



UNIVERSIDADE D
COIMBRA

José Maurício Vieira Filho

**BECOMING ELIGIBLE FOR PEACE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UN
PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE**

**Tese no âmbito do Doutoramento em Relações Internacionais –
Política Internacional e Resolução de Conflitos orientada pela
Professora Doutora Paula Duarte Lopes e apresentada à
Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra.**

Fevereiro de 2020



UNIVERSIDADE D
COIMBRA

BECOMING ELIGIBLE FOR PEACE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UN
PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

José Maurício Vieira Filho

**Tese no âmbito do Doutoramento em Relações Internacionais – Política
Internacional e Resolução de Conflitos orientada pela Professora Doutora
Paula Duarte Lopes e apresentada à Faculdade de Economia da
Universidade de Coimbra para obtenção do grau de Doutor.**

Fevereiro de 2020

*For those that, before me, produced the
knowledge to which I am contributing to.*

Acknowledgements

When I decided to apply for a PhD Degree, I did not commensurate what this choice would imply to my both academic and personal life. For my surprise, the PhD journey reflects one of the concepts I bring in this thesis, arguing that decisions lead to ‘unexpected outcomes’ to refer to things that are not under our control and are beyond our expectations, for more or less. The fact is that there is no decision made in isolation and my first commitment on a PhD degree got me closer to people that now I call as colleagues and friends, who share common thoughts while building a valuable network on issues related to a better understanding of what is peace and what the promotion of peace implies to our daily life. During these four years (surplus months are just details), I have experienced different moments which I am grateful for. First, being selected for a FCT scholarship for the PhD Program in *International Politics and Conflict Resolution* at the University of Coimbra is of great value, since it was the financial apparatus I had to develop a research that will never be for my own benefits only. Second, I am grateful for having the support of all professors at the Faculty of Economics of my home institution: Raquel Freire, Daniela Nascimento, Teresa Cravo and Licínia Simão. A special thanks go to professor Paula Duarte Lopes, who beyond discussions in class, acted as supervisor of this project and who was also responsible for giving me the challenge of exploring New York while I was considering going to Africa for conducting my fieldwork.

In this trajectory, I am grateful for those that enabled me access to relevant places for my object of analysis, with a special thanks to the *Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations in New York*, where, for seven months, I explored the field of the multilateral diplomacy. Special thanks to Cedric de Coning and Kari Osland, from the *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* (NUPI) in Oslo; to Keith Krause and Oliver Jüntersonke, from the *Centre for Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding* (CCDP) at the *Graduate Institute*, in Geneva, who, in different moments, hosted me in their respective institutions and also for enabling me to improve my thoughts, contribution and to enhance my expertise on peacebuilding. Special thanks also to the *University for Peace*, in Costa Rica, where I spent a valuable time on accessing relevant documents for my fieldwork. I thank to Thomas Biersteker, Anna Leander, Arjun Chowdhury, Alena Vieira, Maxine David, Werner Patzelt and Susan Woodward for interesting discussion on how problematizing our own contribution

is a necessary reflection for its improvement, and to all those who I talked to and that, for ethical reasons, are not identified in this thesis. Beyond the academic discussion, a thesis exists also because we can count on the support of those that are responsible for making our life simple: on the one hand, with regard on how to find additional sources for our research. My thanks go to Maria José Carvalho, Acácio Machado and Inês Lima, from the North South Library at the *Center for Social Studies* (CES); to Albert Trithart, from the *International Peace Institute* (IPI); and to the *United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library* in New York. On the other hand, special thanks also to Catarina Fernandes and Rita Pais who are in the front of the bureaucratic structure that provides support to all PhD scholarship holders from CES.

Although I have started this PhD journey in October 2015, its implication is not limited in time only. During these four years, I met and re-met people that are now part of my family: Sérgio Barbosa, Sandra Samúdio, Maísa Lins, Paulo Geovane, Júlia Zuza, Hallison da Silva, Wesley Machini, Ana Cláudia Freitas, Helder Lourenço, Rita Perdigão and Chrystiane Castellucci. Special thanks to Cristina de Oliveira, who were always there to clarify thoughts, problematize the methodology and share our common concerns on how to survive a PhD thesis and for our aspiration on finding a US\$ 10 thousand salary job; to Monica Del Vecchio, who always celebrated from the simplest to the most difficult achievement during this journey; to Bruno Biazatti, for motivating me to write beyond the academic lines and transform part of this journey into chronicles about people we usually see once in a life; to those that opened their own places to host me: Dulce Carneiro Folvik, Jair Nogueira, Kjartan Vevle, Mary-Anne, Milena Loureiro, Gustavo Sancho and Geise Fiscina. And also my colleagues from the PhD program, who I shared learning since the beginning of this journey: Roxana Andrei and Tatiana Daré.

Since celebrating the completion of this thesis is an exercise of looking back to the path I have constructed so far, my special thanks go to my family (Dôra & Maurício, my parents; Samara & John; sister and brother-in-law; and my aunt Graça) who re-signified the term *saudade* caused by the physical distance while I was doing what I like most: research abroad. To them, my gratitude for waiting my return to Brazil and also for keeping the silence during my writing at home.

Aquiraz, Brazil – February, 2nd 2020.

This thesis was funded through the PhD scholarship PD/BD/113981/2015 of the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), Portugal, within the scope of the PhD Program in International Politics and Conflict Resolution – 2015/2019 edition – at the University of Coimbra, in partnership with the Center for Social Studies (CES).

*

Esta tese foi financiada por meio da bolsa de doutoramento PD/BD/113981/2015 proveniente da Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, no âmbito do Programa de Doutoramento em Política Internacional e Resolução de Conflitos – edição 2015/2019 – da Universidade de Coimbra, em parceria com o Centro de Estudos Sociais (CES).

Resumo

Quando a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) estabeleceram sua Arquitetura de Construção da Paz (*Peacebuilding Architecture* – PBA) em dezembro de 2005, não se tinha como comensurar e identificar as implicações para a construção da paz no âmbito institucional nem as implicações com relação a quais países se beneficiariam dessa nova estrutura. A análise da primeira década da PBA (2005-2015) sugere, portanto, algum tipo de competição entre dois de seus três órgãos, os quais são a Comissão de Construção da Paz (*Peacebuilding Commission* – PBC) e o Fundo de Construção da Paz (*Peacebuilding Fund* – PBF), modificando os papéis iniciais esperados para cada um desses órgãos. A maneira como o PBC e o PBF colocaram em prática a perspectiva institucional de construção da paz reforçou a rotulagem de países dentro da ONU. Essa dinâmica é ilustrada pelo fato de Comores e Costa do Marfim terem sido os únicos países cujo pedido oficial de inclusão no PBC foi rejeitado, e estes países foram, conseqüentemente, designados ao apoio financeiro do PBF. As razões subjacentes a esta decisão não são claras, uma vez que não existem critérios específicos para explicar essas decisões. Diante deste cenário, esta tese analisa os processos de tomada de decisão da ONU para identificar os motivos e práticas subjacentes que determinam a diferença na rotulagem de países entre o PBC e o PBF e a conseqüente inclusão de países em um ou outro órgão da PBA. No entanto, essa discussão não é sobre o tipo ideal de modelo de tomada de decisão ou sobre o número de modelos de tomada de decisão que podem (ou não) coexistir dentro da Arquitetura de Construção da Paz. Para abordar essa questão, a tese aborda a discussão sobre a dinâmica da rotulagem na PBA, com o foco nos processos de tomada de decisão estabelecidos e praticados durante a primeira década (2005-2015). A partir de uma metodologia baseada na *practice tracing*, esta tese não fornece uma análise comparativa do PBC e do PBF em si, mas baseia-se em suas respectivas análises para fornecer uma leitura integrada do funcionamento da Arquitetura de Construção da Paz, com ênfase na dinâmica entre o enquadramento e a rotulagem dos países, bem como suas respectivas elegibilidade para a paz na ONU.

Palavras-chaves: Arquitetura de Construção da Paz, Enquadramento, Organização das Nações Unidas, Rotulagem, Tomada de Decisão.

Abstract

When the United Nations (UN) established its Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) on December 2005, the organization was not aware of the implications for peacebuilding at the institutional level nor on the implications with regard to which countries would benefit from this new peacebuilding framework. The analysis of its first decade (2005-2015) suggests, therefore, almost some sort of competition between two of its three bodies, namely the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), seemingly changing the initial expected roles for each body. The way the PBC and the PBF put peacebuilding into practice reinforced country labelling inside the UN. The fact that Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire were the only countries whose official request to be included in the PBC were rejected and that they were subsequently directed to the financial support of the PBF illustrates these labelling dynamics. The reasons underlying this decision are not clear, since no specific consolidate criteria exists to explain these decisions. In this scenario, this thesis opens the 'black box' of international organizations' decision-making processes in order to identify the underlying reasons and practices that determine difference in country labelling between the PBC and the PBF. This discussion is not on the ideal type of decision-making model or on the number of decision-making models that may (or may not) co-exist inside the PBA. In order to fully address this issue, the thesis engages with the discussion on labelling dynamics inside the PBA, focused on the decision-making processes established and practiced. Embedded on a practice tracing methodology, this thesis does not provide a comparative analysis of the PBC and the PBF *per se*, but rather builds on their analysis to provide an integrated reading of the PBA's functioning, focusing on the dynamics between countries' framing and labelling and their respective eligibility for peace.

Keywords: Decision-Making, Framing, Labelling, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, the United Nations.

Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
AHAG	Ad Hoc Advisory Group
ASG-PBSO	Assistant Secretary-General for the Peacebuilding Support Office
BCPR	Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Early Recovery
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BINUCA	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
CARMPTFUN	Central African Republic Multi-Partner Trust Fund
CARMPTFGvt	Central African Republic Multi-Partner Trust Fund Government Window
CCDP	Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding
CDP	Committee for Development
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNDD-FDD	Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie
CPLP	Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries
DAC	Department Assistance Committee
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DFID	Department for International Development
DFS	Department of Field Support
DOCO	Development Coordination Office
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operation
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FSG	Fragile States Index
G7+	Group of Fragile States
HDI	Human Development Index

HIKK	Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ICG	International Crisis Group
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ILO	International Labour Organization
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MINUCI	United Mission Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MPTF-O	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office
MRU	Mano River Union
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRA	Non-Resident Agencies
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIOS	Office for Internal Oversight Services
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAC	Proposal Assessment Committee
PBA	Peacebuilding Architecture
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBC-OC	Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission
PBC-CSC	Country-Specific Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission
PBC-SMC	Statement of Mutual Commitments of the Peacebuilding Commission
PBC-WGLL	Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund

PBF-AG	Advisory Group of the Peacebuilding Fund
PBF-IRF	Immediate Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund
PBF-PRF	Peacebuilding Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund
PBF-ToR	Term of Reference of the Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PPP	Peacebuilding Priority Plan
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RUNO	Resident United Nations Offices
SMC	Statements of Mutual Commitments
SPF	Strategic Peacebuilding Framework
SPG-PCG	Senior Peacebuilding Group-Peacebuilding Contact Group
SOMMPTFUN	Somalia Multi-Partner Trust Fund
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDP-MPTF	United Nations Development Program – Multi Partner Trust Fund
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNOB	United Nations Office in Burundi
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSC-P5	Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOGBIS	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOL	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNWOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

List of Tables

- 1.1. Research questions
- 2.1. Frame, framing and framework
- 3.1. Decision-making models within International Organizations
- 4.1. From AHAG's experience to PBC's expectations
- 5.1. Membership of the PBC-OC during its first session
- 5.2. Members of Guinea-Bissau's and Burundi's frameworks under ECOSOC AHAGs and PBC-CSCs
- 5.3. Scope of the two facilities covered by the PBF
- 5.4. Countries financed by the PBF from 2005 to 2015
- 6.1. Annual funding contributions to the PBF by the UNSC's permanent members
- 6.2. Decision-making process of including countries in the PBC Agenda (2005-2010)
- 6.3. PBF's 'Three-Windows Architecture'
- 6.4. Countries under PBF's "three-window architecture" (2007-2009)
- 6.5. Scope of the PBF's funding instruments
- 6.6. The PBF's layer by financial support
- 6.7. Countries financed by the PBF (2005-2015)
- 6.8. Countries financed by the PBF per type of funding source (2005-2015)
- 6.9. UN dynamic of when countries became eligible for the PBA (2005-2015)
- 7.1. Common peacebuilding priorities for PBC-countries
- 7.2. Specific peacebuilding priorities for PBC-countries
- 7.3. Principles of Cooperation of PBC-countries' Frameworks
- 7.4. Actors engaged on Mutual Commitments of PBC-countries
- 8.1. Conditionality on the scope of the activities to be funded by the PBF
- 8.2. Conditionality for approving project submissions by the PBF
- 8.3. PBF's financial support to countries based on type of funding and label
- 8.4. Quantity of projects per theme financed by the PBF (2005-2015)
- 8.5. Number of projects per PBF's theme to PBC- and non-PBC countries (2005-2015)
- 8.6. Amount and percentage of PBF's funding to PBC- and non-PBC countries (2007-2015)
- 8.7. Consolidated PBF's financial support (2007-2015)
- 8.8. PBF's funding to PBC- and non-PBC country (2007-2015)
- 8.9. PBF donors' commitments (2005-2015)

List of Figures

- 6.1. Consolidated funding contributions to the PBF by the UNSC-P5 (2006-2015)
- 6.2. First layer of the PBF's decision-making – the eligibility criteria
- 6.3. Second layer of the PBF's decision-making – the IRF criteria
- 6.4. Third layer of the PBF's decision-making – the PRF criteria
- 6.5. PBSO performance on PBF's decision-making process in 2010 and 2011*
- 7.1. PBC-Chair's contribution to the Peacebuilding Fund (2006-2015)

List of Boxes

- 8.1. Questions for Assessment of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) by the PBSO
- 8.2. Questions for Assessment of the Annual Project Progress Report by the PBSO

Contents

Acknowledgements	v
Resumo	ix
Abstract.....	xi
Acronyms	xiii
List of Tables	xvii
List of Figures.....	xix
List of Boxes.....	xxi
1. Introduction	27
1.1. The institutional setting for peace	28
1.2. Beyond an analysis of <i>peacebuilding</i> and <i>liberal peace</i>	36
1.2.1. What is Peacebuilding	37
1.2.2. Perspectives for peacebuilding and its liberal predominance approach	41
1.3. PBC eligibility as an object of analysis	44
1.4. Methodology.....	50
1.5. Outline of the thesis.....	57
2. Labelling, Framing and their correlation with Decision-Making.....	61
Introduction	61
2.1. Conceptualizing labelling	62
2.1.1. Functions and legitimacy of labels	67
2.1.2. The political ideology of the labels	71
2.2. Framing <i>or</i> deciding on how to frame the labelled.....	75
2.2.1. The definition of framing and its correlates	77
2.2.2. The political perspective on framing	83
2.3. Diffusing norms by labelling and framing	85
2.3.1. What is norm diffusion?	85
2.3.2. Norm Diffusion as a Shared Function of Framing and Labelling	88
2.3.3. Norm Diffusion and Decision-Making: a correlation.....	90
Conclusion.....	92

3. Decision-Making as a Co-Constitutive Practice	95
Introduction	95
3.1. Decision-making within International Organizations	97
3.2. Decision-Making Models	103
3.2.1. Rational Model	104
3.2.2. Organizational Model	105
3.2.3. Bureaucratic and Naturalistic Models	107
3.3. Constructivism meets decision-making	109
3.4. What is meant by co-constitutive practice?	119
Conclusion	128
4. The UN Practice Towards Labelling and Framing Post-Conflict Countries	129
Introduction	129
4.1. Constructing the label: the case of the Ad Hoc Advisory Groups	131
4.1.1. The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau	136
4.1.2. The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi	139
4.2. Reinforcing the label and re-framing challenges	143
4.2.1. The limits of institutional labelling and framing	144
4.2.2. The institutional discourse of filling a gap on peacebuilding	148
4.3. Disseminating the label and the PBA	153
4.3.1. The PBA and its ‘post-conflict’ label	154
4.3.2. The PBA and its peacebuilding framework	158
Conclusion	161
5. The UN Peacebuilding Architecture	163
Introduction	163
5.1. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)	164
5.2. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)	177
5.3. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)	188
5.3.1. PBC’s Secretariat	191
5.3.2. PBF’s manager	195
Conclusion	198

6. The UN Peacebuilding Architecture in Practice	201
Introduction	201
6.1. When rational and organizational decisions clash.....	203
6.1.1. Delimiting the PBC’s geographic and structural boundaries	208
6.1.2. Creating an already threatened and limited PBC-body	212
6.2. Making countries eligible for the PBC	221
6.2.1. Explaining PBC’s decision-making process.....	224
6.2.2. The politics behind countries inclusion in the PBC Agenda.....	226
6.3. Making countries eligible for the PBF	231
6.3.1. The First PBF’s eligibility criteria: three-windows for defining emergency needs	232
6.3.2. The Second PBF’s eligibility criteria: in between the Immediate and Recovery	
Facilities	235
Conclusion.....	248
7. The Peacebuilding Commission Is Not for All Post-Conflict Countries	249
Introduction	249
7.1. Improving Peacebuilding: from the Configuration to the Framework.....	250
7.1.1. Defining peacebuilding priorities and principles for PBC-countries	259
7.2. Statement of Mutual Commitments: PBC’s normative role?.....	263
7.3. Chair of PBC-configurations: a leading role for peacebuilding?	269
Conclusion.....	274
8. The Peacebuilding Fund is for (almost) all post-conflict countries	277
Introduction	277
8.1. Crafting PBF’s peacebuilding framework.....	278
8.2. Improving peacebuilding: a PBF’s agenda for post-conflict countries	286
8.3. Financing peacebuilding: a dynamic on money flows	301
8.4. PBF’s guiding principles: the role of the PBSO.....	309
Conclusion.....	312
9. Conclusion: The Challenge on Deciding for Peace	315
9.1. The Peacebuilding Architecture in Practice	315
9.2. Labelling and Framing as influencers aspects in Decision-Making.....	321
9.3. Decision-Making as an institutional practice	323

9.4. Implications for future research	325
References	329
Primary Sources	329
Secondary Sources	348
List of Interviewees & Codes	373

1. Introduction

The establishment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) on 20 December 2005 (UN Doc. S/RES/1645 (2005), A/RES/60/180) was perceived as a much needed step to enhanced the UN role in peacebuilding. Comprised by three entities – the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) – the PBA had the aims and means to finally provide a coherent approach to UN’s engagement in peacebuilding. However, soon enough, the PBA’s functioning started denoting seemingly unexpected discrepancies. On the one hand, no clear criteria seemed to explain the inclusion and exclusion of countries of the PBC; and, on the other hand, the actual implications of being included or not in the PBC were not clear. Access to funds was obviously involved, but the label used for different countries also positioned them differently in terms of available international support to their peace prospects. During the PBA’s first decade of functioning (2005-2015), some countries (only six) were considered eligible for the PBC, some were refused access to the PBC (at least two), and the majority (33 countries), including those in the PBC, were restricted to the PBF.

These different types of engagement with the PBA reflect different understandings of countries’ peace contexts: countries *emerging from conflict*, countries in a *post-conflict peacebuilding* phase, countries on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict. Still, when analyzing the use of these different labels to explain the diversity of countries’ involvement with the PBA, no clear consistent practice emerges. Consequently, answering the *why* question becomes paramount in order to better understand the PBA’s role in peacebuilding. The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to open the “black box” of the PBA’s decision-making in order to identify and analyze the process and practice through which some countries were deemed eligible for the PBC and others, such as Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire, were not. My argument is that institutional practices within the PBA determined and reinforced difference in country labelling between the PBC and the PBF implying different responses at the institutional level. The subjectivism at the UN on choosing which country is able to be addressed by the PBC confronts any perspective of a rational decision of what constitutes the eligibility criteria a prospective country must comply with and the appropriated label attached to it. Since eligibility implies an allowance for doing or receiving something due to

the satisfaction of certain and necessary conditions¹, the UN did not provide specific criteria for country eligibility when the PBA was established, any attempt of identifying criteria is easily contested, making this research even more pertinent. This thesis does not present any eligibility criteria *per se*, but it addresses what triggers a dynamic of peace within the PBA.

1.1. The institutional setting for peace

When the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA) simultaneously approved the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office, Kofi Annan was concluding its second and last term² as the UN Secretary-General. The PBA emerged as one of his legacies regarding for peace in parallel with the creation of the Human Rights Council³. Annan's justification for establishing a Commission dedicated to peacebuilding was formally expressed through four institutional reports dedicated to the improvement of UN strategies for peace: the *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (UN Doc. A/59/565), the report *In Larger Freedom* (UN Doc. A/59/2005) and its subsequent *Addendum* (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2), and the *2005 World Summit Outcome* (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1).

As part of the first report, Kofi Annan expressed in 2004 that the core of the debate was not only addressing specific threats, but the possibility for identifying “new ways of understanding the connections between them and the implications for the policies and institutions we must have in place” (UN Doc. A/59/565, page 1). Annan's premise, in that regard, can be taken as a discursive construction over what the UN needed to establish for addressing the identified threats. In that scenario, the emergence of the PBA's first body – the PBC – is justified by the institutional recognition that, first, “*post-conflict peacebuilding* is essential given the challenges we face today” (UN Doc. A/59/565, page 3, emphasis added); second, there was “a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery [that no] system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from

¹ The definition of eligibility is based on its meaning by the Cambridge Dictionary (2020).

² Kofi Annan, from Ghana, was the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations, serving at the institution from 1997 to 2006 (UN, 2020).

³ The Human Rights Council was created on 15 March 2006 by the UNGA's resolution 60/251, replacing the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Its first session took place from 19 to 30 June 2006 (OHCHR, 2020).

war to lasting peace” (UN Doc. A/59/2005, page 31); third, that the new Commission could “ensure that the international community as a whole is effectively supporting the national authorities” (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2, page 2-3); and, fourth, that the PBC could enhance a “coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace” (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, page 24). Taken from each of the aforementioned reports, these four assertions evidence that the Peacebuilding Commission was emerging for ensuring a commitment in a specific field of action and to fill the gap at the UN level, more precisely on its *post-conflict peacebuilding* apparatus. When formally launched in 2005, the new architecture brought to the surface the recognition of “the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of *countries emerging from conflict*” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645 (2005), A/RES/60/180, emphasis added), which framed the creation of the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF.

Although the founding resolutions addressed important issues, such as identifying PBC’s purposes, its members, format, and the role of its counterparts – PBSO and PBF (UN Doc. S/RES/1645 (2005), A/RES/60/180) – none of the documents specified which country – or countries – the PBC was aimed at. The notion of *countries emerging from conflict* was, consequently, lacking an official interpretation of its real meaning and of its intended implementation in the institutional decision-making of the PBA. Both resolutions only pointed out that countries included in the PBC should be preceded by requests from the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the prospective-country itself based on “exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645 (2005), para. 12; A/RES/60/180, para. 12).

Such condition posited any country interested in engaging with the PBC with the right to present its request. In this sense, what constitutes a country emerging from conflict prone to be addressed by the PBC in face of its verge condition of lapsing or relapsing into conflict is embedded in a UN subjectivism, determining that not all countries included in this category would become a PBC-one. During the PBA’s first decade (2005-2015), two cases illustrate this *problématique* and they are the reason underlying this research. First, in a report launched by the PBC’s Organizational Committee in 2008⁴ (UN Doc. A/63/92–

⁴ The report of the PBC’s Organizational Committee comprises meetings held from 23 June 2007 to 22 June 2008 as part of its 2nd Session.

S/2008/417), the Government of Côte d'Ivoire had the initiative – based on paragraph 12 of the founding resolutions – to present its request to be placed in the agenda of the PBC. The information provided by the report is very clear regarding the necessary steps that were taken, pointing out that Côte d'Ivoire's request “was conveyed to the Security Council for consideration on 25 April 2008 [and that] the request was also brought to the attention of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretary-General” (UN Doc. A/63/92–S/2008/417, para. 17). In the following years, no information was provided about Côte d'Ivoire's request neither an official and public justification for not including it in the PBC. In face of this effective rejection, Côte d'Ivoire was directed solely to financial support by the Peacebuilding Fund.

Second, in a review of the Peacebuilding Fund elaborated by Kluyskens and Clark (2014), the authors mention that “the only country that has officially applied to the PBC and been rejected is the Comoros” (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 35). However, they do not discuss this case and its potential implications, nor do they identify any other case. Beyond Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire, other countries have been mentioned as prospective ones for inclusion in the PBC, such as Haiti (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.2), Nepal (Jenkins, 2013: 110) and Timor-Leste⁵. Although there is no official information regarding their respective requests, UN documents did mention them as *prospective* or *candidates* for the PBC. For instance, in the case of Nepal, Jenkins also concurs that this country was “another candidate for inclusion on the PBC's agenda” (Jenkins, 2013: 110). Although considering a country a potential candidate does not imply the existence of a formal request to the PBC, it evidences an understanding of an internal dynamic in making countries eligible for the PBC, despite the fact that, in the case of Nepal, “leaders from across the country's political spectrum were reluctant to increase Nepal's exposure to international monitoring” and actually make the request (Jenkins, 2013: 110). In this sense, the demarcation of an institutional boundary through the PBC has led to different perceptions and dynamics of engagement. First, the UN decision to reject certain countries' requests for the PBC, created a divergent perception of what constitutes a country *emerging from conflict* eligible for *post-conflict peacebuilding* and, most importantly, of what were the actual purposes for establishing the PBC. Second,

⁵ The information on Timor-Leste was provided by the former president of that country, José Ramos-Horta, in a speech addressed to the 62th session of the UNGA, on 27 September 2007, when he affirmed that “as the situation progresses, we hope that the Peace Building Commission will consider placing Timor-Leste on its agenda as a follow-up to the UNMIT” (Ramos-Horta, 2007: 5). See also Otobo (2015).

at the same time, the UN had to deal with the resistance of some countries that decided not to engage with the PBC, crafting a space for stigmatization regarding both the PBC and countries in its agenda. And, third, rejecting countries for the PBC and restricting them to the PBF, unexpectedly conferred an increased role in peacebuilding to the Fund within the PBA. At this point, I would like to declare that this thesis does not advocate on behalf of the PBC nor the PBF. The overall finding is that the guiding perception of what the PBC could do and achieve in the pursuit of peace, based on the founding resolutions, does not encounter a coherent practice through its functioning.

The institutional boundary crafted by the establishment of the PBC becomes more evident when countries considered eligible for the Commission are identified in detriment of those rejected. During the ten years of PBA's functioning (2005-2015) and following a chronological order, Burundi and Sierra Leone (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/2), Guinea-Bissau (UN Doc. A/62/736-S/2007/744, UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.5), Central African Republic (UN Doc. A/62/864-S/2008/383, UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.6) and Liberia (UN Doc. A/64/870-S/2010/389) became eligible for the PBC following a request by the Security Council. Guinea's request, differently, had a similar process as were the cases of Côte d'Ivoire and Comoros. Guinea requested its inclusion based on the paragraph 12 of the PBA founding resolutions. Its successfully eligibility for the PBC was consolidated in 2011, being the sixth and last country to be included in the PBC agenda.

Identifying which country became eligible for the PBC in comparison to those rejected is an evidence that the institutional boundary creates a systemic discrepancy of what represents the achievements of peace within international institutions while confronting the aim of the new established mechanisms. In addition, the same boundary also reflects a dynamic characterized by the role labels play in determining strategies for specific groups of countries. Within this institutional problematic, I point out that there is at least one label for each specific strategy aiming at a behavioral transformation or, more precisely, at the transition from a label to another one that could reflect the successful achievement of the strategy established, also called as *graduation*. Since the focus of this thesis is the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, labels intrinsic to its dynamic involve: *countries emerging from conflict*, *post-conflict peacebuilding* and *post-conflict country*, which reveal the creation of a space dedicated not only to the implementation of *peacebuilding*, but also to its

development. However, within the UN, other labels, beyond these ones, permeate its functioning and work as determining aspects of new institutional strategies, as is the case of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and fragile countries. LDCs include “low-income countries confronting severe structural impediments to sustainable development” (DESA, 2019a) with the aim to provide “exclusive access to certain international support measures in particular in the areas of development assistance and trade” (DESA, 2019a). As of writing, the Committee for Development⁶ (CDP) of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) has classified 47 countries as LDCs, including the six integrated in the PBC⁷.

As a spillover effect, ‘fragile state’ is another label that permeates international organizations’ dynamic, and that classifies prospective countries for intervention (Bhatia, 2015; Peteet, 2015). Under this label, there are two important indexes: States of Fragility, compiled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as part of its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Fragile States Group (FSG) (OECD, 2006: 13); and the Fragile States Index, compiled by The Fund for Peace. These indexes not only transform quantitative and qualitative data on political, societal, economic, environmental, security, cohesion and cross-cutting indicators (OECD, 2018; The Fund for Peace, 2019a) into visualization of which country is (or countries are) classified as most fragile one; but these indexes also refer to a dynamic in which a label attached is passive of transformation, implying a practice of an institutional and political domination, being or not applied at the same proportion as other countries that share the same label. Looking for a plausible or rational justification for comprehending country eligibility for peace – taking its inclusion into the PBC as parameter – is a never-ending process. During the initial phase of this research, such attempt worked as a guiding tool in order to identify what were the similarities and differences among the countries included in the PBC and the ones rejected. Although

⁶ The Committee for Development (CDP) is mandated by the UNGA and the ECOSOC to review the list of LDCs every three years. It also makes recommendations on the inclusion and graduation of eligible countries based on three criteria: income, human assets and economic vulnerability (DESA, 2019a).

⁷ Besides the six countries included in the PBC – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone – the LDC countries list comprises: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Dem. Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia (DESA, 2019b). As of writing, Angola (UN Doc. A/RES/70/253), Bhutan, São Tomé and Príncipe, Solomon Island (UN Doc. A/73/L.40/Rev.1) and Vanuatu (UN Doc. A/RES/68/18) have had their graduation decided by a UNGA’s resolution starting on December 2020 until December 2024. In addition, Botswana, Maldives, Cabo Verde, Samoa and Equatorial Guinea have also graduated from the LDC before.

the indicators initially used reflect a certain level of a naïveté regarding what really determines a country's eligibility for the PBC, they actually evidenced the problematic aspect at the institutional level regarding the rejection of Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire.

The initial analysis started from the context the PBC and PBF were established. The PBC is an intergovernmental advisory body (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES//60/180) aiming at the prevention of countries relapsing into war (Jenkins, 2013: 3), through an involvement of “significant actors from North and South, thus offering unique potential diplomatic leverage” (de Coning and Stamnes, 2015: 10), constituting “an improvement on previous global peacebuilding efforts” (Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2012: 144). The PBF constitutes a “multiyear standing fund for post-conflict peacebuilding” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES//60/180) with the main purpose of providing immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES//60/180), and being a “catalytic funding to reinforce financial assistance by other agencies and donors to address critical financial gaps” (Otobo, 2015: 13). Thus, such autonomous role attributed to the PBF posited itself as not being a fund for the PBC (Cavalcante, 2019: 221), and this disaggregation within the PBA was the starting point for comprehending the panorama of identifying what could interfere on the establishment of the eligibility criteria for the PBC.

The primary indicators used to understand in which context countries were included in the PBC were as follows:

- i. all countries eligible for the PBC during its first decade (2005-2015) are African;
- ii. four of them – Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone – are located regionally on West Africa; while Burundi is located in the region of the African Great Lakes, and Central African Republic is located in the Central Africa;
- iii. Burundi (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/2), Guinea-Bissau (UN Doc. A/62/736–S/2007/744, UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.5) and Sierra Leone (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/2) were, first, eligible for the PBC and, then, received funding allocations through the PBF (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/15; PBF, 2008a);
- iv. Liberia (PBF, 2007) and Guinea (PBF, 2008b) became, first, recipients of the PBF and, later, became eligible for the PBC (UN Doc. A/64/870–S/2010/389);

- v. Central African Republic (UN Doc. A/62/864-S/2008/383, UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.6) was eligible for the PBC and became recipient of the PBF in the same year, in 2008 (PBF, 2008c);
- vi. UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed in four of the countries: Burundi⁸, Central African Republic, Liberia and Sierra Leone⁹; from these four countries, Central African Republic¹⁰ and Liberia¹¹ were still in the list of the current peacekeeping operations in parallel to their eligibility for – and during their engagement with – the PBC until 2015;
- vii. these PBC-countries reflect a low human development category, based on the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2019): from a list of 189 countries and territories, their positioning is remarkably in the margin – Burundi (185), Central African Republic (188), Guinea (174), Guinea-Bissau (178), Liberia (176) and Sierra Leone (181) (UNDP, 2018);
- viii. in addition, the classification of these six countries with regard to their fragility index varies from *alert* to *very high alert*; in order of the most fragile country, PBC-countries are sequenced as follows, Central African Republic (6), Guinea (11), Burundi (15), Guinea-Bissau (19), Liberia (30) and Sierra Leone (39), from a list of 178 countries (Fund for Peace, 2019).

⁸ The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established on 21 May 2004 until December 2006 (UN Doc. S/RES/1545 (2004)), when the UNSC established the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) on 1 January 2007 as part of a peacebuilding process (UN Doc. S/RES/1719 (2006)).

⁹ In Sierra Leone, the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation dates from July 1998, when the UNSC approved the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (UN Doc. S/RES/1181(1998)). Later, on 22 October 1999, this mission was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (UN Doc. S/RES/1270(1999)). Similar to Burundi, it was established a United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) after UNAMSIL (UN Doc. S/RES/1620 (2005)).

¹⁰ A peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic was deployed into three different moments: first, on 27 March 1998, that established the United Nations Mission in The Central African Republic (MINURCA) from April 1998 to February 2000 (UN Doc. S/RES/1159(1998)). The second moment with the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) on 25 September 2007 (UN Doc. S/RES/1778 (2007)) that had its mandate completed on 31 December 2010 (UN Doc. S/RES/1923 (2010)). The third moment is through the approval of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in The Central African Republic (MINUSCA) on 10 April 2014 (UN Doc. S/RES/2149 (2014)), replacing the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). This peacekeeping figures as one of the current operations by the UN.

¹¹ In Liberia, the UN deployed two distinct peace operations in that country: one, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) from September 1993 to September 1997 (UN Doc. S/RES/866 (1993)) and, second, through the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 19 September 2003 (UN Doc. S/RES/1509 (2003)). This second peace operation was concluded only on 30 June 2016, when the UNMIL transferred the security responsibilities to Liberian authorities (UN Doc. S/RES/2239(2015)).

Taking these facts as parameters for thinking about the specificities of being accepted or not to the PBC, the scenario Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire faced for requesting their inclusion or for just becoming a prospective candidate for the PBC is similar to some of these circumstances. Côte d'Ivoire, for example, is an African country, located in the West Africa region, with two peacekeeping operations deployed in its territory: the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) on 13 May 2003 (UN Doc. S/RES/1479(2003)), being replaced by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) (UN Doc. S/RES/1528 (2004)) until 30 June 2017 (UN Doc. S/RES/2284 (2016)). The country is also included in the list of low human development category from the UNDP, being positioned as 165 out of 189 countries and territories (UNDP, 2019); and with a position of 29th in the ranking of the Fragile State Index 2019 (The Fund for Peace, 2019). Its eligibility for the PBF was granted on 19 June 2008 (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522). Côte d'Ivoire remained fragile even after the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2007, being characterized with a situation of persistent high levels of violent crime and lack of progress in disarming rebel forces and militia groups (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522, page 7).

Geographically distant from the other previous countries, Comoros, an archipelago located in the Southern Africa, does not have a record of peacekeeping operations deployment. Comoros was eligible for the PBF on 25 June 2008 (PBF, 2008b) following a request by the national government (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522, page 7). The reason for justifying its eligibility for funding was based on the recognition by the UN Country Team that Comoros was “stable but fragile” in face of the political situation and inter-island relations that caused numerous *coups* or attempted *coups* that could pose a difficulty level to advance peace and stability (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522, page 7). Not differently, Comoros is also classified within the low human development category, being posited as 156 out of 189 countries and territories (UNDP, 2019) and 56th position in the ranking of the Fragile State Index 2019 (The Fund for Peace, 2019). And yet, both countries' requests to be included in the PBC were rejected.

Although each country has experienced different levels of fragility, the panorama above calls attention for an encountering of facts that make them eligible for the PBC without apparent distinction. However, in pragmatic terms, the differentiation over countries eligible for peace in contrast to those rejected for the PBC raises the question that peace is strictly a political

conquest that requires bargaining, negotiation and, generally, a non-transparent decision-making process even inside international organizations. As a former Assistant-Secretary General (ASG) for the PBSO, Carolyn McAskie, stated, “a major issue was how to establish country eligibility for consideration by the PBC” (McAskie, 2016: xxx). Providing such statement after leaving the office is a signal that eligibility was one of the main concerns of the PBC. Although McAskie later recognized that “ideally a process was needed to discuss potential client countries” (2016: xxx), her point of view on defending that the best method of dealing with such matters is through informality (McAskie, 2016: xxx) reverberates what Hadwen and Kaufmann have pointed out in 1962, when they analyzed the UN decision-making processes. At that time, they asserted that “the U.N. operates far more through personal relations and informal discussion than by formal exchanges and public debate” (1962: 14). The 54 years in between both statements indicate that the UN is embedded in a repetition of its own institutional practices, and that its decision-making process on peace and security tends not to reveal the underlying and immaterial aspects that constitute it, which are the power dynamics among its member states, the establishment of institutional boundaries through labels attached to countries passive of being controlled by the UN, as well as through the dissemination of a peace agenda that reflects hegemonic practices of (re)building states.

1.2. Beyond an analysis of *peacebuilding* and *liberal peace*

Although this thesis is focused on the implications for peacebuilding of countries being included on the PBC Agenda or benefiting from the PBF, it is not centered on an in-depth analysis over the concept of *peacebuilding* nor the *liberal peace* approach. There are several contributions on these issues (Galtung, 1976; Fisher, 1993; Spiro, 1994; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Ramsbotham, 2000; Jeong, 2002, 2005; Schwarz, 2005; Pauligny, 2005; Pugh, 2005; Brown, 2006; Richmond, 2006, 2010; Heatershaw and Lambach, 2008; Goetze and Guzina, 2008; Chetail, 2009; Eriksen, 2009; Murithi, 2009; Paris, 1997, 2002, 2010; Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam, 2011; De Coning, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2013; Chetail and Jütersonke, 2014; Hellmüller and Santschi, 2014; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Groß, 2017; Joshi and Wallenstein, 2018; Karbo and Virk, 2018; Karlsrud, 2018), and there is a specific one that analyzes the trajectory of the concept of peacebuilding in the UN and links the PBA with an analysis over a liberal peace agenda (Cavalcante, 2019). Still, a brief

overview on *peacebuilding* and *liberal peace* becomes necessary for a better comprehension the scenario within which the PBA emerged, how it was designed and, most importantly, how it put into practice the existing peacebuilding approach during its first decade (2005-2015). This brief overview is important to situate the reader regarding where the PBA discussion comes in and to link the thesis conceptual approach labelling, framing, decision-making and constructivism to *peacebuilding* and *liberal peace*.

As Cavalcante argues, “the way peacebuilding appeared and gained prominence in the context of the UN in the early 1990s had a profound and lasting influence in the Organisation’s provision of support to societies affected by armed conflict” (2019: 2). For Cavalcante this influence is doubled: on the one hand, influencing the core meaning underlying peacebuilding in the UN, and, on the other hand, preventing substantial changes in that same meaning (Cavalcante, 2019: 2). In this regard, what becomes explicit on Cavalcante’s contribution is not only how peacebuilding was incorporated by the UN in its approach for post-conflict countries, but also how incorporating the term reflects the establishment of a guiding tool for UN practices on this issue. Cavalcante focuses on the trajectory of the term peacebuilding and how it shaped UN practice on peacebuilding with regard to a liberal peace agenda. This thesis argues that there are different labelling and framing practices within *peacebuilding* and *liberal peace*, rendering visible dynamics that are usually not easily identified.

1.2.1. What is Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is, inherently, an academic term. It first appeared in 1976 when Johan Galtung elaborated his argument designating *peacebuilding* as the “associative approach” among the three ones he established for peace – peacekeeping¹² and peacemaking¹³. On his analysis, peace within peacebuilding has a structure different from the other two (Galtung, 1976: 297), in which those “structures must be found [to] remove causes of wars and [to] offer

¹² Following Galtung, peacekeeping is the dissociative approach, in which “the antagonists are kept away from each other under mutual threats of considerable punishment if they transgress, particularly if they transgress into each other's territory”. (1976: 286)

¹³ Peacemaking, in its turn, is the conflict resolution approach, in which “should not only be seen as a way of avoiding war, but also as a way for mankind to progress, to transcend incompatibilities or contradictions that stifle progress and channel attention and all kinds of resources away from more important pursuits”. (Galtung, 1976: 290)

alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur” (Galtung, 1976: 298). In that regard, Galtung explains that at the same time peace *has* a structure, it *is* an infrastructure embedded in a multilevel (Galtung, 1976: 303) analysis in which to fighting against violence¹⁴, peace “*must be built within nations as well as between nations*” (Galtung, 1976: 303). When the term moves from the academic field into a pragmatic interpretation and applicability, *peacebuilding* not only acquires a connotation of being associated to countries facing transitional phases from intrastate war to peace but, most importantly, it becomes incorporated into a multilevel approach, reflecting Galtung’s initial conceptualization.

That *momentum* occurred in 1992, when Boutros Boutros-Ghali institutionalized peacebuilding in the UN with his known *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*. In that document, peacebuilding is classified as a *post-conflict* approach, being defined as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 21), which “may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 56). Once incorporated into the UN, the conceptualization of peacebuilding was constantly improved in order to adequate the institution’s role in face of the challenges of peace, as became evident through other UN documents subsequent to *An Agenda for Peace*. As Cavalcante points out, “since the release of the document, the concept of peacebuilding has informed international initiatives in dozens of armed conflicts and post-conflict situations” (2019: 1). On this issue, I argue that the conceptualization over peacebuilding is analyzed through two main axes: on the one hand, by the UN itself, reframing what peacebuilding entails for its role; on the other hand, by scholars, who analyze what peacebuilding is or should be in face of how the UN applies the concept through its interventionist approach. First, peacebuilding within the UN is not dissociated of a post-conflict character¹⁵.

¹⁴ For a perspective on violence and peace, see Galtung (1969).

¹⁵ Ryan argues that attaching ‘post-conflict’ to ‘peacebuilding’ is problematic for two main reasons: first, “no society is ‘post-conflict’, since conflict is ubiquitous (...) and post-violence would be a better term, though a violence-free society is also hard to imagine” (2013: 28). And, second, “by seeming to restrict the idea of peacebuilding to the final stage in the cycle of violent conflict, it promotes a limited view of what peacebuilding could be” (Ryan, 2013: 28).

As became expressed on different institutional documents, peacebuilding refers to a post-conflict phase in which its implementation can be complicated (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, para. 48) since it “requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace-building effort is needed to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a conflict” (UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318, para. 63). In addition, the associative approach Galtung (1976) mentioned is explained by the fact that peacebuilding “may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development” (UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318, para. 63); as well as working “with both Governments and non-governmental parties and complementing what may be ongoing United Nations development activities” (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 6) on the countries in question.

Secondly, as the conceptualization of peacebuilding was adapted into an institutional framework, the academic debate over the term problematized how the UN and other international organizations applied the concept into pragmatic terms, while enhancing an analysis on what peacebuilding really is. My starting point on making the link within the UN perspective on peacebuilding and scholars who contributed to a better comprehension of the term comes from an analysis provided by Barnett *et al.* (2007), who went in-depth on the term after analyzing 24 governmental and intergovernmental bodies that were, at that time, active in peacebuilding. What they found was that “there are differences among actors regarding [peacebuilding] conceptualization and operationalization” (Barnett *et al.*, 2007: 36). In a more detailed analysis, Barnett *et al.* explain that, on the one hand, “some programs focus on the production of stability and security in the early days of a peace agreement’s implementation” (Barnett *et al.*, 2007: 36); while, on the other hand, “others [programs] focus on building vibrant civil societies and furthering development, democracy, justice, and the rule of law” (Barnett *et al.*, 2007: 36, added). Within the UN, Barnett *et al.* point out that its “specialized agencies have adopted other concepts, a pattern that probably owes to how peacebuilding fits into their broader core mandates” (2007: 42). In this sense, the conceptualization of peacebuilding – on both institutional and academic levels – is one of permanent change and, as no one has the monopoly on the definition of peace (Galtung, 1969), the definition of its derivatives, such as peacebuilding, reflects different perspectives over the same term. In this regard, peacebuilding “is an umbrella term that describes a wide

range of interventions that country offices [and international organizations] undertake to reduce the risk that a conflict-prone will lapse or relapse into violent conflict” (Campbell, 2018: 8, added). Although it “is the most extensive and transformative type of peacekeeping intervention undertaken by the international community” (Barma, 2017: 12), peacebuilding is also “about building effective, accountable state institutions” (McCandless, Abitol and Donais, 2015: 3-4) undertaken by individuals and organizations, as well as institutions, to reduce the effects of violent conflict (Neufeldt, 2014: 427) “through the establishment of (...) non-violent resolution of tensions and disputes” (Chetail and Jütersonke, 2014: 1).

Despite the fact that Pugh argues that peacebuilding “has come to mean revising the structures that led to conflict, and inevitably that means diminution of sovereignty” (Pugh, 2013: 21), it is therefore “part of the security agenda insofar as the pathologies of conflict-prone and underdeveloped states have been constructed as international threats” (Newman, 2013: 320), leading “to the rehabilitation of [those] regions and countries ravaged by armed conflicts in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities and to establish lasting peace” (David, 2002: 18), embedded in a reconstruction and reconciliation paradigm (Jeong, 2002: 7). In the scope of this thesis, such perspective enables comprehending peacebuilding as “a policy response to the non-violent management of conflict” (Holt, 2011: 18) that also “seeks to unify the social and economic spheres” (Murithi, 2009: 3).

From this point of view, being a policy response aims not only at reiterating Galtung’s (1976) contribution on enhancing peacebuilding as an associative approach but also, and most importantly, aims at disassociating peacebuilding from the peacekeeping paradigm¹⁶, since some authors refer peacebuilding as an *operation* or *mission* similar to the peacekeeping ones (David, 2002). Such positioning does not refer only to a terminology perspective, rather it embraces what Murithi points out, arguing that peacebuilding “is an expansive, inclusive and collaborative process which takes place simultaneously at (...) the macro, meso and micro levels” (2009: 7), reflecting that these levels are not only the field with regard to countries where peacebuilding is taking place but also, most importantly, the institutions where peacebuilding is designed and implemented beforehand.

¹⁶ For multidimensional peacekeeping, see DPKO (2003), Howard (2007), Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008), DIIS (2013) and Mandoyi, Choane and Twala (2013).

1.2.2. Perspectives for peacebuilding and its liberal predominance approach

When peace becomes institutionalized – as it is the case of peacebuilding through the establishment of the PBA –, this process reflects not only a type of international practice by the UN, but also that this practice is imbued of significance. I refer ‘significance’ to explain that, on the one hand, there are theories of International Relations that give a meaning to peace and that, on the other hand, such meaning guides institutions on what peace must entail enhancing the respective theoretical approach. Following Richmond (2006), there are four main theoretical debates in IR in which the conceptualization of peace derives from: first, that peace within *realism* “rests upon the balance of power, or domination, perceptions of threat and the glorification of military might” (Richmond, 2006: 369); second, within *idealism*, “peace is represented as desirable but, in effect, very difficult to achieve” (Richmond, 2006: 369); third, *liberalism* sees peace as a framework constructed by “multiple forms of intervention” (Richmond, 2006: 370); and, fourth, peace is taken as emancipatory by *post-modernism/structuralism* and *critical theory*, in which “forms of social and economic justice, identity, and representation allows for marginalized actors such as women, children, and minorities as well as environmental factors to be considered” (Richmond, 2006: 370).

In this thesis, Richmond’s (2006) contribution on the patterns of peace is inherent to the conceptual analysis developed. As he points out, “the methodology of peace is often represented as derived from ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ activities” (Richmond, 2006: 379) in which peace becomes an “objective condition resting either in the values of an international consensus on what constitutes peace and methods derived from this consensus” (Richmond, 2006: 379)¹⁷ or “in a local or indigenous capacity for peace which may need to be nurtured by international actors” (Richmond, 2006: 379). Since this thesis is centered on an analysis of the PBA – inherently a top-down approach –, Richmond explains that a “top-down peacebuilding focuses on building the institutions necessary for democracy, free markets, the rule of law, and development, and expects that the effects of this will trickle down to the general population” (2006: 379). For a better comprehension of what constitutes

¹⁷ The peacebuilding consensus Richmond refers implies on a “broad and deep approach to intervention, impinging upon high politics as well as the full range of social, political, cultural, and economic issues that affect societies caught up in war” (Richmond, 2005: 10).

a top-down approach, Richmond clarifies that this terminology is commonly applied in International Relations, Conflict and Peace Studies, and to the work of the UN system (Richmond, 2006: 379) commonly associated to the liberal peace perspective, since it represents “the evolution of institutional approaches to constructing peace from the Treaty of Westphalia to the UN system and beyond” (Richmond, 2006: 382).

In his analysis, liberal peacebuilding “rests upon a complex web of actors working on the basis of a common peacebuilding consensus between major states, donors, IOs, agencies and NGOs, on the institutionalisation of peace-through-governance” (Richmond, 2006: 392), which also includes perspectives on international, transnational, and domestic forms of governance (Richmond, 2006: 392). Such perspective is reiterated by Chandler, who considers *peacebuilding* as an inherently *liberal* practice. In his words, “peacebuilding is a field of external policy intervention with the intention of assisting post-conflict and conflict-prone states to build a sustainable peace on the basis of liberal frameworks” (2017: 3). In this sense, as Paris argues, “liberal internationalism appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding” (1997: 56) and this approach is embedded in an institutional practice within which consolidating peace “in war-shattered states is to transform these states into stable market democracies” (Paris, 1997: 89).

When applied to peace, the term liberal peace became understood as “dominant critical intellectual framework currently applied to post-Cold War policies and practices of post-conflict intervention” (Sabaratnam, 2011: 13), especially from the peacekeeping operation in Namibia¹⁸ in 1989, “which was gradually codified into international peacebuilding and development policy through a number of precedent-setting policy documents” (Graef, 2015: 20). As Selby points out, liberal peacebuilding “constitutes a problematic and limiting starting point for the analysis of contemporary peacemaking practices” (2013: 58-59). From his analysis, liberal peacebuilding is embedded in the common feature that it exists within a broadly global *paradigm, framework* or *project* in favour of liberal peace (Selby, 2013: 60). Such paradigm, in its turn, “posits that liberal economic and political structures, and processes of economic and political liberalization, are the best way of building sustainable peace in societies emerging from war” (Selby, 2013: 60).

¹⁸ The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was established on 16 February 1989 to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations (UN Doc. S/RES/632 (1989)).

In addition, Tom points out that “whereas peacebuilding places emphasis on issues such as social justice, welfare provision, tradition, custom, culture, the grassroots, reconciliation, equity and humanistic agendas” (2017: 59), liberal peacebuilding initiatives in post-war societies have been seen as controversial because of “their nature and effectiveness, what causes peace, the nature of peace to be built, the owner(s) of the peace, the failure of liberal peace to connect with its target population and how the international actors should relate with local actors” (Tom, 2017: 71). On this issue, Richmond points out “that liberal peacebuilding has created the conservative or orthodox rather than emancipatory model, as can be seen in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq” (2006: 306) and that the liberal peace project “has endeavoured to produce a peace that is stable and consensual, but within a cosmopolitan framework of governance which is both a representation of the individual, the state and the global” (2006: 307).

Although in the same line of thought, Pugh argues that whereas liberal peace has promoted transformation through different strategies – such as “macro-economic stability, reduction of the role of the state, the squeezing of collective and public space, a quest for private affluence, and a reliance on privatisation and on exports and foreign investment to stimulate economic growth” (2005: 25), the author asserts that “the liberal project not only ignores the socio-economic problems confronting war-torn societies, it aggravates the vulnerability of sectors of populations to poverty and does little either to alleviate people’s engagement in shadow economies or to give them a say in economic reconstruction” (2005: 25). As Richmond complements, part of the critics of liberal peacebuilding derives from the fact that this approach is “also inherently unstable because the state rests on international support and elite compromise, and it often lacks local legitimacy because the state does not provide welfare or services designed to offer a material peace dividend” (2013: 381). As Newman states, “the liberal approach to peacebuilding and development in fragile states, around which these actors work, is driven by the belief that the principal *problem* with conflict-prone and post-conflict states is the absence of *effective* state institutions” (2013: 316). Both positioning reiterate what Darby and Mac Ginty (2008) and Richmond (2008) have previously pointed out about the critics of this liberal peace project. On their turn, Darby and Mac Ginty argue that reconstruction is an inherent part of a peace process and that such condition does not refer only to the repair of a physical damage, but rebuilding fractured relationships and communities (2008: 4). Nevertheless, this reconstruction process is taken by Darby and Mac Ginty as problematic because this form of *contemporary peacemaking* in

which peacebuilding is included in “reinforces power-holders and replicates exclusive patterns of social and political relations” (2008: 5-6). Richmond criticizes the liberal peacebuilding project exactly because, according to him, “it has often resulted in a *virtual peace* based upon contested attempts to import liberal democratic models via military intervention” (2008: 258). Three years after the establishment of the PBA, Richmond points out that

recent attempts to create a centralized UN peacebuilding agency with a much more structured approach to the full range of peacebuilding power, rather than the ad hoc approaches generally applied, imply a centralized model of peace to be implanted by the UN Peacebuilding Commission with marginal differentiation according to specific locales, but focusing essentially on the same elements of the liberal peace. (Richmond, 2008: 266)

As mentioned before, Cavalcante’s (2019) work addresses the emergence of the term peacebuilding in the UN and how peacebuilding guided the institution into new practices of peace, but he also criticizes “the strategies outlined by the PBC [because they] tended to be formulated in terms of a state-centric and top-down external support that projected liberal democratic norms, institutions and values, with limited involvement from the societies in peacebuilding contexts” (Cavalcante, 2019: 263). In this sense, peacebuilding reflects a mutual reinforcing dynamic: on the one hand, it is conceived as a liberal practice on the issue of peace and, on the other hand, its practice through the PBA reinforces the same liberal approach. In that regard, this thesis rests on an analysis beyond that dynamic, highlighting that taking peacebuilding through only a liberal perspective does not evidence what is behind other institutional practices on peacebuilding.

1.3. PBC eligibility as an object of analysis

Despite the fact that, on the one hand, peacebuilding within the UN represents an international policy response to countries in their respective transitional phases from intrastate war to peace and that, on the other hand, its liberal approach reinforces dominant practices of disseminating governance models abroad, such institutional dynamic does not explicit what makes a country eligible for the PBC. Although some scholars have provided a contribution to an analysis of the decision-making inside the UN, the literature on this topic does not yet contemplate the PBA. In fact, some of these contributions emerged years before

the creation of the architecture for peacebuilding, as was the case of Hadwen and Kauffman (1962) and Kaufmann (1980). Nevertheless, without focusing on decision-making for peace, exclusively, they contributed to this analysis while explaining the panorama of the UN machinery, its working methods and the constituent elements of the UN decision-making model. On the one hand, Hadwen and Kauffman pointed out that “issues at the UN are influenced by certain specific circumstances, including the behavior of delegations and of governments” (1962: 56); on the other hand, Kaufmann (1980) elucidated that several important developments have taken place as part of the UN’s elements of decision-making when comparing the 1962’s version to the 1980’s one.

At this point, Kaufmann added in his analysis the role of operational programs, global conferences, special sessions, new governmental and non-governmental entities, the decolonization process and, also, the Cold War, which used to dominate many areas of UN decision-making (1980: 73). To Kaufmann’s (1980) list of important elements, I would add the emergence of parallel structures designed to contemplate countries emerging from conflict, as was the case of the Ad Hoc Advisory Groups under scope of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and, later, the establishment of the Peacebuilding Architecture that have fragmented and diversified decision-making models inside the UN. Years later, Matheson (2006), Smith (2006) and Costa and Baccarini (2014) addressed decision-making within the UN with a focus, respectively, on “the development and expanded use by the UNSC during the post-Cold War period of its legal authority to deal with threats to peace” (Matheson, 2006: xiii), on the examination of how UN makes its decision in face of the reconciling process of diverse interests while searching effective solutions to global problems (Smith, 2006: 2), and on the bribery hypothesis, in which “poor countries, highly dependent of international aid, would consistently vote in favor of their major donors, or of those with higher decision power in multilateral aid agencies” (Costa e Baccarini, 2014: 30). Matheson (2006) and Smith (2006) brought their contribution one year after the establishment of the PBA. Matheson (2006) highlighted UN decision-making processes applied to jurisdiction, mandate, sanctions, peacekeeping, and the use of force; whereas, Smith (2006) went deeper into the analysis initiated by Hadwen and Kauffman (1962) and Kaufmann (1980), describing the structure and aspects of UN decision-making on what he called a “global dance”. Within this perspective, Smith (2006) aimed to comprehend the collapse and the restoration of the UNSC marked by, respectively, the United States’ failure

to secure UNSC authorization for its military action against Iraq, and, later, by the United States' lobbying within the UNSC for its plan to rebuild Iraq (Smith, 2006: 1). Although rebuilding Iraq can be seen as a contested peacebuilding process (Call, 2015), Smith (2006) did not define any hypothesis on why the new established PBA at that time was not considered by the UN to address the Iraqi situation as one of its potentially eligible countries.

Different from the literature on UN decision-making, the one regarding the PBA is more diverse, and, so far, none includes an analysis of countries' eligibility. In terms of publications focusing on the PBA, six main references – four compiled as books and two as outcome documents – stand out. First, Jenkins (2013) analyses the structure of the PBA through what the concept of peacebuilding entailed for the emergence and functioning of the new body. Although Jenkins (2013) includes a reference to Nepal's request to the PBC, he does not address issues contemplating criteria for making a country eligible for the Commission. Second, de Coning and Stannes (2016) organized a collection of chapters detailing the impact of the PBA on both institutional and field levels over its first ten years. Their contribution analyzed PBA's achievements in Burundi (Campbell et al, 2016), Sierra Leone (Cavalcante, 2016), Liberia (Caparini, 2016), Guinea-Bissau (Abnenur and Souza Neto, 2016) and Guinea (Quick, 2016). It also includes an analysis over a perspective on gender (Tryggstad, 2016) and civilian capacity (Karlsrud and Vermeij, 2016), and on intrinsic aspects that influenced the establishment of the PBA, such as internal negotiation (Williams and Baily, 2016; Tshirgi and Ponzio, 2016; Cheng-Hopkins, 2016) as well as the functioning of the PBF (Kluyskens, 2016).

The third contribution is provided by Ejeviome Eloho Otobo, who worked as Director and Deputy Head of the PBSO. His analysis addresses the PBC exclusively, focusing on its creation, its evolution, an overview of its structure and functioning, its expectations and, mainly, its relation within the PBSO and the PBF (Otobo, 2016). Even though Otobo (2016) does not discuss eligibility taking Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire as neglected cases by the PBC, he briefly points out PBA's dynamic using the label "PBC-countries" and "non-PBC countries" in order to exemplify money flows through the PBF (Otobo, 2016). Another analysis over "PBC-countries" and "non-PBC countries" in this book was provided by McCandless and Tshirgi's (2010). They compare Burundi and Sierra Leone to Afghanistan and Liberia as two distinct groups of countries emerging from conflict in order to

comprehend to which extent their respective strategic frameworks for peacebuilding enabled a more effective outcome in this field (McCandless and Tschirgi, 2010). Although their analysis was conducted months prior to Liberia inclusion in the PBC on that same year, McCandless and Tschirgi's contribution is still valid while explaining that the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategic Framework (IPSF) was not only developed iteratively in each country before the PBC, but also became the main tool to identify peacebuilding priorities (McCandless and Tschirgi, 2010) under the auspices of the PBC.

The fourth contribution refers to a recent analysis on how the term “peacebuilding” gained life in the UN and how this concept influenced UN's provision of support to societies affected by armed conflict (Cavalcante, 2016: 2). Without mentioning the Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire cases, Cavalcante's analysis briefly points out the criteria aspect of making countries eligible for the PBC, while entering on the merit of affirming that “there are no clearly defined criteria or guidelines to orient the selection of those countries and the decision is thus essentially political” (Cavalcante, 2019: 248). Although “political decision” can be taken for granted and can be considered as a starting point for comprehending countries inclusion in the PBC or their rejection, this assumption opens space for a broad investigation not only on how labelled post-conflict countries were later institutionally categorized as PBC- and non-PBC countries, but also on what were the implications for peacebuilding processes in those distinct groups of countries. Two other publications resulted from two events: one organized to discuss African perspectives¹⁹ and the PBC (Murithi and Scanlon, 2006) and the other on the future of the PBC (Paris, 2010b). Murithi and Scanlon (2006) presented the PBC as a provider of a closer collaboration between the African Union and the UN, feeding a discussion on how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from the new UN body, as well as how African perspectives would be disseminated within the PBC (Murithi and Scanlon, 2006).

As for the second contribution, it is a collection of nine essays published in 2010 aiming to identify and discuss “stretch targets” for the PBC, the PBF and the PBSO for the following

¹⁹ The seminar “African Perspectives on the UN Peacebuilding Commission” was held in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3-4 August 2006. Organized by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) from Cape Town, South Africa, the event was supported by the government of Denmark and by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and funders of its Africa programme: Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and the Department for International Development (DFID) of United Kingdom (Murithi and Scanlon, 2006).

five to ten years²⁰. Scholars at this event discussed the PBC with regard to the promotion of sustainable peace in Africa with a focus on its regional dimension, international political dynamics, transformative impact of peacebuilding in order to develop other key important strategies aiming at African leadership, transitional governance and mediation of conflicts (Aning and Lartey, 2010); how different theoretical perspectives – such as realism, rational institutionalism, public choice, organization theory and constructivism – embrace the PBC (Biersteker and Jütersonke, 2010); and the role of PBA’s operational model, system-wide coherence and principle of local ownership as challenges to serve as information for its 2010 review (de Coning, 2010).

In addition, scholars also argued that PBC and PBSO could play new roles to occupy a central niche on conflict prevention, stabilization and recovery (Jenkins, 2010); the PBA could be a focal point in defining and supporting peacebuilding policy, research and applied techniques (McAskie, 2010); the PBA needs a robust strategy and structure that allows dynamism and flexibility to its functioning (McCandless, 2010) in face of the challenges associated to the engagement of the private sector (Rettberg, 2010), as well as to the development of the PBA’s integrated peacebuilding strategies (IPBS) (Stamnes, 2010); and that the PBC adopts a “multi-tiered approach” to identify and respond to multiple peacebuilding challenges (Tschirgi, 2010). Beyond these six main references, I would say that the debate on the PBA has been much concentrated on the PBC as a case study. In part, such fact nowadays is taken as expectable due to the expectations associated with the establishment of the PBC. Nevertheless, bringing the PBF and the PBSO also to the core of the debate constitutes an opportunity to identify how other mechanisms were rendered operational and performed as decision-making actors. Berdal (2008), for example, pointed out that the rise and fall of the idea of creating the PBC reflects a level of institutional frustration with the mismatch between the process through which the PBC was conceived and what it became in practice.

The institutional path through the High Level Panel (HLP) (UN Doc. A/59/565) to the UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180),

²⁰ The Future of UN Peacebuilding Commission was a project directed by Roland Paris and co-organized by the Centre for International Policy Studies at the University of Ottawa (CIPS), Canada, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), in Oslo, Norway, with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

following Berdal, transformed the PBC from a body conceived with decision-making power to an advisory subsidiary organ category (2008: 357). A change in conception finds support on Bueger (2011), who discussed political controversy within the PBC as a clash of practice. His assumption is based on the argument that PBC's founding resolutions reflect more an expression of controversy rather than a solution on how peacebuilding should be organized (Bueger, 2011: 180-181). As PBC's arrangement determined its *modus operandi* while not exercising its power, Ponzio (2012) elucidated that "each of the countries referred to the PBC (...) has been a case under review by the Security Council, and it is difficult to imagine eligible countries for the PBC that are not currently on the Security Council's agenda" (Ponzio, 2012: 2-3). Such assumption posits the PBC as dependent on the UNSC's action and agenda with regard to countries eligibility. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that from the six countries included in the PBC Agenda, only one – Guinea – was declared eligible through the PBC itself, since its request was not conveyed by the UNSC for previous approval.

Other references address different aspects of the PBA, evidencing an analysis over expectations *versus* reality. Scholars' contributions on this dichotomous dynamic within the PBA can be divided into three clusters of analysis: one, focusing on the structure of the PBC, since it enabled a coordination along the peacebuilding and development nexus with the participation of civil society (Lambourne, 2008) and also congregating peacebuilding activities and actors (Newman, 2013) through different goals to supporting sustainable development (Lambourne and Herro, 2008), as well as to positively influencing political processes in countries which it engaged with, such as the case of Burundi and Sierra Leone (Street et al., 2008; Rugumamu, 2009). Second, focusing on its benefits to the UN, since the PBC only addresses a friction of the institutional problems in the process of reforming peacebuilding inside the UN (Stahn, 2005) while its operational and policy responses aimed at improving UN's performance in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding (Berdal, 2009, Bellamy, 2010). And, third, focused on a criticism of its impact, based on the notion that there is a lack of a peacebuilding strategy that consequently limits its performance (Scott, 2008) hence allowing the PBC with a marginal impact and relevance to African security realities (Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2012) which influenced an African response due to structural limitations among both the UN and the African Union (Murithi, 2008). Bringing these three clusters aims to comprehend, partially, the context and dynamic the PBA was created in,

which reflects its political and organizational contexts (Jenkins, 2008), as well as its geopolitical global governance (Kmec, 2016) approach through power dynamics that had established the PBA. In addition to these references, institutional publications brought the PBA to the core of the debate in order to discuss the implications of the architecture in face of UN challenges on peacebuilding. Publications varied from an analysis of the creation and functioning of the PBC (Ponzio, 2005), highlighting its structure, *raison d'être*, the need to focus on both preventive and post-conflict actions, as well as on what the PBC should do to become an effective advisory body, focusing on clear objectives, mainly with regard to how priority issues should be determined and referred to the PBC (Ponzio, 2005).

The implication of PBC's proposal for effectiveness comes with Jenkins (2008), who complements Ponzio's initial analysis, pointing out that the PBC "has been more successful as a mechanism for reaffirming international norms", becoming "a significant forum for establishing the limits of donor influence in post-conflict states" (Jenkins, 2008); and with Wyeth (2011), who clarifies a misperception pertaining the PBC and a reflection of what a lack of strategy tends to cause. In her analysis, "the PBC does not shape mandates or implement programs in the field, but was designed as a forum for enhancing the coherence of other actors" (Wyeth, 2011: 7). Since the literature on decision-making inside the UN was much focused on the role of the UNSC and other internal bodies, it lacks an analysis of how new mechanisms develop and fit in (or not) decision-making processes, as is the case of the PBA. Furthermore, the fact that the rejection of the Comoros' and Côte d'Ivoire's requests to be integrated in the PBC has not been fully analyzed strengthens the pertinence of this thesis angle of analysis. Analyzing the decision-making process within the PBA constitutes not only a tool for better understanding countries' eligibility and the use of different labels and frames for this effect, but also a lens to better grasp the power dynamics that triggers peace within the PBA and the UN.

1.4. Methodology

An analysis of the PBA over its first decade (2005-2015) is *inherently* an analysis of post-conflict settings in a reverse way: instead of evaluating the post-conflict country in which the PBA is involved in, this thesis is focused on PBA's practices that bring those countries into its institutional agenda. As Bush and Duggan argue, "the proliferation of international

initiatives in violence-prone settings following the end of the Cold War has created a commensurate increase in the need to evaluate them in (...) appropriate” methodological, political, and ethical (2013: 5) ways. I would add that much of what is evaluated at the field level tends to somewhat reflect how the institutional level is designed. For this reason, building upon Constructivism to sustain a debate on decision-making, labelling and framing, focusing on the role of the PBA, requires a qualitative methodology as Pouliot (2014) named *practice tracing*.

Since he applied this methodology to explain the dynamic of multilateral diplomacy (Pouliot, 2016), the name *practice tracing* makes allusion to process-tracing²¹, referring to a “hybrid methodological form that rests on two relatively simple tenets: social causality is to be established locally, but with an eye to producing analytically general insights” (Pouliot, 2014: 237). In other words, Pouliot argues that, for causality, “practice tracing should capture the generative links between various social processes” (2014: 239); and, for analytically general insights, he explains that “the social scientific gaze must always look beyond specific cases, toward cross-case generally” (2014: 239). Since this thesis is built upon the institutional practice that led to a distinction between labelling and framing post-conflict countries within the PBA, tracing PBA’s practice on this issue enables a comprehension of “practitioner’s experiences so as to understand multilateral politics from the perspective of those who do it” (Pouliot, 2016: 274) and also contributes to comprehend how other international organizations – such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) – deal with eligibility criteria with regard to labelling and framing countries under their respective peacebuilding or post-conflict frameworks.

In order to trace practices, Pouliot (2014, 2016) argues that it is first required to find them. In his explanation, “there are different ways to go about this and whichever strategy works best depends on the nature of the social site under study” (Pouliot, 2016: 276). For social site, he refers to a set of places where practices of interests are performed (Pouliot, 2016: 276, footnote) and, in the scope of this thesis, the social site under analysis is the UN Headquarter in New York where the PBA’s practices take place. Such site comprises not

²¹ For process-tracing, see Collier (2011), Bennett and Checkel (2015), Jacobs (2015), Checkel (2015) and Lyall (2015).

only the UN itself, but the Permanent Missions to the UN with regard to countries that engaged with the PBA during the period under analysis (2005-2015), as well as scholars affiliated to academic institutions in New York that contributed to the analysis of the PBA in its early years.

Within the social site, Pouliot explains that there are a number of methods that allow social researchers to conduct practice tracing in their social context. The first one refers to the ethnographic method of *participant observation*, since it “takes place within the ‘natural habitat’ of practitioners, with limited disturbance from the outside” (Pouliot, 2014: 245). For conducting this research, I spent seven months – divided into two terms – at the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations in New York from September to December 2017 and from May to July 2018. My access to the UN through the Permanent Mission of Brazil was possible due to a specific program for graduate students to conduct part of the research on academic areas related to the interests of the Brazilian delegation. This opportunity raises a concern pointed out by Pouliot (2016) that directly relates to my experience during the field research. As he explains, the participant observation is hardly practicable in these sites due to the fact that, on the one hand, multilateral diplomacy tends to be highly secretive and, on the other hand, stringent confidentiality agreements often significantly reduce the value of the data that may be published even though the access to severely restricted floor is allowed (Pouliot, 2016: 276).

Despite the fact that what defines reliable data through participant observation is debatable, my position on this matter does not infringe any ethical issue that could inhibit my access to the UN corridors on both periods. Since I was assigned to the Brazilian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York as a volunteer, information concerning Brazilian interests on peacebuilding issues are not published in this thesis, respecting the agreement of confidentiality between the host Permanent Mission and myself. However, the participant observation constituted a valuable tool on two levels: on the one hand, it enhanced my perspective on peacebuilding beyond the data I had collected before the field research, which called my attention to internal dynamics within the PBA that were not easily captured by UN documents; and, on the other hand, it enabled me to identify practitioners that are not responsible for making decisions, but are involved in these processes, assisting decision-

makers, participating in discussions, drafting position papers, and being familiar with dynamics, arguments and options considered, discussed and approved.

This privileged *first direct contact* led to the second method to reconstruct practicality explained by Pouliot (2014), referring to interviews. Understanding the underlying reasons of what constitute countries' inclusion in the PBC in detriment of others requires an explanation of what motivate countries' and institutional decisions on that matter. As Pouliot mentions, "qualitative interviews are particularly apt at reconstructing the practitioners' point of view" (2016: 277). These interviews confirmed preliminary assumptions that made the research feasible, revealing other intrinsic aspects of the institutional dynamic. From my experience, interviewing is more than reconstructing practitioners' points of view, but also realizing to what extent practitioners' points of view are the reproduction of an institutional discourse that does not differ from the information already provided by historic data.

As part of this research, interviews were conducted in different places, besides the UN Headquarters in New York, including in Oslo, Norway, and in Geneva, Switzerland, during academic mobility periods at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) from 1 September to 12 December 2018, and at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute from 6 May to 4 August 2019, respectively. In total, this thesis is built upon data provided by 39 interviewees, comprising UN staff and former staff; diplomats from the Permanent Missions to the UN involved in the functioning of the PBA; and scholars that had published valuable contributions on the Peacebuilding Architecture. Since my thesis' starting point refers to the inclusion of countries in the PBC Agenda instead of countries that were refused to be included, the main question posited to interviewees was *why*. The *why* question, in my perspective, helps to understand the underlying reasoning behind countries' inclusion or rejection to the PBC and to explain a UN practice on peacebuilding with regard to establishing different labels and frames to post-conflict countries within the PBA decision-making process (Table 1.1). In order to understand why some countries were included in the PBC Agenda and others only benefited from the PBF, the following questions were identified in order to provide an overall lens of analysis for each case. The main research question speaks to a broad comprehension of the decision-making process within the PBA, as well as of the impact that labelling and framing

processes of countries in a post-conflict reconstruction scenario has on their own individual peacebuilding architecture.

Table 1.1. Research questions

Main research question
What are the implications for peacebuilding support in post-conflict countries being included in the PBC Agenda and/or benefiting from the PBF?
Sub-research questions – Group 1
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Why were some countries, first, included in the PBC Agenda and then in the PBF list of recipients? - Why did some countries first, become PBF recipients and then get included in the PBC Agenda? - Why are there no other countries included in the Agenda of the PBC since 2011?
Sub-research questions – Group 2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What is the impact of the decision-making process in face of labelling countries which became included in the PBC Agenda or in the PBF? - Are post-conflict and peacebuilding countries only those included in the PBA? - Why did post-conflict country’s request financial support from the PBF? - Why did those countries benefit from the PBF and were not included in the PBC Agenda?

To this effect, other questions became relevant to guide this research project. The first group of questions is centred on the decision-making process of the PBA. Identifying differences regarding countries inclusion either in the PBC or in the PBF guide the analysis in order to identify underlying reasons in which decisions concerning post-conflict countries at the UN are embedded. After that, the analysis focuses on the second group of questions, which enables the identification and analysis of, first, how those countries relate to the existence of a division between the PBC and the PBF frameworks and, second, the relation among those countries and the UN, in a sense of what are the implications for peacebuilding support at the institutional level.

As conducting interviews is a process of confidence building, the fieldwork developed was mainly possible due to the fact that none of the interviewees were taped. This was not a planned decision, rather a request/suggestion from various of the diplomats interviewed. This situation reminded of what Pouliot explained, that “diplomats know very well the script of an academic interview and they practice it accordingly” (2016: 284). As a result, all notes were transcribed while being interpreted in parallel. Although no interview was taped, only

a few interviewees refused to sign a declaration of informed consent. Despite the fact that some interviewees inverted the positions and first interviewed me in order to assess my level of expertise on the topic, several provided official documents with access to names and confidential information. As Pouliot points out, “getting closer to practitioners helps reconstruct the unfolding of practices in real time, understand how their meanings are negotiated and make sense of the politics of competence that ensue” (2016: 277). Although I agree with the last two of Pouliot’s assertions – that interviewing helps understand how their meanings are negotiated and make sense of the politics of competence that ensue –, my experience from the field evidence a different perspective on reconstructing “the unfolding of practices in real time”. I would state that interviewing practitioners with different degrees of responsibilities and from different levels of expertise helped justifying historical data while providing a meaning to a practice that was conducted in the past; and that the “real time” for the researcher and for the interviewee was contested, since it was/is a reflection of what has already been done.

I argue that tracing practices is marked by the timeframe a researcher establishes for the research. Since this research applied an semi-structured interview method to understand the role of the PBA during its first decade, from 2005 to 2015, interviews were conducted only in 2017 and 2018, evidencing that the practice in question – making countries eligible for the PBC while rejecting others – reflect a different temporality from the time of the fieldwork, hence comprehending the “real time” depends more on historical data, rather than on information of practices that, for any reason, are still – or not – taking place. Conducting interviews years after the specific timeframe, as was the case of this research, revealed to be a challenge. Some practitioners declined being interviewed because they were not working at the UN anymore and suggested me to resort to their contributions provided through secondary sources, such as book chapters or any other related publication. As my interest was related to the way the UN did – *in the past* – instead of the way the institution does – *in the present* – my alternative to this challenge was to apply the third method Pouliot points out as part of his practice tracing methodology: *textual analysis*, which “can be put to work in order to trace practices and interpret the context in which they are performed” (2014: 248). Having the UN as an object of analysis is a challenge in and of itself, since its publications cannot be taken in isolation, rather need to be interpreted in an historical and contextual analysis. In the case of the PBA, I resort to publications related to its functioning during its

first decade (2005-2015) only. I would say that collecting these documents was a crucial step before the field research; and that resorting to them during and after the fieldwork was of incommensurable value to understand different moments in which interviewees contributed to data collection and interpretation.

As part of the textual analysis, I resort to the agenda and the summary records from the first to the ninth sessions of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC-OC) comprising the period from 2006 to 2015, since these documents reflect internal dynamics on how UN members deal with peacebuilding and their respective positioning; to the PBC-OC's annual reports, as a consolidated document of the working year of the PBC; to the Instrument of Engagement and Reviews of the six countries included in the PBC Agenda, as these documents reflect what each PBC-Chair of Configuration worked for peacebuilding on the respective country concerned; to the Secretary-General's Report on the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) as well as the reviews of the PBF, as an evaluation of the its functioning and way of improvement; to the Official Meeting Records of the UNSC, for comprehending UNSC Permanent Members' positioning with regard to the benefits of the PBC for peacebuilding at the UN as well as their positioning when the resolutions on the PBC were adopted; to the summary records of some UNGA's sessions during the approval of the resolutions, to evidence how the establishment of the PBC was of disagreement among few UN member states; and, not least, to the data collected through the Multi-Partner Fund Gateway, an online platform that comprises all financial information on the PBF, including countries who benefit from the Fund and UN member states that financially support the Fund.

Although much of these documents are available online, some of them were made available through the support provided by the UN Library Dag Hammarskjöld in New York. Since text analysis requires a re-checking exercise, this research faced the challenge of not only including confidential documents, but also documents that were no longer available on UN platforms. Additionally, some documents were not possible to access. Despite this reality from the field, which most likely resembles all fieldwork, such conditions evidence that writing a thesis is an exercise of doing it in the right *timing*.

1.5. Outline of the thesis

Since this thesis is an analysis of the Peacebuilding Architecture's role with regard to decision-making processes, it is important to clarify that it is not focused on a comparative study between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund. Although they are two different frameworks for peacebuilding, with specificities in their nature, structure, functioning and, mainly, purposes, a comparison among them would constitute an impossible task. From this starting point, this thesis constructs a narrative in which *becoming eligible for peace* constitutes a perspective permeating the whole analysis, bringing theoretical and empirical dimensions to the same core. To achieve this purpose, Chapters 2 and 3 are centered on the theoretical approach of this thesis. The decision for including two theoretical Chapters rests with the need, on the one hand, to discuss labelling and framing conceptual frameworks (Chapter 2), which will enable the analysis of how post-conflict countries are labeled within certain frames in terms of their peacebuilding status within the PBA and the UN; and, on the other hand, to discuss decision-making processes in order to present these dynamics as co-constitutive practices (Chapter 3).

In more detail, Chapter 2 provides the conceptual context for arguing that for each label there is at least one framework and that decisions are made considering the existence of those frameworks and labels in which the social reality is built upon. Since this thesis works with the label of *post-conflict country*, such label is the one that functions also to name the framework in which those labelled countries are framed. In this sense, labels are important aspects for understanding the construction of the social reality through the significance those names imply, leading to a process of being defined, attached and legitimized, while also encompassing a political implication. In this Chapter, another contribution refers to the differentiation with regard to what constitutes frame, framing and framework as a process in which both labels and frameworks tend to be reinforced and replaced. Notwithstanding, such process of reinforcing and replacing labels and frameworks reflects the perspective of norm diffusion, in which labels and frameworks do not assume a static character, rather are spread through international policies.

Since decision-making is embedded within the perspective of norm diffusion, while reinforcing and replacing labels and frameworks, Chapter 3 addresses this debate. In this

Chapter, I argue that decision-making is a type of co-constitute practice and, therefore, it permeates the entire decision-making analysis, resorting to a Constructivist theoretical approach. My perspective embraces the notion that, within International Organizations, it is hard to analyze decision-making, considering only one model, but that different decision-making models take place simultaneously. These different decision-making models contribute to what International Organizations call their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which work as guiding tools for enhancing decisions within a bureaucratic structure. For this reason, there is no *pure* rational decision within International Organizations, since it embraces organizational, bureaucratic and naturalistic perspectives altogether. Consequently, the social reality we know is constructed by decisions and decisions yield decisions that re-construct the social reality in a permanent way. And here lays the co-constitutive character of the decision-making process, which is taken as a practice reinforced by the knowledge applied and (re-)produced.

The argument that our social reality is influenced, determined and constructed by decisions, reinforce a dichotomy with regard to a categorization process, in which the construction of the other becomes evident. On this issue, Chapters 4 to 8 present the empirical evidence of such theoretical argumentation. These Chapters construct a narrative for understanding the underlying reasons why there are differences on country labelling and framing with regard to their inclusion in the PBA. Chapter 4 explains the emergence of the PBA through the design of a previous framework for post-conflict countries named *Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Countries Emerging from Conflict* (AHAG) under the domain of the ECOSOC. Bringing the AHAG into the analysis is of great value because it not only refers to a framework designed for post-conflict countries, but it is also a framework that illustrates how a label and a framework tend to be replaced institutionally with the emergence of the Peacebuilding Architecture. Despite the fact that the *AHAG on Countries Emerging from Conflict* has been neglected in studies on the functioning and structure of the PBA, the countries it benefited – Guinea-Bissau and Burundi – reiterate my positioning, evidencing that they both had their label and framework replaced when they were incorporated into the PBA. As Chapter 4 shows, at the same time a label is constructed, it tends to be reinforced and disseminated when replaced.

Chapter 5 constitutes the core of the analysis of the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA). Here, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) structures and how they function, their objectives and decision-making processes are discussed. These Chapters contribute to the main argument of this thesis, highlighting how each PBA-body worked to reinforce difference on country labelling and framing, although they were actually under the same peacebuilding framework. Working on data compiled from the official documents of the PBC and the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Gateway (PBF), I identify how difference on labelling and framing can be visualized over PBA's first decade (2005-2015).

Chapter 6 is dedicated to a more nuanced analysis on the PBA. I say *nuanced* because it brings center stage the decision-making process concerning the establishment of the PBC and, later, with regard to countries inclusion in the PBC or the PBF. In this Chapter, my analysis goes straightforward to UN-member states' positioning on the establishment of the PBC. In my perspective, understanding their positioning is of great value because they enable us to comprehend much of the PBC's functioning and internal dynamics in the early days of the PBA. Resorting to official records of sessions at the UNGA and at the UNSC, UN-member states do not posit themselves against the PBC in vain, some of them confront the status quo that dictates much of UN's practice on peace and security issues. Within this perspective, Chapter 6 goes further while evidencing differences on labelling and framing post-conflict countries through how the PBC and the PBF decide on the issue.

As this thesis is not focused on a comparative analysis between the PBC and the PBF, Chapters 7 and 8 are, respectively, dedicated to comprehending what was the implication for post-conflict countries included in one of the associated peacebuilding frameworks. Chapter 7's title – *The Peacebuilding Commission Is Not for All Post-Conflict Countries* – reflects what the PBC became during its first decade of functioning. The rejection of Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire, as well as other prospective countries that considered requesting their inclusion in the PBC and did not do so – such as Haiti, Nepal and Timor-Leste – evidences that the peacebuilding framework designed for benefiting countries under the circumstance of fragility and risk of lapsing or relapsing into armed conflict was one of exclusion. Chapter 8, in its turn, reflects what the PBF became although being a different PBA-body from its counterpart. This chapter explains not only what are the implications for peacebuilding in

countries included in this framework, but also that peacebuilding within the UN became an issue of concern due to its evolution into a fragmented approach. As Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire are the guiding line for comprehending why the PBC is not for all post-conflict countries, they also provide support on explaining why the PBF became a more flexible peacebuilding framework to be accessed.

Finally, in Chapter 9, I reiterate my argument writing it in reverse: pointing out that the way the PBF renders peacebuilding operational and the way the PBC excluded countries from its peacebuilding framework call our attention for comprehending, on the one hand, intrinsic aspects that trigger the establishment of institutional and international policies aiming at peace; and, on the other hand, that the institutional practice designed for and directed at post-conflict countries is one of reinforcing and replacing certain labels and frames in which collective decisions will be embedded in.

2. Labelling, Framing and their correlation with Decision-Making

When Eve walked among the animals and named them – nightingale, red-shouldered hawk, fiddler crab, fallow deer – I wonder if she ever wanted them to speak back, looked into their wide wonderful eyes and whispered, *Name me, name me*. [A Name, by Ada Limón, b. 1976].

Introduction

The perspective based on the assumption that decision-making is a type of practice requires an explanation not only on *why* and *for what purposes* decisions are made but, most importantly, *what* are the factors that influence such decisions and *what* those decisions imply. Since decision-making is discussed in the scope of this thesis as a process that determines how social reality is constructed in and by the international system, as well as how it influences the emergence of norms and rules, there are three factors that must be considered in the analysis of this chapter. First, decisions are made based on individual and collective understandings by the establishment of categories, namely *labels*. This prerogative finds support on Wood's (1985) contribution, who mentions that "labels require advocacy therefore, and successful advocacy is accompanied by institutionalization; that is, a proliferation of practices in support of the prevailing orthodoxy" (1985: 358). Even Wood's (1985) contribution emphasises that advocacy plays an important role in institutionalizing the practices based on the existing labels. However, the author neglects a crucial aspect of his own analysis, since "orthodoxy" can prevail, but it can also be contested. In this sense, the prevailing orthodoxy cannot be taken for granted without considering the role of the decisions in this context. Second, decisions are localised in between a process that consist of, on the one hand, reinforcing the already existing labels and, on the other hand, replacing those labels with other new ones.

Consequently, the third factor explains the notion that decision-making is a constituent element of the labelling and framing processes in which it determines to whom the decisions are targeted to and how the targeted will be framed by the decisions made. In order to develop

this argument, this chapter is divided in three parts: first, it conceptualizes labelling, framing and decision-making embedded in a Constructivist theory of IR; second, it conceptualizes framing and its complementarity with labelling; and third, it discusses norm diffusion as an outcome of the relation between decision-making, labelling and framing.

2.1. Conceptualizing labelling

The concept of labelling does not have its roots in the field of International Relations. Its emergence dates in the 1960's as a theory (Becker, 1963) in order “to explain the unanticipated persistence of criminal and deviant behaviour among those who were categorized in this way, punished and subjected to behaviour modification” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 6). At that time, it became exclusively restricted to deviant behaviour in Social Science (Thorsell and Klemke, 1972), derived from general symbolic interactionism theory²² (Akers, 1997: 100), which contributed to this debate arguing that scholars in this field of study were concerned about “the impact of meanings and symbols on human action and interaction” (Rizter, 2010: 372). The reason for such concern refers to the fact that “meanings and symbols give human *social action* (which involves a single actor) and *social interaction* (which involves two or more actors engaged in mutual social action) distinctive characteristics” (Rizter, 2010: 372; emphasis added).

To understand the distinction and also the complementarity between *social action* and *social interaction*, Rizter explains that while a single actor takes its own action considering others in mind in order “to gauge its impact on the other actors involved” (2010: 372); at the social interaction level, the actors engage in a process of mutual influence in which “people symbolically communicate meanings to the others involved [and, consequently], they interpret those symbols and orient their responding action on the basis of their interpretation” (Rizter, 2010: 372). In this sense, both social action and social interaction provide a

²² Following Carter and Fuller (2015), symbolic interactionism “is a micro-level theoretical framework and perspective in sociology that addresses how society is created and maintained through repeated interactions among individuals” (2015: 1). The authors argue that a central aspect of the symbolic interactionist thought is the prerogative that “individuals use language and significant symbols in their communication with others” which has implication on “how individuals make sense of their world from their unique perspective” (Carter and Fuller, 2015: 1).

comprehension on identifying label beyond its original conceptualization and not becoming limited only to deviant behaviour perspective.

This thought is corroborated by Becker (1963), the precursor of the labelling theory. Before defining label and labelling as a process, he started his conceptualisation with a definition of *deviance* in reference to the existence of an *outsider* who is supposed to have broken the enforced rule and “that cannot be trusted to live by the rules agreed on by the group” (Becker, 1963: 1). This perspective enabled him to assume not only that “all social groups make rules and attempt, at some times and under some circumstances, to enforce them” (Becker, 1963: 1). Consequently, the establishment of social rules determines situations and behaviours that are considered appropriate, as well as what type of actions are ‘right’ and which of them are forbidden as ‘wrong’ (Becker, 1963: 1) taking the deviant’s behaviours as parameter. In this scenario, deviance emerges as a pattern that, on the one hand, labels the other based on its behavioural difference and, on the other hand, determines how the societal reaction should behave based on the existence of the one that now became labelled.

As Akers points out, “the theory on labelling predicts that the identity a person takes on will be profoundly shaped by the way in which others identify and react” (1997: 101) based on its existence. In this regard, the discussion on deviant behaviour is essential to understand the reasons why the perspective on labels was incorporated into a broader domain because, mainly, as Akers mentions, “the behavior creates the label more than the label creates the behavior, and the subsequent (...) behavior continues the label more than label continues the behavior” (Akers, 1997: 105-106). In this sense, the behaviour not only determines the label as well as the given label tends to or contributes to reinforce the behaviour. To understand this prerogative, one question must be asked: why the previous discussion on deviance is important for the notion of label and labelling in the scope of this thesis? There are two main reasons for that.

First, deviance is defined as a process (Becker, 1963) embedded in a political phenomenon of social construction (Schur, 1980). It represents, from a sociological point of view (Erikson, 1962), a property “conferred upon” certain forms of behaviour rather than a property “inherent in” these forms, in which audiences directly or indirectly witness them (Erikson, 1962: 308). Such definition proposed by Erikson (1962) implies a normative

perspective, referring to deviance as a conduct “which is generally thought to require the attention of social control agencies – that is, conduct about which ‘something should be done’” (Erikson, 1962: 308). The existence of a perception of controlling need is explained by Kaplan and Johnson (2001), who point out that “those behaviors are deviant according to the normative system that serves as a reference point” (Kaplan and Johnson, 2001: 4), while also being “anything that varies too widely from the average” (Becker, 1963: 4).

That “variation from the average” theorized by Becker (1963) from his *outsider* perspective represents a sociological conflictual aspect. As Horowitz and Liebowitz (1968) stress out, deviance is a type of conflict “between at least two parties: super ordinates who make and enforce rules, and subordinates whose behavior violates those rules” (Horowitz and Liebowitz, 1968: 282). Since their perspective is based on the notion of what constitutes a forbidden behaviour and how that behaviour is controlled (Horowitz and Liebowitz, 1968: 282), they explain that “the resolution of this conflict entails a political decision about how much social disorder will be tolerated at the expense of how much social control” (Horowitz and Liebowitz, 1968: 282). As Becker (1963) earlier pointed out, labelling a behaviour as deviant requires a comprehension that “the rules created and maintained by such labelling are not universally agreed to. Instead, they are object of conflict and disagreement, part of the political process of society” (Becker, 1963: 18).

In this sense, labelling a behaviour as deviant represents what Schur (1980) explained by a *deviantizing process*. In his perspective, *deviantizing* is a “key element in society’s stratification order” (Schur, 1980: 6-7), which defines parameters for “social definition and reactions” (Schur, 1980: 18) based on what becomes constituted as a *threat*. Following Schur (1980), the identification of a threat provides a link between, on the one hand, the overall or basic boundary-maintaining function of deviance defining and, on the other hand, the emergence of particular collective definitions of deviance within specific social contexts (Schur, 1980: 12), as well as according to a specific group (Kaplan and Johnson, 2001: 4). When applied, the boundary-maintaining function of deviance reflects a sociologist’s legacy on the study of deviance based on “causation”, that is a comparison on *deviants* and *nondeviants*. Such distinction enables a comprehension of what extent labelling acts as a correlation of decision-making processes. Based on the elucidations above and on Horowitz and Liebowitz’s (1968) interpretation of Becker’s (1963) contribution, “the selection of

decision-makers who define deviance as a social problem is a *political* process, not only a value problem” (Horowitz and Liebowitz, 1968: 281).

The second reason is based on Thorsell and Klemke’s (1972) contribution. They point out that labelling theory is focused on “the importance of the impact of societal reaction on the deviant person rather than focusing upon his psychological or sociological characteristics” (Thorsell and Klemke, 1972: 393). In their analysis, there are six assumptions about labelling in which they affirm that, first, “the labelling process seems to have different effects at various stages” (Thorsell and Klemke, 1972: 397). Second, “when a label is assigned (...) there appears to be a greater chance [of avoiding it]” (Thorsell and Klemke, 1972: 398). Third, “when [the labelled] has some commitment to and is, therefore, sensitive to the evaluation of the labeler, the effect of the labeling process appears more likely to be positive than negative” (Thorsell and Klemke, 1972: 398). Fourth, “if a label can be easily [removed], then the probability that the stigmatized [labelled] is likely to move toward conforming behavior is greater” (Thorsell and Klemke, 1972: 399). Fifth, “the nature of the [societal] reaction which follows or accompanies the application of a label is of central importance in determining whether the outcome of the process will be positive or negative” (Thorsell and Klemke, 1972: 400). And, finally, “a liberal assignment of positive labels, within realistic limits, seems to stimulate and increase the prevalence of desirable behaviour” (Thorsell and Klemke, 1972: 400).

In sum, those six assumptions enable to affirm that label and labelling denote an existence of a dynamic between labeller and labelled. This interaction emphasizes that a label tends not to be easily attached because it is embedded within a certain type of stigma based on the implications of the societal reaction at three levels, which are: first, determining what type of outcomes will be designed after the label is assigned; second, establishing a permanent situation of monitoring and evaluation of the labelled; and, third, influencing the labelled in order to stimulate it with a desirable behaviour. Another point to include in this discussion is the distinction between *label* and *labelling*. I make this distinction in order to clarify that labelling is a process (Fine, 1977: 183) in which a label – as an outcome – emerges. Such distinction becomes evident when Wood assumes that “labels reveal more about the process of authoritative designation, agenda-setting and so on than about the characteristics of the labelled” (1985: 353). In this sense, the process of labelling does not only produce the label

per se, but most importantly, it has direct and indirect impacts on what are the implications of the adopted label. To sustain this argument, it is assumed that labelling is both “a universal process in societies” (Wood, 1985: 349) and “a process of symbolic social interaction” (Akers, 1997). It is “a fundamental activity of exercising power” (Wood, 2007: 19; Wood, 1985: 347; Eyben, Moncrieffe and Knowles, 2006), based on an “act of politics involving conflict as well as authority” (Wood, 1985: 347). Therefore, labelling is “a pervasive process, occurring at different levels and within different arenas of interaction” (Wood, 2007: 20) that becomes “essential for the construction of a certain predisposition in what regards a subject” (Cravo, 2012: 76) in which it “represents an act of valuation and judgement involving prejudices and stereotyping” (Wood, 1985: 348). Following Fine, the labelling constructs, “through a process of selection and projection, a version of the other” (1977: 178) which, consequently, is also defined as “a social reality” (Fine, 1977: 181).

Considering all the contributions above and based on Moncrieffe (2007), one can affirm that labelling is considered objective, efficient, routine and indispensable (Moncrieffe, 2007: 1). As a consequence, she complements, labelling “continues wantonly, without contemplation of the politics involved and the potential adverse outcomes” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 1). With regard to outcomes, Moncrieffe points out that “labelling can shift - or sustain - power relations in ways that trigger social dislocation and prejudice efforts to achieve greater equity” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 1). Such dynamism in which labelling is inserted in is supported by Cox (1981). Based on his contribution,

the world is seen from a standpoint defineable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future.” (Cox, 1981: 128)

Therefore, the standpoints not only represent the way we see and interpret the world imbued of significance, but mainly they represent our purposes from the perspective we chose. Since labelling was first conceived as a theory to explain deviance within Social Science, its conceptualization enables to comprehend Cox’s contribution, corroborating the idea that “all theories have a perspective [and those perspectives] derive from a position in time and space” (1981: 128, added). Taking Cox’s (1981) assertion, both political and social time and space are a source of establishing parameters of interaction through the labels adopted in which the *functions* of the labels make them *legitimate*.

2.1.1. Functions and legitimacy of labels

As I pointed out previously, the role of the label is beyond the characterization of the *other*. Labelling, as well as being labelled, are both actions that denote a direct implication on how to perceive the labelled and on how to behave in face of it, calling the attention to the way labeller and labelled interact and influence each other. In the scope of this thesis, labels are means of determining the ways in which societies interact. Within this perspective, I reiterate Cravo's positioning, who affirms that labels are "statements of power" (2012: 76) in order to assume that labels are, in essence, imbued with functions, which specify what they imply and what they produce as intended and unintended outcomes. Considering the functions of labels, there is a basic premise that guides this analysis: many scholars in this field of research assume that the main function of a label "is to justify interventions" (Eyben, Moncrieffe and Knowles 2006; Eyben, 2007: 17; Peteet, 2005: 158; Bhatia, 2005: 14; Wood, 1985: 358) as well as to "bolster the western donor's agenda" (Cravo, 2012: 78).

The word *intervention* appears in the literature associated with different perspectives. The first one focuses on intervention as a means of defining needs and formulating and channelling solutions to perceived problems (Eyben, Moncrieffe and Knowles 2006; Eyben, 2007: 17). Within this perspective, Moncrieffe (2007) and Fine (2007) argue, respectively, that labelling regulates social interactions in order to provide, on the one hand, "the terms on which we relate to 'others' [otherwise the] interaction would be chaotic and inefficient" (Moncrieffe, 2007: 7) and, on the other hand, the maintenance of a sense of order or of social cohesion, a display of power and so on" (Fine, 1977: 178-179). Moncrieffe continues her analysis highlighting that "labelling is instrumental for policy, including managing the allocation and distribution of scarce resources, without which resource management would become inefficient and unwieldy" (2007: 7). In the same line of thought, Wood (2007) complements this perspective on intervention emphasising that labelling processes are being used as variable to distinguish different forms of intermediation between resource controllers and resource/service users (Wood, 2007: 25). This contribution does not only complement the previous perspective as well as it goes beyond by addressing how labelling can be used as a source in the interventionist dynamic. In addition, Wood (2007) highlights that the power of labelling lays on the "dialogue between those in authority (formal and perhaps

informal) and those trying to activate rights or make claims on those with the power and authority to dispose of matching resources and services” (Wood, 2007: 24).

When Wood (2007: 24) presents this dynamic in a form of dialogue, he assumes that, within this process, labelling is essentially political because it is a rationing and allocation activity, as well as a mode of distribution and redistribution (Wood, 2007: 24). Consequently, labelling tends to reproduce “stratification outcomes or (...) new forms of mobilization and voice, which thus become new constituencies for changing the classification discourse” (Wood, 2007: 24). Second, *intervention* is a type of “practice that contributes to the construction of place, distinguishing it from other places and endowing it with particular, culturally meaningful attributes” (Peteet, 2005: 158). Following this perspective, Bhatia (2005) complements this idea assuming that naming peoples, territories and phenomena “are all part of this attempt to recruit and indicate allies and opponents, as well as to demarcate similarity from difference” (2005: 12). He points out that labelling has the function of constructing a place. As Peteet explains, “naming a place functions as a public claim” (Peteet, 2005: 157), in which “repeating a name, standardising it, and displacing former names normalises it” (2005: 157), as well as it works as way of organising and giving meaning to it in order to impose ways of conceptualising and navigating in it (Peteet, 2005: 158). In this aspect, the function of labelling “is to keep these boundaries between the community and what lies beyond it clearly demarcated and to help to clarify them when they begin to be obscured” (Fine, 1977: 186).

The third perspective emphasizes that the word *intervention* works as a propaganda discourse “of belonging and opposition” which justifies action through labelling (Bhatia, 2005: 12). Going further in this perspective, Bhatia (2005) clarifies that the appeal to an audience has a sequence of affirming an identity and delineating “an in-group from an outgroup” in order “to recruit supporters” (Bhatia, 2005: 12) to, consequently, present a dynamic of colonising “by words and names before being physically occupied by soldiers, trading companies and statesmen” (Bhatia, 2005: 13-14). With regard to bolstering the western donors’ agenda, Cravo’s contribution is of important value for comprehending that what is labelled as *success* or *failure* implies on the process of expanding donors’ prevailing model “which the aid community has built for itself: on the one hand, failures are usually attributed to internal factors and not the model; and, on the other hand, successes sanction

the model” (2012: 78). This emphasizes that words acting as colonizers also represent a dynamic of power relations.

As Moncrieffe points out, “the label does not create the behaviour” (2007: 7). In her analysis, “there are other causal factors that may remain and continue to incite deviance, in spite of the labels” (Moncreiffe, 2007: 7) and that “labelling processes produce varied, including unanticipated, outcomes” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 3). In an opposite way of thinking about labelling, Moncrieffe asserts that “labelling can misrepresent whole categories of people; it can stigmatize and incite and/or sustain social and political discord” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 3). Stigma is taken as an inherent part of any analysis of deviance or labelling processes. Embedded on Goffman, stigma is used as a reference to an attribute deeply discrediting (1963: 13). As was already mentioned previously in this chapter, stigma also makes a correlation with Schur’s (1980) perspective on *boundary maintenance*.

In his words, “deviance contributes to social cohesion and reinforces the dominant standards in a society by establishing social and moral limits” (Schur, 1980: 21). In the same line of thought, Adler-Nissen (2014) explains that “stigmatization helps clarify the boundaries of acceptable behavior and identity and the consequences of nonconformity, that is, shame, exclusion or other forms of punishment” (2014: 149). In the field of International Relations, Adler-Nissen (2014) asserts that stigmatization as well as deviance remain an undertheorized object of analysis, although they are, respectively, “central to understanding how norms work” (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 144) and central “to clarify norms” (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 144). In her analysis, Adler-Nissen defines stigma as a sociological concept concerning the construction of deviance and its implications (2014: 147), as well as its reinforcement and replacement. Since her study on stigma was based on an applicability of the concept from the domestic sphere to the international one, Adler-Nissen demonstrates how “stigma resituates conventional approaches to norm diffusion and international society in the maintenance of international order” (2014: 144), while being, indeed, “a more general and continuous phenomenon in international relations” (2014: 149).

In the field of peace, Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu (2018) made a contribution to analysing stigma while revisiting the “problem of the difference in peacebuilding”. They argue that “the miasma of despair regarding difference and peace is the result of three successive errors

that occur when dealing with difference in international interventions: silencing, problematizing and stigmatizing difference” (2018: 284-285). And that, for stigma, Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu explain that “current peacebuilding scholars and practitioners have become more tolerant of other worldviews but in their attempt to integrate difference they stigmatize it by overlooking the conditions of its emergence” (2018: 285)

In order to make such assumption clearer, Adler-Nissen elucidates that while, on the one hand, “stigmatization constitutes an important source of information about the normative outlines of international order” (2014: 171), on the other hand, it “is not a symptom of breakdown of international society, but rather a token of increasing social integration” (2014: 171). In a complementary way, those actors involved in the labelling process – *labellers* – and those that are labelled, create a dynamic in which “malevolent labelling can lead, unexpectedly, to productive outcomes where, over time, people use these adverse labels as a basis for making claims and gaining political space” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 3).

In this sense, label does not only work as an imposed categorization from a top-down perspective, it also works as a self-recognition, self-acceptance or self-rejection processes based on the label attached. In this regard, the legitimacy of the label works on two ways: through both labeller’s and labelled’s actions and their interactions. The functions of the labelling play an important role in providing an analysis on how labels become diffused, referring to the process in which they become accepted or legitimate in a specific context. As Wood (1985) explains, “the function of labelling is to achieve universalistic justification or legitimation of something which is highly selective” (1985: 358). Within this process, legitimizing labels – what Wood (1985) also refers as an agenda-setting perspective – means that “a framework within which others perceive problems will have been established as an arena of ideas” (Wood, 1985: 359).

Hence, legitimacy is inherently social construction (Williams, 1998: 5; Hurd, 2008: 2) representing “something that rulers seek to achieve in relation to the ruled” (Williams, 1998: 1) and is seen as a value judgement (Williams, 1998: 2). Consequently, it is taken as right, fair, and appropriate within a particular and consensually agreed normative context and framework (Clarck, 2007: 13; Whalan, 2014: 6). Since legitimacy involves a subjective quality based on actor’s perception (Hurd, 2008: 8). As points out Coleman, legitimacy is

defined also as a social status that can adhere to an actor or an action (2007: 20). In her analysis, legitimacy finds similarities to the notion on deviance and labelling already elucidated above. On her perspective, legitimacy

involves being recognised as good, proper, or commendable by a group of others. The basis of this judgement bears scrutiny, since in common parlance there seems to be a qualitative difference between being disliked or unpopular and being perceived as illegitimate. (Coleman, 2007: 20)

In this regard, I assume that there is not a unique process of labelling, but different levels of social interaction (Wood, 1985: 349) in which the first defined label is reinforced by reproduction and/or replacement by other new ones. When I mention reinforcement and/or replacement dynamic within the process of labelling, I agree with Wood, when he assumes that “the significance of labelling has been underestimated as an aspect of policy discourse, and especially for its structural impact (through creation, reinforcement and reproduction) upon the institutions and their ideologies through which we are managed” (1985: 347). His thought enables a comprehension about legitimacy and diffusion of the label as a dynamic process embedded in a political realm, which means that labels are a political designation that implies on how the labelled is politicized and, consequently, framed.

2.1.2. The political ideology of the labels

The political perspective on labelling and the political implication of a label are co-constitutive. This assumption is based on the argument provided by Eyben, Moncrieffe and Knowles (2006) and Eyben (2007), who affirm that both labelling and label are an exclusive political action. This perspective finds support on other label’s scholars who discuss this issue taking into account different examples on how labelling and labels are applied, such as in the field of power, hegemony and state-centrism. In this section, the purpose is to give a path of understanding how the conceptualization on label became embedded in the International Relations debate, mainly with a focus on issues related to Peace and Conflict Studies. The political perspective applied to labelling and labels is provided by Bhatia (2005) and Peteet (2005), who use the term *politics of naming* instead of label or labelling. In their analysis, “the politics of naming is about (...) how names are made, assigned and disputed, and how this contest is affected by a series of global dynamics and events” (Bhatia, 2005: 6-

7). In Bhatia's (2005) analysis, when a label is categorised, named, it becomes "known in a manner which may permit certain forms of inquiry and engagement" (Bhatia, 2005: 8), "remov[ing] it from the unknown, and then assign to it a set of characteristics, motives, values and behaviours" (Bhatia, 2005: 8).

In her contribution, this process is defined as "colonisation by words" to attest that "there is a need to argue for defensive action, justify intervention abroad, or delegitimise internal opponents" (Bhatia, 2005: 14). For instance, "the relationship between the names applied and the decision to practice restricted or unrestricted warfare is immediately apparent" (Bhatia, 2005: 14) when using this framework of analysis. Peteet complements her reasoning by arguing that "names are thus not only components of a repertoire of mechanisms of rule and a prominent part of historical transitions but are, methodologically speaking, themselves a means of tracking power in this process (2005: 154).

In this sense, the logic of power is a way to understand how, on the one hand, "names, and their meanings, form part of the cultural systems that structure and nuance the way we see, understand and imagine the world" (Peteet, 2005: 153-154); and, on the other hand, refer "to a moral grammar that underwrites and reproduces power" (Peteet, 2005: 153-154). Notwithstanding, the logic of power that prevails on the process of labelling, on the definition of labels, as well as on the politics of naming are explained by two factors: first, the discussion of their functions and, second, on how labels and names become legitimate in this process, once label embodies "ideological significance and circulate moral attributes" (Peteet, 2005: 154). The premise that guides the thought on legitimacy is based on the fact that, once defined, labels impose boundaries and establish categories that have an influence on the means to construct our social world (Moncrieffe, 2007: 1; Eyben, Moncrieffe and Knowles, 2006).

In this aspect, the construction of the social world through labelling embedded in a political perspective can be identified in a variety of forms, including "the imposition of specific interests and values represented as universally valid via the authority of the state, and the forms of challenge available to counter such imposition" (Wood, 1985: 347-348). Wood later concluded that labelling implies on the way people make history "by making rules for themselves and others to follow" which has a direct impact on "creating social structure"

(1985: 349). However, as he points out, within the politics, labels are “relative and contingent”, which implies on the establishment of patterns of authority that are changeable in the course of struggle; and the acceptance of it in the context of particular events and conjunctures (Wood, 1985: 349). In addition, Wood (1985) goes further, arguing that there is a correlation on how labels were – and still are – used with the purpose of showing dominance and segregation. In this analysis, the dominant class imposes labels that become “shadow across reality which can be useful disguises” but that are also part of “an overall authoritative description even in the face of conflicting evidence about actual international resource flows and transfers” (Wood, 1985: 361). In this regard, the impact of the politicization of a label is what he defines as a *contradictory* process, which has the capacity of, on the one hand, “disorganizing the dominated, the weak, the vulnerable, the poor or just the excluded (via the decomposition of their story into separate cases)” (Wood, 1985: 364); and, on the other hand, “contains simultaneously the potential of reorganizing interests around the solidarities which the labelling might itself engender” (Wood, 1985: 364). In Wood’s analysis, this contradiction is a source to recognize hegemonic tendencies within this dynamic.

The hegemonic tendencies through labelling and label that Wood (1985) mentions above can be understood by the notion of what power represents in this process. Wood (1985), as well as other scholars, has addressed this issue in different arguments, attesting that labelling is a relationship of asymmetrical and one-sided power (Wood, 1985: 352; Wood, 2007: 19; Bhatia, 2005: 9; Eyben, 2007: 179) in which the words chosen within a conflict setting and “from a vast lexicon to describe events, actions, peoples, places and social phenomena reverberate with, uphold or contest power” (Peteet, 2005: 154). Based on this, the notion of power can be analysed considering, first, that “a name will place emphasis on certain aspects and characteristics of an object, while neglecting or omitting other key areas” (Bhatia, 2005: 9-10); and, second, that labels and the power embedded in this process can produce unintended, and sometimes, unwelcome consequences, shifting or sustaining power relations in ways that trigger social dislocation and prejudice efforts to achieve greater equity (Eyben and Moncrieffe, 2006; Moncrieffe, 2007: 1).

In a different perspective, but complementary one, lays the contribution provided by Woodard (2017) on the notion of a label functioning as an ideology within this political

perspective. Her analysis is embedded on the concept of *failed states* and it is usefully applicable in the scope of this thesis once it provides important assumptions in order to understand the political implications of a label. Although Woodward has focused her research on failed states, her initial assumption was that such label was not just a label, but an *ideology* (2017: 3, emphasis added). She justifies this prerogative assuming that “the actors who share this ideology are many and varied, joined only by their common perception of and intervention in countries they identify with this label” (Woodward, 2017: 3). In this context, Woodward argues that

the ideology enables these intervening actors to perceive these practical problems as a manifestation of failed states, as constructivists would argue, and thus to put the onus of change on the countries at issue rather than on the intervening actors, but the reality is rather the particular capacities or political qualities that these actors need to do *their work*. (Woodward, 2017: 8)

In this sense, the author points out that there is a congruence on what a failed state really means. She argues that “states that are labeled failed are not failed or even failing” (Woodward, 2017: 7-8). Although they “lack the specific capacities and qualities” (Woodward, 2017: 7-8), what is in between the lines with regard to the connotation of the label attached is that that the “various intervening actors need to accomplish (...) their own organizational mandates and goals” (Woodward, 2017: 7-8).

The problem of the politicization of a label, as pointed out by Woodward (2017), finds support on Eyben and Moncrieffe (2006) who define five consequences, effects or implications of the labelling process, which can also be considered as its *problématique*. Based on their study, the five effects include: *reduction*, when the categories have often proved inadequate for informing the precise strategy or method of intervention; *misinterpretation*, that means that actors are often labelled in ways that convey particular interpretations of the underlying problem; *stigmatisation*, the labellers or the development agencies can reproduce labels that stigmatise; *benefitting from labels*, when the labelled have the space and opportunity to contest, groups and individuals may successfully redefine and eventually give new meanings to old labels; and *limiting accountability*, when labels are used to indicate diversity, these same labels may homogenise different actors into stereotypes. In practice, these five problems identified by Eyben and Moncrieffe (2006) refer

to dynamics within the labelling process and, more precisely, on how it influences the establishment of the framework in which those labelled will be incorporated.

2.2. Framing *or* deciding on how to frame the labelled

The functions explained in the process of labelling and in the definitions of labels have a direct influence not only in their legitimacy, but on how the labelled should be framed. It is clear that the political perspective and the power dynamic behind labelling and labels determine the path in which labels become incorporated into a specific structure and, consequently, are reinforced or replaced. To this approach, the discussion on labelling and labels only becomes complete with a discussion on the notion of its correlate: *framing*²³. I use this word to call attention not only to the co-constitutive character between labelling and framing, but mainly to argue that a label does not exist without a structure that determines how it will be framed.

One of the reasons about the correlation between label and framing lays on the fact that policy makers, practitioners and researchers both use such words ‘frames’ and ‘labels’ to support their analyses and to describe to others what they do (Eyben and Moncrieffe, 2006; Moncrieffe, 2007) in order to understand and to engage with a complex world (Bhatia, 2005: 8). The correlation between labelling and framing is based on the prerogative that both are co-constitutive. As mentioned by Moncrieffe (2007), while on the one hand, framing legitimizes the process of labelling, on the other hand, the process of labelling establishes the framing. In his point of view, labelling “reveals subjective perceptions of how people fit into different spaces in the social order and of the terms on which society should engage with them in varying contexts and at different points in time” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 2). To understand this correlation in depth, the author establishes two central arguments: first, she considers labelling as a process which involves relationships of power that use frames and labels to influence how particular issues and categories of people are regarded and treated (Moncrieffe, 2007: 2). Based on this, she identifies that the relationships of power occur within state bureaucracies, among political leaders, in non-governmental and community-

²³ Based on van Hulst and Yanow, framing was conceptualized into different areas of study, such as: public policy analysis, artificial intelligence and psychology, linguistics, social movement studies, communication studies, dispute resolution and music (2016: 92-93).

based organizations, in the major financial corporations, across development agencies, within communities and families (Moncrieffe, 2007: 2).

Second, Moncrieffe argues that while “labelling and framing processes involve complex relations of accountability and diverse obligatory relationships, complementary and conflicting” (2007: 3), these relations have implications at different levels of analysis, including: i) the purpose of recognizing and employing frames and labels into different contexts, and how the recognition and employment occur; ii) what types of struggles that ensue over framing and labelling; iii) the spaces allowed for claiming and contesting labels; iv) and the willingness and capability to address problems associated with framing and labelling (Moncrieffe, 2007: 3).

None of these levels of analysis are excluded from the distribution of social, political and economic power in which they are critical for securing hegemonic meanings and values (Moncrieffe, 2007: 2). However, the opposite dynamic in this process, which is characterised by *non-labelling* and *non-framing* (Moncrieffe, 2007: 3) are especially significant. She emphasises that it means that certain issues and peoples can be omitted from policy and programme agendas. “They remain unseen and unheard for a variety of reasons; including lack of knowledge of their existence and people’s own inability to mobilize, gain access to the right networks and to position their issues in sufficiently commanding and persuasive ways” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 3).

Taking the discussion on framing as a condition for establishing policies and programmes or, more precisely, on how it constructs a structure in which the labelled is inserted, I emphasise that there is at least one framing for each label. As Rein and Schön (1993: 153) point out, there is a complementary process of naming and framing in which both of them socially construct the situation, define what is problematic about it, and suggest what course of action is appropriate. “It provides conceptual coherence, a direction for action, a basis for persuasion, and a framework for the collection and analysis of data - order, action, rhetoric, and analysis” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 153). In this sense, framing becomes an essential stage in the labelling process because it enables to define a new structure in which the label will be reinforced for its own reproduction or for its own replacement. To this, I mean that the

label is not static, immutable and its following definitions are embedded in its preliminary version, evidencing the nature of its own conceptualization.

2.2.1. The definition of framing and its correlates

The definition of framing encompasses two main aims: on the one hand, it serves ‘to select’ and, on the other hand, it serves ‘to salience’ something (Entman, 1993: 52) usually identified as a problem. Entman (1993) provides this assumption based on the communication perspective of framing, Rein and Schön went beyond on this perspective, arguing that framing is a way of “selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting” (1993: 146). In their perspective, framing is a term that “capture[s] different features of the processes by which people construct interpretations of problematic situations, making them coherent from various perspectives and providing users with evaluative frameworks within which to judge how to act” (1993: 146). For framing, Moncrieffe assumes that it “refers to how we understand something to be a problem, which may reflect how issues are represented (or not represented) in policy debates and discourse” (2007: 2). In this sense, labelling, labels and framing represent a co-constitutive practice in which each of them reinforces the logic of the categorization: there is no process of labelling which will not delineate how the defined labels should be framed. “Though labelling and framing are distinct, there is a correlation between them” (Moncrieffe, 2007: 2).

Besides these definitions, van Hulst and Yanow (2016) contribute to the debate assuming that framing is carried out through three distinctive acts, which are i) sense-making, ii) naming, which includes selecting and categorizing, and iii) storytelling. These acts are, in essence, political characters which imply that every framing has a political constituency. For sense making, the authors argue that framing enables actors to understand a situation as being of a certain kind and they can start to imagine what could or should happen next in light of prior notions concerning the ways certain problems can and should be handled (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016: 98). For naming, they point out that both selecting and categorizing are contingent, political acts that have implications “not only of shaping the world that one has made, but of knowing it” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016: 100). Even framing is not defined as static, Rein and Schön (1993) point out one problematic aspect of framing. It “leads to

different views of the world and creates multiple social realities” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 147). Following their thought, there are different actors included in their analysis, such as interest groups and policy constituencies, scholars working in different disciplines, and individuals in different contexts of everyday life (Rein and Schön, 1993: 147). Together, they not only share, as well as they “have different frames that lead them to see different things, make different interpretations of the way things are, and support different courses of action concerning what is to be done, by whom, and how to do it” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 147). Nevertheless, how does this process of framing occur? To answer this question, I find support on Knaggård’s (2013), Druckman’s (2004), Joachim’s (2003) and Litfin’s (1994, 1995) contributions. Their perspective on this process refers to the role played by “knowledge brokers” (Litfin, 1994, 1995; Knaggård, 2013).

They are defined as “intermediaries between the original researchers, or the producers of knowledge, and the policymakers who consume that knowledge” (Litfin, 1994: 4), who “interpret knowledge and frame it to be understandable in a political context” (Knaggård, 2013: 6). As Litfin points out, a knowledge broker not only “highlights the discursive nature of knowledge” (1995: 253-254) but, most importantly, “translate[s] science (...) into language accessible to decision-makers” (1995: 253-254). In this sense, knowledge brokers, following her analysis, “serve as channels for discourse and as intermediaries between information and decision-makers, often clothing bare facts with social meaning” (Litfin, 1995: 254). As a result, knowledge brokers are seen portraying the powerful ability of framing and interpreting information (Litfin, 1995: 254). Knaggård’s (2013), on his turn, explains that policy entrepreneurs act as knowledge brokers. Since they are designed for “suggesting policy alternatives and connecting them to problems at certain points in time” (Knaggård, 2013: 1), they play a role not only “in determining what issues end up on the political agenda” (Knaggård, 2013: 1), but also, and most importantly, on “how they frame their solutions to fit a certain problem” (Knaggård, 2013: 1). Consequently, framing is also embedded in a dynamic of “setting a boundary” (Rein and Schön, 1996: 89). As Knaggård explains, “framing an issue as a political problem makes certain policy alternatives seem plausible and makes other alternatives unthinkable” (2013: 2). As an effect, “problem framing defines the preconditions for coupling the stream and sets the stage on which policy entrepreneurs act” (Knaggård, 2013: 2). Based on their contributions, to what extent knowledge brokers and framing relate to a decision-making perspective? As Litfin asserts,

“international decision-making (...) elucidates the mutually constitutive relationship between facts and values, and knowledge and interests” (1995: 274); whereas, decision-making, within Knaggård’s point of view, is expressed on the fact that “policy entrepreneurs and policy-makers can chose[sic] the one among [different] frames that best fit their purposes” (2013: 7). Despite the relation between knowledge and framing and how they influence decision-making, it is important to state that, within this process, framing is taken as a dynamic process.

Since Litfin (1994, 1995) provided an understanding of how international discourse on the protection of the Ozone Layer’s negotiations was successfully approved after a change of its framing; Knaggård goes on the same direction explaining that “problem framing is an on-going process of framing and reframing, where competing frames offer different understandings of the world” (2013: 7). In complementarity, van Hulst and Yanow affirm that there are three kinds of entities within the process of framing and reframing, which are: the substantive content of the policy issue, the identities and relationships of situational actors in the policy process, and the policy process itself (2014: 11). Such assumptions lead to what Druckman (2004) indicates for “framing effect”. In his analysis, framing effect occurs “when different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences” (Druckman, 2004: 671). To this occurrence, Druckman (2004) name it as counter-framing, referring to when alternative frames are offered which, consequently, tends to “violate a basic tenet of rational choice theory that individuals’ preferences do not change from alternatives ways of eliciting the same preferences” (Druckman, 2004: 671).

This is the reason why Joachim (2003) affirmed that framing and reframing an issue is an opportunity for engaging different actors in such process, and not being limited to a unique arena. As she states: “examining how issues are defined or framed is particularly important in this respect since this is the first step in interest formation and determines which institutions will take up these issues and which actors will pay attention to them” (Joachim, 2003: 249). In her analysis, the engagement of other actors rather than the institution in a framing process enables setting an agenda in three stages: “the definition of the problems, the development of solutions or policies, and politicization” (Joachim, 2003: 268). Autesserre, in her turn, complements Joachim’s (2003) contribution, arguing that “frames shape how people understand the world and, based on this understanding, what they perceive

to be appropriate action” (Autesserre, 2009: 252). Within an international interventionist perspective, Autesserre states that frames play an important role, since they “can account for what shapes the international understanding of the causes of violence and of the interveners’ role, and how this understanding makes certain actions possible while precluding others” (2009: 252).

Taking this debate into account, the notion of framing enables to define and to comprehend its correlates concepts, such as *frame* and *framework*. As Entman explains, frame, framing, and framework are common words outside of a scholarly discourse, and their connotation is roughly the same (1993: 51). Since his proposal is to “identify and make explicit common tendencies among the various uses of the terms and to suggest a more precise and universal understanding of them” (Entman, 1993: 51), I embed on his contribution sharing his conceptualizations to the scope of this thesis. This distinction is important because I understand framing as a process which embeds and depends on the role of the label to, consequently, construct a structure to act (Entman, 1993: 146) and to determine how the labelled will be incorporated into the framing. Framing, in this sense, is an important aspect to analyse decision-making processes from different perspectives, mainly because decisions imply the construction of social reality into the frames.

Following Berger, “frame (...) refers to this inevitably relational dimension of meaning” (1974: xiii) in which it “is only a particularly tangible metaphor for what other sociologists have tried to invoke by words like ‘background’, ‘setting’, ‘context’, or a phrase like ‘in terms of’” (1974: xiii). On the same line of thought, Entman (1993) affirms that frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements and suggest remedies, which means that there is a logic of identifying costs and benefits of finding and establishing cultural values in order not only to evidence a problem, but most importantly, defining parameters for action (1993: 52). In other words, frames works as guiding “the ways situational participants perceive their social realities and (re)present these to themselves and to others” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 3); as a reflection of actors’ organizing principles that structure those perceptions, within the capacity of itemizing (van Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 3) This is the reason why they affirm that frame “signifies a more definitional, static, and potentially taxonomizing approach to the subject” (2014: 2); while framing offers a more dynamic and a politically engagement (2014: 2). Although Rein and Schön (1993) argue that

analysing framing does not differ from analysing frames, they assume that “frames exert a powerful influence on what we see and neglect, and how we interpret what we see, they are, paradoxically, difficult to assess” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 151). The reason for this problem lays on the fact that frames “are part of the natural, taken-for-granted world, we are often unaware of their role in organizing our perceptions, thoughts, and actions” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 151). They developed this idea arguing that, first, “frames are about action, and the desire to do something usually leads to a commitment to make the action we seek realizable (Rein and Schön, 1993: 151) and, second, “frames are self-referential, but they are not self-interpretive” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 151).

The difference between the self-referential and the self-interpretive character of frames is dependent, in which “the interpretation of particular policy issues in terms of various frames is always undertaken by someone — usually by groups of individuals or by formal and informal organizations” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 158). In this regard, these entities act as “sponsors” of framing who “seek to develop the frame, explicate its implications for action, and establish the grounds for arguments about it” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 158). Notwithstanding, Rein and Schön (1993: 158) complement this idea pointing out that the “frame sponsorship” may be assumed by research organizations within the social science community. In their analysis, policy analysts²⁴ may play a critical role in the development of frames as they work inside and outside governmental bureaucracies (Rein and Schön, 1993: 158).

The discussion on framing and frames is fundamental to comprehend, following Goffman (1974), the notion of what framework represents in this debate. In his sociological perspective on framework, Goffman (1974) affirms that when the individual in the Western society recognizes a particular event, this same individual tends, whatever else he or she does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) one or more frameworks²⁵ of interpretation of a kind that can be called primary, in reference to the aspect that it is not

²⁴ Based on Rein and Schon, the policy analysts “may name the policy terrain and specify how frames, policy designs, and policy actions are to be linked. They may function as technical specialists, debugging the problems that emerge in the framing of a policy issue and in the process of bringing it into good currency. They may combine research and experience in the use of symbols, communicative metaphors, and simplifying assumptions. In all these ways, analysts help to develop frames; but these very processes may bring them to the limits of their frames, and thus to reframing” (1993: 158).

²⁵ Goffman (1974) also mentions the word “schemata” to refer to framework.

depending on or harking back to some prior or “original” interpretation (Goffman, 1974: 21). In his analysis, “primary frameworks vary in degree of organization” (Goffman, 1974: 27). While some of those primary frameworks are neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates, and rules; others appear to have no apparent articulated shape, providing only a lore of understanding, an approach, a perspective (Goffman, 1974: 27). However, Goffman (1974) calls attention to the degree of organization and its relation to the notion of the primary framework. He argues that each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms of constituting a central element of its own culture (Goffman, 1974: 27). Embedded in the contributions mentioned above, frame is, in my point of view, the matrix in which both framing and framework are insert in and are dependent upon. As Table 2.1. shows below, frame is the first level which entails the identification of the problem or the context leading to level of interpretation (framing) and the level of action (framework).

Table 2.1. Frame, framing and framework

Frame		
Stage 1	Identification of the problem, of the context; usually associated with a label that guides, first, the framing and, then, the framework in a sequence.	
	Framing	Framework
Stage 2	Understanding the issue. Enhancing an interpretation of the problem, of the context. The first assigned label tends to be reinforced or replaced.	Designing a plan for action based on the previous framing, which makes the problem and the context subject to intervention aiming at a change of perception and/or behaviour.
Stage 3	Since framing is a dynamic process, its primary version is reinterpreted based on what was conceived through the primary framework, enabling the emergence of new labels or new meanings in its re-framing phase.	As a consequence of the re-framing effect, the previous framework becomes updated in this phase, improving its intervention plan, highlighting a more co-opted institutionalized label.

Within the Table 2.1. above, all aspects concerning frame, framing and framework become intermittent: first, label is an inherent part of the process of evidencing a frame; second, the identification of the frame naturally involves a process of understanding it, making knowledge an important mechanism for accessing, sharing and manipulating information during the first framing process; third, framework emerges as a type of paradigm, determining interventionist actions within a specific context and goals; fourth, the practice

of this paradigm, symbolized by the establishment and implementation of policies within the scope of the framework, implies a “framing effect” (Druckman, 2004), making the primary framing an object of contestation. At this stage, the primary framing is re-framed, enhancing a more in depth and continuous understanding of the problem. Fifth, as a result, the primary framework acquires a second version, consequence of the process of reinterpreting, reinforcing and replacing labels. In this regard, each stage elucidated above and illustrated on Table 2.1 reflects a process in which both labels and framing are imbued in a politicization dynamic, reflecting power, interests, values and norms.

2.2.2. The political perspective on framing

The political perspective on framing is, at some extent, similar to the political perspective on labelling. This refers to the notion on how politics determine the framing and, at the same time, how framing determines the politics. This argument finds support on Rein and Schön, who assume that “policy (...) defines, and to some extent creates, the way things are” (1993: 148). In their analysis, the framing of a policy issue always takes place within a nested context (Rein and Schön, 1993: 154). For nested context, the authors explain that “policy issues tend to arise in connection with governmental programs, which exist in some policy environment, which is part of some broader political and economic setting, which is located, in turn, within a historical era” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 154).

For a better comprehension about this nested context, the authors elucidate four aspects, varying from: i) internal context, in which “goals emerge from the possibilities of the internal situation and from the need to adapt to changes within it” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 154); ii) proximate context, characterized as “the policy environment in which a program operates” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 154) usually in interaction with other programs and susceptible for reframing (Rein and Schön, 1993: 154); iii) macro context, symbolized by “changes in the directions of policy, changes in the institutions designed to carry out policy, realignment of party politics, and economic fluctuations” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 155); and iv) global shift context, a harder context to be specified because it involves “changes in the historical eras in which reframing of policy issues may occur” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 155).

Within these contexts, van Hulst and Yanow (2014) provide a better comprehension of this policy analytic framing. In their analysis, there are two dimensions where the political character of policy framing takes place: first, “the ways in which policy-relevant actors’ identities and the relationships between and among them can also be a focus of policy framing” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 11); and second, “the ways in which policy processes, themselves, can be subject to framing” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 11). They argue that “policy-relevant actors’ identities can become strongly intertwined with a particular framing of a policy issue” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 11) and this fact implies on different forms of treating the label and, consequently, the framed. Van Hulst and Yanow (2014) explain that those policy-relevant actors

might discover their calling, earn their keep, find friends or partners, or be in some other way(s) drawn into the articulation of a particular framing of a policy issue, or tied in with the organization or group that has constructed, supported, or fought that framing. They might, in other words, become “attached” to their problems, not just through formal political acts (e.g., having voted for some option), but also in emotional, psychological, social, and/or cultural ways. (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 11)

Their call and critics on this aspect resonate to what I have stated previously on the intermittent aspects concerning frame, framing and framework, where knowledge can be used as a tool for manipulating information. On the political dimension, van Hulst and Yanow affirm that it “emphasizes the ways clusters of selecting, naming, categorizing (...), and, indeed, the policy process itself gain or lose credibility during and as a result of framings’ use in various moments in policymaking processes” (2014: 13). In addition, they also provoke, while pointing out that “practitioners — (...) policy-makers, as well as partners in governance networks (...) — are not always cognizant that problem definitions are not given, but “framed,” let alone aware of how such framing takes place” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 14).

Based on these three assumptions and on the perspectives on contexts provided by Rein and Schön (1993) and on the political dimension exposed by van Hulst and Yanow (2014), there are important questions to be made in order to analyse the nested context of the framework and, mainly, how to understand the dynamic behind the process of labelling and framing. These questions refer, first, to the definition of the policy issue; second, to its purpose; third, to whom those policies are designed or established to; fourth, to the reasons why those

policies are designed to specific labelled groups and not others; fifth, to how those labelled become engaged in these policies; sixth, to what is the impact of these policies on the labelled; and, seventh, to what is the outcome of these policies when implemented. For a better comprehension and analysis of the proposed issues, the discussion on norm diffusion becomes essential to fill in the gaps on this discussion.

2.3. Diffusing norms by labelling and framing

The scenario that is structured in this dynamic is understandable through the analysis on how labelling and framing contribute to the discussion on norm diffusion. In this section, I argue that norm diffusion works as a shared function of both labelling and framing processes in which while norm diffusion contributes to disseminate the label, it also contributes to spread the framing. In order to understand this assumption, the perspective on constructivism is important for two reasons: constructivists in political science talk a language of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and international norms carry social content which provide agents or states with understandings of interests, and do not merely constrain behaviour (Checkel, 1997; 1999: 84). Following Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Checkel's (1997, 1999) thoughts, it is important to address the question of how the conceptualization of norm diffusion and its shared-function of labelling and framing relates to the debate on decision-making. For this effect, I structure my argument in three parts, encompassing: i) the definition of norm diffusion and its characterization, ii) the aspects that make norm diffusion a shared function of labelling and framing and iii) how norm diffusion relates to decision-making.

2.3.1. What is norm diffusion?

Before addressing the definition of norm diffusion, it is important to highlight that, first, it is a dual-concept, which means that *norm* and *diffusion* become a single concept and that, second, the debate over it is also anchored on propositions such as *if*, *which* or *why norm matters* (Legro, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Payne, 2001; Acharya, 2004; Björkdahl, 2002). Taking this debate for granted, this thesis incorporates the assumption that “norms do indeed matter” (Legro, 1997: 31) since they are initially defined as collective

understandings of the proper behaviour of actors who operate in international politics (Legro, 1997: 33). Another important point in this discussion is to understand how the research on norm diffusion emerged. As Zimmerman (2016) mentions, the research on norm diffusion emerged at the end of the Cold War and was intended as a means of analysing *how* and *why* certain international norms were being adopted by an increasing number of states (Zimmerman, 2016: 99). The author divided this agenda of research into two generations: the first generation of scholars who developed influential models to describe the ways in which states socialized into international communities²⁶ (Zimmerman, 2016: 100) and the second generation, which expanded this focus to include the socialization of states into democracy and the rule of law in the context of the European Union²⁷. From both generations, there are important elements to consider in this analysis, once they deal with the discussion of norm diffusion as a dynamic process within international organizations.

Having considered this context, the main contribution to this research is provided by Finnemore and Sikkink who assume a general agreement on the definition of a norm. In their perspective, norm is “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (1998: 891). Going deeper in this concept and bringing other authors’ contribution, Winston points out that, on the one hand, “norms create meaning through the construction of intersubjective (i.e. collectively held) understandings of who and what things are” (2017: 3); and, on the other hand, norms are perceived as “having a *constraint* function: they define *acceptable* justifications for *behavior*” (Winston, 2017: 3). Not differently is the conceptualization proposed by Park (2006). For her, norms are important since they teach states what the appropriate behaviour is in any given context, as well as they explain why actors behave in ways that may not have been explained by, or may contradict, rationalist theories (Park, 2006: 343).

In addition, the author complements her thoughts assuming that “the existence of international norms explains how states with divergent interests establish similar policy objectives where there is no evident state demand or need” (Park, 2006: 343). Since norms

²⁶ The models Zimmerman (2016: 100) mentions are related to those developed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), known as “norm life-cycle”; by Keck and Sikkink (1998), as “boomerangs”; and by Rise et al. (1999), “norm-diffusion spiral”.

²⁷ For a debate on this second generation, Zimmerman (2016: 100) mentions the contribution of Schimmelfenning, Engert and Knobel (2006) and Magen and Morlino (2009).

imply the creation of standardized behavior within specific contexts, how does the notion of diffusion become embedded in this concept? Diffusion is defined as a “process through which ideas, normative standards, or – in our case – policies and institutions spread across time and space” (Börzel and Risse, 2012; 2017: 293; Gilardi, 2012) “*associated* with a likely outcome” (Elkins and Simmons, 2005: 36). Based on the notion of diffusion as a process, Gilardi argues that diffusion can take place also within countries, among a wide range of public and private actors, and it can lead to the spread of all kinds of things, from specific instruments, standards, and institutions, both public and private, to broad policy models, ideational frameworks, and institutional settings (2013: 454). In order to clarify the character of the diffusion process, Gilardi continues explaining that there are at least three aspects within such process: first, it is an interdependent process that is conducive to the spread of policies, not the extent of convergence that can result from it; second, it is the process that leads to the pattern of adoption, not the fact that at the end of the period all (or many) countries have adopted the policy; and, third, diffusion is *not* equivalent to convergence, because convergence characterizes the outcome of the process, but not the nature of the process itself (2013: 454).

In this sense, diffusion refers to the “transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another” (Checkel, 1999: 85). When combined, norm diffusion implies that “norms travel [and] they are taken out of their original (highly specific) context and applied to a new (highly specific) context” (Winston, 2017: 8) characterizing this process “as a social practice” (Checkel, 1999: 85). In order to understand norm diffusion, Börzel and Risse (2012, 2017) highlight that there are two types of mechanisms in which norms are diffused. In their analysis, ideas, policies, and institutions are diffused by, on the one hand, direct mechanisms and, on the other hand, indirect mechanisms. For direct mechanisms, Börzel and Risse (2012, 2017) state that “an agent of diffusion actively promotes certain policies or institutional models in [its] interactions with a receiving actor or group of actors” (Börzel and Risse, 2012; 2017: 294). For indirect mechanisms, diffusion is spread through a mechanism conceived as *emulation*. Within this mechanism, Börzel and Risse (2012, 2017) explain that emulation works based on two complementary logics: the logic of consequence, in which “actors need to solve a problem or to overcome a crisis and look around for ‘best practices’ and institutional solutions that serve their needs” (Börzel and Risse, 2012; 2017: 294), and the logic of appropriateness,

which actors “might also simply ‘download’ an institutional model, because this is the way things are done in a given community to which one wants to belong” (Börzel and Risse, 2012; 2017: 294). Emulation is also referred by Gilardi (2013) as a mechanism of norm diffusion. In his analysis, it “means that the normative and socially constructed characteristics or properties of policies matter more than their objective consequences” (Gilardi, 2013: 461, 466).

In addition, Gilardi (2013) goes beyond the identification of the mechanisms in which norms are diffused and he points out three more categories. The first one is *coercion*, marked by “the international organizations and powerful countries [that] can pressure states to adopt certain policies” (Gilardi, 2013: 461). Second, *competition*, that “can be defined as the process whereby policy makers anticipate or react to the behavior of other countries in order to attract or retain economic resources” (Gilardi, 2013: 462) and, third, *learning*, which “can be defined as the process whereby policy makers use the experience of other countries to estimate the likely consequences of policy change” (Gilardi, 2013: 463). Corroborating this thought, I bring Elkins and Simmons’ (2005) contribution who affirm that “another actor’s adoption does not alter the conditions of adopting [a policy]. Rather, the action provides information about such conditions, including the benefits and drawbacks of adopting [it]” (2005: 42, added). About learning, Gilardi emphasizes that before a policy is introduced, its consequences and outcomes are uncertain and this is a reason why “policy makers may rely on expert reports and other assessments, but other countries can also be a useful source of information” (2013: 463-464). In his analysis, the source of looking at outcomes in countries that have already introduced the policy, and maybe comparing them with those of countries that have not adopted it, can be a way for policy makers to evaluate what will likely happen if they choose to pursue the new policy (Gilardi, 2013: 464).

2.3.2. Norm Diffusion as a Shared Function of Framing and Labelling

In this thesis, I argue that norm diffusion works as a shared function of both framing and labelling. For this effect, and taking the definition of norm proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink for granted – “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (1998: 891) – I highlight two constituent elements of this definition: *the standard behavior* and *the given identity*. Considering the first shared-function of norm diffusion within

framing, my argument is based on what Acharya points out, affirming that “framing can thus make a global norm appear local” (2004: 244). Nonetheless, how? The answer to this question comes with Winston who assumes that norms diffuse throughout the world, and are adopted by states that display both the qualities of stability and flexibility of the norm (2017: 6). In her analysis, the stability and the flexibility of a norm offer different outcomes of what became conceived by norm diffusion, with its own form of variation in states’ principled decisions: “first, norms diffuse exactly according to their original contents of problem, value, and behavior (stability); and, second, a norm’s content may actually change in the process of diffusion and adoption” (Winston, 2017: 6).

For this reason, Winston declares that framing “as a tool of norm diffusion is just as likely to lead to change as to continuity across norm adopters” (Winston, 2017: 9). Such assumption enables explaining that framing also becomes a constituent element of the diffusion process. Acharya goes further and declares that, in the process of norm diffusion, framing becomes necessary because, on the one hand, it makes evident that “the linkages between existing norms and emergent norms are not often obvious and must be actively constructed by proponents of new norms” (2004: 243) and, on the other hand, “through framing, norm advocates highlight and ‘create’ issues ‘by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them’” (2004: 243). Based on framing scholars, “framing is not just a politics of who gets what, when, and how, but also a politics of who people [and other actors] are or perceive themselves to be” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016: 105). Although Wood (2007) did not discuss norm diffusion within labelling, he emphasized important elements that are directly related to comprehending norm diffusion in the perpetuation of labels, mainly when he states that “the interesting question is not whether we label and categorize. (...) Rather, the interesting questions are which and whose labels prevail, and under what contextual conditions?” (Wood, 2007: 19).

But where lays the function of the norm diffusion into the labelling process? In his analysis, Wood argues that there are two sub-set of the labelling process, which includes prioritizing claims to welfare and that these claims will be understood as rights, and sometimes as effective demand (2007: 20). When understood as rights, the discourse of labelling will concern universal and moral concepts of need, deserving, targeting, inclusion or exclusion, prioritizing and queuing for access (2007: 20). When understood as effective demand, there

will also be the dimension of effectiveness of voice, meaningful threats of disloyalty, and realistic exit options that might harm resource controllers and service providers (2007: 20). Summarising Wood's (2007) contribution, it is possible to affirm that, first, "the public domain is one of institutionalized power (...) within which policies (...) are constructed to allocate resources and opportunities under conditions of overall scarcity" (Wood, 2007: 19-20); second, "the process of labelling is a relationship of power, in that the labels used by some sets of actors are more easily imposed upon a policy area, upon a situation, upon people as classification than those labels created and offered by others" (Wood, 2007: 20); and third, "all interaction requires labelling in the form of images, badges, stereotypes and metaphors which as signals guide perceptions and thus interactional behaviour" (Wood, 2007: 20). Notwithstanding, how does this discussion provide an approach to better understand the relation between norm diffusion and decision-making?

2.3.3. Norm Diffusion and Decision-Making: a correlation

The premise that guides the discussion on the correlation of norm diffusion and decision-making is based on the prerogative provided by Checkel, who wrote that "national decision-makers have been influenced by global norms" (1997: 474). The *how* question to his assertion is fundamental to comprehend the evidence which norm diffusion and decision-making bring to the surface. In his analysis, the dynamics that enables norms to reach the domestic arenas are defined as "empowerment". Following Checkel, empowerment "highlights earlier stages in policy-making, when the issue is not compliance with well-established rules or the gradual normative reconstitution of actor identities, but how norms get on the domestic agenda in the first place" (1997: 476) "through changes in discourse or behavior" (1997: 476). Checkel developed the notion on empowerment because, in his analysis, this concept involves elite decision-makers and possibly other societal actors as well as actions by state policy-makers (1997: 476).

Years later, Checkel discusses the idea of empowerment through two different norm diffusion mechanisms he identified after reviewing the literature on political science, sociology and international law. The distinction he made based on the existence of "bottom-up" and "top-down" processes (1999: 88) is fundamental to understand the correlation between decision-making and norm diffusion. In the first case, norms are not internalized by

the elites, however, “nonstate actors and policy networks are united in their support for international norms; they then mobilize and coerce decisionmakers to change state policy” (Checkel, 1999: 88). In the “top-down” process, norms not only become internalized and constitute a set of shared understandings that make behavioral claims, as well as it is characterized as a social learning, which leads agents – typically elite decisionmakers – to adopt prescriptions embodied in international norms (Checkel, 1999: 88). The perspective proposed by Checkel (1997) – that national decision-makers have been influenced by global norms – and the models on “bottom-up” or “top-down” (Checkel, 1999) give a path to a broader comprehension of this correlation from what was conceived by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). In these dynamics, they argue that norms influence through a process divided into three stages: norm emergence, norm acceptance or norm cascade²⁸, and internalization. The importance of highlighting these stages lays on the fact that they enable identifying those actors involved in the decision-making process.

The first stage – norm emergence – is characterised by the persuasion of norm entrepreneurs who attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). In this process, the second stage is classified by the authors as “a dynamic of imitations” once the leaders of the norms attempt to socialize other states to become the new followers of the norm adopted (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). In their analysis, the process named as ‘norm cascade’ is marked by different motivations, which vary from a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). And, finally, the third stage – internalization – refers to when “norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895), which means that it does not matter if a norm will be diffused through a bottom-up or a top-down processes, the decision lays and remains with the elites. In this regard, who are the entrepreneurs in this debate? What are their role in linking norm diffusion to decision-making process?

Following Finnemore and Sikkink, norm entrepreneurs are the agents who have strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their respective communities and are

²⁸ The term ‘norm cascade’ is mentioned by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) based on Sustain’s (1997) contribution.

responsible to build the norms (1998: 896) that must be adopted, as well as to act as knowledge brokers (Litfin, 1994, 1995; Knaggård, 2013). In order to achieve the adoption of the desired norms, as mentioned the authors, “all norm promoters at the international level need some kind of organizational platform from and through which they promote their norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 899). However, the practice of the norm entrepreneur and the organizational platform that he/she operates from has an implication on what represents the adoption of the norm in a sense that, as Finnemore and Sikkink point out, “after norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms, we can say the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point” (1998: 901).

Even if they do not provide an answer to what reaching a threshold or tipping point means, I believe that this stage in the process is marked by the consolidation of all aspects already mentioned and explained in this chapter: the definition of a label and its respective framework with the emergence of norms and their diffusion through institutional policies. All of them have a direct impact on how different actors will behave in the creation of social reality. In order to clarify my assumption, I assume that an analysis of a threshold or tipping point requires an analysis of their constituent elements, which include the label, the framework, the norm and the diffusion. Notwithstanding, none of them will be valid in this analysis if there is not a discussion on why those elements prevail and have influence in constructing the social reality through the decision-making.

Conclusion

The process of making decisions is not a static one. Within it, lays many internal and external factors that influence the elite in conducting their decisions. Those factors imply that every decision has an impact or, more precisely, produces an outcome. However, even the analysis provided in this chapter was not centred in the outcomes or the implications of the decision, the factors that tend to influence it were fundamental to comprehend the scenario where the decision is located. In this regard, labels, framing and its correlates, and norm diffusion cannot be analysed in isolation since they represent a co-constitutive aspect of the social reality constructed by the decision. Labels, in this sense, are not simply a characterization of the other, but the identification and the manifestation of a power and hegemonic relation dynamic in which decision tends to perpetuate. Framework, not differently, is the

consolidation of a structure capable of including and also segregating the labelled, functioning as a parameter for action and establishing a new standard of behaviour. Norm diffusion, in complementarity, defines how this new standard behaviour should be spread, working at the same time as a perpetuator or modifier of the framework and the label, but without losing its dominance over the labelled. In this sense, a theoretical discussion on decision-making – whatever is its level of analysis – is imbued on a discussion on how decisions reinforce, replace and reject labels and their respective framings while enhancing a norm structure.

3. Decision-Making as a Co-Constitutive Practice

world peace and orderly societies can only be secure when the powerful entities in the world negotiate consensus to avoid violent conflict and that multilateralism, in practice expressed through international organizations, is the way this can be pursued. Hence the importance of understanding how the process of international organizations works. (Cox, 2004: 5)

Introduction

When John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann launched their *How United Nations Decisions Are Made*²⁹ in the 1960's, they had two aims in mind: first, they were motivated to fill in a gap in face of the need to provide a study on the informal procedures of the United Nations (UN), and second, they considered that an analysis of the way the UN works “might be generally useful in promoting a better understanding of the opportunities for international co-operation which it provides” (1962: 11). Since they launched their book after representing their respective national governments – Canada³⁰ and the Netherlands³¹ – as delegates at the UN in New York, their collective work indicates not only that “small part of what goes on is revealed in public debate and formal resolutions” (Schachter, 1960: 1018), but that “by far the greater part takes place behind the scenes in a collaboration that is generally livelier and more significant than the statements made for the public record” (Schachter, 1960: 1018). Schachter (1960) calls our attention for the fact that the work of the UN was at risk, as well as of “remain[ing] obscured by idealism or cynicism and hidden behind legal complexities” (Hadwen and Kaufmann 1962: 13).

Although Abel points out that neglecting decision-making in the study of war was based on the “prevailing tendency of viewing social events as (...) physical phenomena” (Abel, 1941: 853), and on the “prevalent assumption that the cause-effect schema of the physical sciences is applicable to social phenomena” (Abel, 1941: 853); a research focused on the “quantitative

²⁹ The first edition of this book was launched in 1960 (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1960) and the second revised one in 1962 (A. W. Sijthoff, 1960 – New York-Oceana Publications).

³⁰ John Gaylard Hadwen joined the Canadian Department of External Affairs in 1950, and served in Pakistan, New York, Oslo and Ottawa. (Discover Archives - University of Toronto, 2019).

³¹ Johan Kaufmann was Counsellor of the Netherlands Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from 1956 to 1961. After that period, he was appointed as Permanent Representative to the UN Office and other International Organizations in Geneva from 1961 to 1969 (Kaufmann, 1962).

laws about war [would lose] the significance of the element of decision” (Abel, 1941: 853). Since he defines social phenomena as “the outcome of a process of development in which innumerable and often unique factors play a role” (Abel, 1941: 853), Abel posits war as a phenomenon of growth and development and not the inevitable and invariant effect of some ‘cause’ or ‘causes’ (1941: 853). In this regard, decision-making not only became a neglected issue of research on war studies, but most importantly, on peace research as well, making decision-making a pertinent object of analysis in the scope of this thesis.

Within this context and motivated by presenting an understandable decision-making process, instead of a “perfected” one, Hadwen and Kaufmann (1962) called attention for a specific dynamic that pertains International Organizations in general: their decision-making processes. The reason for evidencing the importance of decision-making into this realm lays on the fact that, first, decision-making is behind every act of foreign policy provided by states or by International Organizations in a multilateral basis; second, the definition and the practice of decision-making has a direct and indirect impact on the establishment of norms, values and policies that determine how social reality is construed in and by the international system (Adler, 1999; Onuf, 1969; Stern, 1995; Wight, 2006); and third, decision-making embraces more the *why* – rather than the *how* – *question*, which evidences motives, dynamics, choices, interests and perceptions over the establishment of the international system’s practices.

In this context, this Chapter conceptualizes decision-making in order to argue that it is a type of both individual and collective practices inside International Organizations. Since this argument is embedded on the idea that “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992), decision-making processes become an inherent aspect of the analysis of social reality construction. For developing this argument, this Chapter is structured as follows: it first presents the definitions of decision-making processes, applying its conceptualization to an analysis of International Organizations; it then discusses decision-making through constructivism which enables, third, comprehending why and how decision-making is characterised, in the scope of this thesis, as a type of practice, which has the impact of producing knowledge.

3.1. Decision-making within International Organizations

Decision-making, in a simplest sense, implies the existence of a process (Cox and Jacobson, 1973; Orasanu and Connolly, 1995; Snyder, *et al.*, 2002). It is localized in between the choices available for action and the decision itself. Although it can be understood as a process of choosing (Sofa *et al.*, 2013: vi), it is not an act of choice *per se*, rather “an act of retroactive interpretation of certain outcomes” (Vidaillet, 2008: 422), which leads to constructing reality that is in continual reconstruction (Sofa *et al.*, 2013: vi) within a routine and habitual behaviour basis (Sofa *et al.*, 2013: vi). For this reason, the definition of decision-making implies the definition of two or more complementary concepts: on the one hand, the existence of ‘choices’ as a pre-requisite for evidencing the necessity for making a decision, choice “is used to encompass the sorting out of option” (Etzioni, 1988: 150 *apud* Sofa *et al.*, 2013: 37); and, on the other hand, the concept of decision itself as an outcome of this process. In this sense, decision is *only* defined as a choice or one existent solution between alternative courses of action in relation to an end or purpose (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 169; Fitzgerald, 2002: 8; Sofa *et al.*, 2013: vi), based “on evidence and the expected costs and benefits associated with the outcome” (Resulaj, et al. 2009: 263) which “imbues a decision with significance” (Fitzgerald, 2002: 9). When ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ meet the decision-making conceptualization, Snyder *et al.* provide a clearer definition, arguing that it is a process which results in the selection of one project, from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects, which intends to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers (2002: 78).

From this definition, it becomes clear that ‘socially defined project’ reflects the construction of social reality through what decision-makers consider appropriate, adequate, legitimate and necessary to be implemented or accepted as a new standard of behaviour. Nevertheless, decision-making is not a process on its own end. As Vidaillet (2008) explains, decision-making implies the emergence of new decision-making processes or an adaptation of the ones already in practice, as a spill-over effect: i) different decision-making processes lead to different decisions; ii) different decisions lead to different actions; and iii) different actions lead to different consequences or outcomes (Vidaillet, 2008: 419). The three points mentioned above by Vidaillet (2008) emphasize that decision-making is an inherent a dynamic process (Klein, *et al.*, 1995: 7), mainly when it is analysed within the literature of

International Organizations. First, these organizations are social constructs made up of the interaction of individuals and groups holding a variety of ideas, beliefs and values (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 173); second, they are systems of coordinated action among individuals and groups whose preferences, information, interests or knowledge differ (Catalani and Clerico, 1996: 1); third, they are embedded in an international dynamic in which its interaction is characterized by the absence of a central authority, and its processes are conceived of as multi-level games embedded in different institutional contexts (Meijerink, 1999: 30); and fourth, within a permanent diplomatic character, these organizations are seen as instruments with which states pursue their own interests (Zangl *et al.*, 2006: 6).

When combined, these four assertions enable affirming that decision-making is inextricably linked to a political process (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 167) which implies, first, on a ‘pulling and hauling’³² among the various participants based on personal, group, organizational and/or national interests (Rosati, 1981: 238); and second, on “a learning process [that] distinguishes between strategic or interactive learning and cognitive learning, and addresses the strategic use of knowledge in a decision making process” (Meijerink, 1999: 14). In this sense, decision-making represents a process with a beginning and an end, in which it can contribute or not to the emergence of different and interrelated decision-making processes, highlighting its structure through its interconnected agents. In this scenario, decision-making is taken as an element and “an integral part [of the development] of the war process” (Abel, 1941: 853) as well as peace, which implies that decisions are reached “at the top” (Hickson and Miller, 1992: 113). Some authors argue that decisions were conceived primarily on a dichotomy of good/right and bad/wrong decisions considering its ‘quality’ or how successful or unsuccessful a decision was (Catalani and Clerico, 1996; Rosanas, 2013). I assume that what is understood by ‘quality’ or by ‘(un)successful’ or ‘good/right-bad/wrong’ is the notion of the ‘impact’ of the decision, which means its consequence, its effect, its result that can be interpreted differently – in a positive or negative way – based on the audience to whom the decision is target to³³. This assumption finds support on Sofo *et al.* who argue that “there is a thin line between a good decision and a bad decision and it is not possible to know how good or bad the decision until the result of the

³² According to Muchaud, “pulling and hauling games happen when two actors of the same level of authority contest each other or when an actor of an inferior level does so with a superior” (2002: 278).

³³ In my perspective, the audience of decision-making process comprises those who are the object of the decision.

choice reveals itself” (2013: vi). In a more pragmatic analysis of this issue, I go back to what I mentioned as a spill-over effect on Vidaillet’s (2008) explanation about decision-making dynamics. In her perspective, many authors have failed to explain causal relationships on the process consisting of: different decisions leading to different actions and different actions to different outcomes, just because ‘decision outcomes’ are not necessarily the outcomes of decision, rather more an action outcome than a decision outcome (Vidaillet’s, 2008: 421). The point on Vidaillet’s assumption is the appeal for comprehending decision-making as a holistic process in which both action and outcome represent a two-sided coin.

With this conceptualization in mind, my starting point for bringing decision-making within International Organizations to the core of this thesis is based, first, on the fact that these organizations “have gained varying degrees of policy autonomy” (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 11), hence, this policy autonomy leads to comprehending the “use of such room for policy manoeuvre and, equally importantly, what policies [they] will try to promote” (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 11). At this point, Reinalda and Verbeek argue that “stipulating the conditions for policy manoeuvre” refer to understanding decision-making as a *process of phases* marked by “where an issue goes from preparation to decision and to implementation, or from agenda setting through deliberation on causes and alternative solutions to voting on a preferred solution” (2004: 14). Although Reinalda and Verbeek (2004) do not enter on the merits of discussing the role played by *influence* as an object of analysis, their research is embedded on a preliminary contribution enhanced by Cox and Jacobson (1973). These authors (1973) argue that International Organizations have been performing a variety of tasks – such as keeping the peace, promoting economic development and reducing obstacles to trade, just to mention a few (Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 5); and that the decision-making with regard to these tasks “occur within a context comprising the functions, the institutional framework and basic procedures, and the historical development of the agency” (Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 5).

Historical development of the agency, in my perspective, can be understood by what Cox and Jacobson (1973) point out as the process in which International Organizations change. In their analysis, such changes may occur in the structure and processes of influence within a particular organization that can be explained in dynamic terms as well as in relation to other organizations (Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 2) leading to a permanent evaluation and

analysis of their decision-making. As Kaufmann explains, the time comprising the twenty years after his first contribution with John Hadwen lead not only to a revised edition of *How United Nations Decisions Are Made* in 1962, but to an individual contribution of the same object of analysis in 1980 entitled *United Nations Decision Making*. The reasoning for such version is based on the structural change marked by the increasing number of UN member-states, the role played by groups of nations while participants in the UN decision-making process, and to problems related to developing countries now paramount inside the organization (Kaufmann, 1980: ix). To this, Kaufmann also adds the rise of both governmental and non-governmental organizations as external actors on this dynamic (1980: ix). A reasoning for understanding such institutional change with regard to decision-making is based on what Cox (2004) names as *historical structure*. In his perspective, historical structure refers to “how the world appears to the entities (...) that are interacting in it, how they perceive the concatenation of the forces at work and the conflicting directions of these forces take” (Cox, 2004: 5-6). Be these entities persons, states, corporations, or whatever, Cox argues that the historical structure is what informs the making of decisions or non-decisions (Cox, 2004: 6). In his analysis,

An historical structure has an objective dimension which depicts a prevailing arrangement of forces and an inter-subjective dimension in which the actors share a vision of reality. By introducing the inter-subjective dimension, however, we allow for the coexistence of different and often conflicting perceptions of reality, each of which can become transformed over time. (Cox, 2004: 6)

Based on the aforementioned prerogative, Cox complements his thought arguing that decision-making processes of International Organizations now take place within the framework of these competing historical structures (2004: 7), which means that, first, decisions *per se* “bring to light the various forces which gave them birth” (Sidjanski, 1973: 2); second, “when people assume organizational positions, they adapt their goals and values to their responsibilities” (Simon and Associates, 1992: 49) making decisions substantially influenced “by the patterns of information flow and other communications among the various organization units” (Simon *et al.*, 1987: 27); third, “decisionmaking environments are in a constant flux” (Geva, Redd and Mintz, 1997: 218); fourth, as Allison and Zelikow point out, “*organizational culture* emerges to shape the behavior of individuals within the organization in ways that conform with informal as well as formal norms” (1999: 145); fifth, “international organizations vary significantly in the decision rules they have adopted”

(Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 15) and such change is a reflection of a change on norms (Goertz, 2003: 49); and sixth, “all actors involved in international organizations are forced to make tradeoffs (...) between the policies that they really want to see adopted and those that realistically can be adopted” (Smith, 2006: 4).

In between the lines, the historical structure proposed by Cox (2004) reflects not only a change on International Organizations, but that such change occurs within a conflictual dynamic. For that reason, analysing decision-making within International Organizations, following Reinalda and Verbeek, requires an analysis on an issue that “takes place against the background of a (...) tension between the member states and the international organization” (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 11). For that purpose, Reinalda and Verbeek argue that such analysis “need a more relaxed, pragmatic attitude toward the rationalist/constructivist divide [in order to look for their] compatibility (...) rather than on their incompatibility” (2004: 11-12).

With the aim of understanding decision-making within an encountering between rationalism and constructivism, Reinalda and Verbeek embed their analysis on a principal-agent theory³⁴, in which International Organizations and member states are caught up in a structural relationship of mutual dependency (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 22). On the one hand, states have founded International Organizations because they benefit from them; on the other hand, International Organizations physically exist because they receive funding from their member states (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 22). In that regard, they argue that an analysis of decision-making within International Organization would consider that this object of analysis “always takes place against the background of the potential conflict between principals and agent, a conflict that occasionally can emerge and affect the decision-making process” (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 23). As Reinalda and Verbeek assert, while a rationalist “argues that international organizations may dominate decision making because

³⁴ Reinalda and Verbeek (2004) find support on principal-agent theory through what Bendor *et al.* (1987) explained on that: “A superior, [identified as *the principal*], knows that the subordinate, [named as *the agent*], enjoys an informational advantage. For example, the agent may possess technical expertise or the principal may be unable to monitor the agent’s actions perfectly. The principal believes the agent may exploit these advantages for the agent’s own purposes. Anticipating this, the principal precommits him- or herself to a reward scheme before the agent acts. The payoffs to the agent are contingent on outcomes the principal can observe. A key task in this research program is to examine the conditions under which a superior can induce a subordinate to choose precisely as the superior would have, had the latter chosen directly” (Bendor *et al.* 1987: 875).

they have carved out policy autonomy for themselves” (2004: 24); a constructivist “suggests that international organizations pursuing policy objectives motivated by norms, ideas or identity are likely to form alliances with other like-minded actors in world politics” (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 26). As a result, decision-making within International Organizations creates “boundaries” due to the fact that “new norms allow the organization to do more than before” (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 27).

Bringing the notion on “boundaries” is not in vain. At this point, the authors bring back the contribution provided by Cox and Jacobson (1973) with regard to their taxonomy on decisions of International Organizations. Since they classified decision-making into seven categories, the one labelled as *boundary decisions* fits better the purpose of this thesis. The reason for bringing them on the analysis of this thesis rests on two facts: first, *boundary decisions* concern “the organization’s external relations with other international and regional structures on the matter of (1) their respective scopes, (2) cooperation among organizations, and (3) initiatives taken in one organization to provoke activity in another” (Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 10); and second, it cannot be taken in isolation from other classified decisions that Cox and Jacobson provide. In my perspective, *boundary decisions* reflect their other six correlates, since the notion of boundary is seen through and implies:

- i. the admission and exclusion of members, validation of credentials, determination of representation on executive organs and committees; referring to *representational decisions*;
- ii. testing the acceptability of goals or ideologies intensely espoused by one group of actors or the legitimacy of long-accepted norms of dominant elites; referring to *symbolic decisions*;
- iii. the strategic allocation of the organization’s resources among different types of activity, in reference to *programmatic decisions*;
- iv. the definition of rules or norms bearing upon matter within the substantive scope of the organization, which is the *rule-creating decisions*’ concern;
- v. the application of approved rules by those subject to them, which is the core of the *rule-supervisory decisions*; and

- vi. the providing of services or the use of organization's resources in accordance with approved rules, policies, or programs, referring to *operational decisions*. (Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 9-11)

Although Cox and Jacobson's (1973) classification enables a comprehension of different perspectives on decision-making, their contribution lays on the aspect that boundary is essentially dynamic and that decision-making is embedded in it. This means that International Organizations are more likely to affect decision making the more they have an information advantage over their member states; the more principals they face, since the plurality of principals enables them to play off member states against each other; and the more decision rules applied by member states work to the advantage of the organization (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 23). Consequently, it is impossible to analyse decision-making within International Organizations taking just one model as parameter. Since states create institutions through collective decisions to attend internal and external demands and to implement actions reflecting what states think and decide, in general terms, collectively and consensually, International Organizations are an arena where different decision-making models co-exist.

3.2. Decision-Making Models

Without resorting to one decision-making model specifically, my perspective embraces decision-making models varying from a perspective on a unilateral base of a state as the main actor, on the relation between states and on the role of the International Organizations (Allison, 1969; Rosati, 1981; Klein *et al.*, 1995; Snyder *et al.*, 2002; Zangl *et al.*, 2006; Mintz and DeRouen, 2010) and are anchored in four main models, classified as rational, organizational, bureaucratic and naturalistic. Since model is normative, predictive and prescriptive (Fitzgerald, 2002: 16), the reason for congregating these four models, in the scope of this thesis, refers to the notion that they, when combined, represent a holistic perspective of what constitutes a rationalist-constructivist divide (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004) for comprehending decision-making within International Organizations. Despite the fact that I do not neglect the rationalist approach, my priority is to analyse decision-making through constructivism. For that purpose, I assume that an analysis of decision-making

within International Organization permeates what states – as rational actors – think, act and decide in a multilateral basis. Although some authors have developed alternative models³⁵ of decision-making which reinforce the rational model, while others have developed an economic approach on this topic³⁶, my perspective concentrates on these four main ones as representation of an international organization functioning.

3.2.1. Rational Model

The most diffused model of decision-making in foreign policy and international relations is the rational one (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 26). Its unit of analysis is the ‘policy as national choice’ and its agent is the nation or the government as a unitary decision-maker, with national security and interests as states’ main goals (Allison, 1969). This model is linked to a state centred framework regarding situations such as the strategic analysis of deterrence and nuclear weapons (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 8), leading to the premise that “actors do what they believe is in their best interest at the time they must choose” (Morrow, 1997: 12), only make self-interested decisions (Zey, 1992: 17), and that they “always have some notion of their goals and some reasons (...) for believing that their choices will promote those goals” (Stein and Welch, 1997: 52-53). Since states remain the core of the functioning of the International Organizations, the decision-makers included in this model “know their alternatives; know their outcomes; know their decision criteria; and have the ability to make the optimum choice and then to implement it” (Lunenburg, 2010: 2). Although Leoveanu argues that the rational model is constituted as an important tool for analytical purposes, it “faces a multitude of obstacles, derived primarily from the difficulty of assuming a pure rational decision” (Leoveanu, 2003: 46) and to the fact that “these [rational] choices are almost never rational” (Stein and Welch, 1997: 53).

In this sense, characterizing a decision-maker as a rational implies on recognizing that the decision-maker knows the problem, generates alternatives to the problem, evaluates each of the alternatives generated in the previous phase, chooses what he/she perceives as ‘the best alternative’, implements the decision and, then, evaluates the effectiveness of the decision

³⁵ For a literature on alternative models of decision-making, see Mintz and DeRouen (2010).

³⁶ For models embedded in economics or based in companies as study cases, see Raiffa (1976) and Biswas (1997).

made (Lunenburg, 2010: 3-7). Since the rational model characterizes decision makers as completely rational, searching through perfect information to make optimal decisions (Lunenburg, 2010: 11), Lunenburg criticizes that any imperfections of decision makers are due to the social and organizational systems in which they are embedded. Those systems “impose limitations on decision makers’ ability to process information needed to make complex decisions (...) that restrict decision makers to finding solutions that are less than optimal” (Lunenburg, 2010: 11). Nevertheless, the counterpoint of this argument is provided by Heracleous whom assumes that the rational decision-making “neither describes actual decision-making processes nor can be used as an adequate guide to effective decision making” (1994: 16). The reasons for criticizing the rational model refer to the fact that, first, the rational decision-making model makes no reference to the filtering and constraining influences of the organizational paradigm on the decision process as a whole; second, the model also ignores the significant effects of political behaviour on this process and; third, it is limited to relatively simple problems, where objectives are clear, unambiguous and agreed, and cause-effect relations are clearly known (Heracleous, 1994: 16, 21).

The gap identified by Heracleous posits decision processes as a whole which “are influenced by the constraining and filtering effects of the organizational paradigm or culture, by actors’ perceptions of their interests and which course of action will best foster them, and by humans’ necessarily bounded rationality” (1994: 17). In this sense, Heracleuos suggests the establishment of a “structural and processual aspects of the decision-making group and cultural attributes (...) which can contribute to more effective decision making” (Heracleuos, 1994: 20). At this point, the model centred on the states gives place to a more holistic approach through the organizational framework.

3.2.2. Organizational Model

The model classified as organizational has “policy as an organizational output” as its unit of analysis and the actor refers to a “constellation of loosely allied organizations on top [of] which government leaders sit” (Allison, 1969; Allison and Zelikow, 1999). In this model, decisions are also made within agencies in which the key dynamic in the organizational politics model is standard operating procedures – SOPs (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 73). SPOs, on the one hand, “tend to govern mundane issues that low-level bureaucrats can

handle [while] important decisions, such as long-term budget making, might be considered through the organizational lens” (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 73); and, on the other hand, they “underline the importance of the decision-making routines in political organizations and, in particular, in the administration, which predetermine the decisions within organizations to a very large extent” (Zangl *et al.*, 2006: 90). The role of SOPs in the organizational process of decision-making refers to the holistic approach Heracleuos (1994) mentioned previously regarding the creation of conditions for more effective decision-making and, in addition, to what Allison and Zelikow point out, as SOPs as coordination mechanisms “to perform complex tasks [while establishing] rules to which things are done” (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 143).

In Heracleuos’ analysis, a more effective decision-making is possible through the existence of three different aspects: structural, processual and cultural. All of them influence each other and provide an integration among all levels in which the decision-making process is located. In relation to the structural aspect, the decision-making is composed of individuals with varying backgrounds; it can be divided into subgroups, which can debate an issue independently and then come together to share their views; and it can incorporate outside consultants since they can see a problem from an independent angle not influenced by the organizational paradigm (Heracleuos, 1994: 20). Regarding the processual aspect, the interaction with organizational members outside the decision-making group and consideration of their views should be encouraged, and a more organic organizational structure (rather than a mechanistic, bureaucratic one) will foster this (Heracleuos, 1994: 21). The cultural aspect must encourage the exchange of diverse views, and members of this culture must consciously realize the constraining and filtering effect of their subconscious ways of thinking on their interpretations and actions and consequently on the decision process itself (Heracleuos, 1994: 21).

When combined, those aspects assume a co-constitutive character in the process of decision-making and, consequently, they present the organizational model as the most complex one. Complex in a sense that it congregates a diversity of actors and connected processes within the main decision-making’s scope. Similarly, Snyder *et al* (2002) consolidated the ideas mentioned previously into the concept of *system of action*. They explain that the characteristics of the system determine the manner in which the decision-makers relate

themselves to the setting. The type of social system with which they are primarily concerned is an *organization* (Snyder *et al.*, 2002: 76). The authors highlight that, on the one hand, “decision-making leads to a *course of action* based on the *project*” which includes objectives and techniques (Snyder *et al.*, 2002: 79); and, on the other hand, “decision-making is a *sequence of activities*” (Snyder *et al.*, 2002: 79). In this sense, both the project and the sequence of activities direct to the *point of final decision*, characterised by the “stage in the sequence at which decision-makers having the authority choose a specific course of action to be implemented and assume or are assigned responsibility for it” (Snyder *et al.*, 2002: 79). Although the model on system of action was based on the foreign policy context, it can be corroborated by two other models defined by Zangl *et al.* (2006) focusing exclusively on the decision-making process within international organizations. The authors point out that the intergovernmental negotiations and majority voting become evident in such process.

The intergovernmental-negotiations model “reflects the idea that decisions within political organizations are generally reached through negotiations between the most powerful actors representing divergent interests within these organizations” (Zangl *et al.*, 2006: 88), while decision-making by majority “is characterized by attempts to form majorities through coalition building among the relevant actors (...) reflect[ing] the interests of all the powerful actors involved but rather[sic] the interests of a majority of these actors” (Zangl *et al.*, 2006: 89). In both models, the authors apply their structure to the role of the United Nations³⁷.

3.2.3. Bureaucratic and Naturalistic Models

Since part of the criticism of a rational actor refers to its capacity to underestimate the impact of a bureaucratic structure on the formation of preferences (Hollis and Smith, 1986: 285), the bureaucratic model sees no unitary actor, but rather many actors as players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems (Allison, 1969). The decisions in this model are made by “pulling and hauling” among various participants as they attempt to advance their concepts of personal, group, organizational, and national interests (Allison, 1969; Rosati, 1981). The unit of analysis is the “policy as political

³⁷ Zangl *et al.* (2006) refer, respectively, to decisions concerning the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the following agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Cartagena Protocol of 2000; and, then, to decisions regarding the United Nations General Assembly.

outcome” (Allison, 1969) which comprise four essential elements of this model: the structure, in which numerous individuals and organizations, with varying interests, are involved for any single issue, without the predominance of any participant; and the process in which the decision is formulated through bargaining (Rosati, 1981: 238). As mention Zangl *et al.* (2006), this model points to the fact that different branches within the administration of political organizations might favour different decisions and they “reflect either the victory of one branch, a compromise between all the relevant branches or the lowest common denominator of all branches involved in the process” (Zangl *et al.*, 2006: 91). For Mintz and DeRouen, the bureaucratic model not only “looks at how decisions involving various bureaucracies can elicit political competition” (2010: 71), as well as it represents a decentralized process that involve various actors in various agencies (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 71).

In the same line of thought is located the naturalistic decision-making model. From the naturalistic perspective, as Cohen (1995) points out, an unquestioning acceptance of the relevance of classical normative standards is untenable, “because real-world decision makers appear to use qualitatively different types of cognitive processes and representations” (Cohen, 1995: 49). Within the naturalistic model, decision-maker is at the center of the investigation and seeks to understand how professionals make quality decisions in complex situations where time and other resources are extremely limited (Rosen *et al.*, 2008: 213). In their analysis, the naturalistic model emphasizes the importance of expertise within a decision-making domain and highlights the importance of understanding decision making in context (Rosen *et al.*, 2008: 213). It also distinguishes from other forms by a “more pronounced concern for decision making in realistic, dynamic, and complex environments” (Cohen, 1995: 49), in which making a decision is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve a broader goal (Orasanu and Connolly, 1995). In this sense, “decisions are embedded in task cycles that consist of defining what the problem is, understanding what a reasonable solution would look like, taking action to reach that goal, and evaluating the effects of that action” (Orasanu and Connolly, 1995: 6).

Although this process finds similarities with the phases regarding the rational model, the naturalistic characteristics become much closer to the organizational model because its analysis considers: the existence of ill-structured problems; uncertain dynamic

environments; shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals; series of events; multiple players; and the existence and practice of organizational goals and norms (Orasanu and Connolly, 1995: 7-10), representing a totally mutable scenario where different types of actors – not limited only to a state-centred analysis – have influence in the entire process of the decision-making. As Table 3.1. summarises below, each aforementioned model has a specific unit of analysis as well as a correspondent agent. Since my perspective lays on comprehending a decision-making process within International Organizations, I am prone to affirm that rationalist, bureaucratic and naturalistic models converge to what is conceived by the organizational one. My reasoning is based on the fact that *policy* represents the main outcome of a decision-making process influenced by expertise and context; and that the decision-maker contemplates the variety of actors that become an inherent aspect of the organizational model.

Table 3.1. Decision-making models within International Organizations

Model	Rationalist	Organizational	Bureaucratic	Naturalistic
Unit of Analysis	Policy as national outcome	Policy as an organizational output	Policy as political outcome	Expertise and context
Agent	National government	Constellation of allied organizations / national leaders	Various actors in various agencies	Decision-maker

With this perspective in mind, the organizational model emerges as a promising one for comprehending how International Organizations work, what decisions they make, and how social reality is influenced by their decisions. As Reinalda and Verbeek argue, “actors in world politics socially construct their environment” (2004: 24), leading to a constructivist approach to better understand the role of decision-making in explaining the anarchy states create and the way they reproduce it through language, symbols, rules and interactions (2004: 24).

3.3. Constructivism meets decision-making

As was previously stated, decision-making structures are not established in advance. They are created considering material and immaterial aspects of each actor involved in the

decision and, specifically, if those actors interact within an International Organization. In this context, the discussion on decision-making, when applied to the field of International Relations, is extensively conducted within a constructivist approach (Adler, 1997, 1999; Buzan, 1995; Jørgensen, 2001; Kratochwil, 2001; Onuf, 1969, 1998, 2001, 2013; Ruggie, 1998; Searle, 1979; Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1999; Wight, 2006; Zehfuss, 2002). This approach was first conceived by Onuf in order to “reconstruct a self-consciously organized field of study called International Relations” (1969: 1), since he identifies that international relations form a bounded and distinctive social reality which is manifestly political (1969: 6). The constructivism theorised in the 1960’s by Onuf is rooted in the notion that “people always construct, or constitute, social reality, even as their being, which can only be social, is constructed for them” (Onuf, 1969: 1; 1998: 3-4).

As Wendt clarifies, although constructivism enables an understanding on “how actors are socially constructed” (1999: 7), it does not indicate “which actors to study or where they are constructed” (1999: 7). For this reason, he argues that before conducting an analysis on constructivism, there is the need of identifying, in a first glance, which units, which levels of analysis, which agents and which structures such reality is embedded in (Wendt, 1999: 7). Taking the notion on middle ground, Adler points out that constructivism “is interested in understanding how the ‘material’, subjective and intersubjective worlds interact in the social construction of reality” (Adler, 1997: 330), bringing both human capacities for reflection and learning as aspects that imply “on the manner in which individuals and social actors attach meaning to the material world and cognitively frame the world they know, experience and understand” (Adler, 1997: 322).

In this regard, constructivism assumes that our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings (Adler, 1999), depend on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world to be constructed, and that the human world is not simply given or already determined, but it is built through the actions and the actors themselves (Kratochwil, 2001). Thus, constructivists believe that international relations consist primarily of social facts and that despite accepting the existence of a real world, this world is not determined by physical reality, but it is socially emerging, and identities, interests and behaviour of political actors are socially constructed by meanings, interpretations and collective assumptions about the world (Adler, 1999). The purpose,

therefore, is to present the world as it really is and how it has become a system where the units are divided (Stern, 1995). Guzzini, in his turn, argues that “what counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive construction of the world out there” (Guzzini, 2000: 159). For this end, he explains that constructivism does not deny the existence of a phenomenal world, external to thought; but it does oppose to it, while enabling the comprehension that “phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge independently of discursive practices” (Guzzini, 2000: 159). In his words, “what counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive construction of the world out there” (Guzzini, 2000: 159). In this same line of thought, he points out that constructivism “distinguishes between the natural and social world [and that] besides brute facts, there are some facts which exist only because we attribute a certain function or meaning to them” (Guzzini, 2000: 160).

Five years later, Guzzini identifies three main claims on constructivism’s contributions, stating that, first, meaning and knowledge are mutually and socially constructed; second, that the social world is constructed; and third, that the social construction of knowledge can itself affect the construction of social reality and vice versa (Guzzini, 2005: 498-499). In that regard, the basic premise of Constructivism concerns the dynamic between ‘agent’ and ‘structure’ within the process of constructing social reality. As Gould (1998) points out, agents are, or consist of, individuals whose acts materially affect the world. As Barkin elucidates, constructivism is about a co-constitution process of agency and structure, in which, on the one hand, the structure is social and that this sociability is an artifact of human nature; and that, on the other hand, the agency part of this dialectic is crucial for understanding change in international politics (Barkin, 2010: 111). In a more in depth analysis of agency, Wendt argues that “constructivists have concentrated on causal and constitutive effects on identities and interests” (Wendt, 1999: 166). In this sense, agency is not only a mechanism for change in constructivism (Barkin, 2010: 112), it is metaphorically compared as people that, following Barkin, are “able to have an impact in the reproduction or transformation of the structures within which they find themselves” (2010: 101).

From his explanation, the definition of agency can be understood considering broad and narrow senses respectively, in which, on the one hand, actors “are determined by others, by the social structure itself, by the biological structures of their brains that cause them

automatically, without thinking, to behave in a certain way” (Barkin, 2010: 101-102); and, on the other hand, actors whose “behaviors that are affected by but not determined by the structures, social or biological, within which actors find themselves” (Barkin, 2010: 101-102). In both of these perspectives, agency is understood as “part of the intersubjective, as making decisions that change people’s understandings of the world in which they live” (Barkin, 2010: 102). On structure, Klotz and Lynch argue that stable meanings form structures (2007: 24). In an explanation of such definition, they point out that structures emerge when constructivists examine when, how and why particular practices become relatively fixed while others remain fluid within specific contexts encompassing almost all types of social order (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 25).

In their contribution, structures include global social systems, issue-specific international regimes, and formal organizations (2007: 25). Guzzini, in his turn, compares structure as *fields*. He argues that, “within the overall structure, and depending on the level of differentiation of a society, different fields exist within a society” (Guzzini, 2000: 166). In his analysis, fields are the specific contexts within which ‘practices’ take place, corresponding to a network of positions, interactions with a shared system of meaning (Guzzini, 2000: 166). In addition, fields give meaning to agency while they are what he calls *playgrounds* where agents realize individual strategies, play within, and thereby openly reproduce the rules of a given game (Guzzini, 2000: 166). In this regard, as Wendt points out, structures have effects not reducible to agents (1999: 139), but enhancing a mutually constitutive reinforcement among them. From his contribution, structures can be of two types: causal and constitutive (Wendt, 1999: 165). For Wendt, structure as causal “describes a change in the state of Y as a result of a change in the state of an independently existing X” (Wendt, 1999: 165). His explanation finds similarities on what Barkin (2010) states on the definition of agency on broad and narrow senses, since he emphasizes co-constitutive aspects external and internal to both structure and agency.

In a deeper explanation, he argues that structures’ differences consisting of causal and constitutive ways “are reflected in the (...) relationship between agency and structure. The former is a relationship of ‘interaction’ or ‘co-determination’, the latter of ‘conceptual dependence’ or ‘mutual constitution’” (Wendt, 1999: 165). On the co-constitutive aspect of agency-structure, Barkin explains that

Co-constitution allows us to look at ways in which social structures are being recreated and changed, and it allows us to identify how new structures came into being historically. But it cannot tell us how agents will behave, what agents will say, with respect to social structures in the future. Constructivist logic thus allows us to predict structure into the (near) future in a contingent way, but does not allow us to predict agency even to this extent. (Barkin, 2010: 111)

What is in question on Barkin's assumption is more than a discussion on structure and agency dynamic; but, most importantly, it is a discussion on how a constructivist perspective is dependent upon agents' behaviors. As Barkin states, be the structure social or biological, "behavior that is determined by structure (...) can be expected to be consistent as long as the structure remains the same" (2010: 102), reinforcing the idea that "presumably structure is static, while agency moves" (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 44). Nevertheless, since they are mutually constitutive, both change in some aspect during their dynamism.

Back to Wendt, there are two main basic claims on this dynamic: one, that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material, a claim that opposes materialism; and, the other one is based on the fact that these structures shape actor's identities and interests, rather than just their behaviour, a claim that opposes rationalism (1995: 72; 1999). A reason that sustain Wendt's premise is based on the fact that the analysis on the social construction of international politics is the analysis on "how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures that shape actor's identities and interests and the significance of their material contexts" (1995: 81). For this reason, Wendt (1995: 73) assumes that social structures are constituted by three elements: practice, material resource and shared knowledge. For him, "without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all" (Wendt, 1999: 139). On the role of shared knowledge, Wendt points out that social systems are also structured by distributions of knowledge (1999: 189). In addition, he argues that social structures are defined by shared understandings or expectations which constitute actors in a situation and the nature of their relationships, whether cooperative or conflictual (Wendt, 1995: 73-74). These shared understanding are, consequently, fundamental to provide meaning for human action in face of material resources they possess, as well as they are fundamental to provide a structure of practices.

Inside this dynamic of constructing social reality, Onuf (1969, 1998, 2013) makes an important contribution, highlighting the existence of an element on the relationship between actor and structure, named as norms and rules., which also influences and is influenced by the elements provided by Wendt (1995, 1999). On rules and norms, there are two main features I bring to this analysis: one, based on Hurd (2015), who argues that rules and norms determine the possible actions available to states, since states articulate those rules and norms by making reference to them in their explanations of their interests and behavior (2015: 400); and second, based on Kratochwil, who points out that rules and norms work as “guidance devices which are designed to simplify choices and import ‘rationality’ to situations by delineating the factors that a decision-maker has to take into account” (Kratochwil, 1989: 10). Therefore, rules are defined as “statements that tell people ‘what’ [they] should do” (Onuf, 1998; 2013: 4) in a sense that “even when [they] do not know what a rule says, [they] can often guess what it is about by looking at people’s practices” (Onuf, 1998; 2013: 4). In this regard, the way people deal with rules – following, breaking, making or changing them – may be called as practice because rules regulate the conduct of agents, and, on the other hand, they give choice to the agents (Onuf, 1998, 2013: 4, 5, 12; Gould, 1998: 81). Norms, on its turn, define situations and hence influence international practice (Zehfuss, 2002: 4), as well as aspects of social structures while shaping actions and beliefs by constituting actors’ identities and interests (Hoffmann, 2010).

Following Björkdahl, norms “are generally considered as a set of intersubjective understandings and collective expectations regarding the proper behaviour of states and other actors in a given context or identity” (2002: 15). From her contribution, there are four main features concerning norms: first, norms vary over time and are often context dependent; second, they are regarded as standards of behaviour, defined in terms of rights and obligations; third, norms imply on normal, customary and usual practices in the international system; and, fourth, norms are concerned with the desirability of the means and goals themselves (Björkdahl, 2002: 13-14).

At this point, Onuf (1998, 2013) assumes that choices are made on behalf of, and in the name of, social constructions, because, mainly, agents act to achieve goals “reflect[ing] people’s needs and wishes in light of their material circumstances [emphasizing] that rules [tell] agents which goals are the appropriate ones for them to pursue” (Onuf, 1998, 2013: 5). What

becomes implicit in this debate is to what extent constructivism – with its norms, its rules, its shared practices – enables an understanding of decision-making processes. On this issue, I build upon Kratochwil’s contribution. On *Rules, Norms and Decisions*, Kratochwil (1989) provides three main assumptions relating norms to decision-making. First, he states that “it is useful to study the role of norms in shaping decisions from the baseline of an abstract initial situation which is defined, more or less, in public-choice terms” (Kratochwil, 1989: 10). Second, he points out that “human action in general is ‘rulegoverned’, which means that (...) it becomes understandable against the background of norms embodied in conventions and rules which give meaning to an action” (Kratochwil, 1989: 11). And, third, Kratochwil affirms that the processes of deliberation and interpretation deserve further attention since “rules and norms influence choices through the reasoning process” (1989: 11).

In a deeper analysis, the author complements his thoughts arguing that “norms are not only ‘guidance devices’, but also the means which allow people to pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and justify actions” (Kratochwil, 1989: 11). Complementing Kratochwil, Doty (1993) argues that the idea of analyzing the construction of social reality embedded in a decision-making process does not pertain to the role of a unique agent. Doty points out that directing our attention to the importance of ‘worlds’ as they are perceived and constructed by collective decision makers – such as a bureaucracy, or the state – raises the possibility that the source of meaning, the social register of value, and agent of action may not be the individual (Doty, 1993: 300).

Embedded on constructivism, decision-making scholars contribute to the debate emphasizing on the critics to the rational models and focusing more on the sociological perspectives of how actors make decisions. Sofo *et al* (2013: vi), for example, assume that many of our choices or decisions are routine and based on habitual behaviour, in which some of them are influenced by time pressure while others – considered the most important ones – are made after a consideration of various factors and risks related to the choice. In their perspective, “any sociological exploration of decision making would not be complete without focusing on the ways in which individual choices are constrained and controlled by social institutions and social structures” (Sofo *et al.*, 2013: 2). In this point, specifically, Weeks and Whimster complement Sofo *et al*’s contribution, assuming that it is a basic tenet of the sociological perspective to focus on the social structures and social processes surround

an outcome or event, mainly if in this case the event is a decision or decision-making process (1985: 167-168). As they point out,

a major result of adopting a sociological stance is to refocus the analytical lens to concentrate not on the individual decision or decision maker but instead to view the decision outcome as part of a wider social pattern in which individuals, although significant, cannot be divorced from their social context in any attempted explanations. (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 168)

Subsequently, Weeks and Whimster (1985) argue that, within a decision-making process, it is not a prime concern of a sociological analysis to investigate the cognitive processes of the individual decision maker, but looking to aspects of the social environment that require that a decision to be made, such as: “stipulate how the decision is to be reached, determine who is to be held responsible, say what is to count as relevant information, and limit what ends and means are to be regarded as acceptable” (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 168). In order to converge sociological perspective into a decision-making process, the authors considered the existence of two sociological perspectives: one, named ‘structural approach’; and the another one, classified as ‘social process approach’. In their analysis, the ‘structural approach’ tends to stress the way in which all social actors are recipients of social reality (Weeks and Whimster, 1985). Under this approach, there is often very little that it is possible to do to change or effectively challenge a situation, at the same this approach on decision-making is limited to an instrumental concern of matching given ends to appropriate means (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 168-169).

The second theoretical approach, which they termed as ‘social process’, places greater emphasis on the manner in which the social environment is constantly changing due to the contributions of individuals and groups engaged in social interaction. The key difference, in comparison to the first one, is the way in which all definitions of social ends and social means are seen as social constructions (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 169). Considering the second approach, as the authors point out, decisions and decision-making can be viewed as a temporary social consensus at a particular conjunction of social factors. “From this viewpoint, the stress in any analysis needs to be placed on the emergent qualities of social reality that is conceived as a constantly developing process” (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 169). In addition, they assume that both structural and social processes approaches “can lead

to different definitions of decision making and how they jointly challenge conventional analyses of the nature and role of decision making in organizations” (Weeks and Whimster, 1985: 169).

Based on this perspective, Meijerink (1999: 22), who developed the idea of decision-making as a network, also contributes to this debate, emphasizing that the relationship between networks and games that are played within these networks has, on the one hand, structural and cultural characteristics, such as the distribution of resources among the actors; and, on the other hand, formal or informal rules of behaviour, which influence the games that are being played. In this perspective, Meijerink (1999: 33) emphasizes that structural and cultural differences between states may influence decision-making in several ways. In his analysis, there are at least four ways. The first one refers to the fact that actors may face difficulties to recognize interdependencies; the second is based on the notion that cultural differences may cause misunderstanding and misinterpretations of the behaviour of others; thirdly, different decision-making cultures may explain different preferences concerning the organization of international decision-making processes and, fourthly, structural and cultural differences may influence international decision-making indirectly once they influence the intranational decision-making. Structural and cultural aspects of the decision-making process inside international organizations or embedded intrinsically in states reflect the notion of ‘practice’ in its pragmatic terms. This means that it is through practice that states and international organizations shape the decision-making structure highlighting each constituent element in this process.

As Wendt explains, decision-makers routinely speak in terms of national ‘interests’, ‘needs’, ‘responsibilities’, ‘rationality’, and it is through such talk that states constitute themselves and each other as agents (1999: 10). An example of this practice within states and international organizations is provided by Sending, Pouliot and Neumann (2015), Hurd (2015) and Pouliot (2015) who analysed the role of diplomacy in making international politics. In their perspective, diplomacy is not merely a practice that deals in relations between pre-constituted political entities (Sending, Pouliot and Neumann, 2015: 7); but a socially emergent phenomenon which produces effects of its own on world politics (Sending, Pouliot and Neumann, 2015: 17); and a social practice by which states interact with other states (Hurd, 2015: 31). Since Pouliot’s (2015) contribution to diplomacy comes from his

analysis on the role of permanent representations within multilateral organizations, his conceptualization embraces an agency aiming the representation of the national government at the international level. In his own words, in their everyday practices, permanent representations do much more than simply represent the views of their national governments in their everyday practices: “they also develop a stake in the success of multilateralism itself, they seek to help their partners in trouble, and they contribute to the collective effort at compromise” (Pouliot, 2015: 106-107). Within this process, he elucidates that “national delegates also come to frame their positions in a language that echoes local norms and rules, they maneuver amid chain reactions, and they strive for constructive ambiguity in addressing multiple audiences” (Pouliot, 2015: 106-107).

In this regard, diplomacy is not a field of action exclusive to states, but a structural dynamic comprising different levels of agencies. Such assumption enables Hurd to argue, first, “that states make use of legal resources and contribute through that use to remaking them” (Hurd, 2015: 40), suggesting a mutual constitution of states and rules; and second, “that states exercise agency in the construction of their legal positions” (Hurd, 2015: 40). Although Hurd considers that such assumption does not mean that non-state actors cannot engage in the practice, what is in question is the fact that “non-state actors are engaged in an activity that is directed toward states, in a process of using international social resources to influence state behavior” (Hurd, 2015: 40-41).

In that regard, diplomacy is made and remade through practices whose characteristics must be treated as contingent and open to change (Sending, Pouliot and Neumann, 2015: 7); it is a form of interaction among social actors that is framed by the existing social structures of rules, norms, and habits, and that is in turn a product of these structures (Hurd, 2015: 35). Hence, it connects a public language to the business of the state, giving meaning, reasons, and explanations for state action (Hurd, 2015: 36), while occupying a position at the intersections between law and politics, between domestic and foreign affairs, and between agency and structure (Hurd, 2015: 53). Since constructivism holds the premise that the system of states is embedded in a society of states, following Ruggie (1998), such society as well as system are embedded in a sets of values, rules, and institutions commonly accepted by states, making it possible for the system of states to function (Ruggie, 1998: 11). Nevertheless, as Wendt elucidates, understanding how states frame international situations

and define their national interests becomes relevant to explain not only foreign policy, states behavior or the dynamic between agents and structures, but also, and most importantly, to what extent practices within a process of constructing social reality enables a ‘distribution’ of knowledge that may have emergent effects (Wendt, 1995: 140-141). Such Wendt’s positioning reverberates to what Autesserre points out, that “agents and structures are mutually constituted [and that] in fact, agency helps explain frame constitution (through practice), contestation, and change” (Autesserre, 2009: 256).

3.4. What is meant by co-constitutive practice?

The assumption that provides the title of this Chapter – *Decision-Making as a Co-Constitutive Practice* – is based on the notion that there is no determined decision-making structure or model that does not become adapted or that does not change its scope in face of its environment and its challenges. Following this line of thought, the motivations and the interests, that were capable of establishing a specific structure of decision-making, are vulnerable to the influence of its outcomes. I argue, therefore, that decisions yield decisions into different levels of analysis and involve different types of actors and structures in an interconnected network. As Cabantous *et al.* point out, “decisions do not occur in a social and organizational vacuum” (2008: 400); as well as there is no isolated decisions (Rosen *et al.* 2008: 220) within organizations that do not consider its historical, political, social, legal, physical environmental and economic contexts (Swann, 1985: 207). To this perspective, I would add that there is no decision that will not cause an impact. For impact I would say implication, consequence and result derived from the decision made, which leads to an analysis of the decision as a spill-over effect. As was previously stated in Chapter 2, decisions are an inherent part of a process of constructing social reality through what was conceived by labelling and framing in a mutual reinforcement. Nevertheless, considering the area of International Relations and Foreign Policy, my argument in this chapter lays on the fact that decision-making is essentially a social and political practice.

As Adler and Pouliot (2011a: 5) point out, focusing on international practices promises key advances for the IR discipline. In their analysis, “world politics can be understood as structured by practices, which give meaning to international action, make possible strategic interaction, and are reproduced, changed, and reinforced by international action and

interaction” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 5). Their understanding that practices “give meaning to international action” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a) finds support on Kratochwil, who affirms that “meaning is constituted by links to other concepts rather than by a match between a concept and its object” (2011: 37). Similar perspective is found on Frost and Lechner (2015), who argue that understanding practice through an internalism perspective holds the premise that “the language of observation must match the language of action used inside the domain of a practice” (2015: 3). Consequently, the interests on analysing how society works, following Kratochwil (2011), must be embedded on “how people communicate, use the concepts, and connect them with actions” (2011: 37). Although Adler and Pouliot (2011a), Frost and Lechner (2015) and Kratochwil (2001) do not provide an analysis on framing and decision-making, their assumptions are similar to how Fairhurst (2010) conceptualize framing, as “the ability to shape the meaning of a subject, to judge its character and significance” (1996: 3). Bringing this definition is essential for understanding that “give a meaning” and “framing”, within the decision-making literature, “brings to the fore the political aspect often silently subsumed within the act of sensemaking”³⁸ (Balogun *et al.*, 2008: 237).

As Frost and Lechner explain, understanding something “is to recognise or make sense of it as a *this* or a *that*” (2015: 2); and that, “a fundamental standpoint for making sense of any social practices whatsoever, be they local or global, domestic or international, cooperative or conflictual” (2015: 2) is assuming that deciding is influencing social reality dynamics. In this sense, bringing practices to the core of this analysis aims to understand not the *how*, but the *why* practices are and were conceived in a specific way. As Pouliot points out, “taking practices seriously throws light on a crucial (albeit oft- neglected) set of social processes” (2016: 10) evidencing its character as “socially productive, that is to say, they are a generative force in and of themselves” (2016: 10). Since Pouliot argues that practices are a necessary part of any account of the so-called big picture, “to ignore them is to cut oneself short from a key set of explanatory factors in world politics” (2016: 10). In his perspective, “the social world is emergent and practice is a key process involved in bringing the many facets of global life into being” (Pouliot, 2016: 10).

³⁸ Sensemaking, for Balogun *et al.* refers “to a social process of meaning construction and reconstruction that enables individuals through interacting with others to collectively create, maintain and interpret their world” (2008: 235-236).

In this regard, practice is understood and defined as “sets of routinized bodily performances, but they are at the same time sets of mental activities [which] imply certain routinized ways of understanding the world, of desiring something, of knowing how to do something” (Reckwitz, 2002: 251) within a “distinctive action domains inside which multiple individuals participate by being guided by common standards of action such as rules or norms” (Forst and Lechner, 2015: 2; 2018: 15). In essence, practice is an array of “human activity” (Schatzki, 2001: 11), which implies “competent performances (...) with socially meaningful patterns of action” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 6; 2011b: 5) “maintained by interactions among its constitutive performances that express their mutual accountability” (Rouse, 2007: 48). In addition, practice is also seen as a “collective singular encompassing various more specific *practices*” (Kratochwil, 2011: 41) in relation to the aspect that practices are constituted of “repetitive patterns (...), dispersed, dynamic, and continuously rearranging in ceaseless movement” (Buerger and Gadinger, 2015: 456).

Since practices do not occur once, but on a regular basis (Stern, 2003: 186), all these definitions direct the concept of practice within the context of decision-making to its closest correlated synonyms, such as ‘action’ and ‘behaviour’. Since “actions are a specific type of behavior, and practices are a particular kind of action” (Cook and Brown, 1999: 387); action, therefore, “is behavior imbued with meaning” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b), occurring when “certain social behavior is drawn from the general behavior of the society and segregated in a special professional preserve” (Rein, 1983: 176), creating “a common framework of rules governing the interaction of multitude of individuals” (Lechner and Frost, 2018: 14). This conceptualization over practices is embedded on the contribution of Bourdieu (1990) with regard to *habitus*, when the author explains that *habitus* represents

systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. (Bourdieu, 1990: 53)

Mentioning Bourdieu’s contribution enables an understanding that *habitus* is not only “a product of history”, but that, most importantly, it produces individual and collective practices while ensuring the active presence of past experiences. As Bourdieu states: these past experiences “deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and

action, tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms” (Bourdieu, 1990: 54). When I argue that decision-making is a type of practice, I am building upon two main ideas: first, on the notion of a “routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one [an]other in forms of bodily and mental activities, [and] background knowledge in the form of understanding” (Reckwitz, 2002: 249); and, second, on the prerogative that practices “are not merely descriptive ‘arrows’ that connect structure to agency and back, but rather the dynamic material and ideational processes that enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structures” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 6; 2011b: 5, Pouliot, 2016). This unstable process is based on the fact that the existence of practices evidences some constituent parts in the decision-making process that cannot be ignored, such as structures and agencies, ideas or matter, rationality or practicality, and stability or change (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b). Nevertheless, as Barnes argues, practices are, in essence, enacted by people as well as “insufficient basis for an understanding of the ongoing pattern of social life that they constitute” (2001: 29). For this reason, the author advocates that, for understanding practices, “it is always necessary to ask what disposes people to enact the practices they do, how and when they do; and their aims, their lived experience and their inherited knowledge” (Barnes, 2001: 29-30).

Following this thought, Adler and Pouliot (2011a) argue that practice is suspended between agency and structure based on four types of relationships among a particular set of practices. In the first type, named as “parallel existence”, practices are linked in space and/or time but they do not significantly interfere. Based on the authors, this may occur in the parallel existence because these practices belong to different registers of social life, they perform unlike functions and they make use of unrelated tools. “This type of interaction is the least conducive to transformation because interference is minimal” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 20). The second type is framed as “symbiosis”. On it, practices remain distinct but they form a coherent whole in which the parts are united in a mutually reinforcing relationship (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 20). In the third type, named as “hybridization”, interacting practices combine and form a new type of competent performance. In the hybridization, elements of different practices are rearranged into a hybrid new form that replaces past ways of doing through innovative associations (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 20). The last type, “subordination”, emphasizes that practices are variously positioned in a hierarchical

relationship working as an “anchor” to other practices and making them possible. “In these hierarchical bundles, one practice may become the dominant form of a set of subordinated practices, which may nonetheless continue to be practiced” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 20). All types of practices mentioned above direct the discussion into the existence of structure framed as “constellations of practices”, in which specific and general practices are interconnected through an epoch, a geographical place, a common object, a similar disposition, and how they react to the same conditions or perform the same functions (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 20).

Providing an analysis on practice as a co-constitutive character lays on the fact that, as Barnes (2001: 25) points out, it is a product of arrays from ongoing and self-reproducing social systems that, consequently, enable comprehending social and cultural phenomena of every kind, since his analysis is embedded in the notion that engaging “in a practice is to exercise a power” (Barnes, 2001: 28). To clarify this assumption, Barnes (2001) provides the concept of “shared practices”³⁹, for practices routinized at the collective level, instead of the individual one. In addition, shared practices are “accomplishments readily achieved by, and routinely to be expected of members acting together” (Barnes, 2001: 32-33). However, the author continues pointing that shared practices “nonetheless have to be generated on every occasion, by agents concerned all the time to retain coordination and alignment with each other in order to bring them about” (Barnes, 2001: 32-33).

The notion of decision-making as a co-constitutive practice acquires importance and legitimacy since it implies, on the one hand, the construction of social reality and, on the other hand, the production of knowledge, more precisely. Converging these two concepts – social reality and the production of knowledge –, they exemplify how Constructivism and Decision-Making support each other not only through the interaction between agents and structure or through the rules that shape agent and structure’s behaviour, but as well as through the level of knowledge that also tends to influence this dynamic. Considering this context, the discussion on knowledge contributes to the argument that social practices are caused by a sort of knowledge, hence producing other knowledge. This argument is based

³⁹ For examples on “shared practices”, see Distler (2016) and Harrison (2010). For “shared practices” as hegemonic perspectives, see Turner and Kühn (2016) and Kühn (2016). For examples on “shared practices” as intervention aiming peace, see Caplan (2019).

on three assumptions following its respective definition: first, knowledge is “a piece of subjectively acquired *information* about the world” (Funke, 2017: 101, emphasis added); second, it is “socially construct based on collective *action*, on socially embedded and guiding social action” (Meusburger and Werlen, 2017: 15, emphasis added); and, third, it is “constructed in minds of individuals in interaction with each other and their environment” (O’Toole, 2011: 131), which imply on the way we perceive the reality. On this last definition, O’Toole (2011) argues that individuals represent components of complex systems of knowledge retention, assuming the form of structural units, “that is, departments within the company, communities of practice, cultures, subcultures and social networks” (O’Toole, 2011: 131).

In this sense, knowledge is not only the outcome of the interaction of such dispositional relation between agents and structure, but the outcome that works as a motor that will have direct and indirect influence in determining the agent’s next action within a structural change. Based on these assumptions mentioned above, I highlight that: knowledge “can be a prerequisite for action but also a consequence of an action” (Funke, 2017: 99); it is the “capacity for societal action (the capacity to act), as the possibility to get something going” (Stehr, 2017: 116); it is “about the past interprets bygone political events and experiences and constructs causal relationships with the present” (de Guevara, 2014: 547); and it is “the content of learning” (Carayannis, Pirzadeh and Popescu, 2012: 138), as well as the content of interpretation and perception. I mention perception due to the fact that “perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand” (Jervis, 2017: 3) and that this type of knowledge “can be used not only to explain specific decisions but also to account for patterns of interaction and to improve our general understanding of international relations” (Jervis, 2017: 3). Since Jervis argues that perception enables a comprehension on how decision-makers draw inferences from information to contradicting their own views, such question, within the IR field has “assumed that decision-makers usually perceive the world quite accurately and that those misperceptions that do occur can only be treated as random accidents” (Jervis, 2017: 3).

The contributions mentioned above corroborate the idea that social reality is conceived as a dynamic process and, consequently, is the reflection of the knowledge produced as well. De Guevara (2014), for example, analyses the role of the International Crisis Group (ICG) as a

knowledge producer, and names its practice as “policy-relevant ‘conflict knowledge’” due to that think-tank’s expertise on this field. As she states, policy-relevant ‘conflict knowledge’ is produced and distributed by many actors, varying from state ministries and intelligence agencies, international organisations, branch offices and field missions, fact-finding missions, contracted consultants, NGOs working in conflict areas, and traditional and new media, (de Guevara, 2014: 545).

Although her ‘conflict knowledge’ perspective was named this way as a reference to her object of analysis, since the ICG is “one of the most notable and widely referenced producers of knowledge about conflict areas” (de Guevara, 2014), that notion is applicable to whatever source of knowledge. Moreover, her ‘conflict knowledge’ perspective embedded on ICG’s role enables a comprehension how other related institutions tend “to exert influence on agenda setting, policy making and policy implementation in post-/conflict areas” (2014: 546). As she states, “politically relevant knowledge is understood (...) as socially constructed in power struggles between actors resorting to specific technologies and bound together through the structures of the policy field” (de Guevara, 2014: 547). Within the organizational field, such knowledge-relation becomes more evident. Boswell (2009), for example, argues that there is a correlation on the role of knowledge in decision-making processes. She points out that “policymakers and officials in organizations draw on knowledge insofar as it can assist them in specifying and implementing the policy goals of their organization” (2009: 31).

For that purpose, Boswell explains that knowledge is “used as an instrument for helping to define and weigh up different policy options, ensuring that decisions contribute towards organizational goals” (2009: 31). In order to sustain this argument, the author builds on three assumptions. First, “organizations have a number of performance-oriented goals that they strive to fulfil” (2009: 31). Since her notion on organizations encompasses them as systems of formal and informal rules designed to limit the scope of variation in the behaviour of individual members (2009: 31), those same organizations are “able to realize its prescribed goals through introducing structures and procedures that facilitate decision output and implementation” (2009: 31). Second, “organizational choices are considered to be the outcome of a combination of individual actions (...) [although] not all members have equal influence in the decision-making process (Boswell, 2009: 31). As she clarifies, the point on

this assumption is “that members feed their individual knowledge and perspective into the decision-making process, so that organizational outcomes can in some sense be attributed to a cumulation of individual actions” (Boswell, 2009: 31). Third, knowledge within international organizations “can be applied to guide policy decisions in a fairly straightforward way [since] (...) researchers have an adequate grasp of problems and sufficient interest in applying research to address them” (Boswell, 2009: 32). From Boswell’s (2009) contribution above, the linkage between decision-making and knowledge does not rest only on their respective definitions. For that purpose, I would like to point out two interrelated concepts that emerge in this debate regarding the notion of decision-making and its constituent elements and the notion of knowledge.

In both of them, the interrelated concepts ‘action’ and ‘information’ appear and suggest an interpretation on how decision-making and knowledge are linked. First, Stehr (2017) clarifies that “neither information nor knowledge can be understood independent of societal contexts”, and second, once “knowledge is the capacity to act, information does not enable to set anything in motion” (Stehr, 2017: 117). This interpretation comes with Meusberger and Werlen, who point out that under conditions of uncertainty, “[people] have to gather new information, acquire new knowledge, and develop new skills in order to cope with unexpected situations and unfamiliar challenges” (2017: 1) in order to achieve their goals. In addition, the authors call attention to the fact that “actors differ in their levels of information, knowledge, skills, experience, and educational achievement, they arrive at very different decisions if they follow the principle of rational decision-making” (Meusberger and Werlen, 2017: 9). For that reason, the authors support collective decisions due to the fact organizations, institutions and other structures “are an environment’s most efficient elements for enhancing or impeding the conversion of a person’s knowledge into action. Without the support of institutions, most decision-makers cannot reach their goals” (Meusberger and Werlen, 2017: 13).

Reaching a goal through decision inside an organization brings two evidences based on their analysis in which consist of: first, specifying those who have the competence to provide knowledge to support the decision; and, second, those who have *only* the competence for deciding. To this distinction Meusberger and Werlen (2017) explain that, concerning the first group, “the knowledge and experience necessary for solving a problem or making the right

decisions to achieve a certain goal may be available somewhere in an organization, but it may not reach the people authorized to act on it” (Meusberger and Werlen, 2017: 13-14). To the second group, the authors point out that “authorized decision-makers may not have the prior knowledge, experience, and intuition necessary to understand and evaluate the importance of information that has been forwarded to them” (Meusberger and Werlen, 2017: 13-14). They complement this thought arguing that “those who decide often not understand those who know. And those who know are often experts in narrow domains only or are not close to those in power” (Meusberger and Werlen, 2017: 13-14).

To this notion, I call attention to the role played by ‘knowledge brokers’ already discussed in the previous Chapter (Litfin, 1995; Knaggård, 2013). Meyer (2010), on his turn, complements the discussion affirming that “knowledge brokers are people or organizations that move knowledge around and create connections between researchers and their various audiences” (2010). From his analysis, knowledge brokers not only produce, enable, and facilitate movement; they are in movement (2010: 123). Within this dynamic, Meyer explains that knowledge brokers move back and forth between different social worlds [while being] engaged in an exchange of knowledge through moving between places” (Meyer, 2010: 123, added). Since knowledge brokers are inserted in an institutional dynamic, in this case, those institutions consolidate and represent a powerful structure in which knowledge is one of their elements of influence. This thought is also supported by O’Toole (2011) in reference to the complexity of the networks which means that “knowledge retention within organizations may be managed and deliberate and have the effect of engendering knowledge retention that is unmanaged and informal but still powerful” (O’Toole, 2011: 131).

Back to Boswell (2009), the power perspective within knowledge is based on two symbolic uses: on the one hand, “an organization can enhance its legitimacy and potentially bolster its claim to resources or jurisdiction over particular policy areas” (Boswell, 2009: 7), and, on the other hand, “knowledge can lend authority to particular policy positions” (Boswell, 2009: 7) within organizations. In this regard, there are two assumptions provided by Kennedy who complements the discussion on the role of knowledge within a decision-making perspective while arguing that: on the one hand, experts “make decisions that affect the wealth, status, and power of other people” (Kennedy, 2005: 3); and, on the other hand, such decisions are made by “interpreting and enforcing the background norms and institutions which structure

activity in the market, in the state, in the family” (Kennedy, 2005: 3). Although he argues that, structures of global political economy, channels for diplomatic struggle, and tools for the allocation, consolidation, and contestation of economic privilege require interpretation and framing as much as implementation or enforcement (2016: 110), I would add to his contribution that decision-making processes inside international organizations require an interpretation of how knowledge permeates and influences the way social world is interpreted and perceived by all levels of agents.

Conclusion

An analysis of decision-making within International Organizations is an analysis of the process of how social reality is constructed. Bringing decision-making to the core of this Chapter represents an attempt of not being limited to an international system’s dynamic through a simplistic agent-structure debate only; but, most importantly, including other aspects pertinent to this process, such as assuming decision-making as a type of co-constitutive practice. Such prerogative not only evidences the role played by different actors – or agents – within structures named as *decision-making models*, highlighting specificities of rational, organizational, bureaucratic and naturalistic perspectives, but also that none of them act in isolation. In this regard, decision-making processes are encountering points where all these aforementioned models co-exist. An implication of this convergence refers to a holistic view of social reality through the decisions made collectively at the international organization’s level. Nevertheless, as the Chapter evidences, decision-making *per se* implies not only decisions made, actions taken or their respective consequences; but also, most importantly, decision-making requires expertise knowledge and such knowledge impacts on decision-making, leading to its improvement and adaptation and, eventually, leading to the re-constitution of the social reality.

4. The UN Practice Towards Labelling and Framing Post-Conflict Countries

Practices do change over time, although quite gradually.
(Pouliot, 2016: 58)

Introduction

The construction of social reality also pertains to individual and collective decisions on the establishment of international organizations. Some of these organizations, such as the United Nations, are imbued in a post-war significance. Thinking on the UN from this framing perspective helps to understand much of its positioning and practices towards the scenario it emerged and, also, towards its role on protecting the world “from the scourge of war” (UN, 1945). As Hanhimäki points out, the onset of World War II (1930-1945) evidenced “that some sort of international organization was needed to safeguard against yet another descent to Armageddon in the future” (2008: 13). In his analysis, the world was being transformed through European empires that have collapsed either during or as a result of the war; through the United States and the Soviet Union that emerged as the strongest nations on earth; and through Germany and Japan that were occupied and militarily emasculated (Hanhimäki, 2008: 13). Hence, “the UN was created, in part, to manage that transformation” (Hanhimäki, 2008: 13) and “be a definite guaranty of peace” (Hanhimäki, 2008: 15).

In my point of view, creating an international organization to manage the world transformation implies on enabling it with a legitimacy role on framing the reality it faces in order to comprehend and to determine which actions take part of the designed frame. That was the case when the UN established its first peacekeeping operations⁴⁰ (PKOs) to deal with “problems and conflicts that required a new kind of policing power” (Hanhimäki, 2008: 74), mainly after the collapse of the “Soviet model of political economy in the 1990s”

⁴⁰ The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) were the first peacekeeping operations deployed by the UN in 1948 and 1949, respectively (DPKO, 2019a, 2019b).

(Turner and Kühn, 2016: 7) when the number of the deployed operations⁴¹ increased. Nevertheless, designing a framework named as *peacekeeping operation* implies on recognizing and legitimizing labels to whom this framework is designed to. Usually, countries where PKOs were deployed are not only associated to labels that reflect their governmental incapacity, such as fragile, failed, collapsed and dysfunctional; but, also, that the label attached to them is reinforced and/or replaced when these countries enter in a post-conflict phase.

Assuming that some of the PKOs' recipient-countries became labelled as *post-conflict* ones marked by their transitional phase from intrastate war to peace, the UN faced itself within the challenge of establishing new frameworks to deal with such demand. In the scope of this thesis, *post-conflict* works as a label and as a framing, and that the UN practice towards post-conflict countries embraces the collective decision of designing and improving its interventionist models for peace. Since this thesis is focused on the role of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), I argue in this chapter that the establishment of the PBA in 2005 reflects an institutional process of re-framing post-conflict challenge embedded in a process of: constructing labels, designing frameworks, reinforcing previous labels, re-framing challenges, and disseminating new labels and/or new frameworks.

Although such process does not represent a linearity, its intertwined character enables identifying intrinsic aspects of its dynamic. In order to explain this argument, this chapter is divided in four parts: first, a comprehension on how label permeates the design and functioning of the PBA depends on a comprehension of what was conceived earlier through the Ad Hoc Advisory Groups (AHAG) on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* under the domain of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Second, the label attached to ECOSOC's framework was reinforced through the institutional reasoning on re-framing post-conflict challenge by the establishment of a peacebuilding machinery at the UN level. Third, the creation of the PBA led ECOSOC's label into a subjacent level in which *peacebuilding* became a reinforced term assigned to both *countries emerging from conflict* and *post-conflict countries*, by the dissemination of PBA's constituent elements, such as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding

⁴¹ During the 1990s, the United Nations has deployed 35 peacekeeping operations, being the decade with the highest number of peace operations (DPKO, 2019c).

Support Office (PBSO). And, fourth, as the scholarly debate evidences, the UN practice towards labelling and framing post-conflict countries reflects more an institutional improvement of its own capacity or limitations rather than a demand that comes externally.

4.1. Constructing the label: the case of the Ad Hoc Advisory Groups

Countries emerging from conflict is a term that has, in its own conceptualization, a transitional phase marked by the end of an intrastate war and the beginning of a peace process. It became an official label and framing within the UN in 2002, through an approved ECOSOC resolution aiming at the establishment of Ad Hoc Advisory Groups (AHAGs) exclusively for African countries (ECOSOC Resolution 2002/1). Until being officially adopted by the ECOSOC, *countries emerging from conflict* was conceived as an UN attempt to improving its own approach for peacebuilding within an internal dynamic comprising decisions at both UNSG's, UNSC's and UNGA's levels. At the UNSG's level, the decision on deliberating on such frame dates of 1998, when the former UNSG Kofi Annan launched *The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa* (UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318). At that time, he called UN-members' attention on societies that have emerged from conflict, explaining that these societies "have special needs" (UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318, para. 66) and "a smooth and early transition to post-conflict peace-building is critical" (UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318, para. 65) in their respective contexts. Annan's appeal at that time was directed to the UNSC in order to influence that UN-body "to look favourably on the establishment of post-conflict peace-building support structures similar to the one in Liberia"⁴² (UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318, para. 65).

Liberia was the first country where the UN has established its first peacebuilding office in 1997 (UN Doc. S/1998/1080). Since that office was designed to promote reconciliation, to strengthen democratic institutions, to mobilize international resources and to assist national recovery and reconstruction (UNSC, 2019: online), Annan considered that suggesting such framework could serve as a model for other peacebuilding offices where needed.

⁴² The UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was established on 1 November 1997 after the withdrawal of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and was followed-on by the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (UNSC, 2019: online).

Nevertheless, the process of establishing a framework for peacebuilding evidenced a dynamic in which expertise knowledge was required to justify the need of such structure. To this expertise demand, I refer the role played by the Ad Hoc Advisory Groups (AHAG), also referred as working group, created by both the UNSC's (UN Doc. S/RES/1170 (1998)) and UNGA's (UN Doc. A/RES/53/92) resolutions as a follow-up of Annan's report. Their decision on establishing their respective ad hoc groups was justified by the need of creating a group of experts to review and monitor the recommendations contained in Annan's report (UN Doc. S/RES/1170 (1998), UN Doc. A/RES/53/92) in order "to prepare a framework for the implementation of recommendations (...) and to submit specific proposals for concrete action" (UN Doc. S/RES/1170 (1998), para 4). Although their respective groups have achieved the result on developing concrete proposals for action (UN Doc. S/1999/1008), UNGA went further on that matter while extending the mandate of its working group⁴³ (UN Doc. A/RES/54/234, UN Doc. A/RES/55/217) and requesting the ECOSOC to consider its proposals, "including the creation of an ad hoc advisory group on countries emerging from conflict" (UN Doc. A/RES/55/217, para 7).

When the UNGA decided on that matter, its decision was embedded on its working group's analysis, which reiterated and recalled that "paragraph 17 of agreed conclusions 1998/1 adopted by the Economic and Social Council, in which the Council noted the need to develop, through a strategic framework, when appropriate, a comprehensive approach to countries in crisis" (UN Doc. A/55/45, para. 48). Hence, the AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* suggested by the UNGA's working group finds its own field of action through an ECOSOC recognition on the possibility of such demand, while recognizing that "peacebuilding efforts require a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of conflict and potential conflict" (UN Doc. A/56/45, para. 47). For this reason, the AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* is conceived within two main axes: first, aiming to assess economic needs of the countries in crisis; and, second, "elaborating a long-term programme of support for implementation that begins with the integration of relief into development" (UN Doc. A/55/45, para 48-49). In my perspective, UNGA's working group acted as *knowledge brokers* within the UN, referring to the concept provided by Litfin (1995), Meyer (2010) and Knaggård (2013), in which experts at all levels – also within international organizations –

⁴³ The UNGA's working group was named as Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. In this thesis, it is referred as *UNGA's working group* only.

are responsible to interpret and to frame social reality in order to make it understandable for individual and collective actions and decisions. In this sense, UNGA's working group interpreted the challenge posited by the UN with regard to peacebuilding and provided a solution while giving a name to it, which is the same one that embraces the label in which the framework was designed. I do not argue here that *knowledge brokers* act intentionally to name social reality, but that when they do attach a label to their interpretation, such label becomes inherently meaningful.

When ECOSOC accepts UNGA's request (UN Doc. A/RES/55/217, para 7) to create an AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict*, it not only decides on that matter as its decision reverberates to a more nuanced notion of what implies the establishment of such label and framework. On its resolution 2002/1, the ECOSOC delimitates its AHAG to *African countries emerging from conflict*, evidencing two elements of a labelling and framing boundaries perspectives: on the one hand, the label *countries emerging from conflict* delimitates its space of action while identifying, on the other hand, *African countries* as the boundary in which such frame will be applied. Such evidence emphasizes a particular distinction on determining which countries are categorized for belonging to the process of *emerging from conflict* and what this condition entails for a peacebuilding on its early stage as an institutional framework. For a better comprehension on the categorization of countries under the label *emerging from conflict* and what this condition entails for a peacebuilding framework, I propose an explanation based on the duties determined for the AHAG based on the ECOSOC Resolution 2002/1.

The AHAG was created to be “a limited but flexible and representative (...) group at the ambassadorial level” in consultation with “representatives of relevant national, subregional, regional and international organizations and other actors” (ECOSOC Res. 2002/1: para. 2,4). Its purposes contributed to construct a sense of ‘need for accompaniment’ at the international level. This prerogative is based on the AHAG's objectives, which clearly attest that the transitional phase from intrastate war to peace is designed for specific groups of countries requiring international support on:

- i. engaging in consultations;
- ii. assessing humanitarian and economic needs in the concerned country or subregion;

- iii. preparing a long-term programme of support that aims at the integration of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development into a comprehensive approach to peace and stability; and
- iv. providing advice on how to ensure that the assistance of the international community in supporting the country or subregion concerned is adequate, coherent, well-coordinated and effective. (ECOSOC Resolutions 2002/1; ECOSOC Report 2002/12: 4-5; ECOSOC Dec. 2003/311)

When combined, each AHAG's objective evidences the emergence of another dynamic in pursuit of peacebuilding within the UN through agents acting as interlocutors in the diplomatic field, emphasizing ECOSOC's leading role on providing an AHAG with the function of acting "as advocates for countries that are not at the forefront of foreign assistance" (ECOSOC Res. 2006/11: 14). In this regard, *countries emerging from conflict* were the ones labelled on this way as a reference to their need for accompaniment, naturally crafting a space for the UN while trying to avoid the "traumatic experience of UN engagement in Somalia and Rwanda" (UN, 2006: 7) and paving the way "to mobilize international support for peace efforts" (UN, 2006: 8). Taking the context and that encouragement (UN, 2006: 8), the AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* was preceded by informal groups, such as the contact group on Sierra Leone in 1998 and the group of friends of Guinea-Bissau in 1999 (UN, 2006: 8; Prantl, 2005; Prantl, 2006), enabling the institution "to identify countries with a pre-existing level of commitment to become deeper engaged in conflict resolution" (UN, 2006: 8). In this sense, it is possible to affirm that the construction of a framework to deal with *countries emerging from conflict* was initially gaining shape in late 1990's; and that this structure "could add real value to the work of the United Nations" (ECOSOC Rep. 2002/12, para. 2). For a more in depth discussion on what should be the added value of informal groups and Ad Hoc ones to the functioning of the UN, I argue that identifying those values is discussing the intrinsic relation on their proliferation.

For this purpose, I highlight the contribution provided by Prantl (2005, 2006), who explains that the proliferation of these informal groups "emerged early in UN history and proliferated in the postbipolar era" (Prantl, 2005: 560) due to two internal circumstances: one, there was an "increasing demands on the UN to adapt to the security environment of the bipolar world,

without changing formally the constitutional foundation of the organization” (Prantl, 2005: 561); and, second, that “the UN and its member states have been constantly facing hard choices regarding which conflicts to address” (Prantl, 2005: 566). In this regard, proliferating those groups enabled the UN to adapt itself to new challenges recognizing that, on the one hand, “the consolidation of peace requires therefore a comprehensive approach, guided by peacebuilding strategy that reflects a common vision, a shared sense of responsibility, and commitment to partnership” (UN, 2006: 10) and, on the other hand, “there was no effective institutional framework to steer the transition from peacemaking to peacebuilding” (UN, 2006: 10). Once created, the AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* was the first UN’s response exclusively addressed for its post-conflict peacebuilding approach. Although it did not have *peacebuilding* on its name does not mean that its role in constructing a path for peacebuilding inside the United Nations should be minimized. As Barnett et al. (2007) explain, practitioners, scholars, international and regional organizations, as well as states “have attempted to better identify what institutionalizes peace after war and what the critical ingredients and steps likely to further that goal are” (2007: 35). Within this collective attempt, Barnett et al. argue that each notion of what the term peacebuilding really entails for their practices lead to “critical differences among actors regarding its conceptualization and operationalization” (2007: 36).

The AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* is, in this case, a reflection of such design process of intervention. Nevertheless, comprehending peacebuilding and designing a framework is also a process on constructing labels. At this point, I argue that, first, there is the notion that the AHAG was addressed only to African countries, reinforcing the categorization of the countries of this continent in face of the fact that “Africa has been the site of a large number of international and continental projects to promote peace” (Curtis, 2012: 1); and, second, such categorization implies on eligibility criteria for post-conflict country’s engagement within the ECOSOC. During its functioning, the AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* became limited only to two countries, Guinea-Bissau in 2002 and Burundi in 2003 reflecting, on the one hand, that the label played a role in making countries identifying themselves with the notion of *emerging from conflict* and, on the other hand, on the subjectivity notion, of how to categorize a *country emerging from conflict* in that context. In the case of the AHAG, countries had their advisory group created after a careful review of their situation, which include the existing arrangements and initiatives in face of three basic needs: humanitarian, reconstruction and development (ECOSOC Rep. 2002/12, para.

4). In addition, the creation of the AHAG should be an opportunity for the ECOSOC to provide an added value as an intergovernmental body on this issue (ECOSOC Rep. 2002/12, para. 4), acting on the purpose of drawing upon the leadership of UN representatives on the field, such as Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN resident coordinator, the UN Country Team, for example (ECOSOC Rep. 2002/12, para. 6). Since the AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* has benefited only two countries under its scope – Guinea-Bissau and Burundi; a debate on this framework becomes necessary for comprehending how this perspective was embraced by the PBA, mainly because both Guinea-Bissau and Burundi had their label *countries emerging from conflict* replaced by the *post-conflict country* one due to their respective inclusion into the PBC. Such evidence, in the scope of this thesis, enables to identify how the AHAG on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* functioned and how it contributed to improve peacebuilding within the UN during the establishment of the PBA.

4.1.1. The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau

The ECOSOC AHAG on Guinea-Bissau was established in 25 October 2002 (ECOSOC 2002/304) and had its mandate extended until 2008 (ECOSOC 2003/1, 2003/53, 2004/1, 2004/61, 2005/2, 2005/32, 2006/11, 2007/15), when Guinea-Bissau was included in the PBC Agenda (UN Doc. A/62/736–S/2007/744, UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.5). At that time, there were five features of Guinea-Bissau’s situation that led the country for an AHAG: first, it was characterized as “emerging from conflict” (ECOSOC 2003/8: 1); second, it was included among the list of countries benefited from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative⁴⁴ (ECOSOC 2003/8: 1); third, its economic, social and political situations were in alarm, suggesting that Guinea-Bissau was “slowly sliding back into conflict” (ECOSOC 2003/8: 1); fourth, the persistent fragility of its democratic institutions (ECOSOC

⁴⁴ The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was launched in 1996 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) with the objective of ensuring that no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage. To date, debt reduction packages under the HIPC Initiative have been approved for 36 countries, 30 of them in Africa, providing \$76 billion in debt-service relief over time. Those countries are: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Benin, The Gambia, Mozambique, Bolivia, Ghana, Nicaragua, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Cameroon, Guyana, São Tomé & Príncipe, Central African Republic, Haiti, Senegal, Chad, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Comoros, Liberia, Tanzania, Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Zambia. Three additional countries – Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan – are eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance (IMF, 2019).

2005/2); and, fifth, the national government of Guinea-Bissau requested ECOSOC “to be the first country for which an Ad Hoc Advisory Group would be created” (E/2004/10). Based on this last aspect, I highlight that Guinea-Bissau legitimized, through its own decision, the label *countries emerging from conflict* as a reflection of its image within the international system and as its parameter for action; the ECOSOC’s framework, as well as the boundary while demarcating AHAG as a framework designed exclusively for African countries. Although the categorization of Guinea-Bissau under a *country emerging from conflict* dates on 2002, Bissau-Guinean scenario, therefore, reflects a volatile condition since its independence in 1974, which led the country being also labelled within “the ranks of the least developed countries” (ECOSOC 2003/8: 5) and being included “on the agenda of the Security Council since the outbreak of the civil war in 1998” (ECOSOC 2003/8: 6). As a result, when framed into an AHAG, its mandate for Guinea-Bissau was designed to:

- i. examine the humanitarian and economic needs;
- ii. review relevant assistance programmes;
- iii. prepare recommendations for a long-term programme, based on development priorities;
- iv. conciliate integration of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development into a comprehensive approach to peace and stability; and
- v. provide advice to ensure that the assistance of the international community in supporting Guinea-Bissau is adequate, coherent, well-coordinated, effective while promoting synergy. (ECOSOC 2002/1; E/2002/12, para. 4-5; 2002/304, 2004/10)

Nevertheless, as the UN deals with peace as an *ad continuum*, the establishment of an AHAG on Guinea-Bissau is just one part of this process and, while being *just one part*, it was not created to assume a permanent character and role for peacebuilding in that country. The AHAG on Guinea-Bissau became a framework derived from another interpretation of what a frame for peacebuilding entails at the institutional level. Following its timeline with regard to peacebuilding at the UN, the AHAG on Guinea-Bissau, on the one hand, emerges after the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) (UN Doc. S/1999/233) – which was the first attempt to provide support to the “political framework and leadership for harmonizing and integrating the activities of the United Nations system” in that country (UN Doc. S/RES/1233(1999), para. 7); and, on the other hand, acts upon on the

reasoning for including Guinea-Bissau in the PBC and, consequently, on the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) (UN Doc. S/RES/1876(2009)).

In this sense, UNOGBIS, AHAG on Guinea-Bissau and UNIOGBIS reflect the existence of different framing perspectives to reinforce a categorization in which Guinea-Bissau was included in. Embedded on the notion that decisions are not made in isolation and are not impact-free, I argue that designing a framework to deal with *countries emerging from conflict* implies on creating an internal structure within the UN in which member-states are invited to play a role, acting as interlocutor in the diplomatic field to deliberate on peacebuilding matters. As I stated previously in this chapter, interlocutors act on behalf of the concerned countries and, in this case, on behalf of Bissau-Guinean's and international's interests within the framework designed. The AHAG on Guinea-Bissau was composed by South Africa, which was appointed as Chair of the group; Portugal, the Netherlands, Brazil and Guinea-Bissau itself (E/2003/8, para 2)⁴⁵. As a report on the AHAG points out, at the first meeting of the group, held on 29 October 2002, they decided into two fronts: first, visiting Guinea-Bissau in order to consult with all stakeholders and actors regarding country's short-term crisis and long-term development (ECOSOC E/2003/8, para 3); and, second, discussing country's challenges and the ways in which bilateral donors and others could help in this process (ECOSOC E/2003/8, para 4).

At this point, I call attention that *in loco* visits became a modality UN-member states adopted as a common practice within their role as interlocutor. As a result of this visit, specifically, the AHAG on Guinea-Bissau has developed *tripartite consultations* between the Government of Guinea-Bissau, the UN system and the donor community aiming to encourage “dialogue among the Government and its key partners on the way forward for the country in the context of the suspension of the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and a significant reduction in donor assistance” (ECOSOC E/2003/8, para 6). As an ECOSOC report pointed out, the volume of financial support from development assistance dropped sharply from \$177.9 million in 1996 to \$52.4 million in 1999 (ECOSOC E/2003/8,

⁴⁵ The AHAG on Guinea-Bissau also required the invitation of other UN-member states, such as Mauritius, while acting as Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Gambia, as Chair of the Group of Friends of Guinea-Bissau; and the President of the Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Ivan Šimonović (Croatia), to participate in the work of the Group (E/2003/8, para. 2).

para. 10). In order to revert such situation, some of the initiatives were accomplished into different fronts: both IMF and World Bank helped the country drafting a 2004 budget; the UNDP had established an Emergency Economic Management Fund in order to addressing the social and economic challenges the country faces; countries as the Netherlands, Sweden and France have donated €1.8 million, \$1 million and €500 thousand, respectively; and the Lusophone Commonwealth⁴⁶ has established a Special Fund for Guinea-Bissau and has received contributions from Angola, Brazil and Portugal (ECOSOC E/2004/10: 6).

Despite the international support, the donations did not achieve structural ruptures in the country, making Guinea-Bissau remaining “in dire need of assistance, including budget support to pay salaries for government workers, some who have not been paid for many months” (ECOSOC E/2004/10: 6) and in meeting “the requirements for the basic functioning of government” (ECOSOC E/2004/92: 5). At this point, I highlight that another aspect that reinforces the categorization of a country labelled as *emerging from conflict* is the existence of financial assistance addressed only to countries included on that transitional phase from intrastate war to peace. This argument finds support in an ECOSOC’s report on Guinea-Bissau, which pointed out that when the country first emerged from conflict it was eligible for receiving “*post-conflict assistance* from donors, including the Bretton Woods institutions” (E/2003/8, emphasis added). In that regard, it becomes evident that labelling and framing are an inherent part of legitimizing institutional practice in a post-conflict field.

4.1.2. The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi

Burundi was the second and last *country emerging from conflict* to hold an AHAG under the ECOSOC. Its framework was established in 2003 (ECOSOC Dec. 2003/311) and remained until 2006 (ECOSOC 2004/2, 2004/60, E/2005/70, 2005/33, E/2006/64), when Burundi was included in the PBC. Similar to its predecessor, there are, at least, five aspects that justify Burundi’s inclusion in an AHAG framework: first, Burundi was also “in need of emergency assistance” (ECOSOC E/2004/11: 3) in face of the critical moment of its peace process⁴⁷ (ECOSOC E/2004/11: 3) and for becoming dependent of international donor support for

⁴⁶ The Lusophone Commonwealth also known as Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (from the Portuguese *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* – CPLP), is comprised by Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea Ecuatorial, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé e Príncipe and Timor-Leste.

⁴⁷ For Burundi’s peace process see (Falch and Becker, 2008: iii).

recovery (ECOSOC E/2004/11: 3). Second, its AHAG was established as part of that *ad continuum* perspective I mentioned with regard to the UN process on re-framing peacebuilding. When the AHAG on Burundi is established, it succeeds in between the United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB) – created in November 1993 by UNSC’s resolution in order to support the initiatives aimed at promoting peace and reconciliation (UN Doc. S/1999/425); and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), established in May 2004 (UN Doc. S/RES/1545 (2004)). Within this timeframe, Burundi registered, from 1990 to 2002, a fell by 66% on international financial assistance as a consequence of the crisis of October 1993⁴⁸ and an embargo in 1996⁴⁹, making international cooperation be suspended (ECOSOC E/2004/11: 14).

Third, Burundi is located in the middle of the “troubled Great Lakes region” (ECOSOC E/2004/11); fourth, it is a “country emerging from 10 years of conflict” (ECOSOC E/2004/11); and, fifth, the government of Burundi also requested its inclusion in an AHAG framework. Such request was sent by the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the UN in New York at that time, ambassador Marc Nteturuye, arguing that such AHAG would benefit its country while “stud[ing] and monitor[ing] the economic and humanitarian situation (...) in this especially difficult period for (...) post-conflict reconstruction” (ECOSOC E/2002/86).

As I stated previously with regard to Guinea-Bissau, Burundi’s decision on that matter reinforces institutional practices embedded in a categorization process. At the same time such decision represents a national desire of being benefited by an AHAG framework, being recognized as a *country emerging from conflict* reflects a certain level of perception of what really constitute a *country emerging from conflict* for the institution and for the country itself. At this point, the legitimization of the label and the framework works as a way of doing politics, since the benefits for Burundi while having an AHAG are related to the international community’s engagement in creating a platform for multilateral aid, hence legitimizing international organization’s role on establishing financial frameworks following the way

⁴⁸ The crisis of October 1993 is marked by a mass killing when a battalion of Tutsi paratroopers stormed killed the president in an effort to reclaim political power that had been lost during the elections (Bundervoet, 2009: 357).

⁴⁹ Burundi’s neighboring countries imposed sanctions demanding the immediate restoration of Burundi’s National Assembly and the reinstatement of political parties as well as peace negotiations (Grauvogel, 2014: 170).

countries are categorized. When AHAG's on Burundi is officially established (ECOSOC Dec. 2003/311), its objectives do not differ from its predecessor, implying on the notion that framing *countries emerging from conflict* under ECOSOC pertains to a homogenous challenge. In this specific case, it was expected from the AHAG on Burundi to:

- i. examine the humanitarian and economic needs;
- ii. review relevant programmes of support and preparing recommendations for a long-term programme of support;
- iii. conciliate integration of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development into a comprehensive approach to peace and stability;
- iv. provide advice on how to ensure that the assistance of the international community in supporting the country concerned is adequate, coherent, well-coordinated and effective while promoting synergy. (E/2004/11, ECOSOC Dec. 2003/311)

In order to achieve these aforementioned objectives, the work of the group would be essential. In that regard, South Africa, UN-member elected to be the Chair of the AHAG on Guinea-Bissau was also elected as Chair of the AHAG on Burundi with the participation of Japan, Ethiopia, Belgium, France, and Burundi itself; as well as ambassador Gert Rosenthal of Guatemala, as president of the ECOSOC at that time, and Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins, ambassador of Angola, who was acting as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the UNSC on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa (E/2004/11, ECOSOC Dec. 2003/311). Their role on acting on behalf of Burundi can be exemplified by the first round for donation, held in January 2004 in Brussels, during the *Forum of Development Partners of Burundi*, in cooperation with the Government of Belgium and with the technical support of UNDP and with the participation of 25 countries, as well as the African Union, the European Union, the World Bank and IMF (ECOSOC E/2004/11: 15). At that forum, the financial assistance to Burundi was attached to specific projects, comprising four main areas of a broad peacebuilding program:

- i. \$942.8 million for the period 2003-2006 for budgetary and balance-of-payments support, including external debt relief;

- ii. \$99.9 million for the period 2004-2005 for the support to the national programme for capacity-building for good governance, including democratic, administrative and economic governance;
- iii. \$80 million for supporting a programme to the reform process of the defence and security forces; and
- iv. €500 million to the National Programme for the Rehabilitation of War Victims, including rural rehabilitation activities (ECOSOC E/2004/11: 15)

Although the objective of the forum was enhancing Burundi for its full accomplishment in alleviating poverty, promoting sustainable development and to put an end to its socio-economic chaos (ECOSOC E/2004/11: 15), all themes aforementioned are the first design of a peacebuilding agenda. Since Burundi was included in a *country emerging from conflict* framework, attaching funds to specific programs – budgetary and balance-of-payments support; good governance; reform process of the defense and security forces; and rehabilitation of both war victims and rural activities – is a temptation in determining in pragmatic terms how post-conflict peacebuilding can be enhanced through funding and assistance programs.

After three years, the AHAG on Burundi transferred its responsibilities to the PBC justifying that “in the post-transition phase, the consideration of international assistance (...) would be better dealt with” that new UN body (ECOSOC E/2006/53: 1). Such justification evidences that *emerging from conflict* and *post-conflict* categories refer to a transitional phase in which a label does require the emergence of new frameworks and the establishment of distinct platforms due to internal limitations. As ECOSOC pointed out, “while the existence of an ad hoc body has been suitable (...), consideration of international cooperation in the current situation would be better dealt with by (...) the Peacebuilding Commission”. Such prerogative suggests that while ECOSOC’s notion on the PBC was promising for allowing “the international community to further support and accompany the Government and people of Burundi” (ECOSOC E/2006/53: 8); on the other hand, it was giving space for the UN to confront its limitations on how to achieve peacebuilding in pragmatic terms.

4.2. Reinforcing the label and re-framing challenges

The creation of the ECOSOC AHAG *on African countries emerging from conflict* was the first institutionalized mechanism within the UN dedicated to address the post-conflict issue (ECOSOC E/2006/64: 9). At its beginning, such framework was designed to congregate different actors – UN member-states and external ones – with the aim of supporting concerned countries in an “adequate, coherent, well-coordinated and effective” manner in order to “promote synergy” (ECOSOC E/2003/8: 3) among different levels at the institution. Based on Neves, AHAGs on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* were the precursors for the establishment of the PBC (2010: 120). During its existence, the AHAGs were classified as “innovative, non-bureaucratic and flexible mechanisms” (ECOSOC E/2004/86: 12) which aimed “bringing the attention of the international community to the necessity of supporting the transition from conflict to peace and development” (ECOSOC E/2004/86: 12). The institutional recognition behind the AHAGs are due to three main reasons: first, they were conceived for “giving concrete shape to the comprehensive approach to peace and stability that the United Nations has been calling for” (ECOSOC E/2004/86: 12); second, for being “an example of how the intergovernmental machinery can enhance its impact in relation to post-conflict countries” (ECOSOC E/2004/86: 12); and, third, for crafting “the broader debate on institutional reform of the United Nations system” (ECOSOC E/2004/86: 13).

Despite the role AHAGs played on supporting countries on their transitional phase from intrastate war to peace, there were some challenges they faced in encountering their respective goals on the field, which were identified as an opportunity for the “future Peacebuilding Commission” (ECOSOC E/2006/64: 8) to improve what was initially conceived by the ECOSOC’s framework while providing a more holistic approach to peacebuilding at the UN. When the AHAG on *African Countries Emerging from Conflict* recognizes its limitations and advocates in favor of a new framework, it is because the UN peacebuilding challenges encounter a re-framing process, which implies on new conceptualization and new strategies for action.

For limitation, I refer to an internal recognition of an absence of institutional capacity to achieve beyond the defined goals. Such limitation becomes evident not only when analyzed what both AHAG’s on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi stated for their respective challenges

during their work (ECOSOC E/2003/8, E/2004/10, E/2005/8, E/2005/70, E/2005/1, E/2007/57, E/2004/11, E/2005/82, E/2006/53), but that also ECOSOC's AHAGs have benefited only two countries – Guinea-Bissau and Burundi – and not enhanced its own capacity with the inclusion of more *African countries* to its post-conflict framework. Although the inclusion of more countries to an ECOSOC framework was not posited into a critical question of its challenges by the UN, its limits embraced concerned issues beyond the respective mandates on Guinea-Bissau (ECOSOC, 2002/304) and Burundi (ECOSOC Dec. 2003/311).

4.2.1. The limits of institutional labelling and framing

Within six years (2002-2008), the AHAGs on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi were concerned with different levels of challenges, reflecting what would be considered for inclusion in a holistic peacebuilding framework. Their concerned issues include the need for acting against the negative effects for the sub-region (ECOSOC E/2003/8, para 56), evidencing that a strategy for peacebuilding should not be taken in isolation or belonging to a country's own territory only. Such evidence is reiterated when an AHAG on Guinea-Bissau's report points out that the international community is already engaged in addressing the political and security challenges of the Mano River Union⁵⁰ countries, specially due to the current political and military crisis in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOSOC E/2003/8, para 56). Although the AHAG was approved for Guinea-Bissau, it had an implication of interfering on cross-border issues, embracing Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone as a regional post-conflict scenario for the UN.

Beyond the cross-border issue, the creation of the Emergency Economic Management Fund, as was stated in a report on Guinea-Bissau, became a required issue (ECOSOC E/2004/10, para 20) due to complexities of post-conflict transitions (ECOSOC E/2005/8, para 26). The establishment of such flexible funding mechanism was justified by the fact that economic reconstruction and reconciliation in post-conflict countries is a burdensome task (ECOSOC E/2005/8, para 26) and that a strong partnership with the international community should be

⁵⁰ As Steady points out, the Mano River Union (MRU) was established as an instrument of regional cooperation consisting of Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire. Founded in 1973 by Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea joined the MRU in 1980 and Côte d'Ivoire only in 2008 (Steady, 2011).

established (ECOSOC E/2004/11, para 57) on that matter. Since this example is taken from Guinea-Bissau (ECOSOC E/2005/8, para 26), the AHAG on Burundi reiterates this positioning, while stating that “international community and donors [should] provide additional assistance to answer short- and medium-term needs in the context of the transition from relief to development” (ECOSOC E/2005/82, para 25).

Bringing a discussion on AHAG’s challenges is a temptation of evidencing how a re-framing process occurs, reflecting, on the one hand, an institutional recognition that a broader framework is needed; and, on the other hand, that the current framework is limited by a discrepancy on what it can achieve in potentiality in contrast to its role in reality. As Autesserre points out, “these actions in turn reproduce and reinforce both the dominant practices and the meanings upon which they are predicated (the frames)” (2009: 255). In the case of Guinea-Bissau, for example, it could be undermined by the weak level of engagement by the international community (ECOSOC E/2006/8: 11); its framework would go beyond immediate problem-solving (ECOSOC E/2008/55: 7); it required a need for being engaged over the long term (ECOSOC E/2008/55: 7); and, it could ensure good communication with the regional partners, including regional and subregional organizations and financial institutions. (ECOSOC E/2008/55: 7).

In the case of Burundi, the AHAG was “aware of the challenges remaining to be met to avoid a relapse into conflict, in particular the vulnerability of the population and the structural weaknesses of the economy, including the land issue” (ECOSOC E/2006/53, para 26). The AHAG also recognized that Burundi’s situation required a “continued commitment of the Government of Burundi supported by the long-term involvement of the international community, which should be commensurate with the needs of the population and appropriate to the regional context” (ECOSOC E/2006/53, para 26). Based on country-specific analysis mentioned above, the re-framing process implies on how challenges on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi will be interpreted through another label attached. This reinforces the logic already explained on chapter 1 of this thesis, that labeling and framing are mutually constitutive and that their following re-definitions are embedded on the establishment of new labels and new framings. As Wood elucidates previously in this thesis, “labels reveal more about the process of authoritative designation, agenda-setting and so on than about the characteristics of the labelled” (1985: 353), and so does the framing. In this regard, replacing one framework for another one is a process that reflects how labels move institutionally. Since the establishment

of the PBC is, in the scope of this thesis, the new framework that resulted from the AHAG’s re-framing process, the inclusion of Guinea-Bissau and Burundi to this new framework reflects not only an adaption of challenges into a new framework, but that that new framework is endowed with new labelled-countries: the early conceived *countries emerging from conflict* were categorized as countries eligible for a more nuanced peacebuilding framework, making the label *post-conflict* part of its identity and way of behavior at the UN.

Table 4.1. From AHAG’s experience to PBC’s expectations

The limited role of the AHAG on peacebuilding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) the AHAGs have been much contingent on the political situation; b) they are not technical in nature and have limited expertise; c) their advice has remained at the broad policy level; d) their interaction with regional and other organizations has remained limited; e) the interaction between the ECOSOC and the Security Council on the situation in Burundi and Guinea-Bissau has not increased during the period under review; f) it has proved sometimes difficult to sustain the time and attention of their members; g) its difficulty in maintaining, after several years of existence, a momentum for what was intended to be a temporary mechanism; h) there was limited capacity of the UN Secretariat to provide services to the AHAGs; and i) their need to find appropriate mechanisms to promote “good donorship”.
The AHAG support for the PBC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) design mechanisms to mobilize donors and ensure “good donorship”; b) go beyond immediate problem-solving in the countries considered; c) define a vision, from the very beginning, of longer-term rehabilitation and support; d) engage in favour of the countries concerned; e) develop concrete support, even when the political situation leads to a “wait and see” approach; f) make good use of the work of UN entities to complement the policy approach; and g) ensure good articulation with regional and subregional organizations, regional development banks and the regional commissions.

Source: Based on ECOSOC 2006/11; ECOSOC E/2006/64.

A change on labelling and framing through the ECOSOC AHAG to the PBC is exemplified by what I point out as the institutional move from AHAG’s *experience* to PBC’s

expectations, as Table 4.1 shows. It evidences how AHAG's perceived themselves embedded in a limited recognition of their role and how they institutionalized their limitations to provide support on the establishment of the PBC. From the aforementioned table, I emphasize that the transitional phase from institutional perception of what constitute a peacebuilding approach is marked by their respective *i* and *a* items, in which the AHAG posits itself on the need to find appropriate mechanisms aiming to support the designing mechanisms to mobilize donors and ensure "good donorship". Since re-framing implies on re-interpreting challenges, re-framing is part of a process of recognizing AHAG's lack of capacity to deal with peacebuilding while enabling the emergence of another framework to replace its role.

This fact becomes clear when analyzed in more depth analysis what the AHAG advocated for the PBC, stating that the new framework would incorporate a perspective embedded in a long-term approach beyond problem-solving, with a full support of UN entities in order to ensure regional and sub-regional articulations. As the argument of this chapter is centered on the fact that the emergence of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 and the whole architecture for peace in the United Nations was early crafted through the establishment of formal arrangements, as was the case of the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi, taking AHAG's experience and PBC's expectation from the AHAGs as comparison is not in vain. Since experience and expectation evidence a fragmented systemic structure, in essence, they reveal much of the PBC's inception through what was early constructed by the AHAGs. As a report clarified, the AHAGs have constituted an "avant-garde" in inspiring "future similar work", as was the case for the PBC, as a permanent organ devoted to strengthening this approach within post-conflict situations (ECOSOC E/2006/64: 7, 9).

A reason for providing a link is based on the argument provided by Prantl, who clarifies that those groups first, "are able to exert considerable influence on an informal level" (Prantl, 2005: 562; 2006); second, "decentralize the workings of the UN Security Council (...) ameliorating its structural deficiencies" (Prantl, 2005: 564); and, third, "amplify the relative influence of stakeholders, which are not being member of the Security Council" (Prantl, 2005: 579). The notion that the lessons from the AHAGs on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi have crafted a space for the new Peacebuilding Architecture, mainly through the role of the

PBC, also highlights important aspects of the systemic dynamic with the Security Council. While the AHAGs have emphasized that their relationship with the Security Council has not increased during the advocacy period for Guinea-Bissau and Burundi, ECOSOC did not provide any advice on this issue for the emerging PBC. Based on the AHAGs experience on this matter, the “two joint missions [that] were held in June 2003 and 2004 to Guinea-Bissau, the Security Council has not paid any further visit to [that country] since then and no such joint mission was ever organized to Burundi” (ECOSOC E/2006/64: 6). The point here is not the emphasis that the SC must pay for those missions, but if peacebuilding is an issue that really matters for the Security Council. In addition, interactions between the ECOSOC with the SC became less frequent since 2005, year which the debate on the PBC was taking place in the UN.

4.2.2. The institutional discourse of filling a gap on peacebuilding

The dynamic behind the creation of the AHAG on *African countries emerging from conflict* and the institutional recognition of its limited role are the starting point on the comprehension of how a re-framing process on peacebuilding pertains to a re-interpretation of the challenges and the construction of the reasoning on why new frameworks are needed. The reason that sustained the creation of the PBA is not consensual. The most diffused justification lays on the existence of a *gap* at the institutional level which was easily coopted historically and taken as a unique voice among the institutional staff while explaining how and why the PBA was conceived. This perception from the fieldwork has its roots in early 2004⁵¹, when the former UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan expressed his concerns over the peacebuilding agenda within the UN while identifying the lack of strategic focus for its work in winning the peace (Annan, 2005). Annan’s recognition of peacebuilding’s missing structure summarizes his legacy over his last mandate as Secretary-General. During his final term, four documents⁵² were launched, expressing the necessity to create a specific

⁵¹ In Olonisakin and Ikpe’s point of view, the conception of the PBC began in 2003, when Kofi Annan tasked the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change to recommend necessary reforms on the UN’s role in maintaining peace and security (2012: 141).

⁵² These documents are: A more secure world: our shared responsibility, also known as the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN Doc. A/59/565); In Larger Freedom; towards development, security and human rights for all (A/59/2005) and its Addendum (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2); and the World Summit Outcome (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1).

commission for peacebuilding (UN Doc. A/59/565, UN Doc. A/59/2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1).

Although these documents brought the need for establishing such structure, this institutional debate among them was conceived earlier, on two historical moments within the UN: first, when the former UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched in 1992 his known *Agenda for Peace* (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111); and, second, when Kofi Annan suggested adapting the institution through his *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform* (UN Doc. A/51/950), launched in mid-1997. The similarities among them lays on the fact that the formers UNSGs reiterate the perspective that *post-conflict* and *peacebuilding* are intertwined concepts embedded in a preventive character; and that their perspective of the UN is the one of constant change due to the process of becoming adapted to new challenges.

With regard to the intertwined aspect, Boutros-Ghali stated that “post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 56); while Annan argued that “post-conflict peace-building refers to the various concurrent and integrated actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation” (UN Doc. A/51/950, para. 120). Since their conceptualizations were embedded on the notion of an institutional preventive role, Boutros-Ghali pointed out that “the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 57); while Annan asserted that “intra-State warfare and multifaceted crises in the present period has added new urgency to the need for a better understanding of their root causes” (UN Doc. A/51/950, para. 110).

At the time of their respective contributions, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan did not have in mind that their conceptualizations – taken here as framing processes of *post-conflict* and *peacebuilding* – would lead to a structure now known as PBA. What they had in mind was the need for adapting the UN to new challenges. As Boutros-Ghali expressed, the UN was facing a new requirement for technical assistance as an obligation to develop and to provide the support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities

(UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 59). Five years later, Annan complements Boutros-Ghali's assumption while justifying his concept of reform "throughout the notion that the organization needs to be significantly reconfigured in order to do better what the international community requires it to do" (UN Doc. A/51/950).

Back to the institutional debate of reforming the UN with a focus on peacebuilding, the need for improving the institution does not acquire only a name – referred here as the establishment of a peacebuilding commission – but that such institutional change becomes an evidence that an institutional gap on this issue was identified reflecting a scenario in which "there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse" (UN Doc. A/59/565, para. 261); there is "no part of the United Nations system [that] effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace" (UN Doc. A/59/2005, para. 114; UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2); and that there is "the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict" (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 97).

Since these institutional assertions are imbued with significance that reforming the UN represents an adequacy in face of what constitute a threat to international peace and security, at the same time it reframes institutional peace strategies; in truth, they bring to the surface different perceptions of an institutional inefficiency on addressing peacebuilding, marked by the fact that the UN "needs to be able to act in a coherent and effective way throughout a whole continuum that runs from early warning through preventive action to post-conflict peacebuilding" (UN Doc. A/59/565, para. 263); that "peace agreements [must be] implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner" (UN Doc. A/59/2005, para. 114; UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2, para. 1) within "a coordinated and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation" (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 97).

Although Olonisakin and Ikpe argue that *the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* addressed "the challenges of coordinating peacebuilding activities and to support the long-term efforts to consolidate peace in postconflict societies" (2012: 141), their analysis cannot be taken with regard only to what the Panel represented for a change on peacebuilding at the UN. The following documents – *In Larger Freedom* with its *Addendum*, as well as *the World Summit Outcome* summarize that "there had been long-standing calls for increased

coordination in international support for peacebuilding” (Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2012: 141). What becomes evident from these requirements UN faced at that time is an indicative that the UN not only looked for an improvement of its role on peace but, most importantly, that an improvement on this issue was concentrated much more on repairing its own structural failures. As UN staff pointed out, the reasoning for creating the PBA permeates the notion of a gap (P-3, P-7) in which “two phases of a peace process, referred to a very heavy intervention in peacekeeping operation and then the link with the development policy, evidencing the discrepancy of an emergency need and a plan for development after an armed conflict” (P-3).

Although their reasoning reflect that the UN did not have a structure or a strategy required to achieve peace after an armed conflict reached an end, it seemed that the institution was limited in its own transitional scope from intrastate war to peace. The context of reforming the UN through peacebuilding is complex and no designed change would achieve that goal easily, mainly because the UN inefficiency on helping countries on their transition from war to peace is also a consequence of what the organization did not achieve through its peacekeeping operations⁵³, since some of them have failed “when resources and strategies [were] not commensurate[d] to meeting the challenge they pose[d]” (UN Doc. A/59/565: 60). As the UN staff complemented later, the institution was looking for a strategy to avoid countries’ relapse to armed conflict. Nevertheless, such assumption reiterates the argument envisaged by Collier *et al.* (2003) when they affirmed that “war creates interests that favor continued violence and criminality [and] as a result, people’s fears of a relapse into further conflict may dominate the postconflict economic landscape” (2003: 22).

Although Collier *et al.* mention ‘people’s fears’, what was really in place was the institutional fear in face of “the incidence of a country going back to war” (UN-s3) which could damage the institutional expertise on that matter. Even though peacebuilding became one of the institution’s strategy since 1992, it did not get a well-established structure of what was conceived as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), with a specific internal structure and, mainly, budget. This is corroborated by Street *et al.* (2008) who argued that “this gap [could] be particularly damaging in the vacuum created by the departure of UN peacekeeping forces [while] institutions [would] not fully functioning and state

⁵³ For analysis on UN peacekeeping operations, see Howard (2019), de Coning (2019), de Coning and Peter (2019) and Junk *et al.* (2017).

authority remain[ed] weak” (Street et al., 2008: 33). Since the notion on the institutional gap is a prevalent argument inside the institution, UN staff still diffused such explanation as a common ground. In their view, “nobody is specialized in peacebuilding” (D-27)⁵⁴ even 13 years after the institutional debate that recognized the gap; and that there was also “something missing to deal with a contemporary issue of peacebuilding” (P-5)⁵⁵.

Such inefficiency also confronted the role played by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Countries Emerging from Conflict created by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in which their results “have proven mixed and even the proponents of these committees acknowledge that they have not succeeded in generating crucial resources to assist fragile transitions” (UN Doc. A/59/565: 61). While the gap was seen as a result of the transitional intervention from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and of peacebuilding not having an institutional framework, an inefficiency was the recognition of shortcomings in ensuring countries’ engagement with the international community and improving their performance at the local level. As emphasized by UN staff, improving countries engagement with the international community was the way encountered by the institution, since those countries “were facing the misuse of resources, misuse of capacity (...) challenging the peacebuilding reconstruction” (P-4)⁵⁶. In this context, the UN was facing an internal challenge motivated by both inside and outside performances related to its role in achieving peace transitions. The solution encountered, at that time, was to establish an “intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace” (UN Doc. A/59/565, para. 225).

Although the UN recognized the existence of a *gap* which enabled the creation of an architecture for peacebuilding and this perception became well-diffused among UN staff and some diplomats from the Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York, a former Assistant-Secretary General for PBSO, Judy Cheng-Hopkins, confronted this notion. After a decade of exclusive domain of the PBA, Cheng-Hopkins stressed that “it was not exactly virgin territory for the new peacebuilding architecture to flourish in” (2016: 240). Her analysis over the establishment of the PBA confronts the role of this new UN-body against

⁵⁴ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

⁵⁵ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

⁵⁶ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

the ones played by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)⁵⁷ and its respective peacebuilding missions mandated by the UNSC; and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with its Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Early Recovery (BCPR) in 2001, which made peacebuilding an evident void at the institution (Cheng-Hopkins, 2016). Despite the criticism Cheng-Hopkins posits on the establishment of the PBA, her perspective enables a comprehension that the creation of an exclusively peacebuilding body would not limit other UN agencies to promoting peacebuilding within their respective domains. As UN-staff have expressed, even though every UN agency is doing a little of peacebuilding, the PBA is not focusing on a specific peacebuilding work – such as the DPA, UNDP or UNICEF – and that the PBA is “not duplicating their work, but ensuring coherence through the lessons learned as the UN has the organizational response” (P-4)⁵⁸ on that matter. Whilst this organizational decision enabled the institution to construct different levels of specialized actors within its own spectrum, those same decisions reflect a collective understanding of what is the institutional response in filling the multiple facets of its own gaps. If, on the one hand, Kofi Annan expressed its intention in creating a Peacebuilding Commission to fill a gap in the UN system and, on the other hand, Cheng-Hopkins (2016) denied such understanding, I argue that *post-conflict* and *peacebuilding* represent the matrix of either a label and a framing in which they do not assume a static character, rather a volatile one in face of how the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) was collectively decided and desired.

4.3. Disseminating the label and the PBA

The PBA was formally established and operationalized on 21 December 2005 through the adoption of twin-resolutions by the UNSC (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005) and the UNGA (UN Doc. A/RES/60/180). The architecture comprises three distinct and autonomous entities – the PBC, the PBF and the PBSO – and enables a categorization of, at least, two different institutional understandings of what constitutes a ‘post-conflict’ country: the one, associated with the object of the PBA in general – countries under the process of reconstruction after civil/intrastate war; and, the other one, derived from this first understanding in which

⁵⁷ In 2019, the DPA was turned into the Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs (DPPA), with the inclusion of the PBSO into its organogram.

⁵⁸ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

countries labeled as “post conflict” ones had a limited engagement with the PBA or, in other circumstances, confronted the institutional positioning that the PBA is for post-conflict countries.

In this regard, ‘post-conflict’ as a label played a two-fold role: while it names countries facing a high level of failure in their internal governance structure after a period of civil/intrastate war, political instability in face of their dysfunctional governmental services and a lack of economic development and security stabilization; it also names the institutional response that provides the reconstruction apparatus for them. Embedded on what I mentioned in Chapter 2, “post-conflict” works as a label because it denotes a direct implication on how to perceive countries categorized on that way and it works as a framework because it guides how institutions and other countries should behave in face of these labelled countries. An example of this two-fold perspective under ‘post-conflict’ as label and as framework is the creation of the PBA, that was designed initially as the UN ‘post-conflict’ apparatus for ‘post-conflict’ countries.

4.3.1. The PBA and its ‘post-conflict’ label

Nevertheless, since this thesis focuses on the analysis of the PBA with regard to the functioning of the PBC and the PBF, both of them have established through their respective practice what a post-conflict country is based on which PBA-body each country engaged with. The PBC has advised only 6 countries under its Agenda over its first decade (2005-2015) – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone –, whereas the PBF has benefited 27 countries beyond the six ones included in the PBC Agenda. For understanding this categorization process, it is necessary to remember the purpose underlying PBA’s creation. In the founding resolutions, the UN emphasizes, on the one hand, “the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to *post-conflict peacebuilding* and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180, emphasis added); while, on the other hand, recognizing “the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of *countries emerging from conflict* towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180, emphasis added).

From those documents, I highlight that the approach was designed to place peacebuilding into a *post-conflict* process regarding countries within this particular transition. On this issue, I emphasize Autesserre's (2009) contribution from her analysis on the Democratic Republic of the Congo's transition from war to peace and democracy in order to understand what implies the term *post-conflict* in this dynamic. She states that post-conflict "drew a distinction between who could be seen as a legitimate partner and who could not and, consequently, who diplomats could meet and negotiate with (...) versus those who were now considered *illegal*. (Autesserre, 2009: 262-263, emphasis added). In this regard, the PBA was, in its essence, a UN body focused on post-conflict, implying its engagement with a set of countries within this context. Such prerogative is corroborated by a former UN staff, who points out that "the establishment of the PBA was not focused on prevention" (P-4)⁵⁹, but rather exclusively on post-conflict. If the PBA was conceived initially as an approach for post-conflict countries, why did the PBC become limited to only six countries – all of them in African – whereas the PBF benefited 27 under the same peacebuilding framework? What can we learn from this PBA practice with regard to the notion of what constitutes a post-conflict reconstruction?

Although this question refers to a pragmatic role of the PBA, it confronts how *post-conflict reconstruction* as a label reflects on its internal functioning. A contribution that sustains this argument is provided by a UN-staff who said that "countries included in the agenda of the PBC were considered as not being 'too big' to become part of the new intergovernmental body" (P-2)⁶⁰. The staff's contribution was exemplified by a comparison: Burundi, which engaged with the PBC and Iraq, which did not become included in the PBC nor received any financial support by the PBF. The comparative analysis provided by the staff takes in consideration how much each country needed to request for funding post-conflict reconstruction: "a US\$10 million project for Iraq will not have any impact when the same total amount goes to a project in Burundi, where the demands and the evaluation of the project would have more chances to become successful" (P-2)⁶¹. The UN staff added further what can be considered the first level of categorization, in which "*small* and *easy* countries were much more prone to be included in the Agenda of the PBC" (P-2, emphasis added)".

⁵⁹ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

⁶⁰ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

⁶¹ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

The justification for this categorization under the label of *post-conflict reconstruction* was based on the financial aspect, on what could be the impact of the amount requested. However, beyond the financial request as an indicative, the institutional positioning and recognition on what constitutes country eligibility for the PBA with regard to post-conflict labelling raises important aspects on UN's dynamic for peacebuilding, in which there are other underlying reasonings for categorizing a country *small* and *easy* for a peacebuilding reconstruction under the PBA; as well as that countries categorized *small* and *easy* become the core of the PBC and the PBF and that countries categorized as opposite to *small* and *easy* are excluded of such framework. In this sense, the PBA disseminated the UN 'post-conflict peacebuilding' embedded on its understanding of the term, as well as from how its operationalized 'post-conflict peacebuilding' taking its respective countries as parameter. On this issue, it is important to make some clarifications. First, following Junne and Verkoren's (2005) and Heathershaw and Lambach's (2008) contributions, post-conflict is a label. Their categorization represents what is identified by a transitional phase and, respectively, the creation of these respective spaces.

As a transitional phase, Junne and Verkoren explain that post-conflict becomes a label "attached to development since it marks the return to normal development strategies after the interruption of development by civil wars" (2005: 2). This process, notwithstanding, must be problematized, following Heathershaw and Lambach's perspective. For them, the comprehension over these post-conflict spaces – created by the attachment of a label marking a phase from outbreak to development – "necessitates breaking out of the 'single sovereign' framework and problematizing the assumptions behind the 'post-conflict' label" (2008: 269). In this sense, Heathershaw and Lambach take 'post-conflict' as a 'misleading term' (2008: 278) because they were understood, respectively and critically, for being "shorthand for conflict situations, in which open warfare has come to an end" (Junne and Verkoren, 2005: 1) and for presuming or entailing "an end, at which reconstruction will be complete" (Etzioni, 2007: 30).

Second, this process – labelled as peacebuilding approach for reconstruction – is an acutely political activity which encompasses *short-term* relief and *longer-term* development (Mac Ginty, 2007: 458). Based on Mac Ginty (2007), Castillo (2008) and Etzioni (2007), the *short-*

term relief and *longer-term development* “[extend] far beyond physical reconstruction to include the provision of livelihoods, the introduction of new or reformed types of governance, and the repairing of fractured societal relationships” (Mac Ginty, 2007: 458). They also include “the stabilization and structural reform policies, as well as the microeconomic foundations required to create a market economy and reactivate investment and broad-based economic growth” (Castillo, 2008: 29). And, thus, restore “the condition of the assets and infrastructure of an occupied nation or territory to the same or similar state in which they were found before the outbreak of hostilities” (Etzioni, 2007: 27). The reparation of fractured societal relationships mentioned by Mac Ginty (2007) has the focus on up to three levels of analysis in order to remodel the nature of the interaction: “between the citizen and the state, the citizen and public goods, and the citizen and the market” (Mac Ginty, 2007: 458).

Notwithstanding, to the list she provided, I add another level of this interaction, which comprises the relationship between the institution responsible for the peacebuilding intervention and the country concerned. Third, the notion on post-conflict reconstruction as a process through *short-* and *longer-term development* contributes to what Kirsh and Flint (2011) call as “the social construction of places”. Their analysis is based on two assumptions: on the one hand, post-war reconstruction is “a contested process that is grounded in particular geographic settings” (Kirsh and Flint, 2011: 315); on the other hand, geographers are located at the center of the debate since those experts “are able to bring a place-specific focus to the understanding of post-war reconstruction as well as to add the particular politics of war-peace transitions and legacies to our knowledge of how places are made and re-made” (Kirsh and Flint, 2011: 315). In this aspect, Kirsh and Flint (2011) corroborated Heathershaw and Lambach’s (2008) contribution on post-conflict as *spaces*. For them, post-conflict spaces are particular fields of international relations and empirical manifestations of authority which arise amid and following periods of civil war and political violence and must be “understood as fields of power where sovereignty is constantly contested and negotiated among global, elite and local actors” (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008: 269-271). Their understanding on post-conflict space is an intersection of these spaces (or selves), which leads to the emergence of structures of governance and domination that are different from what the international community might have envisaged (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008: 280-281).

Although Heathershaw and Lambach had expressed that “post-conflict spaces cannot be understood as a process (whether positive or negative) but need to be conceptualized in terms of space – in which a field of power relations where multiple ‘sovereigns’ negotiate rule across multiple spaces of political authority (2008: 278), I argue to the contrary, affirming that these ‘multiple sovereigns’ negotiating is the evidence that a post-conflict process for reconstruction is taking place. And fourth, the construction of social places by Kirsh and Flint (2011) through *short-* and *longer-term* strategies for reconstruction characterizes a post-conflict country. Based on Castillo (2008: 30-31), those specific countries i) have devastated or at least severely distorted economies; ii) are often characterized by a lack of different sectors in their internal governmental structure and functioning, such as transparency, poor governance, corrupt legal, judicial, and police systems, inadequate protection of property rights, incompetent central banks, weak tax and customs administrations, non-credible public expenditure management, and also a tenuous rule of law with continued violations of human rights; iii) are highly dependent on official aid flows; iv) have often protracted arrears on payments of foreign debt; and v) have several generic principles that apply in equal measure to most development activities and to those that occur within the context of post-conflict reconstruction.

4.3.2. The PBA and its peacebuilding framework

Since the PBA has provided support to 33 countries during its first decade (2005-2015) – 6 included in the PBC Agenda and 27 exclusively financed by the PBF –, the four clarifications discussed above highlight that ‘post-conflict country’ and ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ had a different connotation when the PBA was established, mainly because it explicitly differentiated countries labels while attempting to disseminate peacebuilding through a new UN framework. Consequently, although the PBA was perceived as being successfully conceived for providing good results on the ground, it actually became limited because more countries could have benefited from its framework instead of the only 33 in the entire decade. Although Autesserre identifies *postconflict peacebuilding* as a “frame shared by international actors belonging to many different organizations, such as diplomacies, international organizations, and nongovernmental agencies” (2009: 251), such framework “shaped the international actors’ understanding of their role: diplomats and UN staff

perceived the national and international realms as their “natural” levels of action” (Autesserre, 2009: 251).

Despite this fact, authors argue that the PBA-body was conceived as “an improvement on previous global peacebuilding efforts” (Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2012: 144) in a moment that “the UN had to rethink its doctrines and organizational structures” (Jenkins, 2013: 4) for not having “succeeded in addressing post-conflict peacebuilding, in particular ensuring that countries did not relapse into conflict” (Otobo, 2015: 10). Beyond that, de Coning and Stammes express that the UN system seemed not to take “its eyes off countries emerging from conflict too soon, and to provide a sustained and concerted approach to the international community’s hitherto ad hoc, fragmented, and piecemeal support for post-conflict peacebuilding” (2016: 1). Although some side of the academic debate on the Peacebuilding Commission creation was taken as an element of hope for “bring[ing] a concerted approach to the international community’s fragmented responses to countries emerging from conflict” (Tschirgi and Ponzio, 2016: 40), some critics have pointed out that it “coincided with a period of sustained doubts about the ability of the UN to discharge the tasks it ha[d] been given” (Miall, 2007: 30).

In the UN historical background on work for peace, the Peacebuilding Commission and the system that implies the whole PBA are taken as a “product of the UN’s decade-long experimentation with various strategic tools to support peacebuilding in different conflict” scenarios (Ponzio, 2010: 6). In a subsequent analysis, Ponzio (2012) clarifies that the PBC emerged in a context in which “peacebuilding” was considered by the UN as a “strategic framework approach” in the 1990s, in countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia, centered in political, humanitarian and development activities (2012: 301). When the “peacebuilding strategic framework” became incorporated into the scope of an architecture and an exclusive task of a Commission, the PBC became a means to formalize the strategic framework through the proposed *integrated strategies for peacebuilding*, as expressed in its foundational resolutions and that were not improved as part of the ECOSOC AHAGs on *Countries Emerging from Conflict*.

Ponzio summarizes this view, stating that the strategy framework was design, first, to “provide an agreed-on mechanism for the mutually accountable commitments of a host

government and the international community in the areas of security, governance, and socioeconomic recovery” (2012: 301) and, second, be “introduced following several years of international engagement in a conflict-affected country [following] the drawdown and withdrawal of UN peacekeepers” (2012: 302). Another aspect present in the discussion of the PBC’s creation refers to what Haugerudbraaten (1998) called as the “temporal” aspect, questioning if the international involvement in peacebuilding should be a short-to-medium or long-term effort (1998: 18). The decade-long experimentation mentioned by Miall (2007), the emergence of a specific strategy for peacebuilding highlighted by Ponzio (2010, 2012) and the challenge in determining the “time” for peacebuilding by Haugerudbraaten (1998) corroborate the argument that the UN is, *par excellence*, the international institution that constantly frames and reframes the notion of what peace is and how it must be achieved.

Based on Murithi (2008), the process of framing and re-framing strategies for peacebuilding by the UN can be understood as a process in which the institution improves itself through the frameworks it designs. Naming this process as “UNbuilding”, Murithi (2008) argues that the establishment of the PBA is more an improvement of the institution’s structure rather than an improvement of its peacebuilding strategies. As he points out, there are a range of UN agencies that provided “functions and services that overlap and even replicate[d] the activities of other bodies within the UN system” (Murithi, 2008: 90). In this sense, the recognition that there was a gap justifying the creation of the PBC encounters an explanation over the meaning on *gap* at the institutional level. The “UNbuilding” perspective proposed by Murithi was the characterization of a process in which it is “self-explanatory and indicative of the prevalence of system-wide incoherence and an abject failure to deliver to the people as an integrated and effective bureaucracy” (2008: 91). He continues his argument emphasizing that “UNbuilding” is not a recent perspective, unless it reflects “symptomatic of a bureaucratic system that has persisted for more than 60 years without an internal mechanism to revitalise, re-energise, re-invent or even retire itself” (Murithi, 2008: 91).

If the creation of the PBC was taken as a process to revitalize the UN, according to Murithi (2008), the new PBA-body also implied strengthening the attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery, as expressed on its foundational resolutions. Although this was an expectation of a certitude for PBC’s performance, since the UN’s performance reflected the understanding that an overly top-down model would be

unsuccessful (Williams and Bailey, 2016), “the architecture [did not] represent a maximalist version of participation, and [did not] maximize the potential of organizational learning at the field level” (Williams and Bailey, 2016: 28). The challenge pointed out by Williams and Bailey (2016), referring to the unsuccessful model of the top-down approach was the main challenge the PBA faced during its first decade of existence. While the PBA represents an evolution of the term ‘peacebuilding’ within the UN and it works as the matrix of a post-conflict framework, its creation and its functioning reflects a permanent process in which labels and frameworks are created, reinforced and disseminated by different forms of practices.

Conclusion

The UN practice towards labelling and framing post-conflict countries is a reflection of how international organizations, usually, act on influencing the construction of social reality. Although I argued in this Chapter that there is a process of constructing, reinforcing and disseminating labels and frameworks, I point out that institutions do not follow this sequence as being their intentionality, rather it is through their institutional practices *per se* that they bring to the surface different dynamic levels where labelling and framing take place. From the establishment of the ECOSOC AHAGs on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* to the institutional reasoning for creating a peacebuilding framework and, subsequently, to the establishment of the PBA, I elucidate that the UN is constantly involved in a structural change in which labelling and framing become an inherent part of the process. Nevertheless, establishing a framework for peacebuilding is not an end in itself, it is the platform in which different actors – with varied interests – dialogue and promote what they perceive as *peacebuilding*, implying on fragmented practices that are imbued with different significances from the original labelling and framework designed.

5. The UN Peacebuilding Architecture

Every new institution grapples with the challenge of fulfilling expectations. The Peacebuilding Commission is not an exception. Performance expectations arise – or are cast – not only in relation to stated objectives of institutions but also from the presumptions of what various stakeholders think a particular institution ought to do. (Otobo, 2015: 81)

Introduction

The United Nations peacebuilding framework, referred here as its well-known Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), was not designed under this name. It became labelled *architecture* as a consequence of the institutional practice for having three components under its scope from what was initially constituted as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). When the UNSC and the UNGA approved the twin-resolutions establishing the PBC, “neither the term ‘pillar’ nor ‘architecture’ were used at the time” (Jenkins, 2013: 46). However, both resolutions added two more entities –the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) – which enabled the PBA to be the first *unexpected outcome* of that collective desire and decision in creating a specific body to deal with post-conflict contexts. Even though the PBA became a sort of “a package and ostensibly dedicated to a common endeavor” (Jenkins, 2013: 44), it also became a fragmented framework ruled by different levels of autonomy, respecting and corresponding to the boundaries of each of its constituent elements.

In this sense, the PBA did not comprise unity in its functioning since its beginning as well as it reflected a divergence on how to benefit countries that were facing post-conflict needs. This divergence is identified due to an in depth analysis of the structure of each PBA-body, with a focus on the role played by the PBC and the PBF since they determine countries engagement; and by the PBSO, that works among these two entities as a provider of bureaucratic expertise on peacebuilding issues. The reason that sustain such analysis lays on the fact that the way they were designed had an impact on creating different perceptions and understandings of the same *post-conflict* label. In order to discuss how this divergence occurred in a period of ten years (2005-2015), the proposed analysis on the PBC and the PBF becomes necessary as an evolution on how peacebuilding was framed within the UN.

In this Chapter, I explain my main argument highlighting first, that the design of the PBC as an intergovernmental body reflects a framing and decision-making process in which both *post-conflict* and *peacebuilding* are not only reinforced as intertwined concepts but work as guiding tools on determining country eligibility; second, that the creation of the PBF as a fund for peacebuilding represents an antagonistic perception of the intertwined concepts, since its structure creates another sphere for countries engagement; and, third, that the role played by the PBSO becomes relevant to comprehending how its functioning enhances the construction of a reality in which both the PBC and the PBF are committed to peacebuilding through totally different practices.

5.1. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005 resulted from the UNSC and the UNGA resolutions (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180), letting the ECOSOC with no official participation on that decision-making process. Thus, the emergence of the PBC is a result of a re-framing process on how to deal with peacebuilding at the institutional level. Its establishment reflects a temporality aspect within the UN. In the scope of this thesis, temporality is understood by the emergence of new apparatus to deal specifically with issues on peace and conflict as part of the process in which the institution improves itself through its own institutional lens symbolized by the establishment of new structural dynamics.

Buerger, who analyzed practice theory to explain controversy⁶² in the realm of the PBC, states that the work – as well as the establishment – of the Commission is “an attempt to order the peacebuilding challenge” (2011: 181). In this regard, the PBC became, in 2005, the “intergovernmental advisory body” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180) dedicated to:

- i. bringing together all relevant actors to marshal resources;

⁶² Controversy, in Buerger analysis, refers to “how to proceed in the face of a distinct problematic issue, an indeterminate situation that demands change in the course of action. Hence, the study of politics is the study of the many institutions, procedures and practices with regard to how controversies are settled, closed and lead to distinct courses of action” (2011: 171).

- ii. advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- iii. focusing attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict;
- iv. supporting the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- v. providing recommendations and information in order to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, as well as to develop best practices; and
- vi. helping to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180).

When combined, each goal mentioned above represented the construction of an internal dynamic corroborating the argument that the PBC is part of the process in which the UN recreated its role of engagement with other actors in the international arena in the issue of post-conflict peacebuilding. Such positioning reinforces the intertwined character of *post-conflict* and *peacebuilding* concepts that guided the UN through different moments of its internal reform proposals since Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Kofi Annan. As the foundational resolutions expressed – in accordance to the articles 7, 22 and 29 of the UN Charter – the Security Council and General Assembly may create subsidiary bodies for the performance of their respective functions (UN, 1945; UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180). With this prerogative, the establishment of the PBC gave path to the identification of the structure of that new dynamic, with its work being comprised by *all relevant actors* engaged in proposing *integrated strategies for peacebuilding* while extending *the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery* (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180).

But who are the *all relevant actors* that could belong to the PBC in both ways: managing it and being benefited by it? Following Buerger, UNSC's and UNGA's resolutions mark the PBC as an interesting hybrid (2011: 183). On his perspective, the PBC congregates different sets of organizational structure:

It is an intergovernmental body – a site of nation states’ representatives; it is an interorganisational body – a site in which different representatives from international organizations of various sorts meet; it is a bureaucratic body, given that it is equipped with an office; and it is a research body, given that it is tasked to analyse practices of building peace and translate them into best practices. (Buerger, 2011: 183)

Following PBC’s founding resolutions and Buerger contribution on comprehending an initial overview of the PBC structure, identifying the relevant actors is part of the explanation of its structure and operationalization of its framework, comprised by three sub-organs: first, the Organizational Committee (PBC-OC), responsible for developing its own rules of procedure and working methods; second, the Country-Specific Configurations (PBC-CSC), responsible for providing a direct assistance and an advisory role to each country under consideration by the PBC; and, third, the Working Group on Lessons Learned (PBC-WGLL) (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180), formally established in December 2006 (UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458, Security Council Report, 2008: 11) to “provide a vehicle for reviewing experiences from other postconflict situations” (Otobo, 2015: 12), and also to contribute “to the deliberations of the Commission on to the countries on its agenda” (Security Council Report, 2007: 6; 2008: 11). Each sub-organ represents a more in depth dynamic within the PBC, highlighting the inclusion of a range of UN members and other international actors engaged in the post-conflict arena. For a better comprehension on *how* this framework dealt with peacebuilding and *who* was eligible to be responsible for managing peacebuilding within this new framework, an explanation of each PBC-sub organ is required.

The Organizational Committee is the main sub-organ within the PBC. As UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions stated on that matter, the PBC-OC should be responsible for developing PBC’s rules of procedures and working methods (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180), while tackling operational and administrative issues (Cavalcante, 2019: 219). Within the PBC-OC, the PBC starts gaining shape from the identification of those UN actors capable of playing a role on peacebuilding. In total, both resolutions assigned PBC-OC with 31 UN-member states to serve for renewable terms of two years:

- i. seven members of the UNSC, including permanent members and two elected from its non-permanent list according to its rules and procedures;

- ii. seven members of the ECOSOC, elected from regional groups, giving due consideration to those countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery;
- iii. seven members of the UNGA, elected according to its rules and procedures;
- iv. five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions; and
- v. five top providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets and of voluntary contributions to UN funds, programmes and agencies, including the standing peacebuilding fund (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180).

The composition of the PBC-OC was supposed to be heterogeneous, in face of its members elected from regional groups that have experienced post-conflict recovery (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180). However, Olonisakin and Ikpe argue that its composition reflects its institutional context, since half of PBC-OC's central structure "is dominated by permanent members of the Security Council, the principal donors to the UN system, and the largest peacekeeping contributors" (2012: 149). Although Olonisakin and Ikpe do not use the term *discrepancy* when referring to the actors that constitute PBC-OC's structure, they point out that such evidence "is especially pertinent given that many of these committee members are rich and relatively peaceful countries of the global North" (2012: 149). Beyond an analysis embedded on a dichotomy of which country within the PBC-OC is rich/peaceful or poor/non-peaceful, what really becomes evident within its structure is the role of the UNSC's permanent members (UNSC-P5). This means that the UNSC was meant to be and to maintain its level of influence in the decision-making process of the PBC, bringing post-conflict issues to its exclusive domain. Still, one diplomat pointed out that the "Security Council is not recognized for being a peacebuilding actor" (D-27)⁶³. As Murithi contributed in the early years of the PBC, "there [were] concerns among many delegates at the UN about the way the Permanent-five (P5) members of the Security Council 'insinuated' themselves into the Organizational Committee" (2007: 4).

Such concern stems from how the PBC was internally designed. During its first year of functioning, Angola became PBC-OC's first Chair, and El Salvador and Norway its vice-Chairs (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.1). Nevertheless, the presence of the UNSC-P5 as also permanent members of the PBC reflect a dynamic in which only other UN-member states rather than the UNSC-P5 are passive to turnover (Table 5.1).

⁶³ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

Table 5.1. Membership of the PBC-OC during its first session

UNSC members	UNGA members	ECOSOC members	5 Contributing Providers	5 Troop Contributors
China	Chile	Angola	Germany	Bangladesh
France	El Salvador	Guinea-Bissau	Italy	Gana
Russia	Jamaica	Indonesia	Japan	Índia
United Kingdom	Egypt	Sri Lanka	Netherlands	Nigeria
United States	Burundi	Poland*	Norway	Pakistan
	Fiji	Brazil		
	Croatia	Belgium*		
	Denmark*			
	Tanzania*			

Source: UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458, Neves (2010: 154-155).

*The first session of the PBC-OC is comprised by 23 June 2006 to 27 June 2007. During this period, Belgium, Denmark, Poland and Tanzania were members of the PBC-OC until 31 December 2006, being succeeded by Luxembourg, Panama, Czech Republic and South Africa respectively.

In my perspective, the UNSC-P5 crossed an institutional boundary to also act in the field of peacebuilding, due to the perception that the PBC could threaten the UNSC's role on issues of peace, hence threatening the PBC of being a totally autonomous UN-body. I make the distinction of *being threatened by the PBC* and *threatening the PBC* due to the way it was designed; it did not establish its own agenda freely since its inception. As UNSC's and UNGA's resolutions determined, the PBC-OC should establish its agenda based on:

- i. requests for advice from the UNSC;
- ii. requests for advice from the ECOSOC or the UNGA;
- iii. requests for advice from Member States in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and which are not on the agenda of the Security Council; and
- iv. requests for advice from the UNSG (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180).

In this regard, the autonomy of the PBC-OC is one embedded on requests from other UN-bodies, interfering on the way the PBC decides on its manner of dealing with peacebuilding.

At this point, I argue that even though these bodies are represented at the PBC-OC through their respective elected members, PBC-OC decides over decisions already made reflecting only bureaucratic formality. The second PBC-sub organ is the Country Specific Configuration (PBC-CSC). As Cavalcante explains, “the CSCs are created after countries are placed on the PBC agenda by the Organizational Committee” (2019: 219). Although he points out that “there are no clearly defined criteria or guidelines to orient the selection of those countries” (Cavalcante, 2019: 248), much of what the PBC became as a framework is a reflection of how it disseminated peacebuilding through each PBC-CSC created. This prerogative is corroborated by Tschirgi and Ponzio, who point out that PBC-CSC “became the PBC’s main instrument for peacebuilding” (2016: 45).

Their reasoning on that matter refers to the fact that PBC-CSC confronted “member-states with the challenge of devising an effective modality for country-level engagement” (Tschirgi and Ponzio, 2016: 45), but also that Ambassadors of UN-member states started to play a role on peacebuilding issues on behalf of the concerned country as Chairs of each PBC-CSC created. Hence, PBC-CSC Chairs became a central part of this PBC-sub organ, although both UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions do not specify the need of designating them. In a period of ten years, only six countries were included in the PBC Agenda: Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. For each of these countries, there is one PBC-CSC with a respective Chair. In order to explain what is the PBC-CSC in pragmatic terms, I once again recall what ECOSOC designed for its beneficiary countries in its AHAGs *on Countries Emerging from Conflict*. Much of the structure of the AHAGs was coincidentally reframed to become a PBC-CSC when the adopted UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions determined that PBC-CSC should be comprised by members from:

- i. the country under consideration;
- ii. countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue;
- iii. relevant regional and subregional organizations;
- iv. the major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort;
- v. the senior UN representative in the field and other relevant UN representatives;
- vi. such regional and international financial institutions; and

vii. members of the PBC-OC (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180).

At a first glance, there is an enlargement of internal and external actors engaged in the new UN peacebuilding framework, as a temptation to dialogue, promote and improve institutional aims in post-conflict settings, increasing the number of UN-member states on this process (Table 5.2.). I argue that the AHAG on *countries emerging from conflict* in general worked as a political platform for creating a space not only to deal with peacebuilding issues, but also to make UN member-states get involved in the AHAG in a more pro-active engagement with the entire UN system, with a focus on their respective relationship with the Security Council. The AHAGs on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi worked as a platform not only for countries labelled as *emerging from conflict*, but also on behalf of the political role of some UN-member states. Brazil's engagement on both AHAG on Guinea-Bissau and, later, its leading role as Chair on PBC-CSC on the same country in 2008 reflects what Prantl mentioned previously, that informal groups “amplify the influence of UN members that are not being member of the Security Council” (Prantl, 2005: 579).

When Guinea-Bissau was included in the PBC Agenda on 19 December 2007 (UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.5), Brazil took on a different position within the new framework: from a member of its AHAG, Brazil was appointed as Chair of its PBC-CSC. Brazil considered its appointment as Chair as an inherent part of a process of strengthening bilateral ties through a multilateral platform. On the one hand, “on a recent visit to Brazil, the President of Guinea-Bissau [João Bernardo Vieira] had discussed new avenues of bilateral cooperation with the President of Brazil [Lula da Silva]” (UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.5: 3) in a meeting on 14 November 2007⁶⁴. On the other hand, in the context of the work of the ECOSOC AHAG on Guinea-Bissau in 2002, Brazil had visited that country and had gained valuable insights that would help coordinate the PBC's activities (UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.5: 3). As an ECOSOC report expresses, Brazil and South Africa were members of both AHAG on Guinea-Bissau and the Security Council at various times and such condition “served as an important bridge between the two forums, mutually reinforcing and enriching the debates in both on strategies to promote peace and development in Guinea-Bissau” (ECOSOC E/2008/55).

⁶⁴ In a speech addressed to the President of Guinea-Bissau, João Bernardo Vieira, the former President of Brazil, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, committed Brazil on establishing more “important” missions in Guinea-Bissau aiming technical cooperation, such as the ones provided by Petrobras and Embrapa; as well as the debt relief of US\$ 34 million that Guinea-Bissau has with Brazil (da Silva, 2007).

Table 5.2. Members of Guinea-Bissau’s and Burundi’s frameworks under ECOSOC AHAGs and PBC-CSCs

Guinea-Bissau	AHAG	South Africa (<i>Chair</i>), Portugal, Netherlands, Brazil, Mauritius, Gambia and Croatia.
	PBC-CSC	<p><i>UN-Member States:</i> Angola, Brazil (<i>Chair</i>), Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Mozambique, Niger, Portugal, São Tome and Principe, Senegal, Spain and Timor-Leste.</p> <p><i>UN Representative:</i> Representative of the Secretary-General.</p> <p><i>External Members:</i> African Development Bank, African Union, Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, Economic Community of West African States, <i>Organisation internationale de la Francophonie</i>, <i>Union économique et monétaire ouest africaine</i>, United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.</p>
Burundi	AHAG	South Africa (<i>Chair</i>), Japan, Ethiopia, Belgium and France.
	PBC-CSC	<p><i>UN-Member States:</i> Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Nepal, Norway (<i>Chair</i>), Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania.</p> <p><i>UN Representatives:</i> Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region.</p> <p><i>External Members:</i> Economic Community of Central African States, European Community, African Development Bank, African Union, East African Economic Community, <i>Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie</i>, International Monetary Fund, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Economic Commission for Africa and World Bank.</p>

Source: Based on ECOSOC E/2003/8; E/2004/11; UN Doc. A/64/341–S/2009/444; UN Doc. A/62/137–S/2007/458.

Since Burundi was the first country being considered eligible for the PBC, along with Sierra Leone, its pioneering condition was a deterministic aspect in replacing its AHAG's structure to its PBC-CSC's one. In the case of the AHAG on Burundi, it "also led to a closer working relationship between the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council" (ECOSOC E/2004/11: 4), emphasizing the existence of a dynamic between UN-member states and Security Council for two reasons. First, the AHAG responded "to a set of external and internal factors" (Prantl, 2005: 566) on the systemic change at the UN level; and second, it also "had led to a crisis in [Security] Council decision-making, effectiveness, and representativeness" (Prantl, 2005: 566). For this reason, when the architecture for peacebuilding gained space in the UN, it emerged as a result of the limitation of the ECOSOC in dealing with its aims and as a political bargain, making the UNSC a decisive actor on this domain. At this point, I do not use the word *decisive* in vain. It is evident that the transitional phase marked by the AHAGs on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi to the PBC has symbolic power evidence: the resolution. On the one hand, ECOSOC was the main actor for delimitating AHAGs' mandate, tasks and aims in 2002, leading the ECOSOC to play an important role on this issue and being classified as the "avant-garde" of this framework in the UN (UN, 2006). On the other hand, the PBC emerged from both UNGA's and UNSC's resolutions in which ECOSOC became a tertiary actor of the peacebuilding framework and enabled the UNSC to exercise more control over the peacebuilding agenda rather than the UNGA.

The cases of Guinea-Bissau and Burundi were merely illustrative, since they were the only ones benefited from an AHAGs under the ECOSOC and that were later integrated into a more complex peacebuilding framework. Such institutional change evidences an improvement on the matter that while corroborating to a reframing process on how the UN should deal with post-conflict countries in their transitional phase from intrastate war to peace. Beyond limiting ECOSOC role on the issue of post-conflict peacebuilding within the UN, the PBC-CSC can be seen as a political tool with regard to other countries included in its structure. As a diplomat pointed out, a specific country "was interested in becoming a member of the Security Council and the role in the PBC should be a plus in this chapter" (D-16)⁶⁵.

⁶⁵ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

A PBC-OC meeting during its first session illustrates such dynamic. The Netherlands, for example, was assigned to act as Chair of the PBC-CSC on Sierra Leone (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5) in a meeting on 12 December 2006. On that same meeting, the Netherlands acted on behalf of Canada onto a leading position on PBC-CSC on Sierra Leone, while proposing that Canada “should be invited to address the next country-specific meeting on Sierra Leone in view of Canada’s role as Chairman of the Management Committee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone” (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 2). Some PBC-OC members, however, hesitated on accepting such proposal, as was the case of Guinea-Bissau, that asked for clarification on why such request was not addressed by Canada itself; Egypt, that asked in what capacity and in what basis Canada should be invited; and the secretary of the PBC-OC, that pointed out that such invitation would be to a single meeting only and not reverted into an invitation to all meetings of PBC-CSC on Sierra Leone (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 2). The Netherlands explained that the Special Court was an integral part of the peacebuilding effort in Sierra Leone and that its cross-cutting themes, such as reconstruction, impunity or governance would be relevant to the PBC (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 2). Nevertheless, from that meeting on 12 December 2006 to the one on 25 February 2009, the Netherlands informed PBC-OC members of its intention to relinquish its position as Chair of the PBC-CSC on Sierra Leone (UN Doc. PBC/3/OC/SR.3: 2) while Canada made publicly its interest in becoming the new Chair of that configuration (UN Doc. PBC/3/OC/SR.3: 2). After being elected Chair of PBC-CSC on Sierra Leone by acclamation on that meeting, Canada reiterated its support to peacebuilding highlighting its commitments of

\$20 million to the Peacebuilding Fund, its recently increased support to countries on the Commission’s agenda by providing over \$450,000 for projects in Sierra Leone, Burundi and Guinea-Bissau; [and that] in Sierra Leone [only], almost \$150,000 was being directed to stimulate the engagement of citizens in decision-making processes in order to improve service delivery at the district level. (UN Doc. PBC/3/OC/SR.3: 2)

Canada’s position reiterates one concern posited by Brazil when the Netherlands was assigned as Chair of the PBC-CSC on Sierra Leone. Although Brazil understood that, at that time, “Sierra Leone might wish the Chairperson to be from one of the donor countries, that would send a troubling signal as to the nature of the [PBC], making it appear to be just a coalition of donors and aid recipient countries” (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5).

Despite the fact that the negotiation process between the Netherlands and Canada – or any other UN-member states – on how to become elected Chair of a PBC-CSC is not the core of this thesis, I bring this topic to the debate since it represents an inherent part for understanding internal power dynamics that embrace framing processes at the institutional level. It is clear that deciding on establishing a Peacebuilding Commission is also deciding on how the bureaucratic machinery organizes how the institution should work on behalf of peacebuilding. The operationalization of a framework with the design of an Organizational Committee and a Country-Specific Configuration is the process in which both label and framing are disseminated. On the one hand, the label is disseminated when the designed framework reinforces the need to help countries on their respective transitional phases from intrastate war to peace; and, on the other hand, framing is disseminated when different actors – both internal and external to the UN – are engaged while working collectively in the pursuit of peacebuilding. Since knowledge enables disseminating labels and framing, PBC-OC and PBC-CSC found on their practices to be mutually reinforcing through the support of the Working Group on Lessons Learned (PBC-WGLL), which is the third PBC-sub organ.

The PBC-WGLL was designed to become the peacebuilding knowledge hub. It was conceived to be “an open, inclusive, and informal platform” (Tschirgi and Ponzio, 2016: 47) in order to, on the one hand, address “a variety of experiences of postconflict engagements, at international and national levels (...) with the view toward distilling lessons to guide ongoing processes” (Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2012: 143) and, on the other hand, “to enhance dialogue on issues of relevance to countries on the PBC agenda” (Tschirgi and Ponzio, 2016: 47). For achieving such purpose, the PBC-WGLL interacts “with a number of international and national actors, expert practitioners and policy analysts, as well as drawing on expertise of member states which had relevant post-conflict experience” (Security Council Report, 2007: 6; 2008: 11). Similar to the PBC-OC and the PBC-CSCs, the PBC-WGLL elects a Chair from among the 31 members of the PBC-OC. As Jenkins (2013) points out, “country- and subject-specific experts are invited to formal and informal WGLL sessions, including interactive seminars, roundtables, and program briefings” (Jenkins, 2013: 47). The purpose, following his contribution, “is to ensure the PBC’s engagement with countries on this agenda is informed by an understanding of ‘best practices’ from past and current experience” (Jenkins, 2013: 47). In the Commission’s first year, the Working Group held three informal meetings focusing on the lessons and good practices associated with: i) risk reduction and

confidence-building in the lead up to post-conflict elections; ii) postconflict frameworks for cooperation; and iii) regional approaches to peacebuilding. In organizing these meetings, the Working Group drew on the expertise of national actors, as well as civil society organizations and academic institutions and a number of recommendations were made (UN Doc. A/62/137–S/2007/458, para. 26).

In Otobo's view, former Director and Deputy Head of the PBSO, the creation of the PBC-WGLL was both an act of *institutional innovation* and a *consolation prize* (Otobo, 2015: 59). His perspective reiterates my previous argument, that the establishment of the PBC is taken as a political platform for UN-member states giving visibility to their pro-active role on peacebuilding or any other issue within the multilateral dynamic. Otobo argues that the PBC-WGLL was not explicitly envisaged in the founding resolution, constituting, therefore an act of *institutional innovation*. And when it was created, it “became a vehicle for giving practical effect to the founding resolution's requirement ‘to develop the best practices’ for peacebuilding” (Otobo, 2015: 59). It was also a *consolation prize*, because, according to him, the decision to establish a PBC-WGLL came after one of the first PBC-OC's Vice-Chairs had failed to secure the position of Chair in the PBC-CSC on Sierra Leone (Otobo, 2015: 59). Such agreed solution to relieve the diplomatic distress, as Cavalcante points out, refers to why the Netherlands was appointed as Chair of PBC-CSC's on Sierra Leone instead of El Salvador (2019: 255). Following the logic, if Norway was appointed PBC-OC's Vice-Chair and also Chair of PBC-CSC on Burundi, El Salvador would follow the same path. In this regard, nominating El Salvador as Chair of the PBC-WGLL was a way to compensate such thwarted leadership (Tschirgi and Ponzio, 2016: 47).

Although El Salvador points out in a UNGA meeting on 6 February 2007 (UN Doc. A/61/PV.86) that the UN “has accumulated a number of experiences and lessons learned in assisting countries in transition from a culture of violence to one of peace” (UN Doc. A/61/PV.86: 11), and that its leading role at the PBC-WGLL should be a source of inspiration and enrichment for the assistance provided to countries under the PBC Agenda (A/61/PV.86: 12); its three-and-half year term (Otobo, 2015: 59) was marked by no clear defined strategy. As Tschirgi and Ponzio explain, in principle, “the WGLL offered the PBC an opportunity to become a reservoir of knowledge and to distill lessons in peacebuilding by drawing upon the experiences of its members” (2016: 47); but in reality, “the P5 showed

little interest in the WGLL and many member states regularly assigned lower-level representatives to the working group, further diminishing its effectiveness” (Tschirgi and Ponzio, 2016: 47). As a result, they argue, the PBC-WGLL came to function as an informal discussion group without a strategic vision or agenda with no real effort made to extract appropriate lessons for PBC-CSC (Tschirgi and Ponzio, 2016: 47).

In truth, part of the under-represented role of PBC-WGLL is a result of UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions that demanded a review of the entire PBA every five years (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180). In its first decade, the PBA was reviewed twice: in 2010 (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393) and 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490); and such reviewing processes were consolidated as two different moments in which knowledge expertise evaluated if the PBA was fulfilling the agreed functions or if a change was needed. In both 2010 and 2015 PBA’s reviews, the role of an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), comprised by Ambassadors and diplomats of Permanent Missions to the UN, became relevant, since they acted as knowledge brokers, while not only evaluating the architecture, but being responsible for re-interpreting the challenge of peacebuilding through what it became conceived after the establishment of the PBA.

One important aspect of the 2010 and 2015 reviews refers to the fact that they confronted the way PBC was doing peacebuilding. Although the 2010 review points out that “referral of new countries must be needs-based and take account of the Commission’s performance and capacities” (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 128); the 2015 review explains that the small number of countries on PBC Agenda reflects an “apparent resistance shown by other States to joining that number, compared with the number of contexts that could plausibly be considered in a peacebuilding mode globally” (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490, para. 97). In this thesis, the PBC’s limited capacity to include more countries in its agenda is discussed. Without mentioning any specific country prone to the PBC Agenda, the 2010 and 2015 reviews enable comprehending the re-framing process from AHAG to PBA as an attempt to enhance peacebuilding and disseminate this post-conflict frame through institutional practices. Since the establishment of the PBA encompasses a debate over a dual-connotation of what constitute *post-conflict* within the UN: on the one hand, it works as a label, categorizing countries; and, on the other hand, it works as a framing, which influences

the establishment of a *peacebuilding* framework designed exclusively for those categorized countries.

Nevertheless, disseminating labels and framing through institutional apparatus is a challenge in itself. Within its first decade (2005-2015), the PBC included only six countries in its Agenda – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone – and rejected the requests submitted by Comoros (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 35) and Côte d’Ivoire (UN Doc. A/63/92–S/2008/417, para 17; Security Council Report, 2008: 9). These rejections raise issues regarding the logic of which country is deemed eligible for accessing that peacebuilding framework, and what really constitutes a post-conflict country in their transitional phase from intrastate war to peace. As Côte d’Ivoire and Comoros were not included in PBC Agenda and their rejection was not publicly explained, as of writing, they remained not as *de-categorized* countries, but as countries redirected to another peacebuilding framework within the PBA. Such conditionality made a distinction, on the one hand, on how PBC operationalized its label and, on the other hand, on how the PBA’s funding mechanism benefited countries not accepted for the PBC, enabling the emergence of *PBC-countries* and *non-PBC countries* as derived labels from the matrix *post-conflict countries* included and not included in their respective peacebuilding frameworks.

5.2. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)

The distinction over PBC- and non-PBC countries was not supposed to take place when the PBA was formally operationalized in December 2005. These current labels are consequence of institutional practices from what was constituted as eligibility criteria for the PBC and the PBF, respectively. At the beginning, the Peacebuilding Fund was designed to be only a multiyear standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding that would be funded by voluntary contributions (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), para. 24; UN Doc. A/RES/60/180, para. 24). Its objectives corroborate the aspect that the entire PBA, initially, was conceived as a framework for post-conflict countries only: on the one hand, it aims at “the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), para. 24; UN Doc. A/RES/60/180, para. 24); and, on the other hand, it supports interventions that are considered critical to the peacebuilding process that directly contribute to the stabilization of countries

emerging from conflict (UN Doc. A/60/984: 1). In a brief analysis, there are three characteristics accompanying the creation of the PBF. First, it “was established to reduce the propensity of countries to relapse into violent conflict as a result of faltering peacebuilding processes due to the absence of sufficient funds to run projects” (Murithi, 2008: 92). Second, it was “intended to help kick-start peacebuilding activities in war-torn countries at an early stage”, indicating that the PBC will have little financial clout due to the size of the PBF structure (Miall, 2007). And third, it was “designed to provide catalytic funding to reinforce financial assistance by other agencies” (Otobo, 2015: 13). It was created with the “unique role of providing funding for strategic peacebuilding plans through country-based steering committees that resemble the role played by country-level [Multi-donor Trust Funds] MDTFs” (Lotz, 2011: 11).

Although a fund for peacebuilding was mentioned in PBC’s founding resolutions (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180), the PBF gains a formal structure only 8 months after the adoption of UNSC’s and UNGA’s decisions on the PBC. In August 2006, the UNSG Kofi Annan was requested to report to the UNGA on how the PBF should be designed. The document entitled *Arrangements for establishing the Peacebuilding Fund* expressed not only the context in which the PBF emerged as well as the *funding gap* it was filling in, being the financial support to countries where no other funding mechanism was available (UN Doc. A/60/984: 4). But, most importantly, the document defined the Terms of Reference (ToR) (UN Doc. A/60/984), “after extensive consultations led by the PBSO, and reflected the still uncertain status of the new entity within the UN system” (Tschirgi and Ponzio, 2016: 48). When formally launched, the ToR “indicate that funding from the [PBF] will be informed by an analysis of critical gaps in peacebuilding that would be conducted by national authorities and the United Nations presence in the country concerned” (UN Doc. A/60/984, para. 6), within the target of US\$250 million specified for this standing fund (Jenkins, 2013: 49).

In the scope of this thesis, the ToR are the main component of the new UN peacebuilding framework because they officially and formally delimited a PBA-boundary that differentiated PBC framework from the PBF one. As the document points out, “in principle, any country reviewed by the Peacebuilding Commission should be considered as a possible recipient for Peacebuilding Fund support” (UN Doc. A/60/984, para. 3.1); but, in contrast,

ToR declare that the UNSG “may determine that a country in exceptional circumstances and on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict be considered eligible for [PBF], even if the country is not yet under consideration by the [PBC]” (UN Doc. A/60/984, para. 3.2). Such ToR differentiation enables a better comprehension of what constitutes countries’ eligibility for one instead of other PBA frameworks. Although they are not comparable, because the PBC is an intergovernmental body and the PBF is a funding mechanism, they are both peacebuilding frameworks within their respective structures, bureaucracies and benefited countries and, also, because they both operationalize what a *post-conflict country* means as a label for accessing funds. In this regard, ToR are the PBF’s guidelines and they delimitate the structure of the Fund, as well as the role each actor plays in this financial architecture for peacebuilding. The ToR designed PBF structure centralized at the UNSG, who determines country eligibility for PBF. Other stakeholders comprise:

- i. the PBSO, which is responsible to manage and monitor the fund and that, under the UNSG, conducts review of the priority plan through a consultative process⁶⁶ in order to avoid duplication with ongoing or planned interventions;
- ii. the United Nations Development Programme – Multi-donor Trust Fund (UNDP-MPTF), that has been appointed to serve as the administrative agent of the fund, responsible for receiving donor contributions and for disbursement of funds;
- iii. the UNGA, that guides PBF’s operations on the basis of an annual report submitted by the UNSG, reflecting the lessons learned;
- iv. the PBC, that supports the development of integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and provide strategic advice in relation to countries under its review and may also offer overall policy guidance on the use of the Fund;
- v. an independent advisory group, appointed by the UNSG, to provide advice and oversight on the speed and appropriateness of the fund allocations and to examine performance and financial reports;
- vi. national authorities and the UN presence in the country, that jointly conduct an analysis of critical gaps and, on that basis, draw up a short-term priority plan which

⁶⁶ Based on the ToR, the priority plan through a consultative process involves senior officials from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs (currently, DPPA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the international financial institutions (UN Doc. A/60/984).

contains a select number of critical interventions to strengthen and sustain the peacebuilding process;

- vii. the special representative of the UNSG and the Government authorities of the concerned countries, that conduct at the country level the review and approval of project activities following the determination of the funding envelope; and
- viii. organizations and bodies of the UN system, including its funds, programmes and specialized agencies, and other international organizations and non-governmental organizations (referred to as “recipients”), that can receive Fund support through project agreements as implementing partners. (UN Doc. A/60/984, para. 3-4)

Each aforementioned entity allowed to engage in the PBF, based on its ToR, elucidates that the PBF was conceived to be an intersection point in between the institutional and the country levels within a dynamic comprised by, on the one hand, the bureaucracy of the UN machinery at its Headquarters in New York and, on the other hand, the logistics while implementing peacebuilding projects and programs on the ground. Although PBF ToR declared that the Peacebuilding Commission have a role in the governance arrangements for the Fund (UN Doc. A/60/984: 2), there is no clear vision on how the PBC contributes to the PBF in this aspect, since the Fund became a totally independent body and does not work in consultation with the PBC on issues of fund allocation. As Tschirgi and Ponzio explain, the founding resolutions did not clarify the relationship between the three components of the PBA and, as a result, “there was continuing friction and contestation between the commission and the fund during the early years” (2016: 48). Such friction, they argue, became more evident when the ToR determined that the PBF was created to be a mechanism focused in four specific areas:

- i. activities in support of the implementation of peace agreements;
- ii. activities in support of efforts by the country to build and strengthen capacities which promote coexistence and the peaceful resolution of conflict;
- iii. establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services, which may include the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs; and
- iv. critical interventions designed to respond to imminent threats to the peacebuilding process, such as reintegration of ex-combatants disarmed under a DDR programme (UN Doc. A/60/984).

These areas are, in pragmatic terms, the strategies for peacebuilding in which the PBF framework was designed, making funding allocation more assertive. As Williams and Bailey point out, “it was important for the PBF to have clearly defined funding priorities while allowing for some flexibility in activities that could be supported in a specific transition context” (2016: 34). In addition, these strategies refer as a filtering process on determining which country is eligible for receiving funding if their peacebuilding proposals fit what the PBF is designed to support. At this point, the PBF works with three types of fund-recipient countries: first, any country engaged with the PBC should be considered as a possible recipient for the fund (UN Doc. A/60/984: 5), without previous consultation from any other UN entity on this matter; second, with respect to circumstances in which a country is prone to lapse or relapse into violent and armed conflict, its eligibility is granted by the UNSG even if a country is not yet under consideration by the PBC (UN Doc. A/60/984: 5); and, third, the eligibility criteria can also benefit other *recipients* rather than countries, which include organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, such as its funds, programmes and specialized agencies, and other international organizations and non-governmental organizations (UN Doc. A/60/984: 6).

The last two cases of eligibility – determined by the UNSG and other entities other than national governments – reiterates to my previous point, that the PBF works closely with national authorities, as well as with the United Nations presence in the countries concerned. This means that the PBF has, in its scope, an engagement in the field, being a segment of the PBA that depends from the field. For a better comprehension on how the PBF enhanced an institutional boundary, while being a totally different body from the PBC, and keeping its role on framing post-conflict countries, I call attention to its eligibility conceded by the UNSG along two axes: Immediate Response Facility (PBF-IRF), which is designed to “wherever peacebuilding opportunities arise in the immediate aftermath of political crisis or conflict” (PBSO, 2014: 9); and Peacebuilding Response Facility (PBF-PRF), which is “typically applied within several years following the end of a conflict to support national efforts and consolidate peacebuilding” (PBSO, 2014: 9). As Table 5.3. shows, both the PBF-IRF and the PBF-PRF were designed as part of the process of making the PBF catalytic and quickly responsible for the respective context of the countries’ need.

Table 5.3. Scope of the two facilities covered by the PBF

	PBF-IRF	PBF-PRF
Funding Type	Project	Programme
Funding ceiling	a) UN ASG-PBSO approves up to \$3 million for PBF-IRF without formal eligibility; b) If a country is declared formally eligible for PBF funding by the UNSG, it can receive up to \$10 million for the IRF project.	a) No formal limit: based on Priority Plan needs and capacity; b) Approved on a case-by-case basis by the PBSO.
Duration	6 to 18 months	18 to 36 months
Approval process	One-step approval process by PBSO.	Two-step approval process: Priority Plan approved by PBSO; selection and approval of project proposals by Joint Steering Committee (JSC).

Source: PBSO (2014).

Based on the criteria established for the PBF, its role is the one that corroborates the central argument of this Chapter, emphasizing that the way the PBA functioned enabled different categorization processes of what constitutes a post-conflict country. It becomes evident that even though the PBF has provided financial support to countries included in the PBC Agenda, it also brought other countries rather than the PBC-ones to its framework, since these aim to implement peacebuilding priorities under the strategies defined by the PBF. One aspect on this framing process is the type of funding – PBF-IRF or PBF-PRF.

Another aspect in that this framing process refers to the criteria accomplished by each project or peacebuilding program to be financed by the PBF (PBSO, 2014: 18). For a country to be eligible to the PBF, it depends on its level of engagement with the PBC; and, for meeting the criteria of the projects and programs, they must elaborate the program or project at “country level – either by the government or the UN – and submitted by the Senior Resident

UN Representative to PBSO, following endorsement by the Government” (PBSO, 2014: 18). More specifically, those projects or programs are reviewed by the PBSO based on the following factors:

- i. critical peacebuilding needs: country at risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, as indicated by a current conflict analysis; country is recently post-conflict, and peacebuilding gaps have been identified;
- ii. critical peacebuilding opportunities: a peace agreement is in place; a window of opportunity is currently opened to make a difference; the country is at a crucial cross-roads for peace;
- iii. commitment of national authorities and stakeholders to the peace process and to addressing the identified conflict factors and triggers;
- iv. availability of external funds to the country and potential for strategic leverage of PBF resources (the catalytic impact of the PBF);
- v. the positive role that the UN can play in the country to address the peacebuilding issues (considering its mandate, capacity, perception in country, partnerships and networks). (PBSO, 2014: 18-19)

In my perspective, the framing process within the PBF became complex and difficult because it operationalized peacebuilding within three different framing processes: i) country eligibility; ii) eligibility of the project or program under specific funding ceilings; and iii) the final approval if the project or program fits the criteria elucidated above. As an interviewee pointed out, “it is not easy to apply for external money” (D-4)⁶⁷. In this regard, the categorization inside the PBA differs as part of the process on how peacebuilding was operationalized. Since it works on an inclusion/exclusion basis, not accepting prospective countries to its PBC Agenda became an open-door to the emergence of other institutional practices that occasioned differentiation on the establishment of the PBC and the PBF categories under the PBA. When the PBA was reviewed for the second time in 2015, the AGE addressed some critics to the limited role of the PBC on including countries to its Agenda pointing out that “some 32 countries have been designated as recipients of financing from the Peacebuilding Fund over its 10-year existence, for example, eclipsing the 6 that have ever been formal objects of the Commission’s agenda” (UN Doc. A/69/968-

⁶⁷ Interview conducted from September to December 2017 in New York.

S/2015/490, para 97). The difference on the number of countries, that reflects preference from one framework instead of the other, as well as how the institutional practice enabled such enlargement between the PBC and the PBF becomes visible through Table 5.4., that shows the number of countries under the PBC and the PBF during PBA’s first decade (2005-2015). While the PBC became restricted to providing an advisory role to only 6 countries; the PBF provided financial support to 27 countries under the IRF and PRF together.

Table 5.4. Countries financed by the PBF from 2005 to 2015

Label	PBC-Country	<i>non-PBC Country</i>		
Framework	<i>PBC-CSCs</i>	<i>PBF-IRF / PBF-PRF</i>		
Countries	Burundi	Comoros	Papua New	Madagascar
	Central African	Côte d’Ivoire	Guinea	Mali
	Rep.	DRC	South Sudan	Myanmar/Burma
	Guinea-Bissau	Guatemala	Sudan	Niger
	Guinea	Kyrgyzstan	Uganda	Philippines
	Liberia	Lebanon	(Northern)	Solomon Islands
	Sierra Leone	Chad	Yemen	Somalia
		Haiti	BiH	Sri Lanka
		Nepal	Colombia	Timor Leste
			Kenya	
			Lybia	

Source: MTPF-O (2016: online).

From the consolidated data on funding per country during the PBF’s first decade (2005-2015), I highlight the two countries that created the *problématique* I presented in the beginning of this thesis. Comoros’ and Côte d’Ivoire’s non-acceptance to the PBC was the institutional practice that triggered a dynamic embedded on the perspective that peace through institutions is subject of eligibility. Although Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire became directed to the PBF, they not only had a non-PBC country label attached to them, as well as they reinforced such discrepancy while being the official rejection of the PBC in face of other prospective countries – such as Haiti, Timor-Leste and Nepal (Security Council Report, 2008: 9, Jenkin, 2013) – that were indicated for the PBC but never officially

presented their requests, as Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire did. Furthermore, Jenkins points out that the PBF became both a meeting point for and a constant source of tension between the PBSO and the PBC (2013: 102), mainly because “the PBF is not institutionally linked to the Commission” (Security Council Report, 2007: 2).

Additionally, Jenkins (2013) points out that the source of tension between the PBF and the PBC refers to the “traditionally aid-receiving Southern member states (who form a majority in the PBC), and the smaller but substantial group of traditionally aid-supplying Northern states” (Jenkins, 2013: 131). He explains this tension due to the reason that, on the one hand, “donors want to retain control of their funds, with threat of withdrawal their key negotiating resource” (Jenkins, 2013: 132), while on the other hand, “southern states want more collective (PBC) control over PBF selection and allocation, in effect further de-linking contribution from programmatic control” (Jenkins, 2013: 132). The control aspect mentioned by Jenkins (2013) is contrasted by two realities from the ground: one, provided by interviewees of the Advisory Group of the PBF, which affirmed that some members of the Advisory Group are the ones who donate funds to the PBF and this practice reflects a kind of control exercise. In the perspective of the PBF-AG’s member, the Advisory Group was “supposed to be independent and comprised only by experts, but the inclusion of diplomats ‘mine’ the PBF in a sense of defining some positions based not on what is good for the fund, but for their own countries” (R-5)⁶⁸. On the other hand, as a UN staff mentioned, “the PBF does not have hard politics interfering in the funding”. Such notions of the PBF enabled it to become, as Jenkins emphasizes, both the least and most autonomous of the three PBA-bodies. As Street et al. (2008) highlight, the PBF became another framework for peacebuilding due to two ways: first, “by funding short-term, critical peacebuilding activities” (2008: 36) in countries different from those supported by the PBC and, second, by making the PBC “not directly responsible for the allocation of PBF funding” (2008: 38). Consequently, they point out that “if the PBF is really intended to be quick, flexible and catalytic, the wisdom of allowing its disbursements to become bogged down in controversial political negotiations is questionable”, which means that both the PBC and the PBF require an evaluation of their respective decision-making processes on making countries eligible for accessing its respective political and financial support.

⁶⁸ Interview conducted from September to November 2018 in Oslo, Norway.

According to a former Assistant-Secretary General for the PBSO, Carolyn McAskie, even the PBF “has become a valued tool of the system, providing quick-response funding for critical peacebuilding efforts; it was never intended to substitute long-term recovery, reconstruction, and sustainable development in post-conflict countries (McAskie, 2016: xxxiv). In true, what McAskie advocates for is that the PBF was created in a very competitive post-conflict arena due to the diversity of funding mechanism dedicated for recovery and reconciliation. As Tschirgi and Ponzio argue, “financing for peacebuilding had been a main area of research and advocacy throughout the 1990s since it was recognized that existing funding mechanisms did not adequately respond to the needs of conflict-affected countries” (2016: 48). In this scenario, Williams and Bailey point out that the “increase in the number of multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) in the preceding years [is] driven to some extent by donors who wanted to support selected themes in a more visible manner, as distinct from providing financial support for agency programs” (2016: 33).

In their analysis, those funding mechanism sought to address immediate needs in post-conflict environments within a country focus or within a thematic context (Williams and Bailey, 2016: 33-34). Such division explained by Williams and Bailey is reiterated by the fact that the UNDP-MPTF administers 181 funding mechanisms in accordance to their respective categories. For being designed for supporting countries in their transitional phases from intrastate war to peace, the PBF belongs to the group of funds categorized under the category *Transition*. As with the PBF, there are more 41 funding mechanisms on this same group⁶⁹. As Williams and Bailey complement, when the PBF was established, “the challenge was to avoid possible duplication with other funding mechanisms: therefore, the PBF need[ed] to occupy a clearly defined niche within the existing landscape of special UN funds while building on the lessons learnt from the MDTFs” (Williams and Bailey, 2016: 34).

“Building on lessons learned” that Williams and Bailey (2016) mention refer to the role expertise plays on reviewing the way UN operationalizes peacebuilding. Similar to the PBC, with its Working Group on Lessons Learned; the PBF’s ToR enabled the inclusion of an independent Advisory Group (PBF-AG) to provide support on speed and appropriateness of

⁶⁹ From the total of 181, the UNDP-MPTF administers funding mechanisms into four categories: Development, that comprise funding mechanisms for Climate Change (17), Delivering as One (26) and Development (85); Humanitarian (8); Transition (44); and Fiscal Agent (1) (MPTF-O, 2016).

the fund allocations (UN Doc. A/60/984, op 5.3). Although the UNSG appoints the members of the PBF-AG, they are nominated by UN member-states, which elect up to 10 eminent personalities, selected on the basis of their peacebuilding experience, from all regions, including countries contributing to the Fund (UN Doc. A/60/984). Members of the PBF-AG are appointed for a two/three-year period and receive support from the PBSO (UN Doc. A/60/984, para. 5.3). During its first decade, four PBF'AGs⁷⁰ were appointed.

As Jenkins points out, the PBF-AG meets periodically to assess PBF's substantive priorities and working methods (2013: 102). But, in my perspective, the PBF-AG works as *knowledge brokers*, bringing again the contribution of Litfin (1995), Meyer (2010) and Knaggård (2013), who point out that experts at different levels become responsible to interpret and to reinforce the framing process making social reality understandable for individual and collective actions and decisions. As an interviewee declared, the PBF-AG "was not involved in deciding which country should have a project financed by the PBF, but that it could give the advice on the panorama of the country-project under consideration by the PBF" (PBF-AG, 2018).

It is possible to state that the PBF-AG was established to measure PBF's effectiveness on the ground. The PBF-AG visits PBF-recipient countries in general (both PBC and *non*-PBC), and part of its field visits represent a reinforcement of the PBF framework, because the Advisory Group plays its role within a dynamic while interacting with stakeholders and practitioners to understand their respective roles and responsibilities in the identification of peacebuilding priorities; considering what is essential for the Fund to be a useful and effective peacebuilding instrument in post-conflict settings; and visiting and examining a representative sample of PBF funded projects and activities to get first-hand information on the effect and impact of interventions on peacebuilding in the country concerned. Within its role, the Advisory Group is the entity that can also provide a panorama of the funding challenges the PBF faces. As an interviewee pointed out, the PBF-AG expressed, in different moments, concern that the Fund would not survive unless the UNSG promoted it properly (R-5). Evaluating the PBF through its financial apparatus and effectiveness was also the core

⁷⁰ The first PBF-AG was appointed for a two-year term (2008-2009); the second PBF-AG had its tenure from 2010 to 2011; the third PBF-AG concluded its mandate after a three-year term, from 2012 to 2014; and the fourth PBF-AG was appointed by the UNSG from 2015 to January 2018. As of writing, the fifth PBF-AG was appointed in March 2018.

of the 2010 and 2015 reviews of the PBA (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490), as well as a more specific review on the PBF exclusively, that was conducted by the UN Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in 2008; a revision of its ToR in 2009 (UN Doc. A/63/818); and two more experts’ review on 2009 (Ball and Mariska, 2009) and in 2014 (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014).

Although the 2010 review of the PBA pointed out that the Fund “ha[d] an independent decision-making structure, with decisions being made by the Secretary-General following recommendations by the Advisory Group” (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 161); and the 2015 review argued that the Fund “ha[d] since played an important role in providing financing to countries emerging from conflict or conflict-affected countries, as well as in advancing strategic alignment between the United Nations and the international financial institutions” (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490, para. 112); much of its limited capacity was due to the internal evaluations on its role on benefiting more countries rather than the ones already in place on its respective funding ceilings. As the OIOS pointed out, “the Fund’s decision-making processes remain insufficiently strategic in identifying the peacebuilding countries most in need, the most critical priorities, or the optimal projects and partners for addressing these priorities” (OIOS, 2008: 15). Nevertheless, the PBF saw its funding target amount initially established on \$250 million increase (UN Doc. A/63/818, para. 7.1), and was able to benefit more countries than the ones already indicated. An enhancement of the role of the PBSO became required in that process.

5.3. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)

In between the PBC and the PBF, lays the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), headed by an Assistant Secretary-General (ASG). It was conceived in 2005⁷¹ through the same UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions that established the PBC (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180) and was designed to be a small office staffed by qualified experts “within the Secretariat, from within existing resources” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc.

⁷¹ On the scope of this thesis, I consider both resolutions as the official decision for the PBSO since it reflects collective understanding for the establishment of a new peacebuilding framework at the UN. Nevertheless, I recognize that Jenkins (2013) and Cavalcante (2019) point out that the terrain for the PBSO was prepared before the adoption of the UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions. They argue that on 13 July 2005 an UN internal document advocated for the creation of the PBSO, as it is expressed at the Decision 2005/11 of the UNSG on that matter.

A/RES/60/180). Its budget is derived from only 3 per cent of donor contributions (UN Doc. A/68/722, UN Doc. A/70/715). As the PBSO “does not have an operational mandate, meaning that it does not (normally) have field staff and does not manage or implement programs as part of UN missions” (Jenkins, 2013: 48), I do not include it as a case study under this thesis because it was not conceived to be a part of the peacebuilding framework, rather a bureaucratic cell between the PBC and the PBF. For this reason, the PBSO is indispensable for comprehending how the PBC and the PBF were operationalized at the institutional level and how peacebuilding became disseminated by the PBA during its first decade (2005-2015).

As Jenkins points out, “one modest hope of the PBA’s framers was that [the PBSO] would promote a shared understanding of what peacebuilding is and how the international community could assist it” (2013: 98). On this thought, Jenkins reveals that “the PBSO began working with other entities to generate a common definition of peacebuilding” (2013: 98), which corroborates the disseminating that institutional practice aiming “to arrive at a conception that would capture the term’s distinct meanings at the strategic, policy, and operational levels” (Jenkins, 2013: 98) and to “foster a coherent, coordinated approach to peacebuilding across the UN family, and to spread lessons learned and good practices in the UN and beyond” (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 6-7; PBSO, 2010).

In that regard, the primary documents state that the PBSO was designed to achieve three main objectives: first, assist the PBC in developing peacebuilding strategies to countries under its Agenda and support the PBC’s Working Group on Lessons Learned (Jenkins, 2013: 48); second, develop and document best practices and lessons learnt with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues; and, third, help gathering and analyzing information on financial resources available for peacebuilding relevant for United Nations in-country planning activities (Otobo, 2015: 12; UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180) as part of its engagement with the PBF. At this point, I state that the PBSO was framed in two different ways inside the PBA. On the one hand, it supports the work of the PBC, acting as its secretariat (Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2012: 142); on the other hand, it manages the PBF (Otobo, 2015: 40), while advising the UNSG on UN system-wide peacebuilding strategies and policies (Otobo, 2015: 40), as well as assisting the UNSG in coordinating UN agencies involved in peacebuilding activities (Tryggestad, 2016: 100). Framing the PBSO to address

needs from both the Commission and the Fund was strategic not only in face of the establishment of a common endeavor, but so that it could act as the meeting point for synergies within the PBA.

Its structure comprises three branches: the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, serves as a Secretariat to the PBC and provides support to the PBC-OC and PBC-CSCs (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 7; UN, 2019: online); the Policy, Planning and Application Branch, which is responsible, within the PBSO, for helping to develop common policies, tools and approaches in collaboration with relevant UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes as well as with the relevant non-UN partners (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 7; UN, 2019: online); and the Financing for Peacebuilding Branch, which Branch is led by its Director and working under the supervision of the Assistant-Secretary General (ASG) for PBSO, that directly manages the PBF (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 7; UN, 2019: online). Within that structure, Campbell et al. refer that the PBSO works with two main actors at the country level responsible for elaborating projects and programs to be funded by the PBF: the Resident United Nations Offices (RUNOs), responsible for designing, implementing and monitoring peacebuilding projects and the Joint Steering Committees (JSCs), responsible for monitoring the contribution of these projects to the Peacebuilding Priority Plan; as well as the host government (2016: 136-138; UN, 2019: online).

Although the PBSO stood in unmediated relation to the UNSG's office (Jenkins, 2013: 98), it carved a distinctive and leadership role in the PBA, highlighting that struggling for a space within the UN was a process of looking for its own recognition and identity. Such autonomous role, nevertheless, enabled the PBSO to be recognized as an "independent office located within neither the DPKO nor [the] DPA" (Jenkins, 2013: 98) during its ten years of existence. After that, the PBSO was again re-interpreted, when the 2015 review reframed the peacebuilding architecture into a more inclusive and holistic perspective with the adoption of the *sustaining peace*⁷² concept. Such reframing was responsible for placing the PBSO under the domain of the DPA and, consequently, formally disseminating the peacebuilding architecture to a now reframed Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)⁷³ since January 2019.

⁷² For an analysis on the *sustaining peace* concept, see De Coning (2018) and Mahmoud and Makoond (2017).

⁷³ On 2 January 2019, the DPPA shared on its Twitter account its new logo after incorporating the PBSO to its domain. That information was accompanied with the sentence "new name, (...) reinvigorated mission" which

Despite this fact, part of its process on finding its own niche at the UN became evident through institutional reviews that pointed out, on the one hand, partially what the PBSO did and, on the other hand, more on what and how the PBSO should do with regard to the PBC and the PBF. Therefore, there is no literature exclusively on the PBSO, since its existence as well as its practices depend on what the PBC and the PBF do as peacebuilding actors. For this reason, understanding the role of the PBSO and the criticism over it is an inherent part of understanding the functioning of the PBC and the PBF, since I advocate the PBSO as the meeting point among these two PBA-bodies.

5.3.1. PBC's Secretariat

The role of the PBSO at the PBC was limited to specific tasks aiming to support the work of the PBC. These tasks comprise convening formal and informal working sessions of the PBC-CSCs, producing progress reports on country situations, and arranging the programs of member-state delegations that would conduct field visits to countries on the PBC Agenda (Jenkins, 2013: 48; UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458). In addition, the PBSO works to develop initial drafts of the PBC's calendar and plan of work, while preparing the substantive aspects of meetings, including documentation for the Commission's consideration; and participate in interdepartmental discussions within the Secretariat on peacebuilding (UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458). To this list, I add that the PBSO has an important role on supporting the production of the PBC-OC's annual reports. These reports reflect PBC's achievements and challenges with regard to decisions and meeting's contents during each year in question. At the beginning, these reports were launched corresponding to a period of one year. Nevertheless, as PBC's first meeting was held on 23 June 2006 (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/1), the first annual report comprised PBC's work until 22 June 2007 (UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458) and such timeframe from June to June of the following year showed to be unproductive (UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458; UN Doc. A/63/92-S/2008/417; UN Doc. A/64/341-S/2009/444). As a result, the fourth PBC's annual report comprised the longest period of a PBC-OC's session, from 1 July 2009 to 31 December 2010 (UN Doc. A/65/701-S/2011/41) in order not only to regulate PBC's working calendar from January to December but, most importantly, to be "aligned with the [UN] calendar year, following the

summarizes that re-framing the PBSO to a UN department reflects a weakening/strengthening of its role, as well as formally disseminating peacebuilding through the PBSO to other structures at the UN.

same cycle as the terms of membership and chairmanship of its various configurations” (A/65/701–S/2011/41, para. 2).

Beyond that reasoning, determining such timeframe to report PBC’s working was an attempt to make it in synchronicity with the PBF. Since the Fund faced the same challenge with regard to summarizing its working year (UN Doc. A/62/138; UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522; UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419; UN Doc. A/65/353; UN Doc. A/66/659), its annual reports became aligned with the PBC’s one only in 2012 (UN Doc. A/67/711), constructing the sense that, from that moment onwards, the PBC’s and the PBF’s respective annual reports were enabling a synergy among them. Despite the fact that the production of the PBC-OC’s annual reports enabled an alignment within the PBA, such production also proved to be a negotiation process “similar to a UNSC resolution”, to quote one diplomat (D-18)⁷⁴. Such comparison becomes evident from the field, when some UN-member states’ positioning revealed that producing annual reports constitutes a process of dialoguing in a conflict of interest scenario, in which the language adopted on these reports should not enhance the role of other actors on peacebuilding rather than the UN, even though these external actors had contributed to the PBA.

Another important aspect with regard to the adopted language in these reports refers to the PBC’s role in including more countries in its Agenda, as the 2010 and 2015 PBA’s reviews (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393; UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490) have critically pointed out. These meetings also proved to be the place where PBC’s *modus operandi* was confronted. During a PBC’s meeting on its working methods, for example, the issue of concern was about how the PBC should engage with other countries, and that a change from “countries on PBC Agenda” to “countries under consideration by the PBC” would work as an incentive while enabling it to include more countries than the only six initial ones. In truth, such discussion on *the most appropriate* language reflects how re-framing takes place in the PBA in order to construct a different perception from the one already visible at the institution, that refers to what really constitutes a PBC-country. Without having in mind that such change on the adopted language is part of a re-framing process, some UN-member states pointed out that replacing one term for another would have a positive impact, since “it does not imply on making a country passive, rather engaged aiming to construct a new

⁷⁴ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

partnership with and by the institution”. In contrast, other UN-member states posited against such terminological change, due to the fact that UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions on the establishment of the PBC have designed it considering the existence of an agenda for post-conflict reconstruction, at the same time they questioned the sense of being included in the PBC Agenda and not having a configuration. The debate over language adoption and adaptation was taken in face of new forms of engagement while trying to make the PBC flexible on that matter. Although the core of the question was not a change on the founding resolutions, as was pointed out on that meeting, “adequating the use of new terminologies was recurrent on PBC’s work” (P-3), as well as at the UN in general.

As was stated during that meeting, such terminological change would work on behalf of some prospective countries that were not included in the PBC Agenda for many reasons, as was the case of the Solomon Islands, that became eligible for the PBF and were not included in the PBC Agenda because, as a UN-member state representative explained, “there was no post-conflict context identified on that country that could justify its inclusion”⁷⁵. Such positioning I bring from my fieldwork finds support on Autesserre’s (2009) contribution, who explains that labeling post-conflict situation instead of a war – or any other unstable circumstances – implies on making “a specific set of policies and procedures (...) seem natural and appropriate while (...) another set of strategies (...) seem inappropriate and illegitimate” (2009: 254).

Nevertheless, as it is evident, the PBSO did not have any role on deciding countries inclusion in the PBC Agenda, but worked on enhancing the PBC and the PBF concomitantly. As the 2010 review of the PBA points out, the partnership among the PBSO and the PBC should develop a communication strategy with a strong field focus as well as targeted at UN-member states in New York and the secretariat aiming “to identify (...) how the peacebuilding architecture is constituted and how the elements interact” (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 66). In other words, that communication strategy would carry out the dissemination of the architecture while “spell[ing] out the benefits that the Commission offers: key among these are ‘attention, accompaniment, advocacy’” (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 66), which also works to construct the sense the PBC is viable within the purpose for what it was established.

⁷⁵ Confidential information based on notes taken from the fieldwork from September to December 2017.

The “brand” [referred as the PBC] needs to be repositioned to become much more positive: the Commission represents an innovative and modern approach in which the international community accompanies conflict-affected countries as they chart their own future. The key message is not one of dysfunctionality, but of determination and resolve. (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 66, added)

Since it is “backed by the PBSO” (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 83), the 2010 review stated that the PBC should take a lead role in developing mutual accountability frameworks specifically adapted to the peacebuilding area. In that regard, the PBC should not function only on its own behalf, but enhancing the role of the PBSO because it was expected that the PBSO should earn respect as a “‘centre of competence’ at the cutting edge of United Nations thinking on peacebuilding” (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 83) while, on the one hand, “drawing on work across and outside the United Nations system, including that of non-governmental organizations, academics and local actors” (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 83) and, on the other hand, ensuring that “peacebuilding efforts are informed by the best available research and the most relevant field experience” (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393, para. 83).

Nevertheless, due to the fact that the PBSO remained “understaffed from the outset”, as the 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490) review pointed out, the PBSO had to dedicate most of its scarce resources on providing secretarial support to the meetings of the PBC (UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490, para. 83). Hence, it lacked the resources to perform the most important task that could enhance the PBA overall: in depth policy analysis on dealing with conflict affected states or on what drives the recurrence of conflict (UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490, para. 83). Embedded on Jenkin’s contribution, the PBSO should “have been better positioned to make progress on this front, given its knowledge-management and policy-coherence mandates” (2013: 98). In the analysis of Cheng-Hopkins, who worked as Assistant Secretary-General for the PBSO from 2009 to 2014, being a small office, in the context of the PBSO, means that its level of “unpredictability from year to year of what staff resources will be available the following year” (2015: xx) evidences that the PBSO depends on the “goodwill” of other UN agencies in providing personnel to its functioning. The consequence, as the 2010 review points out, is a PBSO crafting its own space in a fragmented institution where peacebuilding is one of the tasks provided by many departments and offices.

5.3.2. PBF's manager

The PBSO had a more active role with the PBF. And the reason for such engagement does not refer only to the fact that the PBSO was responsible to manage the Fund, but that such responsibility enabled it to become involved in the PBF's decision-making process. On this issue, the PBSO "used a proactive strategy to identify additional countries eligible for Fund support and to engage in early dialogue with [UN] country teams and Governments" (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 13), because there was "no additional countries coming before the Peacebuilding Commission until 2008" (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 13). When the PBSO decided to act on that domain, only Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone had been included in the PBC Agenda. Consequently, the PBSO contributed to make the PBF another peacebuilding framework within the PBA while advocating for the dissemination of peacebuilding to other countries rather than the ones already included in the PBC Agenda. Nevertheless, the PBSO "exercises no authority over the various actors involved in the Fund" (OIOS, 2008: para. 40).

My argument over the dissemination of peacebuilding through the PBSO is part of its role on reviewing applications submitted by prospective countries for the PBF and, later, updating these guidelines (UN Doc. A/67/711: 21). From the list of templates and guidance notes for the PBF, there are three main documents I highlight as part of a framing process on peacebuilding. First, the Eligibility Request Template for countries to access the PBF, in my perspective, works as framing the concerned country as eligible – *or not* – for PBF funding, since such request is structured in a way that the country identifies itself with labels that pertain to a post-conflict scenario, as well as entails a recognition of its level of fragility. At this phase, countries become eligible for PBF and they are requested to provide:

- i. their situation and conflict analysis, in which countries must explain their peacebuilding context, including conflict drivers, dynamics and major opportunities for peace, reiterated by international indexes, such as the World Bank fragile states' list, Global Peace Index, Conflict Barometer⁷⁶, Official Development Assistance

⁷⁶ The Conflict Barometer is a project from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC).

- (ODA) per capita levels, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) related indicators and the Human Development Index;
- ii. their road map for peacebuilding, in which countries must describe their current state of the peace process or any critical transitional moment, highlighting UN's role on that process;
 - iii. the mapping of their existing finances and peacebuilding activities and funding gaps, in which countries must identify if there are peacebuilding needs that are not being addressed, mainly if there are some minority groups excluded from a peace plan; and
 - iv. the potential for PBF support, in which countries must emphasize the prospective priority areas for peacebuilding, as well as their target groups and geographic areas of intervention.

The second and third documents – IRF Project Document (PBF-IRF) and PRF Priority Plan (PBF-PRF), respectively – refer to the subsequent phase after a country is declared eligible for the PBF. They are responsible for designing the framework in which projects and programs in post-conflict countries are categorized as real peacebuilding plans. Since being eligible for PBF funding is not a *sine qua non* condition for having peacebuilding projects or programs approved, they depend on the approval of another evaluation by the PBSO. For requesting funding for projects or programs, countries must state the relevance of such project for peace and why the PBF is the right mechanism for ensuring the implementation. In both the PBF-IRF and the PBF-PRF, countries must provide a joint results framework that clearly states how their projects contribute to common outcomes in an integrated manner, while the PBSO conducts a review of the plan through consultative process in order to avoid any duplication with ongoing or planned interventions (OIOS, 2008, para. 12; Ball and Beijnum, 2009: 2-3).

Beyond that role, the PBSO also worked to enhance the PBF through three different fronts: first, it requested the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to undertake an independent evaluation of the PBF in 2008 following an advice from the PBF-AG (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 18; OIOS, 2008); second, the PBSO initiated a consultative process leading to the revision of the PBF-ToR in 2009 (UN Doc. A/64/341-S/2009/444, para. 69; UN Doc. A/63/818), on the same year that the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom commissioned a review of the PBF on behalf of its five major

donors – Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK (Ball and Beijnum, 2009); and, third, it launched an independent global review of the PBF in 2014 which examined the period of 2011 to 2013 (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014).

These independent reviews are not disassociated from the 2010 (UN Doc. A/64/868–S/2010/393) and 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490) reviews of the PBA nor from the UNSG’s reports on the PBF (UN Doc. A/62/138; UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522; UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419; UN Doc. A/65/353; UN Doc. A/66/659; UN Doc. A/67/711; UN Doc. A/68/722; UN Doc. A/69/745; UN Doc. A/70/715); rather, they complement the sources of evaluating the PBF, exclusively, and they enable an understanding of what was the role of the PBSO in face of its achievements and challenges with regard to the PBF. Although some of these reviews have emphasized that the PBSO, on the one hand, “helps to foster a coherent, coordinated approach to peacebuilding (...), and to spread lessons learned and good practices in the UN and beyond” (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 6-7); and, on the other hand, aims to increase its partnerships and to explore joint funding opportunities with other instruments, such as the European Union’s Instrument for Stability, the World Bank’s State- and Peacebuilding Fund and the UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419: 6; UN Doc. A/67/711); they were aligned on pointing out PBSO’s challenges within the PBA and what it could do for reverting its lack of capacity on peacebuilding during the period under analysis. As OIOS (2018) expressed, the PBSO was created in an environment of “great complexity, requiring astute navigation through multiple, and sometimes competing, demands” (OIOS, 2008: para. 24) and such complexity threatened the PBSO since it “lack[s] adequate capacity to manage the fund to optimal effectiveness” (OIOS, 2008: para. 27).

As the UNSG report on the PBF explained, the PBSO’s lack of capacity reflects an internal demand for additional staff to address crucial “programme management and planning, monitoring and evaluation needs” in face of the rapidly expanding number of countries exclusively under the PBF (UN Doc. A/63/218-2/2008/522: 20), and that it was required to “better manage the diverse expectations of the Fund’s key stakeholders at the global and national levels” (UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419). Based on the 2010 and the 2015 reviews of the PBA, it was pointed out that the PBA was facing a fragmentation process due to an

absence of synergy among each PBA-body, and that the PBSO could play a role on making the boundaries between the PBC and the PBF as minimal as possible.

As the 2010 and 2015 reviews evidenced, “the Commission and the Fund need to be visibly working with the same logic, with coherence and with a strong sense of partnership” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393, para. 145) and, for that purpose, the PBSO should “offer solid analytical input to buttress the Commission’s work” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393, para. 145) and “should provide advice to the [UNSG] on encouraging system wide action in supporting efforts to sustain peace” (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490, para. 148) while becoming “a centre of excellence in the areas of analysis, policy prescription and programme advice, as well as tracking developments in the field” (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490, para. 148). Despite the fact that the PBSO should play a role on enhancing the PBA in general, a letter addressed to the OIOS on 23 January 2009 by the former UN-ASG for the PBSO, Jane Holl Lute, clearly reflects its commitment centered more on the PBF.

On that letter, that was the PBSO’s reply to OIOS review on the PBF in 2008, it was stated that the PBSO endorses the need to improve strategic communication to increase knowledge and awareness about the PBF; the PBSO is committed to reviewing criteria of country eligibility as well as PBF’s decision-making for funding allocations; and that the PBSO is committed to assisting PBF-countries to improve their national strategic planning skills, just to mention a few. In this regard, the PBSO’s effort centered on the PBF cannot be seen as an action against the PBC, but the emergence of the PBF enabled the PBSO to act in a more spontaneous and assertive way, crafting its power and role on enhancing peacebuilding through the PBA, even though through only one PBA-body.

Conclusion

When the UNSC and the UNGA approved the creation of the Peacebuilding Architecture on December 2005, both resolutions did not take into account that that new framework was being conceived in a totally fragmented manner. I say ‘fragmented’ not because the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund were structurally designed as different PBA-bodies; but because they both functioned in a way that peacebuilding became operationalized differently from each other, even though they were conceived under the

same architecture. As a result, their respective countries' engagement evidences how the PBC and the PBF operationalized labelling and framing through their respective decision-making processes for peacebuilding. Such discrepancy becomes more evident through the role the PBSO played in both of them: for the PBC, it is the secretariat; whereas for the PBF, it is the Fund manager. These different responsibilities attributed to the PBSO enable comprehending that UN-member states' decision on establishing the PBA and countries' decision on engaging – *or not* – with the PBC defy pure rational decision-making processes at the organizational level.

6. The UN Peacebuilding Architecture in Practice

The Cold War, which used to dominate many areas of U.N. decision making, has been replaced by a variety of divisive elements which differ from issue to issue; on most economic issues the juxtaposition of developed and developing countries is of paramount importance. (Kaufmann, 1980: 73)

Introduction

The decision-making process within the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) reflects the fragmentation the UN faces in dealing with peacebuilding as an international actor. Fragmentation is here understood as the division regarding the decision-making processes of both the PBC and the PBF in designating countries to one or the other PBA-body. I argue that there are two different models: “the centralized” one, in reference to the PBC decision-making process; and “the three-layered process”, referring to the PBF model. These decision-making models do not fit neatly in any one of the models mentioned previously in Chapter 3. They are a combination of rational motivations guided by the organizational environment within the bureaucratic aspects intrinsic to their functioning, evidencing a “system of action” connecting different actors within different institutional arenas. These models are unintentionally rooted in constructing and consolidating a distinction between not only different forms of engagement, but also, most importantly, different categories for countries to become “eligible” for accessing specific platforms designed for peacebuilding.

Although the PBC and the PBF belong to the same institutional umbrella – the PBA –, their structure, their functioning and the countries they engage with vary. In this regard, the decision-making process of the PBA has become one of the most politicized in the UN. Of course all decision-making processes are political, but, in this case, I argue that since the logic behind countries’ eligibility is not clear, there are other underlying reasons that explain countries inclusion or exclusion that goes beyond their mere categorization as post-conflict countries. Although the PBC and the PBF have their own framing processes for what they conceive to be categorized under a post-conflict label, the analysis of the PBA does not reside in the mere comparison of the PBC to the PBF. Since they have points of intersection

through the role played by the PBSO between them, analyzing the Commission and the Fund separately enables not only an understanding of the complexity of their respective decision-making and framing processes but also a more holistic grasp of the PBA's functioning overall. Moreover, a comparison between an intergovernmental body and a fund for peacebuilding constitutes a challenge in itself, since their structure and *modus operandi* are so different from the outset. As a result, the PBA's decision-making process is not self-explanatory, and opening its decision-making 'black box' enables a comprehension of its functioning, which is essential in dealing with the underlying reasons of its own dynamic. Although this thesis is not focused on the search for an ideal model of decision-making for the PBA, it is centered in recognizing that its practice created a "black box" in which latent perceptions of what constitutes 'peacebuilding' are not visible.

The main goal of the Peacebuilding Architecture is to provide a framework for peacebuilding while helping countries in the transition from war to peace. However, achieving this purpose rests in one of the most intriguing aspects of the PBA: making countries eligible to access either the PBC or the PBF. The path countries must follow to one or another of PBA's body hides a complexity in dealing with the underlying reasons that make a country eligible for the PBC Agenda or for being financially supported by the PBF. The process of deciding for one instead of the other evidences the identification of different levels of post-conflict countries based, on the one hand, on their engagement within the United Nations and, on the other hand, on the role played by what a post-conflict label entails. Such discrepancy can only be explained by opening the 'black box' of the PBA's decision-making.

The 'black box', in the scope of this thesis, refers to the internal dynamics of the PBA where its models of decision-making processes lay. It is located in between the choice available – becoming a PBC-country or getting financial support from the PBF – and the result of this choice – becoming eligible for one or another framework. As mentioned previously, each PBA-body has its own model of deciding countries' eligibility. However, in ten years of its functioning, this is the first time these models are at the core of an analysis, contributing to the academic debate beyond a nonsensical discussion of success or failure of the PBA. This thesis puts forward that the eligibility criteria has an impact on peacebuilding as an institutional framework. For this purpose, this Chapter highlights: i) the PBA's decision-making at the time of its creation through UN-member states positioning on UNSC and

UNGA debates, evidencing a conflict of interests on the establishment of peacebuilding framework; ii) the eligibility criteria that makes the PBC a PBA-body dependent on the decision of the UNSC; and iii) the PBF's decision-making process, that was improved to become more assertive on selecting countries for its financial support.

6.1. When rational and organizational decisions clash

The establishment of the PBA within the UN is part of its historical evolution on enhancing support to countries on their transitional phase from intrastate war to peace. Although the PBA has been established in 2005, its architecture was gradually designed since 1992, when Boutros Boutros-Ghali institutionalized *peacebuilding* in his *Agenda for Peace* in 1992. As Oyedele argues, Boutros Boutros-Ghali also “envisioned new perspectives for the development of peace building operations” (2019: 57). However, from the institutionalization of the term in 1992 until the establishment of its formal structure in 2005, the internal debate on the need for creating the PBA is *per se* a framing process in which a totally new structure for post-conflict countries was taking place inside the UN, evidencing divergences among UN-members that were in favor or against the creation of the new body.

Since the previous documents advised the UNSC to establish a peacebuilding commission under Article 29 of the UN Charter⁷⁷ after a consultation with the ECOSOC (UN Doc. A/59/565, para. 263), as well as establishing a Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN Secretariat to achieve this end (UN Doc. A/59/2005, para. 114; UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2), the decision-making process concerning the establishment of the PBC was not taken only once, marked by the approval of resolutions by the UNSC (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005)) and by the UNGA (UN Doc. A/RES/60/180) on December 2005 alone. It involved a process marked by four distinct decisional moments within the UN, reflecting collective understandings and disagreements on how the PBC should be designed. The first decisional moment is marked by a resolution adopted by the UNGA as part of the 2005 World Summit

⁷⁷ Article 29 - under the Chapter V “Security Council” of the UN Charter - expresses that “The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” (UN, 1945)

Outcome⁷⁸ (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1) on 16 September 2005. The establishment of the PBC as an intergovernmental body was justified by:

- i. the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace;
- ii. the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction; and
- iii. the need to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development, and recognizing the vital role of the United Nations in that regard (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para 97).

Within this first moment, the collective desire of establishing the PBA pertains to the notion that such framing process, as well as the design of the framework, could attend the needs of countries emerging from conflict, as long as it could enhance institutional performance on this field. In this sense, the peacebuilding framing process is embedded on a reciprocal chain, in which the labelled – *post-conflict country* or *country emerging from conflict* – enhances its labeler through the establishment of the framework; and, on the opposite direction, the labeler – the UN – improves its role on peacebuilding through the design of a framework in this field embedded on the notion that it would be a “dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict” (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para 97). For some UN-member states – such as Costa Rica, Egypt and Iran – the UNGA’s resolution is the one that officially marks the establishment of the PBC and the subsequent resolutions just operationalize this initial establishment by deciding how the PBC should be designed (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66).

An important aspect within this first decisional moment embraces UN-member states positioning with regard to the establishment of the PBC. Although some of them have emphasized their support, arguing that there is a high cost in ignoring fragile states

⁷⁸ The 2005 World Summit took place from 14 to 16 September at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Its agenda was based on the proposals outlined by the former UNSG Kofi Annan in his report *In Larger Freedom* (UN Doc. A/59/2005). The known Outcome Document called for timely and decisive collective Security Council action on the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission as well as the Human Rights Council (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para 97; UN Doc. A/60/430).

(Australia, UN Doc. A/60/PV.7: 19); that stabilizing and rebuilding failed or failing states are huge and complex tasks (Norway, UN Doc. A/60/PV.7: 20); and that the PBC is the only coherent strategy that should be necessary for supporting the reconstruction and the restoration of the capabilities of States and institutions during the post-conflict period (Portugal, UN Doc. A/60/PV.7: 15); Australia and Norway were the first UN-member states to donate funds to the PBC's standing fund even though before the formal creation of the PBF. Australia committed itself to a contribution of \$3 million over three years to the new Standing Fund (UN Doc. A/60/PV.7: 19), whereas Norway announced \$15 million to the Peacebuilding Fund (UN Doc. A/60/PV.7: 20). Nevertheless, UN-member states that, in contrast, critically questioned the underlying reasons for creating such peacebuilding framework. As Venezuela questioned, on that meeting on 16 September 2005, "who will be the members of the organizational committee charged with establishing that body?" (UN Doc. A/60/PV.8: 45), this skepticism clearly reflects power dynamics over the peacebuilding framework since its inception. Venezuela answered its own question stating that the members "will be the [UNSC], financial institutions and the main contributors to the Organization. One can therefore already foresee the establishment of a veritable monopoly and dictatorial control over the exercise of the [PBC's] functions" (UN Doc. A/60/PV.8: 45, added). Such position reverberated the subsequent decisional moments on the establishment of the PBC.

The second decisional moment is marked by the second UNGA's resolution on the PBC (UN Doc. A/RES/60/180) alone, which was adopted three months after the 2005 World Summit Outcome concomitantly⁷⁹ to the adoption of the UNSC's resolution (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005)) on the same issue. Analyzing UNGA's and UNSC's decisions separately becomes necessary for comprehending different dynamics over the same resolution. At the UNGA level, the Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly on the 60th session (UN Doc. A/62/11) points out that the resolution was adopted without a vote (UN Doc. A/62/11) or, as Kaufmann explains, through a process of consensus (1980: 127). In his words, consensus indicates that no vote was taken and that this method of decision-making is understood by the presiding officer as commanding general support for the draft decision or resolution before the meeting (Kaufmann, 1980: 127-128). Although the

⁷⁹ Concomitantly means not only that the same resolution was adopted by both UNGA and UNSC; but that their respective meetings were called to order at 11:15am and 11:30am, respectively, on 25 December 2005, crafting an institutional synergy within the UN with regard to collective decision on peacebuilding.

President of the UNGA in 2005, Ambassador Jan Eliasson, from Sweden, has pointed out that the decision on creating the PBC “would be truly historic” referring to its approval without a vote or consensus (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66), concerns and disagreements evidence a less cohesive decision-making process. The statement provided by Venezuela was similar to the previous UNGA’s resolution on the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

As Venezuela pointed out, the first resolution derived from the 2005 World Summit (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1) was accepted “as a simple working paper” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66: 5) which made its national government to disassociate itself from the draft⁸⁰ resolution on the establishment of the PBC. In this sense, Venezuela was, again, the only UN-member state to posit itself against the PBC, arguing that “for consensus to exist, there must be unanimity (...) [and since] there is no unanimity on this draft resolution, and therefore no consensus” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66: 3). Based on Venezuela’s argument, the draft resolution that creates the PBC (UN Doc. A/60/L.40), threatens the attributes and powers of the UNGA; it was the result of secret negotiations conducted behind closed doors, from which more than 170 countries were excluded from (A/60/PV.66: 3-5).

The third and fourth decisional moments are intertwined. They refer, respectively, to the adoption of UNSC’s resolution on the establishment of the PBC – (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005)) – which is similar to the UNGA’s on this issue; and a second resolution concerning the constitution of the PBC’s Organizational Committee (PBC-OC) (UN Doc. S/RES/1646(2005)) in which “the permanent members listed in article 23 (1) of the Charter shall be members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission” (UN Doc. S/RES/1646(2005), para 1)⁸¹. The analysis of the decision provided by the UNSC reiterates Venezuela’s position when a similar resolution was adopted by the UNGA. Nevertheless, the decision-making at the UNSC level was divided in two processes: the one that formally launches and operationalizes the PBC (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005)) through a resolution approved and adopted unanimously by Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, Greece, Japan, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Tanzania and the United States of America (UN Doc. S/PV.5335); and a second process, in which the resolution

⁸⁰ The UNGA’s draft resolution on the PBC is institutionally indicated through UN Doc. A/60/L.40.

⁸¹ Article 23(1) - under the Chapter V “Security Council” of the UN Charter - expresses that “The Republic of China, France, the Russia Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council.” (UN, 1945)

S/RES/1646(2005) was approved with 13 votes in favor and two abstentions – one from Argentina, arguing that the resolution was going on the opposite direction of the “hallmark principle of the legal equality of States and has opposed the creation of privileges” (UN Doc. S/PV.5335); and another one from Brazil, which pointed out that such decision led to several implications for the relationship of the Security Council with the new Peacebuilding Architecture (UN Doc. S/PV.5335).

Abstention, in my perspective, represents a decision-making method, implying the notion that a non-decision, should it be in favor or against, is a decision in practice. In that regard, both abstentions reveal not only a non-decision *per se* but also, most importantly, that abstaining is a decision imbued of significance while it reveals intrinsic dynamics on what moves the PBC through the UNGA in comparison to the UNSC. For Brazil, the Security Council’s P5 logic at the PBC’s structure reflects that:

- i. there was “an imbalance in the interaction between the Peacebuilding Commission and the main organs of the United Nations”;
- ii. the ECOSOC remained underused for providing a role in the peacebuilding framework;
- iii. the Peacebuilding Commission was limited in determining its own agenda;
- iv. there was the perception of not making the Peacebuilding Commission a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, and it should not operate as such; and
- v. the composition of the Peacebuilding Commission should be subject to rotation, and no permanent membership should be established (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005)).

Brazil’s position at the Security Council during the approval of the PBC’s resolution evidences that membership inside the UN is an issue of concern. Moreover, the perspective of reallocating the Security Council P5’ structure to the Peacebuilding Commission represents an extension of control, as well as compromising any potential autonomy the PBC was able to achieve. As a diplomat explained, the relationship between the Security Council and the PBC is “complicated” because “the SC does not want to lose space and control for the PBC” (D-19)⁸²; and much of its initial decision in taking part at the PBC-OC while keeping its SC’ structure reflects its desire to not allow the PBC to be a totally free UN body.

⁸² Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

6.1.1. Delimiting the PBC's geographic and structural boundaries

Within this perspective, these four moments are marked by collective decisions and understandings on the operationalization of the PBC, since they evidence a challengeable terrain in which the framework was crafted. And for comprehending such terrain, I argue that the decision-making processes through the UNGA and the UNSC were also a framing process in which UN-member states constructed the PBC through their collective perception of what it could do and could be as an institutional framework. The framing process, in my perspective, implied on the construction of different boundaries associated to geographical perceptions and to organizational structures. With regard to geographical perceptions, some UN-member states had the notion of attaching *post-conflict country* or *countries emerging from conflict* as a label inherent to African countries and that the new UN peacebuilding framework at that time was designed to address that continent in particular, as was stated by Egypt, India, Jamaica and South Africa (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66). During the approval of the UNGA's resolution in 2005, their respective votes were based on the notion that:

- i. for Egypt, “millions of Africans in countries emerging from or relapsing into conflict are hopeful that the Peacebuilding Commission will be operationalized at the earliest possible date” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 7);
- ii. for India, the creation of the PBC was “of direct interest and of direct use to African and many other developing countries, and which fills a much-needed gap in the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 9);
- iii. for Jamaica, the role of the PBC was viewed as “an important instrument in promoting a coherent and coordinated approach to the sustainable development” in which many of African countries were inserted in (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 14); and
- iv. for South Africa, the geographical construction was more assertive, while pointing out that the PBC “will be judged on how much difference it makes to the lives of the people in Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and other places in Africa” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 18).

Their respective conceptualization of the PBC as designed for African countries evidences what labelling and framing processes argue about. As stated previously in Chapters 2 and 3, framing and labelling involves the construction of the other, the construction of places and the designation of boundaries marked by a dynamic in which interveners find their place of actuation. It is evident that the PBC was designed to fill a gap at the institutional level, and that that gap would be addressed in face of *post-conflict countries*' or *countries emerging from conflict*'s needs. Nevertheless, the perception of a 'PBC for Africa' or a 'PBC for countries labelled as post-conflict or emerging from conflict' would reflect its limited role on filling what really represented an institutional gap on peacebuilding. In addition, such boundary emerged as another social reality's sphere, where institutional dynamics reinforced already existing actors or enabled the emergence of new ones⁸³.

With regard to boundaries on the PBC's organizational structure, my perspective is embedded on three aspects of its constituent elements which became evident through UN-member states' positions during UNGA's and UNSC's decision-making processes: first, including International Financial Institutions (IFIs); second, defining members of the PBC-OC; and third, delimiting boundaries and power-dynamics between the UNGA and UNSC. Although the president of the UNGA at that time, Jan Eliasson, from Sweden, had pointed out that "the draft resolution state[d] that [IFIs] will be included as members in the work of the country-specific meetings of the Commission" (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 3), Venezuela argued that institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should be "limited to participation in the financial assistance requested of them by States in a post-conflict situation for the development of their peacebuilding process" (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 4), instead of playing a catalytic role within the PBC or, as Egypt explained, that dynamic "should have been addressed directly between the donor countries and the country concerned outside the framework of the United Nations" (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 7-8).

⁸³ On new actors, I call attention for further research on the emergence of the G7+ (Group of Fragile States), which is "an open group of self-selecting fragile and conflict affected states" (Fenby, 2013: 36) that was established in 2010 "in response to perceived inadequate and inappropriate international approaches to the poorest countries" (Fenby, 2013: 33). As of writing, its membership is comprised by 20 countries, in which six are included in the PBC Agenda (Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone), 11 became recipients of PBF funding (Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Yemen), and the remaining three that were not benefited by the PBA, as the case of Afghanistan, São Tome e Principe and Togo.

On the boundaries referring to members of the PBC-OC, the institutional framework designed a structure in which much of the criticism by UN-member states were addressed to an unbalanced representation within the PBC or, in a more assertive manner, to a conflictual dynamic of interests from what was conceived through the role played by the UNSC that decided on making its five permanent members also permanent members of the PBC S/RES/1646 (2005). Since the PBC-OC's was designed comprising seven members of the UNSC – including its five permanent members and two more elected; seven members of the ECOSOC, elected from regional groups; seven members elected according to rules and procedures by the General Assembly; five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions; and five top providers of assessed contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to UN funds (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005); UN Doc. A/RES/60/180); such structure determined a boundary perspective while opened space for spill-over effects, creating other decision-making processes for electing UN-member states in their respective internal organisms – such as the UNGA, the UNSC and the ECOSOC – to act as member of the PBC-OC.

As a diplomat pointed out, the election of a UN-member state for the PBC-OC “is not a transparent process” (D-24)⁸⁴ which makes such process more complex for comprehending it. In the same line of thought, Switzerland's position during UNGA's adoption evidences a “more exclusive than inclusive” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 12) process, while explaining that “the list of the 10 contributors is to be established excluding countries that are already members of the Committee in their capacity as members of the Security Council or of the Economic and Social Council” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 12). Within a perspective that the establishment of the PBC crafted an exclusion/inclusion divide among the UN-member states, South Africa posited itself in the UNGA at that time against the additional decision that Security Council's permanent members made themselves permanent in the PBC. On South Africa's position, that decision “came as a big surprise (...) and goes against the spirit of what [is] supported and fought for throughout the process” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 18). The ‘surprise’ aspect that South Africa mentioned with regard to the approval of the ‘now’ PBC-OC's permanent members left the UNGA at a disadvantage in face of a losing power within the UN due to the fact that that situation could not be changed by a UNGA's decision alone. While that situation faced the criticism of UN-member states at the UNGA

⁸⁴ Interview conducted from July to August 2018 through Skype call.

level, it was also the reason that led Argentina and Brazil to abstain in their respective votes at the UNSC level. Positing against a leading role of the UNSC on the PBC was taken due to the fact that:

- i. for Venezuela, such decision alludes the UNSC as the main decision-making body of the PBC (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 4);
- ii. for Egypt, UNSC's authority in driving the work of the PBC has overshadowed the vital role and the sovereign right of the country concerned to directly seek commission's advice (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 7);
- iii. for Costa Rica, such decision would be submitting an organ created by the General Assembly to the prerogative of the veto (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 8);
- iv. for Switzerland, there is a sense of regret that the decision provides such great importance to the UNSC (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 12);
- v. for Cuba, there is a sense of hope that the duality in which the PBC's work would not lead to the UNSC's becoming its guiding body (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 13);
- vi. for Argentina, its positioning goes against "the creation of privileges" (UN Doc. S/PV.5335, page 3) since the establishment of the UN itself in 1945; and
- vii. for Brazil, although PBC's membership was left with little choice (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 16), it could be able to determine its own agenda, to provide recommendations and advice to anybody as it deems necessary, not be understood as a subsidiary organ of the UNSC, and that its composition should be subject to rotation, instead of permanent character (UN Doc. S/PV.5335, page 2).

Although the criticism provided by some UN-member states during the decision-making on the establishment of the PBC was embedded in a conflictual dynamic among them, in face of their perception of power, Venezuela went further pointing out that such conflictual dynamic would cause some interference in the PBC's internal functioning – at the UN level – as well as externally – at the country level. As the United States of America declared, when the adoption of the resolution at the UNGA level, the PBC's "main purpose will be to provide advice at the Council's request" (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 6), referring to the UNSC's notion on its authority on deciding "whether and when the Commission should be asked to address such matters (...) to ensure that the Council can effectively exercise its primary responsibility under the Charter" (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 6), implying the PBC's

operationalization through a “commission’s agenda requested by the Security Council” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 6). Since Venezuela was the only UN-member state to posit itself against the establishment of the PBC, its position, at that time, alludes not only to a non-legitimation of the new peacebuilding framework but also, most importantly, to an understanding that such framework would “help only to further aggravate the profound inequality and injustice that prevail in the United Nations and in the world today” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 5).

As became evident from UN-member states’ practices with regard to their positions on deciding for approving, rejecting or abstaining UNSC’s and UNGA’s resolutions, the PBC emerged segregating countries within its own structure and also segregating countries that could benefit from its role in peacebuilding. The segregation I refer to means that the construction of social reality through different categorization of countries able to benefit by the PBC also included the exclusion of others from the access to a political peacebuilding framework. When Venezuela posited itself against the establishment of the PBC at the UNGA level, that UN-member state affirmed that the new framework for peacebuilding would “aggravate the profound inequality and injustice that prevail in the United Nations” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 5). Although Venezuela’s position was based only on the conflict of interests that prevailed the “secret negotiations conducted behind closed doors” (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66, page 3-4), much of the profound inequality becomes also evident when the PBC faces its *modus operandi* with regard to how to include *post-conflict countries* or *countries emerging from conflict* in its Agenda.

6.1.2. Creating an already threatened and limited PBC-body

Despite the criticism that both resolutions enhanced UNSC’s power over the PBC, it is possible to affirm that the UNSC plays an important role in the PBC and much of what the PBC achieved and not achieved during its first decade (2005-2015) is partially a consequence of being threatened by the UNSC since its beginning. I argue that the PBC is a threatened body by the UNSC because its founding resolutions determined a conditionality that puts the PBC in a constant under-level inside the UN. As they state, for the PBC-OC, maintaining “a balance in addressing situations in countries in different regions in accordance with the main purposes of the Commission” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005); UN

Doc. A/RES/60/180), it should consider establishing its agenda based on the requests for advice from: i) the UNSC; ii) the ECOSOC; iii) the UNGA; iv) member states on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict; and v) the UNSG (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005); UN Doc. A/RES/60/180). From the list of six countries that were included in the PBC Agenda during its first decade (2005-2015), five of them were included following a referral from the UNSC – Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic and Liberia; and only one presented its request independently – Guinea – which did not resort to the UNSC for approval. In this sense, the ECOSOC, the UNGA and the UNSG did not play any role on making these countries eligible for the PBC, leading the UNSC to a quasi-total decision in all cases, in a process consisting of request negotiation, request approval by the UNSC to, then, country's inclusion in the PBC.

In this regard, the role played by the UNSC since the emergence and during the first decade of the PBA (2005-2015) is controversial. And bringing how UNSC-P5 acted on this dynamic is necessary for comprehending their practice on enhancing, limiting and threatening the PBC. The way the UNSC-P5 acted and evaluated the PBC reveals a hidden desire of not only limiting its role on peacebuilding, but also not “making it a competitor with the Security Council” (D-19)⁸⁵. Such perspective of thinking that the PBC could become a competitor against the UNSC must be taken for granted due to three main reasons: first, the ECOSOC lost its leading role on peacebuilding during the transition from the AHAGs to the PBA; second, some UN-member states that engaged in the former AHAGs on *Countries Emerging from Conflict* on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi started their leading role as members of the new architecture, enacting a framework focused exclusively on peacebuilding while the UNSC was – and still is - concentrated on peacekeeping operations; and, third, the UNSC acted strategically in, on the one hand, deciding that the P5 would take part as also permanent members of the PBC-OC and, on the other hand, enlarging its agenda with the inclusion of debates on the work of the PBC.

As Prantl mentions, the transition from the AHAG to the PBC worked as “instrumental in incrementally adapting the Security Council to systemic change without formally altering its structure and composition” (2005: 563). In my perspective, the UNSC seizes the opportunity for systemic change to improve its leadership and role on peace and security related issues,

⁸⁵ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

and such position affects the UNSC “with consequences for the decision making, effectiveness, and representativeness” (Prantl, 2005: 563) at the entire institution. As Prantl argues, some UN-member states found an opportunity with the PBC to increase their capacity to contribute to the Council’s work; to go beyond the biannual rotation, which is seen as an impediment for formulating long-term policies in face of the constraints of the UNSC against systemic changes (2005: 658). Being guided by the diplomats’ contribution on thinking the PBC as a prospective competitor against the UNSC, I state that such perspective is a valid one for comprehending the reasoning why UNSC-P5 had an approach embedded on discursive and pragmatic terms on enhancing, limiting and threatening the PBC. Hence, within this approach, the UNSC reinforces its anti-democratic behavior while “demonstrate[ing] the dominance of the five permanent members to set the Security Council’s agenda and to define the chain of action” (Prantl, 2006: 74).

On discursive terms, permanent members of the UNSC fluctuate between supporting the role of the PBC and its limitation. Such UNSC-P5’s position opens space for a debate on its level of cynicism (Security Council Report, 2017) in which, on the one hand, the PBC “has been looked at cynically by some members of the Security Council, as not providing much added value to the Council’s work” (Security Council Report, 2017: 2); and, on the other hand, “the PBC’s supporters, in turn, have criticised the Council for not being receptive to working with the PBC, thus limiting its ability over the years to demonstrate its value” (Security Council Report, 2017: 2). The point here is that the P5’s role regarding the PBA is a mixture of constructing an image of a UNSC engaged and interested in providing space for peacebuilding while its actions and discursive approach gradually threatened any possibility for the PBA to enhance its goals.

During its early years, the PBC was defined by some UNSC-P5 as “the first effort to improve the cohesiveness of the international community’s actions” (France, UN Doc. S/PV.5895) on peacebuilding. It was established to play “the primary role within the peacebuilding architecture” (Russia, UN Doc. S/PV.6165: 25), to call “attention to countries emerging from conflict, offering advice, and proposing strategies to build sustainable peace after the guns have fallen silent” (USA, UN Doc. S/PV.6503: 13), and to strengthen “coordination with internal and external stakeholders, and [highlight] best practices” (USA, UN Doc. S/PV.6805: 11). From this position, it becomes evident that there is a collective

understanding that the PBC was a synonymous of “pragmatic, action-oriented” (USA, UN Doc. S/PV.5627: 21) framework through its country-specific configurations (USA, UN Doc. S/PV.5627: 21; France, UN Doc. S/PV.5627: 22) in which part of its role was focused on coordinating field visits “that require the stepped-up attention of the international community” (Russia, UN Doc. S/PV.5895: 20). Despite the fact that the United States of America complement this position, arguing that the role of the PBC was “ensuring that peacebuilding is sustainable” (USA, UN Doc. S/PV.5895: 28), that UN-member states critically argued that the PBC was “still a young institution trying to deliver on these expectations” (USA, UN Doc. S/PV.6224: 6) and such justification led the PBC in a condition of being evaluated less than what was expected.

As the PBC was created under the condition of being an UNSC subsidiary organ, much of the collective understanding among the UNSC-P5 is also a consequence of a partially limited role the PBC acquired. I start pointing out that the PBC had a limited role within the UN due, on the one hand, to the small number of countries included in its Agenda and, on the other hand, to the rejection of Comoros’ and Côte d’Ivoire’s requests. In relation to the rejected countries, I point out that the PBC did not advocate for Comoros’ and Côte d’Ivoire’s inclusion in its Agenda, and that the PBCSO was responsible for justifying Comoros’ rejection⁸⁶ (confidential interview) whereas the Ivorian’s rejection was never publicly formalized. The information on these countries’ requests and rejections hardly comes to the surface in the UN corridors. Despite the fact that a few publications evidenced Comoros’ and Côte d’Ivoire’s requests, such information is usually unknown in the UN *milieu*, which reinforces the need to discuss countries’ eligibility for the PBC through the role played by the UNSC on that matter. Since there was an eligibility process, it was expected that “the PBC should respect the sovereignty and independence of the countries concerned” (China, UN Doc. S/PV.6503: 18).

The importance of highlighting this conditionality enables an understanding of how the UNSC-P5 constructed a discursive demarcation of the PBC’s boundaries inside the UN. I say ‘boundaries’ as a reflection of clearly demarcated forms of action and areas in which the PBC could play, without compromising or colliding to any other issue under the domain of the UNSC. Designating countries to the PBC and, consequently, creating another agenda

⁸⁶ Interview conducted in New York on December 2018.

only for post-conflict issues beyond the one already in place at the UNSC was a reason for identifying how UNSC-P5 stressed out the need to delimitate the functioning of the PBC in discursive terms. I say discursive in reference to what became expressed in their respective positions during the 25 meetings at the UNSC level on the issue of *post-conflict peacebuilding* since the emergence of the PBA in December 2005 until December 2015. As became expressed, the PBC had being guided by the UNSC on issues that the UNSC-P5 has considered appropriate to the functioning of the PBC. The UNSC-P5 considered that the PBC:

- i. should not take on an executive role in the detailed determination of peacebuilding priorities in countries on its agenda (Russia, UN Doc. S/PV.5895: 20);
- ii. is not called upon to become a new window for humanitarian or development aid (France, UN Doc. S/PV.5997: 11);
- iii. could be more actively engaged in the processes of peacebuilding and socio-economic transformation currently entrusted to many peacekeeping operations (Russia, UN Doc. S/PV.6165: 25);
- iv. should harmonize the its agreed functions with the mechanisms at its disposal (Russia, UN Doc. S/PV.6224: 10);
- v. could enhance its capacity deploying regional organizations, international financial institutions and donors to be deployed in the subsequent stages of post-conflict peacebuilding (Russia, UN Doc. S/PV.6165: 25);
- vi. must focus more on activities that add value and have a real impact on the ground in the countries on its agenda (UK, UN Doc. S/PV.6954: 6);
- vii. should meet less frequently and with substantive agendas containing clear and necessary decisions to take (UK, UN Doc. S/PV.6954: 6); and
- viii. must continue to strengthen relationships with United Nations missions in those countries on its agenda (UK, UN Doc. S/PV.6954: 6).

The designation of what the PBC was able and not able to do have had direct impact on its improvement, as well as on its challenges over the first decade. At this point, I affirm that the permanent members of the UNSC started to confront the PBC in a more incisive manner, discrediting the body because it was not providing high quality evaluations on the countries under its agenda and also for having its added value diminished when compared to the role

played by the PBF. As the 2010 review of the PBA points out, the first five years of the architecture (2005-2010) has shown that the PBC “interaction with the Security Council has been limited and falls short of the expectations of 2005” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 4). Although Buerger (2011) has analyzed an open debate on peacebuilding held in January 2007 at the UNGA, UNSC-P5’s positioning does not differ while taking his assumptions to this analysis. Such debates reflect an “opportunity by PBC participants and others to justify and criticize what the PBC was doing. Such a debate is a valuable course of the narratives told about the practice of the commission, in terms of both what it had done and what it should do” (Buerger, 2011: 183).

Different from the 2015 review of the PBA (UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490), the 2010’s one had a section exclusively dedicated to the analysis of the PBC’s relationship with the UNSC, the UNGA and the ECOSOC. Within that section, the advisory group entitled a subsection – as *making space and earning space* – reflecting an issue of concern on how the PBC could enhance its role within the UN. In their point of view, the PBC “needs to be accorded more space within United Nations structures; and that, unless and until the Commission can more convincingly demonstrate its added value, the Security Council and other United Nations bodies will not see good reason to accord that space” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 26).

Although they argue that “these two [aforementioned] propositions should be viewed as either competitive or sequential” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 26), they explain that the problem appears to be twofold: on the one hand, they explicit on the 2010 review that “the Security Council perceives that the advice of the Commission does not provide much added value” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 27) and, for this reason, “if the role accorded by the Security Council to the Commission is perceived to be slight, the Commission is devalued” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 26). On the other hand, “the Commission does not provide more focused advice, in part because the Security Council does not make more specific requests” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 27), and, consequently, “if the Security Council is seen to attach real value to the Commission’s role, respect for the body is enhanced” (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 26). In this sense, the relationship between the PBC and the UNSC can be understood as a dilemma, in which enhancing the PBC’s role within the UN is a way of diminishing UNSC’s power on peace and security related issues; and that limiting

the PBC's role should revert to a UNSC's domain on peacebuilding, although "the Security Council is not always understood as a key peacebuilding actor" (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490: 23), as the 2015 review of the PBC points out. A consequence of such dilemma is an underused of the PBC on framing prospective countries for its Agenda and an under-representation of the PBC in UNSC discussion in comparison to other UN departments. As the 2010 review explains:


When the Security Council identifies a lead country in relation to the framing or renewal of a peacekeeping mandate, consultation could take place between the appropriate Peacebuilding Commission representative and the designated lead country. The head of the Peacebuilding Support Office could be invited to brief the Security Council in closed consultations in the same manner as the heads of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs or the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 27)

On this aspect, the 2015 review of the PBA complements the 2010's previous explanation, arguing that "the Commission should make its advice and support available to the Security Council in the formulation of peace operation mandates containing a strong peacebuilding aspect" (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490: 47). As the relationship between the UNSC and the PBC represents just one side of its involvement with the PBA in general, the role the UNSC played with regard to the PBF is also an issue of concern. Although the 2010 review points out that the PBF "was intended to be a first resort and to have a catalytic function that would trigger additional and longer-term funding" (UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: 36); the 2015 one reiterated much of the PBF's initial challenges, evidencing that it "alone is simply too small to achieve the impact required" (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490: 42). In this regard, I state that much of UNSC-P5's engagement with the PBA while limiting the PBC's achievements is also reflected on the amount of funding allocations they provided to the PBF. With the exception of the United Kingdom (UK), only China, France, Russia and the United States of America were far behind of investing on peacebuilding (Figure 6.1)

During the PBA's first decade, voluntary contributions to the PBF were of almost US\$ 672 million (MPTF-O, 2016). From this total, the UK alone provided US\$ 152 million; whereas China, France, Russia and the United States of America provided US\$ 27 million together (MPTF-O, 2016). The total amount from these four last mentioned UN-member states reflect that their engagement with peacebuilding deserves a special attention. Their support to the PBA is one of cynicism, since the "PBC proponents fell that some Council members are still

very reluctant to allow the PBC the larger role it could play” (Security Council Report, 2017: 12). Taking Security Council Report’s assumption into account, the reluctant aspect in which some UNSC-P5 had on enhancing the role of the PBA, in general, can be exemplified by their respective annual contributions. As funding allocations to the PBF started being registered by the MPTF-O from 2006⁸⁷, donations provided by China, France, Russia and the United States of America were not adequate for what it was designed to be and to achieve.

Figure 6.1. Consolidated funding contributions to the PBF by the UNSC-P5 (2006-2015)



Source: Based on the MPTF-O Gateway database.

As Table 6.1 evidences, the UK is the leading UNSC’s permanent member funding the PBF, despite the fact that it did not provide financial support in 2010. In contrast, its counterparts oscillated in a yearly basis. In a period comprised from 2006 to 2015, China, for example, established its funding to the PBF on amounts in between US\$ 1 million to US\$ 2 million; France donated twice, in 2007 and 2008, leaving the following years without financial support; Russia, in its turn, affirms that its donation to the PBF is of US\$ 2 million on an annual basis (UN Doc. S/PV.6396: 16; UN Doc. S/PV.6503: 8; UN Doc. S/PV.6643: 20;

⁸⁷ Based on the UNDP-MPTF Gateway database, PBF allocations in 2006 were provided by Austria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, India, Ireland, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Turkey (UNDP-MPTF, 2019).

UN Doc. S/PV.6805: 15; UN Doc. S/PV.7143: 18; UN Doc. S/PV.7359: 11). However, such amount per year only becomes possible if we split it based on the years that Russia provided more than US\$ 2 million to the PBF, as was the case in 2010, covering 2009; and 2014, which covered 2012 and 2013. But, in fact, Russia did not finance the PBF in 2006 and 2007. The United States of America, in comparison, is the only permanent member of the UNSC that supported the PBF only once during its entire first decade providing one allocation of US\$ 250 thousand in 2015.

Table 6.1. Annual funding contributions to the PBF by the UNSC’s permanent members

	China	France	Russia	UK	USA
2006					
2007	1.000.000	1.359.100		11.811.000	
2008	1.000.000	1.522.500	2.000.000	24.086.400	
2009	1.000.000			17.062.800	
2010	1.000.000		4.000.000		
2011			2.000.000	8.968.850	
2012	1.000.000			19.728.550	
2013	2.000.000			22.544.000	
2014			6.000.000	24.702.750	
2015	1.000.000		2.000.000	23.179.272	250.000

Source: Based on the MPTF-O Gateway database. Amounts in US\$.

These figure and table show a consolidated amount of funding to the PBF by the UNSC-P5 during its first decade of functioning, the data also reflect that they collectively started funding the PBF in 2007 (Table 6.1.). Such coincidence, nevertheless, reverberates on how Chinese, French, Russian and the United States positions only contributed to discrediting the PBA in general: on the one hand, not through adequately funding the PBF, which implied assisting a fewer number of post-conflict countries than it was expected; and, on the other hand, through limiting the PBC’s role on assisting post-conflict countries in their respective political transitions from intrastate war to peace. At this point, I bring again to the surface the Comoros’ and Côte d’Ivoire’s rejections to take part in the PBC Agenda. Rejecting their

requests suggest different framing processes within the PBA in which institutional decision-making is the determinant aspect of such segregation.

6.2. Making countries eligible for the PBC

The cases of Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire bring to the surface that differences regarding countries eligibility for the PBC Agenda reflect differences on framing post-conflict countries within the UN. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, becoming eligible for the PBC is a process of not only reinforcing the post-conflict label but also, most importantly, replacing it with another label that directly represents the framework a post-conflict country is included in. In this sense, not accepting Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire for the PBC Agenda is the same as replacing their label to *non-PBC* country, in face of their inclusion in the PBF. Nevertheless, as PBC's decision-making process⁸⁸ starts with requests by the UNGA, the UNSC, the ECOSOC, the UNSG and the country in question; in most of the situations, making countries eligible – and, then, replacing their label – is a decision embedded in a hegemonic practice by the UNSC.

In the scope of this thesis, the UNSC is taken as “the pre-eminent authoritative body within the UN system” (Knight, 2002: 19) due to two main reasons: first, it has the ability of expressing its power through making decisions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter⁸⁹ (Smith, 2006: 163); and, second, “if the UNSC decided something – to impose sanctions against a country or to enforce a ceasefire in a conflict area – the order would have to be implemented” (Hanhimäki, 2008: 51). Since UNSC's decisions are binding on the entire membership of the UN (Smith, 2006: 163), such perspective enables not only a comprehension of its role with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN, 1945), but as limiting other UN bodies' role. The perspective that the UNSC limits other UN bodies' role follows Reinalda and Verbeek's contribution. They argue that “when states create international organizations, they delegate authority in certain areas to them and engage in a principal-agent relationship in which they are the principals” (2004: 21).

⁸⁸ At the UN level, Smith (2006) points out that there are five formal arenas of decision-making: the UNGA, the UNSC, the ECOSOC, specialized agencies and Global Conferences.

⁸⁹ Chapter 7 of the UN Charter refer to “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”, comprising Articles 39 to 51 (UN, 1945).

Such relationship, however, is essential for understanding how decision-making within international organizations are structured. For comprehending why there is a pre-eminence of some organizational bodies over others⁹⁰ with regard to decision-making process, Reinalda and Verbeek elucidate three main aspects of such dynamic: first, the recognition that the policy autonomy of an international organization is embedded in a tense relationship between international organizations and their member states; second, that a pragmatic attitude towards the rationalist/constructivist divide in international relations may be fruitful in producing empirical studies; and, third, that the study of decision-making within international organizations is best served by modest theoretical claims regarding contingent empirical phenomena (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 21). In this sense, decisions regarding countries eligibility for the PBC do not pertain to a particular model and they are embedded within an international organizations approach. They can be of three types, following Reinalda and Verbeek:

- i. a process of phases or a ‘barrier model’, where an issue goes from preparation to decision and to implementation, or from agenda setting through deliberation on causes and alternative solutions to voting on a preferred solution;
- ii. a combination of temporal streams or ‘garbage cans’, in which problems, solutions, decision makers and choice opportunities come together as a result of being simultaneously available; and
- iii. as rounds of decisions, in which problems and solutions are relevant by the time a participant in the process, such as an initiator, broker or facilitator, is available to play such a role. (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 14-15)

In their contribution, all these three types mentioned above enable understanding PBC’s decision-making through a principal-agent analysis, which involves “ongoing processes of public decision making and the creation of international principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, referred to as international standard setting and law making” (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 15). Considering the analysis’ timeframe of this thesis (2005-2015), the UNSC is the main UN actor responsible for suggesting and deciding which country should be under the auspices of the PBC. This view of the UNSC’s role is

⁹⁰ For an analysis on power, see: Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), Dahl (1957), Barach and Baratz (1962), Parsons (1963), Lukes (1974), Hindess (1982), Layder (1985), Stewart (2001), Russel (2004[1938]), Nye (2011).

corroborated by an interviewee's statement, which reiterated that "there was no request or recommendation provided by the General Assembly during that period" (P-4) nor other UN body. Following a recommendation from the UNSC means that it "is not mandatory, but voluntary action taken by the concerned states. The Security Council can encourage, and the request is not like a demand, a condition, which is up to convey, which make countries think and act on the way that they find they need a support" (P-4). Being mandatory or not, the request provided by the UNSC worked as an influencer to five of the six countries included in the PBC Agenda and, in my perspective, defined the internal rules of the PBC's working methods in its beginning (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180). Taking UNSC's role for granted, such hegemony over the PBC is explained by Jenkins (2013), who points out that while the PBC aims to prevent countries from returning to war, this purpose is supposed to be done by "maintaining a 'watching brief' on countries placed on its agenda, much as the Security Council does with countries situations of which it 'remains seized'" (Jenkins, 2013: 3).

According to Jenkins, the role played by the Security Council in the PBC is similar to the construction of another agenda dedicated to 'keeping an eye' on concerned countries through a different institutionalized angle. Notwithstanding, how and why the UNSC became the centre in the PBC's decision-making model? To understand these two aspects – how and why – it is important to describe the process in which the dynamic became dependent upon the role of the UNSC. The UNSC expressed its advice regarding specific countries to be considered for the Peacebuilding Commission after those countries have presented their formal request for the PBC through a letter sent to the UNSG or to the President of the UNGA for UNSC's approval. The five countries the UNSC suggested in ten years of the PBC – Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone – followed this internal procedure. Their respective letters of request attested that there was a need for being among the first beneficiary countries to count on the PBC's support in face of the challenge of consolidating peace after the armed conflict and of promoting security and development (Burundi, 2006; Sierra Leone, 2006; Guinea Bissau, 2007; Liberia, 2010; UN Doc. A/62/864-S/2008/383).

6.2.1. Explaining PBC's decision-making process

Besides the hegemonic practice of the UNSC on deciding countries eligibility for the PBC, its role reflects another important element in this internal dynamic, characterized by its political influence in making decisions. As was pointed out by one interviewee, “the decision to include countries in the PBC’s Agenda is totally embedded into a political criterion, [which means] that the Security Council is the only one capable of suggesting and deciding which country should be included in the PBC” (UN-s3, 2018). Such statement suggests two main co-constitutive features of this dynamic: on the one hand, the Security Council is the main and unique actor responsible for limiting or expanding the agenda of the PBC to six countries in ten years since its creation in 2005; and, on the other hand, the absence of any request by any other UN bodies other than the Security Council supports the perspective that this body has also limited the role other PBC’s constituent members were expected to have. As McAskie rightly points out, “although this was not mentioned in the resolution, the Security Council decided that they would manage requests from client countries and then pass them on, in this way confirming the subsidiary/advisory role of the PBC” (2016: xxx).

With the decision-making process politically dependent on the Security Council, including countries under the PBC Agenda became an exclusive “New York-based practice”, also involving the concerned PBC-country through their respective Permanent Representative Missions to the United Nations. This New York-based perspective lays on the fact that the process of communicating through “letters of request” as a requisite for being considered for the PBC’s Agenda reflects the purpose why UN-Member States’ Permanent Missions were established in New York: to work “as the focal points of such interaction, transmitting policy influences from government to the Organisation and vice versa, but not necessarily in the role of passive transmission belts” (Appathurai, 1985: 95). Although Appathurai’s contribution dates from 1985, it is still a valid one since it explains the reasons that pertain to the dynamic in the relationship between the Permanent Missions and the UN. The interaction he mentions is based on the following reasons: first, the presence of these Missions “in one place makes it easier for them to follow developments, trends and opinions at the global level as they are reflected in the Organisation” (Appathurai, 1985: 96); second, national governments perceive the need for participating “in the deliberations and activities of the United Nations more actively than through simple membership to it” (Appathurai,

1985: 95). Besides the participation on the annual sessions of the General Assembly, which is the third reason mentioned by the author; the fourth one refers to their engagement with the Security Council, attesting that “the negotiation of the security interests of states results in round-the-clock, behind the scenes consultations and bargaining which goes well beyond the confines of the Council’s limited membership” (Appathurai, 1985: 97).

The reasons mentioned by Appathurai (1985) and the explanations regarding the role played by the Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York enable a better understanding of the PBC’s model of decision-making process and the role played by the Security Council on this issue. Since the PBC remained limited only to six countries under its agenda, the process of requesting their inclusion can be analyzed through the existence of three different groups of countries and their respective negotiation process with the SC based on the official records available through the PBC’s documentation. These groups are constituted by: i) countries that were the first ones to be included in the PBC, as was the case of Burundi and Sierra Leone both in 2006, which followed a referral from the Security Council and also served “as a test case for much of the institutional set-up of the new body, including the format and content of the PBC’s instruments of engagement” (Cavalcante, 2016: 145); ii) countries that were first eligible for funding by the PBF and were later included in the PBC Agenda, also following a referral from the Security Council, such were the cases of Guinea-Bissau in 2007, Central African Republic in 2008 and Liberia in 2010; and iii) the case of Guinea, in 2011, which was the unique and last country to be included in the PBC Agenda that requested its inclusion without having UNSC’s advise on that matter.

In this sense, what makes a country eligible for the PBC is the most intriguing question not only for this thesis, but also within the UN. Since eligibility was conceived as the starting point for this research, Cavalcante argues that “there is no clearly defined criteria or guidelines to orient the selection of those countries and the decision is thus essentially political” (2019: 248). The process of the six countries included in the PBC’s first decade (2005-2015) suggests a political perspective that guided countries’ requests, and UNSC’s decision on making them eligible to the PBC.

6.2.2. The politics behind countries inclusion in the PBC Agenda

Burundi and Sierra Leone were the first two countries included in the PBC Agenda, reflecting “a politicised issue among PBC members and the Secretariat, one that would be discussed in private rather than in open meetings” (Cavalcante, 2019: 249). Although the politicization is seen on Burundi’s and Sierra Leone’s inclusion, it can be expanded for analysis on how the other four countries became eligible for the PBC. The Sierra Leone’s process started on 27 February 2006, when the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed a letter to the UNGA in order to ask to be considered “among its first country-specific operations” (Sierra Leone, 2006) for the Peacebuilding Commission. In that letter, the permanent representative of Sierra Leone at that time, Ambassador Joe Robert Pemagbi, argued that “Sierra Leone experienced a violent armed conflict from 1991 to 2002, and is now going through a post-conflict recovery process” (Sierra Leone, 2006) and, despite the fact that “numerous formidable challenges remain in the way of the recovery process, [there is a] need [for] the support of the Peace Building Commission” (Sierra Leone, 2006). On 15 June 2006, the president of the Security Council was invited by the UNSG to make a statement at the constituting meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission scheduled for 23 June 2006 (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/2) and, in response to such invitation, a letter addressed by the UNSC to the UNSG on 21 June 2006 expressed the UNSC’s decision on requesting the advice of the PBC on the situation in Sierra Leone (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/2). On 13 July 2006 (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.2), during a PBC-OC’s meeting, Sierra Leone was officially approved as the first PBC-country within the UN.

The same request by Burundi reflects different levels of negotiations within the organization: first, through negotiations to place Burundi into the PBC Agenda during a meeting on 26 January 2006 with members of the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Advisory Group, when the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Burundi, Antoniette Batumubwira, argued on behalf of submitting country’s request (Burundi, 2006); second, on 13 April 2006, when the President of that country, Pierre Nkurunziza, addressed a letter to the UNSG emphasizing the national government’s desire of being among the first beneficiaries of the PBC (Burundi, 2006); and, third, through a letter by permanent representative of Burundi at that time, Joseph Ntakirutimana, on 8 June 2006 (Burundi, 2006) that reinforced these two previous negotiations. On his letter, the Ambassador stressed

out that a protocol of agreement had been signed on 24 May 2006 with the National Government and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on the priorities to be submitted to the PBC. Although their respective requests reflected a national desire, the consolidation of Burundi's and Sierra Leone's processes of being included in the PBC were achieved only when the UNSC deliberated on their behalf and for their benefit. On a letter from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General dated on 21 June 2006, the UNSC stated that, for being "one of the main recipients of advice from the Peacebuilding Commission (...) [it] would like to request the advice (...) on the situations in Burundi and Sierra Leone" (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/2). On 13 July 2006 (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.2), during a PBC-OC's meeting, Burundi was officially approved as another of the first PBC-countries within the UN.

The third country to be included in the PBC Agenda was Guinea-Bissau. Its negotiation process started on 11 July 2007 (Guinea-Bissau, 2007) when the national government addressed a letter to the former UNSG Ban Ki-Moon highlighting Guinea-Bissau's interests in correcting its "weak governance practices" (Guinea-Bissau, 2007) to avoid the "risk of continuing in a downward spiral" (Guinea-Bissau, 2007). That same document was forwarded to the UNSC on 26 July 2007, and Guinea-Bissau's request was approved by the UNSC on 11 December 2007, as became expressed on a letter of that day (UN Doc. A/62/736-S/2007/744), in which the UNSC supported its request and invited the PBC "to provide advice on the situation in Guinea-Bissau" (UN Doc. A/62/736-S/2007/744). In a PBC-OC's meeting on 19 December 2007, Guinea-Bissau was officially included in the PBC Agenda (UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.5).

Part of the reasoning behind the inclusion of Guinea-Bissau in the PBC Agenda and, consequently, its approved request, is due to the fact that, first, the UNSC was concerned "with the fragility of the democratization process in Guinea-Bissau as well as persistent economic and social crisis" (UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/38: 2); second, the UNSC believed that there was a need for "a holistic approach in resolving the complex and multidimensional situation facing Guinea-Bissau" (UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/38: 2); and, third, as it is related to what the former UNSG Ban Ki-Moon pointed out with regard to a joint work between the PBC and the United Nations Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) while explaining that the extension of the UNOGBIS mandate for an additional year, until December 2008 would

“allow the Office to continue to assist Guinea-Bissau as it confronts the challenges of peacebuilding and strives to bring political stabilization” (UN Doc. S/2007/700).

The process of including the Central African Republic (CAR) and Liberia in the PBC Agenda did not reflect a similar negotiation process or UN position about the role played by any UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) or Special Political Mission (SPM) on these respective countries taking the Bissau-Guinean case for comparison, although there were PKOs⁹¹ on the ground at the time of CAR’s and Liberia’s requests to the PBC. Regarding the CAR’s process, the national government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and Francophonie, requested the country’s inclusion in the PBC agenda on 6 March 2008 (UN Doc. A/62/864–S/2008/383). Such request was later forwarded to the UNSC on 10 April 2008, which was conveyed for approval by the UNSC on 30 May 2008 (UN Doc. A/62/864–S/2008/383). As the PBC-OS’s Chairperson at that time pointed out, “by conveying its acceptance of that request, the Security Council was inviting the Peacebuilding Commission to provide advice on the situation in the Central African Republic” (UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.6, page 2). It is clear that *inviting the PBC to provide advice* represents an attempt practice of exercising power within the PBC through a control measure of deciding which country is eligible for the PBC and which is not. On 3 June 2008, all members of the PBC-OC were informed that the Commission would respond promptly to the request from the UNSC and, during a PBC-OC’s meeting on 12 June 2008, CAR was officially placed on the agenda of the PBC (UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.6).

On Liberia’s inclusion, the process initiated on 27 May 2010. Following instructions from the national government, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations, represented by Ambassador Marjon V. Kamara, addressed a letter to UNSG Ban Ki-moon on that day requesting the PBC’s support on including Liberia as the fifth country of its agenda, based on the argument that the national government “is convinced that an engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission is timely and would be catalytic in enabling

⁹¹ The peacekeeping operation that was taking place at the Central African Republic (CAR) when that country requested its inclusion in the PBC Agenda was the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) which started on 25 September 2007 (UN Doc. S/RES/1778 (2007)) and remained until 31 December 2010 (UN Doc. S/RES1923(2010)). In the case of Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established on 19 September 2003 (UN Doc. S/RES/1509(2003)) and remained in the country until 17 September 2015, when UNMIL completed the transfer of security responsibilities to Liberian authorities (UN Doc. S/RES/2239(2015)).

Government to operationalize plans for reform” (Liberia, 2010). That letter was forwarded to the UNSC on 14 June 2010 and was conveyed for approval on 19 July 2010, through a letter addressed by the UNSC to the PBC-OC (UN Doc. A/64/870–S/2010/389) arguing that Liberia’s request is “an important step on the country’s, and indeed the region’s, path to stability and lasting peace” (UN Doc. A/64/870–S/2010/389). After the official approval from the UNSC, Liberia was placed in the PBC Agenda during a PBC-OC’s meeting on 16 September 2010 (UN Doc. PBC/4/OC/SR.2).

The sixth and last country to be placed in the PBC Agenda was Guinea. Since its process did not depend on the UNSC’s approval, as pointed out by an interviewee, “from the six countries included in the period from 2005 to 2015, only one [Guinea] requested its [own] inclusion, [while] the other five followed a recommendation from the Security Council” (P-4). Guinea was the case in which two request letters were sent directly to the Peacebuilding Commission, and there was no intermediate process in which the UNGA, the UNSG or the ECOSOC could interfere. The first letter was addressed on 21 October 2010 by the Ministry of State, Bakary Fofana, emphasizing that, in face of the fragility of peace, the national government requested Guinea’s inclusion in the PBC Agenda while asking for support on advice and accompaniment on its recovery process and peacebuilding (Guinea, 2010). The second letter was addressed by Edouard Niankoye Lama, from the *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et des Guinéens de l’Étranger*, on 24 January 2011. On that document, he evidences the negotiation between the government of Guinea, through its Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, with the Peacebuilding Commission, as was stated on a letter from the PBC addressed to the government of Guinea on 30 December 2010 in response to its initial interest of being placed in the PBA Agenda in October 2010 (Guinea, 2011). On 23 February 2011, Guinea was included in the PBC Agenda after a consultation with its Permanent Mission and the PBC’s Organizational Committee (UN, 2011a), as became expressed in a note from the Chair of the PBC-OC on 2 March 2011.

The process of including these six countries under the PBC Agenda is not limited only to a discussion on a dynamic based on country’s request and Security Council’s approval, as it is summarised on Table 6.2. It goes beyond this internal procedure showing PBC’s forms of engagement in its first decade, but most importantly, it reflects an intrinsic character of the PBC: its political constituency in deciding which country should be included in its Agenda.

Table 6.2. Decision-making process of including countries in the PBC Agenda (2005-2010)

	<i>Country's requests</i>		<i>UNSC approval</i>	<i>PBC's inclusion</i>
Burundi	8 June 2006 <i>Permanent Mission addresses a letter to the UNGA requesting inclusion in the PBC</i>	15 June 2006 <i>The UNGA invited the President of the UNSC to make a statement at a meeting of the PBC</i>	21 June 2006 <i>The UNSC requests the advice of the PBC on the situations in Burundi</i>	23 June 2006 <i>Upon requests by Burundi and the UNSC, the PBC selected Burundi for PBC Agenda</i>
Sierra Leone	27 Feb 2006 <i>Letter addressed by the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the UNGA requesting country's inclusion</i>	15 June 2006 <i>The UNGA invited the UNSC to make a statement at the constituting meeting of the PBC</i>	21 June 2006 <i>The UNSC requests the advice of the PBC on the situations in Sierra Leone</i>	23 June 2006 <i>Upon requests by Sierra Leone and the UNSC, the PBC selected Sierra Leone for PBC Agenda</i>
Guinea-Bissau	11 Jul 2007 <i>Letter addressed by the Prime Minister to the UNSG requesting country's inclusion in the PBC</i>		11 Dec 2007 <i>UNSC addresses a letter to the PBC-OC's Chair accepting Guinea-Bissau's request</i>	19 Dec 2007 <i>Guinea-Bissau configuration was established initially consisting of members of the PBC-OC</i>
CAR	6 Mar 2008 <i>The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the CAR addressed a letter to the Chair of the PBC-OC</i>	10 Apr 2008 <i>The letter addressed to the Chair of the PBC-OC is forwarded to the UNSC</i>	30 May 2008 <i>The UNSC supports CAR's request and invites the PBC to provide advice</i>	12 June 2008 <i>The Chair of the PBC informed that the PBC-OC decided for placing the CAR in the PBC Agenda</i>
Liberia	27 May 2010 <i>Permanent Mission of Liberia addresses a letter to the UNGA requesting country's inclusion in the PBC</i>	14 June 2010 <i>Letter of 27 May 2010 is forwarded to the UNSC for approval</i>	19 Jul 2010 <i>The UNSC addresses a letter to the Chair of the PBC supporting Liberia's request</i>	16 Sep 2010 <i>The Chair of the PBC-OC conveying its support on placing Liberia on the PBC</i>
Guinea	21 Oct 2010 <i>The Ministry of State addresses the 1st letter to the Chair of the PBC requesting Guinea's inclusion</i>	24 Jan 2011 <i>The Permanent Mission of Guinea addresses the 2nd letter to the PBC-OC with the same request</i>		23 Feb 2011 <i>PBC-OC's Chair addresses a letter to the Permanent Mission informing that Guinea is placed on the PBC</i>

Source: Burundi (2006), Sierra Leone (2006), Guinea-Bissau (2007), Liberia (2010), Guinea (2010, 2011), UN (2008, 2011), UN Doc's. PBC/1/OC/2, A/62/864-S/2008/383, A/62/736-S/2007/744, A/64/870-S/2010/389.

When Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire requested their inclusions in the PBC in 2008, they were asking for a different form of engagement with the international community through political advice in their respective transitional phases for peace. Since their requests work as a guide in understanding how the PBC made its concerned countries eligible for peace, not selecting them reflects the segregation derived from an obscured decision-making process. And the reason for opening the 'black box' of the PBA's decision-making becomes an important aspect for comprehending what counted for making some countries eligible for the PBC instead of others. Although the PBC has been created for filling in a gap in the institutional machinery with regard to peacebuilding, the collective perception that it could benefit all *post-conflict countries* or all *countries emerging from conflict* was a fallacy. Based on an official document of the PBC, only Côte d'Ivoire is referred as having officially requested its inclusion in the PBC Agenda in 2008 (UN Doc. A/63/92-S/2008/417, para. 17; Security Council Report, 2008: 9), while Comoros is referred only through a review of the PBF (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 35). Nevertheless, in both cases, UN staff reiterated that Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire were the only countries that were officially rejected by the PBC. As was stated officially, Côte d'Ivoire's request for the PBC "was conveyed to the Security Council for consideration on 25 April 2008 [and such] request was also brought to the attention of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretary-General" (UN Doc. A/63/92-S/2008/417: 4). This did not mean that such attention conferred a role played by them on deciding if Côte d'Ivoire or any other country would be placed in the PBC Agenda. As it is clear, *conveyed to the Security Council for consideration* implies on whom the decision holds to, even though the case of Guinea represents the only exception on this issue. In face of Comoros' and Côte d'Ivoire's rejections, their requests confronted the political character of this advisory body in guiding the principles of the new UN entity; the decision behind which country is eligible or not to engage with the PBC reflects also what the label "post-conflict country" entails as a guiding principle to the dynamic within the UN.

6.3. Making countries eligible for the PBF

While the engagement with the PBC had been structured mainly in a decision made by the Security Council; the functioning of the PBF and its respective beneficiaries is centered in the UNSG. Although the PBF defines its process as a "two-tier decision-making" (MTPF-

O, 2018: online) regarding the type of funding ceiling countries can access, I include the process of making a country eligible to access those funds as the first tier in this decision-making dynamic, enlarging the process from *two* to *three*-tier. In order to explain this three-tier decision-making process, the case of Comoros' and Côte d'Ivoire's rejected requests to the PBC constitutes a good example. The reason for putting Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire in the center of this analysis allows explaining that, on the one hand, being a post-conflict country does not guarantee any engagement with the PBC and, on the other hand, analyzing the PBF requires an explanation on how it works through its decision-making processes.

As previously stated, Côte d'Ivoire's request to the PBC was conveyed to the Security Council for consideration on April 2008 (UN Doc. A/63/92–S/2008/417: 4) and, for being rejected for such inclusion, this country became diverted exclusively into the PBF. Despite the fact that Comoros was also directed to the PBF, there is no official information on when it submitted its request for UNSC consideration. However, what makes a country eligible to the PBF instead of the PBC? Before answering this question, it is important to highlight that the eligibility criteria to the PBF is divided in two periods considering the revision of its PBF-ToR in 2008 and 2009 (UN Doc. A/60/984; UN Doc. A/63/818). The reason for working with these periods of analysis is because the fund changed its forms of engagement and designed its own model of decision-making. The first period is marked by a *three-window architecture* segregating funds for PBC and non-PBC countries and for emergency needs, known as window I, window II and window III, respectively. The second period is characterized by the transformation of these windows into only two, identified as *Immediate Response Facility* (PBF-IRF) and *Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility* (PBF-PRF), which are the current ones applied by the PBA. These current facilities, respectively, expanded and turned Window III into a more agile emergency relief (PBF-IRF); whereas windows I and II were merged into the same framework (PBF-PRF).

6.3.1. The First PBF's eligibility criteria: three-windows for defining emergency needs

Before the first revision of the PBF-ToR, the access to PBF's funds was done through a "three-window architecture". This modality comprised on making countries eligible

following their position based on: i) their engagement as a country under consideration by the Peacebuilding Commission in a sense of belonging to its Agenda; ii) countries declared eligible by the Secretary-General and iii) countries declared eligible for receiving funds in face of urgent peacebuilding activities (UN Docs. A/62/138: 3; A/63/218–S/2008/522: 3). For each one of these categories, there was a specific window of opportunity to provide access to PBF’s funds expressed as window I, window II and window III, respectively, as viewed on Table 6.3. This distinction created a cleavage between the PBC and the PBF: on the one hand, countries under the PBC’s Agenda had priority in receiving PBF’s funds; on the other hand, countries outside the PBC’s Agenda faced the challenge of being categorized under one or another form of engagement, such as window II or window III.

Table 6.3. PBF’s ‘Three-Windows Architecture’

Window I	Window II	Window III
Designed for countries under consideration by the Peacebuilding Commission	Designed for countries declared eligible by the UN Secretary-General	Designed for countries with emergency peacebuilding activities

Source: UN Doc. A/62/138.

While these last two opportunities reflected the Secretary-General’s decision, the process of “becoming eligible” consisted in having the project reviewed by the PBSO, which was – and still is – responsible “to assess if country criteria and Fund terms of reference requirements were met” (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 6). Nevertheless, the process was not always structured in a formal basis as expressed previously. As the Second Report of the UNSG on the PBF highlights, the Fund was “increasingly” used by the Secretary-General “to support countries he had visited or who had approached him directly for support” (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 13). The document also expresses that “this strategy resulted in six additional countries being declared eligible for funding by the Secretary-General (Window II) and the identification of seven emergency window projects” (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 13). This fact evidences that the PBF started playing an autonomous role in negotiating countries’ inclusion under the auspices of the Peacebuilding Architecture, but without declaring them eligible for engaging with the PBC, as highlights Table 6.3. Such divergence in dealing with post-conflict countries through formal and informal decision-making processes within the PBF enabled it to play a different role in the peacebuilding

scenario. The PBF became the first known PBA’s framework outside of New York, reiterating to what a diplomat declared during an interview, that “in the field, no one knows about the PBC” (D-22)⁹².

Table 6.4. Countries under PBF’s “three-window architecture” (2007-2009)

	Window I	Window II	Window III
2007	Burundi Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone		Central African Republic Côte d’Ivoire Guinea Liberia
2008	Burundi Sierra Leone	Côte d’Ivoire Liberia	Burundi Haiti Timor-Leste
2009	Central African Republic Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone	Comoros Guinea-Bissau Liberia Nepal	Burundi Sierra Leone Somalia

Source: Based on the official Gateway platform of the MPTF-O (2016).

Despite this fact, some of the first PBF’s beneficiary countries did request their inclusion in the PBC. This evidence lays on the list of countries financed by the PBF through formal and informal decision-making processes during this first period of eligibility until the end of 2009. As shown in Table 6.4, PBF’s dynamic emphasizes that the eligibility criteria defined in its early years worked as an understanding of different framing perspectives within the PBC. In this regard, I state that:

- i. the process of requesting PBF’s funds and getting Secretary-General’s approval was first considered by some countries before their requests to become part of the PBC Agenda, as was the case of the Central African Republic, Guinea and Liberia when they were eligible for PBF-Window III in 2007;
- ii. on that same year, Côte d’Ivoire became eligible for the PBF, receiving fund under Window III, the same Central African Republic, Guinea and Liberia were eligible for;

⁹² Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

- iii. in a similar situation as Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros started receiving funding by the PBF in 2009, and were eligible for PBF under Window II, same as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Nepal; and
- iv. other countries that were cogitated to become PBC-ones, as the case of Haiti, Nepal and Timor-Leste, are also identified while engaging with the PBF alone, emphasizing that they were, at a certain moment in time, declared eligible by the SG for this Fund.


This first period of defining country eligibility for the PBF is central in comprehending the constructed dynamic within the PBA. Nevertheless, the change on defining forms of engagement represent the co-constitutive aspect of the decision-making process as mentioned in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The co-constitutive aspect refers to the improvement of criteria; the enlargement of the rules agreed by the parts in the process; the identification of the purposes of the bodies involved in the PBA; and, most importantly, the recipient's perception of the PBF when presenting their request, as a result of their way of talking back to the institution through their individual and collective behavior.

6.3.2. The Second PBF's eligibility criteria: in between the Immediate and Recovery Facilities

When the PBSO reviewed the PBF-ToR in 2009 (UN Doc. A/63/818), the initial model of requesting its financial support changed. The previously defined "three-window architecture" became disseminated as two distinct modalities of financing: Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PBF-PRF) and Immediate Response Facility (PBF-IRF) (UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419). Those modalities were defined by the PBF as a "two-tier decision-making process". In this thesis I name it a "three-tier decision-making process", referring to PBF's funds eligibility criteria *per se*. While this change had the purpose of improving the relationship with the PBC and making the PBF more catalytic, this model represented a way of improving the Fund's performance through two axes: on the one hand, it enabled a "greater operational responsiveness, increased effectiveness and efficiency and enhanced synergy between the Fund and the Peacebuilding Commission" (UN Doc. A/RES/63/282: 1) and, on the other hand, it reached "its role in filling the critical funding gaps (...) benefiting from the strategic advice of Government, civil society and United Nations

leadership in countries” (UN Doc. A/65/353: 3). At this first stage, as represented in Figure 6.2, the process of eligibility is discussed and agreed by the United Nations Country Team⁹³ (UNCT) of the concerned country, non-resident UN officials and advisers, the Government and the other development partners (PBF, 2018).

Figure 6.2. First layer of the PBF’s decision-making – the eligibility criteria



Source: PBF (2018).

The process involves different phases: it comprises the involvement of the country level stakeholders in providing consultation on the suitability of the country eligibility for the PBF to, then, submit it to the PBSO through the Senior Resident UN Representative. At the PBSO

⁹³ The UNCT is composed of representatives of the UN funds and programmes, specialized agencies and other UN entities in a given country, including non-resident agencies (NRAs) and representatives of the Breton Woods institutions (UN, 2016).

level, there are two internal processes: first, the request is reviewed and, second, the PBSO prepares an internal assessment for eligibility, which is informed to the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF-O) and to the Senior Peacebuilding Group-Peacebuilding Contact Group (SPG-PCG)⁹⁴. The SPG is convened only if necessary to engage with this decision-making process. After completing the assessment, the PBSO holds the Proposal Assessment Committee (PAC) meeting. This meeting is the core of the process while it is responsible to decide, preliminary, if the eligibility is to be approved or rejected. As Figure 6.2 shows, the PAC's decision guides the decision of the Assistant-Secretary General of the PBSO. If a country becomes eligible, then the PBSO prepares a country file presenting the case to the UN Secretary-General for formal declaration of eligibility. After the UNSG's decision, the PBSO informs the Senior UN Representative, the PBC Chair, the SPG/PCG, the MPTF and the Permanent Mission of the respective country. In contrast, if the PAC decides to reject the country, this decision is informed by the PBSO to the Senior UN Representative and national authorities, the SPG, the MPTF and the PBC.

What became evident in this process is that no matter what the final decision is regarding the country's approval or rejection for the PBF, the PBC is not involved in the decision-making process. In both situations, the PBC is only informed of the result by the PBSO. Although a country in the PBC Agenda is automatically eligible for PBF's funds, the process to request those funds follows a different path: the PBSO prepares a country file to be presented to the UNSG for formal declaration of eligibility of the project, not the country. In this process, the PBC Chair is expected to have "a more direct involvement in the elaboration of or quality assurance" (PBF, 2018) of the project in question. When a country becomes eligible for the PBF, the second phase relates to the internal evaluation of making its project or program eligible for one of the funds available: IRF or PRF. Each of these PBF's funds has its own target countries, diverging not only in scope, as highlights Table 6.5, but also in terms of the aspects considered for the peacebuilding, such as period of implementation, institutions involved and amount of financial support. The scope determines not only aspects related to the immediate or structural peacebuilding plan, but also establishes an internal criterion regarding both the period for implementing the project as well as the amount of money requested.

⁹⁴ The SPG is chaired by the ASG for Peacebuilding Support, and includes DPKO, DPA, DFS, DESA, DOCO, OCHA, UNDP, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, World Bank and the Secretary of the SG's Policy Committee. It meets at the ASG or comparable level (PBF, 2013c: 11).

Table 6.5. Scope of the PBF’s funding instruments

Scope	
IRF	Designed to jumpstart immediate peacebuilding and recovery needs and being flexible and fast funding tool for single or multiple projects.
PRF	Designed to support a structured peacebuilding process, driven by national actors based on a joint analysis of needs with the international community.

Source: MPTF-O (2016).

On this issue, the decision-making process for each of the PBF’s funds distinguishes: i) up to US\$3 million and up to US\$ 15 million for PBF-IRF; and ii) more than US\$ 15 million for PBF-PRF, as highlights Table 6.6. Depending on the amount of money, the first declared eligibility enables a country to access one fund or another. At this point, the criteria established to both PBF’s funds made its process pragmatic. I call it pragmatic referring to the requirements countries must meet in order to become eligible by the Secretary General and, consequently, have the right to access PBF’s funds.

Table 6.6. The PBF’s layer by financial support


PBF	Financial support	Process	Duration of the Plan
IRF	Up to US\$ 3 mi	No eligibility required. Decision by the PBSO	6 - 18 months
IRF	Up to US\$ 15 mi	Eligibility required. Decision by the UNSG	6 - 18 months
PRF	Above US\$ 15 mi	Eligibility required. Decision by the UNSG	18 - 36 months

Source: Based on MPTF-O (2016).

To both processes, PBF-IRF and PBF-PRF, a country must present a project or peacebuilding program proposal based on the context it is inserted in. In this regard, this proposal must highlight its context, considering the:

- i. critical peacebuilding needs;
- ii. critical peacebuilding opportunities;
- iii. commitment of national authorities and stakeholders regarding the peace process and in addressing the identified conflict factors and triggers;
- iv. availability of external funds and potential for strategic leverage of PBF resources;

Figure 6.3. Second layer of the PBF's decision-making – the IRF criteria




Source: PBF (2018).

- v. the positive role that the UN can play in the country to address the peacebuilding issues;
- vi. a level of lapsing or relapsing into conflict or being recently post-conflict; and
- vii. a peace agreement in place and at crucial cross-roads for peace (PBSO, 2014).

However, submitting a proposal for accessing PBF's funds does not ensure its approval by the PBSO. The eligibility process of a country represents the first tier, submitting a project for PBF-IRF or PBF-PRF is one more internal procedure in legitimizing the second and third layers of the PBF's decision-making process, respectively. In this second stage, both models regarding the types of funds – Figures 6.3 and 6.4 – highlight the centrality of the decision with the PBSO through the PAC meeting. PAC's decisions include i) rejecting, ii) approving with conditions or iii) simply approving the peacebuilding plan. Whereas the IRF's model – Figure 6.3 – is centered in the role played by the Senior UN Representative and national authorities with the involvement of the Recipient UN Organization (RUNO), which is responsible for implementing the project; the PRF's model – Figure 6.4 – depends exclusively on the role played by the Joint Steering Committee (JSC), which is an enlarged version of the initial structure of those involved in the designing a project under the IRF funding. The JSC is defined as a platform for engaging national and international stakeholders in peacebuilding, which is co-chaired by the Senior UN Representative and a senior government representative with key government, UN, civil society and development partner representatives, including the European Union (EU), World Bank (WB) and bilateral donors, with no more than 8 to 10 members (MPTF-O, 2016).

In both processes, the PBC is not involved, only informed of the final decision regarding each country PBF allocation or, unless the process relates to any project requested by a PBC-country to be funded by the PBF. Whereas the eligibility criteria of the PBC is based on a political decision – which has implications for the categorization of countries under the post-conflict label – the PBF's is characterized initially by a dynamic of different stakeholders at the country level. When the PBF determines that the reality on the ground must be considered as criteria for eligibility based on the aforementioned factors, it diverges completely from the PBC for being guided by locally owned projects. This means that the PBF is closer to a bottom-up approach than the PBC, although it still depends on decisions at the top level within the PBSO. This decision-making model encompasses a three-tier process. In each layer, the PBF contributed to institutionalize countries' categorization within the PBA.


Figure 6.4. Third layer of the PBF’s decision-making – the PRF criteria



Source: PBF (2018).

This assumption becomes evident based on the role played by the PBSO in this process, in which it may refer to renowned public sources and publications to assess countries’ fragility, including those produced by the UN (MPTF-O, 2016) to support its decision on the projects submitted related to countries emerging from violent conflict or at risk of lapsing or relapsing into violent conflict. On this issue, the Fifth UNSG’s report on the PBF (UN Doc. A/66/659) is the only official document that attests PBSO’s performance on its decision-making process concerning the percentage of projects examined by the Peacebuilding Support Office Appraisal Committee on 2010 and 2011, as Figure 6.5 highlights below.

Figure 6.5. PBSO performance on PBF’s decision-making process in 2010 and 2011*



Source: UN Doc. A/66/659.

In my perspective, the UNSG’s report on the PBF provided such analysis based on the fact that there was a correlation of *timely decisions* to the *quality of proposals* (UN Doc. A/66/659: 26). As the report states, “although the level of allocations increased significantly in 2010 and 2011, the Fund has improved its ability to make decisions quickly” (UN Doc. A/66/659: 26). The report also adds that “in 2011, 70 per cent of decisions made by the Peacebuilding Support Office Appraisal Committee were made within four weeks, compared with the target of three weeks” (UN Doc. A/66/659: 26), which means that four weeks were the minimum time required for the PBSO to provide a feedback on project

eligibility for funding. Since the Fifth UNSG's report on the PBF (UN Doc. A/66/659) was the only PBF's annual evaluation providing a brief overview of PBSO's decision-making on that matter, I highlight that an absence of similar information on previous and subsequent years evidence that measuring PBSO's efficiency becomes an issue of concern. The concern is explained based not only because the PBSO is understaffed, but that its understaffed condition compromises PBSO on achieving its efficiency while deciding projects eligibility within the minimum of four weeks required. In addition, Figure 6.5 above does not explicit the quantity of projects submitted for funding, only PBSO's performance on examining those projects. As a UN staff pointed out, even though the PBF receives 'a lot of projects', there is no information about this quantity rather only on projects that were approved previously and are specified in the UNDP-MPTF Gateway Database. Another aspect on this data comes from an interviewee, who pointed out that the PBF did not reach many applications in the beginning of its functioning because "the process was comprised by projects presented by the UN only [and] they were seen weak and poor in quality" (R-5). In order to increase project submission, the interviewee explained that "the inclusion of civil society partnership applying together with the UN, which made the number of applications more effective" (R-5).

Beyond a discussion on subjectivity aspects on categorizing countries within the PBA, the core concern is that both PBC's and PBF's decision-making processes enabled the use of post-conflict countries' label. The process of eligibility regarding countries engagement with the PBC and the PBF evidences that being a post-conflict country does not ensure a commitment by the PBA. As was stated above, the decision is part of a process of fitting each country into the criteria required for such engagement, as well as identifying commonalities in between them through "renowned public sources and publications to assess country fragility" (MPTF-O, 2016). Hence, the role a label plays in this dynamic can be understood by, on the one hand, the perception of a country in being a post-conflict one and identifying its peacebuilding needs for accessing the PBC or the PBF and, on the other hand, the perception of a post-conflict country through the institutional lens, in which the country fragility is assessed by the core of the decision-making processes at the UN.

However, it is important to highlight that even if a country identifies itself as a post-conflict one and is in need of a peacebuilding plan with the endorsement of a UN country level, this

first recognition of behaving as post-conflict labeled depends of a New York-based decision. This implies that the process reflects the “UN evaluating the UN” in what constitutes a post-conflict country label taking both field and New York-based consultations as parameters. Countries that engaged with the PBC were identified previously – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. A full list of countries which benefited from the PBF is presented here based on the Gateway online platform administered by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF-O). In the period of the first ten years of its functioning (2005-2015), the PBF provided support to 33 countries. From this total, six are PBC-countries that receive financial support by the PBF and 27 are restricted only to PBF funding (Table 6.7).

Table 6.7. Countries financed by the PBF (2005-2015)

PBC-countries	Non-PBC Countries	
Burundi	Côte d’Ivoire*	Chad
Central African Republic	DRC	Sri Lanka
Guinea	Kyrgyzstan	Haiti*
Guinea-Bissau	Nepal*	Niger
Liberia	Yemen	Lebanon
Sierra Leone	Sudan	Philippines
	South Sudan	Libya
	Uganda	Bosnia and Herzegovina
	Somalia	Colombia
	Comoros*	Tajikistan
	Guatemala	Kenya
	Mali	Timor-Leste*
	Papua New Guinea	Madagascar
	Myanmar	

Source: Based on MPTF-O (2016).

This consolidated list of countries who received support during the PBA’s first decade differentiates post-conflict countries labelled as PBC- and *non*-PBC countries considering their respective engagement with the Fund. In this initial analysis on the PBC and the PBF, Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire take part in the list of also some countries that, at least once, were considered or cogitated in being part of the PBC, as was the case of Haiti, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Solomon Island.

The countries on the *non*-PBC list that were not considered prospective to the PBC Agenda, also reflect what moves the dynamics of the PBA's 'black box' with regard to its decision-making process. Based on the table above, it is possible to identify a dynamic comprised by the country's behavior following its attached label – post-conflict – combined with the need of a peacebuilding plan and the possibility of requesting financial support to the PBF. Focusing on the 27 countries labelled as non-PBC, it is possible to present three main postulates:

- i. the number of countries under the PBF, which did not engage with the PBC, represents the capacity of the Fund in dealing with more countries under the post-conflict recovery needs;
- ii. the Comoros' and Côte d'Ivoire's requests to the PBC and its restriction to the PBF evidences a *thin line* in what constitutes the boundaries of the eligibility criteria inside the PBA diverging on countries capable and not capable of having a PBC's political apparatus;
- iii. the cogitated countries to the PBC – Haiti, Nepal and Timor-Leste – evidence that the decision of not presenting their requests reflects an institutional barrier creating a cleavage in what constitutes the PBC and the PBF based on their respective engaged countries.

Zooming in on this analysis, based on the identification of the countries supported by the PBF, the PBA's opened 'black box' enables to differentiate the benefited countries according to four compartmentalized groups, as exemplified by Table 6.7. This differentiation has its starting point on the list of the PBC and non-PBC countries under their respective PBF's funding source. The first group is the one marked by the list of PBC-countries – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone – which have combined support from both the PBF-PRF and the PBF-IRF during the period in analysis (2005-2015).

The list of *non*-PBC countries, on its turn, is divided into three groups: one, comprised by both PRF and IRF benefited countries; another group formed by countries benefited only from IRF that still have a peacebuilding plan being conducted on the ground; and the last one, comprised by countries that have their projects financed by IRF concluded. Taking the

cases of Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire once again, it is possible to note their similarities and differences regarding the PBC and the PBF from the Table 6.7. For similarities, Comoros’ and Côte d’Ivoire’s requests to the PBC Agenda and their restriction to the PBF, in which it has been supported under the same fund sources as to PBC-ones – PBF-PRF and PBF-IRF – means that being out of the PBC Agenda does not represent any disadvantage in accessing financial support because, as one diplomat pointed out, “the PBC has no money” (D-1)⁹⁵ and the money can be accessed by both countries labelled as PBC- and *non*-PBC ones.

Table 6.8. Countries financed by the PBF per type of funding source (2005-2015)

PBF			
PBC-Countries		Non-PBC Countries	
PRF+IRF*	PRF+IRF*	IRF**	IRF***
Burundi	Côte d’Ivoire	Tajikistan	Madagascar
Central African Republic	Papua New Guinea	Niger	Timor-Leste
Guinea	Guatemala	Mali	Kenya
Guinea-Bissau	Comoros	Somalia	Colombia
Liberia	Uganda		Myanmar
Sierra Leone	South Sudan		Libya
	Yemen		Philippines
	Nepal		Lebanon
	Kyrgyzstan		Haiti
	DRC		Sri Lanka
			Chad
			Sudan
			Bosnia and Herzegovina

Source: Based on MTPF-O (2016).

* Include countries with a mixture of Financially Closed, Operationally Closed and On Going projects.

** At least, one project is identified as On Going.

*** All projects are Financially or Operationally Closed.

However, the condition played by Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire posits the question of why they became eligible to access funds by the PBF but were not converted into a PBC-country as per their request? Their condition of being supported by PBF-PRF and PBF-IRF include other countries under the same circumstances; and others that play a role in constructing a barrier in what makes the eligible process of being a PBF-country not a PBC-one an issue of concern in this research. The countries that support this prerogative are those identified with the same background as Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, South Sudan, Uganda

⁹⁵ Interview conducted from September to December 2017 in New York.

and Yemen, as identified in blue in Table 6.8. Despite the fact that Haiti and Timor-Leste were mentioned during the field work as prospective PBC-countries, their engagement with the PBF was sporadic through financial support for emergency peacebuilding only, leading them to a different categorization, since they did not receive PBF support through both PBF-PRF and PBF-IRF, although being a *non-PBC* country (Table 6.8).

Table 6.9. UN dynamic of when countries became eligible for the PBA (2005-2015)

<i>Date of Eligibility for the PBF</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Date of Inclusion in the PBC</i>
23 June 2006	Burundi	23 Jun 2006
23 June 2006	Sierra Leone	23 Jun 2006
4 Oct 2007	Liberia	16 Sep 2010
28 Dec 2007	Nepal	
8 Jan 2008	CAR	12 Jun 2008
13 Mar 2008	Guinea-Bissau	17 Dec 2007
19 Jun 2008	Côte d'Ivoire	
25 Jun 2008	Comoros	
25 Jun 2008	Guinea	23 Feb 2011
17 June 2009	DRC	
3 Jun 2010	Uganda	
15 Nov 2010	Guatemala	
May 2012*	South Sudan	
Nov 2012*	Kyrgyzstan	
1 May 2013	Yemen	
3 Oct 2013	P. New Guinea	

Source: Burundi (2006), Sierra Leone (2006), Guinea-Bissau (2007), Liberia (2010), Guinea (2010, 2011), PBF (2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2010, 2013a, 2013b), UN (2008, 2011), UN Docs. PBC/1/OC/2, A/62/864-S/2008/383, A/62/736-S/2007/744, A/64/870-S/2010/389.

* In the cases of Kyrgyzstan and South Sudan, their date refers only to the month they both were considered eligible for the PBF.

In a more detailed analysis on how the PBF and the PBC worked on different framing processes, Table 6.9 evidences another level of that dynamic, in which countries' engagement with the PBA is a process of framing and re-framing their position with regard to post-conflict at the UN. I argue that there are different forms of analyzing evidences on countries' eligibility for the PBA and that there is no standard procedure of what makes a

country eligible for one or the other framework. Although Burundi and Sierra Leone were the first two countries included in the PBC on 23 June 2006 and eligible for the PBF on that same day; their counterparts did not have synchronicity on that aspect: Guinea-Bissau, for example, became first eligible for the PBC to, then, become eligible for the PBF; while CAR, Guinea and Liberia were, first, eligible for the PBF to, later on, request their eligibility for the PBC. Interesting on this dynamic is the fact that Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire, as well as Nepal, became eligible for the PBF during a period that marks other countries inclusion in the PBC Agenda, leading to an evidence that there was the perception of becoming engaged with the PBC through the PBF in a first moment. As Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire became restricted to the PBF, identifying countries moving from one framework (PBF) to another (PBC) – as well as from one label to another (*non*-PBC country to PBC-one) – represents not only the fragmentation of a peacebuilding framework but, most importantly, which country is considered eligible for peace at some point.

Conclusion

Opening international organizations' 'black box' with regard to their decision-making processes is an inherent part of understanding the reasoning behind their practice on labelling and framing post-conflict countries. The emergence of the Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005 is an example of such practice in which its main bodies – the PBC and the PBF – operationalize what peacebuilding is intended to pursuit. From the analysis conducted so far, the PBC and the PBF are not only an intergovernmental body and a peacebuilding fund, respectively, but also different frameworks designed for countries facing a post-conflict context. Since they function differently from each other, their respective decision-making processes evidence a contested institutional practice with regard to peacebuilding. On the one hand, there was no criteria on what constitutes a country eligible for the PBC; and, on the other hand, the PBF improved its criteria for countries' engagement. As a result, the PBC provided support to only six countries during its first decade (2005-2015), whereas the PBF provided support to 27 countries within an exclusive basis on the same period. In this sense, the first decade of the PBA reflects the establishment of an institutional framework in which not only countries become eligible for the PBC and the PBF, but that there are many others that still remain excluded from both frameworks.

7. The Peacebuilding Commission Is Not for All Post-Conflict Countries

In its present form, the Peacebuilding Commission will be at best marginally relevant to Africa, and at worst irrelevant, if it fails to overcome the limits that prevent it from contributing to a more transformative peacebuilding agenda.
(Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2012: 155)

Introduction

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was conceived to be *the* right project on the promotion of peace and stability within a post-conflict scenario. A reason that sustains this assumption is based on the fact that for the first time in the UN history such project comprised a structure capable of congregating different UN agencies and bodies as well as external actors on determining and influencing new approaches for peacebuilding. Much of the literature on the PBC, exclusively, enables an understanding on how it would achieve peace in pragmatic terms, rather than on its functioning or on how other factors influenced its way of doing peacebuilding. For other factors I point out that the role labels played within the PBC is crucial for understanding its prioritization of some countries over others, making the notion on *eligibility for peace* a real synthesis of its functioning.

Such notion becomes evident because during the PBC's first decade (2005-2015) only six countries were included in its Agenda – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone –, and the non-acceptance of Côte d'Ivoire into the PBC, which presented a formal request in 2008 (UN Doc. A/63/92–S/2008/417), as well as Comoros as a former UN staff announced (P-6), confront the institutional reasoning for creating the new body, that would fill in a gap in the institutional machinery for peacebuilding at the UN. Côte d'Ivoire and Comoros, in this sense, are countries that represent the *thin line* between aspects that determine a country being eligible for peace under the scope of the PBC, on the one hand; and a country restricted only to access financial support by its counterpart, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), on the other hand. Since these three countries were not included in the PBC and there is an absence of an official UN

position on this issue, being labelled as a post-conflict country does not guarantee that such label will work as criteria in determining an engagement with the PBC. In this regard, what are the implications for the peacebuilding approach of those now labelled as PBC-countries? Implication is here understood as a change on peacebuilding perspective through the conditionality assumed by different actors within the PBC's organizational structure. For that purpose, this chapter is comprised of, first, a discussion on to what extent the PBC improved peacebuilding through a designation of specific frameworks and principles for cooperation; second, its normative role through the Statement of Mutual Commitments (SMCs); and, third, the role played by the Chairs of the PBC-configurations in enhancing peacebuilding in different fronts.

7.1. Improving Peacebuilding: from the Configuration to the Framework

The decision on establishing the PBC did not bring any innovative aspect on how to enhance peacebuilding at a first glance. Much of its structure – with a focus on working as a configuration method – is embedded on its previous version through the AHAG on Countries Emerging from Conflict within the ECOSOC. At that time, the only two countries that were under the scope of the AHAG – Burundi and Guinea-Bissau – had a structure comprised by other UN member states who were assigned a role in their early post-conflict phase, since *Countries Emerging from Conflict* is a label embedded in a meaning of transition from one stage to another on the path for peace. Such structure, when applied to the new UN-body, was named *configuration* in reference to a subdivision group inside the PBC which was responsible to work towards the achievement of peace in the respective country concerned. As one diplomat mentioned, the configuration “allows someone taking care of the country in question, organize meetings and field visits in a yearly basis” (D-18) in order to deliberate peacebuilding strategies, goals and evaluations. The PBC only dealt with six countries during its first decade (2005-2015) – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone – which presumes that there were six different and interrelated configurations under the PBC. I mention *interrelated* due to the fact that each configuration was not working in isolation, but contributing and getting the contribution through examples and advice on post-conflict recovery by its counterparts during specific meetings organized by each configuration or by the PBC's Organizational Committee.

Despite the lack of innovative functioning of the PBC through this *configuration* model in its early years, I identify some turning points that made the PBC a promising case for peacebuilding at the UN. The first turning point from the AHAG to the PBC was the way the configuration operationalized peacebuilding: transforming challenges into opportunities while enabling a more pragmatic approach to a peace strategy through the design of a framework⁹⁶. In the scope of this thesis, framework is the structure designed exclusively to deal with those labelled – in this case, a post-conflict country included in the PBC – which determines intrinsic aspects of what must be achieved or done in order to *graduate* the respective labelled from one stage to another at the institutional category level. The notion on *graduating* is based on the contribution of a former UN staff (R-1), who criticized the absence of a timeframe in which a country would be engaged with the PBC. As occurred from the labelling transition from *Countries Emerging from Conflict* to *Post-Conflict Countries*, the label was not only replaced by another one with the establishment of the PBC but, most importantly, this process also enhanced the designation of a framework in order to make these new labelled countries achieve their desired goals on peace.

In this sense, framework is a structure comprising one or more projects of intervention designed to play a transformative role on the labelled's behavior and laso image among its peers. Applying this perspective to the PBC, *post-conflict* appears as both a label as well as a framework for countries under its domain aiming their respective *graduation* from unstable to stable peace. In the case of the PBC, the framework is: first, “a medium-term document for partnership and mutual accountability” (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1, page 3) which specifies actions to be taken by the national government and the PBC in order to “address the challenges and threats most critical to sustaining and consolidating peace” (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1, page 3); second, it is designed to guide “the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (...) by highlighting key peacebuilding gaps in existing national strategies and commitments and ensuring their timely and effective implementation” (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1, page 3); and, third, it is a tool “to enhance dialogue and strengthen the partnerships” (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1, page 3) with regard to each configuration.

⁹⁶ From the six countries included in the PBC's Agenda, only Liberia and Guinea named their respective peacebuilding plan as Statement of Mutual Commitments (SMCs) instead of adopting the name “framework” to entitle it. However, when analyzed, the scope of Liberia's and Guinea's peacebuilding plans does not differ in strategy neither in commitments assumed by national governments and the PBC, evidencing that SMCs works also as a framework in these respective PBC-countries.

When combined, these three aspects on the definition of the framework point out that peacebuilding is a descriptive project indicating paths for sustainability aiming to bring the national government and civil society to the core of the accountability. As the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon mentioned in 2008, while the “framework correctly recognized that the primary responsibility to address the peacebuilding challenges rested with the people and [national] Government” (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/SR.2, page 2, added), it also “acknowledged that the international community (...) should remain engaged in the country and that their continued support for national efforts remained vital” (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/SR.2, page 2). Although his speech was a reference to the adoption of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1), it can be applied for each PBC-country which had a framework for peace established since it reinforces the need for enhancing national government and civil society ties along the implementation of the framework. Although the framework is presumed to be unique, respecting the specificities and contextual facts of each country concerned by the PBC, the analysis of this thesis proved that each country configuration had its framework embedded on already existing ones designed previously by external institutions, as is the case of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers⁹⁷ (PRSP) established by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Since this document is updated every three years (IMF, 2016: online), the role of the PBC on defining what would be implemented and prioritized in a peacebuilding plan in its respective countries took the PRSP as parameter. Mentioning the influence IMF’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers had on the establishment of the PBC’s frameworks is not in vain. It became recurrent having the PRSP as a pillar on the process of defining priorities during some PBC country-specific configurations’ meetings and PBC’s reports on Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone and, most importantly, on defining the way both National Governments and the PBC should engage in assuming their respective commitments with regard to the achievement of peace (UN Docs. PBC/1/BDI/SR.4, PBC/3/BDI/6, PBC/5/BDI/2, PBC/5/BDI/3, PBC/1/SLE/SR.1, PBC/1/SLE/SR.2, PBC/1/SLE/SR.3, PBC/1/SLE/SR.4, PBC/1/SLE/2, PBC/1/SLE/SR.5, PBC/2/SLE/1, PBC/2/SLE/SR.1, PBC/2/SLE/SR.2, PBC/2/SLE/5, PBC/2/SLE/SR.4, PBC/3/SLE/SR.1, PBC/3/SLE/3, PBC/3/SLE/6, PBC/3/CAF/3, PBC/3/CAF/7,

⁹⁷ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are prepared by the member countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as development partners, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2016: online).

PBC/5/CAF/1, PBC/2/GNB/5, PBC/4/GNB/1, PBC/3/GNB/1, PBC/3/GNB/3, PBC/4/LBR/2, PBC/5/GUI/2).

For Burundi, for example, there was a “space for policy dialogue (...) on the opportunities to harmonize the [Poverty Reduction] Strategy Paper and the Strategic Framework [for Peacebuilding]” (UN Doc. PBC/3/BDI/6, page 5). Such space crafted between the two frameworks enabled both the PBC and the Government of Burundi to establish a “pragmatic review of the [second-generation of the PRSP] focusing on the main achievements and remaining challenges in the field of peace consolidation (UN Doc. PBC/5/BDI/2: 3; UN Doc. PBC/6/BDI/2: 1). In the case of the Central African Republic, the PBC have called upon the participation of some actors in order to deliberate on Central African Republic configuration aiming to define “the nature and scope of the Commission’s engagement (...) on the basis of the country’s second poverty reduction strategy paper” (UN Doc. PBC/5/CAF/1: 7). The notion was to complement, reinforce and form “a coherent set of interventions” in the pursuit of peace (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7: 6). Although Guinea did not have its PBC’ strategy named as *framework*, rather Statement of Mutual Commitments (SMC), such form of engagement did not discard the influence of the PRSP on its deliberations. As it is expressed, Guinea’s peacebuilding priorities were “viewed within the broader context of peacebuilding and development set out in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2011-2012” (UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2, page 3) in which its Agenda was established.

Not differently, PBC’s engagement with Guinea-Bissau was established towards supporting the National Government in its commitment to achieve measures aiming at the reactivation of the economy and reform of public administration within the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3, page 15-16). Liberia, another PBC-country that has its framework named as SMCs, pointed out that its strategy under the PBC is “aligned with Liberia’s national strategic vision, namely, the poverty reduction strategy (UN Doc. PBC/4/LBR/2, page 2). With regard to Sierra Leone, the perception of a holistic peacebuilding was agreed to be built on and to strength existing frameworks (UN Doc. PBC/1/SLE/2, page 7), taking the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Peace Consolidation Strategy (UN Doc. PBC/1/SLE/SR.1, page 5) as parameters. Even though there was a caution to avoid replacing these frameworks (UN Doc. PBC/1/SLE/2, page 7), the purpose with this decision was first, to “highlight critical peacebuilding priorities from those

documents and increase the coherence of both the United Nations system and bilateral actors in addressing them” (UN Doc. PBC/1/SLE/2, page 7) and to integrate their respective agendas and balancing “between the development, social and human rights dimension and the security and economic dimension” (UN Doc. PBC/1/SLE/SR.2, page 2). In 2007, when Sierra Leone’s framework was adopted by the PBC, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone, José Victor da Silva Angelo, pointed out that the document “addressed the critical areas relevant to peace consolidation and was *consistent* with existing frameworks” (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/SR.1, page 3, emphasis added), in a reference to the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

The *consistent* aspect, in this case, refers to a common ground among peacebuilding priorities identified for PBC-countries, on the one hand and the strategy designed for a poverty reduction by the IMF, on the other hand. The point, here, is not a discussion if designing a framework for PBC-countries embedded on existing ones represents positive or negative aspects of that process, but such *consistency* evidences that the PBC’s perspective on peacebuilding did not start from scratch, but reproduced, at some level, already existing priorities on recovery and stabilization for post-conflict countries. It becomes evident that the strategy designed under the IMF’s PRSP focuses on a wider range of areas for building country stability; however, the meeting point between both frameworks resides on the existence of *common priorities*. I use the term *common priorities* as a reference to what is not specific to a unique country under the PBC’s Agenda, but to a notion that one or more strategies are being replicated in different countries, reflecting an institutional agenda of what constitutes the promotion of peace in practice. From the part of the IMF, the PRSP designed for the same six countries included in the PBC’s Agenda – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, with regard to their respective year of engaging within the PBC – contemplate projects and programs on strengthening the rule of law and the justice; regional integration; strengthening national security; promoting, strengthening and improving political and democratic governance (IMF, 2005; 2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 2008b; 2009), just to mention a few. As Table 7.1 highlights, *common priorities* have been attributed to each PBC-country, enabling the diffusion of a general perception that building a country’s stability with an international community partnership lays mainly on actions aiming at the improvement of good

governance, security sector reform, democracy, rule of law and national reconciliation in face of countries' legacy of institutional fragility.

Table 7.1. Common peacebuilding priorities for PBC-countries

Burundi	Sierra Leone
Promotion of good governance	Justice and security sector reform
Security Sector	Consolidation of democracy and good governance
Justice, promotion of human rights and action to combat impunity	Subregional dimensions of peacebuilding
Subregional dimension	
Central African Republic	Guinea-Bissau
Reform of the Security Sector and DDR	Security and defence sector reform
Governance: rule of law	Strengthening of the justice sector, consolidating the rule of law and fighting against drug trafficking
Liberia	Guinea
The rule of law	Promotion of National Reconciliation and Unity
Security Sector Reform	
National Reconciliation	Security and Defence Sector Reform

Source: UN Docs. PBC/1/BDI/4; PBC/2/SLE/1; PBC/3/CAF/7; PBC/3/GNB/3; PBC/4/LBR/2; PBC/5/GUI/2.

When analyzed based exclusively on PBC-countries' frameworks, those same areas are there, evidencing a PBC's peacebuilding perspective based on the establishment of *common priorities*, in which its concerned countries must implement them as part of their peacebuilding agenda. Establishing *common priorities* as part of PBC's frameworks represents a sense of building consensus on an integrative perspective of peacebuilding. Since these priorities were agreed previously and adopted as part of a national and international plan for peacebuilding by each PBC-country (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4, UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1, UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7, UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3, UN Doc. PBC/A/LBR/2, UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2), reflecting on commitments assumed by national governments, the PBC, the UN system and other actors and stakeholders, they imply a dimensional level with a focus on regional perspective. Notwithstanding, the identification of *common priorities* as

part of the PBC's frameworks does not represent any attempt to neglect what was defined as being particular for each PBC-country.

When analyzed taking the role of the Peacebuilding Commission only, it is possible to affirm that the notion of fragmenting peacebuilding into *common* or *specific priorities* is a valid perspective to all PBC-countries because their common and specific priorities were divided into more focused strategies aiming the whole perspective of their peacebuilding agenda. The fragmentation is more explicit in the Central African Republic (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7), Guinea-Bissau (UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3) and Sierra Leone (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1) since the Peacebuilding Commission defined its involvement in these countries based on strategic actions for each of the priorities established, rather than just fragmenting peacebuilding into more generic terms, as was the case of Burundi (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4) and Liberia (UN Doc. PBC/4/LIB/2). In the case of the Guinea (UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2), the involvement of the PBC was defined taking not only the strategy for each priority, but what would be achieved on short- and medium- to long- terms.

As Table 7.2 evidences, the framework established what I identify in the scope of this thesis as *specific priorities*, in reference to strategic areas beyond the common ones, which were aimed at addressing challenges that could undermine the promotion of peace or could represent the possibility of a country relapsing into conflict for not having addressed the root causes. With the exception of Liberia, which was not attributed any *specific priority*, each remaining PBC-country has an agenda focused on *re-building* community ties. Attention is given to gender and youth dimensions, elections and infrastructure. The importance of bringing IMF's PRSP contribution, to understand from where PBC-countries' frameworks came from, becomes also pertinent on the identification of their *specific priorities*. In the case of the Central African Republic, the *development poles* strategy corroborates the idea that external actors with their already existing frameworks had a direct influence on determining some actions on the peacebuilding process. As was expressed in a report on Central African Republic, the PBC "learned that the concept of development poles has been fully endorsed by the Government of the Central African Republic in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper" (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/3: 7), which means that building on already existing strategies was a tool to enhance its advisory role competence on peacebuilding.

Table 7.2. Specific peacebuilding priorities for PBC-countries

Burundi	Sierra Leone
Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and PALIHUTU-FNL	Youth employment and empowerment
The land issue and socio-economic recovery	Capacity-building
Gender dimension	Energy sector
Central African Republic	Guinea-Bissau
Development poles	Elections and institution-building for the National Electoral Commission
	Measures to jump-start the economy and rehabilitate infrastructure, in particular in the energy sector
	Public administration reform and modernization
Liberia	Guinea
-	Youth and Women's Employment Policy

Source: UN Docs. PBC/1/BDI/4; PBC/2/SLE/1; PBC/3/CAF/7; PBC/3/GNB/3; PBC/5/GUI/2.

Conceived as a project envisaged to establish eleven development poles around population centers in the country into two phases (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/3, page 7), the PBC advised that, first, there was an “unbalanced geographical distribution of development poles in the first phase, which could be a trigger of additional tensions between those areas with development poles and those without them” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/3, page 7) and, second, that the “implementation of the development pole concept should proceed in parallel with rehabilitating the national road system, both main roads and feeder roads from village to regional markets” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/3, page 7). Even though some *specific priorities* are found in more than one country – as the case of gender and youth dimensions – it cannot be included as a *common priority* for the PBC because it is not replicated in all PBC-countries. Nevertheless, I do not discard the possibility of combining *common* and *specific priorities* in the general perception of what constitutes the PBA's agenda for peace since areas financed exclusively by the Peacebuilding Fund to countries out of the PBC's Agenda are similar.

During its first decade (2005-2015), the PBC became present almost exclusive in neighboring countries in West Africa – Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. At this regional level, Mohamedou points out that transnational non-state armed groups are “the primary challenge to building peace in West Africa” (2015: 2), which “have risen to the level of a multifaceted menace that has both contributed to the deepening of existing conflicts and spawned new ones” (2015: 2). However, the regional challenge for the PBC lies on different aspects, which are restricted not only to West Africa, but also to the whole continent, since the PBC dealt only with African countries during its entire term since 2005. As Adejumobi explains, West Africa and the Great Lakes region – where Burundi is located – “has been an epicentre of armed conflicts in Africa in which some of the most severe and sustained conflicts have taken place within the last decade and a half” (2004: 60), as was the case of what he calls “The Mano River States”, referring to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the case of Senegal and Niger Delta in Nigeria (Adejumobi, 2004: 60).

An interesting fact, at this point, refers to the request submitted by Côte d’Ivoire to become a PBC-country in mid-2008: if it had its request approved by the Security Council or by the PBC’s Organizational Committee, Côte d’Ivoire would be the fifth West African country on the PBC’s list. Such evidence does not mean that the PBC was eager to prioritize its work in West African countries, since Burundi and Sierra Leone were the first ones included in its Agenda in 2006; but that the regional perspective of peacebuilding became relevant in face of the common challenges shared by neighboring PBC-countries, making the PBC decide to adopt a strategy focusing on a regional approach after 2015, when the PBC became involved with the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) in January 2017 (Security Council Report, 2018). Such involvement was determined by a Security Council presidential statement (UN Doc. S/PRST/2017/2) asking the PBC to support the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) in its implementation (Security Council Report, 2018). As a result, the PBC started in 2017 its meeting on the Sahel region (UN, 2019). Although there was an evidence of the working methods of the PBC – marked by the inclusion of a regional approach on its agenda – such change only occurred in a moment after its first decade of functioning (2005-2015), which makes this research more pertinent with regard to the implications for peacebuilding in post-conflict countries being included in the PBC’s Agenda.

7.1.1. Defining peacebuilding priorities and principles for PBC-countries

Although PBC's frameworks were not designed taking into consideration a division over *common* and *specific priorities*, as presented in this thesis; such division not only enables a better understanding of the PBC's Agenda and the areas the PBC chose to work within its country-configurations, but also becomes a part of the process in which frameworks and SMCs were adopted as strategic actions aiming at peacebuilding. It is evident that the IMF's PRSPs played an important role in influencing that process. However, determining which area would prevail from the amount of other ones must be elucidated. Before addressing this process, I point out that since the PBC was created to deal exclusively with post-conflict countries in its early years, its priorities were strategically chosen based on being:

- i. critical to avoiding relapse into conflict;
- ii. short-to-medium term in duration; and
- iii. required for mutual action from the Government and other national stakeholders (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1: 3).

These purposes were taken from the adoption of the Sierra Leone's framework (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1), nevertheless they represent a broad overview of what PBC aims since its inception in 2005. In order to achieve these purposes, the definition of each PBC-country's frameworks involved consultation with UN member-states and external institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and the World Bank (WB); participation of actors from the peace process, engagement with peacekeeping operations and following previous institutional actions designed under the scope of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Consultation became an essential part of the process for two reasons: first, it "solicit[s] inputs both from the Commission and key stakeholders on the ground (...) to guide [their mutual] engagement" (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4: 4); and, second, it enables having the contribution from a mapping conducted at various levels of the respective country (UN Doc. PBC/1/SLE/SR.4: 3-4; UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/SR.3: 4) in order to obtain first-hand information, to assess the challenges to peacebuilding, to identify gaps within priority areas (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/2: 1), to enhance a certain level of stability in the concerned country and to match priorities with local demands. As a diplomat explained, defining what a country needs for its reconstruction is not an easy task, referring to the "hard situation" of making

the national government sit together with different actors in order to deliberate on local sensitive topics (D-1).

Table 7.3. Principles of Cooperation of PBC-countries’ Frameworks

Burundi	Sierra Leone
National ownership	National ownership
International, national and local partnership	Mutual accountability Sustained engagement
Central African Republic	Guinea-Bissau
National ownership	National ownership
Partnership and mutual responsibility	Partnership and mutual accountability
Methodological approach	Inclusiveness
Inclusive approach	Sustained engagement
Sustained commitment	Coordination
Coordination	
Human rights-based approach	
Liberia	Guinea
National ownership and leadership	National ownership and leadership
International partnership	Partnership
Joint responsibility	Mutual accountability

Source: UN Docs. PBC/1/BDI/4; PBC/2/SLE/1; PBC/3/CAF/7; PBC/3/GNB/3; PBC/4/LIB/2; PBC/5/GUI/2.

However, since the Peacebuilding Commission had a particular interest in some areas from a previous established general development plan designed by the country (D-1), agreeing on what would be strategically included in a framework contributed to strengthen and to disseminate an institutional perspective on peacebuilding. This institutional perspective implied that priority should be given to achieve the three main purposes listed above, as well as to become a tool used for building synergies with peacekeeping operations (D-5) and for reproducing other models of international intervention conceived as collective goals for sustainability taking the MDGs as example (D-6)⁹⁸. Despite the fact that the PBC’s Agenda and frameworks were embedded in already existing strategies for recovery and stability, the

⁹⁸ Interviews with diplomats identified as D-1 to D-6 were conducted from September to December 2017 in New York.

second turning point of its improvement on peacebuilding was the establishment of the *principles of cooperation* when the adoption of the respective countries' frameworks. The PBC does not provide a definition of what *principles of cooperation* are. Nevertheless, based on what became established as a *principle* between the PBC and the concerned countries, I define them in the scope of this thesis as internally agreed norms acting as guiding-values responsible for delimitating the boundaries of PBC's engagement with countries included in its Agenda in order to avoid misconduct by PBC with regard to national sovereignty of its respective countries. Misconduct, here, refers to the notion that the PBC is just an advisory body and, for being conceived in this way, it is not allowed to act beyond its mandate.

As Table 7.3 shows, the *principles of cooperation* vary according to the context of the country and to the priorities defined for the framework. However, three main ones pertain to all PBC-countries referring to what pillars sustain the PBC's work while enhancing peacebuilding: national ownership, partnership and mutual accountability. The extent to which these *principles of cooperation* delimitate the scope of the PBC with regard to its functioning while being an advisory body, they also specify responsibilities taken by the countries in question, making them agree on commitments and planning strategic policies for peacebuilding. National ownership is the first *principle of cooperation* adopted by all PBC-frameworks. It states that each country included in the agenda of the PCB is the primary actor responsible for the consolidation of peace, democracy and development with the participation of its respective civil society (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4; UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1; UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7; UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3). As one PBC-country diplomat claimed: "we have our sovereignty" (D-1), conveying the notion that there is a limit to what the PBC can and cannot do. On the issue of ownership, Jenkins argues that "PBC member-states has rallied behind the currently fashionable aid-community rhetoric of *national ownership*" (2008: 1345) referring to the conditionality that "policy and institutional reforms cannot, and should not, be imposed on recipient countries through (...) aid agreements" (2008: 1345).

On partnerships, the *principles of cooperation* recognize that "peacebuilding is a long-term process requiring sustained and predictable engagement from all stakeholders" (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1: 2; UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7; UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3). For that reason, partnerships are seen as "essential for the success of peacebuilding" (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4), enabling the PBC to act "in support of the various organizations of the

international community (...) at the bilateral and multilateral levels” (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4) with the inclusion of civil society, women’s organizations, private sector, political parties, religious communities and regional institutions (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4). For assuring both national ownership and partnership, mutual accountability emerged as the third main *principle of cooperation*. It supports the perspective that “peacebuilding requires a solid partnership based on mutual respect and responsibility” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7; UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3) creating a space for dialogue, action and commitments for and by the PBC and the National Governments in face of all actors involved in a peacebuilding process.

Beyond the three main pillars, only Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau established additional detailed *principles of cooperation*. Nevertheless, the incorporation of inclusiveness, for example, does not differ from the principle of partnership, since various stakeholders are expected to play “their key roles in peacebuilding” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7; UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3) in countries’ recovery processes. The principle of coordination, therefore, is aligned with pre-existing strategies for peacebuilding in which “the activities planned under [the] strategic framework must [be built] on recent peacebuilding actions and successes” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7; UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3). On methodological and human rights-based approaches, which were exclusive for the Central African Republic, the design and implementation of peacebuilding actions was based on two aspects, respectively: “systematic and continuous consultations between the stakeholders” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7) and “on the promotion and protection of human rights” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7), which were crucial for building a sense of a holistic implementation of its three peacebuilding priorities.

Whereas the *principles of cooperation* were taken as internally agreed rules acting as guiding-values responsible for delimitating the boundaries of the PBC's engagement with countries included in its Agenda, the process of adopting a framework and delimitating these principles naturally called upon for a more assertive position from the actors involved in the PBC-countries’ strategies for peacebuilding. The third turning point on the PBC’s peacebuilding perspective was the establishment of Statement of Mutual Commitments (SMC) as shared responsibilities in which the PBC and national governments, as well as other actors involved in this process, were expected to commit and deliver tangible results for each defined peacebuilding priority. Although the intention was to make the PBC

pragmatic with regard to peacebuilding results on the ground, the point here, with the adoption of the SMCs is to evidence that being a PBC-country is being a country passive of external influence that prescribes – even in agreed terms – what must be done by all actors involved in recovery and stability in the country. The reasons why Haiti did not accept to become part of the PBC with a configuration were never clear, since Haiti was indicated as a prospective PBC-country when the Architecture was created in 2005.

However, based on Haiti's position at that time, an interviewed diplomat presumed that "it was an additional form of not being influenced in its internal affairs" (D-27), which later became a notion generalized by other countries who opposed being integrated in the PBC Agenda (D-27). In addition, the diplomat explained that such decision was similar to its own country, in which "we did not want [to join the PBC] for the same reason; [and] successfully, we did accept financing from the PBF, but not all this paraphernalia of country-configuration" (D-27). The diplomat's position – referring to a preference of being a country exclusively financed by the PBF instead of being a PBC-one – reflects the existence of a structural dynamic comprised by agreed norms in the form of commitments, which makes each PBC-country responsible for the achievement of peace, and strengthens how the PBC should be pragmatic in its own expected results on the ground. In a deeper analysis, the diplomat's contribution enables to comprehend that the structure the PBC faces with its configuration format and the establishment of a framework reinforces the label some countries do not want to be attached to – PBC-country. Such label is not only an avoided issue among the diplomat's own country and other ones, but an influence factor that determines country's decision to engage or not with the PBC.

7.2. Statement of Mutual Commitments: PBC's normative role?

The Statement of Mutual Commitments (SMCs) is an integral part of the PBC's frameworks. It is comprised by fragmenting each of the broad priorities already mentioned (Table 7.1.) into specific strategies aiming at the achievement of peacebuilding in its holistic perspective. They result from a consultation process between the PBC and the national governments "with other key stakeholders, including the United Nations system, civil society and the private sector, bilateral and multilateral partners and regional organizations" (UN Doc.

PBC/5/GUI/2: 2). Taking Guinea's framework as example, the SMCs, in general, comprise six main features:

- i. It is based on the principles of cooperation in support of national efforts in peacebuilding and mutual accountability for results;
- ii. It is intended to be a flexible instrument that can be adjusted in the light of developments in the country;
- iii. It focuses on peacebuilding challenges;
- iv. It highlights the key issues and actions to be taken for each of the peacebuilding priorities;
- v. It spells out the engagements of both the Peacebuilding Commission and the Government; and
- vi. It defines the frequency with which the mutual commitments are to be reviewed (UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2: 2).

The most important aspect with the establishment of the SMCs is related to its capacity to determine a permanent evaluation of how the PBC and national government, as well as other actors, are working in the pursuit of peace. Although no interviewee mentioned the SMCs' main function, its definition and features direct to an interpretation of its monitoring role for indicating not only if a country succeeds or not in its commitments, but also, most importantly, how the PBC is acting as a peacebuilding actor through the eyes of its counterparts at the UN. As diplomats pointed out, the existence of norms, even though in a flexible way (D-4), symbolized that the "UN requested us to provide some results, mainly with regard to the reconciliation process" (D-5). Requesting a country to provide results from the ground was a way encountered by the PBC to enhance its work's success (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/SR.1: 2). In that regard, PBC-countries positioned themselves as promising to achieve results and, also, on strategically bargaining their commitments' results in a shared perspective with the international community.

The bargain, here, does not refer to a taking and giving perspective, but to the notion that commitment achieved is commitment used as a pressure tool for more results from other actors. As some official documents on PBC-countries' meetings highlight, the mutual commitments brought national governments and their partners "to work together to

overcome challenges and eliminate threats to building a sustainable peace” (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4: 6), as was the case of Burundi. For Sierra Leone, the government posited itself in need of “sustained support from diverse stakeholders, multilateral and bilateral partners and the private sector” (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/5: 1) in order to ensure lasting and self-sustaining peace and to mobilize resources (UN Doc. PBC/3/SLE/SR.1: 3).

Table 7.4. Actors engaged on Mutual Commitments of PBC-countries

Burundi	Sierra Leone
National Government	National Government
PBC	PBC
The United Nations System	The United Nations System
Bilateral and Multilateral Partners	Bilateral and Multilateral Partners
The Subregion	States in the West Africa Region
Central African Republic	Guinea-Bissau
National Government	National Government
PBC	PBC
	The United Nations System
	IFIs, Bilateral and Multilateral Donors
	Regional and Subregional Organizations
	Civil Society, Religious and Private Sectors
Liberia	Guinea
National Government	National Government
PBC	PBC

Source: UN Docs. PBC/1/BDI/4; PBC/2/SLE/1; PBC/3/CAF/7; PBC/3/GNB/3; PBC/4/LIB/2; PBC/5/GUI/2.

In the case of Liberia, its former President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, was categorical while asserting that: on the one hand, “her Government, and the Liberian people, were committed to fulfilling their obligations” (UN Doc. PBC/4/LBR/SR.1: 2); and, on the other hand, “she was convinced that the Commission would fulfil its own commitments and that the international community, including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the Mano River Union countries, would also continue to support Liberia” (UN Doc. PBC/4/LBR/SR.1: 2). Relying on achievable commitments by different actors, as was clearly posited by former President of Liberia, reflects a collective understanding of

different levels of doing peacebuilding, constructing a sense that there is a *frontier* which determines specific commitments for specific actors.

On this point, I argue that the importance of establishing a country-configuration under the auspices of the PBC lays on enabling different actors to assume a range of commitments in order to share their results and experiences on peacebuilding in a concerted way. The discussion here is not about the results of these commitments, but on the extent these commitments – as conditionality for achieving peace through the PBC – play a role on the implications for peacebuilding to post-conflict countries included in its Agenda. As it becomes evident on Table 7.4, the first implication refers to the fact that the PBC broadened its capacity in dealing with peacebuilding from the designation of specific commitments for strategic partners, which could not be excluded for the process of recovery and stabilization. Although these partners are the same included in PBC-countries configurations; the second implication reveals that, when commitments were established, these partners were congregated regarding their commonalties and their respective goals for peacebuilding. Fragmenting peacebuilding enabled identifying a dichotomy over distinction and complementarity between different actors involved in this process, such as the role played by the PBC and the UN system; bilateral and multilateral donors; regional and subregional organizations and other actors which assumed their commitments taking the national government's commitment as a parameter for intervention. Still, some countries do not evidence a fragmentation of their peacebuilding priorities into commitments assumed by other actors rather than the national government and the PBC, as it is the case of the Central African Republic (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7), Liberia (UN Doc. PBC/4/LIB/2) and Guinea (UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2).

Based on this perception, what do the SMCs reveal with regard to the PBC's way of doing peacebuilding? Since the PBC is an advisory body, its way of doing peacebuilding was marked by a doubt on the *how* it would achieve peace because much of its position inside the UN was hardly defined into pragmatic terms. The Statement of Mutual Commitments assumed by the PBC with regard to countries under its Agenda illustrate that the PBC was doing peacebuilding by improving its role as an advisory body and respecting the boundaries imposed by the national ownership as a principle of cooperation. Still, at the same time, the PBC was characterized by a limited capacity to provide tangible results on what it could

really do for peacebuilding at both the institutional and ground levels. When I affirm that there was a doubt on *how* peacebuilding would be achieved by the PBC, it is because its role was comprised by:

- i. Supporting the efforts of the Government and its civil society for peace consolidation consistent with the Framework;
- ii. Supporting for the mobilization of resources;
- iii. Working towards integrating regional and subregional dimension;
- iv. Sharing lessons learned on peacebuilding with the national government;
- v. Encouraging the effective coordination of United Nations and other actors;
- vi. Encouraging the broadest participation of partners in all international forums and for increased international assistance to the country;
- vii. Galvanizing attention to support the implementation of the present Framework;
- viii. Encouraging tangible contributions while advocating for sustained levels of financial;
- ix. Strengthening coordination between bilateral and multilateral actors;
- x. Facilitating the strengthening of dialogue between the Government and all actors;
- xi. Identifying critical infrastructure gaps; and
- xii. Advising all governments in the process of developing coherent policies and programs of their respective *common* and *specific priorities* (UN Docs. PBC/1/BDI/4; PBC/2/SLE/1; PBC/3/CAF/7; PBC/3/GNB/3; PBC/4/LBR/2; PBC/5/GUI/2).

Consequently, there was a lack of guidelines regarding *how* these commitments would be achieved, since much of the criticism on the PBC is related to its lack of results from the ground. In order to minimize the lack of achievable results, these initial commitments were agreed to be reviewed in a timely manner with semi-annual country-specific meetings, as was the case of Sierra Leone (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1: 15) and Guinea Bissau (UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3: 20); biennial reviews for Central African Republic (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7: 12); six- and nine-months intervals from the date of the adoption of Guinea's and Liberia's frameworks, respectively (UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2: 12; UN Doc. PBC/4/LBR/2: 9); and, in the case of Burundi, a tracking and monitoring mechanism between the national government, the PBC and stakeholders "based on the monitoring mechanisms and timelines established

for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and other frameworks in order to reduce the administrative burden” (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4: 17). Although the main purpose of the reviews was to evaluate the progress achieved in order to update the initial framework (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1; UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7; UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3; UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2), such purpose involved a process comprised by moving the framework’s initial phase to its following levels in order to continue:

- i. Focusing the attention of the international community on key peacebuilding issues requiring additional action;
- ii. Ensuring that the national government, the PBC and all stakeholders honour their commitments; and
- iii. Drawing lessons and good practices can be applied as parameter on policies and programs already implemented (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1: 14; UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7: 13; UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3: 20-21).

Notwithstanding, what becomes clear from the establishment of the SMCs and their following reviews⁹⁹ concerning each PBC-country is the PBC’s normative aspect while working as a monitoring platform on peacebuilding in order to assure that each commitment can be translated into achievable results. To that aim, the engagement of the Chair of the configuration in this process is most valuable. Achieving peacebuilding through the PBC is not only an institutional enhancement over this issue but, most importantly, it is also an enhancement resulted from the role played by the Chair on behalf of a respective PBC-country. It is important to affirm that the Chair is not responsible for promoting peace on the ground, but building a structure at the institutional level capable of putting commitments into action and actions into desirable results. And here lays the fourth improvement on the PBC’s peacebuilding perspective: the designation of a Chair responsible for constructing a peacebuilding dialogue platform in which priorities and SMCs were established and monitored.

⁹⁹ For an evaluation on the reviews regarding each PBC-country, see the following documents: Burundi (UN Docs. PBC/2/BDI/4, PBC/2/BDI/9, PBC/2/BDI/10, PBC/3/BDI/2, PBC/3/BDI/3, PBC/3/BDI/5, PBC/3/BDI/6, PBC/4/BDI/1, PBC/4/BDI/3, PBC/5/BDI/2, PBC/5/BDI/3, PBC/6/BDI/2); Sierra Leone (UN Docs. PBC/2/SLE/8, PBC/2/SLE/9, PBC/3/SLE/2, PBC/3/SLE/3); Central African Republic (UN Docs. PBC/4/CAF/2, PBC/4/CAF/5, PBC/5/CAF/3); Guinea-Bissau (UN Docs. PBC/4/GNB/1, PBC/4/GNB/1/Add.1, PBC/4/GNB/3); Liberia (UN Docs. PBC/6/LBR/1, PBC/6/LBR/2, PBC/7/LBR/1, PBC/7/LBR/3, PBC/8/LBR/1, PBC/8/LBR/2, PBC/9/LBR/1, PBC/9/LBR/2) and Guinea (UN Docs. PBC/6/GUI/2, PBC/6/GUI/3, PBC/8/GUI/1, PBC/8/GUI/2).

7.3. Chair of PBC-configurations: a leading role for peacebuilding?

The establishment of the SMCs as part of a plan to achieve peacebuilding priorities reflects the scope in which the Chairs of the PBC-configurations must play their role. Since the Chair represents the country responsible for mediating the configuration with its respective members in order to assure that the SMCs are being achieved; s/he is also responsible for initiating the monitoring role on the level of threat/instability a PBC-country faces in its peacebuilding process. Nevertheless, there are other reasons for being a Chair, beyond the simple fact of assuming a role in peacebuilding. While the justification of some countries permeates their interests in contributing to the common notion on why the PBC was created or because some countries had “a significance presence in the [concerned] country” (D-17)¹⁰⁰ or just because the country “believes in cooperation” (D-17), for other Chairs, this opportunity served as trampoline to their country’s role inside the UN.

For some, the gap was an “opportunity [a country had] to invest and work properly as an added value” and at the same time build upon its “interest in becoming a member of the Security Council and the role in the PBC should be a plus in this aspect” (D-16)¹⁰¹. For others, a country’s interests on being Chair is justified by “its commitment on the UN reforms in order to make the institution more democratic and adjusted to what is required for the XXI century” as long as “the country saw on the PBC a real possibility for that change” (D-19)¹⁰². For this reason, some countries engaged with the PBC since its inception in 2005 corroborating the notion that the transitional phase from the AHAG on Countries Emerging from Conflict to the new UN body on peacebuilding was a valuable one, making the creation of the PBC more a political process rather than based on the need of creating a peacebuilding architecture. The reasons behind the decision of being a Chair of a PBC-configuration enable to understand the *meaning* of this position. In my point of view, *meaning* is much more than the simplistic fact of defining what a Chair is, but describing and evidencing what it is in between the lines through its role played within the PBC.

¹⁰⁰ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

¹⁰¹ Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

¹⁰² Interview conducted from May to July 2018 in New York.

It is clear that the Chair plays an important political role in a PBC-configuration, acting as a “mediator who carefully manages local, sub-regional, regional and global opposition interests to certain projects” (D-19); acting “on the mobilization for [financial] resources” (D-18); and “creating a kind of a [country] profile based on a personal capacity” (D-19). In this sense, the *meaning* is embedded in the practice a Chair develops, also taking into account the political benefits of this position. Although the discussion on the *benefits* divided diplomats interviewed, with some of them refusing the use of the term *benefit* while arguing that “the country that receives the benefit is the one included in the PBC’s Agenda” (D-19); that “the country is not [being a Chair] for its own sake” (D-21), but working on the support of the peacebuilding program; and that the country “was interested in helping the experience of what it could be and do to support [the PBC-country]” (D-19); the notion of being *benefited* became evident in a sequence. The diplomats that initially had a resistance in using this word, later assumed that “the unique benefit is the strengthening of bilateral relations” since the Chair has a close relationship with the PBC-country (D-19) and there is a recognition on a “level of attention, appreciation because [the Chair] does care with international solidarity, acting in what it believes and bringing some credibility” (D-21). In addition, as another diplomat mentioned, the benefit of being Chair is related to the fact that such country is “now in constant contact with other countries and big donors and with more access to the Security Council, making briefings there” (D-17).

Even though the *meaning* of being Chair represents the possibility of enhancing its own role at the UN in face of its position with regard to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the ECOSOC – just to mention the ones that belong to the PBC’s Organizational Committee –, the *meaning* also enables to pointing out, first, how the six Chairs of configurations acted on doing peacebuilding; and, second, how the PBC enabled an enhancement of bilateral relations between, on the one hand, PBC-countries and its respective Chairs of configurations and, on the other hand, between PBC-countries and UN-member states that engaged with the PBC in a certain way. Regarding the aspect on *how* Chairs acted on doing peacebuilding, their engagement was defined taking into account a collective engagement, when all PBC-Chairs with the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) visited, in November 2011, the African Development Bank (AfDB) in order to explore areas of potential collaboration in countries on the agenda of the Commission (UN Doc. PBC/7/LBR/1: 16) and, on September 2012, World Bank

headquarters in Washington, D.C., to deepen the partnership between the PBC and the WB (UN Doc. PBC/7/LBR/1: 16). In an individual basis, Chairs continued their engagement marked by visits to the WB and the IMF in order to discuss the engagement of the PBC with regard to Burundi's framework (UN Doc. PBC/2/BDI/10: 10); by meetings with member States and representatives of the IFIs, including visits to Washington, D.C., London, Brussels, Berlin, and The Hague in order to garner political and financial support for the Sierra Leone's framework (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/9: 9), and by convening "meetings with representatives of the private sector, non-traditional donors and private foundations" (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/9: 9); advising the "Security Council on the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) to continue to support the peace consolidation efforts of the Government" (UN Doc. PBC/3/SLE/3: 10). In the case of Liberia, the Chair visited the country twice in 2014. At that occasion, the delegation explored ways to enhance financial support, strengthen coordination and maximize synergies for peacebuilding purposes in collaboration with the United Nations, the international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the Government of Liberia (UN Doc. PBC/9/LBR/1: 17).

The Chair has continued to advocate for sustained international support for Liberia, especially in the light of the impact of the Ebola virus crisis on the peacebuilding process in the country (UN Doc. PBC/9/LBR/1: 17); has met with bilateral partners and Liberian officials in Monrovia, New York and other cities to discuss developments in the areas under the three pillars of the statement of mutual commitments (UN Doc. PBC/9/LBR/1: 18); has co-chaired joint configuration meetings with the configurations of Guinea and Sierra Leone in August and November 2014 to discuss the immediate and long-term impacts of the Ebola crisis (UN Doc. PBC/9/LBR/1: 18); has continued engaging with ECOWAS and with the Mano River Union (UN Doc. PBC/9/LBR/1: 18); has continued to hold discussions on land-related issues, natural resources and community involvement as part of his follow-up to the letter from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia of 12 December 2013 (UN Doc. PBC/9/LBR/1: 18); has addressed the Security Council three times in 2014 focusing on the challenges of accelerating progress on justice and security as well as national reconciliation efforts, gender issues, conflict-sensitive management of land and resources and the importance of the role of civil society (UN Doc. PBC/9/LBR/1: 18); and has continued to ensure stronger coordination of support among


stakeholders at the international and national levels for the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments (UN Doc. PBC/9/LBR/1: 19).

On the enhancement of bilateral relations between the PBC-countries and UN-member states that engaged with the PBC in a certain way, there are several examples that illustrate this bilateral dynamic afforded by the Peacebuilding Commission. As pointed out by the Brazilian representative during a PBC-meeting on Sierra Leone configuration in December 2008, “Brazil and Sierra Leone had strengthened their relations over the past year” (UN Doc. PBC/3/SLE/SR.1: 6), referring to a technical cooperation agreement in which “technical staff from the Brazilian Agriculture Research Company had been dispatched to Sierra Leone to explore avenues for cooperation in agriculture” (UN Doc. PBC/3/SLE/SR.1: 6). In a PBC-meeting on Guinea-Bissau, the representative of the United Kingdom affirmed that the UK was a non-traditional donor with respect to that country. “However, it was keen to support the Government’s strategy and had a distinctive ‘niche’ contribution to make” (UN Doc. PBC/2/GNB/SR.2: 7).

This bilateral perspective within the PBC is also corroborated through the configuration on Burundi, which stated that “members of the PBC have provided bilateral assistance while multilateral partners have continued to provide support for the implementation of the mutual commitments” (UN Doc. PBC/2/BDI/10: 16). Those members – Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, the UK and Norway – acted in different fronts, from supporting programs on similar areas of Burundi’s peacebuilding priorities; on the advancement of women, on the reintegration of returning refugees and HIV/AIDS issues; on infrastructure, water systems, and the reintegration of refugees, displaced persons and ex-combatants; on training computer skills; on programs on violence against women, and strengthening the judiciary; on capacity-building in the diplomatic services; on police and student scholarships; on humanitarian response; and on reconciliation, effective governance, open dialogue and the reintegration of former child soldiers (UN Doc. PBC/2/BDI/10: 12). In the case of Liberia, bilateral efforts were also identified, comprising the engagement of Japan, Germany, Sweden – Chair of configuration on Liberia – and the United States of America. Respectively, their bilateral role was on supporting educational activities related to controlling small arms-related violence (UN Doc. PBC/7/LBR/1: 18) and on strengthening the rule of law and a cooperation project concerning

Liberian transport infrastructure (UN Doc. PBC/7/LBR/1: 18-19). Sweden and the USA jointly supported Liberia’s involvement in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, while Sweden supported the UNDP Justice and Security Trust Fund and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue while also planned a contribution of SKr 20 million to the Justice and Security Trust Fund in late 2012 (UN Doc. PBC/7/LBR/1: 19). From these examples, the PBC served as a platform for strengthening and enabling bilateral relations to countries included in its Agenda. As Figure 7.1 evidences, Sweden was not only a PBC-Chair configuration for Liberia, but it also had become the main PBF-contributor within the list of Chairs of configurations. Canada, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Brazil and Morocco, respectively in this order, provided less financial support to the PBF in comparison to Sweden.

Figure 7.1. PBC-Chair’s contribution to the Peacebuilding Fund (2006-2015)



Source: Based on the data available at the MPTF-O (2016).

In this sense, the PBC’s perspective on peacebuilding makes clear that even though in an institutional way, peacebuilding also depends on countries’ interests in supporting an international agenda and, most importantly, on being a financial donor to make peace achievable.

Although the Chairs of configurations have contributed to enhance bilateral engagement with other PBC-members as well as in between PBC-members and PBC-countries, some Chairs' position concerning strengthening peacebuilding inside the UN through financial support to the Peacebuilding Fund proved to be reticent taking the period in analysis (2005-2015). I do not argue that being a Chair is a *sine qua non* condition for being one of the main financial donors to the PBF or vice-versa; at the same time that doing peacebuilding in one front does not necessarily requires neglecting on the side of providing financial support to the Fund. The interesting aspects that come up with the financial support provided by PBC-Chairs to the PBF is that, first, there is a thin line on what constitutes a peacebuilding perspective made by the PBC and the PBF, since the PBF supports peacebuilding programs and projects to countries included in the Agenda of the PBC and to countries that are not included. Second, instead of having all PBC-Chairs also supporting the PBF and contributing to the strengthening of the Peacebuilding Architecture as a whole, some of them have limited their capacity in enhancing the PBA while compromising PBF's allocations.

Third, it opens for debate at what extent PBC-Chairs prioritized bilateral relations and directed funding to their respective countries-configurations and correlates instead of increasing their respective contributions to the PBF. The point, here, is that the PBC's perspective on peacebuilding improved an institutional notion on peace into a more pragmatic approach – with the establishment of configurations, frameworks, principles of cooperation, Statement of Mutual Commitments and the role played by the Chair – nevertheless, such improvement can be taken as parameter also for evaluating the PBC as it was scrutinized at the UN, evidencing that its perspective on peacebuilding was not wrong, but lacked tangible results even after one decade of working.

Conclusion

When the PBC was established in 2005, there was not a clear vision of what would be its implications for peacebuilding in post-conflict countries included in its Agenda. After a decade of its functioning (2005-2015), the six countries – that shared a common purpose on being re-built and recovered after years of political instability and/or armed conflict – shaped what the PBC became on enhancing peacebuilding. That because the conditionality emphasized in this Chapter – the designation of a framework, the establishment of SMCs

and the monitoring role of the Chair of a country-configuration – had been agreed as the dynamic among PBC’s partners arose. In this sense, the conditionality among the PBC and countries in its Agenda is the path for identifying the implications for peacebuilding in post-conflict countries when included in the PBC’s: the submission of a country’s leading role in its own peacebuilding process to the commitments defined with the PBC. These dynamics has raised concerns regarding PBC-countries autonomy. It is evident that this loss of a country’s leading role is part of the implication a label attached to it has caused: being a PBC-country is more than just being a *post-conflict country*, because the meaning attached to the first label refers to how it became replaced by its previous one, reinforcing institutional categories and how those labelled countries should behave in order to have this label withdrawn.

8. The Peacebuilding Fund is for (almost) all post-conflict countries

The PBF's current focus is to ensure that projects are cost efficient, but there is little evidence that the main entities responsible for PBF programming in its countries (...) consistently apply principles designed to ensure value for money. (Kluyskens, 2016: 72)

Introduction

The establishment of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) as the financial platform for post-conflict countries within the Peacebuilding Architecture (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180) reveals an institutional dynamic inside the UN that reinforces the notion of how labelling plays an important role in defining eligibility criteria in the promotion of peace. This dynamic through the PBF has its starting point from how its counterpart – the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) – functioned and dealt with countries on its Agenda during its first decade (2005-2015). While, on the one hand, only six countries were included into the PBC, transforming the label *post-conflict countries* into *PBC-country* in a reference to those ones benefited by its intergovernmental advice; the emergence of the PBF, on the other hand, enabled other post-conflict countries beyond those included in the PBC to access funds for peacebuilding, constructing the distinction of *non-PBC countries* as another label in the peacebuilding dynamic at the UN.

Although this thesis is not focused on a comparative analysis between the PBC and the PBF because these new UN bodies differ in their structure and functioning; the common ground among them lays on two points of intersection embedded in the conceptualization of what a post-conflict country should entail: first, referring to the list of countries benefited by both PBC and PBF – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone; and second, referring to countries that requested their inclusion in the PBC's Agenda and were rejected, being, consequently, directed to the PBF support, as were the cases of Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire. As was stated in the previous Chapter, these two countries represent a *thin line* between aspects that determine a country eligibility for peace under the scope of the PBC. The PBF, in this Chapter, brought to its functioning another

perception of what constitutes a post-conflict country through the assignment of another institutional label. In this regard, the PBF became another sphere for peacebuilding in which not only *PBC-countries* were benefited, but where *non-PBC countries* determined intrinsic aspects of PBF's structure and functioning (UN Doc. A/RES/60/287) and, most importantly, its peacebuilding perspective. Defining the PBF as another sphere for peacebuilding in the scope of this thesis is not in vain: while it was created to provide support for *PBC-countries*, countries not labelled this way became the majority within the PBF, making this UN body another protagonist in the peacebuilding arena.

In pragmatic terms, while countries under PBC/PBF scope were only the six aforementioned above, the total number of countries exclusive to the PBF were 27. Based on this scenario, what are the implications for peacebuilding to those labelled as *non-PBC countries*? In order to answer the question that guides this thesis with a focus exclusively on the PBF, I once again apply the notion of *implication* already explained in the previous Chapter, referring to a change on peacebuilding perspective through the conditionality assumed by different actors within the PBF's organizational structure. The debate over the implications for peacebuilding is centered on PBA's first decade (2005-2015) and for this purpose, this Chapter is divided in three parts: first, a discussion of what was the conditionality with regard to *non-PBC countries*' dynamic and how this conditionality contributed to an improvement of peacebuilding within the PBF; second, a discussion on the PBF's normative role within countries benefited from its financial apparatus; and, third, the role of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in enhancing peacebuilding through the PBF.

8.1. Crafting PBF's peacebuilding framework

At the outset, the UNGA's and UNSC's resolutions that established the Peacebuilding Architecture (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180) did not provide a clear overview of how the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) would be and how it would function. While the twin-resolutions were focused on the creation and on the dissemination of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) at a first glance, the PBF was mentioned only in one paragraph and was designed to be "a multiyear standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions (...), with the objective of ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability

of appropriate financing for recovery” (UN Doc. S/RES/1645(2005) para. 24; UN Doc. A/RES/60/180: para. 24). However, as long as the PBC included the first countries in its Agenda – Burundi and Sierra Leone – and had the official meeting on these two configurations on June 2006 (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.1), the PBF coincidentally gained its official scope through its resolution (UN Doc. A/RES/60/287) on September 2006 and “was formally launched on 11 October 2006 and has been in operation since January 2007” (UN Doc. A/62/138: 3). Although the PBF was conceived as an integral part of the PBA while providing financial support to the PBC, its protagonism was smoothly enhanced and separated from its counterpart. My argument over this assumption is based on the first Arrangements for establishing the Peacebuilding Fund in 2006 (UN Doc. A/60/984) and their review in 2009 (UN Doc. A/63/818). Both documents highlight PBF’s structure, functioning, principles, agenda and, most importantly, its criteria for making countries eligible for accessing the Fund based on the Terms of Reference (ToR)¹⁰³, that not only delimited the scenario where the PBF would act upon, but “provide[d] the political framework within which the PBF operates” (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: 7).

The Terms of Reference, as they were conceived in its first version (UN Doc. A/60/984), work as a guide for enhancing the PBF’s decision-making process, as well as enabling it to become a more pro-active body within the PBA, since it was designed to determine influential aspects on the definition of countries’ financial needs and establishing criteria for its prospective countries. In this regard, the ToR enabled the PBF to play an important role on:

- i. “focus[ing] on key areas related to the allocation and disbursement modalities of the Fund” (UN Doc. A/60/984: 2);
- ii. “address[ing] the issue of eligibility for funding” (UN Doc. A/60/984: 2);
- iii. “indicate[ing] that funding from the Peacebuilding Fund will be informed by an analysis of critical gaps in peacebuilding” (UN Doc. A/60/984: 2);

¹⁰³ The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Peacebuilding Fund “were developed based on extensive [formal and informal] consultations (...) with the organizations and bodies of the United Nations system” (A/60/984, page 1) as well as Member States, including delegations of the Peacebuilding Commission. After the consultations, “the Peacebuilding Support Office thus took into account the valuable comments (A/60/984, page 1) to elaborate the document.

- iv. Enhance[ing] national authorities and the United Nations presence in the country concerned by the PBF to conduct the analysis on the gaps in peacebuilding (UN Doc. A/60/984: 2);
- v. “specify[ing] that submissions for funding will be submitted in the form of priority plans that would include the overall funding requirements for peacebuilding interventions and highlight the need for additional support from the Peacebuilding Commission” (UN Doc. A/60/984: 2); and
- vi. “indicat[ing] that the use of the Fund will be actively monitored by the Peacebuilding Support Office” (UN Doc. A/60/984: 2).

When combined, these aforementioned PBF’s influential aspects evidenced that the PBF was the only PBA’s body in which the notion of decision-making was evident on the process of eligibility and, most importantly, that decision-making was an issue of concern discussed internally by the PBF and the PBSO internally (UN Doc. A/66/659). As was expressed in the Arrangements for establishing the Peacebuilding Fund in 2009 (UN Doc. A/63/818), there were two main reasons for reviewing the first version of the PBF’s ToR: first, enhancing the PBF’s “capacity to serve as a flexible, responsive and focused resource for peacebuilding support, including through rationalizing and simplifying the Fund’s structure and architecture” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 2) and, second, enhancing and maximizing “the synergy between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Fund through provisions for enhanced consultation and dialogue” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 2).

Focusing on the first justification for reviewing the ToR, the role of the PBF was improved from one version to another through the delimitation of two levels of conditionality in the process of eligibility: one, determining at what stance the activities to be funded by the PBF must fit in a specific scope (UN Doc. A/60/984; UN Doc. A/63/818) and, two, identifying what those activities should ensure by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Government in order to receive funding from the PBF (UN Doc. A/60/984; UN Doc. A/63/818) (Tables 8.1 and 8.2). Taking both scopes on Table 8.1 as a comparison for improvement, it is possible to state that there was not a substantial change from one version to the other, except for the inclusion of the notion that “activities undertaken in support of efforts to revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends for the population at large” (UN Doc. A/63/818, item c) as a guiding scope for PBF activities.

Table 8.1. Conditionality on the scope of the activities to be funded by the PBF

A/60/984 (2006)	<p>(a) Activities in support of the implementation of peace agreements, in particular in relation to national institutions and processes set up under those agreements;</p> <p>(b) Activities in support of efforts by the country to build and strengthen capacities which promote coexistence and the peaceful resolution of conflict, thereby reducing the likelihood of recurrent conflict;</p> <p>(c) Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities which may include, in exceptional circumstances and over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs;</p> <p>(d) <i>Critical interventions designed to respond to imminent threats to the peacebuilding process</i> (e.g., reintegration of ex-combatants disarmed under a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme).</p>
A/63/818 (2009)	<p>(a) <i>Activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process</i>, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, in particular in relation to strengthening of national institutions and processes set up under those agreements;</p> <p>(b) Activities undertaken to build and/or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peacebuilding activities;</p> <p>(c) <i>Activities undertaken in support of efforts to revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends for the population at large</i>;</p> <p>(d) <i>Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities which may include, in exceptional circumstances and over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs.</i></p>

Source: Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund (UN Doc. A/60/984: 4-5; UN Doc. A/63/818: 4). Emphasis added.

Other improvements refer only to a replacement of conditionality already identified in the 2006 version, in which, first, “interventions designed to respond to imminent threats to the peacebuilding process” (UN Doc. A/60/984, item d) became incorporated into the process of supporting “the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue” (UN Doc. A/63/818, item a); and, second, the condition that determined the “establishment or re-

establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities (...) may include (...) the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs” was transferred from item *c* (UN Doc. A/60/984) to item *d* (UN Doc. A/63/818) without any change in scope. In essence, reviewing PBF’s ToR and making a little change in the scope of the prospective activities represent a field of action for the PBF while enhancing peacebuilding with a focus on areas that play an important role in an approach centered on conflict resolution.

Table 8.2. Conditionality for approving project submissions by the PBF

A/60/984 (2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Support the priorities identified in the priority plan; (b) Seek to address a gap that cannot be funded through any other mechanism; (c) Not duplicate other ongoing interventions.
A/63/818 (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Support the priorities and needs reflected in the priority plan and, <i>for countries included in the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, the priorities established by the Commission;</i> (b) <i>Adhere to the established principles of the Fund;</i> (c) Address any gap that cannot be, or has not been, funded through any other mechanism; (d) Not duplicate other ongoing interventions; (e) <i>Be undertaken by competent recipient organizations with the requisite expertise and capacity.</i>

Source: Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund (UN Doc. A/60/984: 6; UN Doc. A/63/818: 8). Emphasis added.

The contribution in evidencing the improvement of the PBF through a review of its ToR represent a preliminary scope of a PBF’s agenda for reconstruction, in which its perspective on peacebuilding brought specific strategies to the core of its financial support, aiming at strengthening key aspects that could enhance a sustainable peace in its concerned countries, such as implementing peace agreements, supporting political dialogue, strengthening national institutions and national capacities, revitalizing the economy, working for the reestablishment of administrative services and, most importantly, enhancing a practice

focused on generating peace dividends¹⁰⁴. As Jenkins points out, “the PBF became more politicized and more professionalized” (2013: 130) with the establishment and review of its ToR. Although the author argues that “limited progress was made on both fronts” (Jenkins, 2013: 130), referring to the reasons why PBF’s ToR were reviewed – simplifying PBF’s structure and enhancing synergy with the Peacebuilding Commission (UN Doc. A/63/818: 2) – the progress achieved through the review of its ToR can be exemplified by the conditionality that determined intrinsic aspects of prospective PBF’s projects. As Table 8.2 emphasizes, it became evident that a change in perception of what a post-conflict country under the scope of the PBC and/or the PBF entails for accessing financial support had occurred. From the 2006 ToR (UN Doc. A/60/984) to its 2009 review (UN Doc. A/63/818), it became clear that both PBC and PBF play their respective roles into different peacebuilding arenas, when the ToR highlight that the priority plan for peacebuilding does not consider a general overview of a broad peacebuilding plan, but specific conditionality regarding countries included those in the agenda of the PBC (UN Doc. A/63/818, item a).

Beyond the distinction among countries under the PBC and the PBF while accessing PBF funding, 2009 PBF’s ToR review incorporated guiding principles which the intervention through the PBF should adopt. These principles were defined as: transparency, flexibility, operational speed, accountability, catalytic effect, effectiveness, needs-based allocations and national ownership (UN Doc. A/63/818: 4). All of these principles enhanced the PBF in more pragmatic terms within the PBA, even though it shared a common principle with its counterpart – the PBC – with regard to national ownership of a concerned country. In addition, the 2009 ToR review determined that peacebuilding projects in PBF’s concerned countries should “be undertaken by competent recipient organizations” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 8). A change in the conditionality presented in Table 8.2, which not only made the PBF more pragmatic while constructing a broader peacebuilding network outside the domain of the UN, but also improved its decision-making process while encompassing two levels of analysis: “a central allocation of funding to countries eligible for Fund support” and, at the country level, a joint review by the Government and the Senior United Nations Representative of the Secretary-General in the country” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 7). In this

¹⁰⁴ Based on the PBSO, peace dividends “have been historically attributed to increased expenditures on social spending (as less is spent on military spending), resting on the assumption that this promotes peace” (PBSO, 2012: 16). At the institutional level, the UN started using “the concept to describe timely and tangible deliverables, which in particular contexts can facilitate social cohesion and stability, build trust in the peace process and support the state to earn legitimacy under challenging conditions” (PBSO, 2012: 16).

sense, the PBF legitimized the labels *PBC-countries* and *non-PBC countries* through its “two-tier decision-making process” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 7), in which Peacebuilding & Recovery Facility (PRF) and Immediate Response Facility (IRF) replaced the “existing three-window system” (Jenkins, 2013: 130). My argument over this assumption is based on the fact that the PRF and IRF were defined as a mechanism for both *PBC-* and *non-PBC countries*, suggesting that the PBF was eager to play a role in countries excluded from the PBC.

As explained in the review of 2009 PBF’s ToR, the IRF was a response encountered at the institutional level to take “maximum advantage of the ability of the Peacebuilding Fund to act rapidly and flexibly in countries included in the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission as well as those not included in the agenda of the Commission are eligible” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 6) for the funding. The difference, in this process, refers to the fact that, on one hand, the PBC “may offer strategic guidance on immediate and/or critical peacebuilding and recovery needs” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 6) when a PBC-country applies for support to the Immediate Response Facility; while, on the other hand, non-PBC countries must request financial support from the PBF and, when submitted, “the Head of the Peacebuilding Support Office will undertake a rapid and thorough review of the funding request with an accompanying risk assessment” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 6). The same perspective on legitimizing PBC-countries and segregating them from the non-PBC list is valid for better understanding the PBF-PRF.

As mentioned previously in the beginning of this Chapter, the PBF has provided financial support to a total of 33 countries in a decade (2005-2015), being 27 under its exclusive scope while six were included in the PBC Agenda. Nevertheless, the type of funding for peacebuilding plan under the PBF legitimizes a labelling dynamic inside the PBA, as Table 8.3 emphasizes. My argument lays on the fact that not only *PBC-countries* have received financial support for both PRF and IRF plans; as well as those *non-PBC countries*, including the ones that had requested their inclusion in the PBC and were rejected. As it is highlighted in blue in Table 8.3, Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire are truly a *thin line* with regard to the notion on how a *post-conflict country* label can be discrepant inside the UN. This preliminary analysis from the type of ceiling reveals that PBF-PRF became the common mechanism for

financial support in which both *PBC-* and *non-PBC countries*¹⁰⁵ benefited from, creating a meeting point for enhancing a PBF's agenda among countries under its scope and countries that were engaged with the PBC through specific-configurations. Such evidence, nevertheless, differs from the *non-PBC country* label attached to those ones benefited by PBF-IRF alone.

Table 8.3. PBF's financial support to countries based on type of funding and label

Funding type	PRF + IRF	PRF + IRF	IRF only
Label	PBC-country	Non-PBC country	Non-PBC country
Countries	Burundi	<i>Comoros</i>	BiH
	Central African Republic	<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	Colombia
	Guinea	DRC	Chad
	Guinea-Bissau	Guatemala	Haiti
	Liberia	Kyrgyzstan	Kenya
	Sierra Leone	<i>Nepal</i>	Lebanon
		Papua New Guinea	Lybia
		South Sudan	Madagascar
		Uganda	Mali
		Yémen	Myanmar
			Niger
			Philippines
			Sri Lanka
			Somalia
			Sudan
			Tajikistan
			Timor-Leste

Source: Based on the MPTF-O (2016) database. Note that DRC refers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and BiH, for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although some of these *non-PBC countries* were mentioned as prospective ones for inclusion in the PBC's Agenda by some diplomats and UN staff, as well as some documents, as was the case of Haiti and Timor-Leste, there was no official declaration attesting that Haiti

¹⁰⁵ For *non-PBC country* I refer only to the ten ones under the PRF and IRF funding ceiling together, excluding countries benefited by the IRF only.

and Timor-Leste have presented their requests. In this sense, the analysis on the PBF's peacebuilding perspective on the scope of this thesis has two features: first, it permeates only *PBC-* and *non-PBC countries* under the PBF-PRF and PBF-IRF funding ceilings together, totalizing 16 countries as it is highlighted in blue in Table 8.3; and, second, it legitimates an institutional agenda for peacebuilding, reinforcing the main areas designed for *PBC-* *countries* while constructing and promoting similar agendas to countries not labelled this way.

8.2. Improving peacebuilding: a PBF's agenda for post-conflict countries

Understanding the logic behind the establishment of a PBF's agenda for peacebuilding requires, first, comprehending the identification of the challenges that had influenced a respective country to decide for PBF's financial support. Since Burundi and Sierra Leone were the first countries included in the PBC's Agenda, as well as the first ones eligible for PBF, their respective engagements were responsible for defining much of what became conceived as an agenda for reconstruction while their challenges together congregated a common scenario where the Peacebuilding Architecture could enhance its role from. Since the PBF was created to provide financial support to countries in and out of the PBC's Agenda, an analysis on its perspective on peacebuilding becomes embedded on the common challenges both *PBC-* and *non-PBC countries* face. For identifying these challenges, I refer to what was institutionally disseminated by the PBF through the annual Secretary-General's Report on the Peacebuilding Fund (UN Docs. A/62/138; A/63/218-S/2008/522; A/64/217-S/2009/419; A/65/353; A/66/659; A/67/711; A/68/722; A/69/745; A/70/715) covering the PBA's first decade (2005-2015).

In Burundi, some peacebuilding initiatives were designed due to the country's new phase after a civil war and after the agreement that had facilitated the transformation of the *Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de liberation* (Palipehutu-FNL) into a political party (UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419: 7). Nevertheless, as Campbell *et al.* point out, "the rebel groups were not included in the peace agreement; they continued to engage in open combat with the Burundian Army" (2016: 127) and such condition led to the country's commitment with the UN on "preventing it from backsliding" (Campbell *et al.*, 2016: 127). As Sierra Leone served "as a test case for much of the institutional set-up of the

new body, including the format and content of the PBC's instruments of engagement" (Cavalcante, 2016: 145), much of its peacebuilding priority was designed as a consequence of its high level of fragility on political issues. As an example, in March 2009, Sierra Leone faced "the worst political violence since the end of the civil war in 2002" (UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419: 8), and the focus was to foster national political dialogue and reconciliation" (UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419: 8).

The third country to be included in the PBC's Agenda was Guinea-Bissau. Since its engagement with the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Countries Emerging from Conflict (ECOSOC, 2002), Guinea-Bissau represented a challenge as a remnant to the *coup d'état* that occurred in 2012 that led to a significant level of "political and military tension" in the country (UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419: 8), which also led to the suspension of PBC activities, emphasizing that the "recurrent interruptions to constitutional rule in Guinea-Bissau underscore the need to strengthen the preventive as well as remedial dimensions of peacebuilding as envisioned by the UN mechanisms" (Abdenur, et al., 2016: 182). The Central African Republic became eligible for the PBF on January 2008 (PBF, 2008: online) and was the fourth country to be included in the PBC's Agenda (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522). Since it was emerging from conflict and "seemed, to many observers, a stretch, though a 2009 peace agreement ostensibly provided a justification for CAR's classification as a post-conflict country" (Jenkins, 2013: 111), the Central African Republic was characterized for having a complex political situation, weak State capacity, recurrent instability and lawlessness (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 7). A ceasefire agreement was seen as an "opportunity for enhanced peacebuilding support" (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 7) while crafting space for enhancing the national political dialogue (UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419: 7).

The last two countries included in the PBC's Agenda were Liberia and Guinea. Nevertheless, they were first eligible for PBF in October 2007 and June 2008, respectively. At the time of its eligibility, Liberia was considered a country in a pivotal transitional recovery phase, with peacebuilding considered a cornerstone of national development and peace consolidation (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 8). Although its classification was as a stable post-conflict state, Liberia was still fragile, with "many core governance institutions weak and societal divisions remain[ing] as potential drivers of conflict" (Caparini, 2016: 160). Guinea became

eligible for PBF support due to its unstable political scenario. As was stated, the country “has been plagued by political instability that has its roots in a population weary of deteriorating living conditions, and that led, in 2007, to violent street protests” (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 8). The peak of its political instability – as a consequence of the death of the President and the subsequent takeover of power by a military junta (UN Doc. A/64/217–S/2009/419: 10) – had maintained the institutional eyes on the country.

Since Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire requested their inclusion in the PBC but were redirected to the financial support of the PBF, their challenges are mentioned as an illustration of the notion of the *thin line* that intersects realities on the ground on both PBC- and non-PBC countries. Comoros was declared eligible to receive the support of the Fund on 25 June 2008 following a Government request (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 7). At that time, the country was classified by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) as “stable but fragile”, since Comoros was witnessing numerous *coups* or attempted *coups* that had made it difficult to advance peace and stability (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 7), which was a volatile condition to the country due to its remained fragile political situation (UN Doc. A/67/711: 13). Côte d’Ivoire was declared eligible to receive Peacebuilding Fund assistance on 19 June 2008 (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 7).

A brief evaluation stated that “although the security and political climate in Côte d’Ivoire has improved since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2007, the country is still fragile, with the situation characterized by persistently high levels of violent crime and a lack of progress in disarming rebel forces and militia groups” (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 7; UN Doc. A/64/217–S/2009/419). Nepal, one mentioned prospective PBC-country, was the second one to be declared eligible under window II¹⁰⁶ in late December 2007 (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 8) and was mainly focused on the assistance in relation to the peace process (UN Doc. A/63/218–S/2008/522: 8) and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (UN Doc. A/66/659: 16). The Secretary-General declared the Democratic Republic of the Congo eligible to receive Peacebuilding Fund funding on 17 June 2009. Eligibility was justified by the situation in the eastern portion of

¹⁰⁶ Fund allocations provided by the PBF on its first ToR were based on three windows, regarding the label assigned to a country: window I for PBC-countries; window II for non-PBC countries; and window III, for both countries based on emergency needs. With the review of the ToR, these windows were reverted into: Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) as window I and II; and Immediate Response Facility (IRF) as window III.

the country, where “elements of fragility and insecurity remained but significant opportunities for a durable peace were also present, mainly with the signing of accords and agreements between the Government and armed groups” (UN Doc. A/64/217–S/2009/419: 9). Guatemala was declared eligible on 15 November 2010 (PBF, 2010: online). Although the institutional analysis on the country stated that the peace agreement in Guatemala was signed 15 years ago, some critical aspects had never been sustainably addressed (UN Doc. A/66/659: 15). In the case of Kyrgyzstan, its eligibility for PBF was declared in the first half of 2011 due to a wave of inter-ethnic violence, which jeopardized the nascent transition to democracy already warned on June 2010 (UN Doc. A/66/659: 15). The challenges identified on both PBC- and non-PBC countries enable the identification of a common perception of what constitute priorities for peacebuilding, as strategy against lack of institutional capacity, instability at political level, remained fragility at both local and governmental levels, and high level of insecurity.

In this sense, the analysis of the PBF’s peacebuilding perspective through its recipient countries labelled based on its type of funding attests that PBF “is not a PBC’s fund” (Cavalcante, 2019: 221). While, on the one hand, *PBC-countries* received financial support for their respective Strategic Peacebuilding Frameworks – SPF (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4; UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1; UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7; UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3) or Statement of Mutual Commitments – SMC (UN Doc. PBC/4/LBR/2; UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2) focusing on common and specific priorities for peacebuilding embedded in an already existing IMF strategy, named Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IMF, 2005; 2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 2008b; 2009); on the other hand, *non-PBC countries* benefited from the same type of funding upon an approval of eligibility by the Secretary-General via Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), is responsible to “determine the overall country funding envelope based on a review of the priorities set, with due regard for funding needs, the available balance in the Peacebuilding Fund and projected requirements for new countries likely to be considered by the Fund” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 6-7). The difference among them refers to the fact that allocations and disbursements to *non-PBC countries* are “made based on a priority plan jointly developed by national authorities and the United Nations presence in the country concerned” (UN Doc. A/63/818: 6-7), which involves a range of actors at local level, such as the Joint Steering Committee (JSC).

According to the PBF's ToR, the priority plan proposes interventions and provides corresponding indicative budget estimates required to strengthen and sustain the peacebuilding process, at the same time it indicates funding beyond the immediate scope of the PBF (UN Doc. A/63/818: 7). It constitutes the guide for countries to present their peacebuilding programs under the scope discussed above (see Table 8.1.), but, most importantly, it works for countries fitting their plans into specific areas of intervention, constructing and consolidating PBF's agenda for peacebuilding. Before addressing the agenda *per se*, indicating what constitutes it, its main areas of intervention, I briefly point out that the PBF's peacebuilding perspective is built upon the aim to "address immediate needs in countries emerging from conflict at a time when sufficient resources are not available from other funding mechanisms that could extend support to peacebuilding activities" (UN Doc. A/60/984: 5) in order to achieve sustainable peace on key strategies areas, such as social, economic and political field that serve the needs of the population (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 9). As the second annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund points out, there is a tendency in which many post-conflict countries addressed by the PBF have common "systemic roots whose causes are typically complex" (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 9), varying from unequal political representation, skewed land distribution, marginalization, lack of access to justice and respect for human rights (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 9).

In order to address these "systemic roots" on post-conflict countries, the priority plan designed for *non-PBC countries* was working on two fronts: being focused on the "early stages of a peacebuilding process, before donor conferences are organized and such funding mechanisms as country-specific multi-donor trust funds have been set up" (UN Doc. A/60/984: 5) and enhancing PBF concerned countries "to analyse and deal with some of the structural causes of the conflict and to prioritize the most critical interventions needed for peace consolidation" (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 9). Nevertheless, establishing what a country really needs for its reconstruction as part of the process of designing a priority plan, transform the conditionality on the scope of the activities to be funded by the PBF into eleven strategies (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 9) later defined as "lower-level Outcome Areas" (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 9) as part of a broad four main priority areas (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 9; PBF, 2013: 10-16; PBF, 2014: 12-30):

- i. Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue
 - a. Security sector reform (SSR)
 - b. Rule of law (ROL)
 - c. Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of former combatants (DDR)
 - d. Political dialogue for peace agreements
- ii. Promote co-existence and peaceful resolution of conflict
 - e. National reconciliation
 - f. Democratic governance
 - g. Management of natural resources (including land)
- iii. Revitalize the economy and generate peace dividends
 - h. Short term employment generation
 - i. Sustainable livelihoods
- iv. Re-establish essential administrative services
 - j. Public administration
 - k. Public service delivery (including infrastructure)

An interesting aspect taken from this PBF's agenda for post-conflict countries lays on the fact that Kluyskens and Clark (2014) call each specific strategy as "lower-level Outcome Areas". The term "outcome" is mentioned in the scope of this thesis as an intrinsic aspect to decision-making processes, highlighting that decisions made imply the emergence of both expected and unexpected outcomes. The outcomes, in my analysis, can, on the one hand, evidence a mutual agreement between countries and institution through the conditionality over the promotion of the prevailing agenda for reconstruction; and, on the other hand, refer to what is expected from the United Nations when countries request PBF's financial support for peacebuilding. At this point, my argument is corroborated by the PBF, when it "defines 'outcomes' as those changed behaviours (individual or institutional) or changed perceptions (e.g. increased confidence in the Government) that are estimated to contribute to peacebuilding" (UN Doc. A/66/659: 19).

At a first glance, all these strategies aiming at peacebuilding represent the existence of a common agenda which both *PBC*- and *non-PBC countries* implement. Nevertheless, the division I proposed in the previous Chapter with regard to the agenda for PBC-countries based in their respective Strategic Peacebuilding Framework (SPF) or Statement of Mutual

Commitments (SMC) into *common* and *specific priorities* is corroborated when the number of peacebuilding projects financed by the PBF to each category is analyzed. As Table 8.4 shows below, peacebuilding projects on energy power, property & land, community affected by conflict and other PBF financial support characterized as unallocated¹⁰⁷ were exclusive to PBC-countries only as part of their specific priorities, as highlighted in blue.

Table 8.4. Quantity of projects per theme financed by the PBF (2005-2015)

Peacebuilding Theme	Number of projects	PBC-country	Non-PBC country
Democratic Governance	76	56	20
Security	59	33	26
Youth Emp/Emp*	43	21	22
Human Rights	9	8	1
Public Administration	34	16	18
National Politic Dialogue	9	4	5
Energy Power	1	1	-
Property & Land	2	2	-
Community Aff. by Conflict	13	13	-
PBF Unallocated	4	4	-
IRF	82	47	35
Total of projects	332	205	127
	100%	62%	38%

Source: Based on MPTF-O (2016) database.

* Employment/Empowerment.

Second, the other themes, in contrast, not only represent the common priority of what a PBC-country implements but, most importantly, represent what a non-PBC country also establishes as part of its peacebuilding plan. Such evidence on what PBF finances for *PBC*- and *non-PBC countries* posits a range of questions regarding the PBC's added value with

¹⁰⁷ Unallocated refers to projects financially supported by the PBF in which there is no specific theme identified. The four projects identified as "unallocated" were implemented in Sierra and refer to: i) Supporting the Implementation of the Joint Communiqué through an Independent Investigation into Allegations of Rape and Sexual Violence against Women at the SLPP Headquarters on 16 Mar 2009 (project number 00071605); ii) Supporting the Implementation of the Joint Communiqué through the refurbishment of the SLPP Headquarters (project number 00071607); iii) People-Centred Security Governance: Special Initiative to Promote Community Women's Participation in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Process in Sierra Leone (project number 00071613); and iv) Independent Review Panel (project number 00073335). (MPTF-O, 2016)

regard to a country included in its agenda. If it is taken into account that those not included in the PBC are benefited by the same type of priorities, the possibility of receiving financial support by the PBF without any engagement or commitment within the PBC sustains and reinforces the labelling stigmatization a *PBC-country* posits to those not labelled this way. The main reason diplomats affirmed for not engaging with the PBC is due to the image a country will face when it takes part on this intergovernmental body, while being compared as a “sick” country in need for “quick recovery” (PBF1); and that its configuration format (PBF3, PBF5) did not provide flexibility for other countries to engage. Embedded on Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu’s (2018) contribution, the stigma countries face when they reject any possibility of being associated to the PBC refers to a process of what they call as *differentiation*. In their perspective,

difference is often associated to ‘informal institutions’ or ‘tradition’; yet these ‘characteristics’ only become salient through the use and acceptance of a specific normative frame influenced by Western perceptions of the ‘normal’. In this frame, difference is identified in relation to what the Self believes *himself* to be. As such, emphasizing difference (even as something to be celebrated or as a space where bottom-up peace initiatives can be designed) does not remove the stigma attached to it insofar as what passes for ‘normal’ is not questioned nor made explicit. (Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu, 2018: 289).

Third, both PBC- and non-PBC countries have received financial support from the PBF to implement peacebuilding plans over three main broad agendas: Democratic Governance, Security, and Youth Employment and Empowerment, totalizing 178 projects. From a PBF’s perspective on peacebuilding, projects on democratic governance aim to establish “permanent frameworks for dialogue to develop broad national peacebuilding strategies, implement anti-corruption legislation and promote a culture of democracy which will allow for the peaceful resolution of potential causes of conflict” (UNDP, 2009: 20-21); while projects on the security sector “aim to address some of the most pressing problems facing the judiciary, police and security forces in terms of enforcing the rule of law, conflict and dispute resolution, and reducing the threat of tension and violence” (UNDP, 2009: 23). In both areas, the one focusing on Youth Empowerment and Employment is transversally implemented with an aim to promote “a cohesive society” (UNDP, 2009: 20-21). Those areas of intervention and the others mentioned as a general peacebuilding priority financed by the PBF are chosen also based on already existing plans for reconstruction and stability.

As some diplomats pointed out, priorities are just adapted from the “National Plan” (D-7) as a result of a partnership with the national government through the ministries “reflecting the work of the international cooperation” (D-2) on this issue. In contrast the themes of the projects are just “selected by the PBSO as a strategy to enhance a direct relationship with the country” (D-9). Such evidence opens the debate for an approach centered on the role of the PBSO in crafting space while identifying prospective countries eligible for financial support by the PBF in order to consolidate the Fund’s domain in peacebuilding at the UN.

Finally, there is a prevalence of more approved peacebuilding projects to PBC-countries rather than to non-PBC ones. In the decade in analysis, 205 of them were financed to PBC-countries alone, representing more than half of the PBF’s funding allocation in terms of the number of projects approved (62% of 332 projects). This difference suggest that PBC-countries became a priority on approved projects for funding allocations. Although this information is provided by an analysis of project per project with regard to each country, both PBC- and non-PBC, such analysis does not consider the number of projects submitted to the PBSO for approval. Although such data could provide an analysis of PBF’s efficiency on projects submitted, projects approved and funding allocation, in that order; it could also indicate other underlying reasoning on making projects eligible for funding in the PBA’s dynamic. As a UN staff explained, “the PBF receives a lot of projects”, but there is no information about this number “once the PBF does not count on projects that were not approved previously” (P-4). The PBSO and the PBF only considers the ones approved and regularly monitored at the MPTF Gateway Database.

Nevertheless, the UN staff pointed out that approving a project for the PBF is based on an excluding-question: “what are the benefits of the project applied to the PBF in establishing a peacebuilding culture in the local level it is to be implemented? In answering this question, countries must explain and provide a conflict analysis about all possibilities it aims to achieve” (P-4). The UN staff continues explaining that this conditionality posited to non-PBC countries is previously evaluated by the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) “who comprises the decision-making body” at country level (P-4). In the case of Liberia – before its inclusion in the PBC’s Agenda – the JSC “found itself rejecting many proposals for [PBF’s funding] owing to a poor understanding of peacebuilding and poor design quality” (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 14-15). In order to enable Liberia’s projects approval,

“additional advisory services were brought in to help recipient agencies and implementing partners in the development of project proposals” (UN Doc. A/63/218-S/2008/522: 14-15). Although Liberia presented a peculiar case on the selection of projects and the member of the PBF’s AG explained a general solution for a challenge on making those projects approved, the case of the Central African Republic showed an unclear process over this issue. In a meeting of the configuration of the Central African Republic (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/SR.2), the Egyptian diplomat asked for details about “the selection criteria that had been adopted” on the occasion of the approval of “11 projects that would be funded with US\$ 10 million from the Peacebuilding Fund” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/SR.2: 6). As a first-answer, the former ASG for PBSO, Jane Holl Lute, reproduced the institutional reasoning pointing out that “peacebuilding was a complex and painstaking process” and that CAR’s projects were selected based on “the four priority areas of engagement” (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/SR.2: 7). As a second-answer, the Minister of Planning, Economy and International Cooperation of the Central African Republic at that time, Sylvain Maliko, said that:

the 11 projects (...) had been selected from over 70 proposals. The projects tackled issues involving the four priority areas that had thus far been comparatively neglected. All but one of the projects addressed security sector reform. One project, promoting the demobilization of soldiers and in particular child soldiers, had originally accounted for \$6 million of the funds available; however, budgetary constraints meant that only some \$2 million could be allocated to it. With regard to the second priority area, namely, good governance and the rule of law, a project supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was intended to protect the rights of the child. The Department of Communications was working together with the [UNESCO] to improve local community radio, which could disseminate a powerful message in favour of peace and reconciliation. (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/SR.2: 7)

What becomes clear from that assertion is the common conditionality all submitted projects to the PBF must fit: being a tool for enhancing peacebuilding at the local level. In addition, that assertion reveals three other aspects on the PBF’s dynamic: first, a panorama on selected projects per country under the PBA; second, respective funding allocations for those projects; and, third, the dissemination of an agenda embedded in a peacebuilding framework. With regard to the first aspect, identifying which project per country was selected evidences not only how PBF’s perspective on peacebuilding was disseminated over PBA’s first decade, but most importantly, which project was most diffused reinforcing PBF’s agenda, and which

one had its niche underfinanced (Table 8.5). The data on quantifying projects per country reflects the scenario where the PBF operates and enables the emergence of other sources of information in order to better understand the dynamic over the conditionality, selectiveness, eligibility of a country for the PBA. As Kluyskens and Clark mention, since the creation of the PBF, PBC-countries “have received more than half of the total PBF funding” (2014: xvii).

Table 8.5. Number of projects per PBF’s theme to PBC- and non-PBC countries (2005-2015)

	Democratic Gov.	Security	Youth Emp/Emp.	Human Rights	Public Adm.	Nat. Pol. Dialogue	Energy Power	Property & Land	Comm. Af. Conflict	PBF Unallocated	IRF	Total
Burundi	13	5	-	4	-	1	-	1	-	-	4	28
CAR	8	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	13	-	10	35
Guinea	11	8	6	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	13	42
G. Bissau	2	6	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	9	20
Liberia	14	2	12	-	9	2	-	1	-	-	2	42
Sierra L.	8	9	1	4	2	-	1	-	-	4	9	38
Comoros	4	4	6	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	18
C. d’Ivoire	3	3	-	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	4	15
DRC	1	5	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	2	16
Guatemala	-	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	5
Kyrgyzstan	5	4	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	10	23
Nepal	3	4	3	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	3	16
P.N. Guinea	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	7
S. Sudan	-	-	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	8
Uganda	2	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	5
Yemen	1	2	4	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	6	14

Source: Based on the MPTF-O (2016) database.

In that regard:

- i. projects on Human Rights and National Politic Dialogue were the least requested priorities for intervention with PBF funding. Only 9 projects were approved in each cluster, while being implemented in 3 and 7 countries, respectively;
- ii. projects on National Politic Dialogue were not approved/selected/requested by/in 9 countries: Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Comoros, DRC, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, South Sudan and Uganda;
- iii. Côte d’Ivoire was the unique non-PBC country to implement a project on Human Rights, while Burundi and Sierra Leone – as PBC-ones – implemented four each on this area;
- iv. whilst projects on Energy Power, Property & Land, Communities Affected by Conflict and PBF Unallocated were defined as specific priorities for PBC-countries only, three of these priorities were limited to one country each, while Property & Land was implemented in Burundi and Liberia; and
- v. Guatemala, Uganda, Papua New Guinea and South Sudan implemented less than 10 projects each.

Although their analysis refers to a timeframe of only six years, from 2008 to 2013 (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014) considering their launched review of the PBF in 2014; what is truly on their assumption is the fact that the PBF provided “significantly more resources to PBC countries than to non-PBC” (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 54) during that time. Assuming the distinction over PBC- and non-PBC countries based on the same type of funding, Table 8.6 shows that 63% of the total PBF’s funding has being allocated to only six countries under the PBC’s Agenda, while 10 non-PBC ones have received the remaining 37% of that support.

Table 8.6. Amount and percentage of PBF’s funding to PBC- and non-PBC countries (2007-2015)

Label	PBC-countries		non-PBC countries	
	PRF	IRF	PRF	IRF
Amount in US\$	268,530,459	65,015,804	148,725,030	51,277,837
Total in US\$	333,546,263		200,002,867	
Percentage	63%		37%	

Source: Based on the MPTF-O (2016) database.

Motivated by a broad overview of PBF’s allocations over the first decade and also motivated by the initial Kluyskens and Clark’s (2014) contribution for comprehending a general perception of PBF’s funding to PBC- and non-PBC countries, I decided to include a consolidated amount of its financial support. In Table 8.7, I mention what was financed also to non-PBC countries under the PBF-IRF funding type alone and I also bring two other units: a funding designed as Direct Cost¹⁰⁸ in the respective PBF concerned country, and what was allocated to the United Nations through its participating organizations as funding recipients. In this broad scenario, the PBF’s consolidated allocation evidences that first, it corroborates that six countries in the PBC’s Agenda alone have concentrated 51% of the total PBF’s funding.

Table 8.7. Consolidated PBF’s financial support (2007-2015)

	Type of funding	Amount in US\$	Total in US\$	%
PBC	PRF	268,530,459	335,169,382	51%
	IRF	65,015,804		
	Direct Cost	1,623,119		
non-PBC	PRF	148,725,030	288,884,543	45%
	IRF	51,277,837		
	Direct Cost	184,800		
	IRF only	88,696,876		
UN	IRF	294,464	24,819,167	4%
	Direct Cost	24,524,703		

Source: Based on the MPTF-O (2016) database.

Second, 45% has been allocated to 27 countries labelled as non-PBC – being 10 under analysis in this thesis and 17 only benefited from the PBF-IRF. Based on Otobo, the high level of financial support to countries under the PBC can be explained taking into account “the existence of three categories on the basis of their initial fiscal conditions and the extent to their external support when conflict ends” (2015: 47). These categories include countries “that draw on their own financial resources to meet their postconflict peacebuilding needs”

¹⁰⁸ Direct Cost is designed where “participating organization is requested to provide support to the [Joint] Steering Committee/Executive Committee/Resource Management Committee of the MPTF/JP/One UN Fund” (MPTF-O, 2017a).

(Otobo, 2015: 47); the second category include countries that classified as ‘donor darlings’, referring to those countries that are the preference of the donors (Otobo, 2015: 47); and the third category, comprising ‘donor orphans’, in which external financial support is limited (Otobo, 2015: 47). As Otobo explains, “by coming on the agenda of the PBC, any postconflict country that belongs to the third category potentially stands a better chance of increased international attention, including financial support” (2015: 47). Third, Direct Cost appears as a type of funding, although it does not configure as funding for specific projects or programs on peacebuilding. It was allocated to Burundi (MPTF-O, 2017b), Central African Republic (MPTF-O, 2017c), Guinea (MPTF-O, 2017d), Guinea-Bissau (MPTF-O, 2017e), Liberia (MPTF-O, 2017f), Sierra Leone (MPTF-O, 2017g), Comoros (MPTF-O, 2017h) and Kyrgyzstan (MPTF-O, 2017i), totalizing US\$ 1,807,919. Fourth, this same type of funding was allocated to the United Nations when US\$ 24,524,703 were disbursed aiming three main objectives: (i) implementing PBSO’s activities related to the PBF, (ii) expenditures related to the Advisory Group and (iii) support to the office of the Senior UN Representative and the national counterparts responsible for the management of the PBF programme at the country level (MPTF-O, 2017j). In this specific case, “direct cost [is] approved by PBSO in support of the PBF’s operations at global and country levels at a rate not to exceed 3% of the amount contributed by each Donor” (MPTF-O, 2017k)¹⁰⁹.

The other funding allocation to the UN was provided by a PBF-IRF branch, in support of the review of the 2013 PBF’s business model and its strategic position within the peacebuilding architecture (MPTF-O, 2017l)¹¹⁰. Despite these four aspects, the dynamic through financial allocation by the PBF reveals intrinsic aspects of its main feature: being a promising peacebuilding mechanism inside the UN. This prospective role, in question, reinforces the legitimization of labelling among countries benefited by the PBF. What really configures as thought provoking on the PBC-PBF dynamic is the fact that the PBF crafted its own niche outside the PBC’s domain on peacebuilding and became responsible for managing financial support to 27 countries, instead being limited to only six. As Kluyskens and Clark (2014) later mention:

¹⁰⁹ The funding allocation to the UN through a Direct Cost was approved from 31 December 2008 until 31 December 2020 and involved two of its participating organizations: the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Program (MPTF-O, 2017k).

¹¹⁰ The IRF funding ceiling to the UN was approved from 13 June 2013 until 31 December 2014 through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations – DPKO (MPTF-O, 2017l).

One of the concerns regarding the level of PBF funding to PBC countries is whether the high funding level for PBC countries reduces its allocations for non-PBC countries. PBF has had more funds than it could programme throughout most of its existence, so it would seem that over these years PBF funding was not a zero-sum game. (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 56)

The concern mentioned by Kluyskens and Clark (2014) finds support on the PBF's early years, when "the Secretary-General [Ban Ki-moon] announced country envelopes of US\$ 35 million each for Burundi and Sierra Leone" (A/62/138, page 8), causing a misperception that every PBC-country would receive similar financial support for peacebuilding without any plan, as pointed out by a former UN staff (P-6).

Table 8.8. PBF's funding to PBC- and non-PBC country (2007-2015)

Country	Amount in US\$
Central African Republic	87,440,765
Guinea	60,634,854
Burundi	58,382,910
Sierra Leone	52,169,736
Liberia	45,943,088
Côte d'Ivoire	34,234,626
Kyrgyzstan	29,307,149
Guinea-Bissau	28,974,910
Democratic Republic of the Congo	28,627,175
Nepal	22,724,436
Yemen	20,703,554
South Sudan	16,521,947
Uganda	15,460,918
Comoros	12,332,227
Guatemala	10,999,999
Papua New Guinea	9,090,836

Source: Based on the MPTF-O (2016) database.

Although Table 8.8 reinforces a predominance on funding allocations to PBC-countries, as is the case of Central African Republic, Guinea, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Liberia, in that order, I argue that much of what the PBF became while being just a financial mechanism

within the PBA is a result of a permanent evaluation of its role and a commitment at the organizational level enabling it to be a more influential promising peacebuilding actor. For promising peacebuilding actor, I refer to the fact that PBF's allocated data evidences not only the dynamic over which country has received more funding allocations by the PBF but, most importantly, that those prioritized were also previously classified as "aid orphans"¹¹¹ (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 54). Such designation tends to reinforce the underlying reasoning in determining countries' engagement to one of the two PBA's bodies, at the same time it plays a role on making the PBF another politicized UN body.

8.3. Financing peacebuilding: a dynamic on money flows

Even though the PBF was conceived as a fund for post-conflict peacebuilding (UN Doc. S/RES/1645 (2005); UN Doc. A/RES/60/180; UN Doc. A/RES/60/287), it "had a difficult start" (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: i). The reasons presented by Ball and van Beijnum (2009) for that difficulty refer to "the political demands from New York to disburse rapidly, before PBF systems were fully in place or recipients had a clear idea what the purposes of the fund were" (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: i). To these two aspects, I add the fact that the space crafted by the PBF inside the UN while being a fund managed by the MPTF-O was a very competitive one, with 181 other funding mechanisms beyond the PBF taking place during the period in analysis (2005-2015). In addition, the PBF was not only funding peacebuilding interventions to the aforementioned PBC- and non-PBC countries, but also to other funding mechanisms that, on the one hand, were identified for having similar recipient countries already supported by the PBF and, on the other hand, received financial support from the PBF, which means that the PBF was not only funding peacebuilding projects under its four priorities, but also supporting projects through other correlated funding mechanisms.

In the PBA's first decade (2005-2015), the PBF consolidated US\$ 671,913,093 (MPTF-O, 2016) on commitments by donors. Since this amount relies on voluntary contributions by UN member states, organizations and individuals (PBF, 2019), the dynamic on money flows contributes to better understand the PBF's peacebuilding perspective through intrinsic

¹¹¹ On Kluyskens and Clark's review, Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic were the countries which have received the largest financial support by PBF since 2007: \$49.2 million, \$46.9 million and \$33.4 million, respectively (2014: 54).

aspects on the politics on from whom and to whom the money is donated. This debate is important for two reasons: first, because former and current UN staff, as well as diplomats and scholars mentioned that the PBF was/is “under-resourced” (P-1, P-2, P-3) and, second, because this notion functions as a reinforcement tool that, whilst it limits the possibility of the PBF increasing its level of funding for peacebuilding and for more countries, it also limits the whole PBA structure in its ability to become a structural peacebuilding actor.

To sustain these assumptions, I take a different position from the one pointed out by Otobo, who named as *fiction* the fact that the “PBC is dominated by the Security Council, the principal donors of UN system and the largest troop contributors” (2015: 98). I would say that that fiction, if taken without criticism, does not bring to light the PBC as dependent on the PBF, and that assumption explains not only the underlying reasons why the PBF became, for an entire decade, an under-resourced fund mechanism but, most importantly, the way some donors decided to enhance the PBA while others donors just minimized its role through lesser donations. During the period in analysis, the PBF received donations from 54 UN member states. From this total, two of them provided funding through their respective agencies for international cooperation, as was the case of Canada, through its Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the United Kingdom, through its Department for International Development (DFID). The Organization of Islamic Conference and the Private Sector also figure as donors. In order to explain this dynamic and the assumptions I put forward above, I provide a general overview of quantitative data that illustrates the money flows through PBF donors’ commitments. Based on Table 8.9, there are three factors that guide and sustain these arguments.

First, the role played by the Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5) – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States of America, highlighted in blue – evidences a controversy and dichotomy on debate and action in terms of strengthening the PBF. Taking back Otobo’s (2015) assumption, part of his argument is embedded on the role played and *not* played by some P5 while enhancing PBF through financial contributions. The author, who also assumed a temporary position as ASG for PBSO, later explained the fiction he named, pointing out that “the criticism or observation that permanent members of the Security Council dominate the PBC can be sustained if domination is by inaction” (Otobo, 2015: 99) and that the “real problem with the Security Council permanent members’

attitude towards the PBF is not one of domination but of neglect or indifference” (Otobo, 2015: 99).

Table 8.9. PBF donors’ commitments (2005-2015)

1	DFID, UK	152,083,622	27	Brazil	590,000
2	Sweden	117,225,194	28	Kuwait	500,000
3	Netherlands	72,365,567		U. Arab Emirates	500,000
4	Norway	56,258,897	29	Mexico	370,000
5	Japan	42,500,000	30	Czech Rep.	356,399
6	Germany	36,729,390	31	Poland	288,504
7	CIDA, Canada	33,855,496	32	Estonia	273,383
8	Finland	24,763,094	33	USA	250,000
9	Australia	18,711,600	34	Indonesia	180,000
10	Denmark	17,750,837	35	Croatia	148,000
11	Spain	17,629,873	36	Romania	147,210
12	Ireland	16,418,475	37	Egypt	110,000
13	Russia	16,000,000	38	Libya	100,000
14	China	8,000,000		Malaysia	100,000
15	South Korea	6,000,000	39	Slovenia	41,688
16	Italy	5,974,597	40	Slovak	41,538
17	Belgium	5,051,078	41	Cyprus	40,000
18	Luxembourg	4,867,145	42	Morocco	35,000
19	India	4,000,000	43	Peru	23,841
20	France	2,881,600	44	Colombia	20,000
21	Austria	2,108,550		Org. Islamic Conf.	20,000
22	Turkey	1,700,000		Thailand	20,000
23	Iceland	1,000,000	45	Private Sector	19,333
	Portugal	1,000,000	46	Pakistan	15,000
24	Switzerland	844,944	47	Bahrain	10,000
25	Chile	770,149		Israel	10,000
26	Qatar	600,000	48	Nigeria	8,039
	Saudi Arabia	600,000	49	Bangladesh	5,000

Source: Based on the MPTF-O (2016) database.

His argument comes from a brief analysis on P5 engagement to the PBF until 2014, when at that time:

- i. one member “has made no contribution to the PBF since the Fund was established” (Otobo, 2015: 99), which was the case of the United States of America, that later made a contribution of US\$250 thousands to the PBF just once, on December 2015 (MPTF-O, 2016);
- ii. “another [member] has contributed less than US\$3 million” (Otobo, 2015: 99, added), which was the case of France, that made contribution to the PBF in 2007 (US\$1,359,100) and 2008 (US\$1,522,500), totalizing US\$2,881,600 until 2015 (MPTF-O, 2016);
- iii. “another [member] has made a total contribution of US\$8 million” (Otobo, 2015: 99), that was the case of China, which provided contribution on a regular amount of US\$1,000,000 in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2015. In 2013, China’s commitment to the PBF was of US\$2,000,000 (MPTF-O, 2016);
- iv. Russia “has contributed a total of US\$14 million” (Otobo, 2015: 99), but has consolidated a commitment on PBF’s first decade on US\$16 million (MPTF-O, 2016); and
- v. “only one [P5 member] has topped the charts by making a commitment of over US\$141 million” (Otobo, 2015: 99), that was the case of the United Kingdom through its Department for International Development (DFID), which consolidated a total of US\$ 152,083,622 to the PBF in its first decade (MPTF-O, 2016).

Although Otobo (2015) did not identify which country made which contribution to the PBF in his analysis, bringing those countries into the light refers to the fact that identifying them is a way to comprehend intrinsic aspects in the decision-making process within the PBA embedded in a dynamic of money flows taking into account each P5 member’s positioning. In addition, the data in Table 8.9 enables an understating of what is in between the lines with regard to P5 members’ discursive action with regard to the PBA. In my perspective, what some of the P5 members say does not reflect their real engagement with the PBA. My first point on this issue refers to Russia’s positioning: at some Security Council meetings on peacebuilding, Russia affirmed it had provided “annual contribution to the Fund of \$2million” (UN Docs. S/PV.6396: 16; S/PV.6503: 8; S/PV.6643: 20; S/PV.6805: 15;

S/PV.7143: 18; S/PV.7359: 11). However, when analyzed in depth, Russia's discourse reflects the construction of the image such P5 member wants to promote among its peers. In true, Russia operationalizes its discourse in order to justify why it does not provide financial contribution to the PBF regularly as it affirms it does. In a more detailed analysis, Russia made funding contributions to the PBF five times during its first decade: in 2008 (US\$2 million); 2010 (US\$4 million); 2011 (US\$2 million); 2014 (US\$6 million) and 2015 (US\$2 million) (MPTF-O, 2016). I call attention that these contributions were not on a yearly basis, but that the total amount donated to the Fund since 2008 enabled Russia to construct a discourse in which its donation was supposedly provided year by year. Such positioning evidences a level of cynicism, since it affirms it provides total support to the PBA while its financial support contributes for putting the PBF in an under-resourced level.

Another aspect in this dynamic refers to the USA commitment to the PBF. In 2015, USA government donated US\$250,000 and this was the only money allocation the USA provided to the Fund. That amount is comparatively lesser than the one the US provided for Peacekeeping Operations¹¹² in a yearly basis during the same decade under analysis. From 2005 to 2015, the USA were the main contributor for peacekeeping while being responsible for 27% (UN, 2009, 2010, 2011b; Schaefer, 2015) of a budget that varied from US\$3.87 billion in 2004 (UN, 2004) to an estimated US\$8 billion in 2015 (UN Doc. A/C.5/69/17). Although the USA engaged in reducing "its assessment for peacekeeping, which has outstripped the U.N. regular budget in size and resulted in an increasingly heavy financial burden on the permanent members of the Security Council" (Schaefer, 2015: 4), reducing¹¹³ it to a proposed "25 percent has been a long-term objective of the U.S." (Schaefer, 2017: 1). In this sense, while the "U.N. peacekeeping is important and can serve U.S. interests" (Schaefer, 2017: 4), UN peacebuilding remains a neglected (Otobo, 2015: 99) agenda evidenced by the USA and the other P5 commitments to the PBF.

Nevertheless, I agree that neglect is also an act of domination, in which some members of the UNSC do not provide essential support for peacebuilding in order not to lose control

¹¹² As Schaefer mentioned, "the peacekeeping budget can fluctuate significantly as missions are established, expanded, contracted, or terminated" (2015: 2) and its approved year budget starts on July to June of the subsequent year.

¹¹³ As Schaefer explains, the U.N. scale of assessments is a zero-sum game and, "in order for the U.S. assessment to fall, the assessments for other countries must rise" (2017: 4)

over countries included in an agenda of a UN body identified as its “competitor”, quoting what a diplomat said (D-19). Consequently, the Security Council dominates the entire PBA in a reverse way: with less money, the PBF limits its capacity to provide support to countries included in its scope and in the PBC’s agenda, damaging not only the PBF’s role, but also the PBC’s achievements on peacebuilding.

Second, the dynamic on money flows is also represented by the engagement of the PBF’s major donors. In 2009, DFID commissioned a review on the PBF on behalf of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009)¹¹⁴ which was one among internal (OIOS, 2008; Kluyskens and Clark, 2014) and external evaluations (van Beijnum, 2013); including both 2010 (UN Doc. A/64/686-S/2010/393) and 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490) reviews of the PBA that aimed at evaluating its general achievements through the intersection of the role played by the PBC, the PBF and the PBSO. The review aimed at more than analyzing the PBF’s structure. It focused on the PBF’s strategic role, its delivery, management and accountability, and its knowledge and information (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: 1). What the review found was a PBF functioning embedded in a process of reinforcing labelling and decision-making as a co-constitutive practice:

The role of the PBC determining PBF eligibility seems to be a further complicating factor in this respect. The PBSO initially developed a long list of potential PBF recipient countries, but not every country on that list was keen to become a PBF country. Some countries were reluctant to be considered at risk of relapsing into conflict. Others did not want to associate themselves with the PBF because they felt it carried a risk of coming onto the PBC agenda (which was deemed politically undesirable, as it was associated with admitting to a certain level of weakness and perceived to be allowing international interference in national affairs). As the Fund needs to be demand driven, negotiating PBF eligibility is a process that takes time, persuasion and knowledge. (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: 10-11)

Ball and van Beijnum’s (2009) assumption corroborates the main argument of this thesis, that a decision-making process involves a dynamic of replacing and reinforcing labels and is embedded in intrinsic aspects such as time, persuasion and knowledge. Although the authors do not mention *perception* as a driver in the eligibility process of becoming a country

¹¹⁴ Although Ball and van Beijnum (2009) mentioned that the top-five contributors to the PBF at the time of the review were Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and UK, I explain that the five major donors consolidated in 2008 were Sweden (US\$ 54,555,181), Netherlands (US\$ 46,456,518), UK (US\$ 35,897,400), Norway (US\$ 32,124,458) and Japan (US\$ 20,000,000), on that order (MPTF-O, 2019). Canada was among the ten contributors, assuming the sixth position. The five major donors remain the same if comparing Ball and van Beijnum’s (2009) list and the consolidated on table 9 of this thesis, despite a change in the order.

under the PBF, the notion of perception is valuable while identifying that prospective countries for the PBF were reluctant on being associated with two different connotations: as a country “at risk of relapsing into conflict” (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: 10-11), and as a country which “carried a risk of coming onto the PBC agenda” (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: 10-11). As Kluyskens and Clark corroborate, “some countries that considered applying but preferred not to have what they understood might be the negative connotations of ‘fragility’ associated with being a PBC country” (2014: 35). Pursuing this argument further and considering the three-layered model of the PBF’s decision-making previously discussed on Chapters 5 and 6, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) stated that:

each decision-making level is fraught with difficulty, the strategic basis of decisions progressively declines at each sequential level of decision-making, from the determination of country eligibility to the identification of each country’s most critical peacebuilding gaps to the selection of the optimal projects and partners for addressing these gaps. (OIOS, 2008: 15)

The concern, in question, refers to the rationality that should guide PBF’s decisions, but such rationality is confronted when “the current list of PBF-assisted countries does not necessarily represent the most rational list of those in greatest need of peacebuilding assistance” (OIOS, 2008: 16). Such statement evidences that, “in practice, decision-making processes do not always lead to the selection of the most critical interventions for addressing the critical peacebuilding priority at hand” (OIOS, 2008: 17). In that regard, my argument is corroborated once more, in which the structure established for peacebuilding based on a specific post-conflict label does not contemplate all countries labelled that way, creating a distinction through the politicization of a peacebuilding institutional strategy, as was in the case of Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire and Nepal.

In addition, Ball and van Beijnum also conclude that priority plans produced until 2008 did not uniformly prioritize the most urgent needs in terms of peacebuilding due to a lack of “clarity on what constitutes peacebuilding” and a lack of “mapping of comparative advantages of different types of funding” (2009: 11). Their contribution corroborates what OIOS’ (2008) review stated, elucidating that these two aforementioned lacks belong to a level of insufficient institutional capacity (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: 13) causing a spillover effect marked by three aspects. First, the “Fund’s decision-making processes remain insufficiently strategic in identifying the peacebuilding countries most in need, the

most critical priorities, or the optimal projects and partners for addressing these priorities” (OIOS, 2008: 15). Second, the Fund remains with a high level of insufficient capacity, which leads to the third aspect, associated to the dynamic on money flows within the PBF: the engagement of the UN agencies responsible for implementing peacebuilding priorities in the respective concerned countries and the subsequent competition for financial resources among them.

Since UN agencies are an intrinsic part of the PBF’s intervention in post-conflict countries, “all projects must include a UN recipient agency charged with overseeing project management, monitoring and reporting, and ultimately fiduciary responsibility and accountability for project performance” (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: 3). In that regard, the PBF has provided support to 20 agencies¹¹⁵, three specific funds¹¹⁶ and one assessment of the World Bank¹¹⁷ during the decade in analysis. From the total amount donated by the PBF to these agencies, the UNDP was the major recipient: US\$ 4,080,907 in 2007 (MPTF-O, 2016). As a former UN staff pointed out, much of the funding allocations were going into the UNDP in the following years and other UN agencies started to complain (P-6, 2018). The competition I refer is illustrated by what was allocated to the UNDP in detriment of other recipient agencies: 51% of the PBF allocation was directed at the UNDP alone, with the remainder 49% being channeled to 23 peacebuilding recipients. In that regard, the UNDP itself implemented projects on peacebuilding with a budget of US\$ 297,534,763, remaining “the largest recipient in dollar terms, although the share of funding allocated to a broader range of organizations is growing” (UN Doc. A/66/659: 9).

Despite the change, the former UN staff recognized the UN as a “dominant agency” on this issue which made the PBF consider giving “money to human rights, a little bit to the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] and other bodies” (P-6). In light of this situation, when can we consider that UN agencies’ engagement has an impact on the PBF’s perspective on peacebuilding? The answer to this question is provided by another review of the PBF, launched by Kluyskens and Clark (2014). In their analysis, the inefficiency is

¹¹⁵ Those agencies are: UNFPA, UNHCR, UNWOMEN, UNOPS, UNDP, UNICEF, UNODC, UNESCO, IOM, UNHABITAT, FAO, ILO, OHCHR, UNCDF, UNIDO, WFP, UNRWA, UNDPA, UNDPKO, WHO, UNEP. (MPTF-O, 2016)

¹¹⁶ Specific funds comprise: CARMPTFUN, CARMPTFGvt, SOMMPTFUN. (MPTF-O, 2016)

¹¹⁷ The assessment of the World Bank is the IBRD. (MPTF-O, 2016)

reflected on peacebuilding priorities because the Joint Steering Committee's (JSC) decision-making is not transparent (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 40) and "the JSC did not insist on a strong conflict analysis while this is clearly indicated in the PBF Guidelines" (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 40). Their concern, taken from data collected at UN agencies in-country, compromises what is expected for a peacebuilding outcome: "if a conflict analysis is deemed not necessary, then an appropriate and relevant alternative analysis needs to be available and assessed on its appropriateness for PBF Outcome areas" (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014: 40).

8.4. PBF's guiding principles: the role of the PBSO

As was mentioned on Chapter 5, the PBSO is the manager of the PBF and, within its responsibilities, there are the functions of not only approving countries eligibility for the PBF but, most importantly, evaluating their respective projects when implemented. Since projects financed by the PBF must be embedded in a peacebuilding approach, focused on enhancing community based empowerment as well as constructing a culture of conflict transformation and peace, these projects also tend to enhance the capacity of the UN in the field. Under the period in analysis (2005-2015), the PBF has provided support to 332 projects (Table 8.3.); however, as a UN staff pointed out, there is no information regarding how many projects the PBSO receives for evaluating and, among them, there is no information on the quantity of projects that are not eligible for funding (P-4).

The UN staff statement affirming only that the PBSO "receives a lot" of projects does not give any idea for commensuration on what this reflects in the universe of 332 projects approved during its first decade of functioning. Within this dynamic of receiving projects proposals and evaluating them in order to declare their eligibility for the PBF, the PBSO also designates, at least, two annual evaluating procedures for both the Joint Steering Committee (JSC), responsible for implementing the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) under the PBF-PRF; and to the Resident United Nations Office (RUNO), responsible for implementing projects under the PBF-PRF and PBF-IRF. Despite the fact that there is no official and declared *principle* to guide the implementation of projects under the PBF, I take both evaluating procedures as guiding tools by the PBSO since they consolidate what the institution aims for peacebuilding and what the institution expects to achieve through peacebuilding. As a diplomat explained, "norms and rules exist in the process of being able

to request PBF financial support, which is *bonne gestion* of the money. This implies that there is a permanent and constant evaluation of the programs implemented with PBF's money" (D-8). In both annual templates for the JSC and the RUNO, the PBSO aims to monitor and evaluate projects through questions regarding coherence, risk, catalytic effects, value for money, gender issues and other cross-cutting questions (Boxes 8.1. and 8.2.).

Box 8.1. Questions for Assessment of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) by the PBSO

Coherence/ coordination: Did the PPP contribute to better coherence and coordination of UN and/or Development Partner support in peacebuilding in the country? How?

Value for money: Did the PPP provide value for money, that is, is the level of outcomes proportionate to the level of investment? What is the evidence?

Catalytic effects: Did the PPP achieve any catalytic effects, (...) to unblock/ accelerate peace relevant processes? How?

Risk taking/ innovation: Did the PPP support any innovative or risky activities to achieve peacebuilding results? What were they and what was the result?

Gender sensitivity and responsiveness: How is the PPP taking into account gender considerations and promoting gender equity/women's empowerment?

PBF/PBC synergy: For countries on the PBC agenda, how did the PPP promote the synergy between PBF support and PBC engagement?

Source: Based on the internal document of the JSC Annual Reporting (Template 4.2) for evaluating PBF financed projects.

In my perspective, those questions reflect not only the understanding of what peacebuilding is for the PBSO; but, most importantly, that those questions reflect and ask for a change in behavior while requiring and expecting that the concerned country should implement a respective project aiming its transformation or *graduation* with regard not only to the conclusion of the project implement, but if the country advanced to another stage of its peacebuilding process. Based on Box 8.1, questions that focus on the conditionality of the project with regard to what extent a respective concerned country takes innovative activities to achieve peacebuilding and to promote gender equity corroborate to the perspective that being financially supported by the PBF is a way to consent and agree with the acceptance of a common peacebuilding agenda. These questions represent a standard model for evaluating

all projects financed by the PBF even though these projects relate to different themes of financing.

Box 8.2. Questions for Assessment of the Annual Project Progress Report by the PBSO

Evidence base: What is the evidence base for this report and for project progress? What consultation/validation process has taken place on this report

Funding gaps: Did the project fill critical funding gaps in peacebuilding in the country?

Catalytic effects: Did the project achieve any catalytic effects (...) to unblock/ accelerate peace relevant processes?

Risk taking/ innovation: Did the project support any innovative or risky activities to achieve peacebuilding results? What were they and what was the result?

Gender: How have gender considerations been mainstreamed in the project to the extent possible? Is the original gender marker for the project still the right one?

Other issues: Are there any other issues concerning project implementation that should be shared with PBSO?

Source: Based on the internal document of the RUNO Annual Reporting (Template 4.4) for evaluating PBF financed projects.

As elucidated in this thesis, such analysis is possible because the perspective on norm diffusion discussed on Chapter 2 enables a comprehension that label and framework are mutually reinforcing and such reinforcement process implies on spreading new standard of behavior through a common peacebuilding agenda. In addition, the process of being financially supported by the PBF implies on the commitment of enhancing the role of the UN in the field. In a search for coherence and coordination, the evaluation by the PBSO aims to understand to what extent a respective project contributes to the UN, as well as how such project under the PPP enables a synergy among countries financed by the PBF and the engagement of the PBC in this scenario.

Similar to the evaluating procedure of projects under the domain of the JSC is the evaluation of projects under the domain of the RUNO. There is no great change on questions regarding one and another evaluating procedure, rather some specificities that must be addressed. As Box 8.2. evidences, projects are required to be innovative, to include gender approach but, most importantly, calls for adaptation from previous projects to new ones when the evaluator asks if *the original gender marker for the project still the right one*. Such evidence

corroborates to the notion on diffusing norms elucidated in Chapter 2 and above, while affirming that norms are applied in a very specific context.

Beyond the notion that the PBF guiding principles can be analyzed within a norm diffusion perspective, I would also affirm that these questions posited for evaluating peacebuilding in the field are also a tool for knowledge production with regard to peacebuilding within the PBA, as well as a tool for improvement of the PBSO's practices with regard to peacebuilding at the UN. On this issue, I remember the perspective on knowledge production as well as knowledge brokers elucidated on Chapter 3, which implies on portraying the powerful ability of framing and interpreting information. Despite the fact that none of the PBA-bodies have expertise in conflict analysis (McCandless, 2010: 24), McCandless argues that the PBSO should have considerable capacity in conflict analysis (McCandless, 2010: 25). In her argument, enhancing the PBSO on the issue of conflict analysis would "both serve to ensure that strategic assessment processes leading to the development of peace operations (...) and that they can support capacity development of headquarters and field staff" (McCandless, 2010: 25).

In the same line of thought is Jenkins' contribution, who points out that "the PBSO can exploit the opportunities afforded by participation in interagency structures" (2010: 16) since its mandate enables it to "consolidate knowledge from across the UN system" (2010: 16). In this regard, the *guiding principles* of the PBF, as I call them, work not only to evaluate the implemented program, rather to establish a parameter for thought on how peacebuilding is being conceived through UN agencies, national governments and civil society and how their practice for peace talks back to the UN on the improvement of its strategies aiming peace.

Conclusion

The Peacebuilding Fund was not designed to be, in essence, another peacebuilding framework for post-conflict countries. Nevertheless, the way it became operationalized, the way it was reviewed for a better improvement of the peacebuilding inside the UN and considering the fact that Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire were included under its scope for not being accepted for the PBC, enabled the PBF to play a different role on peacebuilding within the PBA. As a consequence, the PBF became not only the most autonomous PBA-body,

rather it crafted a different space and dynamic in the UN, in which it is possible to identify from where money for peacebuilding comes and to where it goes. Such dynamic evidences that countries under the PBC Agenda were prioritized in terms of amount of money approved for implementing their respective projects, in comparison to the amount of money financed for projects in countries included in the PBF only. Although such evidence reflects that countries under the PBC Agenda were prioritized, such fact also reflects that the process of becoming eligible for the PBF involves different stages of conditionality approval, in which the label – post-conflict country – permeates this dynamic since the beginning of such request. In addition, the functioning of the PBF showed that the dynamic on money flows is embedded on political controversy among some of the UNSC-P5's members, in which their positioning on supporting the entire PBA is not consistent with their respective financial donation. As peacebuilding depends on financial support to implement projects and programs abroad, not supporting the PBF financially is a way to minimize its impact in the field level and, more evidently, it is a way to reinforce peace as a political issue within the UN.

9. Conclusion: The Challenge on Deciding for Peace

When Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire presented their requests for the Peacebuilding Commission, what was in question was not only their engagement with an architecture for peacebuilding but, most importantly, an approval of their respective eligibility condition by the UN. Naturally, the process of making a country eligible for the PBC, as well as a country's rejection, reverberates on four main clusters of analysis: first, on how the perception of a label influences and determines national governments' and institutional decisions; second, on how decisions made imply on the establishment of frameworks for action; third, on how decisions embedded in labelling construct a social reality from the adoption of norms aiming at a behavioral change; and, fourth, on how UN decisions are made. An analysis of what makes a country eligible for peace is an analysis, in the scope of this thesis, of the structure responsible for such choices. Bringing eligibility as a guiding concept in this research, it embraces a theoretical debate on decision-making, labelling, framing and constructivism.

These four main theoretical approaches reflect complementary aspects of the *problématique* elucidated in this thesis, in order to comprehend, on the one hand, the underlying reasons why countries under the same labelling category – *emerging from conflict* or *post-conflict* – became eligible for different peacebuilding frameworks – *PBC* or *PBF*; and, on the other hand, the implications for peacebuilding in countries included in the PBC or redirected to the PBF. In this context, the conclusion of this thesis is beyond a discussion of what was elucidated in the previous Chapters, rather an analysis of its contribution to the academic debate starting from: i) a reflection of the practice within the Peacebuilding Architecture; ii) a debate on labelling and framing as influencing aspects in organizational decision-making processes; iii) an analysis of how decision-making inside organizations is a type of co-constitutive practice; and iv) implications for future research.

9.1. The Peacebuilding Architecture in Practice

The first decade of the functioning of the Peacebuilding Architecture (2005-2015) evidences that there is no unique decision-making model capable of explaining differences on countries

labelling and framing with regard to their respective engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and/or the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). My reasoning on this issue refers to the fact that decisions within the PBA reflect an encountering dynamic in between rationality and organizational bureaucratic in a mutually reinforcing process, in which labels become an important aspect of that matter and are, in essence, what also justifies international organization's and their member-states' decisions on engaging or not with the PBA. I provide the distinction of decisions made by organizations and decisions made by organizational member-states to emphasize that labels permeate both levels of analysis: on the one hand, specific policies designed by international organizations are addressed to countries that share a common scenario or are under the same category; and, on the other hand, countries legitimize labels since they decide based on a self-recognition that those international policies were designed to support their progress on development, security and, mainly, peace.

It is adequate to state that the PBA was established in 2005 to become the UN framework for countries on their transitional phase from intrastate war to peace, making *post-conflict* the main label, as well as the main framework, under its domain. As I have argued that an understanding of its emergence depends on what was designed for the *Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Countries Emerging from Conflict* under the ECOSOC, I state that the PBA reflects institutional improvements on the design of frameworks for peace at the same time that it replaces and reinforces institutional labelling. Nevertheless, differences on categorizing countries do not refer to a consequence of the establishment of the PBA *per se*. One thing that becomes clear when analyzing decision-making processes within international organizations is the emergence of what I call *unexpected outcomes*, for comprehending – as the name already posits – different implications beyond what was expected by the decisions made.

As I have emphasized in this thesis, creating the PBA does not represent a direct implication on the emergence of labels, even though its establishment has implied the reinforcement of an already existing label disseminated within and beyond the UN, that is the *post-conflict* one, as long as a new framework for *post-conflict peacebuilding* has been designed. Nevertheless, it is from the PBA's practice that emerge what I call *unexpected outcomes* with regard to its decision-making process. My focus on explaining the *unexpected outcomes*

refers exclusively to what the PBF did to improve peacebuilding at the institutional level. There are three main aspects I would like to address on this issue. First, the PBF was not designed to be a synergic PBA-body with its counter-part, the PBC. My argument on this issue is based on the fact that the UNGA's resolution that formally established the PBF was adopted only in October 2006, and the PBF started being operationalized in 2007 (UN Doc. A/RES/60/287). The difference from the moment the PBC was conceived – December 2005 – to the moment the PBF started operating – January 2007 – leads to the construction and to the fragmentation of different frameworks within the PBA. The PBF was designed to be a UNSG's Fund for peacebuilding, whereas the PBC was designed to be an intergovernmental body under the auspices of the UNSC, UNGA, UNSG and the ECOSOC. In this sense, their respective domains elicit to the notion that both the PBC and the PBF had different structures for putting peacebuilding into practice.

Second, the PBF was reviewed twice in its early years: once, in 2008, by the Office of International Oversight Services (OIOS) following a request by the PBSO, and then in 2009 (UN Doc. A/63/818), comprising the review of the first PBF's Terms of Reference (UN Doc. A/60/984). These two distinct reviews reinforced the importance of the PBF in filling a financial gap for peacebuilding, as well as they provided the PBSO with a leading role on making the PBF more than just a Fund, but a framework for peacebuilding with its own structure for making countries eligible for financial support. When Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire submitted their requests to engage with the PBC, none of these UN-member states had their requests approved. Consequently, they were redirected to the PBF. In this regard, the third aspect for comprehending the *unexpected outcomes* refers to a distinction made by the UN on which country is eligible to engage with the PBC and which one is not. And such institutional decision reverberates a distinction made on new assigned labels within the UN: countries identified as *PBC* and *non-PBC* in face of the existence of two different frameworks for peacebuilding under the same architecture.

Since I have argued that labels play an important role for understanding decision-making processes within international organizations, I must highlight that this dynamic embedded in a label perspective does not embrace only what institutions attach to countries under its domain. There is, as part of my argument, a self-recognition by international organization's member-states of the labels assigned to them. As almost all countries benefited from the

PBA during the period under analysis (2005-2015) recognize themselves as being a *post-conflict country* in general – or to any other label related to this one, such as fragile or failed –, those that benefited from the PBF alone decided not to move from the Fund to the PBC, because they did not want to be associated with a different label that could damage their image as a structurally weak country. At a first glance, it can be argued that this is the reason why the PBC became limited to only six countries under its scope – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone – and that there was no other country included in its Agenda since 2011; whereas the PBF benefited other 27 different countries during the same period under analysis. Although this thesis does not provide a comparative analysis between the PBC and the PBF, highlighting the number of countries they both benefited does not presume any attempt of comparison, rather than emphasizing that countries' decisions on behalf of one instead of the other peacebuilding framework reflect what label they want to avoid, as well as to be associated with.

On this issue, I would like to state four main reflections on the reasons why no additional countries were included in the PBC Agenda since 2011 based on the countries' perspective and on the UN perception on that matter. The first one relates to the conceptualization of a *post-conflict country*. In the perspective of this thesis, *post-conflict country* has two functions: on the one hand, it works as a label for countries that have experienced armed conflict and are included in some international or national policy to be physical- and socially *re-constructed*; whereas, on the other hand, it works as a framework, which congregates the policies designed to fit those labelled countries. The basic prerogative for this distinction is that the existence of a post-conflict country enables the establishment of its framework and the framework established reinforces and manifests the label. Pointing this out, I assume that the main reason for requesting the inclusion in the PBC Agenda and getting its approval by the Security Council was because five of the six countries identified themselves as “post-conflict” ones, while the sixth one identified itself as *vulnerable* due to its proximity to the instability posited by its neighboring post-conflict countries (D-1). This self-recognition also gained another interpretation, such as the need for “accompaniment” at the political level, “assistance” at the national level, “strengthening” democracy and stability, as well as looking for support while being a country close to those in instable political situation.

The second reason refers to the stigmatization aspect of being labelled not only as a post-conflict country, but as a PBC-country. The two-sides of this label – *PBC-country* – reflect what some countries want to avoid, to depart from. At a first glance, countries do not want to be identified as “failed states” since this image tends to undermine their position in the international and multilateral spheres and, consequently, they do not want to be seen as “weak” for having an international support in different areas of intervention either in the country concerned or in the Headquarter of the United Nations, in New York. The third reason becomes evident when taking into account *non-PBC* countries’ reasoning for not engaging with the PBC: they want to avoid a peacebuilding framework embedded in a configuration model. A configuration means that a country different from the one concerned by the PBC will play the role in leading the negotiations that involve the search for political stability, economic partnership and dialogue. In this regard, countries that did not engage with the PBC in this context decided much more based on keeping their own autonomy as well as their sovereignty in dealing with the negotiations by themselves.

Finally, regarding the positioning of the UN, there is no official justification for why some countries were included in the PBC Agenda while others remained exclusively financially supported by the PBF. In addition, there are collective understandings of why other countries which face the same challenges in post-conflict reconstruction did request their inclusion in the PBC. The main reason for this scenario remains, first, on the aspect that *stigmatization* plays a role in constructing the image countries have of the PBC through its own practice and, second, the political aspect of the decision being exclusively with the Security Council. In this sense, including a country or not in the PBC Agenda is not simply a mere case of receiving a country’s request but, most importantly, of having its approval by the UNSC. In a nutshell, these four reasons work as influencers in making countries decide their type of engagement or not with the PBC, or being restricted to the financing by the PBF, as well as reflects its level of engagement with the Security Council. As labels represent an *immaterial* aspect for comprehending countries’ decision for the PBC and for the PBF, they are embedded in the construction of a stigmatization process, in which it is not only determined by the category a country belongs to, but to which framework the country is included.

This thesis showed that criteria for making a country eligible for peace is politically constructed, and that institutional criteria reinforce the perspective in which countries must

perform in a certain way to be fitted into what the institution designed for them. For these reasons, countries within a post-conflict context are framed by the institution and by themselves in order to, respectively, implement policies the institution want to be disseminated as part of a common peacebuilding agenda and to get approval for financial support to implement those designed policies. In this regard, there is no difference on what constitutes a post-conflict country under the auspices of the PBC or the PBF, since all these countries requested support from the PBA in order to solve issues at the internal level after an armed conflict or other type of internal instability. In my perspective, all of them share a common ground of what makes ‘post-conflict country’ a label attached to them. However, there are two perspectives that I would like to address regarding the impact of the decision-making process considering the amount of money donated to those countries.

The first perspective is based on the level of their post-conflict engagement within the PBA – considering those countries under the auspices of the PBC and the PBF. Being a PBC-country with a configuration means that there is no need for a formal request to access the PBF’s resources. All PBC-countries with a configuration are “automatically eligible” whereas PBF-countries only become eligible if they match the certain requisites. As stated previously, the two forms of engagement – PBF-IRF and PBF-PRF – reflect the level of the post-conflict country’s engagement with the PBF. In all cases, the process of making a country eligible for the PBF starts on the field level, either by the government or the UN, which is submitted by the Senior Resident UN Representative to PBSO, following endorsement by the Government in order to implement peacebuilding projects/programs varying from 6 to 18 months or 18 to 36 months; or emergence relief of no more than US\$ 3 million. Such difference regarding how money flows to PBC- and to non-PBC countries can be seen through their respective financial support provided by the PBF. In pragmatic terms, PBC-countries have received 63% of the total amount, while *non-PBC* countries received 37%, reflecting that eligibility criteria within the PBF tend to be more assertive, since under the PBF countries must request eligibility through different stages of that process.

The second perspective is contextualized taking into consideration the countries that do not belong to any of those forms of support from the PBA. Based on the interviews conducted, the PBF is a small financing body which is not capable of providing high amount of financial

support to countries that face difficult tasks in the post-conflict scenario and, consequently, does not provide chances for successful evaluation. In this sense, the impact of the decision-making process regarding how countries are labelled is identified by the forms of engagement countries share within the PBA and in comparison to the countries outside of it, reinforcing its political character.

The third aspect on this issue refers to the peacebuilding agenda countries implement as part of their engagement with the PBA. Since the PBF provides financial support to PBC- and *non*-PBC countries, these two groups share a common peacebuilding agenda over three main areas where their projects were financed most: democratic governance, security, and youth employment and empowerment. Even though someone argued that this data can be taken as coincidental among PBC and *non*-PBC countries, the other areas of this peacebuilding agenda refute such equivocal position because both PBC- and *non*-PBC countries have implemented projects on Human Rights, Public Administration, National Political Dialogue, as well as on areas classified for emergency relief. In this sense, although PBC has an agenda to keep an eye on countries under its domain, the dissemination of a peacebuilding agenda is of the responsibility of the PBF, since both PBC- and *non*-PBC countries must request financial support for implementing projects based on the requirements imposed by the Fund. As I pointed out, these requirements are taken as part of the conditionality a country must agree with the institution. Such conditionality embraces the scope of the projects, to whom the projects are addressed to, the role of the UN in the implementation of the project and the peacebuilding impact through the project implemented. For PBC-countries alone, such conditionality is seen through the Statement of Mutual Commitments (SMC) countries agree with the institution through their respective configurations; for *non*-PBC countries, conditionality relates to a certain level of control by the PBSO on evaluating projects and programs implemented through financial support by the PBF. However, in both cases, conditionality reveals to be the guarantor to which both PBC and *non*-PBC countries ensure the achievement of results of the projects implemented on the ground.

9.2. Labelling and Framing as influencers aspects in Decision-Making

As it was emphasized, understanding eligibility of a country for peace permeates a discussion beyond the traditional models of decision-making processes. These models refer

to approaches in which decision-making is categorized, explained and visualized for a better adequacy of its object of analysis. In the scope of this thesis, decision-making models were taken based on the notion that they co-exist and, consequently, they are not mutually excluding. For this reason, this thesis prioritized an understanding of decision-making processes embedded in rational, organizational, bureaucratic and naturalistic models in order to explain that an eligibility for peace is a result of what these approaches imply for the decision, since they enable an evaluation of a “broader context” of the decision-making with the inclusion of “social factors, social structures, moral commitments, emotions, and values” (Mintz, 1997: 3) on this process.

In my perspective, both labelling and framing act as social factors, social structures and values that pertain to different phases of the decision-making process. As Mintz argues, “the way issues are ‘framed’ and ‘counterframed’ and the situation represented (...) are likely to affect the choice” (1997: 1). As choice, in a decision-making process, evidences the need for decision; and decision is the outcome of such process imbued with significance, then, the significance, in this sense, is a constructed perception from the role labelling and framing played with regard to the decision made. Within a decision-making process, labelling indicates to whom the decisions are target to; while framing specifies in which social structure the labelled will be included in. For this reason, I do not dissociate labelling and framing from an analysis on decision-making: they are mutually reinforcing in such process. As framing and labelling legitimize each other, establishing a dynamic of reinforcing already existing labels or replacing them with new ones (Moncrieffe, 2007), label emerges as a consequence of behavioral difference that leads to a societal reaction based on the existence of the labelled (Becker, 1963; Schur, 1980) and that that societal reaction is what I call framing, which leads to a structure to act (Entman, 1993).

There are, in the scope of this thesis, at least two labels: *countries emerging from conflict* and *post-conflict country*. Both of them are imbued with significance, meaning and symbols and represent political spaces socially constructed in which these spaces “are constantly being shaped by the decisions of a variety of actors” (Kirsch and Flint, 2011: 13). As I elucidated in the *problématique* of this thesis, attaching a label to categorize what defines a *country emerging from conflict* or a *post-conflict* one is not a simple practice, specially within the International Organization’s dynamic. These type of practices demonstrate that

being labelled as an *emerging from conflict* or *post-conflict* country is not a *sine qua non* condition for being included in peacebuilding apparatus for reconstruction after intrastate war. Following the perspective that labelling and framing are mutually reinforcing, these aforementioned labels attached to a country are the same that name the framework designed for them.

Since both labels and framings encompass a rebuilding process, they comprise a range of strategies for action which include short-, medium and longer-terms strategies. When applied in this research, Castillo (2008) points out that the return of peace is the common requirement for the implementation of effective and sustainable reconstruction policies. Such perspective is the one that I consider for guiding the notion on how the labels *emerging from conflict* and *post-conflict* turn into framing, evidencing which strategies and which scope the labelled will be framed in. Letting labels as intrinsic part of the framing process reflects how peace becomes fragmented, constructing what institutions adopt and establish as frameworks. The contribution, in this regard, is that labelling and framing are not mutually reinforcing in vain, but that both disseminate organizational decision outcomes' as a norm diffusion process in which there are different institutional frameworks for their respective labelled objectification.

9.3. Decision-Making as an institutional practice

Since decision-making models are not mutually excluding and they are influenced by the broader context of their respective processes, my second contribution refers to an explanation of their co-constitutive practice through a Constructivist lens. My argument over this contribution states that the structure comprising different models of decision-making processes are not established in advance. These processes become adaptable in face of their environmental dynamic as well as challenges. The notion of adaptability with regard to decision-making process is what evidences decision-making as part of a set of institutional practices taking place within the same environment. Since practice is understood as performances under routinized ways of understanding the world, of desiring something and of knowing how to do something in a socially organized way, an analysis of practices to understand decision-making processes inside International Organizations is of important value.

The reasons that sustain this contribution are based on the fact that peace eligibility inside International Organizations requires an understanding of *why* “something is done because it is traditionally done, or routinely done, or done because it is part of the practice of the collective” (Barnes, 2001: 29). In the scope of this thesis, Constructivism is the perspective in which practice is embedded in, hence, decision-making as well. In this sense, my positioning on this issue reflects the notion that there is a relation within decision-making process in which agents and structures mutually constitute themselves. Taking the analysis of this thesis for granted, when the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund were established, there was no decision-making model designed in advance for both of these peacebuilding frameworks. As a result, the PBC became the most politicized PBA-body on electing countries for its Agenda, due to the fact that countries requesting inclusion on its Agenda should be evaluated by the UNSC beforehand; while, in contrast, the PBF became the most operationalized PBA-body, since it brought to the light what really could count as a process of making country eligible for its financial support through its three-tier decision-making process.

Although the PBF is taken as the most operationalized PBA-body, its decision-making process was improved once, when comparing its Terms of Reference (ToR) of 2006 and 2009 in which not only PBF-ToR specified in a more detailed different eligibility processes countries would apply for but, most importantly, that such change avoided the UNSG to use the PBF as a bargain tool during UN field visits to countries in need of financial support. Such change on the PBF’s decision-making process implied on two aspects: first, on the legitimization of post-conflict label through the process a country must follow in order to become eligible for funding; and, second, on the consolidation of a peacebuilding agenda. As illustrated in the thesis, PBF has established six common peacebuilding themes for both PBC- and *non*-PBC countries, which is also a result of legitimizing a framework for countries under the same label.

In this regard, an analysis of International Organization’s decision-making processes as a type of co-constitutive practice is an analysis beyond the materialism. Since Constructivism calls our attention for a broader spectrum of other aspects that influence choices, at both state and organizational levels, an analysis of decision-making process within one specific model or one theoretical approach that prioritizes states and excludes the participation of other

agents would be incomplete. For this reason, this thesis applied the notion of *system of action* proposed by Snyder *et al.* (2002). Based on the fact that the PBC and the PBF are divergent bodies under the same architecture for peacebuilding, and that Comoros and Côte d'Ivoire did not become eligible for the PBC, the *system of action* enables a comprehension of which dynamic pertains to each of the PBA's bodies, as well as what they imply for peacebuilding within the UN. As Constructivist school elucidates, our institutions are built upon collective understanding of values, norms, rules, and it would be of limited analysis not including a perspective that embrace these aspects for understanding what makes a country eligible for peace.

9.4. Implications for future research

Although this thesis is centered in an analysis of the decision-making process with regard to countries eligibility for peace under the scope of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, its contribution implies, in a first glance, on investigating how other International Organizations deal with eligibility and decision-making with regard to countries benefited by their respective peacebuilding frameworks. As this thesis applied a methodology named as *practice tracing* in allusion to explain that local social causality produces general insights (Pouliot, 2014), it is important to state that peacebuilding is not an exclusive domain of the UN, and that other International Organizations institutionalize their own understanding of peacebuilding as well as they apply their respective models for reconstructing countries after intrastate wars. In this sense, investigating how other International Organizations determine which country is eligible for peace under their respective scopes is an added value for understanding other intrinsic aspect behind the International Organization's decision-making process. Organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) with its conflict prevention and resolution approach; the European Union, which finance development cooperation in the field of security and peacebuilding through several geographical instruments and through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP); the International Organization for Peacebuilding (InterPeace); and the International Alert, just to mention a few. In addition, it is important to understand which other labels pertain to their respective frameworks for peace. Especially because these Organizations enable a comprehension of decision-making and eligibility beyond the dynamic comprised by the one between the UN and the African

continent, for example, because, as became explicit in the present analysis, the majority of countries benefited by the PBA during its first decade (2005-2015) – 19 of 33 – are Africans.

The second implication for future research refers to a more in-depth analysis on the role of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture with regard to how UN Integrated Peacebuilding Offices in countries included in the PBC Agenda worked as partners. Mentioning this implication is of important value because there were established offices in four of the six countries included in the PBC Agenda – the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNPSIL). As of writing, from these four offices, only one is currently in operation, which is the UNIOGBIS; the other three had their mandates completed and two of them – BNUB and UNPSIL – were integrated into the new United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNWAS). My concern over this issue refers to what extent these respective offices for peacebuilding complement the functioning of the PBA and vice-versa, and to what extent these respective offices influence on maintaining countries in the PBC Agenda instead of *graduating* them from the PBA.

Finally, the third implication for future research is related to a more detailed analysis of the implications for peacebuilding in those respective countries included in the PBA. Since this thesis is focused on the implication at the institutional level, because my concern was to understand the underlying reasons that make countries eligible for the PBC while others are rejected; the field level is one object of analysis that must be contemplated. In this case, would be possible to compare projects and programs implemented in both PBC- and *non*-PBC countries since they are implemented under the same theme; different from the analysis conducted in this thesis because the PBC and the PBF are totally different PBA-bodies and comparing them would be of impossible task. As it was provided in this thesis, PBC- and *non*-PBC countries have implemented peacebuilding projects under three main areas – Democratic Governance, Security, and Youth Empowerment and Employment – and analyzing them in-depth would be important to contesting the other side of the organizational practices' aiming to implement peacebuilding.

As became evident from this thesis, International Organizations' decision-making process is dependent upon labels to define their respective frameworks. No matter what will be its name, organizations naturally construct a process to make both labels and frameworks acceptable, reinforced, replaced and disseminated. It is not necessary to follow this linear path nor to accept a label or a framework as if they are/were the real representation of a specific image/identity. Labels must be contested and the process of contesting them is what enable it to be evaluated in order to understand to whom the label and the framework are designed to and to what dynamic they imply for comprehending our social reality.

References

Primary Sources

A/47/277-S/24111. An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/144858>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/50/60-S/1995/1. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations of 25 January 1995. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/168325>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/51/950. Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform. Report of the Secretary-General of 14 July 1997. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/A/51/950>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/52/871-S/1998/318. The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Report of the Secretary-General of 13 April 1998. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/A/52/871>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/55/305–S/2000/809. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/A/55/305>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/55/45. Report of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/A/55/45>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/56/45. Report of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/448307>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/59/565. A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/59/565>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/59/2005. In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/59/2005>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/59/2005/Add.2. In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General. Addendum. Peacebuilding Commission. Explanatory note by the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/59/2005/Add.2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/60/430. Implementation of decisions from the 2005 World Summit Outcome for action by the Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/60/430>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/60/984. Arrangements for establishing the Peacebuilding Fund. Report of the Secretary-General of 22 August 2006. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/60/984>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/60/L.40. Draft resolution submitted by the President of the General Assembly. The Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/60/L.40>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/60/PV.7. Summary Official Records. 7th plenary meeting Friday, 16 September 2005, 9 a.m. New York. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/60/PV.7>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/60/PV.8. Summary Official Records. 8th plenary meeting. Friday, 16 September 2005, 3 p.m. New York. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/60/PV.8>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/60/PV.66. Summary Official Records. 66th plenary meeting. Tuesday, 20 December 2005, 10 a.m. New York. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/60/PV.66>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/61/PV.86. Summary Official Records. 86th plenary meeting. Tuesday, 6 February 2007, 10 a.m. New York. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/61/PV.86>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/62/11. Report of the Committee on Contributions. Sixty-seventh session (11-29 June 2007). Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/en/A/62/11\(SUPP\)](https://undocs.org/en/A/62/11(SUPP)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/62/137-S/2007/458. Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its first session. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/62/137>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/62/138. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 26 July 2007. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/62/138>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/62/736-S/2007/744. Letter dated 11 December 2007 from the President of the Security Council to the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/62/736>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/62/864-S/2008/383. Letter dated 30 May 2008 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/62/864>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/63/92-S/2008/417. Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its second session. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/63/92>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/63/218-S/2008/522. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 4 August 2008. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/63/218>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/63/818. Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund. Report of the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/63/818>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/64/217-S/2009/419. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 3 August 2009. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/64/217>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/64/341-S/2009/444. Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its third session. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/64/341>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/64/870-S/2010/389. Letter dated 19 July 2010 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission. Report of the Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/64/870>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/64/868-S/2010/393. Review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture of 21 July 2010. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/64/868>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/65/353. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 9 September 2010. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/65/353>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/65/701-S/2011/41. Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fourth session. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/65/701>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/66/659. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 16 January 2012. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/66/659>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/67/711. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 25 January 2013. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/67/711>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/68/722. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 28 January 2014. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/68/722>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/69/745. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 29 January 2015. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/69/745>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/69/968-S/2015/490. Challenge of sustaining peace. Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/69/968>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/70/715. Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund of 4 February 2016. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/70/715>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/73/L.40/Rev.1. Graduation of countries from the least developed country category. Report of the Economic and Social Council. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/73/L.40/Rev.1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/C.5/69/17. Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/C.5/69/17>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/53/92. Resolution Adopted by The General Assembly on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/53/92>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/54/234. Resolution Adopted by The General Assembly on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/54/234>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/55/217. Resolution Adopted by The General Assembly on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/55/217>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/60/1. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/60/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/60/180. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2005. The Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/60/180>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/60/287. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006. The Peacebuilding Fund. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/60/287>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/63/282. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 June 2009. The Peacebuilding Fund. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/63/282>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/68/18. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December 2013. Graduation of countries from the least developed country category. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/68/18>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

A/RES/70/253. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 12 February 2016. Graduation of Angola from the least developed country category. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/253>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

DESA (2019a, January 28). Least Developed Countries. About the LDC category. Retrieved on January 28, 2020, from www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category.html. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

DESA (2019b, January 28). Least Developed Countries list. Retrieved on January 28, 2020, from <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldcs-at-a-glance.html>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

DPKO (2003). *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*. United Nations? New York. Retrieved from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping-handbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

DPKO (2019a). *UNTSO Fact Sheet*. Retrieved from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/untso>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

DPKO (2019b). *UNMOGIP Fact Sheet*. Retrieved from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmogip>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

DPKO (2019c). *List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948-2019*. Retrieved from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unpeacekeeping-operationlist_3_1_0.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2002/1. Resolution. Ad hoc advisory group on African countries emerging from conflict. Retrieved from: www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2002/resolution-2002-1.pdf. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2002/304. Decision. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2002/decision%202002-304.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2003/1. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2003/resolution-2003-1.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC 2003/53. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2003/resolution-2003-53.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2003/311. Decision. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2003/decision-2003-311.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2004/1. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2004/resolution-2004-1.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2004/2. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2004/resolution-2004-2.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2004/60. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. Retrieved on: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2004/resolution-2004-60.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2004/61. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2004/resolution-2004-61.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2005/1. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2005/resolution-2005-1.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2005/2. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2005/resolution-2005-2.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2005/32. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2005/resolution-2005-32.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2005/33. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2005/resolution-2005-33.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. 2006/11. Resolution. Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2006/resolution-2006-11.pdf>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2002/12. Establishment of an ad hoc advisory group on African countries emerging from conflict: report of the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/462062>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2002/86. Letter dated 2002/09/26 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Economic and Social Council. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/475692?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2004/92. Letter dated 2004/07/025 from the Permanent Representative South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Economic and Social Council. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/525943?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2003/8. Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/485848?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2004/10. Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/515416?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2004/11. Report of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/516446?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2004/86. Assessment of the ad hoc advisory groups of the Economic and Social Council on African countries emerging from conflict: report of the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/525993?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2005/8. Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/539083?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2005/70. Ad hoc advisory groups on African countries emerging from conflict: report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/552519?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2005/82. Report of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/552830?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2006/8. Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/575004?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2006/53. Report of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/575283?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC. E/2006/64. Assessment of the ad hoc advisory groups of the Economic and Social Council on African countries emerging from conflict: report of the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/576117?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

ECOSOC E/2008/55. Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/627934?ln=en>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

Guinea (2010). First Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Guinea to the United Nations requesting country inclusion in the Peacebuilding Commission. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations in New York, No.079/MPG/NY/Amb/asd/11.

Guinea (2011). Second Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Guinea to the United Nations requesting country inclusion in the Peacebuilding Commission. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations in New York.

Guinea-Bissau (2007). Letter from the Primer Minister of the Guinea-Bissau, Martinho Dafa Cabi, to the United Nations requesting country inclusion in the Peacebuilding Commission. Permanent Mission of the Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations in New York.

IMF (2005). *Sierra Leone: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. IMF Country Report No. 05/191. Retrieved from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05191.pdf. [First access on July 2019]

IMF (2007a). *Burundi: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. IMF Country Report No. 07/46. Retrieved from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0746.pdf. [First access on July 2019]

IMF (2007b). *Guinea-Bissau: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. IMF Country Report No. 07/339. Retrieved from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07339.pdf. [First access on July 2019]

IMF (2008a). *Guinea: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. IMF Country Report No. 08/7. Retrieved from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr0807.pdf. [First access on July 2019]

IMF (2008b). *Liberia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. IMF Country Report No. 08/219. Retrieved from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08219.pdf. [First access on July 2019]

IMF (2009). *Central African Republic: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper - First Annual Progress Report*. IMF Country Report No. 09/240. Retrieved from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09240.pdf. [First access on July 2019]

IMF (2016). *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)*. Retrieved from: www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.aspx. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

IMF (2019). *Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative*. Retrieved from: www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Liberia (2010). Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations requesting country inclusion in the Peacebuilding Commission. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations in New York.

MPTF-O (2016). Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office. Trust Fund Factsheet. The Peacebuilding Fund. Gateway. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

MPTF-O (2017a). PBF Direct Cost Budget. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073672>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017b). PBF Direct Cost Budget Burundi. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073672>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017c). PBF Direct Cost Budget Central African Republic. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073675>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017d). PBF Direct Cost Budget Guinea. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073679>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017e). PBF Direct Cost Budget Guinea Bissau. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073674>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017f). PBF Direct Cost Budget Liberia. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073676>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017g). PBF Direct Cost Budget Sierra Leone. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073673>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017h). PBF Direct Cost Budget Comoros. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073677>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017i). PBF Direct Cost Budget Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00076527>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017j). Fund – Direct Cost Budgets. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/DCB00>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017k). PBF Direct Cost Budget. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00073589>. [First access on June 2019]

MPTF-O (2017). PBF/IRF-67: PBF Review. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00086901>. [First access on June 2019]

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). *Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: A report on findings and recommendations*. Retrieved from: www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/fn/final_operations.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

OECD (2006). *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*. Paris: OECD, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Retrieved from: www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/37826256.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

OECD (2018). *States of Fragility 2018*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264302075-en>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

OHCHR (2020, January 28). *Welcome to the Human Rights Council*. Retrieved from www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

OIOS (2008). *Fund Fills Clear Niche and Has Seen Early Results, But Must Become Speedier, More Efficient and More Strategic to Fulfil Its Vision*. Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Independent Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund. IED-08-06. Retrieved from: <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?valid=4309>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

PBC/1/BDI/2. Report of the mission of the Peacebuilding Commission to Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/BDI/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/BDI/4. Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/BDI/4>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/BDI/SR.1. First session. Burundi configuration. Summary record of the 1st meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/BDI/4>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/BDI/SR.3. First session. Burundi configuration. Summary record of the 3rd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/BDI/SR.3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/BDI/SR.4. First session. Burundi configuration. Summary record of the 4th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/BDI/SR.4>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/BDI/4. Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/BDI/4>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/BDI/9. Recommendations of the biannual review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/BDI/9>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/BDI/10. Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/BDI/10>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/BDI/2. Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi Second progress report. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/BDI/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/BDI/3. Conclusions of the second biannual review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/BDI/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/BDI/5. Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi Third progress report. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/BDI/5>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/BDI/6. Conclusions of the third biannual review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/BDI/6>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/BDI/1. Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Fourth progress report. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/BDI/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/BDI/3. Conclusions of the fourth biannual review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/BDI/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/5/BDI/2. Outcome of the fifth review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/5/BDI/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/5/BDI/3. Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. Fifth progress report. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/5/BDI/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/6/BDI/2. Conclusions and recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission on the annual review of its engagement with Burundi. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/6/BDI/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/CAF/3. Report of the Peacebuilding Commission mission to the Central African Republic, 30 October-6 November 2008. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/CAF/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/CAF/7. Strategic framework for peacebuilding in the Central African Republic 2009-2011. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/CAF/7>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/CAF/SR.2. Peacebuilding Commission. Third session. Central African Republic configuration. Summary record of the 2nd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/CAF/SR.2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/CAF/2. Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/CAF/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/CAF/5. Conclusions and recommendations of the first biannual review of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/CAF/5>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/5/CAF/1. Report of the Peacebuilding Commission mission to the Central African Republic, 10-15 October 2011. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/5/CAF/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/5/CAF/3. Conclusions and recommendations of the second biannual review of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/5/CAF/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/5/GUI/2. Statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Guinea between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/5/GUI/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/6/GUI/2. Conclusions and recommendations of the first review of the Statement of Mutual Commitments between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/6/GUI/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/6/GUI/3. Report of the first review of the Statement of Mutual Commitments between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission (September 2011 to March 2012). Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/6/GUI/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/8/GUI/1. Report of the second review of the Statement of Mutual Commitments between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission (April 2012 to April 2014). Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/8/GUI/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/8/GUI/2. Conclusions and recommendations of the second review of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Guinea between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/8/GUI/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/GNB/5. Background note on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/GNB/5>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/GNB/SR.2. Peacebuilding Commission. Second session. Guinea-Bissau configuration. Summary record of the 2nd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/GNB/SR.2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/GNB/1. Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau. Conclusions and recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/GNB/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/GNB/3. Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau 31 July 2008. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/GNB/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/GNB/1. Progress report on the implementation of the Peacebuilding Strategic Framework for Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/GNB/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/GNB/1/Add.1. Progress report on the implementation of the Peacebuilding Strategic Framework for Guinea-Bissau. Addendum. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/GNB/1/Add.1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/GNB/3. Conclusions and recommendations of the first review of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/GNB/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/LBR/2. Statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/LBR/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/LBR/SR.1. Peacebuilding Commission. Fourth session. Liberia configuration. Summary record of the 1st meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/LBR/SR.1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/6/LBR/1. Review of progress in the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. First progress report. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/6/LBR/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/6/LBR/2. Outcome of the first review of the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/6/LBR/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/7/LBR/1. Review of progress in the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. Second progress report. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/7/LBR/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/7/LBR/3. Outcome of the second review of the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/7/LBR/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/8/LBR/1. Review of progress in the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. Third progress report. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/8/LBR/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/8/LBR/2. Outcome of the third review of the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/8/LBR/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/9/LBR/1. Review of progress in the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. Fourth progress report. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/9/LBR/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/9/LBR/2. Outcome of the fourth review of the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/9/LBR/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/OC/1. Peacebuilding Commission. Organizational Committee. First session. 23 June 2006. Provisional agenda. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/OC/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/OC/2. Letter dated 21 June 2006 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/OC/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/OC/15. Letter dated 20 December 2006 from the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/OC/15>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/OC/SR.1. Peacebuilding Commission. Organizational Committee. First session. Summary record of the 1st meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/OC/SR.1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/OC/SR.2. Peacebuilding Commission. Organizational Committee. First session. Summary record of the 2nd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/OC/SR.2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/OC/SR.5. Peacebuilding Commission. Organizational Committee. First session. Summary record of the 5th meeting (closed). Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/OC/SR.5>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/OC/SR.5. Peacebuilding Commission. Organizational Committee. Second session. Summary record of the 5th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/OC/SR.5>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/OC/SR.6. Peacebuilding Commission. Organizational Committee. Second session. Summary record of the 6th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/OC/SR.6>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/OC/SR.3. Peacebuilding Commission. Organizational Committee. Third session. Summary record of the 3rd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/OC/SR.3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/4/OC/SR.2. Peacebuilding Commission. Organizational Committee. Fourth session. Summary record of the 2nd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/4/OC/SR.2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/SLE/2. Report of the Peacebuilding Commission mission to Sierra Leone 19-25 March 2007. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/SLE/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/SLE/SR.1. First session. Sierra Leone configuration. Summary record of the 1st meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/SLE/SR.1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/SLE/SR.2. First session. Sierra Leone configuration. Summary record of the 2nd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/SLE/SR.2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/SLE/SR.3. First session. Sierra Leone configuration. Summary record of the 3rd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/SLE/SR.3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/SLE/SR.4. First session. Sierra Leone configuration. Summary record of the 4th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/SLE/SR.4>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/1/SLE/SR.5. First session. Sierra Leone configuration. Summary record of the 5th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/1/SLE/SR.5>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/SLE/1. Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/SLE/1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/SLE/5. Peacebuilding Commission. Second session. Sierra Leone configuration. Chair's summary statement. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/SLE/5>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/SLE/8. Conclusions and recommendations of the biannual review of the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/SLE/8>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/SLE/9. Progress report on the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/SLE/9>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/SLE/SR.1. Sierra Leone configuration. Second session. Summary record of the 1st meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/SLE/SR.1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/SLE/SR.2. Sierra Leone configuration. Second session. Summary record of the 2nd meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/SLE/SR.2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/2/SLE/SR.4. Sierra Leone configuration. Second session. Summary record of the 4th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/2/SLE/SR.4>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/SLE/2. Conclusions and recommendations of the second biannual review of the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/SLE/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/SLE/3. Progress report on the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/SLE/3>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/SLE/6. Outcome of the Peacebuilding Commission High-level Special Session on Sierra Leone. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/SLE/6>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBC/3/SLE/SR.1. Peacebuilding Commission. Third session. Sierra Leone configuration. Summary record of the 1st meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/PBC/3/SLE/SR.1>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

PBF (2007a). *Liberia becomes eligible for PBF*. Retrieved from: www.liberia-becomes-eligible-for-pbf. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2007b). *The Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared today that Nepal is eligible to receive assistance from the PBF*. Retrieved from: www.unpbf.org/new/secretary-general-declares-nepal-eligible-for-pbf/. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2008a). *Secretary-General declares Guinea-Bissau eligible for PBF*. Retrieved from: www.unpbf.org/news/secretary-general-declares-guinea-bissau-eligible-for-pbf/. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2008b). *Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced today the Comoros and Guinea Conakry eligible to receive funding from the PBF*. Retrieved from: <http://www.secretary-general-declares-the-comoros-and-guinea-conakry-eligible-for-pbf-funding/>. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2008c). *Secretary-General declares Central African Republic eligible for PBF*. Retrieved from: www.secretary-general-declares-central-african-republic-eligible-for-pbf/. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2008d). *Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced today that Côte d'Ivoire is eligible to receive funding from the PBF*. Retrieved from: www.unpbf.org/news/secretary-general-declares-cote-d%e%80%99ivoire-eligible-for-pbf-funding/. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2010). *Republic of Guatemala is declared eligible for PBF Funding*. Retrieved from: www.unpbf.org/news/the-republic-of-guatemala-eligible-to-receive-funding-from-the-united-nations-pbf. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2013a). *Yemen, Kyrgyzstan and South Sudan declared eligible for PBF Funding*. Retrieved from: www.unpbf.org/new/peacebuilding-fund-pbf/. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2013b). *Papua New Guinea is declared eligible for the PBF*. Retrieved from: www.unpbf.org/countries/png/. [First access on 15 December 2015].

PBF (2013c). United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (2013). *Investing in Peace - 2012 annual report of The Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund*. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/11401>. [First access on July 2019]

PBF (2014). United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (2014). *Investing in Peace 2013 - Annual Report of the Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund*. Retrieved from: <http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/12880>. [First access on July 2019]

PBSO (2012). *Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding*. Retrieved from: http://s3.amazonaws.com/inec-assets/resources/peace_dividends.pdf. [First access on July 2019]

PBSO (2014). *United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Guidelines on application and use of funds*. Retrieved from: <http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/PBF-Guidelines-Final-April-20141.pdf>. [First access on 20 August, 2016].

PBF (2018). *United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Country Eligibility for Accessing PBF funding*. Retrieved from: www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/country-eligibility-for-accessing-pbf-funding/. [First access on 13 October, 2016].

Sierra Leone (2006). Request from the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations to be included in the Peacebuilding Commission. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations in New York.

S/1998/1080. Letter dated 11 November 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/1998/1080>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/1999/233. Letter dated 3 March 1999 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/1999/233>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/1999/425. Letter dated 12 April 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/1999/425>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/1999/1008. Progress report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/1999/1008>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/2007/700. Letter dated 28 November 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/2007/700>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PRST/2007/38. Statement by the President of the Security Council. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2007/38>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PRST/2017/2. Statement by the President of the Security Council. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2017/2>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.5335. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 5335th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.5335>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.5627. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 5627th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.5627>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.5895. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 5895th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.5895>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.5997. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 5997th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.5997>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.6165. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 6165th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.6165>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.6224. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 6224th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.6224>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.6396. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 6396th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.6396>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.6503. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 6503th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.6503>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.6643. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 6643th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.6643>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.6805. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 6805th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.6805>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.6954. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 6954th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.6954>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.7143. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 7143th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.7143>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/PV.7359. Security Council. Provisional Summary Records of the 7359th meeting. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/S/PV.7359>. Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/632(1989). UN Security Council. Resolution 632 (1989) of 16 February 1989. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/632\(1989\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/632(1989)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/866(1993). UN Security Council. Resolution 866 (1993). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3281st meeting, on 22 September 1993. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/866\(1993\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/866(1993)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1159(1998). UN Security Council. Resolution 1159 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3867th meeting, on 27 March 1998. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1159\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1159(1998)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1170(1998). UN Security Council. Resolution 1170 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3886th meeting, on 28 May 1998. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1170\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1170(1998)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1181(1998). UN Security Council. Resolution 1181 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3902nd meeting, on 13 July 1998. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1181\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1181(1998)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1233(1999). UN Security Council. Resolution 1233 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3991st meeting, on 6 April 1999. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1233\(1999\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1233(1999)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1270(1999). UN Security Council. Resolution 1270 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4054th meeting on 22 October 1999. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1270\(1999\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1270(1999)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1479(2003). UN Security Council. Resolution 1479 (2003). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4754th meeting, on 13 May 2003. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1270\(1999\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1270(1999)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1509(2003). UN Security Council. Resolution 1509 (2003). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4830th meeting, on 19 September 2003. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1509\(2003\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1509(2003)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1528(2004). UN Security Council. Resolution 1528 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4918th meeting, on 27 February 2004. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1528\(2004\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1528(2004)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1545(2004). UN Security Council. Resolution 1545 (2004). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4975th meeting, on 21 May 2004. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1545\(2004\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1545(2004)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1620(2005). UN Security Council. Resolution 1620 (2005). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5254th meeting, on 31 August 2005. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1620\(2005\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1620(2005)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1645(2005). UN Security Council. Resolution 1645 (2005). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5335th meeting, on 20 December 2005. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1645\(2005\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1645(2005)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1646(2005). UN Security Council. Resolution 1646 (2005). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5335th meeting, on 20 December 2005. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1646\(2005\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1646(2005)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1719(2006). UN Security Council. Resolution 1719 (2006). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5554th meeting, on 25 October 2006. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1719\(2006\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1719(2006)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1778(2007). UN Security Council. Resolution 1778 (2007). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5748th meeting, on 25 September 2007. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1778\(2007\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1778(2007)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/1923(2010). UN Security Council. Resolution 1923 (2010). Adopted by the Security Council at its 6321st meeting, on 25 May 2010. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1923\(2010\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1923(2010)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/2149(2014). UN Security Council. Resolution 2149 (2014). Adopted by the Security Council at its 7153rd meeting, on 10 April 2014. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2149\(2014\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2149(2014)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/2239(2015). UN Security Council. Resolution 2239 (2015). Adopted by the Security Council at its 7525th meeting, on 17 September 2015. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2239\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2239(2015)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

S/RES/2284(2016). UN Security Council. Resolution 2284 (2016). Adopted by the Security Council at its 7681st meeting, on 28 April 2016. Retrieved from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2284\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2284(2016)). Accessed 1 Feb. 2020.

UN (1945). *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. Retrieved from: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

UN (2004). *United Nations Peace Operations Year in Review 2004*. Retrieved from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/yir2004.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

UN (2006). ECOSOC Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on African Countries Emerging from Conflict: The Silent Avant-Garde. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination. New York: United Nations Publications.

UN (2008). Letter addressed by the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission on the request of the Peacebuilding Commission.

UN (2009). *United Nations Peace Operations 2009 Year in Review*. Retrieved from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/yir2009.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

UN (2010). *United Nations Peace Operations 2010 Year in Review*. Retrieved from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/yir2010.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

UN (2011a). Letter addressed to Guinea on its placement to the Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from: www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/psc_response_govt.pdf. [First access on November 2015].

UN (2011b). *United Nations Peace Operations 2011 Year in Review*. Retrieved from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/yir2011.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

UN (2016). Guidance Note on UN Country Team Conduct and Working Arrangements. Retrieved from: <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Approved-Guidance-Note-on-UNCT-Conduct-and-Working-Arrangements.pdf>. Accessed on September 2018. [First access on on September 2018].

UN (2019). Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). Retrieved from: www.un.org/peacebuilding/supportoffice/about. [First access on on September 2018].

UN (2020, January 28). Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Retrieved from www.un.org/sg/en/content/kofi-annan. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

UNDP (2018). Human Development Report 2019. Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century. New York: UNDP. Retrieved from: <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

UNDP-MPTF (2009). *Second Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund*. Report of the Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2008. Retrieved from: http://unpbf-static.cdn.ekouk.com/Annual_Progress_Report_2008.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

UNSC (2019). Political Missions and Offices. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/political-missions-and-offices>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Secondary Sources

Abel, T. (1941). 'The Element of Decision in the Pattern of War'. *American Sociological Review*, vol. 6, no. 6, 1941, pp. 853–859. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2085765. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Abdenur, A. E. & Souza Neto, D. M. (2016). "The impact of the Peacebuilding Architecture in Guinea-Bissau" in De Coning, C and Stamnes, E. (eds.) *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, 181-195.

Acharya, A. (2004). 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism'. *International Organization*, 58(2), 239-275. DOI:10.1017/S0020818304582024. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Adejumobi, S. (2004). 'Conflict and peace building in West Africa: the role of civil society and the African Union'. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 4:1, 59-77, DOI: 10.1080/1467880042000206868. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Adler, E. (1997) 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3), pp. 319–363. DOI: 10.1177/1354066197003003003. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Adler, E. (1999). 'O construtivismo no estudo das relações internacionais'. *Lua Nova* [online], n.47, pp.201-246. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0102-64451999000200011>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Adler, E. & Pouliot, V. (2011a). 'International practices: introduction and framework' in Adler, E. and Pouliot, V. (eds.), *International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-35.

Adler, E., & Pouliot, V. (2011). International practices. *International Theory*, 3(1), 1-36. DOI:10.1017/S175297191000031X. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Adler-Nissen, R. (2014). 'Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society', *International Organization*, 68, Winter 2014, 143–76. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818313000337. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

- Allison, G. (1969). 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis'. *American Political Science Review*, 63(3), 689-718. DOI:10.1017/S000305540025853X. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Second Edition. New York: Longman.
- Akers, R. (1997). *Criminological Theories: Introduction and Evaluation*, Los Angeles, CA, Roxbury Publishing.
- Aning, K. & Lartey, E. (2010). *Establishing the Future State of the Peacebuilding Commission: Perspectives from Africa*. Working Paper, NUPI. 26 p. <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/278032>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Appathurai, E. R. (1985). 'Permanent Missions in New York' in Berridge, G. R. & Jennings, A. (eds.) *Diplomacy at the UN*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press, p. 94-108.
- Autesserre, S. (2009). 'Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention'. *International Organization*, 63(2), 249-280. doi:10.1017/S0020818309090080. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Ball, N. & van Beijnum, M. (2009). *Review of the Peacebuilding Fund*. www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20090604%20PBF_Review.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Balogun, J.; Pye, A.; Hodgkinson, G. P. (2008). 'Cognitively Skilled Organizational Decision Making: Making Sense of Deciding' in Hodgkinson, G. P. & Starbuck, W. H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 233-249.
- Barach, P. & Baratz, M. S. (1962). 'Two faces of Power'. *The American Political Science Review*, Volume 56, Issue 4 (Dec., 1962), 947-952. www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/bachrach.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Bargués-Pedreny, P. & Mathieu, X. (2018) 'Beyond Silence, Obstacle and Stigma: Revisiting the 'Problem' of Difference in Peacebuilding'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 12:3, 283-299, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2018.1513622. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Barkin, S. (2010). *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barma, N. H. (2017). *The Peacebuilding Puzzle: Political Order in Post-Conflict States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barnes, B. (2001). 'Practice as collective action', in Schatzki, T.; Cetina, K. K.; & Savigny, E. von. (eds.), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 25-36.

Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M., Sitea, L. (2007). 'Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?'. *Global Governance*, 13 (2007), 35–58. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01301004>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Bennett, A. & Checkel, J. (eds.). *Process Tracing: from Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Becker, H. S. (1963). *Outsiders - Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: The Free Press.

Bendor, J.; Taulor, S.; Gaalen, R. van. (1987). 'Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design'. *American Political Science Review*, 81(3), 873-896. doi:10.2307/1962681. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Berdal, M. (2005). 'The United Nations, Peacebuilding, and the Genocide in Rwanda'. *Global Governance*; 11(1), 115-130. Retrieved January 31, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/27800557. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Berger, B. (1974). 'Foreword' in Goffman, E. (ed.) *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, i-viii.

Bhatia, M. V. (2005). 'Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors', *Third World Quarterly*, 26:1, 5-22, DOI: 10.1080/0143659042000322874. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Biswas, T. (1997). *Decision-making under uncertainty*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.

Boswell, C. (2009). *The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge: Immigration Policy and Social Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Björkdahl, A. (2002). 'Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 15:1, 9-23, DOI: 10.1080/09557570220126216. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Biersteker, T. & Jüntersonke, O. (2010). *The Challenges of Institution Building: Prospects for the UN Peacebuilding Commission*. Working Paper, NUPI. 17 p. <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/278028>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2012), 'From Europeanization to diffusion: Introduction'. *West European Politics*, 35:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2012.631310. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2017). 'From Europeanization to diffusion: Introduction' in Risse, T.; *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations: Ideas do not float freely*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 290-307.

- Brown, K. (2006). 'War Economies and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Identifying a Weak Link'. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 3:1, 6-19, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2006.260470878529. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Buerger, C. (2011). 'The clash of practice: political controversy and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission'. *Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice*. 7. DOI: 171-191. 10.1332/174426411X579216. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Buerger, C. & Gadinger, F. (2015). 'The Play of International Practices'. *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 59, Issue 3, September 2015, Pages 449–460, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12202>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Bundervoet, T. (2009). 'Livestock, Land and Political Power: The 1993 Killings in Burundi'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(3), 357–376. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309102657>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Burundi (2006). Request from the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations to be included in the Peacebuilding Commission. Permanent Mission of Burundi to the United Nations in New York.
- Buzan, B. (1995). 'The Level of Analysis Problem in IR reconsidered' in Booth, K. & Smith, S. (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 198-216.
- Cabantous, L.; Gond, J.; Johnson-Cramer, M. (2008). 'The Social Construction of Rationality in Organizational Decision Making' in Hodgkinson, G. P. & Starbuck, W. H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 399-417.
- Call, C. T. (2015, June 17). *Addressing Two Problems with Peacebuilding*. Retrieved on 31 Jan. 2020, from <https://cpr.unu.edu/addressing-two-problems-with-peacebuilding.html>.
- Cambridge Dictionary (2020, January 28). *Eligible*. Retrieved on 28 Jan 2020, from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/pt/dicionario/ingles-portugues/eligible?q=eligibility>.
- Campbell, S. (2018). *Global Governance and Local Peace: Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/9781108290630.
- Campbell, S., Chandler, D., Sabaratnam, M. (2011). *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books.
- Campbell, S. et al. (2016). 'The Impact of the Peacebuilding Architecture in Burundi' in De Coning, C. and Stamnes, E. (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 127-144.
- Caparine, M. (2016). 'The impact of the Peacebuilding Architecture on consolidating Liberia's peace process' in De Coning, C. and Stamnes, E. (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 159-180.

Caplan, R. (2019). *Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices, and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carayannis, E. G., Pirzadeh, A., Popescu, D. (2012). *Institutional Learning and Knowledge Transfer Across Epistemic Communities: New Tools of Global Governance*. Heidelberg: Springer.

Carter, M. J. & Fuller, C. (2015). 'Symbolic interactionism', *Sociopedia.isa*, 1-17. DOI: 10.1177/205684601561. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Castillo, G. del (2008). *Rebuilding war-torn states: the challenge of post-conflict economic reconstruction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Catalani, M. S. and Clerico, G. F. (1996). *Decision Making Structures: Dealing with Uncertainty within Organizations*. Heidelberg: Physical-Verlag.

Cavalcante, F. (2016). 'The impact of the Peacebuilding Architecture on consolidating the Sierra Leone peace process' in De Coning, C. and Stamnes, E. (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 145-158.

Cavalcante, F. (2019). *Peacebuilding in the United Nations: Coming into Life*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chandler, D. (2017). *Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1997-2017*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Checkel, J. T. (1997). 'International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(4), 473-495. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003004003>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Checkel, J. T. (1999). 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe'. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1), 83-114. www.jstor.org/stable/2600966. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Checkel, J. (2014). 'Mechanisms, process, and the study of international institutions' in Bennett, A. & Checkel, J. (eds.), *Process Tracing: from Metaphor to Analytic Tool Strategies for social inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 74-97.

Cheng-Hopkins, J. (2016). 'The UN Peacebuilding Architecture - good intentions, confused expectations, faulty assumptions' in De Coning, C. and Stamnes, E. (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 233-250.

Chetail, V. (2009). *Post-conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chetail V. & Jütersonke, O. (eds.). (2014). *Peacebuilding: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, four volumes, London & New York: Routledge.

Clark, I. (2007). *International Legitimacy and World Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, M. S. (1995). 'Three Paradigms for Viewing Decision Biases' in Klein, G. A. *et al. Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods*. New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, pp. 36-50.

Coleman, K. P. (2007). *International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, P. *et al.* (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. A World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington: Oxford University Press.

Collier, D. (2011). 'Understanding Process Tracing, Political Science and Politics'. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 44, N 4, 823-830. DOI: 10.1017/S1049096511001429. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Cook, S. D. N. & Brown, J.S. (1999). 'Bridging epistemologies: the generative dance between organizational knowledge and organizational knowing'. *Organization Science*, 10 (4): 381–400. Retrieved from: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cabd/cab01ab25828a3fa1adb2d7d0c5f66944b1e.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Costa, E. P. L. D. & Baccharini, M. (2014). 'UN Security Council decision-making: testing the bribery hypothesis'. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol.57, n.2, pp.29-57. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400303>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Cox, R. (1981). 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'. *Millennium*, 10(2), 126–155. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Cox, R. (2004). 'International organization in an era of changing historical structures' in Reinalda, B. & Verbeek, B. (auth.), *Decision Making Within International Organization*, London & New York: Routledge, pp. 3-8.

Cox, R. & Jacobson, H. K. (1973). *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Cravo, T. A. (2012). *What's in a Label? The Aid Community's Representations of Success and Failure in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau*. PhD Thesis in Politics and International Relations. University of Cambridge. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Curtis, D. (2012). 'The Contested Politics of Peacebuilding in Africa' in Curtis, D. & Dzinesa, G. A. (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*. Ohio: Ohio university Press, pp. 1-28.

Dahl, R.A. (1957). 'The concept of power'. *Journal of the Society for General Systems Research*, 2: 201-215. DOI:10.1002/bs.3830020303. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Darby, J. & Mac Ginty, R. (2008). 'Introduction: What Peace? What Process?' in Darby, J. & Mac Ginty, R. (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan: pp. 1-8.

David, C. (2002). 'Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?' in Jeon, Ho-Won (ed.), *Approaches to Peacebuilding*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 18-58.

De Coning, C. (2010). *Clarity, Coherence and Context: Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding*. Working Paper, NUPI. 31 p. <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/277922>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

De Coning, C. (2013). 'Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 2(1), p.Art. 6. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.as>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

De Coning, C. (2018). 'Sustaining Peace. Can a new approach change the UN?'. *Global Governance Spotlight*, 3|2018. Retrieved from: www.sef-bonn.org/en/publications/global-governance-spotlight/32018.html. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

De Coning, C. (2019). 'How UN Peacekeeping Operations Can Adapt to a New Multipolar World Order', *International Peacekeeping*, 26:5, 536-539, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2019.1677286. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

De Coning, C. & Stammes, E. (2016). 'Assessing the impact of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture' in De Coning, C. & Stammes, E., *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 1-20.

De Coning, C. & Peter, M. (2019). *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

De Guevara, B. B. (2014). 'Studying the International Crisis Group', *Third World Quarterly*, 35:4, 545-562, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2014.924060. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

DIIS. (2013). *Blue Helmets and Grey Zones: Do UN Multidimensional Peace Operations Work?* Copenhagen: Vesterkopi AS, 2013:29. www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/rp2013-29_lan_blue-helmets_web.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Distler, W. (2016). 'Intervention as a social practice: knowledge formation and transfer in the everyday of police missions'. *International Peacekeeping*, 23:2, 326-349, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2016.1139460. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Doty, R. L. (1993). 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines'. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 297-320. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600810>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Doyle, M. W. & Sambanis, N. (2000). 'International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis'. *The American Political Science Review*; 94(4), 779-801. doi:10.2307/2586208. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

- Druckman, J. N. (2004). 'Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects'. *The American Political Science Review*, 98(4), 671-686. doi:10.1017/S0003055404041413. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Elkins, Z. & Simmons, B. (2005). 'On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework' in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 598(1), 33-51. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204272516>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Entman, R. M. (1993). 'Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm'. *Journal of Communication*, 43: 51-58. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Eriksen, S. S. (2009). 'The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo'. *International Peacekeeping*, 16:5, 652-666, DOI: 10.1080/13533310903303289. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Erikson, K. T. (1962). 'Notes on the Sociology of Deviance'. *Social Problems*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1962), pp. 307-314. DOI: 10.2307/798544. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Etzioni, A. (2007). 'Reconstruction: An Agenda'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 1:1, 27-45, DOI: 10.1080/17502970601075881. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Eyben, R. & Moncrieffe, J. (auth.), Knowles, C. (ed.). (2006). *The Power of Labelling in Development Practice*. Policy Briefing, Issue 28, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex. Retrieved from: www.ids.ac.uk/publications/the-power-of-labelling-in-development-practice/. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Eyben, R. (2007). 'Afterword: Changing Practice' in Moncrieffe, J. & Eyben, R. (eds.), *The Power of Labelling: How People Are Categorized and Why it Matters*. London: Earthscan, pp. 177-184.
- Fairhurst, G. T. (2010). *The Power of Framing: Creating the Language of Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Falch, Å. & Becker, M. (2008). *Power-sharing and Peacebuilding in Burundi*, CSCW Paper. Oslo: PRIO. Retrieved from: www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7314. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Fenby, S. (2013). 'The g7+ Group of Fragile States: Towards Better International Engagement and Accountability in Aid Delivery to Fragile Nations' in Kinsbury, D. (ed.), *Critical Reflections on Development*. London & New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 33-49.
- Fine, Bob (1977). 'Labelling theory: an investigation into the sociological critique of deviance'. *Economy and Society*, 6:2, 166-193, DOI: 10.1080/030851477000000003. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998). 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change'. *International Organization*, 52(4), 887-917. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/2601361. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Fisher, R. J. (1993). 'The Potential for Peacebuilding Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking'. *Peace & Change*, 18: 247-266. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0130.1993.tb00177.x. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Fitzgerald, Stephen P. (2002). *Decision Making*. Oxford: Capstone Publishing.

Frost, M. & Lechner, S. (2015). 'Understanding international practices from the internal point of view'. *Journal of International Political Theory*, 1–21. DOI: 10.1177/1755088215596765. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Funke, Joachim (2017). 'How Much Knowledge Is Necessary for Action?' in Meusburger, P.; Werlen, B.; Suarsana, L. (eds.) (2017). *Knowledge and Action*. Vol. 9. Cham: SpringerOpen, pp. 99-111.

Galtung, J. (1976). 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding'. *Peace, war and defense: essays in peace research*, vol 2, Copenhagen: Ejlers, pp. 282-304.

Galtung, J. (1969). 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research'. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167-191. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Geva, N.; Redd, S. B. & Mintz, A. (1997). 'Decisionmaking on War and Peace: Challenges for Future Research' in Geva, N. & Mintz, A., *Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 215-222.

Gilardi, F. (2013). 'Transnational diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies' in Carlsnaes, W.; Risse, T. & Simmons, B. (eds), *Handbook of International Relations*. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 453-477.

Goertz, G. (2003). *International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Goetze, C. & Guzina, D. (2008). 'Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Nationbuilding – Turtles All the Way Down?'. *Civil Wars*, 10:4, 319-347, DOI: 10.1080/13698240802354458. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Gould, H. D. (1998). 'What Is at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?' in Kubálková, V.; Onuf, N.; & Kowert, P. (eds), *International Relations in a Constructed World*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 79-98.

Graef, J. (2015). *Practicing Post-Liberal Peacebuilding: Legal Empowerment and Emergent Hybridity in Liberia*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Grauvogel, J. (2014). *Regional Sanctions against Burundi: A Powerful Campaign and Its Unintended Consequences*, GIGA Working Papers, No. 255, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg. Retrieved from: <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103655>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Groß, L. (2017). *Peacebuilding and Post-War Transitions: Assessing the impact of external domestic interactions*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.

Guzzini, S. (2000). 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 6: 147-182. DOI: 10.1177/1354066100006002001. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Guzzini, S. (2005). 'The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis'. *Millennium*, 33(3), 495–521. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330031301>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Hadwen, J. G. & Kaufmann, J. (1962). *How United Nations Decisions Are Made*. New York: Oceania Publications.

Hanhimäki, J. M. (2015). *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Harrison, G. (2010). 'Practices of Intervention: Repertoires, Habits, and Conduct in Neoliberal Africa'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 4:4, 433-452, DOI: 10.1080/17502971003700969. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Haugerudbraaten, H. (1998). 'Peacebuilding: Six dimensions and two concepts'. *African Security Review*, 7:6, 17-26, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.1998.9628005. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Heathershaw, J. & Lambach, D. (2008). 'Introduction: Post-Conflict Spaces in International Relations'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 2:3, 269-289, DOI: 10.1080/17502970802436296. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Hellmüller, S. & Santschi, M. (eds.). (2014). *Is Local Beautiful? Peacebuilding between International Interventions and Locally Led Initiatives*. Heidelberg: Springer.

Heracleous, L. (1994). 'Rational Decision Making: Myth or Reality?'. *Management Development Review*, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 16-23. <https://doi.org/10.1108/09622519410771628>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Hickson, D. J. & Miller, S. (1992). 'Concepts of Decisions: Making and Implementing Strategic Decisions in Organizations' in Heller, F., *Decision-making and leadership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 113-132.

Hindess, B. (1982). 'Power, Interests and the Outcomes of Struggles'. *Sociology*, 16(4), 498-511. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/42852483. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Hoffmann, M. (2017, December 22). 'Norms and Social Constructivism in International Relations' in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. Retrieved 29 Jan. 2020, from <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-60>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Holt, S. (2011). *Aid, Peacebuilding and the Resurgence of War Buying Time in Sri Lanka*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Horowitz, I. L. & Liebowitz, M. (1968). 'Social Deviance and Political Marginality: Toward a Redefinition of the Relation between Sociology and Politics'. *Social Problems*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter, 1968), pp. 280-296. DOI: 10.2307/799785. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Howard, L. M. (2007). The ongoing multidimensional peacekeeping operations. In *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (pp. 299-326). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511840593.009. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Howard, L. M. (2019). *Power in Peacekeeping*. Cambridge University Press.

Hurd, I. (2008). *After Anarchy: Legitimacy & Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Hurd, I. (2015). 'International law and the politics of diplomacy' in Sending, O. J.; Pouliot, V.; Neumann, I. B. (eds.). *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 31-54.

Jacobs, A. M. (2014). 'Process tracing the effects of ideas' in Bennett, A. & Checkel, J. (eds.), *Process Tracing: from Metaphor to Analytic Tool Strategies for social inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41-73.

Jenkins, R. (2008). 'Organizational Change and Institutional Survival: The Case of the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission'. *Seton Hall Law Review*: Vol. 38: Iss. 4, Article 5. [https://scholarship.shu.edu/shlr/vol38/iss4/5]. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Jenkins, R. (2010). *Re-engineering the UN Peacebuilding Architecture*, Working Paper, NUPI. 37 p. Retrieved from: <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/278026>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Jenkins, R. (2013). *Peacebuilding: from concept to commission*. New York: Routledge.

Jeon, H. (ed.) (2002). *Approaches to Peacebuilding*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Jeon, H. (2005). *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Jervis, R. (2017). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Joachim, J. (2003). 'Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights'. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(2), 247-274. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/3693544. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Jørgensen, K. E. (2001). 'Four Levels and a Discipline' in Fierke, K. M.; Jørgensen, K. E. (eds.), *Constructing International Relations: the next generation*. New York: M.E.Sharp, pp. 36-53.

- Junk, J. *et al.* (2017). *The Management of UN Peacekeeping: Coordination, Learning, and Leadership in Peace Operations*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Junne, G. & Verkoren, W. (2005). 'The Challenges of Postconflict Development' in Junne, G. & Verkoren, W., *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-18.
- Kaplan, H. B. & Johnson, R. J. (2001). *Social Deviance Testing a General Theory*. New York: Springer Science+Business Media.
- Karbo, T. & Virk, K. (eds.) (2018). *The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Karlsrud, J. (2018). 'From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism'. *International Peacekeeping*, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2018.1502040. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Karlsrud, J. & Vermeij, L. (2016). 'Bridging the gap?: The UN civilian capacity initiative' in De Coning, C. and Stamnes, E. (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 109-123.
- Kaufmann, J. (1980). *United Nations Decision Making*. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff.
- Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kennedy, D. (2005). 'Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance'. *Sydney Law Review*, 1; 27(1). Retrieved from: www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/SydLawRw/2005/1.html#. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Kennedy, D. (2016). *A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Kirsch, S. & Flint, C. (2011). 'Introduction: Reconstruction and the Worlds that War Makes' in Kirsch, S. & Flint, C., *Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 3-28.
- Klein, G. A. *et al.* (1995). *Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods*. New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- Klotz, A. & Lynch, C. (2007). *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Kluyskens, J. (2016). 'The Peacebuilding Fund: From uncertainty to promise' in De Coning and Stamnes (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 61-76.
- Kluyskens, J. & Clark, L. (2014). *Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund*. Oslo: NORAD, Norad Collected Reviews 15/2014. Retrieved from:

<https://norad.no/globalassets/publikasjoner/publikasjoner-2016/norad-collected-reviews/review-of-the-united-nations-peacebuilding-fund.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Kmec, V. (2016). 'The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission: reflecting power shifts in the United Nations'. *International Peacekeeping*, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2016.1250628. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Knaggård, Å. (2013). *Framing the Problem: Knowledge Brokers in the Multiple Streams Approach*. Paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 2013, Mainz, Germany. Retrieved from: <https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/files/6403258/5337344.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Knight, W. A. (2002). 'The future of the UN Security Council: Questions of legitimacy and representation in multilateral governance' in Cooper, A. F.; English, J.; & Thakur, R., *Enhancing global governance: Towards a new diplomacy?*. Tokyo, New York & Paris: United Nations University Press, pp. 19-37.

Kratochwil, F. V. (1989). *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kratochwil, Friedrich (2001). 'Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study' in Fierke, K. M.; Jørgensen, K. E. (eds.), *Constructing International Relations: the next generation*. New York: M. E. Sharp, pp. 13-35.

Kratochwil, F. (2011). 'Making sense of 'international practices'' in Adler, E. & Pouliot, V., *International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 36-60.

Kühn, F. P. (2016). 'International peace practice: Ambiguity, contradictions and perpetual violence' in Turner, M. & Kühn, F. P. (eds.), *The Politics of International Intervention: The tyranny of peace*. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 21-38.

Lambourne, W. (2008). 'Towards Sustainable Peace and Development in Sierra Leone: Civil Society and the Peacebuilding Commission'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 4:2, 47-59, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2008.630221763481. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Lambourne, W. and Herro, A. (2008). 'Peacebuilding theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: implications for non-UN interventions'. *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 20:3, 275-289, DOI: 10.1080/14781150802390467. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Lasswell, H. D. & Kaplan, A. (1950). *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Layder, D. (1985). 'Power, Structure and Agency'. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*. 15: 131-149. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.1985.tb00048.x. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020

Lechern, S. & Frost, M. (2018). *Practice Theory and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Legro, J. W. (1997). 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism'. *International Organization*, 51(1), 31-63. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/2703951. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Leoveanu, Andy Constantin (2013). "Rationalist Model in Public Decision Making", *Journal of Public Administration, Finance and Law*, Issue 4, 43-54. Retrieved from: http://www.jopafll.com/uploads/issue4/RATIONALIST_MODEL_IN_PUBLIC_DECISION_MAKING.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Litfin, K. T. (1994). *Ozone Discourse: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Litfin, K. T. (1995). Framing Science: Precautionary Discourse and the Ozone Treaties. *Millennium*, 24(2), 251–277. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298950240020501>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Lotz, Christian (2011) Financing for Peacebuilding: The Case for a Broader Concept of Aid Effectiveness, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 6:2, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2011.126445821957
- Lunenburg, F. C. (2010). 'The Decision Making Process'. *National Forum of Educational Administration and Supervision Journal*, Vol. 27, Issue 4, pp. 1-12. Retrieved from: <http://www.nationalforum.com/Electronic%20Journal%20Volumes/Lunenburg,%20Fred%20C.%20The%20Decision%20Making%20Process%20NFEASJ%20V27%20N4%202010.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Lukes, Steven (1974). *Power: A Radical View*. London: The Macmillan Press.
- Lyall, J. (2014). 'Process tracing, causal inference, and civil war' in Bennett, A. & Checkel, J. (eds.), *Process Tracing: from Metaphor to Analytic Tool Strategies for social inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186-207.
- Mac Ginty, R. (2007) 'Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: A challenge to the liberal peace?'. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 7:3, 457-482, DOI: 10.1080/14678800701556552. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Mac Ginty, R. (ed.) (2013). *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Magen, A. A. & Morlino, L. (2009). *International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring Democracy?*. London: Routledge.
- Mahmoud, Y. & Makoond, A. (2017). *Sustaining Peace: What Does It Mean in Practice*. Issue Brief. International Peace Institute. Retrieved from: www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/1704_Sustaining-Peace-final.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Mandoyi, N.; Choane, M.; & Twala, C.B. (2013). 'The Role of the International Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions in Africa: A Case of Darfur (Sudan)'. *Journal of Social Sciences*, 36:1, 1-9, DOI: 10.1080/09718923.2013.11893167. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Matheson, M. J. (2006). *Council Unbound: the Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

McAskie, C. (2010). *2020 Vision. Visioning the Future of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*. Working Paper, NUPI. 29 p. Retrieved from: <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/277924>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

McAskie, C. (2016). 'Foreword: Reflection on the birth of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture' in De Coning, C. and Stamnes, E. (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. xxvii-xxxviii.

McCandless, E. (2010). *In Pursuit of Peacebuilding for Perpetual Peace: Where the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture Needs to Go*. Working Paper, NUPI. 37 p. Retrieved from: <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/277918>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

McCandless, E. & Tschirgi, N. (2010). 'Strategic Frameworks that Embrace Mutual Accountability for Peacebuilding: Emerging Lessons in PBC and non-PBC Countries'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 5:2, 20-46, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2010.598777554033. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

McCandless, E., Abitbol, E., & Donais, T. (2015). 'Vertical Integration: A Dynamic Practice Promoting Transformative Peacebuilding'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 10(1), 1-9. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2015.1014268>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Meijerink, S. V. (1999). *Conflict and Cooperation on the Scheldt River Basin: A Case Study of Decision Making on International Scheldt Issues between 1967 and 1997*. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

Meusburger, P. & Werlen, B. (2017). 'Knowledge, Action, and Space: An Introduction' in Meusburger, P.; Werlen, B.; Suarsana, L. (eds.), *Knowledge and Action*. Vol. 9. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 1-30.

Meyer, M. (2010). 'The Rise of the Knowledge Broker'. *Science Communication*, SAGE Publications, 32(1), pp.118-127. 10.1177/1075547009359797. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Miall, H. (2007) 'The EU and the Peacebuilding Commission'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20:1, 29-45, DOI: 10.1080/09557570601155294. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Michaud, N. (2002). 'Bureaucratic Politics and the Shaping of Policies: Can We Measure Pulling and Hauling Games?'. *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne De Science Politique*, 35(2), 269-300. Retrieved January 29, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/3233428. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Mintz, A. (1997). 'Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: Bridging the Gap Between the Cognitive Psychology and Rational Actor "Schools"' in Geva, N. & Mintz, A., *Decisionmaking on War and Peace*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-7.

- Mintz, A. & DeRouen, K. (2010). *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mohamedou, M. O. (2015). *West Africa Regional perspectives for the White Paper on Peacebuilding*. Geneva Peacebuilding Platform. White Paper Series No. 1. Retrieved from: www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/White%20Paper%20Series%20-%20Compilation_0.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Moncrieffe, J. (2007). 'Introduction. Labelling, Power and Accountability: How and Why 'Our' Categories Matter' in Moncrieffe, J. and Eyben, R., *The Power of Labelling: How People Are Categorized and Why it Matters*. London: Earthscan, pp. 1-16.
- Morrow, J. D. (1997). 'A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict' in Geva, N. & Mintz, A., *Decisionmaking on War and Peace*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 11-31.
- Murithi, T. (2007). *Between Paternalism and Hybrid Partnership: The Emerging UN and Africa Relationship in Peace Operations*, Briefing Paper, Dialogue on Globalization. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04676.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Murithi, T. (2008). 'Peacebuilding or 'UN-Building'? African Institutional Responses to the Peacebuilding Commission'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 4:2, 89-94, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2008.661802498267. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Murithi, T. (2009). *The Ethics of Peacebuilding*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Murithi, T., & Scanlon, H. (2006). *Africa Perspectives: on the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Research Report*. Centre for Conflict Resolution. Retrieved from: www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05183. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Neufeldt, R. C. (2014). 'Doing good better: expanding the ethics of peacebuilding'. *International Peacekeeping*, 21(4): 427-442. DOI 10.1080/13533312.2014.946710. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Neves, G. M. S. (2010). *Comissão das Nações Unidas para Consolidação da Paz: Perspectiva Brasileira*. Brasília: FUNAG.
- Newman, E. (2013). 'The International Architecture of Peacebuilding' in Mac Ginty, R. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 311-324.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr (2011). *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Olonisakin, 'F. and Ikpe, E. (2012). 'The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Problems and Prospects' in Curtis, D. & Dzinesa, G. A., *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*. Ohio, Ohio University Press: pp. 140-157.
- Onuf, N. (1969). *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Onuf, N. (1998). 'Constructivism: A User's Manual' in Kubálková, V.; Onuf, N.; & Kowert, P. (eds), *International Relations in a Constructed World*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 58-78.

Onuf, N. (2001). 'The Politics of Constructivism' in Fierke, K. M.; Jørgensen, K. E. (eds.). *Constructing International Relations: the next generation*. New York: M. E. Sharp, 236-254.

Onuf, N. (2013). *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in social theory and international relations*. Oxon: Routledge.

Orasanu, J. & Connolly, T. (1995). 'The Reinvention of Decision Making' in Klein, G. A. et al. *Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods*. New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, pp. 3-20.

Otobo, E. E. (2015). *Consolidating Peace in Africa: The role of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission*. Princeton: AMVPS.

O'Toole, Paddy (2011). *How Organizations Remember: Retaining Knowledge through Organizational Action*. New York: Springer Science+Business Media.

Oyedele. L. K. (2019). 'Peace Building: Conceptual, Trajectory and Imperative Analyses in the Third World Countries'. *Canadian Social Science*, 15 (2), 53-64. Retrieved from: www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/10843. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/10843>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Paris, R. (1997). 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism'. *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1997, pp. 54–89. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2539367. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Paris, R. (2002). 'International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice''. *Review of International Studies*, (2002), 28, 637–656. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021050200637X>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Paris, R. (2010). 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding'. *Review of International Studies*, 36(2), 337-365. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/40783202. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Park, Susan (2006). 'Theorizing Norm Diffusion Within International Organizations', *International Politics*, 43, 342-361. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800149>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Parsons, T. (1963). 'On the Concept of Political Power'. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 107(3), 232-262. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/985582. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Payne, R. A. (2001). 'Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 7(1), 37–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007001002>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

- Peteet, J. (2005). 'Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine: Israel Conflict'. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(1), 153-172. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/3993769. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Poulin, B. (2005). 'Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies'. *Security Dialogue*, 36, 4, pp. 495-510. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605060448>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Ponzio, R. (2005). *The creation and functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission*, Briefing, Saferworld. Retrieved from: www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20238/SW_Peace%20Building4.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Ponzio, R. J. (2010). 'Strategic Policy Frameworks as Peacebuilding Tools: A Comparative Study'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 5:2, 6-19, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2010.766938236986. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Ponzio, R. (2012). 'After Exit: The UN Peacebuilding Architecture' in Caplan, R. (ed.), *Exit Strategies and State Building*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 293-310.
- Pouliot, V. (2014). 'Practice Tracing' in Bennett, A. & Checkel, J. (eds.), *Process Tracing: from Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 327-259.
- Pouliot, V. (2015). 'The practice of permanent representation to international organizations' in Sending, O. J.; Pouliot, V.; Neumann, I. B. (eds.). *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 80-108.
- Pouliot, V. (2016). *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Prantl, J. (2005). 'Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council'. *International Organization*, 59(3), 559-592. doi:10.1017/S0020818305050204. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Prantl, J. (2006). *The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States: Complementing or Competing for Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pugh, M. (2005). 'The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: a Critical Theory Perspective'. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 10(2), 23-42. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/41852928. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.
- Pugh, M. (2013). 'The problem-solving and critical paradigms' in Mac Ginty, R. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 11-24.
- Quick, I. D. (2016). 'Searching for a niche: UN peacebuilding in the Republic of Guinea' in De Coning, C. and Stamnes, E. (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 196-213.
- Raiffa, H. (1976). *Decision analysis: introductory lectures on choices under uncertainty*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Ramos-Horta, J. (2007). Address at the 62nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. 27 September 2007. Retrieved from: www.un.org/webcast/ga/62/2007/pdfs/timor-leste-eng.pdf. [First access on 23 January 2020].

Ramsbotham, O. (2000). 'Reflection on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding'. *International Peacekeeping*, 7:1, 169-189, DOI: 10.1080/13533310008413824. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Reckwitz, A. (2002). 'Toward a Theory of Social Practices. A Development in Culturalist Theorizing'. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(2), 243-263. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310222225432>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Rein, M. (1983). *From Policy to Practice*. London: The Macmillan Press.

Rein, M. & Schön, D. (1993). 'Reframing Policy Discourse' in Fischer, F. & Forester, J. (eds.), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. London: University College London Press, pp. 145-166.

Rein, M. & Schön, D. (1996). 'Frame-Critical Policy Analysis and Frame-Reflective Policy Practice'. *Knowledge and Policy: The International Journal of Knowledge Transfer and Utilization*, 9: 85-140. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02832235>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Reinalda, B. & Verbeek, B. (2004). 'The issue of decision making within international organizations' in Reinalda, B. & Verbeek, B., *Decision Making Within International Organization*. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 9-41.

Resulaj, A., Kiani, R., Wolpert, D. M., & Shadlen, M. (2009). 'Changes of mind in decision making'. *Nature*, 263-266 (2009). <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08275>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Rettberg, A. (2010). *The Private Sector, Peacebuilding, and Economic Recovery: A Challenge for the UN Peacebuilding Architecture*. Working Paper, NUPI. 34 p. Retrieved from: <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/277920>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Richmond, O. P. (2005). *The Transformation of Peace*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Richmond, O. P. (2006). 'The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace''. *Conflict, Security and Development*, 6, 3, pp. 291-314. DOI: 10.1080/14678800600933480. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Richmond, O. P. (2008). 'The UN and Liberal Peacebuilding: Consensus and Challenges' in Darby, J. & Mac Ginty, R. (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 257-270.

Richmond, O. P. (2010). *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding. Critical Developments and Approaches*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Richmond, O. P. (2013). (2013). 'Failed Statebuilding versus Peace Formation' in Chandler, D. & Sisk, T. D. (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding*, London & New York: Routledge, pp. 130-140.

Richmond, O. P. & Mac Ginty, R. (2015). 'Where now for the critique of the liberal peace?'. *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 50(2) 171–189. DOI: 10.1177/0010836714545691. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Risse, T., Ropp, S., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (1999). *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511598777.

Ritzer, G. (2010). *Sociological Theory*. 8th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies.

Rosanas, J. M. (2013). *Decision-Making in an Organizational Context: Beyond Economic Criteria*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rosati, J. A. (1981). 'Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective'. *World Politics*, 33(2), 234-252. doi:10.2307/2010371. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Rosen, M. A.; Salas, E.; Lyons, R.; Fiore, S. M. (2008). 'Expertise and Naturalistic Decision Making in Organizations: Mechanisms of Effective Decision Making' in Hodgkinson, G. P. & Starbuck, W. H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 211-230.

Rouse, J. (2007). 'Social Practices and Normativity'. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 37, N. 1, 46-56. DOI: 10.1177/0048393106296542. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Ruffa, C.; Rietjens, S. & Nygren, E. (2020). 'Resilience and Conflict Resolution: UN Peacekeeping in Mali' in Cusumano, E.; Hofmaier, S. (Eds.), *Projecting Resilience Across the Mediterranean*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 189-203. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-23641-0_10.

Ruggie, J. G. (1998). *Constructing World Polity: Essays in International Institutionalization*. London & New York: Routledge.

Rugumamu, S. M. (2009). *Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa?*, Briefing Paper 8, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/06505.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Russel, Bertrand (2004[1938]). *Power: A new social analysis*. London: Routledge.

Ryan, S. (2013). 'The evolution of peacebuilding' in Mac Ginty, R. (ed.). *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 25-35.

Sabaratham, M. (2011). 'The Liberal Peace? An Intellectual History of International Conflict Management, 1990-2010' in Campbell, S., Chandler, D., Sabaratnam, M., *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books, pp. 13-30.

Schachter, O. (1961). 'Review of How United Nations Decisions are Made by John G. Hadwen & Johan Kaufmann'. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 1018-1019. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2196295>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Schaefer, Brett D. (2015). *The U.S. Should Push for Fundamental Changes to the United Nations Scale of Assessments*. The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, No. 3023, June 11, 2015. Retrieved from: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/BG3023.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Schaefer, Brett D. (2017). *Diplomatic Effort to Reduce America's Peacekeeping Dues Must Start Now*. The Heritage Foundation, Issue Brief, No. 4781, November 1, 2017. Retrieved from: <https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/IB4781.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Schatzki, T. R. (2001). 'Introduction: practice theory' in Schatzki, T. R.; Cetina, K. K.; Savigny, E. Von (eds.), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*. London: Routledge, pp. 10-23.

Schimmelfennig, F.; Engert, S.; Knobel, H. (2006). *International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schur, M. (1980). *The Politics of Deviance: Stigma Contests and the Uses of Power*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Schwarz, R. (2005). 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation'. *Security Dialogue*. Vol. 36(4): 429-446, DOI: 10.1177/0967010605060447. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Searle, J. R. (1979). *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Security Council Report (2007). *Peacebuilding Commission*. Special Research Report No. 2. Retrieved from: www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/lookup-cgIKWLeMTIsG-b-3471567.php. [First access on January 2019].

Security Council Report (2008). *Peacebuilding Commission*. Special Research Report No. 5. Retrieved from: www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/lookup-cgIKWLeMTIsG-b-4673567.php. [First access on January 2019].

Security Council Report (2017). *The Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council: From Cynicism to Synergy?*. Research Report, No. 5. Retrieved from: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_peacebuilding_commission_2017.pdf. [First access on November 2017].

Security Council Report (2018). *Briefing on the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel*. What's In Blue. Retrieved from: www.whatsinblue.org/2018/12/briefing-on-the-un-integrated-strategy-for-the-sahel.php. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Selby, J. (2013). 'The myth of liberal peace-building'. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 13:1, 57-86, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2013.770259. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Sending, O. J.; Pouliot, V.; Neumann, I. B. (2015). 'Introduction' in Sending, O. J.; Pouliot, V.; Neumann, I. B. (eds.). *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-28.

Sidjanski, D. (1973). 'Introduction: Decision-Making Approaches' in Sidjanski, D., *Political Decision-Making Processes*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1-17.

Silva, L. I. L. da, (2007). Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante almoço com o Presidente de Guiné-Bissau, João Bernardo Nino Vieira. Retrieved from: www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/2o-mandato/2007/14-11-2007-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-durante-almoco-com-o-presidente-de-guine-bissau-joao-bernardo-nino-vieira/view. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Simon, H., et al. (1987). 'Decision Making and Problem Solving'. *Interfaces*, 17(5), 11-31. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/25061004. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Smith, C. B. (2006). *Politics and Process at the United Nations: the Global Dance*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Snyder, R. C.; Bruck, K.W. & Sapin, B. (2002). 'Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study' in Snyder, R. C.; Bruck, K.W. & Sapin, B., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 21-152.

Sofo, F.; Colapinto, C.; Sofo, M.; Ammirato, S. (2013). *Adaptative Decision Making and Intellectual Styles*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Spiro, D. E. (1994). 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace'. *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall, 1994), pp. 50-86. Retrieved from: www.jstor.org/stable/2539196. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Stahn, C. (2005). 'Institutionalizing Brahimi's "light Footprint": A Comment on the Role and Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission'. *International Organizations Law Review*, 2(2), 403-415. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1163/157237405775093753>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Stamnes, E. (2010). *Values, Context and Hybridity: How can the insights from the Liberal Peace Critique Literature Be Brought to Bear on the Practices of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture?*, Working Paper, NUPI. 33 p. <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/278024>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Steady F.C. (2011). *Women and Leadership in West Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York

Stein, J. G., & Welch, D. A. (1997). 'Rational and psychological approaches to the study of international conflict: Comparative strengths and weaknesses' in N. Geva, & A. Mintz (Eds.), *Decisionmaking on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 51-80.

Stern, G. (1995). *The Structure of International Society*. London: Pinter.

Stern, D. (2008). 'The Practical Turn' in Turner, S.P & Roth, P. A. (eds.). *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 185-206. DOI: 10.1002/9780470756485.ch8. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Stewart, A. (2001). *Theories of Power and Domination*. London: SAGE Publications.

Sther, N. (2017). 'Knowing and Not Knowing' in Meusburger, P.; Werlen, B.; Suarsana, L. (eds.), *Knowledge and Action*. Vol. 9. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 113-125.

Street, A. M.; Mollett, H. and Smith, J. (2008). 'Experiences of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone and Burundi'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 4:2, 33-46, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2008.938822409973. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.'

Sunstein, C. (1997). *Free Markets and Social Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Swann, H. (1985). 'Decision Making in Organizations: The Effective Use of Personnel' in Payne, J. W. & Wright, G. (eds.), *Behavioral Decision Making*. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 207-231.

The Fund for Peace (2019). *Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019*. Washington: The Fund for Peace. Retrieved from: <https://fundforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Thorsell, B. A. & Klemke, L. W. (1972). 'The Labeling Process: Reinforcement and Deterrent?'. *Law & Society Review*, 6(3), 393-403. doi:10.2307/3052990. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Tom, P. (2017). *Liberal Peace and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tryggestad, T. L. (2016). 'The gender(ed) impact of the Peacebuilding Architecture' in De Coning and Stamnes (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 197-108.

Tschirgi, N. (2010). *Escaping Path Dependency: A Proposed Multi-Tiered Approach for the UN's Peacebuilding Commission*, Working Paper, NUPI, 24 p. Retrieved from: <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/277947>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Tschirgi, N. & Ponzio, R. (2016). 'The dynamics that shaped the establishment of the Peacebuilding Architecture in the early years' in De Coning and Stamnes (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 40-57.

Turner, M. & Kühn, F. P. (2016). 'Introduction: The tyranny of peace and the politics of international intervention' in Turner, M. & Kühn, F. P. (eds.), *The Politics of International Intervention: The tyranny of peace*. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 1-18.

University of Toronto (2019). Discover Archives. Retrieved from: <https://discoverarchives.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/hadwen-john-g>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

van Hulst, M. & Yanow, D. (2016). 'From Policy 'Frames' to 'Framing': Theorizing a More Dynamic, Political Approach'. *American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 46(1), 92-112. DOI: 10.1177/0275074014533142. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Vidaillet, B. (2008). 'When "Decision Outcomes" are not the Outcomes of Decisions' in Hodgkinson, G. P. & Starbuck, W. H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 418-436.

Weeks, D. & Whimster, S. (1985). 'Contexted Decision Making: A Socio-organizational Perspective' in Wright, G., *Behavioral decision making*. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 167-188.

Wendt, A. (1987). 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory'. *International Organization*, 41(3), 335-370. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/2706749. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Wendt, A. (1992). 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/2706858. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Wendt, A. (1995). 'Constructing International Politics'. *International Security*, 20(1), 71-81. doi:10.2307/2539217. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Whalan, J. (2014). *How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wight, Colin (2006). *Agents, Structures and International Relations – Politics as Ontology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, J. (1998). *Legitimacy in International Relations and The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press.

Williams, A. & Baily, M. (2016). 'The vision and thinking behind the UN Peacebuilding Architecture' in De Coning, C. and Stamnes, E. (eds.), *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years*. New York: Routledge, pp. 23-39.

Winston, C. (2017), Norm structure, diffusion, and evolution: A conceptual approach'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 1-24. DOI: 10.1177/1354066117720794. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Wood, G. (1985). 'The politics of development policy labelling'. *Development and Change*, 16: 347-373. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.1985.tb00214.x. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Wood, G. (2007). 'Labels, Welfare Regimes and Intermediation: Contesting Formal Power' in Moncrieffe, J. & Eyben, R., *The Power of Labelling: How People Are Categorized and Why it Matters*. London: Earthscan, pp. 17-32.

Woodward, S. L. (2017). *The Ideology of Failed States: Why Intervention Fails*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wyeth, V. (2011). *Peacebuilding at the UN over the last 10 years*, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwicklung, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Essay Series 06/2011, 1-11. Retrieved from: www.steps-for-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/FriEnt_Essay_series_Wyeth.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

Zangl, B.; Rittberger, V.; Staich, M. (2006). *International Organizations: Polity, Politics and Policies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zehfuss, M. (2002). *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511491795.

Zey, M. (1992). *Decision Making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models*. London: SAGE.

Zimmerman, L. (2016). 'Same Same or Different? Norm Diffusion Between Resistance, Compliance, and Localization in Post-conflict States'. *International Studies Perspectives*, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 98-115. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12080>. Accessed 31 Jan. 2020.

List of Interviewees & Codes

Practitioners assigned as UN Staff or former-Staff			
Practitioner 1	P-1	Practitioner 5	P-5
Practitioner 2	P-2	Practitioner 6	P-6
Practitioner 3	P-3	Practitioner 7	P-7
Practitioner 4	P-4		
Researchers in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies			
Researcher 1	R-1	Researcher 4	R-4
Researcher 2	R-2	Researcher 5	R-5
Researcher 3	R-2		
Practitioners assigned as Diplomats from Permanent Missions to the UN in New York			
Diplomat 1	D-1	Diplomat 15	D-15
Diplomat 2	D-2	Diplomat 16	D-16
Diplomat 3	D-3	Diplomat 17	D-17
Diplomat 4	D-4	Diplomat 18	D-18
Diplomat 5	D-5	Diplomat 19	D-19
Diplomat 6	D-6	Diplomat 20	D-20
Diplomat 7	D-7	Diplomat 21	D-21
Diplomat 8	D-8	Diplomat 22	D-22
Diplomat 9	D-9	Diplomat 23	D-23
Diplomat 10	D-10	Diplomat 24	D-24
Diplomat 11	D-11	Diplomat 25	D-25
Diplomat 12	D-12	Diplomat 26	D-26
Diplomat 13	D-13	Diplomat 27	D-27
Diplomat 14	D-14		