

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The rise and fall of industrial self-management in Portugal: A historical institutionalist perspective

Andrés Spognardi Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra,
Coimbra, Portugal**Correspondence**Andrés Spognardi, Colégio de S. Jerónimo,
Apartado 3087, 3000-995 Coimbra, Portugal.
E-mail: aspognardi@ces.uc.pt**Funding information**Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Grant/
Award Number: SFRH/BPD/100418/2014;
Foundation for Science and Technology

In the aftermath of the 1974 democratic revolution, Portugal witnessed a massive wave of worker occupations and factory takeovers. Following this period of exponential growth, industrial self-management entered a phase of stagnation, eventually slipping into an unstoppable path of decay. Drawing on historical institutional theory, this paper explores the causes of this evolutionary trend. The climate of political and economic uncertainty that followed the military coup is conceptualized as a critical juncture. For a relatively short period of time, long-established institutional constraints on worker entrepreneurship relaxed, opening a window of opportunity for the development of a hitherto neglected form of organizing industrial production. At such a crucial moment, however, the Portuguese workers failed to form a political coalition with the power to bring about essential legal and policy reforms. In a rather hostile institutional environment, some factories were returned to their former owners, while others struggled to become economically self-sufficient and eventually disappeared.

1 | INTRODUCTION

The last two centuries have witnessed the penetration of capitalist relations of production throughout the world. The supremacy of capital over labor has become the natural state of things, for both entrepreneurs and workers, in the vast majority of contemporary societies. At various points in history and in different countries, however, workers have taken production into their own hands, organizing themselves into economic and political movements that have challenged the “natural order” of capitalism.

With few or no exceptions, such emancipatory undertakings have coincided with times of economic and political distress. In some cases, the distress has been caused by a slowdown in capitalist

production. Unable to sell their labor power to the capitalists, workers have resorted to self-management as a coping strategy to avoid unemployment. The upsurges in worker co-operatives in Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and Spain during the 1970s' recession (CEC, 1987), as well as the movements of "recovered factories" spurred by the failure of the 1990s' neoliberal experiments in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (Vieta & Ruggeri, 2009), are perhaps among the most emblematic examples of this type of development. Other worker self-managed movements have instead emerged in the context of a rupture with the capitalist mode of production. In some instances, the rupture has been the result of a revolutionary process, while in others it has been driven from within the institutionalized political system. The cases of Russia in the 1910s, Algeria in the 1960s, and Portugal in the 1970s are examples of the former type of development (Bayat, 1991); those of Chile in the 1970s and Venezuela in the early 2000s are examples of the latter (Azzellini, 2011; Espinosa & Zimbalist, 1978).

More often than not, and regardless of their origins, industrial self-management movements have experienced two distinct evolutionary phases. The first has been typically characterized by a brief spurt of exponential growth. Having completed this stage, self-management has generally followed one of two possible developmental paths. Some movements have consolidated their institutional and economic base, entering a phase of stability or slower growth. The aforementioned case of Argentina can be cited as an example of this type of evolutionary trajectory (Ruggeri, 2015). Other self-management movements have instead failed to achieve institutional recognition and economic sustainability, entering a phase of more or less rapid decline that has eventually led to their complete disintegration.

The case of Portugal falls into this latter category. The military coup of April 25, 1974, opened a turbulent phase of political transition and economic uncertainty, which, among other radical socioeconomic transformations, prompted a wave of worker occupations and takeovers across the industrial sector. This sudden upsurge in industrial self-management, however, was followed by a phase of stagnation, which would eventually turn into sharp decline.

This paper examines the causes of this evolutionary trend. The framework of analysis is built upon the historical institutionalist notions of path dependence and critical juncture. Path dependence is defined as a social process with a self-reinforcing dynamic such that "*preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction*" (Pierson, 2000, p. 252). This implies that institutions — intended as social structures that provide a conduit to collective action — follow an evolutionary trajectory that is difficult to reverse or redirect. The notion of critical juncture, on the other hand, refers to exogenous shocks that can lead to a temporary (usually brief) relaxation of institutional constraints on collective action (Capoccia, 2015, 2016). As the constraining effects of institutions weaken, social actors are provided with a window of opportunity for changing the course of an institutional evolutionary path. Whether change happens or not ultimately depends on political agency, that is, on the ability of those supporting change to impose their desired solution (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007).

On the basis of these insights, Portugal's revolutionary transition to democracy is conceptualized as a "near-miss" critical juncture—the development of a robust industrial self-managed sector was possible but narrowly failed to materialize, restoring an institutional setting that had been traditionally uncondusive to worker entrepreneurship.¹ The analysis draws on primary sources collected through archival research, as well as on information gathered from an exhaustive review of the existing literature. Because both primary and secondary sources are scattered and incomplete, quantitative data are complemented by a critical examination of legal provisions and anecdotal evidence.² This method has of course its limitations, so the figures provided here are not meant to be taken as factual information, but only as a reasonable approximation of the overall trend.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the set of contingent economic and political factors that led to the configuration of the critical juncture. Section 3 analyzes the nature and the outcomes of the political struggle that took place during the critical juncture period. Section 4 focuses on the post-critical juncture phase, offering a brief overview of the evolution of industrial self-management until the present day. The concluding remarks summarize the main contributions of the study and outline future research directions.

2 | THE SUDDEN RISE OF INDUSTRIAL SELF-MANAGEMENT

For more than a century, self-managed industrial enterprises were relegated to the margins of the Portuguese economy. Available evidence suggests that the first of such enterprises was established in 1858—nine years before the passing of the country's first law on co-operative societies (Costa Goodolphim, 1889, p. 51). The early introduction of a legal framework regulating and promoting the operation of co-operatives, however, did not seem to have encouraged the growth of the sector. Official statistics indicate the existence of 7 industrial worker co-operatives in 1875, 10 in 1883, and again 7 in 1889 (Costa Goodolphim, 1889, p. 50; INE, 1877, pp. 388–389; MOPCI, 1883). Even though we still lack a proper historiography of self-management in 19th century Portugal, anecdotal evidence suggests that most co-operatives went quickly out of business because of shortages of capital and inadequate organization (Gonçalves, 1905, p. 76; Lima, 1905, pp. 718–719).

Premature economic failure, in turn, seems to have undermined the legitimacy of their organizational model, discouraging the pursuit of similar undertakings.³ According to the few available sources, in 1929 Portugal counted only 31 industrial co-operatives (Tamagnini Barbosa, 1930, p. 218). With the rise of the authoritarian Estado Novo, in the 1930s, the establishment of a strict control over the working class left little room for collective entrepreneurship, and worker self-management became even rarer. By April 1974, when the regime was finally toppled, the number of industrial co-operatives had dwindled to just 15 (INSCOOP-PNUD-OIT, 1984, p. 50.)

The 1974 revolution offered a unique opportunity for breaking this century-long path of stagnation. The introduction of the principle of trade union freedom, together with the government's decision to raise the minimum wage, rapidly undermined the comparative advantages of an industry that had been traditionally dependent on cheap labor (Maxwell, 1995). The end of the country's colonial presence in Africa, on the other hand, interrupted the flow of raw materials and prompted the return of hundreds of thousands of Portuguese settlers (the so-called *retornados*), who put additional pressure to an already strained job market. In a context of extraordinary political uncertainty, the increasing unemployment rate, the falling demand, and the rising costs of production mutually reinforced their effects, triggering a vicious circle of reduced investment and economic decline.⁴ These developments, combined with the relaxation of the rule of law and the restoration of civil liberties that followed the coup, sparked off an unprecedented wave of worker demonstrations and set the stage for a movement of factory takeovers.

For purposes of discussion, the intertwined and overlapping series of events that led to the emergence of the self-management movement can be analytically divided into four stages. The first stage involved a wave of spontaneous and decentralized protests and strikes aimed at achieving improved working conditions, such as higher wages, shorter work weeks, and paid vacations (Patriarca 1998, pp. 139–140). Following the example set by the employees of the country's largest manufacturing companies, tens of thousands of workers from small- and medium-sized factories gathered in shop-floor assemblies and established democratically elected workers' councils in order to organize and articulate their interests (Robinson, 1990, 2011).

The second stage was characterized by the partial politicization of the workers' struggle. Some of the newly established workers' councils rapidly fell under the influence of a wide variety of small and differently oriented far-left political forces, which advocated for the overthrow of the capitalist order and envisioned self-management as an instrument to achieve that goal.

The third stage was marked by the rapid deterioration of the economic situation and the emergence of a series of economically driven factory takeovers. A few months into the revolutionary process, the mounting economic crisis, marred by political and social turmoil, started to force hundreds of the most vulnerable firms into failure, compromised the viability of many others, and eroded the confidence of the most skeptical entrepreneurs. As some owners began to strip assets and abandon their factories, many workers took production into their own hands to preserve their jobs (Maxwell, 1995).

The fourth and final stage of the process that led to the emergence of the Portuguese self-management movement saw the involvement of the State in the affairs of the companies. Assuming that factory owners were deliberately cutting down production in order to undermine the economic basis of the revolution, in November 1974 the government enacted a decree law introducing the notion of "economic sabotage," which allowed State intervention in firms that were deliberately producing below capacity or withdrawing capital.⁵ The prospects of State intervention, in turn, prompted some workers to expel their bosses under the accusations of sabotage or ties with the deposed regime—a behavior that not only contributed to an increase in the number of factory occupations but also to a greater diversity in their underlying motivations.

2.1 | A movement of self-managed factories and construction co-operatives

The turbulent nature of the revolutionary process has hindered the production of reliable statistics, thus rendering impossible an accurate assessment of the motivations and magnitude of the self-management movement. With this caveat in mind, Figure 1 provides a rough overview of the industrial self-managed sector at the critical juncture (1974–1979). Data from two unrelated samples, reported on Panel A, suggest that economic imperatives played a major role in the process that led to the factory occupations and takeovers. More often than not (57% and 65% of the cases, depending on the sample), the workers had no option but to take control of a company that had gone bankrupt or that had been abandoned by its former owner. In other cases, however, the workers expelled the owners under allegations of "fraud," "contract violation," "managerial incompetence," and "unlawful firings." Because the veracity or falsehood of these accusations cannot be ascertained from the available sources, the possibility that a minority of entrepreneurs may have been unfairly expelled from their factories cannot be excluded.

Panel B of Figure 1, on the other hand, provides an approximate estimate of the size of the industrial self-managed sector. Available statistics report a total of 923 self-managed ventures, which can be grouped into three broad categories. The first include 453 manufacturing companies that were taken over by their employees. Most of them were small- or medium-sized enterprises, located in the industrial districts of Lisbon (31%) and Porto (26%), and active in low-technology, labor-intensive sectors of the economy, such as metallurgy (23%), textiles (27%), and typography (13%). They were controlled by informal collectives of workers (310) or by worker co-operatives (143), which in neither case held a legal title to the property (CIAPEA, 1980, pp. 256–258). The second category comprises 319 manufacturing co-operatives, listed by official sources as "probable worker takeovers" and with a geographical and sectoral distribution that closely mirrors that of the ventures included in the first group (CIAPEA, 1980, p. 256).⁶ Finally, the third category includes 151 construction cooperatives, mostly established from scratch by unemployed workers, demobilized soldiers, and *retornados* fleeing from the overseas colonies (INSCOOP, 1980, p. 50; INSCOOP-PNUD-OIT, 1984, pp. 6–7;




FIGURE 1 Industrial self-management at the critical juncture, 1974–1979

Notes: (a) Data from a survey of all transformed firms existing in 1976; (b) Data from a survey of 37 worker co-operatives; (c) Other reasons include “fraud”, “contract violation”, “managerial incompetence”, “unlawful firings”, “occupations”, and “unspecified”.

Sources: Own elaboration based on Bermeo (1983, p. 187); INSCOOP-PNUD-OIT (1984, pp. 49-50); CIAPEA (1980, pp. 256-258)

Mesa Redonda, 1979, p. 3).⁷ Unlike the self-managed undertakings in the manufacturing sector, these construction co-operatives were more common in districts suffering from high unemployment rates, and therefore more widely spread across the country (INSCOOP 1980, p. 50).

3 | THE POLITICS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT AT THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE

At first glance, conditions for the consolidation of a strong and vibrant worker self-managed sector seemed ideal. A few months into the revolutionary process, self-management and other forms of worker participation in factory-level decision-making rose to a prominent place in the political debate. In an environment dominated by a socialist narrative, right-wing parties qualified their adhesion to economic liberalism, proposing reforms tending to a greater participation of workers in the management and in the profits of companies (Antunes, Manuel, Amorim, Cascais, & Bacalhau, 1975, p. 77; CDS, 1975, pp. 21–22). The revolutionary rhetoric also shaped the contours of the 1976 Constitution, purportedly placing Portugal in a phase of transition to socialism (Maxwell, 1995, pp. 157–167). Within this context, self-managed organizations were recognized as fundamental constituents of the socialized ownership of the means of production (arts. 80, 89, and 90), and the State committed itself to stimulate and support their activities by providing fiscal and financial benefits, as well as preferential terms and conditions for obtaining credit and technical assistance (art. 84).

A closer look at the political dynamics of this period, however, reveals a less promising picture. To better understand the politics of self-management during the critical juncture, one must first bear in mind the two distinct phases that characterized Portugal's transition to democracy. The first phase, roughly spanning from April 1974 to November 1975, was marked by a power struggle between political forces supporting liberal democracy and market economy, and other parties promoting the establishment of State socialism and a centrally planned economy. The second phase, which approximately lasted from November 1975 to September 1982, saw the consolidation of a market-based liberal democratic regime; it encompassed the sanction of the Constitution, the establishment of democratic elections, and a constitutional revision that redefined the structures of political power and toned down the socialist elements contained in the original text (Maxwell, 1989).

During the first phase of democratic transition, the workers' most likely and potentially useful allies—left-wing actors with sufficient leverage to shape the development of economic institutions—were absorbed in a much bigger struggle over the definition of a new political and economic order. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), together with a radicalized sector of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA)—the group of low-ranked military officers that masterminded the coup⁸—promoted a transition toward State socialism, with an emphasis on the nationalization of the means of production and the centralization of political power. Though they did not turn their backs on the workers, their assistance was provided on a case-by-case basis and limited to small- and medium-sized factories that were not deemed suitable for nationalization (CAC, 1976, pp. 9, 12; Colectivo do Porto do Combate, 1975; Melo Antunes, 1975, pp. 104–106; MFA, 1975a, 1975b).

The Socialist Party (PS), on the other hand, supported a transition to a pluralist democracy based on a social market economy, which did not exclude the participation of investor-owned companies. Taken up by the struggle against the forces advocating for a centralized planned economy, the PS initially relegated the promotion of worker self-management to the background. Once the specter of State socialism was gone, the PS came to power and the imperatives of macroeconomic stability began to dictate the content of the party's political agenda. Buffeted by a mounting external deficit, in 1977 the socialist-headed government of Mário Soares signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), waving circumstantial alliances with the Social Democratic Party (PSD)⁹ and the Democratic and Social Center (CDS)—two right-wing parties which by that time had become overtly unsympathetic to the cause of workers.¹⁰

3.1 | The weakness of workers' representative structures

The lack of support from potential political allies was matched by the workers' inability to mobilize resources and build institutions capable of articulating and representing their interests.¹¹ Apart from a few short-lived organizations that were closely tied to the main left-wing political forces,¹² the phase of democratic transition saw the establishment of only one sectoral representative body — the Federation of Producer Co-operatives (FCP). Founded in June 1974 by the enthusiastic leaders of a handful of small pre-existent co-operatives, FCP encouraged informal worker collectives to establish their own co-operatives and to organize themselves into regional and sector-specific networks of collaboration (FCP, 1975). Hoping that the organized labor movement would naturally assume the representation of the industrial self-managed enterprises, the federation distanced itself from political debates and urged its affiliates to take a similar stance (FCP, 1977).

The labor unions, however, were entangled in the same struggle that absorbed the attention of the political parties, and thus never undertook the responsibility of representing the self-managed sector vis-à-vis the government.¹³ With more developed structures and greater capacity for action and mobilization, the unions aligned with the PCP committed themselves to the establishment of State

socialism. In line with this goal, they sought to co-opt self-organized worker councils, supported the nationalization of the largest companies, and advocated for the so-called *unicidade sindical*—a principle according to which a single labor union federation (the PCP-dominated Intersindical) would have the legal monopoly to represent all Portuguese workers.¹⁴ With a much smaller support base, the unions that were under the influence of the PS and the PSD devoted the bulk of their efforts to resisting the hegemonic project of the Intersindical.¹⁵ In the opinion of some scholars, this political dispute has affected the Portuguese labor movement in an enduring way, introducing a political bias in the unions' strategies and drawing their attention away from the promotion of industrial democracy and other forms of organizing production and work (Lopes, 1991; Lopes & Reto, 1992; Stoleroff, 2016).

3.2 | The institutional and policy outcomes

The workers' inability to mobilize the support of potential allies had two detrimental consequences for the survival of their industrial endeavors. The first was that the government lacked the incentives to comply with the constitutional mandate of providing critical funding and technical assistance. A so-called Commission for the Support of Co-operatives (CAC), which operated between 1975 and 1976, and the António Sérgio Institute for the Co-operative Sector (INSCOOP), which replaced it, were both understaffed, underfunded, and without sufficient authority to really have much enforcement power (CAC, 1976, pp. 23, 158; CONFECOOP, 1987). The inadequacy of State support, in turn, compromised the economic viability of the less efficient enterprises and was decisive for the fate of FCP's ambitious project of sectoral integration, which was definitely abandoned in 1979.

A second and perhaps more serious consequence of the workers' political weakness was the prolonged uncertainty regarding the ownership rights of the ventures that were born out of a pre-existing capitalist firm. For nearly four years, most of these factories went on working on the basis of so-called “credentials”—informal ad hoc written statements issued by different organs of the civil and military power, which authorized workers to operate with the company's bank accounts and/or to assume all of the company's managerial tasks (CIAPEA, 1980, p. 115).

In general, the factories that did not even manage to obtain a credential only lasted for a few months. Without any official support, the workers eventually negotiated their restitution to the original owners, usually demanding guarantees against dismissal and improvements in the working conditions. Those who did get a credential, on the other hand, were left with a provisional title, which exposed them to lawsuits, discouraged long-term replacement investments, and fueled distrust among lending institutions, suppliers, and customers (Baptista, 1983; CAC, 1976, pp. 181–183; CIAPEA, 1980, p. 122).¹⁶ To compound matters further, the precarious nature of their legal status gave rise to a defamatory campaign run by a group of entrepreneurs gathered around an organization called National Movement of Usurped Entrepreneurs (MNEU). From the pages of the right-wing press, the MNEU released a series of denigratory statements, portraying workers as “thieves and saboteurs” who had “kidnapped, beaten and subjected honest and flawless businessmen to fascist-style interrogations” (MNEU, 1979). The campaign elicited solidarity from various sectors of the business community, leading to boycotts that further strained the already compromised viability of a large number of factories (A luta na Duarte Feteira, 1975; Ferreira, 1976).

By January 1978, when the Parliament finally began discussing the guidelines and procedures for settling the disputes over property rights, right-wing parties had already become an influential force in government. Taking advantage of their increased political leverage, they reshaped the content of a proposal presented by the PS, crafting a solution that was more concerned with protecting the interests and property rights of the former owners than it was with

providing stability to the operation of the self-managed endeavors.¹⁷ Based on the nature of the events that led to the worker takeover, the new legislation—passed in June and registered in October as law 68—distinguished between justified self-management (*autogestão justificada*), unjustified self-management (*autogestão injustificada*), and flawed self-management (*autogestão viciada*).¹⁸ The original owner could obtain the restitution of the company in the courts, if he could prove that the workers had committed fraud or resorted to violence (flawed self-management), or if he could demonstrate that given the specific circumstances in which he found himself, it was “reasonable” for him to abandon the establishment (unjustified self-management). To make matters worse for the workers, the meaning of “reasonable” was not clearly defined, leaving its interpretation open to the discretion of sitting judges who were often unsympathetic to factory occupations and seizures of private properties.¹⁹

4 | SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE POST-CRITICAL JUNCTURE PERIOD

It is difficult to quantify the impact of the above-discussed legal and policy setting on the emergent self-management movement. With regard to construction co-operatives, the most reliable available data since the 1974 revolution come from an official survey conducted in 1986 (INSCOOP, 1987).²⁰ According to this source, only 30 of the 151 construction co-operatives established between 1974 and 1979 were still active by 1986. Scattered pieces of evidence suggest that a number of financial and productive fragilities (particularly a heavy reliance on short-term borrowing, and higher production costs than conventional firms) left the co-operatives ill-prepared to handle the downturn that hit the construction industry between the late 1970s and the early 1980s (Cooperativas de produção, 1984; Uniurba, 1984).²¹

To determine what happened to the self-managed factories that were born from the occupation of investor-owned companies is even more problematic. Available data do not allow estimation of how many of them were restored to their former owners (after being declared unjustified or flawed self-managed initiatives by the courts) or how many disappeared because of economic and financial difficulties.²² In view of these limitations, the only obtainable figure is the approximate number of self-managed factories that survived into the mid-1980s.

To arrive at this number one must first consider the legal provisions laid down by the Parliament in 1978, as well as the way they were implemented afterwards. From this information, it is possible to identify a necessary condition for the survival of the self-managed factories: in order to keep in business, the workers had to acquire the ownership of the means of production and incorporate their company under one of the various available legal entities.²³ Anecdotal information, in turn, suggests that only a handful of these surviving factories chose to be incorporated as for-profit-businesses (Salazar Leite, 1986, p. 3). In the vast majority of cases, the workers opted for the figure of the “*coop-erativa de produção operária*” (worker production co-operative)—a type of worker co-operative specifically devoted to the production and processing of industrial goods, and/or to the extraction of natural resources (CCEA, 1982, pp. 25–26).²⁴

Turning the attention to the evolution of the co-operative sector, it is therefore possible to infer that most self-managed factories were either restored to their former owners or simply disappeared. As suggested in Figure 2, only 102 of the 462 manufacturing co-operatives established between 1974 and 1979 were still operating in 1986.²⁵ As also suggested in Figure 2, by 1986 the sector counted another 25 more recently established worker co-operatives—some of which probably originated from the regularization of the 310 informal worker collectives reported on Panel B of Figure 1.




FIGURE 2 The evolution of the 1970s' takeovers until the year 1986: A tentative account

Notes: (a) Available data and anecdotal evidence indicate that only a tiny minority of self-managed factories were incorporated as investor-owned companies; (b) Established as worker co-operatives between 1980 and 1986.


Sources: Own elaboration based on CCEA (1982), CIAPEA (1980), INSCOOP (1987), Law 66/78, Law 68/78, and Salazar Leite (1986)

4.1 | Self-management after Portugal's accession to the EEC

Figure 3 provides an overview of the evolution of industrial self-management in Portugal since the country's accession to the EEC in 1986. At that time, the Portuguese industrial sector counted 168 self-managed firms — 132 manufacturing co-operatives and 36 construction co-operatives, most of which had been founded between 1974 and 1979 (Panel A). Three decades later, these numbers have fallen to just 28 and 8, respectively.²⁶ The majority of the existing manufacturing co-operatives (16 out of the 18 more recently established ventures) specialize in the covering of steering wheels in natural leather and have been founded under the auspices of multinational auto parts manufacturers located in the industrial hub of Viana do Castelo, in Northern Portugal. Thus, even if they are run as self-managed organizations, they can hardly be regarded as autonomous entrepreneurial undertakings of the Portuguese workforce.²⁷

The sluggish development of collective-worker entrepreneurship is reflected in the extremely low birth rate of new industrial self-managed enterprises. As shown in the Panel B of Figure 3, the foundation of worker co-operatives (in both the manufacturing and construction sectors) experienced a

Panel A | Number of worker co-operatives, years 1986 and 2018



Panel B | Birth rate of worker co-operatives vs. birth rate of all enterprises, 1974-2016 (a, b)




FIGURE 3 Industrial self-management after Portugal's accession to the EEC, 1986–2018

Notes: (a) Simple average of the birth rate of companies operating in the manufacturing and construction sector; (b) Birth rate of the entire population of manufacturing and construction enterprises for the period 1982–2000 is unavailable.

Sources: Own elaboration based on CASES (2018), INSCOOP-PNUD-OIT (1984, p. 50), INSCOOP (1987, 1987–2007), INE (1985, 2018), Ministério da Justiça (2018), Observatório Raciús (2018), SICAE (2018)

sharp increase in the aftermath of the 1974 revolution, followed by a steep decline, particularly after 1977, and a further more gradual decrease after 1987. As also shown in Figure 3 (Panel B), both the increase and the decline in the rate of creation of new ventures have been substantially steeper for worker co-operatives than for the whole population of enterprises operating in the same industrial sectors. Between 2001 and 2016 (the most recent period for which comparable statistics are available), the birth rate of construction and manufacturing enterprises has fluctuated between 6 and 10% per year, while that of the worker co-operatives have been consistently below 2%. The absolute figures are even more telling: between 2004 and 2016 Portugal witnessed the creation of more than 15,000 new construction and manufacturing companies (INE, 2018), of which only 7 were worker co-operatives (CASES, 2018; Ministério da Justiça, 2018).²⁸

4.2 | The scarcity of specially designed resources

The disappointing development of industrial self-management, as depicted by Panels A and B of Figure 3, can be largely explained in terms of resource scarcity. The issue is common to co-operatives in many countries: because of their democratic, member-oriented nature, co-operatives usually require resources that are qualitatively different from those that are readily available in environments dominated by vertically-managed, business-oriented companies (Stryjan, 1989).

In the case of Portugal, the problem of resource scarcity was exacerbated by three additional factors. One was related to the economic conditions under which the self-managed factories emerged. Born out of companies that had benefited from decades of State protection and repressive

labor legislation, most Portuguese co-operatives started their operations with an unbalanced endowment of tangible and intangible assets; they were critically undercapitalized and had a severe deficit of technical skills.²⁹ Another factor was the perpetuation of the institutional and policy setting laid out during the critical juncture period. Through the 1980s, available assistance programs were few, and mostly channeled through State agencies that did not take into account the special needs of the self-managed organization (Mendes, 1988). The third factor was the weakness of the collaborative ties established between the various co-operative subsectors, which undermined the ability of the industrial self-managed ventures to exploit the opportunities and withstand the threats posed by the process of European integration.

In 1982, a group of worker co-operatives promoted the foundation of the National Federation of Producer Co-operatives (FINCOOP). Unlike its predecessor, the defunct FCP, FINCOOP initially relegated the goal economic integration to the background, concentrating the bulk of its efforts on providing political representation, professional training, and various consultancy services.³⁰ In order to increase its political leverage and take advantage of economies of scale, it later completed a de facto integration with the National Federation of Service Co-operatives (FECOOP-SERV)³¹ Both organizations, in turn, took part in the foundation of the Confederation of Portuguese Co-operatives (CONFECOOP), which assumed the role of interlocutor between the various branches of the nonagricultural co-operative movement and the State authorities. Still, the fact that the more economically powerful agricultural co-operatives did not join CONFECOOP (they established their own apex body), undermined the confederation's political power, and hampered its ability to exert any meaningful influence on public policy-making (Namorado, 1993a).

After Portugal's accession to the EEC, the shortcomings of the sector's established institutions became evident. The little political leverage of FINCOOP/FECOOPSERV, as well as their inability to mobilize economic resources from their own affiliates, left the extant co-operatives vulnerable to the forces of an increasingly competitive market.³² The lack of credit lines suited to their special needs put them in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their capitalist counterparts. Having easier access to bank loans, the latter were more readily able to co-fund their participation in European programs for industrial restructuring and upgrading. Cash-strained co-operatives, by contrast, remained largely marginalized from EEC structural funds, and were thus forced to face the process of European integration with an obsolete and inefficient productive structure (Cooperativas de produção, 1989).

4.3 | Eroded organizational legitimacy?

During the 1980s, the leadership of the Portuguese industrial self-managed sector was highly concerned about the reputation of the co-operative model among the general public. The topic was the subject of a workshop organized in Lisbon in March 1988 and appeared recurrently in bi-monthly newsletter jointly issued by FINCOOP/FECOOPSERV (*Modernizamos o modelo respeitando os princípios*, 1988). Anecdotal sources, on the other hand, point to factories hiding their self-managed nature so as to not compromise their commercial relationships with suppliers and customers (Barreto, 1977, p. 710), as well as to public servants deliberately circumventing the implementation of supportive measures for the co-operative sector (CECES-FEUC, 1983, p. 55; Namorado, 1993a, p. 401; Schwartz Silva, 1991, p. 67). On the whole, these scattered pieces of evidence suggest that the events of the 1970s may have affected the legitimacy of the co-operative model.

The above hypothesis, in turn, points to another possible factor for the decline in industrial self-management. According to organizational ecology theories, organizational legitimacy—intended as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or

appropriate" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574)—is directly correlated with organizational density and development. The lack legitimacy has a negative effect on reproduction, reducing organizational density and thus the availability of population-specific resources (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suddaby, Bitektine, & Haack, 2017). On the basis of these insights, it can be hypothesized that the eroded legitimacy of the worker co-operative model has exacerbated the problem of resource scarcity, further affecting the survival prospects of the remaining co-operatives and discouraging the foundation of organizations with similar characteristics.

5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS

Drawing on historical institutional theory, this article has examined the evolution of industrial self-management in Portugal over the last four decades. In the first part, Portugal's revolutionary transition to democracy has been conceptualized as a critical juncture. For a brief period of time, the relaxation of structural constraints on collective action created a window of opportunity for the development of a hitherto neglected form of organizing industrial production. This conceptualization has two important implications for the scholarly literature on self-management. On the one hand, it suggests that political factors may be at least as important as economic factors in determining the success or failure of the workers' industrial ventures. On the other hand, it suggests that countries or regions with no tradition in worker self-management are not necessarily "condemned" to a small and sluggish industrial self-managed sector. Worker self-management can emerge as a powerful force at any time, provided the suitable structural and political conditions are in place.

The second part of the article has focused on the politics of the critical juncture. The constellation of actors and interests that shaped the political arena in the late 1970s was not conducive to the consolidation of industrial self-management. The lack of powerful allies undermined the workers' political influence, leading to the adoption of a legal and policy framework that was detrimental for the survival and development of the nascent self-managed ventures.

By highlighting the key role of politics, this interpretation of the Portuguese case opens interesting avenues for comparative research. A key question is whether the nature of the events that create a critical juncture—a downturn in economic activity, or a radical rupture with the capitalist mode of production—affects the parameters of the political struggle, and thus the chances of self-management success. In Argentina—perhaps the most recent successful example of worker self-management—factory occupations were initially driven by an economic recession. The Argentine workers eventually developed a political consciousness, but never questioned the legitimacy of the capitalist order (Ruggeri, 2015; Vieta, 2014). A plausible hypothesis is that this moderate political stance has mitigated the opposition of right-wing forces to industrial self-management, giving Argentine recovered factories the chance to operate in a relatively favorable institutional environment.

The last part of the study has looked at the long-term implications of the critical juncture period. It has been shown that the events of the 1970s have not led to institutional change, but to the restoration of a path-dependent institutional setting that is unconducive to self-management survival and reproduction. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the political struggle that took place at the critical juncture may have undermined the legitimacy of the self-managed organizational model—a hypothesis is worth exploring in future research, by empirically assessing the way in which self-management is perceived among the Portuguese workforce, as well as among a number of relevant economic and political actors, such as the mainstream parties, the labor unions, the State bureaucracy, and the business community.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was funded by a postdoctoral grant from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology, Ref. SFRH/BPD/100418/2014.

ENDNOTES

¹The term “near-miss” refers to critical junctures in which a change is possible and feasible but is not achieved. For this topic, see Capoccia (2015, pp. 165–166).

²The rise of self-management attracted the attention of scholars from different disciplines, giving rise to a small body of literature on the topic. Among these studies, there are a few contemporary accounts of the events (Bermeo, 1983; Carvalho Ferreira, 1985; Pereira Bastos, 1977; Santana, 1981), as well as a number of case studies of factory takeovers (Baptista, Kovács, & Lobo Antunes, 1985; Barreto, 1977; Hammond, 1981; Patriarca, 1977; Pires, 1976; Santos, Lima, & Ferreira, 1976). This scholarly interest rapidly waned with the sector’s decline in the 1980s, leaving a number of important issues unaddressed. The handful of articles published over the last 30 years have either limited the scope of the analysis to the political process that led to the formation of workers’ councils (Patriarca, 1998; Robinson, 1990, 2011; Varela, 2014) or have tangentially addressed the topic while discussing other related phenomena (Hammond, 1988; Lopes, 1991; Lopes & Reto, 1992; Maxwell, 1995; Namorado, 1993a, 1993b).

³In 1889, for example, the acclaimed writer Antero de Quental—co-founder of the PS and pioneer in the promotion of worker co-operatives—wrote that industrial worker co-operatives had “disastrously failed (...) even among the working classes endowed with the most practical and moral sense and a disciplined spirit.” See the letter of Antero de Quental to Fernando Leal, February 8, 1889, in Velloso (1896, p. 14).

⁴For a brief but accurate description of the economic crisis that followed the demise of the dictatorship, see Kayman (1987, pp. 187–210).

⁵Decree law 660/74 of November 25, 1974.

⁶This second group of manufacturing co-operatives were mostly concentrated in Lisbon (35%) and Porto (12%), and predominantly active in metallurgy (38%), textiles (15%), and typography (16%); see CIAPEA (1980, pp. 256–258).

⁷A few construction co-operatives were instead established as partnerships between the owner of a preexisting construction company and his former employees (Salazar Leite, 1987, p. 3).

⁸Initially committed to a transition to a pluralist representative democracy, the MFA subsequently suffered internal divisions and saw the emergence of a powerful faction, which forcefully endorsed a transition to State socialism. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Hammond (1988) and Maxwell (1989).

⁹The PSD was originally known as Popular Democratic Party (PPD).

¹⁰The initial pro-worker stance of the PSD and the CDS was promptly abandoned when the PCP and the most radical factions of the MFA lost their grip on power (Carvalho Ferreira, 1985, p. 198).

¹¹A handful of small far-left political parties supported the cause of the workers but lacked the power to influence political decision-making (Carvalho Ferreira, 1985).

¹²The PS founded a Center for the Study and Support of Self-Managed Enterprises (CEAG), and the PCP encouraged the creation of a Provisional Secretariat of the Workers’ Commissions of the Lisbon Industrial District, which was later transformed into a Secretariat of Self-managed Enterprises and Co-operatives (CEAG, 1978). Marred by poor funding and internal divisions, they never exerted a meaningful influence on the State authorities and eventually disappeared. Another organization formed by workers’ commissions which gravitated under the influence of far-left political forces—called *Interempresas*—followed a similar fate (Robinson, 1990, 133–173).

¹³Experience from other countries indicates that the support of trade unions is key to the success of worker self-management. For this, see Cornforth (1982) and Thornley (1983).

¹⁴The Decree laws 215-A/75, 215-B/75, and 215-C/75 of April 30, 1975 gave the Intersindical a legal monopoly to represent all Portuguese workers.

¹⁵As the PCP’s hold on power began to wane, Intersindical’s representative monopoly was abolished (see Decree law 773/76 of October 27, 1976). Two years later, a number of unions related to the PS and the PSD founded a second confederation, called General Union of Workers (UGT).

¹⁶In November 1976, the socialist-led government of Mário Soares enacted a decree meant to reinforce the legal protection offered by the credentials. The norm, known as *Suspensão de Acções* (Suspension of Suits), forbade evictions for reasons other than nonpayment of rent, suspended any repossession suits filed by former owners, and prevented the initiation of similar actions until new legislation clarified and defined the legal status of the self-managed factories. A few months earlier, however, a statutory order from the Ministry of Labor had excluded co-operatives from the credentialing process, which in practice restricted the scope of the November decree to those self-managed factories that were controlled by informal worker collectives (see Decree law 821 of November 12, 1976 and Statutory Order from the State Secretary of the Ministry of Labor of February 24, 1976).

¹⁷See DAR, I, n. 44, 1978, pp. 1643–1647. The bill was finally approved with the support of the PS, the CDS, and the PSD, and the opposition of the PCP (DAR, I, n. 89, 1978, p. 3342).

¹⁸Law 68 of October 16, 1978.

¹⁹The bias against the interests of the workers was subsequently confirmed by an ad hoc commission convened by the government to study “the problem of self-managed enterprises”. In a 377-pages report, published in 1980, the commission recommended the restitution of the factories to their former owners (or, alternatively, their transformation into worker co-operatives), and called for action to “prevent similar experiences of self-management from occurring in the future” (CIAPEA, 1980, pp. 322–323).

²⁰Available statistics for the period 1980–1985 refer to registered co-operatives. Because liquidations were seldom reported, these figures overestimate the actual size of the sector (Schwartz Silva, 1991).

²¹For a case study analysis of the economic and financial problems faced by construction co-operatives in the early 1980s, see INSCOOP-PNUD-OIT (1984, pp. 35–37).

²²The only available statistics illustrate the state of the sector as of November 1979. By that time, 34 self-managed factories had been restored to their former owners (the courts were still examining 56 restitution claims); 12 had been closed by the workers; and 8 had been declared bankrupt (CIAPEA, 1980, p. 254).

²³Law 68/78 established a distinction between the right to manage the factory's assets (the so-called *posse útil*) and the right of possession of those assets (the so-called *nua-titularidade*). Until the dispute between workers and former owners was settled, the factories would continue operating under a provisional status (*autogestão provisória*), in which the *posse útil* would belong to the workers and the *nua-titularidade* would be in the hands of the former owner. Once the court ruling was issued or a voluntary agreement between the parties was reached, the company would follow one of two possible paths: it would be returned to its former owners or it would acquire a status of definitive self-management (*autogestão definitiva*). In factories entering into definitive self-management, the worker collectives would keep the *posse útil*, while the *nua-titularidade* would be either bought by the workers or held by the State. In the latter case, factory operations would be supervised by an ad hoc agency called National Institute of Self-Managed Enterprises (INEA). The fact that the INEA—established by law 66/78 of October 14, 1978—never came into being, allows concluding that no self-managed endeavor achieved the definitive self-management status (*autogestão definitiva*), in which ownership rights were split between the workers (*posse útil*) and the State (*nua-titularidade*).

²⁴See Decree law 454/80 of October 9, 1980 and Decree law 309/81 of November 16, 1981. The Decree law 454/80 also introduced the figure of the “*cooperativa de artesanato*” (artisan co-operative), which encompasses small production units of artisans and craftsmen (see Decree law 303/81 of November 12, 1981). Because the boundaries between artisan and industrial production are sometimes blurred, it is possible that a few self-managed industrial ventures may have actually been incorporated as “artisan co-operatives.”

²⁵Given that not all self-managed factories were incorporated as worker co-operatives, this number probably underestimates the true figure.

²⁶The reduction of the sector's size led to the dissolution of FINCOOP, which was officially liquidated in September 2009.

²⁷See, for example, Almeida (2006).

²⁸These figures include enterprises with five or more employees, coded in divisions 10 through 33 (manufacturing industry) and 43 (specialized activities of construction) of the Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities (CAE Rev. 3).

²⁹A 1979 study based on a sample of 229 worker co-operatives reported that most co-operative managers were under 35 years of age (42%) and had only completed elementary schooling (72%); see INSCOOP-PNUD-OIT (1984, p. 25).

³⁰After Portugal's accession to the EEC, FINCOOP's formative actions benefited from the funding of the European Social Fund. Most programs were not sustained over time, however, thereby failing to address the co-operatives' pressing and continued need for capacity-building support; see “Programa Formação 86” (1986), “Formação 87” (1987), and “Projectos de formação 89” (1988).

³¹A formal merger between FINCOOP and FECOOPSERV was prevented by a provision of the 1980 Co-operative Code establishing that co-operative unions and federations had to be formed by firms belonging to the same economic branch; see Decree law 454/80, Article 79, paragraph 1, and Article 82, paragraph 1.

³²In 1984, FINCOOP fiercely criticized a trade union's proposal to create a co-operative bank (Azevedo, 1984). By the late 1980s, however, the federation had changed its stance, joining an international working group which pondered the possibility of establishing a credit union and a mutual credit guarantee system (Seminário de financiamento, 1989)

ORCID

Andrés Spognardi  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3942-2644>

REFERENCES

- A luta na Duarte Feteira: Da impossibilidade da autogestão em regime capitalista. (1975, March 21). *Jornal Alavança*, 5.
- Almeida, L. (2006, February 7). Unidade fabril absorve labor feminino em zona serrana. *Jornal de Notícias*.
- Antunes, A., Manuel, A., Amorim, A., Cascais, F., & Bacalhau, M. (orgs.). (1975). *A opção do voto*. Lisboa: Intervoz.
- Azevedo, V. (1984, March 31). *Federações contra proposta da UGT*. *Jornal Expresso*, Lisbon, p. 19.
- Azzellini, D. (2011). Workers' control under Venezuela's Bolivarian revolution. In I. Ness & D. Azzellini (Eds.), *Ours to master and to own: Workers' control from the commune to the present* (pp. 382–399). Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Baptista, J., Kovács, I., & Lobo Antunes, C. (1985). *Uma gestão alternativa: Para uma sociologia da participação nas organizações a partir de uma experiência portuguesa*. Lisboa: Relógio d'água.
- Baptista, M. (1983). Empresas em autogestão: alguns aspectos do seu regime jurídico. *Revista do Ministério Público*, 16(4), 65–132.
- Barreto, J. (1977). Empresas industriais geridas pelos trabalhadores. *Análise Social*, 51(3), 681–717.
- Bayat, A. (1991). *Work, politics and power: An international perspective on workers' control and self-management*. Worcester: Billing and Sons.
- Bermeo, N. (1983). Worker Management in Industry: Reconciling representative government and industrial democracy in a polarized society. In L. S. Graham & D. L. Wheeler (Eds.), *Search of modern Portugal: The revolution and its consequences* (pp. 181–197). Madison: Winsconsin University Press.
- CAC – Comissão de Apoio às Cooperativas. (1976). Acção desenvolvida desde a sua constituição: perspectivas do fomento do sector cooperativo. Lisboa: [s.n.].
- Capoccia, G. (2015). Critical junctures and institutional change. In J. Mahoney & K. Thelen (Eds.), *Advances in comparative-historical analysis* (pp. 147–179). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316273104.007>
- Capoccia, G. (2016). Critical junctures. In O. Fioretos, T. Falleti, & A. Sheingate (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of historical institutionalism* (pp. 89–106). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.013.5>
- Capoccia, G., & Kelemen, D. (2007). The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative and counterfactuals in institutional analysis. *World Politics*, 59(3), 341–369. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100020852>
- Carvalho Ferreira, J. (1985). O enquadramento político-institucional das lutas operárias urbanas após o 25 de Abril de 1974. *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais*, 15-16-17 (May), 187–207.
- CASES - Cooperativa António Sérgio para a Economia Social. (2018). *Estatísticas do sector cooperativo*. Retrieved from <https://www.cases.pt/>
- CCEA – Comissão Coordenadora das Empresas em Autogestão. (1982). *A realidade da autogestão em Portugal*. Lisboa: Perspectivas & Realidades.
- CDS – Partido do Centro Democrático Social. (1975). *Programa*. Lisboa: CDS.
- CEAG - Centro de Estudos e Apoio às Empresas em Autogestão. (1978). *Estatutos*. Arquivo e Biblioteca da Fundação Mário Soares, Documents Francisco Marcelo Curto, Folder n. 4795, 004.
- CEC – Commission of the European Communities. (1987). *Analysis of the experiences of and problems encountered by worker take-overs of companies in difficulty or bankrupt*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- CECES-FEUC – Centro de Estudos Cooperativos da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra. (1983, March). Actas das Primeiras Jornadas Cooperativas. Coimbra: [s.n.].
- CIAPEA – Comissão Interministerial para Análise da Problemática das Empresas em Autogestão. (1980). *Autogestão em Portugal: Relatório da CIAPEA*. Lisboa: Ministério das Finanças.
- Colectivo do Porto do Combate. (1975, May 16–30). Autogestão em Portugal. *Jornal Combate*, 23, pp. 1, 3, 8.
- CONFECOOP – Comissão Instaladora da Confederação Cooperativa Portuguesa. (1987, January). Posição do movimento cooperativo face à actual situação do INSCOOP. *Trabalho Associado*, 1, 7–10.
- Cooperativas de produção operária no Algarve: forjar a resposta à crise. (1984, June-July). *Cooperação Operária*, 7, p. 5.
- Cooperativas de produção facturaram 19,5 milhões. (1989, January 15). *Jornal 1 de Janeiro*, p. 22.
- Cornforth, C. (1982). Trade unions and producer co-operatives. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 3(1), 17–30. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X8231003>

- Costa Goodolphim, J. (1889). *A Previdência: Associações de Socorro Mútuo. Cooperativas, Caixas de Pensões e Reformas, Caixas Econômicas*. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional.
- DAR – Diário da Assembleia da República. (1976–1981). Retrieved from <http://debates.parlamento.pt>
- Espinosa, J., & Zimbalist, A. S. (1978). *Economic democracy: Workers' participation in Chilean industry* (pp. 1970–1973). New York: Academic Press.
- FPC – Federação das Cooperativas de Produção. (1975, December 8). *Tópicos para o desenvolvimento do trabalho organizativo no plano da intervenção económica*. Dossier Cooperativismo. Centro de Documentação 25 de Abril, Universidade de Coimbra.
- FPC – Federação das Cooperativas de Produção. (1977, January 5). *Circular n. 8. Cooperativas e sindicatos*. Dossier Cooperativismo. Centro de Documentação 25 de Abril, Universidade de Coimbra.
- Ferreira, L. (1976, July 1). *As cooperativas e o regresso dos patrões*. *Gazeta*, Lisbon, p. 8.
- Formação 87': alargar a experiência, promover o futuro. (1987, February). *Trabalho Associado*, 2, pp. 5–10.
- Gonçalves, L. d. C. (1905). *A evolução do movimento operário em Portugal*. Lisboa: Adolpho de Mendonça & Ca Editores.
- Hammond, J. (1981). Worker control in Portugal: The revolution and today. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 2, 413–453. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X8124002>
- Hammond, J. (1988). *Building popular power: Workers' and neighborhood movements in the Portuguese revolution*. New York: New York University Press.
- Hannan, M., & Carroll, G. (1992). *Dynamics of organizational populations: Density, legitimation, and competition*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- INE – Instituto Nacional de Estatística. (1877). *Anuário Estatístico do Reino de Portugal, 1º Anno 1875*. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional.
- INE – Instituto Nacional de Estatística. (1985). *Estatística das sociedades*. Lisboa: INE.
- INE – Instituto Nacional de Estatística. (2018). *Demografia das empresas*. Retrieved from <http://www.ine.pt>
- INSCOOP – Instituto António Sérgio do Sector Cooperativo. (1980). *Projecto de investigação do sector cooperativo*. Lisboa: INSCOOP.
- INSCOOP – Instituto António Sérgio do Sector Cooperativo. (1987). *Inquérito Nacional ao Sector Cooperativo*. Lisboa: Incoop.
- INSCOOP – Instituto António Sérgio do Sector Cooperativo. (1987–2007) *Anuário comercial do sector cooperativo*, various issues [1987 to 2007]. Lisboa: INSCOOP.
- INSCOOP; PNUD; OIT – Instituto António Sérgio do Sector Cooperativo; Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento; Organização Internacional do Trabalho. (1984). *Cooperativas de PRO operária. Contribuição para o diagnóstico*. Lisboa: INSCOOP.
- Kayman, M. (1987). *Revolution and counter-revolution in Portugal*. London: The Merlin Press.
- Lima, J. E. C. (1905). Movimento Operário em Portugal. *O Instituto Revista Científica e Litteraria*, 52, 712–722.
- Lopes, A. (1991). *Approche culturelle des coopératives de production au Portugal: caractérisation, atouts e faiblesses du modèle*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
- Lopes, A., & Reto, L. (1992). *Cooperativismo e sindicalismo: a experiência das cooperativas de produção*. Lisboa: INSCOOP.
- Maxwell, K. (1989). The consolidation of political democracy in Portugal: Some unanswered questions. *Portuguese Studies*, 5, 161–177.
- Maxwell, K. (1995). *The making of Portuguese democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Melo Antunes, E. (1975). Responder ao país. In F. S. Cabral, C. Oliveira, & L. F. de Carvalho (Eds.), *Debate sobre o programa de política económica e social* (pp. 91–124). Lisboa: Moraes Editores.
- Mendes, R. (1988). *O IAPMEI e o apoio às cooperativas*. Paper presented at Forum Coop, 5-6 de março, Lisboa.
- Mesa redonda. A propriedade social e as suas dificuldades. (1979, April 26). *Diário de Lisboa, Suplemento*, 7, pp. 1–4.
- Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), 340–363. <https://doi.org/10.1086/226550>
- MFA – Movimento das Forças Armadas. (1975a, April 08). As cooperativas no momento actual (1). *Movimento - Boletim Informativo das Forças Armadas*, 14, p. 8.
- MFA – Movimento das Forças Armadas. (1975b, April 22). As cooperativas no momento actual (2). *Movimento - Boletim Informativo das Forças Armadas*, 15, pp. 7–8.
- Ministério da Justiça. (2018). *Portal da Justiça - Publicação On-Line de Acto Societário e de outras entidades*. Retrieved from <https://publicacoes.mj.pt>
- MNEU – Movimento Nacional de Empresários Usurpados. (1979, February 26). *Open letter to Prime Minister Mota Pinto*. *Jornal Novo*, p. 16.
- Modernizamos o modelo respeitando os princípios. (1988, March 8). *Jornal de Notícias*, p. 34.
- MOPCI – Ministério das Obras Públicas, Comércio e Indústria. (1883). *Sociedades Cooperativas Fundadas na Conformidade da Lei de 2 de Julho de 1867*. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional.
- Namorado, R. (1993a). *Da cooperação ao direito cooperativo: para uma expressão jurídica da cooperatividade*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Coimbra, Portugal.
- Namorado, R. (1993b). As relações entre as cooperativas e o Estado em Portugal: do Estado paralelo ao Estado heterogéneo. In B. de Sousa Santos (Ed.), *Portugal: um retrato singular* (pp. 338–372). Porto: Afrontamento.
- Observatório Raciús. (2018). *Estatísticas sobre mundo empresarial em Portugal*. Retrieved from <https://www.raciús.com/>
- Patriarca, F. (1977). Práticas de acção operária e formas organizativas na Lisnave. *Análise Social*, 51(3), 619–680.
- Patriarca, F. (1998). A revolução e a questão social. Que justiça social? In F. Rosas (Ed.), (org.) *Portugal e a transição para a democracia, 1974–1976* (pp. 139–160). Lisboa: Fundação Mário Soares, Instituto de História Contemporânea da F.C.S.H. da U.N.L.

- Pereira Bastos, J. (1977). *As cooperativas depois de Abril: uma força dos trabalhadores*. Coimbra: Centelha.
- Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. *The American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 251–267. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2586011>
- Pires, J. (1976). *O povo em acção. Greves e o 25 de Abril*. Lisboa: Edições Base.
- Programa Formação '86. (1986, April-May). *Cooperação Operária*, 15, pp. 4–5.
- Projectos de formação/89. (1988, June-July-August). *Trabalho Associado*, 18–19–20, pp. 11–16.
- Robinson, P. (1990). *Workers' councils in Portugal 1974–1975*. Unpublished MPhil. dissertation. The Open University, UK.
- Robinson, P. (2011). Workers' councils in Portugal, 1974–1975. In I. Ness & D. Azzellini (Eds.), *Ours to master and to own: Workers' control from the commune to the present* (pp. 263–281). Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Ruggeri, A. (2015). *310 empresas okupadas, suma y sigue: las empresas y fábricas recuperadas entre 2010 y 2015*. Madrid: Libros Terribles.
- Salazar Leite, J. (1986). *Cooperativas de produção operária em Portugal*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Salazar Leite, J. (1987). *Cooperativas de Produção Operária: factos e números*. Lisboa: INSCOOP.
- Santana, E. (1981). *Experiência autogestionária em Portugal*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Santos, M., Lima, M., & Ferreira, V. (1976). *O 25 de Abril e as lutas sociais nas empresas (vol. 1)*. Porto: Afrontamento.
- Schwartz Silva, H. (1991). As cooperativas no estado democrático português. *Informação Cooperativa*, 7–8, 47–85.
- Seminário de financiamento às cooperativas. (1989). January-February. *Trabalho Associado*, 25–26, 10–11.
- SICAE – Sistema Informação da Classificação Portuguesa de Actividades Económicas. (2018). Retrieved from <http://www.sicae.pt/>
- Stoleroff, A. (2016). The Portuguese labour movement and industrial democracy: From workplace revolution to a precarious quest for economic justice. *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, 22(1), 101–119. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1024258915619325>
- Stryjan, Y. (1989). *Impossible organizations: Self-management and organizational reproduction*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Suchman, M. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(3), 571–610. <https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1995.9508080331>
- Suddaby, R., Bitektine, A., & Haack, P. (2017). Legitimacy. *Accademy of Management Annals*, 11(1), 451–478. <https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2015.0101>
- Tamagnini Barbosa, R. (1930). *Modalidades e aspectos do cooperativismo*. Porto: Imprensa Social.
- Thomley, J. (1983). The influence of trade unions on Italian Workers' cooperatives. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 4(3), 321–344. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X8343003>
- Unirba. (1984, September-October). *O sector da construção civil: 10 anos depois... que futuro? Cooperação Operária*, 8, p. 8.
- Varela, R. (2014). *História do Povo na Revolução Portuguesa, 1974–75*. Lisboa: Bertrand Editora.
- Velloso, R. (1896). *Anthero de Quental: Soldados da Revolução*. Barcellos: Typographia da Aurora do Cavado.
- Vieta, M. (2014). Learning in struggle: Argentina's new worker cooperatives as transformative learning organizations. *Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations*, 69(1), 186–218. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1024212ar>
- Vieta, M., & Ruggeri, A. (2009). Worker-recovered enterprises as Workers' co-operatives: The conjunctures, challenges, and innovations of self-Management in Argentina and Latin America. In D. Reed & J. J. McMurty (Eds.), *Co-operatives in a global economy: The challenges of co-operation across Borders* (pp. 178–225). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

ANDRÉS SPOGNARDI holds a PhD in Political Science from the Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (Italy). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) at the University of Coimbra (Portugal) and member of the Research Group on Solidarity Economy (ECO-SOL-CES).

How to cite this article: Spognardi A. The rise and fall of industrial self-management in Portugal: A historical institutionalist perspective. *Labor and Society*. 2019;22:589–605. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lands.12400>