seattle or Prato have already invested in civic dialogue during the pandemic, thus showing how innovative solutions can bring benefits to communities.

COMPLEXITY

Ana Teixeira de Melo

The current crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic emerges, like many others, as a natural expression of the complexity of the world. A microscopic virus dismantles a much greater "whole". It disturbs us and opens the way for transformation, not because it is able to embrace the entire world or because it tussles with, reduces, fragments or controls it, but because it naturally pairs with its complexity, acting accordingly. Hence, it introduces significant perturbations in the relational matrix that sustains the world and its complexity, operating as an integral part of it: it affects the internal relationships that sustain our biological integrity, the relationships that sustain us as a society, the relationships that make us part of the physical and biological world.

As an emergent product of complexity, the virus is not complex in itself, but rather becomes complex in how it couples with the world – following the same organising principles, understanding the cooperative, synergetic, constructive nature of the relationships that generate it. This virus is not a stranger, because it understands and penetrates this relational matrix, its great impact resulting from this congruence. Arising from complexity, it introduces a marked perturbation in the various levels of organisation of our living, creating opportunities for transformation. But a greater risk lies in the perpetuation of the old modes of thinking that brought us to this point of bifurcation: vulnerability or opportunity? Destruction or (re)creation?

It is possible to find new ways to deal with the complexity of the world through the complexity of our thinking. Strategies and resources are available that can support (more) complex thinking, but they need to be coordinated within an ontological and epistemological relational framework. New strategies must be developed to enable a mode of coupling that is congruent with the complexity of the world: one that both recognises and performs complexity, for the emergence of a better world for all.

The practice of our thinking, which informs action and is sustained by it, must perform a greater complexity, in the following dimensions:

1. Structural (multidimensionality/variety; relationality, recursiveness);

2. Dynamic (integration of time scales; processes and dynamics, ambiguity-uncertainty);

3. Causal (multiple forms of description and purposes; path-dependency; circular complexity and part-whole relationships; emergent causality and abductive thinking);

4. Dialectics and complementarities (dualities and complementarities; levels and processes);

5. Observer-dependent (multipositioning and multiple perspectives; reflexivity; intentionality);

6. Adaptive and evolutionary (adaptive value; evolutionary potential);

7. Pragmatic (pragmatic value; sustainability);

8. Ethical and aesthetic (values);

9. Narrative (differentiation and coherence; coordination and identities of multiple critical observers; flexibility/openness).

The solution? To match complexity with complexity.

CONFINED LEISURES

Rui Gomes

Those who experienced confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic report a strange sensation in which subjective time either accelerated or slowed down. As if in a fictional time capsule, where movements occur at unimaginable speeds without the travellers being physically aware of the fact. This spatio-temporal disconnect is paradoxical when we think about bodily leisure practices because we have gotten used to perceiving them as the archetype of movement and mobility. Some alternative forms of leisure adopted during this period, especially those involving remote exercise, the use of simulated forms of physical activity, or filling the slowness of time with e-sports, inverted the customary motor logic: movement was replaced by anxious stillness.

On the one hand, the speed of virtual contact with others, whether people, objects or symbols, suggests intensity; on the other hand, the paralysis of confinement produces dejection. The feeling of speed is no longer a feature of the moving body; it has moved to the screens of TV sets, smartphones and computer monitors. Leg speed has shifted to the visual-manual anxiety of keyboards.

The confinement created the conditions for the exacerbation of already existing tendencies, which entered the various fields of life as an extended form of simulacrum and hyper-reality.

The pandemic highlighted the two paths to leisure. The first is the immersion in hyper-reality that defines a material and mental condition of life in which the distinction between the real thing and its imitation is abolished: holiday places that imitate and amplify our sense of exoticism; closed spaces in cold regions that reproduce lush spaces of tropical beaches; exotic spaces that include references recognisable by tourists from other continents; virtual activities without the presence of instructors; mobile applications that replace face-to-face interaction; e-sports designed to give spectators a bigger thrill; confined spaces amplified by images in which you can play golf in a hotel, play soccer in your room or ride a bicycle against wild landscapes without ever leaving your home. That which is geographically distant seems very familiar and that which is geographically close creates the illusion of strangeness.

The alternative path is the growing demand for the dazzling spaces of domesticated nature that were left out of the great confinement: hiking or cycling by the river or the ocean; taking regular exercise in the big lungs of the city, enjoying its public areas. Eco-leisure had already gained followers as a reaction to the artificialism of life and urban sedentariness. With the experience of confinement, it gained a new meaning: the search for reflexive slowness and new cognitive maps, capable of developing new roots in a territory and a place that must be protected as a common asset.

CONSCIOUS ECONOMY

Vasco Almeida

The COVID-19 pandemic led to a serious economic crisis in a short period of time. The contraction of globalisation-driven international trade and production chains and the fall in the financial markets were the first signs of the crisis. The lockdown of a high percentage of the world's population has led to many economic sectors suspending their activities, including retail, transport, restaurants, hotels, culture, sports, energy and a significant part of manufacturing. Unemployment has increased significantly and is expected to push millions of workers into poverty and social exclusion.

The great economic and social impact of the pandemic is due, among other reasons, to the economic model adopted in recent decades. Mass production and consumption, the liberalisation of trade and the growing need for the movement of people, goods and capital have led to financial instability, job insecurity, social inequality and environmental degradation. Furthermore, the relationship between the economic model adopted and the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem balance has led to the emergence of new diseases, such as COVID-19. The situation has been made worse by the adoption of neoliberal policies that weakened public services, particularly in the health sector, thereby reducing the possibility of efficiently fighting the pandemic.

The current crisis opens an opportunity to design a new economic model. While it is foreseeable that political and economic decision-makers call for a return to "normality", this is an opportunity to lay the foundations for a conscientious economy in which people's motivations and choices are based on values such as sustainability, democracy and social justice, promoting well-being and environmental balance.

The real needs of workers and communities must be met with the production of goods and services based on processes that preserve the environment and are safe for them. This entails, on the one hand, decreasing some sectors of economic activity that tend to deplete natural resources and foster unsustainable consumption and, on the other hand, developing sectors that promote well-being, such as health, education and renewable energies. Globalised production processes based on complex value chains should be gradually replaced with local production systems partly provided by community-based or municipal organisations. Finally, it is the State's responsibility to ensure a fair distribution of income and the empowerment of citizens. A conscientious economy must be intrinsically democratic, governed not by capital, but by people who are active in their communities and who can play a fundamental role in transforming society.

COURTS, AN (ALMOST) ABSENT SOVEREIGNTY POWER

João Pedroso

The "constitutional state of exception" is subject to political supervision by the Assembly of the Republic (AR) and to judicial control. The Constitutional Court (CC) is responsible for verifying the constitutionality "of acts of decree and execution of the state of exception that have a normative nature, and the other courts shall be responsible for verifying the legality of acts, as well as the application of the criminal and civil liability arising from their practice". Thus, in a democratic rule of law, fundamental rights cannot be limited without the courts being able to control the constitutionality or legality of the exception.

Article 5 (1) (e) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 27 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (CPR) prohibit the compulsory internment of "suspects", only allowing it for persons positively infected. However, the governments of the Madeira and Azores regions imposed arriving passengers – even in situations where the laboratory test was negative for COVID-19 – the obligation of prophylactic isolation for 14 days, in a hotel guarded by the police.

However, the CC was not called upon to decide in abstract control of constitutionality about these measures restricting fundamental rights. And as far as the courts are concerned, although the impact of the state of constitutional exception has not yet been studied, it can be said, given the information available, that they were "almost absent", even in terms of fundamental rights protection. The courts operated in a logic of "minimum services", with the judicial deadlines suspended, ensuring only the urgent acts related to the validation of police detention but not always proceeding with the other urgent cases, namely those related to family and children's rights. Only the case of the Ponta Delgada Judicial Court is known, which granted a request for the immediate release of a citizen placed in compulsory quarantine in a hotel, having tested negative to COVID-19, because it constituted an "unconstitutional and illegal deprivation of freedom".

The declaration – with general mandatory force – of unconstitutionality can only be requested from the CC by the Presidents of the Republic and the AR, the Ombudsman, the Attorney General of the Republic, a tenth of the Deputies of the AR, and the Prime Minister. Therefore, as an alternative, and with respect for our society's plurality, it is imperative, on the one hand, that the initiative to control constitutionality, in the abstract, be extended to citizens organised in associations or through petition. On the other hand, it is necessary to broaden the concept and the legal and practical interpretation of "urgent act", so that, in situations of judicial deadline and judicial activity suspension, a greater number of rights violations are resolved by the courts.

CULTURE AND TERRITORY

Cláudia Pato de Carvalho

The interior of Portugal consists of a vast, unequal and uneven territory (in relation to the coastal zones), with a set of natural, patrimonial, human and social resources we know little about and of which there is no structured and longitudinally organised inventory. In cultural terms specifically, inland areas present major challenges with regard to public policy formulation. Most of these policies focus on cities and areas of greater economic intensity and interaction and lack the capacity to adapt to the specificities and needs of inland areas. For this reason, inland territories have an unequal access to acceptable standards of quality and are faced with increasing economic, social and environmental difficulties in terms of employment, business, cultural and logistical opportunities. These regions are normally seen as unattractive and characterised in terms of distance, rurality and, in some cases, harsh weather conditions.

On the other hand, it is possible to predict the potential of some remote and low-density areas, where creating differentiated employment, valuing material and immaterial resources and creating a sense of community are more likely to become reality than in some densely populated regions.

The lockdown resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis may require a paradigm shift in the way in which we look at these territories. Perceptions should not be too focused on economic gains but rather on the cultural and geographical uniqueness of peripheral and semi-peripheral regions, as well as on the identification of a variety of culturally related resources that offer a distinctive character to those particular locations. Firstly, the notion of innovation needs to be expanded. Traditionally, innovation tends to be limited to research and development (R&D) taking place in large urban centres. However, innovation also takes place (in traditionally less attractive places) in other ways, allowing for other, equally impactful articulations. Cultural practice – as an activity, a policy, a space for intervention and reflection – can create conditions to rethink these territories from innovative perspectives.

This paradigm shift can arise from an exercise of cultural mapping. It is a systematic approach for identifying, recording and classifying the cultural, material and immaterial resources of a community. It is considered an interdisciplinary research field and a methodological tool in participatory planning and community development. The aim is to evidence how local cultural assets, stories, practices, memories and rituals can turn areas into meaningful places. Cultural mapping can influence cultural planning and cultural policies and it can help define an integrated strategy for cultural action.

DEGLOBALISING

João Rodrigues

The intensification of capitalist globalisation – promoted by dominant neoliberal policies from the late 1970s onwards – was associated with the erosion of democracy caused by growing blackmail on the part of more mobile capital, the increase in social inequalities, the increasingly visible environmental crisis and the multiplication of financial crises in a system that is becoming more and more opaque, interconnected and therefore politically more difficult to manage.

Seen from Portugal, globalisation has also eroded national productive capabilities, reducing self-sufficiency in many areas that have now proven crucial. Thanks to trade and financial liberalisation, the country was exposed to increased international competition while lacking in policy instruments to counteract its external dependence, which manifested itself, for example, in the form of unprecedented external indebtedness. All this served to provide renewed confirmation that free trade is the protectionism of the strongest.

Globalisation has given rise to an ideology – globalism – that portraits it as an irreversible process and only argues for solutions on a global scale, that is, on the scale of democratic impotence.

The pandemic crisis has evidenced the need to reverse the process of globalisation, because the latter has been a powerful vehicle for the spread of COVID-19, laying bare the price paid for relying on so-called global production chains for crucial goods, or for allowing the manic mobility of people in pursuit of business or leisure.

The verb 'to deglobalise' describes a process of increased assertion by States with regard to the international circulation of factors, aimed at making national economies less interdependent. This will make them less vulnerable and more malleable to vital planning for reasons of security, employment protection or environmental sustainability.

In fact, it will not be possible to avert imminent disasters unless we reduce the length of production chains, favour local production and embed the economy in democratically delimited territories. This, in turn, will not be possible without policy instruments – from selective protectionism to controls on inward and outward capital movements. These instruments have historically been, and still are, employed to guide economies towards forms that are more nationally oriented and self-sufficient, and therefore more economically and environmentally sustainable and less exposed to crises.

These instruments are also decisive in mitigating the structural power of capital, thus rendered less mobile and less capable not only of pressuring States but also of promoting races to the bottom with regard to redistribution or regulation in accordance with democratic public interest, particularly as far as the always decisive issue of labour relations is concerned.

Deglobalising will entail the dismantling of an 'acquis' of international treaties and institutions that have been, and still are, used to lock-in the advantages of the most extroverted fractions of capital. Only then will it be possible to dream of a fairer, more sustainable and democratic system.

DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE

Rui Gomes

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the vulnerability of institutions was revealed in the attacks on the democracy pillar. The war metaphor prepared the mentality that was needed for measures such as the state of emergency, submission to a single command of experts and politicians, the limitation of criticism and attacks on those in command of the crisis, and the acceptance of collateral damage like digital surveillance.

Systems to monitor those infected and track all their movements and potential contacts have become commonplace in Europe. Either single-handedly or in collaboration with the State, digital capitalism moved quickly to participate in developing these systems, which already existed for the purposes of tracking consumer behaviour, advertising, creating mobility profiles, anticipating behaviour and promoting lifestyles. The synchronisation of mobile phones allows for the permanent control of the profile and movements of each individual and the real-time transfer of this data to analysis centres capable of triggering offers of goods and services within microseconds. The synchronisation, monitoring and availability routine for receiving commercial stimuli, either through smartphone location systems or GPS, was already part of socially accepted behaviour.

In Portugal, the persuasive surveillance model, based on the seductive power of the new technologies and on geolocation applications commonly used in search-and-seizure games of "dangerous monsters" (PokémonGo), is currently dominant. In this case, the measure is being trivialised thanks to game mentality, now also part of the sociability of a portion of the population.

This is a global phenomenon and it needs global and continental regulation. National regulations are necessary, but they will have little capacity to prevent abuse if issued in isolation.

Governments should ensure that digital devices are designed and used in a way that is compatible with privacy and non-discrimination standards. Electronic health surveillance devices should not be allowed. Voluntary use, even if agreed to and informed, would open the door to their mainstreaming, especially if the health situation continues and repeats itself.

Laws authorising States to collect, use and store personal data must be strictly compatible with the right to privacy or otherwise repealed.

Government and market initiatives must be urgently subjected to independent scrutiny. Temporary acceptance of intrusive measures where the strategy based on fear of contracting COVID-19 has worked should be subject to rigorous supervision by independent bodies, judicial supervision, monitoring by Parliament and monitoring by international human rights institutions.

DISABLED PEOPLE

Bruno Sena Martins

The everyday reality of disabled people is deeply marked by social exclusion, which makes itself felt through greater exposure to conditions of economic insecurity, unemployment, social isolation, as well as poorer access to public goods and spheres of political participation. This picture has been challenged by the growing denunciation of disablism, defined as a form of social oppression based on the inferiority – an inferiority naturalised in bodies – of persons who are socially defined by the frame of disability. The response to the new coronavirus forced the general population to live for the first time an experience of social confinement that has long characterised the existence of disabled people.

In addition to disparaging values and attitudes, disabled people are faced with architectural and communication barriers, obstacles in access to transport, the inexistence, insufficiency or inadequacy of support within the regular education system, and exclusionary criteria as regards access to employment. A vicious circle is therefore created between the social invisibility of disabled people and their disparagement by the oppressive structures under which they live. This prejudice is so deeply embedded that the concept of disability is actually part of Eurocentric modernity, in a hegemony of normality that uses biomedicine to distinguish valuable bodies from those considered deviating, inferior or incurable. The fact that the differences defining disabled people are naturalised as indicators of a social marginality that is viewed as fatal has implications for the blatant absence of disability in many agendas for social emancipation.

It is important to recognise the experiences and aspirations of disabled people not only when designing social policies that concern them directly, but also when designing a new society that will necessarily have to free itself from a capitalist, patriarchal, heterosexist, racist and disablist normality. In fact, the vast majority of disabled people are perfectly apt to have a profession, access higher education, enjoy public spaces and have an active democratic participation. In order to achieve this, it would be important to heed the overwhelming functional and aesthetic diversity that characterises human existence, in contrast to any ideals of normality hierarchically based on the systematic confinement of struggles, bodies and subjectivities.

ECONOMY OF CARE

José Reis

One of the wisest economists, Albert Hirschman, stated that the organisation of material life and social relations under capitalism can be seen from two “rival visions”: one emphasising the prevalence of individualism, the use of resources to exhaustion and the “depletion” of society’s relational foundations, the other attributing greater importance to the general interest and the production of common goods. The thesis of self-destruction and of the civilising effects of capitalism (or *doux commerce*) are thus confronted. To be sure, the long duration of capitalism was made possible by the varied articulations of these two principles. However, it seems clear that today we face a reality whose intrinsic nature has never been so extreme. It became extreme due to the incessant increase in transactions, mobility and accumulation, the exclusion of many (based on property and money) from accessing the fruits of wealth creation, the exploitation of resources, spaces and people, and also the institution of inequality. In addition, the most recent developments in capitalism have evidenced how financial markets are prone to dominating people’s lives, communities, States, resources and, finally, the productive system itself.

The prevalence of individualistic rationalities and market principles – especially the financial markets –, the constriction of public action and provision, the economy’s move away from the communities it should serve (countries, regions, places), the environmental burden, the globalist views, the underestimation of well-being or the devaluation of work and social mechanisms of inclusion, have pushed contemporary societies and economies to a state of severe unsustainability. By confronting capitalisms with the shutting down of many activities and the breakdown of mobilities and supply chains, the pandemic showed how serious are the dependencies that have been generated and how dangerous and unsustainable the societies we have built. At the same time, it also showed the safest responses, to which we all turned: public action, knowledge, collective services, solidarity and proximity.

An economy of care is, first and foremost, one that *provides* for the essential needs of a country and those who live in it, an economy that has power over itself and the power to break down its most serious *dependencies* – those that make countries, regions and people, i.e., communities – *vulnerable*. It is therefore the whole economy and not just certain areas of society, such as the so-called third sector or the branches of personal care. It is, of course, a matter of political economy, of the collective deliberations needed to organise a country. Hopefully this is the form of political economy that will determine the uncertain and unstable cycle that lies ahead. May we prove able to steer it.

EDUCATION AND INEQUALITIES

Rui Gomes

Inequalities predate the crisis in education created by the COVID-19 pandemic, as shown by the high retention and dropout rates – mainly affecting social groups with fewer resources –, the failure to attend compulsory schooling in almost all courses of study, the inability to integrate ethnic minorities successfully, the slowness in the process of extending pre-school education, and the deficiencies in the way integrated education is dealt with.

With students having to stay at home, the inequality of access to the digital society became clear, but this is only one example of unequal access to cultural assets. Info-exclusion goes hand in hand with the new technologies to the extent that the latter are used as a simple aid to traditional teaching rather than a tool for differentiated learning anchored in the students' experiences.

Social inequalities turn into school inequalities due to the 18th century graduate class model, in which *many are taught as if they were a class of one*. The traditional mass school model, based on collective education, on the classroom as a space for a fixed and homogeneous group of students and on a standard class time, proved obsolete when confronted with the glaring economic and cultural inequalities between students.

The fiction of the average student as representative of the whole lives on in the institution of the exam. It is assumed that the students who pass the exam are those in a position to receive the same collective education in the next grade. The exam is also a way to certify the value of each student and to insert this value into the productive logic of the capitalist labour market. Through meritocracy, the exam hides the inequalities of economic resources and the cultural capital of families behind the neutrality and objectivity of the student's results.

Resolving these inequalities will require the following measures:

- Full compliance with 12 years of compulsory education, reducing retention and dropout rates to residual levels.
- Universalisation of pre-school education, integrating it into compulsory education.
- Establishment of specific integration programmes for ethnic minorities and students with special needs.
- Expansion of documentation and information network centres so as to allow a substantial move from reproductive education to productive learning, centred on autonomous paths of knowledge appropriation.
- Ensuring of the replacement of a portion of collective education with project-based education, be it of the tutorial type or in small groups, both remote and face-to-face.
- Replacement of lecture-type classes with supervised group work carried out in new, dedicated school facilities but also remotely, and also remotely, in libraries or other educational and cultural resources available. The standard class time can be replaced with time credits of teachers and students, according to the degree of compliance with the purposes, objectives and tasks set by the curricular goals.
- Gradual extinction of all exams in free and compulsory universal education.

EMERGENCY BASIC INCOME

Nuno Serra

The need to immediately protect income, the economy and employment in the face of the abrupt emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic (and the threat of its rapid spread) focused mainly on access to lay-offs for workers and support for businesses, with measures to support self-employment and strengthen existing social protection mechanisms adopted only later.

However, this approach, focused mainly on the supply and the formal dimensions of the labour market, has not only failed to prevent the emergence of dismissals in many companies (including publicly supported companies), but has also left a very significant part of more atypical and precarious employment situations, as well as many of the more informal areas of our economy, uncovered.

It is well known that a more comprehensive, simple and agile response would immediately come up against the obstacle of European commitments, aggravated by the uncertainty and slowness, even if relative, in ensuring the necessary solidarity of the European Union with the different countries. And it is also certain that a more extensive and automatic approach of this kind, in support of all situations of need, would require new response mechanisms to be created, despite the potential benefit of avoiding the sectoral proliferation of measures.

Today, there is a clear notion that the future most likely carries the risk of a repetition of pandemic crises such as we are going through, or situations of calamity with similar impacts on the economy and society (associated, of course, with phenomena related to climate change, but not only).

This fact should therefore lead us to consider the need to develop a new, more comprehensive, simple and agile response to crises of this nature. In other words, situations with a sudden impact on the economy, employment and income.

That new response could consist in the creation of support for emergency situations, capable of ensuring the well-being of all individuals and families and mitigating – by protecting consumption capacity – the impact of crises on different economic activities (or at least part of them). Such a measure would be especially targeted at situations of greater fragility and lack of protection, so as to ensure temporary access to basic income.

It should be emphasised that this measure, which could be called Emergency Basic Income (EBI), cannot and should not be confused with the proposals to implement an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) nor with the current Social Integration Income (SII). In the first case, because the Emergency Basic Income is temporary and not universal (unlike the UBI) and, in the second case, because it is not conditional upon any integration contracts (which characterise the SII).

EUROPEAN UNION

José Reis

The idea of European Union as a project of peace and solidarity, launched when the ashes of war were still warm, cannot be forgotten, however many rival interpretations there may be. The European Economic Community (EEC), formally established in Rome in 1957 to link six rich, central countries on a new basis, would take time to expand and reach the peripheries, until then represented only by the geography of southern Italy. For whatever reasons, special prominence was given to the idea of the convergence of levels of development, of structural policies (and here the term was well applied, still untarnished by the cynicism that would emerge later, when it came to mean, without revealing it honestly, wage devaluation and State constriction) and, therefore, of territorial cohesion between countries and regions.

Transforming the EEC into the European Union (EU) was a radical step. Although the single market still required the previous policies, everything now revolved around the acceleration of competition policy, the unequal exploitation of differences in wage costs and technological capacities, the limitation of the budgetary capacities of States, and the notion of so-called “economic governance”, which is in effect essentially the subtraction of public instruments of substantive intervention in the economy and society and the blind concentration on the management of formal balances, common to macroeconomics as a way of limiting public action and change. It is no wonder, therefore, that the EU has been one of the most orthodox centres for imposing harmful austerity policies on some of its Member States. At the same time, Europe became one of the world’s most focused areas with regard to advancing financialisation and facilitating the mechanisms for the proliferation of capital markets. This consolidated a European fracture that allowed some countries to become creditors and extend that privilege while others became debtors and saw their submission intensified. From a political point of view, fragmentation and confrontation became more evident.

Europe can find itself once again, in a common project of relaunch and cohesion. It is not certain that this will happen. But this is a key issue for debate. It is a point of tension with a resolution that must be considered open. It is possible to formulate an alternative for a Europe that is capable of balancing the national and community spheres in a new way, of regaining the centrality of public initiative, provision and governance, of restricting financial powers, of taking on a heterogeneity that tends towards divergence instead of being seen as advantageous diversity, of overcoming fragmentation, of making employment systems essential mechanisms for social inclusion, of leading a solid environmental transformation and having open and cooperative relations with neighbouring countries. It is up to the democratic political struggle to make this choice, avoiding collapse in general and of the EU in particular.

FIGHTING DYSTOPIA

Rui Bebiano

While utopia provides an ideal of organisation, happiness and harmony applied to collective life, dystopia draws an imaginary place where life is lived under extreme conditions of oppression, despair and conflict. In relation to objective reality, utopia is a realm of desire and hope, while dystopia is a place of suffering and desolation, conditioned by a transformation of nature stemming from bad choices in human intervention. In *Dystopia: A Natural History*, however, Gregory Claeys calls for a positive reading of the concept, given that it reveals a set of "natural" fears (gods, monsters, calamities) or "social" fears (oppressive technologies, labour exploitation or totalitarian systems), through which communities are confronted with scenarios they have in no way desired and must reject.

Addressing the human landscape that may result from the current COVID-19 pandemic, geographically the vastest and one of the deadliest in history, only surpassed by the Black Death and the Pneumonic Plague, ongoing reflections put forward dystopian configurations for societies in the near future. Measures such as imposing social distance, restraining events of a collective nature, monitoring citizens and their private lives, controlling households, abruptly readopting closed borders, limiting human movement and presence in public places, recording health conditions regularly and in detail, carrying out surveillance on people, compulsorily extending the remote working regime, electronically controlling individual activity, making unemployment completely flexible, the very limiting of freedom of assembly and protest, as well as promoting heavier intervention through State, law and police mechanisms, announce, in the name of an indispensable health safety – as in the dystopian novels of Zamiatine, Huxley and Orwell – a normality dominated by numerous restrictions.

The drama that this list reveals may be tempered by the intervention of public opinion and of democratic forces, institutions and movements, as well as the development of a better informed and collaborative collective awareness. However, the negative landscape it reveals cannot be seen as a mere nightmare that will disappear when we wake up. The dystopian scenario announced by the response to COVID-19 should help us to better measure, with a clear and intelligent perception of benefits and damages, each of the steps taken towards the rapid transformation of social practices and habits. In the post-pandemic landscape, there can be no incompatibility between preserving public health, defending human rights and ensuring individual freedom. The example of China, where the ostensible effectiveness of the fight against the pandemic, supported by hypervigilance, is being carried out to the detriment of citizens' autonomy and freedom, must not be allowed to spread. It is imperative to scrutinise the outlines of the "new normal" and prevent the materialisation of dystopia.

FINANCIAL DEPENDENCY AND PUBLIC POLICIES

Ana Cordeiro Santos

Portugal faces an asphyxiating dependence on private financial markets. This situation stems from the European integration project, in the midst of a dysfunctional economic and monetary union which has deprived the country of macroeconomic policy instruments and imposed severe budgetary constraints, with the consent of national elites. The impossibility for the treasury to turn to its lender of last resort, the Central Bank, was compounded by other limitations when carrying out public policies, as strategic sectors were privatised and capital was relieved, giving up revenue for public investment and social policies. The global financial crisis, its transmutation into a sovereign debt crisis, and the adjustment programme that followed, have highlighted the close link between financial dependence and the vulnerability of a country. When it stopped obtaining funding from the markets and was forced to request it from the Troika – consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund – its financial dependence became more pronounced, resulting in a further abdication of sovereignty in new areas of public policy, such as labour relations, health and housing. The economy became more vulnerable and based on rentier and extractive sectors, such as real estate and tourism, and inequalities in access to essential goods increased.

If the Portuguese State has placed itself in a position of dependence on the financial markets to govern the country, recovering sovereignty implies regaining control of macroeconomic policy. This will require the return of the exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies at a national level. Only then will it be possible to reverse the structural vulnerabilities of an economy that requires public investment in strategic sectors, breaking with a supposed logic of competition that only favours central European countries. Only then will it be possible to restructure the economy around high value-added sectors capable of qualifying labour, replacing the rentier or extractive sectors based on precarious cheap labour. Only then will it be possible to restore the public services, degraded by austerity, and ensure universal access to essential goods. Provision dependent on financial intermediation for a privileged minority – health insurance, home loans or private pension savings plans – cannot ensure universal access to social rights. It should not be concluded from this that the financial sector is intrinsically pernicious. However, it must be redirected to the revitalisation of the economy and job creation, and public banks functionally specialised to carry out clear missions are also needed. Finally, it is also essential to reinstate capital controls, discouraging leaks, and put an end to socially perverse tax arbitrage.

FINANCING

Paulo Alexandre Chaves Coimbra

The shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to stabilise national economies have forced governments around the world to take extraordinary measures and therefore to incur in deficits with precedents only in times of war. Public debts reached new historic highs.

In a context in which the International Monetary Fund predicts that the public debt of the most advanced economies will reach 120 percent of Gross Domestic Product by 2021, the debate on the sustainability of this indebtedness has become unavoidable. And there is no shortage of those who argue that penniless States will inevitably be confronted by private financial markets that will not fail to demand higher pay for financing this additional parcel of debt, which will result in the need for imposing austerity measures on the private sector. Will this be the case?

For a monetarily sovereign State, which issues its own currency, money is not a scarce resource. The main constraint on budget deficits is inflation, but in a historical situation like this, where the danger is deflation, that concern is extemporaneous.

One of the distinguishing features of a neo-liberal monetary regime – perhaps the most important of all – is the politically and institutionally constructed self-imposition of the sovereign State's credit subordination. A state that grants the monopoly of monetary issuance, now entirely fiduciary and dependent on its legal force, to a central bank, while simultaneously excluding itself from the possibility of being directly financed by it, thus placing itself, by choice, in the dependence of private financial markets.

This dystopian monetary regime has benefited from a laboriously produced opacity, based on mechanisms that are complex only in appearance, to manufacture the subordination of the State to private interests and to allow them an unjustified extraction of value.

However, society can always pay for what it can produce. As long as there is unemployment, the State can and must guarantee work. The value of what is produced by those who have access to a new job is the guarantee that it is possible to pay them for it.

It has recently become public knowledge that the Bank of England will directly finance UK's fiscal policy. Nothing new. It is merely the umpteenth demonstration that a monetarily sovereign State does not need private markets to finance itself in a currency it issues.

We cannot forget this in the difficult times ahead.

The taboo of monetary policy independence must give way to the articulated action of national treasuries and central banks mandated with the dual objective of full employment and price stability. And the Treasury must at all times be able to decide whether to finance itself in the private financial markets or directly in the central bank and, thus, whether or not this financing entails public debt. And governments must be made accountable for these options in the electoral process.

FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

Teresa Cunha

Despite the great narrative propagated by the capitalist food industry, according to the World Food Programme, in 2019 one in nine people in the world suffered from hunger and/ /or chronic malnutrition. The intensive agriculture megaprojects – which are only viable with the deforestation for monoculture agriculture –, the systematic use of poisons (agrotoxics) and the indiscriminate use of water, are seriously putting at risk ancestral forms of life and the access to drinking water and food of the majority of the people in the world.

Furthermore, the way food is managed has led to the privatisation of biodiversity and the emergence of various diseases that are closely related to processed food, such as diabetes, high blood pressure or even cardiovascular diseases. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between food sovereignty and the very liberal idea of food safety. Food safety does not question the conditions under which food is produced, nor does it claim a structural alternative to the capitalist system of its production, processing and commercialisation. The urgency to achieve food sovereignty is made even clearer by what Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain call environmental colonialism. It helps us to understand how the exploitation and extraction of the so-called natural resources, including food, is based on a colonial political economy.

The idea of food sovereignty contradicts this logic of endless appropriation and exploitation of the Earth. It is based on an intense attachment to the territory and implies self-determination. This means the power to decide, on their own terms, what people want for their lives – in the present and in the future; how they want to feed themselves and how they want to reproduce their way of living in its most diverse aspects. The food sovereignty movements claim much more than the individual right to food, because they proclaim the necessary devolution of decision-making power to communities and collectives. This means to have the capacity to decide over what should be planted and what food is, with respect for the land, the water, the identities and the cosmovisions that know that Mother-Earth is not, and cannot be, a mere commodity. It is also a question of recognising that small-scale agriculture feeds the majority of the world's population and that it is able to adequately tackle anthropogenic food crises.

Food sovereignty is achieved in different ways: cooperative forms of food production based on the needs of the populations and their territories; enhancement of low-food-mile/local circuits of food production, processing, and trade and barter; tax protection for the production and marketing of poison-free food and small-scale production; an agrarian reform that ensures the right to land for all.

FOOTBALL

Carlos Nolasco

Football is one of the most important expressions of the contemporary world. It is played with such intensity that, in some countries, social and political life have been "footballised". In essence, football is a recreational game, with its own language, representations and contingencies, repeated in every match – regardless of whether it is played in the street or in the most sophisticated of stadiums. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association – FIFA, the governing body responsible for world football, is a major international organisation, both in terms of the number of its member countries and budget and in terms of the way it has commercialised football and promoted it on a global scale. From a simple match played by two teams and based on the emotion of identity, football has become a complex product due to its multiple, steadily accumulated dimensions. Thus it turned clubs into companies, directors into managers, players into workers/merchandise, and supporters into clients, through a process in which, in addition to sports results, financial gains and political dividends are sought, enhanced by the media and television broadcasts. In contrast to the entrancing, romantic view of the match, the moves and the players, football metamorphosed when it mixed with the economy, was adulterated by politics, and was thwarted by violence, racism, xenophobia and sexism.

With the COVID-19 pandemic, football had to be interrupted, which highlighted the excessive media space occupied by the game and its by-products. It also made clear that it is possible for society to exist without this dominant kind of football and all that is inherent in it. As a hegemonic product, football – namely top-level football – needs to recreate itself from the remains of an apparently exhausted economic model. A different kind of football is possible, but, for this to happen, sporting ethics – rather than the market – must be given pride of place, doping and violence must be prevented, and fair play must be promoted, along with social ethics aimed at preventing racism, xenophobia, discrimination and corruption, while encouraging integration. Given football's social relevance, its management by national and international private entities should not be spared the censure of the public authorities, who are supposed to monitor football's public benefit status and all the institutional practices that go with it – from the management of television rights to supporter behaviour to the commercialisation of international transfers of players. Football allows for a different grammar of human dignity; however, for this to happen, it is important that all football agents, starting with the players, have a social commitment that translates into political and value-based preconditions. A football emancipated from the big stadiums, seeking alternative forms of play, such as street football, popular and amateur football – inclusive, selfless and emancipated ways of playing.

FREEDOM OF WORSHIP AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

Teresa Toldy

In Portugal, freedom of worship is protected by the religious freedom law. During the lockdown and state of emergency resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, António Costa met with religious leaders so that an agreement could be reached on how to comply with the restrictive measures in place, namely with regard to the suspension of celebrations with crowds or, at least, within the temples, in light of the social distancing policy. The first meeting took place with the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon a few weeks before the great pilgrimage to Fátima in May, although a month before that the Cardinal of Leiria-Fátima had already declared, on his own initiative, that the May celebrations would be cancelled. António Costa also met with the leaders of the Islamic community of Lisbon. *Aliança Evangélica*, which brings together mainly Pentecostal religious groups, criticised the fact that António Costa did not communicate with them, which happened later. There are no reports of contacts between the Prime Minister or the Ministry of Health and other religious groups, namely with leaders of the historical Protestant Churches in Portugal or with leaders of *Terreiros*, Buddhist temples, Hindus or others. This asymmetry obviously reproduces a conception of the relevance of a religious group based on the percentage of its members in relation to the general population – a sociological criterion that is questionable from an anthropological and even political point of view. Conservative groups in the Catholic Church, with greater power and capacity to make themselves heard in the media, reacted against the impossibility of religious services during the state of emergency. In fact, one of the arguments used in Parliament (by the CDS party) contrasted the authorisation for the commemoration of May 1st by the CGTP tradeunion federation with the suspension of religious services.

The impossibility of holding religious celebrations during lockdown created a situation which will merit further consideration in the future. Believers of the various religious groups themselves searched for alternative forms, especially through more conventional electronic means (computer applications or WhatsApp) and social networks. Hitherto regarded by some religious groups as a form of individualistic encapsulation, with a distracting effect regarding reality, these became the form of "community encounter" and mobilisation for small events of solidarity, namely with the sick and elderly, and even in worship.

All religious communities (or, to be more precise, those that succeed in arousing media interest) have expressed their willingness to comply with the sanitary measures imposed by the government, which can also show that daily civic life and religious practice converge. It is likely that the issue of "social distancing" still in place will continue to trigger new forms of "social approximation" through technological means, although such alternatives may generate or exacerbate existing forms of exclusion, given the requirement of "technological literacy".

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS

José Castro Caldas

The value chain concept was coined by Michael Porter in the 1980s to describe the chain of activities within a production organisation – a networked organisation of production, broken down into modules that transform inputs from outside or from other modules into outputs provided downstream along the links of a process (chain) in which each module adds value to the inputs received. As production organisations began to adopt, as a strategy of flexibility and cost reduction, the subcontracting to other organisations of services and products previously attributed to modules of internal value chains, the value chain concept, originally conceived of from an intra-organisational perspective, became adequate to describe similar processes underway in the relational space of production organisations. Finally, as inter-organisational value chains began losing their territorial basis to extend their reach to multiple national jurisdictions, as part of the process commonly referred to as globalisation, the adjective "global" was added to the value chain concept.

Previously praised by globalist views as bringing prosperity to "emerging" countries and ensuring low-cost provision to the rest, global value chains (GVC) have proven to be a problem in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, even for many of its former advocates. As the pandemic advanced, the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) countries found themselves suddenly deprived of intermediate and consumer products which are essential in healthcare and dependent on external supply. The result was a sudden shift from free-trade principles to strategic self-sufficiency. One of the conclusions presented by the European Council President on April 23, 2020 formulates this shift in the following terms: "It is of utmost importance to increase the strategic autonomy of the Union and produce essential goods in Europe".

In fact, the vulnerability of the GVCs had already manifested itself before the pandemic crisis. The expeditious operation of these chains depends on an international order characterised by the unimpeded flow of capital, goods and people, as well as legal security of contracts and intellectual property rights. The tensions in the US-EU-China triangle, which before the pandemic had at times assumed the proportions of a trade war, are clear precursors to a crisis in the GVCs, now in the form of an open fracture.

The discursive and practical responses to the GVC crisis – the alternatives before us – take two forms. The first, drafted by the EU, is the territorialisation of part of production, particularly industrial production, on the scale of the Union itself, in a sort of homecoming of "champions", this time non-national but European, which by their scale could not only efficiently supply the internal market but also compete on a global scale. The second is genuine territorialisation on various scales – notably the national, regional and local – geared towards sufficiency of supply and the replacement of transcontinental production chains with short circular economy cycles.

GREEN NEW DEAL

Ricardo Coelho

The "COVID-19 crisis" exposed the weaknesses of an economy that maintains a destructive relationship with the environment. A combination of wildlife destruction, which paves the way for exposure to new viruses, and air transport trivialisation, which allows the rapid transmission of diseases between countries, is at the basis of a new zoonotic pandemic that has shaken health systems. We are now experiencing an unprecedented recession caused by conflicting and even destructive society-environment-economy interactions.

The response to the crisis cannot simply be a return to an unsustainable status quo marked by climate and ecological crises, profound social inequalities, systematic discrimination, and a world economic order marked by the privatisation and financialisation of common goods and unequal international trade. An economic recovery programme must therefore be based on principles of justice and environmental sustainability, its main priorities being public investment and regulation aimed at reducing environmental degradation and social inequalities while creating employment.

The Green New Deal concept first emerged during the 2007 financial crisis, when international and civil society organisations put forward proposals for an economic recovery to encourage "green" investments. Over the last few years, the idea was picked up and a resolution plan presented at the United States Congress, while the European Union approved a Green Deal.

Despite the fact that we are facing proposals with different levels of ambition and different geographical and political scopes, it is possible, based on a critical analysis, to outline a Green New Deal for Portugal and Europe. As a public investment and regulation programme aimed at a change of course, the Green New Deal should create decently paid employment and ensure employment protection for workers affected by the necessary industrial restructuring, directly benefiting the most socially vulnerable people. Taking environmental justice as its basic principle, it must ensure territorial cohesion and non-discrimination in the distribution of benefits. Going further, it should ensure that the greatest beneficiaries of environmental investment measures are those most affected by environmental degradation.

Deep changes of this kind will not be possible without rational economic planning. A Green New Deal should therefore be a first step towards reorganising economic activity, including the renationalisation of strategic sectors, the re-regulation of the industry sector and a reform of the financial system, with the ultimate goal of building an economy of care, respectful of people and nature and geared towards ensuring basic rights rather than the pursuit of profit.

HEALTH AND SOCIETY

João Arriscado Nunes, Mauro Serapioni

At the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic erupted in the midst of a major reform of the National Health Service (NHS) and the approval of a new Basic Health Law. These aimed at returning to the NHS – after the 2008 crisis, the austerity policies imposed by the Troika and the moves towards privatisation – its central role in ensuring the right to health and access to health care. The current crisis showed the crucial importance of the welfare state, social policies and, in particular, universal public health systems. But it also revealed limitations and vulnerabilities which tend to become more visible in times of crisis and are therefore particularly significant when the scenario of collapse becomes a possibility, with unevenly distributed consequences.

A public health emergency such as the one lived in 2020 creates such pressure on the system that it can cause it to collapse if there is no capacity to contain the situation – through measures based on surveillance, case tracking, testing, hygiene and personal protection and isolation. And, when deemed necessary, through quarantine and lockdown of territories and populations, with the resulting social, economic and political consequences.

Several lessons can be taken from the COVID-19 pandemic and the way it has been handled, starting with understanding the mutually constitutive relations of the problems of public health, ecology, political economy, social relations, State, and political participation.

It is on this understanding that support for public policies to strengthen NHS and public health action in emergency situations can be based:

- Affirmation of health as transversal to all public policies;
- Strengthening the funding of the NHS and public health institutions and services and of research targeted at vulnerabilities and public policies addressing them;
- Preparation of health units for major – both in size and impact – health emergencies, taking into account the territorial and social context of their interventions;
- Protection of health professionals and workers by creating and adequately distributing equipment stocks;
- Developing of a greater articulation between the NHS and its units and the public health area, to ensure a timely and effective response to health emergencies;
- Greater involvement of health institutions with society and with organisations and movements linked to health or involved with vulnerable populations, in articulation with civil defence and the NHS, and greater capacity for intervention in situations of vulnerability;
- Provision of training, through outreach activities – based on a collaboration between higher education, research and health institutions, and civil defence – for intervention in public health actions and emergencies;
- Health education aimed at empowerment to respond to emergency situations and promote health in schools and other environments.

HEALTH PROFESSIONS

Pedro Hespanha

This broad concept of health professions encompasses many categories of workers delivering, either directly or indirectly, care and services to sick persons, namely doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists and laboratory technicians, nutritionists, psychologists, diagnostic and therapeutic technicians, hospital managers, aides, helpers, medical waste handlers, etc. In a pandemic situation such as that of COVID-19, a distinction must be made between frontline and support professionals, the former being subject to a higher level of risk and stress due to the emergency nature and unpredictability of care. This distinction exists both within each profession and between professions.

Health professionals take on high levels of responsibility, but have poor conditions to perform their duties. Below we identify several problems faced by these professionals:

- In general, health services are not prepared for pandemic emergency situations, either because they have been designed for "normal" demand or because their form of organisation is not geared towards interacting with medical and non-medical actors and institutions;
- The lack of essential resources can force health professionals to make decisions or follow procedures that compromise the duty of universal help and can prejudice the rights of patients;
- In emergency medical situations, multi-professional teams do not always operate in accordance with the distinct skills of each profession and under a coordination capable of generating trust among professionals;
- The intensive working conditions and the increased risks under which the professionals work are not recognised, either in terms of remuneration or career advancement;
- The doctor-patient relationship was greatly affected by the restrictive measures in medical appointments triggered by the pandemic. Teleconsultation was used instead, and many people are now arguing that it should become the norm in patient care.

What the pandemic made more obvious is the need to create integrated and sustained professional practices to overcome the problems mentioned.

Each service's contingency plans must be effectively individualised, taking into account the specificities of each case, and periodically reassessed to adjust to unforeseen factors. In addition, the investment in the National Health Service must be reinforced to ensure both adequate resources and effective and simplified management.

The existence of conflicting situations between service availability and patients' rights should never be concealed, and multi-representative ethics committees should be activated to advise on decisions.

Interprofessional solidarity, although difficult to achieve, must be a goal, and it is up to everyone – training schools, professional associations, heads of services at all levels, the media – to help create an environment of respect and trust between professions and to counter the discriminatory practices (the more evident the lower the social status) that

fuel these problems. Otherwise, people cannot be expected to be mobilised for tiresome, underrated tasks, no matter how essential they may be.

Society has already demonstrated everywhere its recognition of the health professionals fighting COVID-19 on the ground. Institutional recognition is also in order, namely through legal provisions aimed at compensating not only to their present dedication, but also the labour-intensive and high-risk situations in which they place social well-being above self-interest.

Lastly, since teleconsultation is a resource solution that eliminates the face-to-face relationship between patient and healthcare professional, it should only take place in exceptional cases and when it does not compromise direct relationships with patients, for such relationships are based on emotions, trust and privacy.

HOUSING ARCHITECTURE

Tiago Castela

The debate on housing during the pandemic rightly focuses on emergencies, such as housing for homeless people or the prospect of mass evictions after exceptional protections expire. However, in addition to the crucial issue of the political economy of housing, it is also urgent to rethink the architecture of housing. Preliminary research suggests that urban density is not a relevant factor in the pandemic; in contrast, the lack of adequate housing size is definitely a factor. Furthermore, the materiality and shape of housing are central elements in the climate crisis: from emissions associated with the use of the building materials that are more suitable for industrialised construction, to the increase in built volumes and the dispersion of privileged housing. In this framework, the conundrum of the housing architecture that results from spatial commodification encompasses three central problems: the lack of access, on the part of most citizens, to specialists capable of designing the necessary transformations to face pandemics and the climate crisis; the lack of adequate housing unit size and pedestrian outdoor spaces in many residential areas; and the emissions associated with construction and urbanism.

It is therefore necessary to think about the architecture of housing starting from Portugal's central State, avoiding policy fragmentation but also the return to technocratic planning. This would include a democratic, multiscale project for housing, as well as the provision of technical services for direct intervention – notably for people without access to private architectural services. This process could be called the National Architecture Service.

The NAS could immediately coordinate the implementation of the following situated measures in Portugal: to reclassify, in every city, roads with a majority of residential buildings and sidewalks less than 2 metres wide, for a speed limit of 30 km/h on a shared road; to create a programme for balcony construction in buildings with small units, as has been done in France; and to amend the country's national building code so as to introduce maximum areas for rooms, instead of minimum areas only. In the medium term, the NAS could also develop the following policies: to discourage, in urban areas, dispersed new construction that is impossible to reach easily by public transport; to encourage rehabilitation based on low-emission materials and increasing energy efficiency; to foster local energy generation on non-accessible flat roofs; to foster a mix of activities in residential areas while prohibiting the construction of new peripheral shopping centres. These are just a few examples; only with a transformation programme defined through democratic deliberation and informed by expert knowledge will we be able to transform the architecture of housing in a way that mirrors the gargantuan ambitions of the 20th century. This time, however, without the belief in permanent development, which turned out to be both destructive for the planet and a source of inequality.

HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Daniela Nascimento

The World Health Organisation's declaration of a pandemic in March 2020 had a very negative impact on the existing humanitarian crises, which were aggravated by the priorities given to the urgent need of a response from governments. The global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic has left millions of victims of humanitarian crises in a particularly vulnerable situation, not only in terms of their level of protection against the spread of the virus – because of the extremely precarious and fragile basic health and hygiene conditions they find themselves in, which make them much more prone to infection – but also because this negligence has led to an even greater reduction in funding and support for these crises, namely humanitarian and emergency aid.

Most victims of humanitarian crises resulting from violent conflict, natural disasters or climate change currently live in very poor countries, challenged by high rates of malnutrition, low levels of immunity and an immense vulnerability to a multitude of chronic and/or highly infectious diseases, combined with increased difficulties in terms of access to basic economic and social rights such as health care, access to food and housing, for example. From the refugee camps in Greece to the internally displaced individuals and victims of armed conflict in Yemen or Mali, to the millions of Venezuelans affected by years of economic and humanitarian crisis due to political instability, the impact of the pandemic has been devastating. For the 25 million or so refugees in the world who depend on international aid, not only are budgets increasingly limited, but most of the countries that receive them have no concrete plan to deal with and fight the pandemic as well as to respond to the very specific needs of those who are already more vulnerable.

In this context, the alternative must be to fight the pandemic through tangible and inclusive actions, policies and measures directed at the multiple needs and vulnerabilities of the victims of these crises. This entails the assumption of, and respect for, the most basic humanistic principles and solidarity with all, regardless of their condition, origin or specific situation. It is a complex challenge requiring a closer look at these realities of increasing vulnerability, as well as a serious political commitment and will on the part of those who take the most important decisions within the international aid system. Also important is a civil society mobilised by and attentive to these other needs, even if from far away.

It therefore requires a clear position that caters for real needs, instead of divisive, exclusionary economic and/or geopolitical agendas that (re)produce inequalities and vulnerabilities. It involves a greater and better availability of medical equipment and resources to treat the infected, infrastructure enabling access to basic water and sanitation – which are essential for the sanitisation of these communities – and, above all, reinforced humanitarian support in the communities plagued by humanitarian crises that most need this aid. As UN Secretary General António Guterres stated, it is true that COVID-19 threatens all mankind without distinction and it is essential that mankind fights it with all its forces and capabilities. Our response must be to not ignore the "ultravulnerable", the millions of people who depend on aid and who cannot be abandoned, lest we forget, along with them, what solidarity is.

INCLUSIVE PUBLIC SPACE

Gonçalo Canto Moniz

The public space of cities is undergoing a considerable transformation in Portugal, in Europe and in the world. Today, the street, the avenue, the square or the garden that built the city centres in the last centuries are not necessarily public spaces, they are often spaces that have lost their character, use and public representation. On the one hand, tourism has occupied urban centres, mainly the historical areas, pushing city dwellers away to the peripheral ones due to the exponential increase in land value and the cost of services. On the other hand, the rapid growth of cities, with successive areas of expansion, has led to investments in road infrastructure, generating open spaces devoid of urban life.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted this problem, as urban centres became empty due to the lack of tourists and city dwellers, and the peripheries also became empty, due to a lack of qualified and inclusive public spaces.

This represents a great opportunity for cities that seek a different model of development and governance, one that can be extended to all their urban areas, is more attentive to the needs of city dwellers and ensures greater density, connection, integration and inclusion.

Denser cities tend to make the best use of available resources and promote the intensification of urban life. A better balance is thus created between built-up and natural areas – forest, field, parks, rivers, sea – promoting a green corridor or ring that regenerates the city, bringing citizens closer to nature.

Better-connected cities establish a strong link between their centres through a fast mobility network for private and public transport and a slow mobility network for city dwellers travelling on foot or by bicycle. This slow mobility has a strong impact on the well-being of city dwellers, is socially more inclusive and makes the use of public spaces richer and safer.

More integrated cities develop a balanced network of services and public spaces, allowing city dwellers access to amenities within a short distance from their home or workplace. This way, the city promotes the city dwellers' right to housing, education, health and culture.

More inclusive cities establish a dialogue with city dwellers, particularly the most vulnerable, to ensure not only their access to the public spaces but also their involvement and empowerment in the planning and decision-making process. This way, more inclusive cities ensure that urban decisions and plans have an effective impact on city dwellers' lives.

The sacrifices imposed by the virus have thus raised awareness of the emergence of a new, more inclusive paradigm of public space, where city dwellers organise themselves to activate living labs and promote co-creation processes that respond to the challenges of their city.

INCOME INEQUALITIES IN HOUSEHOLDS AND LABOUR MARKET

Lina Coelho

Crises produce uneven effects for the various social and economic sectors, tending to intensify pre-existing inequalities. Portugal is an unequal country: in 2018 it ranked 7th in the eurozone in terms of income inequality, measured by both the Gini index and the income quintile share ratio S80/S20.

Household income strongly depends on labour market participation. By threatening especially jobs involving greater social interaction, the crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic tends to disadvantage women and younger workers.* During the last decade, production specialisation and the labour market have evolved towards devaluation of skilled work, precarious employment and reduced labour rights for younger workers, who compose the most qualified generation ever in Portugal. The evolution of household net wealth speaks for itself: in 2017, households under 35 years of age had a net wealth 57 percent lower than the same group in 2010, while the net wealth of lower income groups also declined sharply. Households with children are especially vulnerable: In 2018, poverty rates of single parent households, couples with three or more children and other non-couple households with children (33.9 percent, 30.2 percent and 23.6 percent, respectively) were well above the average (17.2 percent). Young adults neither studying nor working or seeking employment are also highly vulnerable and have been increasing (in age 20-24 they went up from 13.5 percent in 2008 to 16.8 percent in 2018).

Reducing inequalities in times of crisis is a demanding process that requires a collective effort, founded on awareness of the advantages of equity. It is, in itself, a political project in which the economy is put in the right place: supporting higher living standards for all, meeting people's needs and allowing every person to lead a life of human dignity.

The alternative approach is, then, a care economy, based on solidarity, humanism, and feminism, ensuring a fair share of resources and a balanced distribution of income, namely between capital and labour. In such an economy the State should be committed to redistribution as a fundamental task, to ensure a decent livelihood and a basic income for all people.

Equal opportunities for all also entails acknowledging and giving due recognition to the crucial role of women's unpaid work in providing well-being. This requires socialising the costs of caring for dependent people (children, the elderly, people with disabilities and sick people). It is also imperative to have inclusive schools, i.e., schools that are able to embrace the students' different starting points and welcome social differences and the varied capacities and difficulties that make us human. In short, schools that are able to make a meaningful contribution to breaking the intergenerational reproduction of inequalities.

Such an alternative therefore entails a strong welfare state, capable of ensuring that all citizens are entitled to equal access to rights and basic public services.

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* On the vulnerability of women to the crisis, see the entry "(In)equality between women and men".

INDIVIDUAL DISTANCING OR SOCIAL CLOSENESS?

Carlos Fortuna

All over the world, while the technical/biomedical solution for COVID-19 is still being sought, people have been asked to fight the new coronavirus by practicing social distancing. This was supposed to help reach the plateau and "flatten the curve" of viral transmission, reducing the number of infections and relieving hospital emergencies. Staying at home, from where one could leave only virtually, was the most radical solution to manage distance between people. The streets became empty as cities became devoid of soul(s) given the sudden scarcity of urbanity. When people dared to go out, whether with or without mask, they did so like zombies, suspicious, almost always alone, left to clumsy wariness in their subjective gauging of the two-meter distance from each other. For the unwitting, safe distance markers on the floor ensured compliance with the precepts.

I myself, in my very brief forays from domestic lockdown, felt I had become a *distanced* citizen. Remembering the psychotic American experience of personal space preservation a long time back, I witnessed local replicas of such disputes: when someone inadvertently shortened distances, they were immediately faced with intolerant reprimands and disapproving looks that re-established said distance. This commonplace precept was like a revisiting of political dispute – *homo homini lupus* –, unappeased except by a powerful authority that spread more and more *social distancing*.

In light of the pandemic, sociology – that narrative of social interactions, which was always concerned with the evils of individualistic isolation (in order to condemn them) and which, since its early stages, understood the political virtue of social gatherings, urban crowds and collective movements –, suddenly emerged as a rhetorical device in defence of the exact *opposite*. Instead of virtuous gregariousness, it appears to point to *social distancing* as the solution to the current attack on public health.

"Stadtluft macht frei!", the German aphorism that raised so many hopes of individual progress, is still true. To keep the promise of emancipatory liberation, today's city air must be beyond any individualistic solutions. *Social distancing* is not, in this sense, an adequate sociological recommendation. *Distancing is always individual(istic)* and has nothing of social sharing.

The air one wishes to breathe in the city is that of urban democracy, made up of a renewed, proactive "coming together" and multicultural consensus. The diversity of workers' movements, of feminisms and neo-feminisms, of religious syncretism, of anti-racist and neo-ethnic movements, queer activisms and other urban social manifestations, which grow apart and come together all at once, is where the antidote to the level of social intrusion brought about by COVID-19 is to be found. A concerted going back to closeness is where the solution for the threatened city lies. Thus recast in the role of counsellor, sociology recommends that individuals and groups stay socially close. What the pandemic requires, sociologically speaking, is therefore the s*ocial coming together* that *physical distancing* prevents and the coronavirus blocks.

INEQUALITIES AND HOUSING

Ana Cordeiro Santos

The pandemic crisis has evidenced the centrality of housing in reproducing spatial, socio-economic, ethnic, gender or generational inequalities. In Portugal, the inequality-reproducing effect was intensified by the lack of a robust public housing stock. As a result, during the COVID-19 pandemic not all citizens were able to adequately comply with public health recommendations to stay at home, because they did not have one, or to be socially isolated, because they lived in densely populated neighbourhoods or overcrowded dwellings. In turn, the disparity of housing conditions created a huge discrepancy in lockdown experiences. That of residents in luxury houses with large outdoor spaces was very different from the one experienced by immigrants living in hostels in the centre of Lisbon, many of them with no citizenship rights, or of those living in slums, where the most vulnerable segments of the population are concentrated. Emergency measures, such as taking in homeless people, suspending evictions, automatically extending rental contracts, or moratoria on housing loans, attest to the relevance of housing in protecting citizens and the community. However, these measures are short term; they remedy the problem but do not solve it.

Medium and long-term measures need to be developed, because much of the right to housing has yet to be achieved in Portugal. A number of measures must be promptly implemented. The urban rental regime must be reviewed to include the definition of decent contract duration minimums and affordable maximum rent values. The incentives – tax incentives, among others – that have fuelled real estate speculation must be eliminated and channelled to support decommercialised forms of provision, fomenting, for example, the participation of cooperatives or residents' associations. The small public housing stock must be expanded. Lastly, a National Housing Service must be created, allowing access to housing with rents matching the families' income. To this end, priority must be given to existing buildings, rehabilitating public properties or acquiring privately owned or vacant properties. The public housing stock should be of quality from the point of view of construction, size of the accommodation and energy performance. It should also be integrated into the urban network and include public spaces and collective facilities for the well-being of residents. This upgrade of buildings and public space will not only fill a serious gap in a crucial area of social provision, but also boost local economies in times of crisis, creating jobs and generating income. While housing can often be an inequality-reproducing mechanism, it is also a fundamental part of the solution to fighting inequality.

(IN)EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN

Mónica Lopes, Lina Coelho

The COVID-19 crisis is having different effects on women and men. In Portugal, up to May 2020, women had the highest percentage in terms of infection (58 percent) and registered deaths (51 percent). And the data on socioeconomic developments shows that forced absence from the workplace, unemployment and loss of income are also disproportionally affecting women. The specificities of this crisis and the experience of previous crises enable us to predict a particularly severe impact on women, considering the prevailing "gender order". Pre-existing inequalities have been reconfigured and aggravated, which challenges us to think of alternatives to mitigate the gender impacts of this crisis.

Women's employment revolves around care services and direct customer service and involves physical proximity with people, which creates a double vulnerability. On the one hand, women are more directly exposed to COVID-19 and the risk of contagion. On the other hand, those activities are severely affected by the recession, increasing unemployment among women. Moreover, women are more exposed than men to precarious forms of labour, lower wages and poor legal and social protection, which makes them very vulnerable to economic downturns.

Schools, crèches and other social facilities had to close (or operate on a reduced schedule), reinforcing the need for support for children and dependent people. This had a disproportionate impact on employed mothers, especially those in single-parent families. According to traditional gender roles, women generally carry out domestic tasks and the tasks of unpaid care. The increase in this workload has harmful effects for women, both in terms of their psychosocial well-being and health and their career prospects, since they are forced to reduce their involvement in the professional sphere (as their working hours are cut, their careers interrupted, and their productivity in teleworking situations reduced).

"Gender lenses" need to be introduced in the decision-making process in this context, as an alternative to counteract the trend towards greater inequality between men and women. Such a strategy involves:

- Ensuring women representation in decision-making processes at the various levels and moments of the crisis response planning;
- Ensuring availability of and access to statistical data and information disaggregated by sex, an indispensable basis for decision-making;
- Valuing unpaid and (poorly) paid care activities which are essential to life and the harmonious functioning of the economy and society;
- Implementing measures to tackle occupational and sectoral segregation and improving women's access to quality employment opportunities;
- Reinforcing investment in care, social support, health and education services;
- Creating gender-sensitive fiscal stimulus packages to ensure an economic recovery that is equally beneficial to men and women;

- Developing strategies to counter traditional gender stereotypes and roles by encouraging men's participation in domestic and family work and promoting the change in gender roles that is taking place in some households (particularly where men engage in teleworking);
- Providing exceptional support to families affected by the closure of schools and other social facilities, with particular attention to single-parent families and parents working in basic services;
- Enabling a reduced work schedule for people with care responsibilities, without pay cuts;
- Laying the foundations for social consultation on new ways of organising work (including working hours and working space), taking due account of the circumstances of women and men in the context of the "new normal".

INSTITUTIONAL RACISM

Silvia Rodríguez Maeso, Danielle Pereira Araújo, Luana Coelho, Sebijan Fejzula

The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the conditions of inequality that already exist, highlighting systematically denied racist dynamics. The (im)possibility of making these conditions visible stems from the effects of racism itself, which are manifested in the spread of ideas such as that "the virus does not see colour, it is an equaliser."

In the Portuguese and Spanish contexts, the denial of racism became clear from the lack of ethnic-racial data, from the legitimising of differentiated treatment in access to basic services, or still from the increase in surveillance of the racialised body, which is now not only *dangerous*, but also *contagious*. Anti-Gypsyism, Islamophobia and anti-Blackness create "permanent states of exception" that normalise and justify the violence of safety strategies before, during, and after the pandemic. In Portugal, the *Bairro das Pedreiras* – a ghetto built to rehouse Romani families in Beja – has been the subject of news coverage highlighting the vulnerability of these families to infection by COVID-19, as they live in extremely poor housing conditions. One of the measures implemented to monitor compliance with lockdown measures was the presence of security forces in the access routes to the neighbourhood.

Publications in the media and social networks continued to reproduce racist imaginaries. In Spain, in March 2020, rumours circulated on social networks about the Roma population in the city of Haro, stating that "the Roma were doing as they pleased without the Police being able to control them." A number of newspapers published news focused on "non-compliance" of lockdown measures in social housing estates, dehumanising the Roma population.

The emergency policies created by the States with a focus on migrant and Roma families illustrate how governments see and treat racialised populations. The pandemic has shown that racialised people are overrepresented in precarious jobs, such as those in the domestic service sector. With the loss of these jobs and the numerous requirements needed to access public assistance, these people are left unprotected – which produces more precariousness and revictimisation.

In a context of precarious State assistance, antiracist organisations and grassroots associations in several Portuguese and Spanish cities have mobilised their solidarity networks to support black and Roma families. They have exposed the fallacy of the "democratic virus," as well as the State-sanctioned denial of basic rights in an anti-Black and anti-Roma Europe.

In Spain, anti-racist associations have seen an increase in the number of complaints of police violence since the state of alarm was decreed, and have sought to spread a counter-narrative: this increase is not merely circumstantial, but shows that the bodies of racialised people have been historically treated as a permanent threat to the democratic State.

While white people wish to "return to normality" after the pandemic, racialised people are problematising the meaning of this "normality".

INTERDISCIPLINARITY

Rita Campos

"On the shoulders of giants" is a metaphor that recognises the way in which we develop knowledge on top of knowledge developed by other people. But it can also be interpreted as a metaphor for the references on which each of the different scientific disciplines is based. As such, Biology will have different references from Medicine or Sociology or Literature. Just as we identify our different "giants", the academy has grown into colleges, departments, research centres. Dialogue amongst scientific disciplines has become more difficult and sometimes almost non-existent. However, just like in a massive house of cards, our world is a set of living organisms, non-living elements and material and immaterial heritage, in more or less deep, delicate, intricate balances and interactions. A piecemeal look at this house will fail to cover all those dimensions or their connections. We live in a complex world, with problems often manifested on a global scale, such as the current COVID-19 pandemic. These therefore require integrated approaches. We will not be able to understand, based on a single scientific discipline, the local and global complexities created by the myriad of contacts and relationships between the parts that make up reality. We will not be able to identify the weaknesses of that dynamic balance. And, without a holistic approach, we will hardly understand the problem(s) and find ways to manage or eliminate them.

Interdisciplinarity works through the dialogue established between disciplines, linking different languages, methods and practices, integrating them to better reflect the complexities of the world. Because knowledge is not contained within disciplinary limits. The process of knowledge construction is fluid and active, it feeds on multiple ways of looking at and interpreting reality, and it can change according to the sensitivity, vocabulary, experience or technique of those involved. It is by crossing disciplinary boundaries that we broaden our look on complex scenarios and/or those capable of threatening human sustainability. The realities created by the COVID-19 pandemic clearly show the need for interdisciplinary approaches. We need a broad debate, bringing together voices from different disciplinary backgrounds and relevant social actors – social workers, health professionals, community leaders, social and/or environmental movement activists – to capture the complexity of the situation. We must be able to create undisciplined spaces from the porosities between the scientific disciplines and between these and the institutions linked to the various social sectors. Spaces for democratic and horizontal debate, where all knowledges can come together, helping to not only understand the current realities, but also find sustainable solutions to deal with the problems of the present and prevent those of the future.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND MULTILATERALISM

Maria Raquel Freire, Paula Duarte Lopes

International governance has always been a challenge, traditionally marked by binary relations of cooperation/competition, at different times returning to a more unilateral and often even protectionist posture. Especially since 1945, multilateralism has tried to assert itself as a path towards greater coordination and coherence between different actors in order to shape a system of international governance. More recently, however, we have witnessed a fragmentation of this process, with multilateralisation facing a rollback on specific issues', such as the fight against climate change. These dynamics are extremely problematic because, on the one hand, many of the issues on the agenda cannot be properly managed without everyone's participation and, on the other hand, the analytical frameworks continue to seek to identify power centres, undermining the sustainability of a multilateral system of international governance.

An effective and resilient international governance model must be able to make timely decisions, with increasing degrees of uncertainty, and review those decisions quickly if necessary, as the current COVID-19 pandemic clearly demonstrates. The variety of actors that make up the international system – such as States, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, organised crime networks or multinational companies – extends the international governance challenges well beyond the traditional territorialised conceptions of the sovereign States. Thus, this multilaterality should not only involve several States, it must also include, at all levels, the other relevant actors regardless of their nature, offering creative opportunities for international governance sensitive to thematic specificities. Moreover, this multilateralisation must not focus on decision-making alone, but also promote the multilateralisation of global benefits, beyond the actors directly involved. This model of governance must stand as a networked assembly of different actors, changing according to the relevant theme, adjusting in terms of participants and instruments, co-constituting itself and reinventing itself according to each situation and its level of complexity. It is essential to make the negotiation and conciliation mechanisms involving the different actors more responsive. The benign or more competitive character of this model, which varies according to context, must nevertheless remain under scrutiny. Unilaterality has become obsolete, as shown by the pandemic. It is now essential to co-develop a dynamic and resilient multilateralism, striking a balance between the territoriality of causes and effects and the deterritorialisation of multilateral governance.

JUSTICE REFORMS

Conceição Gomes

The marks of neoliberal governance that have guided public policies – with special emphasis on the binding period of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Portuguese State and the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (Troika) – have also had a strong impact in the field of justice. The efficiency associated with productivity, focused on quantitative production and parameterised evaluation, the tendency to replace the foundations of judicial citizenship with a cost-benefit rationality in court mobilisation, the focus on delay and quantity response, seeking above all to reduce the volume of judicial cases, largely dominated by business-related debt collection actions, are goals that have guided the many types of reforms of the last two decades. They are associated with a model of intervention dominated by individual reforms. Despite the lack of methodologically credible assessments, legal changes and experiences have been introduced one after another, not only at the pace of governments, but within the legislature itself, pushing the justice sector into a permanent situation of *reform upon reform*. Regardless these reforms, the perception is one of paralysis in the justice system. Disguised as change with respect to the broadening of citizenship and quality in the courts' functional performance, such paralysis has strongly conditioned the conflict pattern of court mobilisation.

The reformist pattern has not been able to significantly change the structural-functional stability of the judicial system in responding to violations of human and fundamental rights and the legitimate interests of citizens, to old and new social vulnerabilities. Nor does it show any signs of special awareness of "social emergencies" such as domestic violence, the many forms of violence against children, and occupational accidents. The reconfiguration of the courts' role depends very much on the regeneration capacity of public policy construction and implementation models. It is therefore essential to develop a strategic agenda for justice reform, its central axis being citizenship and the quality of justice. Four guidelines should be highlighted in this agenda: i) the strengthening of the mechanisms of transparency and (internal and external) accountability of the judiciary, so as to reduce the opacity and social distance of the justice system and facilitate public scrutiny of the courts' functional performance; ii) better understanding of the multi-institutional and multidisciplinary dimension of the courts' actions, developing effective collaborative models of communication and articulation; iii) broad reform in the legal education and professional training of judicial actors, creating a judicial culture conducive to democratic change; iv) effective implementation of the constitutional principle of the right of access to justice for all citizens, with no exclusions, whether of a cultural, social or economic nature.

KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

Hugo Pinto

The role of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) has changed significantly in recent decades. From a vision focused essentially on work qualification and the production of new knowledge, the HEIs evolved to give centrality to so-called knowledge transfer, privileging the connection with the business fabric and innovation. This connection has been stimulated essentially through the use of industrial property mechanisms (patents in particular), strengthening support for academic entrepreneurship and an organisational culture aimed at obtaining its own income from services and research contracts.

Although somewhat belatedly, Portugal did not stay away from this trend, replicating institutional practices and models from other places, namely the United States of America. This vision of transfer, based on the commercialisation and economic valorisation of science, has not been free from criticism. A number of broader proposals regarding the role of HEIs have been put forward, albeit in a limited manner, to foster innovation systems, generate open innovation logics aimed at activating collective appropriation of the benefits of knowledge, or consolidate civic involvement through the promotion of citizenship and leadership. The post-pandemic period will certainly be characterised by a complex set of challenges to HEIs, both in their more traditional functions of Education and Research and in the area of knowledge transfer.

The pressure on public budgets will further squeeze HEIs' availabilities. It is plausible that HEIs will focus on areas of R&D and Education that are considered more marketable. It is necessary to anticipate problems arising between private appropriation of and public access to therapies and vaccines to be developed with the support of HEIs and public investment.

On the other hand, the spectre of the pandemic will lead to an excessive channelling of resources into research in the biomedical sciences – currently those where investment is already more significant – creating distortions and barriers to the production and transfer of new knowledge in many other areas. Systemic support activities, such as those performed by intermediary entities, namely transfer offices, are likely to be strongly affected – especially in view of the fact that they already existed within a precarious institutional framework –, with impacts that are difficult to measure.

It is therefore essential to provide HEIs with the financial capacity to maintain their mission and to structure their lines of interaction with society in a planned manner and according to a long-term vision. This includes the desired linkages not only with the local productive, social and cultural fabric, but also with international networks, so that the HEIs' universalist vocation is not held hostage to regional development goals or finds itself too dependent on productive specialisation.

KNOWLEDGE, SCIENCE AND MARKET

Sofia Branco Sousa

In the context of universities and research centres, we can talk of a contemporary hegemony of a type of scientific knowledge that is convertible into market value, under keywords like “application”, “utility”, “relevance” and “impact”. It is all about valuing knowledge that is instrumentalised by the market. There is a tension characterised by two extremes, already identified by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2008: knowledge for its own sake (“pure” or “applied” knowledge decided by those who make or manage science, regardless of its market value) and economic-driven knowledge (“pure” or “applied” knowledge for “consumption” by the society whose specific problems and needs it is meant to address). The problem then lies in the growing promotion of the latter and the progressive exclusion of the former, and it is especially evident in the social sciences and humanities and in the arts, but is in fact also present in all types of scientific knowledge. Academic productivity is therefore crushed by increasingly demanding bureaucratic procedures, the close monitoring of academic performance, and an enormous pressure to produce knowledge deemed relevant and visibly convertible into market value.

The current COVID-19 pandemic could ultimately prove that knowledge for its own sake – developed for reasons that might not necessarily be related to the market or to profit – actually responds, or can respond, to social and human needs. This is particularly important at a time when we can anticipate funding cuts in higher education and research. In the context of the pandemic, we have seen society turn to the scientific community (and its various knowledges) in order to better understand the situation we are going through. This is therefore an opportunity to emphasise, on the one hand, the great potential of knowledge for its own sake in times of crisis and, on the other hand, the risks of excessively valuing knowledge production for economic reasons, especially foreseeable economic reasons. It becomes clear that keywords like “application”, “utility”, “relevance” and “impact” can be attributed to knowledge for its own sake and not necessarily only to knowledge that is convertible into market value. It is also evident that the European paradox – i.e., the European countries’ apparent inability to convert their numerous scientific publications into innovation, growth and jobs – should cease being as central to their agenda of knowledge production as it still is. If there is one thing that this pandemic has highlighted, it is that the market, and market value, cannot be the solution to everything.

LABELS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Teresa Almeida Cravo

The complexity of the world around us calls for a language that renders it intelligible. By capturing a series of traits, values and behaviours in a single image, the use of labels enables us to classify and simplify this vast social reality. The representations invoked by labels trigger positive and negative feelings, generating a predisposition towards the subjects they refer to, which in turn conditions our actions. In both interpersonal and international relations, labelling is an emotionally charged process with clear political and social implications.

Labels are neither neutral nor innocuous; they are produced in a context of power relations and can serve to naturalise and legitimise certain representations and actions, constituting, rather than merely reflecting, our social reality. A full understanding of contemporary problems, such as COVID-19, therefore requires analysis of the specific words used to describe them.

Donald Trump's labelling of the pandemic as "the Chinese virus" in his political speeches is an example of an exercise of power – of selection and legitimation, as well as of omission and marginalisation. It localises what is global, holding China solely responsible for the contagion, while invoking pejorative stereotypes about Chinese cultural practices. It stigmatises entire communities – both in China and amongst Chinese immigrants in the global North –, legitimising discriminatory and violent practices. When the virus is described as an external phenomenon, the enemy becomes not the virus itself, but the society from which it allegedly originated, thus hindering local and international efforts to halt the pandemic.

Labels will not cease to exist: they are part of our language and the way in which we understand and represent the world. It is essential, however, that we recognise their role – and our own – in (re)producing power relations.

Self-reflection makes us confront the impact of our own words and our responsibility as agents of power. This calls for looking critically not only at Trump's statements, but also at those we utter at the dinner or café table. Moreover, it means supporting institutional decisions, such as that of the World Health Organisation in 2015, to end the practice of naming diseases after their supposed places of origin.

In addition to self-awareness, we need a commitment to deconstruction – that is, to the unmasking of the interests served by labels and the questioning of their connotations and effects. In the case of COVID-19, an exercise in deconstruction might highlight the role of global Northern multinationals in deforestation and urbanisation, which increases the probability of zoonotic contagion; or it might reveal the US administration's real political intent, which is to link China to the virus, as a strategy aimed at evading responsibility for the failure to protect its own population.

Challenging the (re)production of labels and the hierarchies they legitimate also requires what David Spurr calls "guerrilla resistance": refuting the explicit and implicit assumptions of civilisational superiority from within. We do not escape our place of enunciation, however, simply by viewing it critically. Resistance requires, above all, an attitude of openness to new forms of knowledge and to an understanding of the Other, one which assumes society not only as a space of power relations, but also as a space of possibility.

LABOUR SOCIAL MARKET

Nuno Serra

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the fragilities of excessive investment in tourism, assumed in recent years as one of the main "engines" of development in the country. Even before the pandemic, this excessive burden raised important questions in terms of employment (namely precariousness and low wages), housing (with the steep rise in prices, gentrification and the expulsion of residents to the peripheries of large cities, especially Lisbon and Oporto) and in various activities not linked to the dynamics of tourism (which have also found it difficult to locate in larger urban spaces).

However, even the most optimistic prospects of a general economic activity recovery, once the pandemic outbreak is over, come up against the fact that tourism (travel, accommodation and catering) cannot be expected to recover at the same pace as other sectors. In fact, it is quite unlikely that we return – at least in the next few years – to the levels of tourism demand, mainly foreign, registered before the crisis. This, of course, limits the ability to reabsorb many of the jobs now lost.

Despite all the destabilising effects in various areas, the recent focus on tourism has been one of the main factors in employment recovery in recent years, which has reversed the results produced in this domain by the austerity policies carried out between 2011 and 2015. In fact, the sector generated job opportunities for a significant number of inactive and unemployed people (namely the long-term unemployed), whose profile, in terms of age and qualifications, made their return to the job market difficult.

Today, given the impact of the pandemic on the tourism sector, which is expected to last (longer than in other sectors, anyway), the absorption of this contingent of labour could be achieved, at least in part, with public investment in a number of services in which Portugal has a deep structural deficit: namely, the responses to demographic ageing and the growing demand for care, in a logic of proximity and diversification of support modalities (residential and health units, home support, community intervention, etc.).

These are, in fact, areas that require a very significant workforce, with a great diversity of profiles and a variety of qualification requirements. Therefore, investing in these areas in terms of employment will not only alleviate the current deficit of services, but also provide an opportunity for training and capacity-building of low-skilled assets.

LAY-OFF

João Ramos de Almeida

To counter the effects of the economy "shutdown" due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government used a legal mechanism already in existence, the lay-off, which supports companies in difficult situations but is inadequate to tackle the recession, as it cuts income and does not prevent unemployment. Since the first cases of infection were detected in early March 2020, the measures adopted have led to closures in main services, with rapid recessive impact. Conditioned by a limited range of macroeconomic policies and fearing – given the example of the euro crisis ten years before – an escalation of budgetary spending without community protection, the government contained the counter-cyclical measures. Lines of credit were created. The lay-off scheme was adapted, cutting the value of wages by one third and making the State pay a substantial part of the wage costs (granting companies a "saving" of 84 percent), and finally, under pressure from the left, a ban was implemented to adhering companies on dismissals, but only during the implementation of this measure and in cases of collective dismissal or job extinction (with other forms being allowed). On May 15, 109,376 companies had adhered to the lay-off (four-fifths of which in the services sector), with a total of 1,315,187 employees. The costs of this measure – as the Minister of Finance stated in Parliament – fell below the provision made: of the 1.5 million employees predicted, the measure covered 62 percent of the participating companies' employees; and the wages covered remained below the 1,000 euros of average wages that had been predicted. The lay-off may have stopped the "haemorrhage" of unemployment, but the danger was not averted. The measure is unfair, has effects contrary to what is necessary – it is recessive – and, even if it extends beyond the *deconfinement*, will leave companies with the option of dismissal if the recovery is delayed, as seems to be the case for tourism.

Economic policy should aim to maintain incomes and prevent the rise in unemployment by combating recession. The wage cut sent out the wrong signal by embarking on a policy that has already proved disastrous. Public support must therefore ensure total wage income, without cuts and without decapitalising Social Security. In the long run, economic policy measures should *address* the over-exposure of the national economy to the services sector, in particular tourism, which, in the face of an external shock, may shake the foundations of the economy as a whole. Unlike services, the industry and even the construction sector continued to be active during the pandemic, despite the suspicion that they did so without proper sanitary conditions. It will be necessary to start rethinking a recentring of a new national production strategy, either by introducing elements of economic planning, by breathing new life into the industry sector and following import substitution policies – rethinking a new role for public banking, with a drag effect on private banking –, or by redirecting services towards activities less dependent on tourism and strengthening social support.

LOVE RELATIONSHIPS

Ana Paula Relvas, Alda Portugal, Luciana Sotero

The world is facing the largest pandemic of the 21st century: COVID-19. In December 2019 there was the first case in Wuhan, China; on March 11, 2020 the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the pandemic; on March 18 the state of emergency was declared in Portugal, renewed twice (April 3 and 17). This data allows us to contextualise the problem, that is, the lockdown and the inevitable confrontation between the *I* and the *You* in a loving relationship.

Home confinement and social isolation became a reality with an impact at many levels on the lives of families and couples. Increased childcare, reduced contact with one's extended family and social networks, indoor family leisure and short/medium-term planning difficulties have translated into an increase in stress.

A study developed by CES* shows a statistically significant increase in stress, between pre- and post-social isolation periods, in people who are in a loving, cohabiting relationship. It is known that stress can exacerbate existing difficulties in the couple, such as the perception of lower marital satisfaction or increased conflict. The context brought about by the pandemic promotes the instability of the dyad, which (being already unstable by definition) closes itself off, as the habitual and healthy triangulations – with the rest of the family or with work and friends, for example – are drastically reduced. The problem is then the inevitability of systematic and continuous exposure of the *I* to the *You* (and vice versa), which maximises the individual components and makes the *We*, that is, the couple's collective, vulnerable.

Gender and power issues can be affected by the excessive physical proximity caused by isolation, associated with the traditional definition of roles, women's multitasking abilities and their role as carers. It is therefore not surprising that, of the participants in this study most concerned about the pandemic, 87.7 percent are women.

This study helps identify an alternative: the third party/ies and the quality of support between the *I* and the *You* in the relationship.

Although extremely concerned about the pandemic and reaching very high levels of stress, the participants showed that having someone to be concerned about in addition to the other (the *You*) in the same c space seems to be protective of the relationship, as it reduces the emotional disturbance (stress, depression and anxiety combined). In this case, this someone – the "third" party who helps stabilise the dyad – are the children, regardless of their age.

Companionship and the perception of the quality of the relationship are associated with a greater sense of control over the pandemic and greater individual well-being, but it is clear that the pandemic does not cut across all relationships, since the most vulnerable tend to be those most negatively affected by the lockdown.

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* https://www.ces.uc.pt/ficheiros2/files/RELATORIO_Resultados%20Preliminares%20sobre%20Impacto%20Psicossocial%20da%20COVID-19%20em%20Portugal.pdf

MEDIA DISCOURSES AND ALTERITY

Ana Cristina Pereira, Gaia Giuliani, Rita Santos, Sílvia Roque

The current COVID-19 pandemic led to a drastic reduction in social interaction, which reinforced the crucial role of the media – a stage where narratives of sanitary, punitive and security content, among others, are disputed – in interpreting and producing realities. Some media stood out in facilitating access to information on the pandemic and communicating health risks, highlighting some of the social groups most vulnerable to virus exposure due to their health profile, profession, or socio-economic fragility prior to the pandemic. However, some media (re) produced – albeit well-meaningly – the narrative according to which "we are all in the same boat", thereby neglecting the socio-economic, racial, age, gender and health differences, etc., that pre-existed and were aggravated by the new scenario. In addition, the media conveyed representations that situated the origin and spread of the virus in people who are foreign or considered as such: tourists, immigrants, refugees, blacks and Roma.

The media, and especially social networks, conveyed the idea that the Chinese were responsible for the emergence of the virus and that southern European countries, in particular Italy and Spain, were its disseminators on a global scale. The suggestion that Africans are more resistant to COVID-19, alongside the portraying of migrant, refugee and Roma communities as particular hotbeds of contamination, has normalised media and policy narratives of a racist and xenophobic nature, providing support for security and punitive measures towards certain groups.

As an alternative to this, solidarity discourses and practices should be promoted, including:

- Developing and enforcing media codes of conduct when covering marginalised and vulnerable groups;
- Giving visibility to groups that are especially vulnerable to the pandemic – i.e., racialised individuals and people living in poverty, who are also the most exposed to economic crises and lack of rights –, clearly evidencing their point of view. Particular attention should be given to people who are in an extremely vulnerable position or exposed because of their gender, identity, sexuality, type of work, etc.
- Supporting initiatives that fight for rights and tackle the pandemic (meeting basic needs, supporting access to information on labour as well as social, health, antiracism and xenophobia rights) organised by migrants, refugees and racialised people;
- Promoting partnerships between mainstream, collective, alternative and other media/forms of communication in order to bring awareness to the problems faced by migrants, refugees and racialised people, among others, and implementing strategies to tackle these difficulties;
- Promoting increased representation of marginalised and vulnerable people, including racialised people, in the media and newsrooms (especially in publishing and other decision-making positions).

MENTAL ILLNESS

Sílvia Portugal, Tiago Pires Marques

Much has been said about the epidemic of fear, anxiety and depression accompanying the COVID-19 epidemic. What is forgotten are the people with pre-existing conditions, especially those with mental health problems. More specifically, people living with a diagnosis of mental illness have not received any attention. Their invisibility in the public space and the way in which they have been neglected by the health policies adopted in response to the epidemic have a serious impact on their lives. News emerged about the reduced number of admissions and appointments in the National Health Service, unmet prescription needs, declining community and home care, and patients arriving at the health services with very fragile conditions. In addition to reduced public assistance, restrictions were put in place to the support provided by patient and carer organisations. The closing of face-to-face associational activities – appointments, training, self-help groups, meetings – further isolated a population in need of sociability and dependent on daily routines to ensure its emotional stability. The digitalisation of multiple aspects of life as a response to the epidemic presents additional limitations when applied to a population that, due to the nature of its vulnerability or to logistic and financial incapacity, is unable to mobilise digital resources to maintain social relations. At the therapeutic level, increased isolation also tends to intensify this group's clear tendency to respond to psychic suffering solely through psychotropic drugs. In addition to the problems experienced by people with mental illness, one must not forget those of their families, isolated and left to themselves in care, exhausted and with no resources.

People with a pre-existing mental illness diagnosis should be a priority of health policies in response to the current health crisis. The potential for their health to deteriorate, given their susceptibility to changes in routine and stress in comparison with the general population, deserves greater attention. The post-pandemic period should thus be seen as an opportunity for mental health policies to meet the goals, long established in programmatic plans, of abandoning hospital-centric models of assistance in favour of community-based forms of support, as well as diversifying therapeutic responses. People with mental health problems should be spared the suffering of abrupt losses in their daily lives and should maintain access to material resources, including housing and decent livelihoods, as well as relational and emotional resources. Users/patients and relatives/caregivers associations should be supported so that they can create alternatives for assistance in periods of physical distancing. A proximity, networked type of care has a greater chance of resisting the crisis and disruption. Finally, mental health and social service professionals should get proper support in outpatient care settings.

METROPOLISES AND NETWORKS OF CITIES

José António Bandeirinha

Since the dawn of hygienism two centuries ago, cities have been blamed for the health disasters that plagued their populations. Among other reasons, the gradual increase of that blaming led to the anti-urban utopias of the last century. With the development of the metropolis, caused by the influx of labour into the large cities and industrial centres of the 19th century, these utopias were given new strength. Now the city has existed since at least the Neolithic. Until the Industrial Revolution, it was characterised by clear territorial antinomies: the countryside vs non-humanised natural space. The city always polarised the surrounding territory. As to the metropolis, it was the result of the excessive growth of a small city, a city that grew over the others nearby and absorbed them. It grew so much that it generated another entity, the suburb. This in turn is divided into two types of spaces: that which aspires to be a city – the poor suburbs; and that which aspires to be natural space – the rich suburbs. Its intensified spread, especially after the Second World War, generated a territory that is culturally poor, indistinguishable and often unnamed. An example of this is what happens in Portugal, when metropolitan elites speak of “the interior” to refer to everything within proximity, ignoring the country’s territorial diversity.

It is very important to discuss the urban future. How can we prepare the more densely populated spaces for that future? In many ways, for sure, although some are more emergent than others, under the circumstances. We can try to focus on one of them: the potentialities loosely known as medium-sized cities. First of all, there is a lot to be done to improve their attractiveness. Qualifying these densities, from the point of view of comfort and sustainability, is feasible, and actually more so than is the case with the metropolis.

The competitive qualification of our medium-sized cities can and should be an alternative to the exclusive nature of the metropolitan capital. In order to achieve this, they need to be identified, both by their intrinsic features and by the way they have historically polarised their territories. They need public and private interventions aimed at qualifying their spaces and enabling them to maintain their heritage. Their economic, cultural and, above all, political decline needs to be reversed. Nowadays, the decline of the city cannot be explained by the absorption power of the metropolis alone; it is an economic decline, but it is, above all, a decline of its political significance, its political representativeness.

In order to assume a significance commensurate with its social, cultural and economic value, the national territory must be polarised by the sense of belonging to a territorial cell that feels not only closer and more significant than that of the capital-city, but also stronger and more polarising than that of the municipality. The cultural re-signification of the territory entails a sense of being part of the (territorially and financially) capitalised space of city A, B, or C. The expansion of this polarisation will make it possible to identify an urban network that is denser than that of the metropolises and which ought to be established through a national purpose – a policy of cities.

PANDEMIC, PRECARIOUSNESS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

João Pedroso

The social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the growth of social inequalities, as unemployment rose in its multiple forms, in particular amongst "dependent" or "self-employed" precarious workers (in probation, in temporary work, "green receipts" of independent workers, in electronic platforms, autonomous and intermittent workers of in the arts sector, etc.) of the formal and informal economy (housework, tourism, catering, odd jobs in repairs, etc.).

The vast majority of these workers do not have access to unemployment benefits, either because there is no formal employment relationship or because they have not accumulated enough days of social security contributions to meet the current system's terms. Moreover, they are also sometimes not entitled to any other social benefits from citizenship social protection schemes, except for the odd support from public social services or third sector entities.

These precarious and vulnerable people could thus, in the short term, add to the approximately 113 million people at risk of poverty and social exclusion and the approximately 25 million children living below the poverty line in the European Union.

In the face of these precarious and vulnerable situations, public social security policy must, on the one hand, intensify the responses to the current situation and to the urgent crisis posed by the risk of social fracture, and, on the other hand, plan, in structural and future terms, a redesign of the social security systems.

Among the first measures mentioned, it is urgent to amend the existing social security systems for unemployment benefit and minimum income benefit, in order to: 1) include more dependent and self-employed workers in access to unemployment benefit and unemployment social benefit; 2) establish the right to a guaranteed minimum income benefit (now RSI – Social Integration Income) capable of ensuring that the basic needs of any person are met, with the proviso that, where the person is fit for work, this benefit should be combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the labour market.

Among the structural and forward-looking measures, it is fundamental, in the short term, to redesign contributory social security schemes (general and independent) and non-contributory or citizenship social protection schemes. In this way, social security benefits, with different natures and financing methods, would be anchored as rights of their beneficiaries to meet the income needs of the precarious and the vulnerable when these do not have an economic activity, thus avoiding an increase in inequalities and more people risking poverty.

PANDEMIC-WAR ANALOGY

Ana Cristina Pereira, Gaia Giuliani, Rita Santos, Sílvia Roque

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, expressions making an analogy between the pandemic and war have been used repeatedly. In this simplified narrative, the virus is the "invisible enemy", hospitals are the "front line" and health professionals "'our' heroes". While it is true that, in some contexts, the virus's lethality or its socio-economic impacts may be greater than those of a war, it should be noted that the systematic use of this rhetoric, in particular by the media and political decision-makers, generates a series of issues that need further reflection.

The idea of war is used, on the one hand, to convey *urgency*, with the aim of intensifying the mobilisation of means and resources, and on the other to connote *gravity* and the inherent call for order, discipline and obedience on the part of the population. Those who are confined are left following orders and being passively protected, and those who are called upon to intervene are classified as "heroes" and applauded for their super-human qualities for acting on the "front line". Given the state of exceptionality and unpredictability, the constant calls for attention to the risks of a pandemic on the part of academics and/or activists and the negligence of governments with regard to preparing and organising pre-pandemic health and social support services – which all but left it to citizens to sacrifice themselves for the common good – are rendered invisible. The rhetoric of conflict and of an enemy can be translated into a language that tends to replace the "invisible enemy" with "visible enemies", thus designated by their potential for "contamination", i.e., virus transmission, and by the need to have them contained, driven away or protected against their will. War language authorises "fight or flight" behaviour in defence of one's self-interest (such as the amassing of firearms or virus protection equipment) and is associated with fundamentally white and male figures of authority and protection.

As an alternative to bellicose, militaristic discourse, one must:

- Emphasise the policies of "normal times" and their consequences in terms of managing the policies of exceptional times (employment, social support, health services);
- Highlight practices and discourses of care, interdependence and the need to strengthen links between people and collective, horizontal, open and democratic social structures, based on co-responsibility for care and the common good;
- Combat representations of identity reinforcement and nationalism (such as protecting "our own" from viruses and "external behaviour") or authoritarian, patriarchal and punitive representations (protecting through the use of force);
- Reinforce democratic mechanisms to monitor public discourse and practices in terms of representation, participation and contestation of measures, as well as discourses with a militaristic, nationalist, heteropatriarchal and punitive content;
- Think critically and actively in order to deconstruct bellicose discourse.

PARENTING

Maria Filomena Gaspar

The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified existing challenges to a social role – parenting – considered by many to be merely a source of happiness and emotional well-being, but which is also a source of stressful demands.

When an imbalance occurs between these demands and the resources available – because the former are more numerous or have a greater impact –, it results in parental burnout (PB) syndrome. PB is a mental health disorder characterised by a state of exhaustion and a feeling of saturation in relation to the parental role, with loss of pleasure in the children's company and emotional distancing from them, in contrast to the feelings and states experienced before.

The lockdown imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis lead to the emergence and amplification of previous, potentially stressful parental circumstances and to a reduction in the resources available for parents to deal with them, thereby increasing the risk of developing PB. These impositions generate such demands as balancing work – which in many cases is now performed at home – and the increase in domestic chores and childcare tasks, including the need to ensure school activities at home. For many, there was the additional pressure of loss of income due to lay-offs, unemployment or the threat of dismissal.

In crisis situations resulting from health emergencies, with the closing of nurseries, kindergartens and schools, violence against children tends to increase, and so does their vulnerability. Therefore, part of the response must be to prevent stress and PB with measures aimed at reducing specific risk factors and increasing the availability of resources, while turning the pandemic crisis into an opportunity to strengthen parent-children relationships.

One of the answers is to create and/or provide resources promoting positive parenting, as part of a blame-free social discourse that values parenting and avoids the exclusive focus on duties and on an unrealistic "ideal" of parent that has little to do with the values of each family. To listen to parents and understand how they would like these resources to be provided is therefore crucial.

It is also important to raise awareness among parents (both individually and as a couple) with regard to self-care and among men in particular with a view to a more active role in parenting.

Faced with a particularly unpredictable pandemic like the present one, it is urgent that we organise ourselves as a society in order to promote and protect the rights of children and young people by supporting positive parenting – reminding ourselves that parenting cannot be closed down or quarantined.

PATRIARCHY, MASCULINITY AND PANDEMIC

Tatiana Moura

Attitudes, practices and political decisions validated by patriarchal views on masculinities (and gender relations) have affected the world in these times of pandemic, with visible manifestations in everyday life. Some impacts are already known, highlighting society's expectations regarding the roles of men and women. Male discourse has dominated international and government responses to COVID-19, and the global approaches and proposals adopted are strongly shaped by masculinised policies, such as declarations of "war" on the virus. This is a problematic analogy, since the key to tackling this crisis in the short term is the antithesis of "war" – care, social solidarity or community support. Some world leaders have shown disdain for the pandemic, acting as if their countries were too strong to be affected by it.

These patriarchal discourses may have significant consequences both for national and global policies, encouraging militarised and authoritarian approaches and prioritising economic and social sectors dominated by men, while neglecting the vital sectors where women are most present. Furthermore, women's jobs are more precarious and are not included in the protective measures that have been developed. Finally, the increase in caring responsibilities has fallen on women, exacerbated by men's lower propensity to care for themselves and others.

It is necessary to rethink the moments of transition in times of crisis, using as an analytical and epistemological focus the transformations and choices that have generational and gender implications. It is essential, in the short and medium term, to understand how this crisis has been intensified by patriarchal policy approaches and responses – how it has shaped masculinities, gender relations and domestic/family dynamics. Above all, it is urgent to understand how moments of crisis defy patriarchal constructions of masculinities, creating spaces of non-violence and equality. We are, therefore, at the right moment to understand the factors associated with non-violent and equitable pathways of masculinity and gender relations, bringing to the debate the concept and practices of (formal and informal) care, which is essential to prevent violence and achieve more equitable societies in the long term. This means understanding the emancipatory potential of promoting caring masculinities and thus challenge the dominant patriarchal structures and the hierarchy of policies.

PEACE SUSTAINABILITY

Paula Duarte Lopes

Positive peace includes, in addition to the general absence of physical violence, the absence of structural violence, that which creates inequalities, discriminates, stigmatises, gives different opportunities to each person. Most so-called democratic countries live in positive peace, for they have normative and institutional frameworks that protect their entire population in terms of fundamental rights and promote equal individual opportunities. This context of positive peace is all the more sustainable when it is resilient, i.e., when it can absorb changes, even the most drastic and rapid ones, without jeopardising the protection of these fundamental rights and the promotion of equal opportunities. In other words, peace sustainability is tested in times of exception and its fragility becomes apparent when social and economic imbalances and inequalities are exacerbated. In the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic, people with precarious jobs that require their physical presence, who barely survive in the informal economy, who live in overcrowded or unhealthy housing, who do not have access to the equipment and technological networks necessary to remain productive while in lockdown, are the most affected. Peace sustainability has been constantly questioned during this pandemic, given that the most legally unprotected groups, the most economically fragile and the most socially marginalised, have been the ones most disproportionately affected. Thus, the positive peace in which we allegedly lived – or think we live – is not sustainable. And without sustainable positive peace, what happens is that negative peace, i.e., the absence of widespread physical violence, may, in time, also suffer structural challenges.

Passing legislation and creating institutions to protect the fundamental rights of all people is an important first step towards the co-construction of a more just, sustainable and peaceful society. But it is essential that these values are institutionalised as social practices, which requires a structural commitment to Peace Education at all levels and in all fields. Peace Education must be structurally included in the training of security forces, as well as health and justice professionals; in the training of professionals in the trade and service sectors; in the training of teachers and educators; and in basic and higher education itself, including technological and artistic education, the humanities and social sciences, and the so-called exact sciences. Peace Education must be internalised in all training, qualification and education programmes, not merely as a subject to be taught, but as a way of teaching, training and educating. Without the structural transformation of society promoted by Peace Education, so as to embed positive peace and foster cultures of peace, the sustainability and resilience of peace will always be illusory, precarious and temporary.

PLANNING AND THE METROPOLITAN CRISIS

Ana Drago

After the major financial crisis of 2008, part of the economic recovery launched within the Lisbon Metropolitan Area rested upon a strategy of *monetising the city* – that is, attracting real estate investment and focusing on the touristification of city centres. This strategy led to a metropolitan economy that increasingly showed signs of imbalance: excessively focused on external demand; valuing real estate assets at international prices, while persisting in "local" wage devaluation and job insecurity; and expelling popular classes and youngsters, paving the way for transnational gentrification and tourism.

Though it was always fragile and built upon inequalities, this strategy of *monetisation of the city* became unsustainable as a model of economic recovery in the post-pandemic period. Firstly, because it accumulated a housing stock directed at an external demand and/or tourism that has collapsed, and we do not know when (or even if) it will return on the same terms. And secondly, because it sustained itself upon precarious, low-skilled, and poorly paid employment, with a feeble social protection that is now without prospects. The vulnerabilities that stem from such a strategy are now quite striking: a metropolitan centre overflowing with empty houses but priced "above the means" of the overwhelming majority of the metropolitan population; significant sectors of the economy with little local support; and an expensive residential model that has encouraged suburbanisation.

To face the collapse of the monetisation of the city one must tackle the weaknesses that have become visible. For that, we need public policies: to counteract the financialisation of housing and the economy; to create skilled employment and locally sustained economic activity; and to pave the way to an energy transition. This should be translated into: 1) reinforcing public housing stock; 2) directing the holidays short-term rentals housing stock towards new affordable rentals, counteracting both suburbanisation and household indebtedness; and, 3) relaunching the local economy/employment by a programme of refurbishment of buildings to foster energy efficiency and to promote sustainable metropolitan public transport.

Implementing such an agenda requires economic and territorial articulation, political commitment, and coordination – conceiving of urban territories as both problem and solution. Thus, the answer to our current imbalances must start by empowering and coordinating agents and public policies on a metropolitan scale. It is therefore necessary to reinstate a political practice of planning – that is, to embrace *planning* as a political process that brings together different actors, scales, and public policies.

POETRY

Maria Irene Ramalho

Plato banned the poets from his ideal city supposedly because poetry lies. But poetry cannot lie because it nothing says.

Plato was a great admirer of Homer and the Greek tragedians. For the education of the guardians of his ideal city, however, Plato was willing to admit only poetry in praise of the gods and heroes. In Plato's ideal city law and reason would rule; no room for pleasure or pain, feeling or passion, argument or critique. Poetry does seem to pose a problem for Plato. Unlike philosophy, which alone in the *Republic* is said to serve justice and good, poetry interrupts the status quo and causes disquietude.

But that is precisely why poetry stands to this day as part of the solution.

Someone said that language is fossil poetry. In the beginning the word coincided exactly with the thing. It accurately said what is. Later, the word started blabbering mere information from afar. Only in poetry worthy of the name does the word go on questioning its own accuracy. If it does not interrupt, question, resist and disquiet, poetry fails to fulfil its role as major interpellator.

Poetry – no embellishment or consolation, rather interruption and questioning – does not speak the truth which philosophy claims to speak. Poetry rather interpellates and questions the truth. The quarrel between philosophy and poetry that we hear about in Plato's *Republic* goes on today, regrettably, after so much dispute on the two, three or four cultures, between the (Social) Sciences and the Humanities.

But if Newton's binomial is as beautiful as the Venus de Milo, the Venus de Milo is as true as Newton's binomial. We cannot do without either of them in this our difficult human journey towards a better world.

Indeed, poetry does not lie at all. Poetry speaks itself. And, by speaking itself, poetry says the world. Let it be heard loud and clear!

POLITICS OF MEMORY

Miguel Cardina

The crisis tends to create space for nationalist, racist and proto-fascist feelings and increases the danger of authoritarian solutions. If it is true that historical contexts do not repeat themselves, it is also true that crises bring with them this political threat, mobilising uncertainty, fear and resentment. This was the case in the past and is the case today in some countries. It is not written in the stars that it cannot be so in other places, including Portugal. The COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated previously existing systemic problems and dysfunctions. The health crisis will be followed by an economic and social crisis that has already set in, with extensive and unequally distributed impacts. In this context, there is a threat of proliferation of nationalist and racist proposals, anchored in certain persistent traits of Portuguese society, now combined with the shocks caused by the crisis.

The memory of the struggles for democracy, equality and justice is, thus, one of the obstacles to this threat. In fact, Portuguese democracy has been genetically determined by the legacies of the anti-fascist and anti-colonial struggles, the 25th of April Revolution, and the struggles for the democratisation of the country and the development and defence of the welfare state. Interpellating this heritage – with its fulfilled promises, but also its limitations or shortcomings – is a civic duty and one of the antidotes needed to face authoritarian and anti-democratic threats. Memory is necessarily dynamic, plural and open to debate. Its erasure leaves communities unprotected and impoverishes the political imagination. It is imperative to counter the induced or involuntary erasure of the past by ensuring access and dissemination of historical knowledge and memory preservation. The State naturally has a prominent role in that valorisation. Its defence, however, should not come from the State and its institutions alone. The divide between the "political class" (clearly a misnomer) and a supposed "popular feeling" is precisely the divide that the authoritarian hypothesis seeks to exploit. To this extent, the activation of the memory of emancipatory struggles cannot be carried out without the involvement of various social actors: political parties, social movements, associations, academe, historians and other professionals who study the past, etc. Only as a living heritage – resisting depoliticisation and institutional ceremonialism – will memory be able to find its way into the future and function as an antidote against the organisation of forgetting, so useful to those bent on redesigning society based on inequality, exploitation and fear.

POPULISM AND EXTREME RIGHT

Elísio Estanque

The notion of populism encompasses a wide range of phenomena on the international political scene, whose origins date back to the late 19th century in the United States of America and Russia. A distinction can be made between "left-wing" and "right-wing" populism: in John B. Judis's formulation, the former is "dyadic", vertical and binary, and mobilises the people (the low and middle strata of society) against the establishment and the elite, while the latter is "triadic", looks up but also down, and confronts the elite, accusing them of defending a particular group, an ethnic minority, immigrants, etc.

Populism focuses mainly on the figure of the charismatic leader; however, given the recent relevance of digital social networks in the public sphere, this notion has taken on new shapes. In the age of fake news, the massive use of these media – run by armies of professionals and hackers – has helped promote policies that elevated Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro into icons of right-wing populism, but the issue is more complex than that. Cas Mudde explains populism as based on the assumption that society is divided into two camps, with those from "below" standing in opposition to those from "above", the people against the elite, while Chantal Mouffe relies on the conception of "agonistic pluralism" and the tendency towards extreme-right radicalism. However, populism is not an ideology with a specific programmatic content. It is a way of doing politics, which can take different forms but centres around three essential issues: corruption, security, and minority threat. In Europe, terrorism and anti-Islamic sentiment, refugees, emigration and the economic crisis have fomented its growth; in Portugal, the crisis, the spectre of corruption and the segregation of the Roma community are some of the reasons for the growth of the Chega («Enough!») party, which pursues similar tenets.

It is a fact that populism represents a danger to democracy, but democracy itself will have to correct some perversions and update ideological references in its various political currents. The different ideological fields gave in to "pragmatism", giving priority to immediate election results. In Europe, the alternative to populism will require a reinvention of the European Union project and its ability to recreate a new political economy. To this end, we must recover well-known proposals, such as the complementarity between representative and participatory democracy. Future emancipatory projects, in the post-pandemic scenario, require coordinated political action between institutions and civil society, promoting sustainable socioeconomic projects – with the involvement of communities and local forces – and lending greater transparency and credibility to the exercise of grassroots democracy. On the other hand, a greater investment in civic pedagogy, conveyed through the education system and based on the republican principles of the exercise of democracy, can strengthen human values, solidarity and equality as antidotes to the populist rhetoric.

POST-CATASTROPHE LANDSCAPE

Rui Bebiano

In *La dernière catastrophe* Henry Rousso suggested a flow of history guided by times that incorporate modules of political and social organisation with a degree of harmony, each determined by the effects of a great inaugural disaster. The word is not used by Rousso in its ordinary sense, which equates it with public calamity, but rather in association with the root that identifies *καταστροφή,* the *katastrophe* – a term taken from Greek drama to describe the moment when the plot turns against the protagonist – as an expression of the sudden end, the turning point, the abrupt change that disrupts the order of things. At the same time, out of the nebulous memory of a way of life that has collapsed, it imposes a necessarily new cosmovision. To this extent, such events as the Final Solution leading to the Shoah, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union, or the attacks of September 11, 2001, established significant changes in the way their contemporaries inhabit the world, marking the end of one time and announcing the beginning of another.

When the shared features of life in society are, as now, faced everywhere with the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic and the sudden and irrevocable character of the transfiguration it brought about, it becomes possible to acknowledge that we are living through a critical stage, the threshold of a new time. In it, the present forms of collective existence travel to another reality, under new conditions and new demands, facing dangers, dilemmas and hypotheses of an equally diverse nature. As in a post-apocalyptic fiction scenario, we come across – in the same places we inhabited until now, populated by the same people – the projection of social practices and political realities of an unexpected nature. For a moment, we believe we have ended up in a dream, where much of what we had previously done and hoped is now faced with practices and hopes made of an altogether different substance.

It is clear that our universe will resurface from this trance in a very different shape. Certain practices will be unavoidable: a more restrained physical contact, more attention to health care and hygiene, and, after the shock, a more acute perception of the importance of a shared life on a global scale, determining changes that will be far from negative. A greater capacity for cooperation between States and regions in the definition – albeit slow and contradictory – of common health and economic policies could also bring about something positive. However, dark scenarios also unfold: the dematerialisation of societies thanks to the spread of the digital empire, intensification of distances between nations and continents, greater ethnic or religious prejudice, the strengthening of regimes based on hygienic authoritarianism, heavily monitored circulation and relationships, overvaluation of productivity and work pace, increase in precariousness and unemployment. The worst will be that the restrictive measures will be justified by a notion of the common good based on an imperative of survival. This catastrophe therefore makes it crucial to imagine alternatives and forms of resistance to ward off the shadows.

PRISONS

Conceição Gomes, Carlos Nolasco

The health crisis caused by COVID-19 exposed some of the structural weaknesses of Portuguese prisons, forcing politicians to implement emergency measures that allowed the immediate release of two thousand prisoners. Prison overcrowding is an old Portuguese problem, posing complex challenges to the penal system. According to data from the Council of Europe, in Portugal the prison population was 12,867 in January 2019, corresponding to a prison rate of 125 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, which is above the European average of 106 prisoners. In the list of 43 countries, Portugal was the 14th country with the highest incarceration rate, part of the small group of countries that were the exception to the general trend of a reduction in prison population. The excessive rate of imprisonment revealed by these figures highlights the paradox of prison establishments overcrowded with citizens with low social and economic resources, serving prison sentences for low- and medium-severity crimes, as shown by the relevant indicators. Prison overcrowding intensifies other structural problems, such as poor hygiene, health and safety conditions in the buildings and the definition and implementation, for all prisoners, of credible programmes of social reintegration, including work, education and relations with the outside world. This jeopardises prisoners' fundamental rights and has led to the mobilisation of European courts against the Portuguese prison system.

The increase in prison population depends on a wide range of factors – such as the volume and structure of the crimes reported, accused and tried, the perception citizens have of safety and the seriousness of the crimes –, but above all it depends on the public criminal policies. There are two main challenges to which these policies must respond effectively. The first concerns the creation of conditions conducive to a broader use of penalties and measures that may function as an alternative to imprisonment, be they of a legal nature (by removing obstacles from the law) or organisational (by providing adequate resources to the institutions monitoring the execution of penalties and measures and by promoting integrated responses with regard to health, employment, education, social security and community). In this strategic agenda, the training of judicial actors must play a central role, not only as a way of providing them with technical and legal skills, but also as a space for critical reflection on criminal and penitentiary systems. The second, upstream, focuses on policies of conduct criminalisation/ /decriminalisation. It is essential to generate a debate on whether we are transferring to the penal system complex problems requiring measures of a political and social nature. The fundamental principle that imprisonment – either as a sanction or as a measure of coercion – is the last response must be fully put into practice.

PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

Vasco Almeida

The declaration of the state of emergency as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a suspension of some social responses – crèches, nurseries and leisure activity centres –, which aggravated the financial state of a significant part of the country's Private Institutions of Social Solidarity (IPSS). Although the latter sought different solutions, from completely suspending user contributions to reducing them to a greater or lesser degree, there was a general decline in revenue. According to a 2018 study, user contributions constitute about 32 percent of IPSS total income, while public contributions make up 46 percent. Together with philanthropy, these two financing sources are not enough to prevent around 40 percent of IPSS from having negative results in any normal year.

Public support measures to address the IPSS situation during the pandemic – in particular, an increase of 59 million in funding for cooperation agreements, the maintaining of social security contributions and the creation of a specific line of funding – were considered by representatives of the sector to be clearly insufficient to mitigate the decline in revenue and the increase in costs. In fact, the above-mentioned 59 million represent a 3.5 percent increase in relation to the funds from cooperation agreements, while the 2020 increase in labour costs caused by the minimum wage upgrade was as high as 5.8 percent.

The model of cooperation between the State and the IPSS must be rethought. Firstly, public funding must be sufficient to ensure the adequate functioning of social responses, taking into account the quality of the goods and services provided, the adequacy of physical spaces and the human resources required. Funding should be calculated on the basis of the average real costs of social responses and the applicable tables of user contributions. There may be mechanisms for positive differentiation between IPSS, according to their users' economic capacity. Secondly, "the transition from a protective to a partner State", as mentioned in recent legislation regulating this sector, cannot mean that the State may shirk its obligations with regard to supervision and direct provision. Although the IPSS Statute stipulates the principle of autonomy, they have to ensure the quality of services provided. Last but not least, the boundaries of action between the State and the IPSS must be clearly defined. Contrary to what has been the trend in recent years, universal rights must be ensured by the State, with the IPSS playing a complementary role in protecting vulnerable social groups. It makes no sense to delegate to the IPSS the allocation of the Social Integration Income or the so-called contingent benefits, despite the positive financial impact that such measures may have.

PRIVATE INTERESTS, SOCIAL COSTS

Vítor Neves

In Portugal, and on a global scale in general, the economy has been structured around institutional arrangements based on the logic of money and corporate profit. Increasingly, human beings, the common good and sustainable human development are being sacrificed to private interests. Like the workers in Chaplin's *Modern Times*, people have been turned into cogs of a machine whose inexorable logic is beyond them. Neo-liberal capitalism (ill-named "economicism") has accentuated this logic, causing the market to gradually spread to all spheres of life. The logic of private interests and the market also imposes itself in what were once considered non-market areas: health, care, scientific research, and also the organisation of work, of cities and of the transport system. Time is money; human life is reduced to a statistical value; the cost of environment protection and of the sustainability of life has to be set against that of sacrificing our present way of life. Captured by this logic, welfare states crumble. The result is a growing gap between what society legitimately expects from the economy and what it actually gets – the so-called "social costs" of capitalism. Who pays for these costs?

The issue of the social costs of capitalism can be seen from different angles. First of all, that of the institutional arrangements that generate them. But also the ideas that underlie such arrangements and sustain them. The alternative must be built on both levels. The social costs derive from a specific logic that must be deconstructed: that markets dictate the value of things, people and life. It is imperative to break with the idea of an economic rationality based on market accounting, while renewed attention must be given to the economic valuation criteria: the incommensurability of values and the limits of monetary calculation; the inadequacy of using efficiency and economic growth, measured on the basis of Gross Domestic Product, as economy performance assessment criteria; the importance of a new social accounting. Finally, it is fundamental to reclaim the human person and life sustainability as the ultimate criteria for valuing all policies. For this to become possible, both the economy and economics will have to return to ethics and the economy and politics will have to be conceived of in terms of social justice and solidarity. Ultimately, the question of who is to pay the social costs of capitalism is linked to the debate on a new model of development, citizenship and democratic participation. Such a model requires not only new ways of conceiving of "the economic" but also the promotion of what Amartya Sen has called "capabilities" – i.e., creating conditions for people to fulfil themselves and build a different kind of future.

REFUGEES

Carlos Nolasco

In 2018, 70.8 million people were in a situation of forced mobility due to persecution, conflict, violence or violation of human rights. Of these, 25.9 million were refugees, 41.3 were displaced in their countries of origin and 3.5 million were asylum seekers. Half of the refugees were under the age of 18 and 111,000 were unaccompanied children. Every day 37,000 people enter a situation of forced displacement. By comparison, in 2009, the number of people in forced mobility was 43.3 million. These figures have been rising especially since 2012, with successive armed conflicts and persecutions in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Bangladesh, and lately in Ethiopia and Venezuela, among others. One third of refugees are in the world's poorest countries and only 16 percent in countries in developed regions. The paradoxes of the world are clear in these figures, made available by the UN. People are being increasingly forced by circumstances to flee their places of origin. At the same time, countries that are signatories to conventions in which they commit themselves to reception, that possess high development indicators and arrogate themselves to a political ethics based on the defence of fundamental rights intensify border protection efforts by raising obstacles to reception, refusing entry to refugees and, in some cases, criminalising humanitarian aid to those who help them.

In face of an increasingly harsh reality, aggravated by the social and political circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, the alternatives are apparently simple, but almost utopian in their implementation. Firstly, where Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the right to seek asylum on the part of those who are persecuted, it should also provide for the recognition, on the part of States, of the obligation to take in those who need refuge – simply because the chances of leaving become difficult if they meet with a lack of willingness to receive. Secondly, a new refugee status must be established, extending its scope to those seeking refuge as a result of environmental problems and natural disasters. By the same token, all those who are forced to leave because of widespread poverty and lack of life prospects must also be considered refugees, even if they come from countries not experiencing conflict. Thirdly, all countries that signed conventions and refugee statuses must be penalised under international law and be subject to economic sanctions if they refuse to support and receive refugees. Fourthly, countries with better development indicators must develop effective common refugee protection policies. Finally, the most relevant of all the alternatives is that global measures and actions must be developed to prevent barbarities, promote regional development at a political, economic and environmental level, and defend fundamental rights without concessions.

REGENERATIVE TOURISM

Nancy Duxbury, Fiona Bakas, Tiago Vinagre Castro, Sílvia Silva

The trajectories and dynamics of mass tourism development have caused stress on host cities and communities. Large events/gatherings have become central to many tourism and cultural strategies, and mainstream approaches have been detached from more-than-economic benefits to local communities. The COVID-19 pandemic has put these issues in stark relief. The dominant tourism models are not sustainable going forward. Post-crisis, alternate trajectories will need to be articulated in order to avoid going back to "business as usual".

Due to the pandemic, tourism and other sectors have faced a major disruption or entire collapse, and are re-emerging in what can be described as a transition phase. A less mobile era is emerging, characterised by an increase in 'proximity tourism' (with a renewed emphasis on domestic tourism and partnered 'bubble' countries) as well as longer stays in one area instead of flitting from place to place. Crowded events with strangers will be less attractive and smaller-scale activities may emerge.

In the short and medium-term, while travel businesses are being reconfigured, travelers are also rethinking the kind of travel they are able and comfortable to pursue. Among potential travelers, a growth in conscientious travel is expected, with a socially minded mindset and sense of solidarity, emphasising personal responsibility, spending money where most needed, supporting local businesses, and doing things for the public good.

In rethinking and redefining tourism, new approaches should be built, aimed at the public good and based on the interests of local communities. After extended periods of lockdown, shorter destinations have new opportunities in this 'new normal', with recent surveys showing a growing interest in smaller, less-crowded destinations such as small cities, towns, and villages as well as natural, rural, and remote areas.

Regenerative tourism encourages the things that matter most in ways that benefit the whole, although never at the expense of its parts. Regenerative tourism approaches emphasise more conscientious options, to the explicit benefit of the community. Sustainable and responsible tourism principles also apply, with growing attention to careful management and local impacts.

Culture- and community-based small-scale creative tourism can provide regenerative options for local traditions and specificities. Creative tourism develops options and activities geared to smaller social bubbles and small group interaction, rather than to large crowds. This approach aligns with planning for longer stays. It offers visitors an array of interesting incentives and activities, with a focus not only on getting immersed in and connected to the place, but also on active learning and doing.

In an integrated approach, communities must be centrally engaged in reconceiving and restructuring their tourism development for the public good. Attention to regenerative tourism approaches will provide social, cultural and economic added value for local host communities.

REMOTE WORKING

Dora Fonseca

The performance of remote working activities, defined as the provision of work carried out within a relationship of legal subordination, usually outside the company and through the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), is regulated by Articles 165 to 171 of the Portuguese Labour Code (LC). The employee is granted the same rights and duties as other workers, namely with regard to training and promotion or career advancement, limits to the normal working hours and other working conditions. Among other aspects, the employer is responsible for providing adequate training on the use of ICT inherent to the activity.

There are several problems associated with remote working, especially when considering the lockdown resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. First, the issue of ownership of work tools and responsibility for their installation, maintenance and payment of related expenses. The LC assumes the employer's ownership and responsibility for them in case of omission. This burden now seems to have fallen mainly on the employees, in particular with regard to payment of the related expenses. Second, having adequate ICT training can be an obstacle in many situations. Added to this is the increased danger of invasion of the private sphere when overseeing work performance.

In the current context, remote working has gone from being residual and limited to very specific activities, to being compulsory, except in situations of insurmountable incompatibility. If, on the one hand, the viability and possibilities opened up by remote working have been demonstrated, on the other hand, the challenges to its regulation have also become clear.

Most Collective labour regulation instruments do not mention remote working, thus leaving it to the LC, which can open the door to employer discretion. Hence the need to stimulate collective bargaining in the context of remote working. It is up to the social partners involved in such bargaining to establish more favourable conditions than those defined by the LC. In particular, it is important to reinforce and detail the employer's responsibility in relation to the means and expenses for carrying out the activity.

On the other hand, collective regulation must safeguard situations where it is necessary to reconcile remote working with family support, for example, by reducing working hours without significant loss of pay. Although the LC provides for the right of workers with children of up to three years of age to work remotely, the difficulties in reconciling work and care are countless, so solutions such as the one presented above are necessary.

There is also the issue of coverage of the conditions obtained through collective bargaining. Given the low density of trade unions but also of employers' organisations, extension mechanisms are of particular importance as a means of ensuring that the negotiated conditions apply to more workers.

REPRESENTATIONS AND PRACTICES

Raquel Ribeiro

Like any new object, COVID-19 enables the creation of new social representations. By social representations we mean a set of concepts, propositions and explanations originated in daily life in the course of interpersonal communications, which allow us to transform strange concepts into familiar ones and create a common knowledge that enables communication. Social representations are unconsciously formed, in conversations between people and the information disseminated in the media, anchoring themselves in pre-existing systems of knowledge and values. They constitute lay theories for interpreting the world and guiding practices.

Social representations can be relatively shared – when anchored in common values and experiences – or, on the contrary, they can present significant (and even antagonistic) variations, when anchored in unequal or conflicting social dynamics. Whereas in a first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic the representations aimed, above all, to respond to a need for information and communication, as the consequences of the spread of the virus and the measures adopted to stop it intensified and made social inequalities visible – opposing those who have the resources to adopt prevention and protection practices to those who do not – they aimed to respond to the need to give meaning to events, maintain a positive personal and social identity and justify practices (both one's own and those of others).

The importance of the values and norms that stand out in a given context is well known: while competition and self-interest are associated with practices of group rejection and unethical economic actions, the salience of interconnectedness and interdependence creates a social and political consciousness conducive to defending the common good. The constant highlighting of death, competition for scarce resources, crime, the lack of responsiveness on the part of social protection systems, etc., nurtures a social climate that helps create representations which justify antisocial practices, creating conditions for the health and economic crisis to be compounded by a societal crisis.

The pandemic response highlighted the "lack of alternatives" fallacy. Just as it was possible "to stop", it is possible to replace the focus given to individual or sectoral survival, self-interest, economic growth and profitability with a focus on cooperation and interdependence, the ethics of shared social responsibility, attention to and care for one another and the planet, the importance of the fair distribution of resources, respect for the voice and dignity of each and every one. Such a normative context will guide the creation of representations that will stimulate collaborative practices capable of eliminating avoidable suffering and using the experiences of inevitable suffering to build a better world. For this to be possible, it is crucial that we do not add to the practice of "washing our hands well" the practice of "washing our hands of it"!

RESILIENCE

Madalena Alarcão, Luciana Sotero

What do you do when the future seems bleak and uncertain? COVID-19 confronts us not only with an immediate health problem, but with very significant and as yet not fully known negative impacts on the economy, employment, education, security, tourism, as well as on how we manage our own social and family relations.

Uncertainty about the evolution of the pandemic and the capacity of the economy, work and society to recover; the prediction that a second wave will emerge again before science comes up with an effective medical response; and fear of a future that seems increasingly uncertain and marked by threats and disasters on a large scale, all tend to generate a feeling of fear accompanied by withdrawal, blockage and hopelessness.

Against this background, how shall we react? By being resilient and able to turn adversity into opportunity. The greatest harm man can do to himself is to lack, or lose, a sense of the future. Because that is where you project your favourite vision of life, or your vision of the world, your dreams, your purpose. And while that vision is the backbone of your existence and the organiser of values, skills, learning and behaviour, purpose is the source of energy that makes us able to overcome obstacles and adversities, because it drives us towards transformation.

Much has been written and thought about resilience, at the individual and family level to begin with, and more recently at the organisational, community and even global level as well. Given that this is a complex concept, consensus is far from having been reached, especially regarding the way resilience is built and how it develops.

But there are some aspects that seem essential for the human being to be resilient:

1. Giving meaning to adversity and seeing it as an opportunity to transform oneself, in accordance with one's preferred vision of life and purpose, even if the latter also need adjustment;

2. Having a positive outlook, even in regard to the most negative aspects or realities, as well as being able to discover the "good", transformative side of adversities; humour and reframing are very useful strategies to see "the half-full part" of a "half empty" glass;

3. Maintaining and raising hope, identifying strengths and (possible) sources of support; this hope is not abstract but rather feeds on the many strengths contained in each one of us, even when we are still not aware of them;

4. Actively pursuing a desired future, which can mean a lot of work and, above all, focus, determination and perseverance;

5. Not focussing on the desire to return to a past that will no longer exist as such, and fully embracing the idea that "reality" is something you build;

6. Allowing oneself to feel the happiness and joy of small victories;

7. Creating and/or maintaining meaningful relationships and sharing experiences, meanings, victories, failures… in short: to inspire and let oneself be inspired, to give and to receive.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HUMANITIES

Graça Capinha

I remember a seminar at CES, some years ago, with a legal expert, a Law professor at a Spanish university, who had been appointed as a member of a European Ethics Commission. She came to CES to speak of the horrific practices of some pharmaceutical laboratories then under investigation. Because the existing laws still said nothing about the many questions raised by the new advances in science, these laboratories could not be considered accountable, even though, from an ethical point of view, their crimes were clear. The Spanish professor considered the Humanities to be the last redoubt of resistance to inhumanity.

In a kind of phantasmagoria, that inhumanity seems to be rising from an abyssal thinking which sees "the real" as the only possibility and the ultimate limit to what is. That phantasmagoria, imposing on ourselves as if it were an amputated limb, is language itself. Language being nothing but a construction of the mind, an artifice which results from the process of construction which then becomes a phantom objectivity. Language, so naturalised, that we tend to forget it is nothing but an artifice that rises from power and in power is embodied.

When we read and listen to the daily news on the current pandemic, the inhumanity of that artifice becomes obvious. Amidst the numbers on the infected and the dead, the money numbers are presented as an equally serious, if not worse, calamity. Amidst the numbers on the aligned coffins and the healthcare workers (some of them now dead or infected) begging for ventilators or masks, the numbers on firms and bankruptcies are presented as an equally serious, if not worse, calamity. Amidst the numbers on the refugees and the hands begging for food, the speeches of politicians concerned with a static economy, unemployment and the oil crisis are presented as an equally serious, if not worse, calamity. That both sides are inextricably intertwined is clear enough, but wouldn't it be more accurate – more humane, as it were – to use a language that made it clear that the two sides do not mean the same thing and, what is more, that they are far from being equivalent?

What can the Humanities do — the Humanities being probably the only space where the pain of the amputated limb can still be felt — to end the omission of our laws, in language and elsewhere, about these crimes, and/or to change the terrible evidence of our inhumanity? And, amidst all that, to make us understand that what we call "the real", that construction in language, accounts for a mere 4,5 percent of the visible matter our science is capable of glimpsing in the immensity of the universe?

Maybe the greatest responsibility of the Humanities should be, as expressed by many poets in relation to Poetry (etymologically, the making that primal language is), to keep the capacity to go on questioning. Questioning, perhaps in an anti-humanistic way, whether our words should not be adequate to a more truthful Humanism, a Humanism truly capable of locating us at a far end of a remote galaxy that we are able to glance at? Whether our current way of organising ourselves globally (or should I say globalisedly) to live our little, fragile lives is fit for the insignificant, and yet so extraordinary, existence of our humanity? Questioning whether it is not legitimate to imagine and/or to construct, in language and beyond, other forms of organisation?

Yes, that cognitive dissidence must be the responsibility of the Humanities. Maybe it will still be possible, with it, to create another form of dignity for human life. And for death.

RITUALISED SPACE

Jorge Figueira

The emergence of COVID-19 created a ritualised space that broke individual freedom and the sociability of communities. From the eye of the computer camera to "social distancing", from masks to surveillance over the other, we live today in an airport ritual, with no planes departing: protocols, suspicion, shops with the lights off. There is "customs and baggage control" to the smallest and most intimate detail: the air you breathe.

In confinement as well as in deconfinement, space is ritualised, in the manner of a totalitarian and dystopian experience: steps are measured, distance is mandatory, the other is a possible agent of the virus, or perhaps even an alien like in John Carpenter's *They Live*. Self-protection is also protection of others; after all, we ourselves could turn out to be the alien. And it is our face that permanently appears on the computer screen, in a ritualised online quotidian, with links, appointments, a raised hand. The laptop has become a digital mirror, at which we constantly speak; the mask gives us back the sound of our voice. The ritualised space is also that of disinfection, of washing hands and surfaces, before and after. Disinfection, as on a plane in an intercontinental trip; digitalisation, as in a future to which one must compulsorily adhere.

The ritualisation of space by tourism, which had been growing exponentially and apparently inexorably, was abruptly interrupted by this ritualisation imposed by a virus: an unknown silence with planetary rules and instructions has fallen upon us.

The de-ritualisation of space depends on the evolution of the pandemic, its peaks and waves, statistics and lethality. But it is a societal survival task; the prevalence of the social significance of communities and of our individual freedom will depend on it. Low density and the "countryside" as a retreat for the most privileged cannot replace high density and the city as the site of democracy *par excellence*, for that would be going back in civilisation. Regaining the city will mean opening doors, crossing all mobilities, stopping digital, physical and territorial surveillance from imposing itself as a model.

The Post-COVID-19 era is to commence the moment we return to the city imbued with a new sense, perhaps even a new paradigm: finding something we never thought of losing. The Streets and squares will be the same, but our gaze will be different; and perhaps this new gaze can ultimately invest the city with a new sense of inclusion and sociability.

The experience of ritualised space is structurally intrusive, inclined to totalitarianism, and cannot be normalised. "The romanticisation of the quarantine is a class privilege", says the writing on the wall. The quarantine amounts to a ritualised space, which stratifies and exacerbates differences under a veil of apparent equality.

To de-ritualise space will mean to leave the airport of confinement, and deconfinement, and to return, by turning off the eye of the camera, to the city, which will be the same – and yet different.

ROUTINES

Madalena Alarcão, Luciana Sotero

How do I get organised when I cannot go through the usual routines? Although it made itself announced, COVID-19 took us by surprise, be it because we did not believe it would reach these parts of the world, so distant from its original focus, be it because we had not fully understood its contagious potential, or because we could not imagine how much it was to change our routines.

In almost two months of lockdown, one of the biggest complaints and difficulties of those who adopted remote working and remote studying was the loss of pre-lockdown routines and the challenges of organising space and time in an environment where work, leisure and family life are almost seamless.

Should we create new routines or should we rather wait for the crisis to pass before we return to the usual routines and regain control over the disorganisation brought about by COVID-19?

Creating new routines is necessary and facilitates organisation! We often view routine as something uninteresting, something that imprisons us, that limits our creativity and becomes tiresome because of the constant repetition it entails. We dream of the freedom we associate with breaking the routine, but fail to value its organising power.

By organising our space and our time, routines save us the energy – quite a lot of energy indeed – required by decision-making and all the indecision and the explaning that accompany it. It is obvious that daily life cannot be a mere succession of routines. Their added value is, on the one hand, the energy, time and availability they leave us with for cognitively and/or emotionally demanding, challenging, hopefully rewarding activities, and, on the other hand, the limits they place and the differentiation they establish between the different activities and/or roles we perform.

Confined to one single space – for many a very exiguous one –, where you study/work, eat, rest and cohabit 24 hours a day, the "Self" feels suffocated, overpowered by the duty to attend to the new demands and deprived of the "breathing" sensation made possible by the changing of surroundings and interactions. Not everyone will feel this way, but there are many who complain exactly about this.

It is thus necessary to create new routines, not only to keep our various activities and roles separate, albeit in the same space, but also to create times for each of them and for the "Self". Even if time now seems to be dominated by remote work or remote study, as well as by intense family interactions, it is very important to create routines of leisure, of physical activity, of pause.

One of the most important aspects in managing routines is our ability to transform them when we feel they do not meet our needs. Despite all the constraints that may arise, we should not and cannot waive the power to determine our own lives.

Whatever the crisis, we must view it as an opportunity for change. The past never returns the same, and therefore waiting for the crisis to pass in order to return to the same old routines is completely disorganising.

RURAL RIGHTS: THE REGROUNDING OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY PEASANT MOVEMENTS

Irina Velicu

Sustainable transformations in agriculture and food systems are crucial when it comes to coping with climate change: thus, small farming and rural livelihoods are seen as planetary ecological assets. Still, people living in rural areas are some of the most marginalised and impoverished, affected by droughts, floods and fires. Moreover, while seed biodiversity is crucial for the sustainability of future food systems and for climate change adaptation, the ancient practice of saving-replanting seeds is being increasingly criminalized. The work and knowledge of peasants remains unrecognised, while their efforts to reproduce grain and seed are misconceived as weak or inefficient.

Scholar-activists are concerned about the growing class of rural labourers and peasants who are dispossessed and precarious. A main focus of agro-food sovereignty movements is, thus, the organisation of a global "politics of anti-enclosure", which, in the attempt to create self-governance or popular self-rule, challenges both the modern liberal State and transnational capital.

The recent UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and other People Working in Rural Areas (UNDROP 2018) represents an important success of agro-food movements in their efforts to institutionalise new rural rights in accordance with the 'subversive' paradigm of the 'peasant way' and to recognise peasants' collective rights to land, food, seeds and other natural resources. Such innovations shift the international human rights architecture by unsettling and extending the conventional framing: thus, new rights are created for peasants, labourers and nature, with sovereignty being discussed critically in the literature as a way to decolonise the human rights system. Claiming sovereignty over food, seeds or land is a political-democratic move through which peasants are credited for their role in 'cooling the planet', reversing urban unemployment, migration or hunger, which will potentially result in a revaluing of the countryside while building ecosystem resilience. In this paradigm, farmers are no longer seen as historically anachronistic, but rather as a contemporary foundation of civilisation.

With the 'peasant way' under critical scrutiny, given the increasing commodification of subsistence, there has been a growing recognition of the value of food sovereignty in today's movements of social transformation, which places peasants at the centre of agro-food politics as a potential ontological alternative to capital's food regime. Therefore, avoiding the drama of optimism and disappointment in the search for justice is also a matter of working with the limits and fragilities of the new subjectivities in the making and with the inevitable tensions and contradictions that divide them.

SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION

Tiago Santos Pereira

Having emerged as the main means of scientific communication since the 17th century, promoting the dissemination of knowledge and ensuring the credibility of results through peer review, scientific publication today faces significant challenges. Journal publishing, traditionally led by scientific societies and institutions, has become a lucrative business, dominated by a limited set of private publishers. By charging scientists to access, in the traditional model, or to publish, in the open access model, publishers have their revenue guaranteed by the academic institutions that produce the content of these very same publishers. The debate around open access was important to challenge the system in place, but despite its altering the terms of the business, the power relation remained the same, and inequalities were possibly further intensified. With costs of access being transferred to the publication of articles, countries and institutions with greater funds have a greater chance to publish and, hence, reinforce their prominent role in the production of knowledge and its potential impacts. On the other hand, the dominant assessment system, based on the impact of journals rather than individual publications and valuing quantity, works as an incentive to increase publication, thus guaranteeing profit. With this growing "market", new publishing houses and journals also emerge, predatorily, attracting researchers with promises of easy and fast publication and decreasing scientific rigour and quality. With the increase in supply and demand, the number of scientific publications continues to follow the same trend, which limits their capacity to represent an area of open scientific debate and social impact that they once promoted.

The scientific publication system should no longer be dominated by the publishing system or by the continuous increase of publications, and scientists should strive for a model of publication and evaluation that contributes to the main goals of knowledge dissemination, of high quality and social impact, diversified and accessible. That is exactly what the current COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, by promoting new ways of publishing and openly disseminating data and publications, as well as by showing the importance of ethical practices and the difficulty in regulating them simply by traditional means of publication. The alternative, therefore, has to cover two avenues. On the one hand, institutional incentives should no longer encourage the unlimited increase in publications, but rather value quality, the social impact of research, and open discussion. On the other hand, public funding should ensure support for editorial initiatives – both of an innovative and traditional nature, as was the case with the repositories or open science – led by scientists, without the goal of profit, with diversified objectives and audiences, and aimed at ensuring that competition in publishing is determined not by the market but by science as a public good.

SEXUAL AND GENDER DIVERSITY

Ana Cristina Santos

Discrimination is intersectional, cumulative and aggravated by vulnerability, which has historically placed lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex (LGBTI) people at increased risk. Many crosscutting issues emerge from the relationship between pandemic, natural disasters or other critical events, and sexual and gender diversity. One example is domestic, sexual and gender-based violence among LGBTI youth, enhanced by late emancipation and confinement with the family of origin and/or lack of economic autonomy, or absence of social networks and informal support from schoolmates, educational agents or a group of friends. Another common issue is a decrease in objective conditions of existence for those who – through homophobia, transphobia and other forms of structural discrimination – traditionally have a high incidence of unemployment or of invisible, precarious and insecure employment. This is particularly relevant in the case of trans and non-binary people. An equally important issue is the isolation of LGBTI people over 65, in cases where ageing, together with digital illiteracy and the absence of an adequate support and care network, leads to increased risk for this heavily neglected population, particularly in situations related to economic and emotional fragility, chronic illness and mental health.

The intersectional impact of sexual discrimination in a pandemic, natural disaster or other critical events should be tackled with short, medium and long-term measures to counter the economic and emotional vulnerability, as well as the structural discrimination with regard to gender and sexuality. We know that the tendency to create priority hierarchies pushes LGBTI people to the end of the waiting list and that post-crisis periods are, as a rule, fertile ground for populist incursions. Therefore, in establishing priority areas of intervention and defining the most urgent measures, the rights of LGBTI people must not be reverted, and sexual and gender diversity must remain a bastion of democracy and human dignity. When ensuring respect and monitoring the rights already established, it is important to accelerate, monitor and consolidate the work in progress to tackle discrimination, especially in the areas of education, health and employment. To achieve this aim, links with actors in the field, including non-governmental organisations, social movements and academia, should be strengthened. Evidence-based knowledge production by gender studies and sociology will be essential to inform political decision-making and defuse populist discourses. We will need an attentive and participatory university that ensures more and better citizenship, as well as sexual and gender justice, one that blatantly refuses sexist and homophobic practices based on tradition, in full compliance with the principle of equality established in Article 13 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.

SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH

Mauro Serapioni, João Arriscado Nunes

Social Inequalities of Health (SIH) and different forms of exclusion are an open wound in society around the world, both in the global North and South. The increase in inequalities *within and between countries* is one of the most significant problems of our time. Despite the general rise in living standards during the 20th century and the introduction of national health systems, all studies demonstrate that health indicators – such as life expectancy at birth, incidence of disease and self-perceived health status – are not randomly distributed among the population; there are significant disparities related to gender, social class, level of education, type of occupation and ethnic group. This results in forms of structural vulnerability where different types of unequal social relations and exclusions converge and reinforce each other.

It is fundamental to analyse the causal power of social structures in order to explain health inequality. Social class has largely extended its influence during the growing supremacy of global neoliberalism, starting in the 1970s, and SIH and its harmful effects on health dramatically increased. Reduced investment in health and an accelerated privatisation of health systems, heavily induced by international bodies, have also contributed to the increase of SIH globally.

The COVID-19 pandemic has further intensified the existing SIH in all countries, especially in the most vulnerable groups, which are being disproportionately affected by the pandemic, as demonstrated by data from the United Kingdom, United States, Brazil and India.

Over the last 30 years, the epidemiological and sociological literature has made great strides in the theoretical analysis and interpretation of SIH, as well as in identifying effective alternatives to tackle its causes and effects. However, in terms of evaluating the results of actions to resolve SIH, this is still a difficult and challenging task, although interesting experiences, strategies and recommendations are currently being adopted and adapted in different countries and contexts.

Thus, existing knowledge suggests the following priorities for policies that can help reduce SIH: i) increasing public resources for active labour market policies; ii) reducing relative poverty rates; iii) increasing public resources for social protection and housing; iv) improving the quality of care and reducing family health spending; v) increasing public investment in health and its share in the State budget; vi) having educational policies in place to promote people's participation in decisions on policies that influence their lives and health. These are universal policies that respect the specificity of the cases of inequality, deprivation, vulnerability and exclusion they seek to address, and they must be transversal to all spheres of government, beyond the health system.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the efforts to tackle it provide several lessons that can be used to reconstruct society so that it can respond to the vulnerabilities, inequalities and consequences of a way of life that promotes exploitation, exclusion and disease. Learning from the crisis therefore means understanding the mutually constitutive relationships of public health, ecology, political economy, social relations, the State and political participation.

SOCIAL VULNERABILITIES AND RIGHTS

Marina Henriques, Conceição Gomes

The increase in vulnerabilities to which some social groups and communities are subjected in the wake of the global pandemic caused by COVID-19 prompts us to a critical and committed reflection on the strength of the impact of this crisis on the lives of persons for whom the pandemic and the fragility – or even the absence – of measures taken by the State has meant a worsening of the state of exception in which they permanently live. The health crisis has made visible the structural fragility of the fundamental rights of vulnerable persons or persons at risk, such as the elderly, women, children, persons with disabilities, precarious and informal workers, Roma and other ethnic minorities, detainees, the homeless, migrants and refugees. But this visibility was not enough to bring about positive discrimination measures. On the contrary, those groups are not at the top of any comprehensive package or programme, which reflects their abyssal exclusion and makes their lives all the more precarious. Besides peoples' vulnerabilities there is the instability and uncertainty of social support organisations – now faced with structural shortcomings, some of them still a result of the austerity measures of the last economic and financial crisis –, which prevents them from adequately responding to the social emergencies at hand.

The framework of exception in which we currently live reveals the inadequacy and fragmentation of social responses to vulnerabilities and calls for a critical and proactive mobilisation of societies and States. It is essential to politicise social vulnerabilities and put them on the political agenda, bringing them into the public debate. Public policies must combine national strategies with strong measures at the local level and then seek to provide structured and integrated responses based on an in-depth knowledge of reality, thereby improving the synergies of the institutional network. Given the urgent need for an ethical shift towards a society more in line with fundamental rights and a rule of law that is responsive to vulnerabilities, the alternative requires the development of public policies committed to fairer, more equalitarian and inclusive conditions in three main aspects: 1) promoting decent work as a means of tackling the proliferation of precarious situations and the increasing restrictions on labour and social protection rights, which particularly affects young and less qualified workers; 2) developing an education policy with robust measures strategically aimed at effectively promoting equal access to education for all children and young persons; 3) intensifying the support network for the most vulnerable, such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, persons from ethnic minorities, the homeless, migrants and refugees, with the dual aim of reinforcing the synergies of public services and community organisations and developing integrated responses that actively promote change. The implementation of these policies calls on society and State institutions, including the courts, to understand and proactively assume their role in establishing fundamental rights.

SOCIALISM

João Rodrigues

In the last three decades, there has been an erosion of socialist restrains and counterweights to capitalism, both in the sphere of international relations and in the national spheres of social relations. Capitalists have basically won all the class struggles. The price of these victories is high: capitalisms that are economically financialised, socially oligarchical, environmentally unsustainable and politically post-democratic.

The pandemic crisis, however, has made it clear that society is more than a sum of market-immersed individuals. And in doing so, it has shown the importance of the struggles in defence of the institutional survival, albeit too narrow, of a socialist principle: from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs. After all, the health of each person is also a precondition for the health of all. Those States characterised by less inequality, greater social trust and more robust national health services have also been more responsive to the COVID-19 pandemic.

It is thus necessary to ensure the vitality and expansion of socialism at the level of the systems of provision, where everything is decided. This includes notably democratic planning, which nowadays is decisive in addressing the greatest failure in the history of capitalism: climate change.

Socialism is the name given to the democratisation of the economy, which allows the latter to be subordinated to the priorities of States – political communities that must possess the material conditions necessary for ensuring that all their members are provided with real equality to develop their capabilities, including the ability to participate in deliberations about the broader issues that concern us all. Socialism is based on a hypothesis that is both realistic and hopeful: that people do their best under the circumstances they are faced with, and that it is necessary to develop capabilities on an equal basis and to humanise our circumstances.

This general assumption, which is subject to multiple institutional variations, presupposes, at the very least, sovereign control over the central elements of an economy, including money, which is decisive if a monetary economy is to be able to guarantee full employment. Even if necessary, public ownership of strategic sectors is not enough. It is necessary to stimulate control by workers and to maintain some market mechanisms, promoting incentives and identifying preferences without creating further inequalities or compulsions.

Socialisation of basic goods and services, combined with full employment and carried out within a framework of demand management that does not dispense with either capital control or a national collective negotiation of income policy compatible with external balance, would ensure real freedom for all and the confidence to pursue social experimentation.

All this may entail less globalised economies, but we need to keep our eyes on the goals, that is, to fulfil the revolutionary promise that lies beyond capitalism: freedom, equality and fraternity.

SOVEREIGNTY

João Rodrigues

Article 1 of the Constitution declares that "Portugal is a sovereign Republic", and Article 2 specifies that "the Portuguese Republic is a democratic State based on popular sovereignty". It is no accident that sovereignty, people's power and our democratic constitutional order are tightly imbricated.

Sovereignty entails a people within a territory delimited by borders. It is, furthermore, a bundle of powers allowing a State to be independent and have the authority to deliberate on and implement the necessary policies. Without sovereignty, there is neither collective choice nor freedom. It is a necessary condition for democracy, for the power of those from below, and therefore it was and still is a potentially subversive idea. Loss of sovereignty, on the contrary, is a reactionary gambit, which threatens democracy and the interests of the popular classes.

The power elites in Portugal have allowed popular sovereignty to be challenged by supranational integration processes, associated with globalisation in general and European integration in particular.

In fact, the country has given up the policy instruments that can give material density to national political authority, particularly in the economic field, transferring them to European entities devoid of democratic legitimacy and scrutiny and which can be more easily captured by capitalist powers. In this transfer process, many of the policy instruments have simply disappeared.

Without instruments of commercial, monetary, industrial or financial policy, sovereignty in the economic field is a fiction that undermines democracy. Portugal has come under the tutelage of foreign powers, reduced – in much of what matters most – to a semi-colonial status.

However, the loss of sovereignty is not inevitable. This pandemic crisis has shown that the truly important issues, those of life and death, are ultimately decided by States, and the collective capacities of States are still decisive for the effectiveness of the response. Still powerful enough in the field of healthcare – thanks to one of the great achievements of popular sovereignty, the National Health Service – the Portuguese State was able to respond to a crucial aspect of the crisis by protecting public health.

Ours has been described as a sovereignist moment, given that the bulk of the action has fallen on the States. However, if sovereignty is the capacity to declare the state of exception, the truth is that, in crucial areas, it is the European Union that, from budgets to State aid, has declared the temporary suspension of rules constraining national sovereignty.

In order to be effective, public action must seize this moment and recover instruments to the national scale, where the democratic Constitution is. This is the great challenge with which our community – which is where the highest authority still formally resides – is faced today. It is a democratic struggle, a struggle of those below against those above. Sovereignty is and will remain the centre of politics.

SPATIAL INEQUALITIES ON AN URBAN SCALE

Eliana Sousa Santos

Certain testimonies from the past have become particularly relevant in light of the current global pandemic. In "Stocktaking Architecture: Tradition/Technology" (1960), the architectural historian Reyner Banham (1922-1988) proposed a new definition of architecture, one not limited to buildings but capable of creating what he called "fit environments" for human activities. To illustrate what architecture could be within that broad definition, Banham explains that a lake infected with a virus could be transformed into a fit environment if everyone who visits it is inoculated against the infection, in which case the vaccine would be an "architectural" device – since it would enable the transformation of a threatening place into a public space. Banham wrote this piece a few years after the discovery and production of the polio vaccine, a disease that haunted the imagination of the first half of the 20th century. Like the current COVID-19 pandemic, polio was a disease that highlighted the spatial inequalities mainly affecting the most vulnerable populations, for whom the vaccine, disseminated from 1955 onwards, provided the freedom to walk in the park or swim in a public pool.

In recent years, we have witnessed the way in which the dynamics of investment transformed the urban fabric of cities. The recent redevelopment and redesign of public spaces in cities occurred in parallel with the overvaluation of house prices, which caused areas of overvalued housing to have access to more and better public spaces and facilities, thereby intensifying spatial inequalities on an urban scale.

In the current context of the global pandemic, inequalities at all levels have become increasingly apparent. In similar fashion, then, when access to public spaces became restricted, access to gardens, beaches, swimming pools, and other facilities fundamental to physical and mental health was also limited to private property. Even as we return to normal activities, the scarcity of public spaces of quality in certain urban areas reflects the structural inequalities of society.

As has been happening over the last decades, we can expect that, in the near future, new zoonotic viruses will emerge with transmission principles similar to those that caused the current pandemic. In order to overcome them, it is essential that we establish a network of necessarily redundant solutions, to allow public spaces to be used freely. These solutions entail the creation of more and better public spaces, accessible to the largest number of people possible, as well as the redesigning of existing ones, so that they can be used with safety. Similarly, and following Banham's thinking, these constructed structures must be complemented by the creation, production and dissemination of new personal protective equipment, as well as treatments and vaccines – the other "architectural" devices that can transform a hostile space into a fit environment.

STAYING HOME

António Olaio

To say that an artist is an individual obviously seems like an unnecessary statement, because we all know that yes, everyone is an individual, regardless of what they do or choose to do. An individual is an individual. But artists exercise, as artists, that condition; making, out of that condition, the work they do. More than they would if they asked what that means, which would make them philosophers – which they are not. Although they may get close to philosophy, as they walk their path when making art, artists pass by it and keep on walking.

Above all, the artist transforms the experience of being an individual into an image that will be the experience and the reflection of that condition. And that's an experience that one has and thinks about while having it. It's an experience of such breadth and spatial plasticity that it configures the dynamics of being and, at the same time, the consciousness of being beyond time. Realising that an individual is the relationship with all things beyond himself, all the things that, being the negative space of his body and his identity, shape him.

In this condition, the artist finds out that the time to be with himself in seclusion has been expanded, sees his consciousness of self densified. Being an artist, one will certainly keep on making more art. And the fact of being left to oneself does not increase the consciousness of any singularity. Quite the contrary, as one already knew, what is densified is the consciousness of being someone else, the condition of being, defined by the possibility of being someone else entirely. Because it's beyond the skin that we find the inner self, as it forms and expresses itself in its relations.

Left to oneself, each individual intensifies self-perception and, with it, the expectation of the presence of the other. In this absence there grows the awareness of what one already knew: the other is part of oneself. Or rather, it is the relationship with the other that defines us and, at the same time, self-awareness is not so important. Because the individual is someone you pass through when you think about yourself. And, though to be an individual is the condition to be, it happens by always being something else.

One is at home as if with oneself, in a body that expands into what you recognise as your house, a house that begins to be the moment it is no longer strange to you. Having in it what one needs, and what one needs beyond the things one most easily associates with utility.

And we remember that the house, over time, increasingly assumes its condition as house. But, as with the issue of being an individual, the house is a house when it transcends itself. That is why we have walls, which, more than creating rooms, and hence bedrooms, living rooms, kitchens, bathrooms… serve to place things, to hang things so that they look like they belong to the walls, images that dematerialise the walls and take them to other places, to others.

TECHNOLOGY

Tiago Santos Pereira

Combined with continued research activity, the inventive spirit ensures that new technologies are constantly being developed in the search for technology-based solutions to existing problems or in opening doors to new challenges not previously imagined. Advances in health or new communication technologies are excellent examples of this. Combined with an entrepreneurial spirit, established companies or public welfare initiatives, technology can thus develop successfully, achieving faster diffusion. However, the market exploits its novelty faster than it questions its impacts. Technology is not always a solution to an existing problem; sometimes it creates new needs. The development of digital social networks is an example of this – it was quickly adopted without imagining what its effects might be. In other cases, the benefits to some bring harm to others, e.g. invading the private sphere or causing collective damage, as in the case of environmental damage. What is at stake here is society's ability to influence the direction, adoption or consequences of new technologies.

The alternative is clear enough: we need spaces, both formal and informal, to foster the debate around new technologies and their impacts. Technology is often seen as an inexorable symbol of progress to which society must adapt as it seeks to maximise its benefits, without being aware of the limitation we thus impose on ourselves. We rarely think the opposite – shaping, adapting, or limiting technology. The debate around and assessment of technology is thus essential not only to recognise that technology and society shape and co-produce each other, but also to help us reflect upon what kind of societies we want to be, what problems we define as central, and what options we should consider or promote. The inventive spirit is not only visible when a solution is proposed; it is also evident when we develop alternative solutions. The entrepreneurial spirit, described by Schumpeter, is not only present when it brings solutions to the market; it is also evident when it brings solutions to people and to the problems that societies face. That is the big challenge.

Sheila Jasanoff calls for the development of "technologies of humility", methods that seek to deal with the uncertainty associated with new technologies and their impacts by promoting the participation of citizens, experts, public decision-makers and other stakeholders. In several countries, parliament-based institutions promote these technology assessment processes. Based on free, open and critical debate, informed by the knowledge and experience of each participant, these processes have a goal that is central to an informed democracy: to imagine various paths for a collective future.

TERRITORY: INTERNAL COUNTRY REORGANISATION AFTER THE UNIPOLAR MODEL AND THE UNRAVELING

José Reis

The territory does not generally benefit from the attention of the political economy and the social sciences. Except in the case of the more specific disciplinary analyses, it is used, if anything, in the form of a descriptive category. Even when one tries to understand how certain institutional architectures are formed and their consequences for collective organisation, the territory is generally a missing variable.

The idea that this is an essential issue of good collective organisation has always had its determined advocates. And they know, unlike those who have hasty responses, that a territorial vision is, by nature, multiscale: it is local, regional, urban and rural, it is national and may even be foreign and therefore international. It does not propose simplistic ideas like the reducing of territorial cohesion to a vague notion of paternalistic relationship with "the interior", as has happened among us, or the idea that fragile territories be given conditions of a general nature, since there is no point in insisting on them as they have little to give back.

In the two decades of this century, Portugal had the greatest territorial upheaval of our contemporaneity: it consisted in a profound change in relations between regions, whose developments became asymmetrical and as disparate as never before. This resulted from very specific circumstances: a form of unipolar growth, centred on the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (MAL), with losses to all other spaces, whether urban, rural, coastal or interior. The most significant consequence of all this was what happened with the medium-sized cities, which generally regressed in demographic terms, leaving us without an adequate national urban system.

Given these trends, the possibility of relevant territorial crises emerging was quite plausible, even if such a heavy "normality" were to continue.

Attention to medium-sized towns, small communities, regions and different territories is essential to rebalance the country. We will only obtain this capacity if each area can take care of its own economies – industry, agriculture, public services, housing, different ways of ensuring local well-being; if we have an idea for each of them, on the appropriate scale – that is, if we think in terms of development and not in terms of assistance.

The territory implies coherence between a development model and the society that sustains it. It is now time for all of us to understand that the challenge is to put the economy back in relation to the community it is supposed to serve. And with the purpose of life. To de-globalise, to break dependencies, to focus the country's economy on aspects that save us, such as health, science, supplies (with enabling infrastructures and the networks that guarantee them): "returning to national production and reindustrialising". Now, there will be no re-focusing if there is no territorial vitality and regional articulation.

TRADE UNIONISM

Hermes Augusto Costa

Often considered the "poor relative" of labour relations, trade unionism comes under even greater pressure in situations of economic and employment crisis such as that resulting from COVID-19. Some of the empowerment resources of trade unions are therefore put to the test, as they were during the period of "internal devaluation" that accompanied the financial rescue and Troika intervention in Portugal. It is around these resources (sources of power) that the main problems revolve.

From a structural point of view, the negotiating capacity of workers in a work context seems to be diminished, first of all, because unemployment and the threats of collective dismissal in temporary work companies, in sectors such as hotels and tourism, etc., take on dramatic proportions. In addition to that, from an organisational point of view the propensity to attract new members tends to be lower, given that, not infrequently, the climate of economic uncertainty and even fear prevail over joining collective projects. Thirdly, the suspension of the right to strike (during the state of emergency) or the suspension of the hearing of trade union organisations on the drafting of labour laws, have highlighted the institutional weaknesses of trade unions.

In the face of these three types of blockades (often imposed "from the outside in") at the structural, organisational and institutional levels, possibilities arise to respond in the societal field, i.e., to develop coalitions and networks in civil society and to value innovative strategies.

On the one hand, the fact that temporary workers, i.e., workers in a probation period, with fixed-term contracts and issuing self-employed receipts, are, among others, the most vulnerable in this pandemic crisis, makes it urgent to risk a new policy of alliances between the "old" trade unions and the "new" precarious workers' organisations. It is important, therefore, to focus on factors that promote convergence and mutual learning: joint pressure to denounce and resist situations of unemployment and precariousness; outcry against a new era of austerity; a merging of the tactical sense of union struggles and the virtuousness of digital activism typical of precarious organisations, etc.

On the other hand, trade unions need to make the best use of social networks, not only to recruit new members, but also to communicate and speak "to the heart" of society. This pandemic has implicitly put pressure on trade unions to mobilise their members in support of "distance" campaigns, based on the use of digital communication resources and strategies. While recognising that the focus of trade unionism must continue to be on the workplace and in close proximity to workers, giving a larger role to digital communication, albeit in a supplementary way, is becoming increasingly necessary.

TRAUMA

Luisa Sales

If trauma means a frightening, limiting experience triggered by an external, unexpected and intense event, likely to jeopardise one's own physical and/or psychological survival or that of others and to cause discontinuity or rupture in relation to previous beliefs and safety standards, then the COVID-19 pandemic has all the conditions to trigger trauma. We see it in its initial period (fear of the virus, invisible enemy with unknown mechanisms of action, danger of serious illness or death, confinement, loneliness, disintegration of one's previous life plans). We confirm it when the signs of its consequences – threats with regard to access to work, individual and collective economic survival, family functioning and support networks – are added. We are concerned with the uncertainty of the repercussions on education, of the rigid separation of age groups, of health service overload, of the unknown pathological consequences on infected individuals and on those who, who, because of delays in clinical care, see their pathologies aggravated. We remain anxiously alert to new outbreaks, poorer response, and greater suffering. In this context, a new epidemic will easily erupt namely the invasive memories, we call traumatic pathologies (unresolved grief, repressed guilt, unexplained fears or behaviour imprinted by previous generations) and which can disruptively jump out of Pandora's box where we stuff them away We foresee an increase in traumatic suffering in individuals and communities.

The transformative power of traumatic events, as they impact on the path of individuals and societies, is well known. Trauma results from the interaction between specific events and concrete individuals, in a given socio-cultural context; the responses to overcome post-trauma, the internal strategies for (re)signification of the traumatic experience, and the necessary social support solutions bear the clear marks of the cultural matrix. The current pattern of trauma intervention is predominantly restrictive and based on the traditional clinical model, i.e., on intervention on victims rather than with the victims. It is time to expand the intervention. In a potentially traumatic context such as the current one, the way to act is rather through community-centred intervention(s) with flexible responses that take into account creative diversity, fomenting solidarity-driven information sharing, integrating the knowledge of local communities and technical knowledge centres, and promoting civic intervention, in a process of steady growth both for individuals and societies. This will ensure that the emotional response is improved, stress mechanisms are controlled, the immune response is stimulated, and intervening as the subject of one's own future becomes a real possibility. Spontaneously, such an attitude will begin to take shape – to be sure, the collective acts of solidarity witnessed during the lockdown in response to the COVID pandemic were also, themselves, spontaneous ways of preventing traumatic illness.

VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS

Madalena Duarte

The exacerbation of risk caused by the COVID-19 pandemic brought the need for social confinement and spread a "Stay at home" message throughout the world, thereby equating intimate space with an ideal of personal safety. However, for many people, mostly women, the fear of public space as a health risk coexists with (and even takes a back seat to) the fear of private space, where the ideal of intimacy and protection is corrupted by violence. The increase in reports of domestic violence in some countries during the lockdown period has caused social alarm and forced urgent measures to be taken, especially in terms of reinforcing victim support services. However, the indispensability of these measures should not prevent us from questioning the broader paradigm and from tackling, or at least seeking to be more responsive to, situations of violence in intimate relationships. The present pandemic moment shows that if we really wish to face up to this reality, it is not enough to adapt already existing responses and services to a virtual emergency context; a critical and feminist reflection is needed on the policies aimed at this type of violence. We must not forget that: (i) many of these women were already in a situation of social isolation; (ii) the pandemic only exacerbates a pre-existing context marked by violence-promoting precariousness and gender inequality in various spheres of our social life; (iii) women who are victims of violence tend to experience, at the same time, different forms of oppression and social control, since they are immersed in social contexts where patriarchy intersects with other power systems that weaken them, such as colonialism and capitalism.

What we have here, therefore, is the combination of a structural scenario that is actively produced by patriarchy and a conjunctural but emergency context that was caused by the pandemic and is likely to aggravate situations of abuse.

Contrary to what is being promised to the rest of us, the victims of violence do not look forward to the end of the pandemic as a return to normality, for which reason the measures to be taken in this area must also be directed at the conditions and processes that contribute to their daily vulnerability: (i) primary prevention must remain a priority; (ii) the measures must be empowering and allow the home to become a truly safe space, while efforts should be made to actively combat the notion – widely spread in society at large and the legal arena in particular – that women must leave home to escape violence; (iii) the measures must take into account the economic situation of women before and after the pandemic and strengthen their position in the labour market, valuing their multiple roles; (iv) an intersectional look at the causes and impacts of violence on women's lives is also needed, as is currently being done with regard to the pandemic.

The current pandemic has been particularly severe for older women and women from lower social classes. But women who are immigrants, refugees, from ethnic and cultural minorities, of non-normative sexual orientation, among many others, are also on the margins of society. If this is worrying enough in contexts of social, political and economic peace, it is even more so at a critical time like the one we are currently experiencing.

VIOLENCE IN TIMES OF PANDEMICS

António Sousa Ribeiro

In everyday expressions such as “the violence of the pandemic” or “the violence of nature”, the concept of violence is, of course, being used in a loose sense. Violence is a social fact and a sociological datum – in the strict sense, violence only exists within relationships between individuals and groups rooted in specific social contexts. Now, if there is currently an element of general consensus in studies of violence, it is in the perception that only a broad understanding can encompass the multifaceted dimensions of the concept – any too narrow definition easily becomes blind by the failure to name the diversity of manifestations of violence, which are often microsociological, interstitial, and in no way limited to aggression or direct physical violence.

The context of the pandemic crisis is conducive to a resurgence of multiple forms of violence: in cases of domestic violence, for example, confinement can become a death trap for the victim by aggravating conditions of forced cohabitation with the aggressor; current forms of violent exclusion of groups defined as different, such as racism and xenophobia, find conditions conducive to radical aggravation, bringing back fantasies that turn “the other” into a threat that needs to be eliminated or at least taken hostage and controlled, if necessary by force; on the other hand, the “health emergency” serves as an argument for extending the powers of the State and imposing forms of coercion and social discipline that tend to be indifferent to the logic of democratic decision-making.

There is, however, another sense in which the context of crisis highlights certain social dimensions of violence which are often silenced. Johan Galtung coined the concept of “structural violence” to define situations in which, for various reasons, but primarily for economic ones – unemployment, low wages, unequal income distribution – human beings are prevented from developing the potential inherent to their condition of humanity. It is clear that for those who have been forced to live in confinement in tiny, dilapidated dwellings, or in a situation of forced mobility, for example as refugees, “pandemic violence” is essentially social violence, rooted in unequal power relations.

The most obvious misconception of current perceptions of violence is to see it as an anthropological constant, according to which human beings are “structurally violent”. It is indispensable to counter this notion with the awareness that violence is always a social construct and, therefore, is not inevitable; on the contrary, it can be fought at its causes. In a time of crisis, which, like all crises, contains a moment of opportunity, to root this perception in the public consciousness is a fundamental act of resistance.

VISUALITY

Maria José Canelo

The confluence of vision and knowledge established ocularcentrism as one of the most solid foundations of modern culture. The forms of production of visual representations, the objects represented, the meanings associated with them and their impact on beliefs and social practices are naturally situated in specific contexts and we can speak of visuality to refer to the constellation of discursive practices that attribute meanings to the dominant visual imaginary.

The current public health crisis has been complemented by a visuality of its own, the images and meanings that explain what the pandemic is: images of hospitals overflowing with a common humanity displaying despair, disease and death, in contrast with others, of deserted streets, which we associate with discouragement and fear. These real images are accompanied by symbolic images of disease codification in numbers, usually assisted by another common image, the visual representation of the virus. The latter allows the eye to exercise the power of capture that appropriates the represented, which reduces the discomfort and fear of what escapes vision and knowledge, because it stabilises the virus: it gives it shape, colour and even texture – we have seen that it is a spongy sphere, fluffy and grey, sprinkled with small thorns whose end assumes a shape similar to a crown. This photograph uses artificial colours: from the grey nucleus, the sphere itself, to the extensions, coloured red. Even without exact correspondence to the microscopy of the virus, the image has become iconic and pedagogical by visualising this entity, actually invisible to the naked eye. As to the conversion of numbers into graphs, tables and maps, it proposes another type of visual epistemology, by processing and translating data into schemes that produce constantly updated interactive information, suggesting that we are watching live the spreading of the pandemic. The numbers arranged according to regions and age groups and the layout of contact networks propose the readability of the pandemic, suggesting control, responsible decision-making, trust and safety. But identifying is not understanding. Images are part of an immediate logic that shows but does not explain; it offers but does not fill up, in a consumption nexus that satisfies the eye alone.

It is certain that, in the development of ocularcentric culture, the subjects' relationship with images has not been accompanied by instruments of critical analysis or by a visual literacy that allows first of all the selection of significant images from those that only pacify the gaze and momentary restlessness. Observation must be attentive and responsible, it must require context and compare images; it must be persistent, searching for the genealogy of the pandemic: the links to history, to the economy, to politics, to culture, to other catastrophes; searching for natural and human causes and also the reflections of the future that the image projects. This critical eye knows how to avoid obfuscation, is suspicious of excessive visibility or focus, is interested in perspective, and also looks for that which is not visible. We can call all this interpretation; without it, the image never says enough.

VULNERABILITIES

José Reis

Vulnerability is a condition of individuals or collective systems when they are subject to processes resulting in a diminishment not only of their capacities and roles, but also of the possibility of recovering from the losses they have suffered and returning to previous circumstances. We assume here the vulnerabilities that are essentially generated or induced by institutional and political processes, that is, deliberations and forms of organisation that add new weaknesses to the necessarily uncertain and contingent condition of individual and collective life. The notion of vulnerabilities is multidimensional and multiscale and is sensitive to space and time. It is also a relational notion, which takes into consideration the structural aspects and the system of economic, social and political organisation. A policy of reversing vulnerabilities will be a social and political ethics of care, that is, of reconstituting the relationships that empower individuals and collective organisation.

Contemporary Portugal has been subject to relevant processes of vulnerability creation, and such vulnerabilities can be identified on different scales and dimensions. This occurred at the same time that the country, as a result of having embarked on ill-advised processes and contexts in which it holds a peripheral position, destroyed some of the mechanisms that gave it dominion over its collective organisation without creating new, more robust levels, thus accentuating its dependencies. The shock of austerity was an essential moment for the problems we face today. But the issue does not end here. And even in regard to more recent weaknesses, some processes have reversed vulnerabilities while others have created, consolidated or accelerated new weaknesses. At the moment, we are faced with those that the pandemic has revealed and created.

The vulnerabilities are multiscale and can be identified at macro-economic, state, territorial, local and metropolitan levels, in the care given to people, in labour relations and at trade union level, in the gradual transformation of private costs into social costs, in intergenerational relations or in physical territories, in the form of risks.

Again, the vulnerabilities are multiscale, and so are the alternatives. At the macroeconomic level, a new balance must be found beyond the rules of so-called European “economic governance” and the limits it entails at the monetary, budgetary and public policy levels. It is a question of reconstituting forms of public action that strengthen society, overcoming imbalances and qualifying said society. Internally, in addition to dealing with risk areas, the country needs public policies that restore capacity to its territories, also ensuring that the capital and its metropolitan area become more cohesive and empowered from an economic and social point of view, replacing a model of growth that is poorly qualified and has led to the demographic depletion of the rest of the country. Social policies and the valuing of work and well-being also need to regain the centrality they have lost.

WORDS HAVE MEANING

Diana Andringa

Because words have meaning, the World Health Organisation urged authorities and the general public to change the phrase "social distance", used in relation to the rules applied to the COVID-19 threat, to "physical distance", but the term had already entered our vocabulary and it was not possible to change it.

The Human Rights in Mental Health-FGIP organisation even created the campaign "Mind the Gap" as a reminder that, if physical distance is a necessity in times of pandemic, those who suffer most from the current crisis are many of those who most need social contact – such as institutionalised elderly people, underprivileged immigrant populations and refugees.

This was not the only case of word misuse. At the start of the pandemic, the use of the term "Chinese virus", in reference to the fact that the first cases appeared in a city in China, caused xenophobic reactions against the Chinese community in several countries, including Portugal.

Numbers also induce reactions. Is providing the number of deaths on a daily basis not somewhat trivialising those deaths, making us indifferent to them? Aren't we devaluing death, one dead person after another?

The pandemic was still in its early stages when the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which oversees the work of humanitarian aid agencies, warned that the constant fear and concern, uncertainty and stress of the population during the COVID-19 outbreak could lead to long-term consequences in communities, families and vulnerable individuals. It mentioned, by way of illustration, flaring tempers, anger and aggression against governments and frontline workers, and possible distrust of information provided by the government and other authorities.

This has not prevented the media from giving a voice to precisely those tempers and mistrust, sometimes suffused with obvious political intentions.

Curiously enough, the flaws that the State was being severely accused of tended to be forgiven when they occurred in the private sector. The most blatant case was that of retirement homes, where there was a high number of fatalities, but in relation to which it was the State, not the institution, that was criticised for the lack of contingency plans.

Given this disenchanted picture of the pandemic media coverage, what is the alternative?

I can only think of one alternative: to create a different kind of journalism, one that reads / writes / thinks differently. A journalism that, between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, opts for responsibility. A journalism that does not present facts just because they are available, that does not use words without reflecting on their meaning for those who hear or read them, that ponders on the effects of what it feeds the public.

This may entail re-thinking not only the teaching of journalism (which, unfortunately, in many cases is part of Social Communication courses) but the teaching of language itself (words do have meaning), the habit of writing (characters are meant to be written, not counted), choosing quality above quantity (be it the number of academic citations or likes in social networks), the concern with better – as opposed to more and faster – information and, finally, ending the *quasi*-monopoly of Social Communications/Journalism training in the newsrooms, with priority being given to a kind of interdisciplinarity that allows them to have specialists in various areas, capable of interpreting texts and information on different themes, assessing their verisimilitude, asking the important questions.

WORKING CONDITIONS IN COURTS

João Paulo Dias, Paula Casaleiro, Teresa Maneca Lima

The working conditions of court clerks, public prosecutors and judges have been characterised, among other aspects, by a lack of organisation in task distribution, obsolete and/or complex computer hardware and software resources, problems with teleworking, cramped work space, inadequate furniture, poor air quality, low income among court clerks, and excessive working hours.

When the state of emergency was decreed, Portuguese courts entered a period of minimum service provision, accompanied by an expected reduction in operationality. But unlike the National Health Service or the public education system (from primary schools to universities), courts showed great difficulty in adapting to the new demands, evidencing a worrying organisational inflexibility. The COVID-19 pandemic therefore laid bare the physical and organisational limitations of Portuguese courts.

This operational "inflexibility" of the courts and management bodies, in courts or high councils and including the Ministry of Justice (and related institutional structures), created delays in the courts' response. For three months these bodies almost stopped operating, due to a lack of working conditions that made it impossible to ensure minimum health and safety standards for the judicial professions. Also, these were the last public services to resume activity, albeit in a limited way, in the third phase of deconfinement, due to the difficulty in implementing suitable working conditions in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

Together with the Directorate General for Health, the judicial management bodies defined "Measures to reduce the risk of virus transmission in courts". However, in addition to good practice measures with regard to personal hygiene, cleaning and disinfection, and also space reorganisation, a Judicial Intervention Plan (JIP) remains to be defined and implemented. This plan would structurally address the physical needs of the courts and ensure adequate, healthy, safe and efficient working conditions for the various judicial professions, as well as better conditions for the use of courts by lawyers and the general public.

The JIP should thus include, among other measures, the adaptation of the "judicial space" by assessing current working conditions, in accordance with the new rules of physical distancing, safety and health; reorganising services according to the buildings' physical limitations; implementing a management structure with the participation of the numerous actors involved, taking into account the needs and interests of the various professions and citizens; introducing mechanisms for assessing compliance with approved measures and public "accountability"; and allocating the necessary financial means, making use of available European funds.

A JIP for the courts is not the same as a quick response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It must instead be an opportunity to empower courts to respond to the real shortcomings of the facilities, both in physical and organisational terms, ensuring safe and healthy working conditions for the professionals and all the citizens who use them.

YEAR 0 A.C.: MUTATIONS IN THE URBAN HABITAT

Nuno Grande

I have witnessed several debates on the possible mutations in the urban habitat resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Only over the course of this year 0 a.C. – as a humorous colleague calls it –, will we begin to understand cities better after-COVID, in light of the urban dynamics we knew b.C.

Some say that nothing will change substantially: we will go back to business as usual, and reality will just be a little worse, a little more iniquitous for the elderly, the chronically ill, the homeless, etc. Others describe a path to urban dystopia, in which we abandon the dense cities, the collective facilities, the massified public spaces, in search of a cocoon where we can isolate ourselves, amongst family and (tele)work, between fear of “the other” and obedience to “their” (the State’s) health surveillance. In this post-apocalyptic vision, the year 2020 will end in 1984 – that of George Orwell.

A third vision states that this is the opportunity to achieve what until now was only an ecological utopia: the end of natural resource predation and the immediate decarbonisation of the planet, which has clearly benefited from our months of confinement.

Considering the resilience of cities, there are no certainties, but I have a feeling that we will witness a variable combination of these visions. The neoliberal urbanisation will certainly take advantage of the polarisation of positions: here and there, there will be a new sprawl, motivated by the escape of the most sceptical to isolated regions (ironically saving them from desertification?); here and there, new neighbourhoods and buildings, better adapted to the green economy, will be announced.

I am more interested in the options of those who will continue to militantly live in the dense, cosmopolitan, conflictual city. Only there will it be possible to build the alternative in which I believe: a city which shares, in space and time, an intersocial, intercultural and intergenerational cohesion. As an inhabitant, one will have room for one’s confinement (if needed), but in the remaining common residential areas – halls, patios, terraces, gardens – uses and costs will be shared with one’s neighbours, based on fair value (cohousing); at work, if possible through a better articulation with inhabiting, collective resources should also be more shared and optimised (coworking).

In the public space, pride of place will be given to pedestrians and soft mobility (e.g. cycling), while reinforcing public transport and the safe, shared use of private transport (e.g. eCar-sharing). Collective facilities will be suitable for everyone but adaptable to the isolation and treatment of each person in the event of new pandemics.

This flexibility will be applied not only to space but also to qualitative (not quantitative) time, based on the partitioning of work modes, schedules and commuting, avoiding useless displacements and peak hours. This alternative will be a step towards the requalification of the urban habitat, but, above all, towards a renewed “right to the city”.



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