

ESTUDIOS SOBRE GUERRA Y SOCIEDAD
EN LA MONARQUÍA HISPÁNICA

Guerra marítima, estrategia, organización
y cultura militar (1500-1700)

Enrique García Hernán y Davide Maffi
(Eds.)



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XI

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THE PORTUGUESE PARTICIPATION IN THE CONQUEST OF TUNIS (1535): A SOCIAL AND MILITARY REASSESSMENT

Hélder Carvalho
Roger Lee de Jesus

Introduction

THE aim of this paper is to discuss the Portuguese participation in the conquest of Tunis (1535), a military enterprise conducted by Charles V (1500-1558) that was the result of a combined effort by the majority of Christendom connected to the Habsburgs. This debate will consider two different but complementary perspectives: the military perspective, regarding the crusade dynamic and the war in the Mediterranean; and the social perspective, which concerns the composition of the two groups of Portuguese soldiers to be discussed. Both of these components have strong political implications, since intervention in the Mediterranean gave rise to considerable discussion during the rule of King João III of Portugal (r.1521-1557).

Considering previous approaches to this subject, we will argue that an element of the Portuguese forces had a strong political motive that permeated their participation in the expedition to Tunis. By committing themselves to the project, they were not only trying to further their own careers, but also to express a political opinion about North African and Mediterranean affairs.

In order to achieve its aims, this article will begin with a brief historiographical overview of the role of Portugal in Mediterranean affairs during the first decades of the sixteenth century. Subsequently, two discussions will be covered: the first, on the preparation of the *armada*, attempting to solve an old problem related with previous assumptions made about its composition and military ability; the second will take the form of an analysis and further debate of the social composition of the Portuguese forces, especially the group that followed *Infante* Luís (1506-1555). It is expected that the latter discussion could solve the issue of the motivation that drove these men to participate in such a project, a group of them disobeying the king's orders not to cross the border. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the debates

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mentioned, which hopefully can contribute to establishing what the Portuguese participation in Tunis represented, not only in general, but also with regard to the internal political agenda.

Historiography and Context

Historiography today agrees that most of the Christian princes preferred not to confront the Ottoman Empire directly. Instead, war between the great powers, such as France against Castile and the Empire, prevailed during the first half of the sixteenth century. As noted by María José Rodríguez-Salgado, despite the notion of peace between the Christians and war against infidels, the reality was quite the opposite¹. It is important to keep this dynamic in mind when placing the interest of the Portuguese monarchy within the political equilibrium of the Mediterranean. Despite the expansion towards other regions overseas, the Mediterranean Sea was still a crucial area during the sixteenth century, as shown by considerable investment on the part of the Iberian crown². The outcome of the expedition itself had been propagated as a tremendous success all over Europe. This impact is visible in the cultural material and literary works that circulated within the continent in subsequent decades and centuries³. In fact, the conquest of Tunis appeared to be the first step towards a crusade that was repeatedly delayed.

Little attention has been paid to the Portuguese participation in this expedition, especially the significance it had on the attack and the political consequences. Moreover, the framework of the analysis has not been debated much in recent times, with authors generally repeating chronicles of accounts without any analysis of them. Later Portuguese sources tended to exaggerate the role of the galleon *S. João Botafogo* in the takeover of the port. This historiography has crystallised the fabricated image of a long chain that allegedly protected La Goulette from invasion. The breakup of this chain of supposedly 366 canons, has been considered since as one of the decisive events in the success of the expedition. Not only is this a myth concerning the

¹ María José Rodríguez-Salgado, "La cruzada sin cruzado: Carlos V y El Turco a principios de su reinado" in Giuseppe Galasso and Aurelio Musi (eds.), *Carlo V, Napoli e il Mediterraneo: atti del Convegno internazionale*, Napoli: Società napoletana di storia patria, 2001, 201-237. See also Gérard Poumarède, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade. Mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles*. Paris 2004.

² See, for instance, Beatriz Alonso Acero, "Defensa del Mediterráneo: escenarios, objetivos y estrategias" in Hugo José O'Donnell y Duque de Estrada (coord.), *Historia Militar de España*, tomo III: Edad Moderna. I – Ultramar y la Marina. Madrid 2013, 227-252.

³ Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, "L'expédition de Tunis (1535): images, interprétations, répercussions culturelles", in Bartolomé Benassar e Robert Sauzet (eds.), *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance. Actes du 37e colloque international du CESR*. Paris 1998, 75-132; Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra and Miguel Falomir Faus, "Carlos V, Vermeyen y la conquista de Túnez", in Francisco Sánchez-Montes González and Juan Luis Castellano (coords.), *Carlos V, Europeísmo y Universalidad [Congreso Internacional, Granada mayo 2000]*. Madrid 2001, 243-57; Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro y José Ignacio Ruiz Rodríguez (dirs.), *Túnez, 1535. Halcones y Halconeros en la diplomacia y la monarquía española*. Madrid 2002, 2010.

naval combat itself (as the galleon did not even participate in the main bombardment), but also from a political point of view, since it allowed further claims to be made based on erroneous propaganda⁴.

Such an effort from the Portuguese Crown served a significant group of noblemen with an opportunity for political affirmation. It is known that a significant number of individuals in the court of King João III had issues with the policy of a presence in the North African and Mediterranean Sea. Most of them were in favour of a more open participation in the region, because of factors such as the Ottoman piracy and the fact that this was a geo-strategically located domain⁵. The desire to participate in the conquest of Tunis demonstrated by several of these courtiers joining an additional force headed by *Infante* Luís (1506-1555), brother of João III, resulted in a challenge to the official participation of the Crown. This event is particularly relevant as some of the members of the high nobility, including Teodósio (c.1510-1563), fifth duke of Braganza, and João de Lencastre (1501-1571), first marquis of Torres Novas, requested permission to participate. Although not having obtained authorisation to leave the kingdom, this signal had political prominence, since the aforementioned noblemen were major stakeholders in internal affairs. Such an absence, as the king's council avowed, could give rise to a risky situation. However, the true motivation for the prohibition by João III was related to the risk of political distress, since a sizeable number of the Portuguese nobility had demonstrated their desire to follow the political opinions of Luís.

However, this premise does not mean that the Portuguese Crown had no interest in the European political stage. Despite the large investment in the upkeep of what can be called a Portuguese Seaborne Empire (note that the term is used here for convenience), the kingdom was not only concerned with overseas issues in South Asia. The monarch and some court members had privileged contacts with other European courts and dissemination of news frequently brought developments about conflicts, peace and alliances. Apart from the latest problems at the end of the fifteenth century, King Manuel I (r.1495-1521) and his son João III both had close relationships with Castile due to alliances made through marriage that politically affected both royal houses. These alliances through marriage are well known for giving rise to geopolitical consequences. Portugal is often referred to as an ally of the Habsburg party, although little evidence is placed under discussion when it comes to debating the existence of alternative factions inside the king's council⁶.

⁴ See José Virgílio Pissarra, "O galeão S. João (c.1530-1551). Dados para uma monografia" in Francisco Contente Domingues and Inácio Guerreiro (eds.), *Fernando Oliveira and his Era. Humanism and the Art of Navigation in Renaissance Europe (1450-1650). Proceedings of the IX International Reunion for the History of Nautical Science and Hydrography*. Cascais 2000, 285-224.

⁵ Rui Manuel Loureiro, *A rare sixteenth century Portuguese imprint: The Livro da origem dos Turcos by Fr. Diogo de Castilho (Leuven, 1538)*. Portimão 2013, 14-15.

⁶ Pedro Cardim, "A diplomacia portuguesa no tempo de D. João III. Entre o império e a reputação" in Roberto Carneiro and Artur Teodoro de Matos (eds.), *D. João III e o Império. Actas do Congresso Internacional comemorativo do seu nascimento*. Lisboa 2004, 627-660.

Problems with coastal piracy, especially in the southern regions, had always been a considerable issue for Portugal. Up to a point, one goal of the expansion in North Africa was related to minimising the loss of human and material resources resulting from piracy. The empowerment experienced during Suleiman's government (1520-1566) led to an increasing concern by Christianity about Ottoman naval raids throughout the Mediterranean, commanded by the admiral Khayr al-Din, later Hayreddin Pasha, also known as *Barbarossa* (d.1546)⁷. Before Tunis, other crusades in the Mediterranean against both Mameluks and Ottomans were discussed. In 1506 Manuel I prepared and debated a plan to conquer Jerusalem and the Mamluk Empire of Egypt with Ferdinand of Aragon (1452-1516), seeking support in the European courts of Henry VII (1457-1509), Louis XII (1462-1515), Maximilian I (1459-1519), Vladislaus II (1456-1516) and Pope Julius II (1443-1513)⁸. This crusading spirit was also present in *Infante* Luís, brother of João III. In the late 1520s, preparations were made for an expedition to Alger, with 2,000 foot soldiers captained by this member of the royal family. The king's support for the enterprise reveals that only repeated financial issues prevented Luís from achieving his goal⁹. In fact, financial issues were frequently raised by João III as the main reason not to become involved in the crusade dynamic. The monarch's preference for the Asian project also served as a political statement, which relegated the North African/Mediterranean operation to the backstage.

The approach we will present uses this complex and specific context, where a peripheral kingdom participates in an episode from a more global and longer-lasting struggle. Such participation reflects, to a certain extent, a politically divided court and the efforts of a group of men whose ambition and desire for legitimacy forced the king into making additional investment to support an already costly expedition.

The Preparation: Numbers and Estimates

The circumstances of the conquest of Tunis are well known to historiography. Concern expressed by Charles V after the Ottoman strike on that city in August 1534 led to all European courts (including France, at the time on a truce with the Sultanate) being invited to a formal re-conquest. Like other kingdoms, Portugal responded with a sizeable military squad. As a matter of fact, two distinct contingents participated: the *armada* and a smaller group of *fidalgos*, politically led by *Infante* Luís.

⁷ About the admiral see Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, *Los Barbarroja. Corsarios del Mediterráneo*. Madrid 2004.

⁸ João Paulo Oliveira e Costa, *D. Manuel I. Um príncipe do Renascimento*. Lisboa 2007, 259; Luís Filipe F.R. Thomaz, *L'idée impériale manueline*, in *La découverte, le Portugal et l'Europe*. Paris 1990, 35-103.

⁹ AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Leg. 2, n° 180 [Letter of Lope Hurtado de Mendonza to the Archbishop of Santiago. Lisbon, 1 November 1529]. Published in Aude Viaud (ed.), *Correspondance d'un ambassadeur castillan au Portugal dans les années 1530: Lope Hurtado de Mendonza*. Lisbon and Paris 2001, 381.

The first problem to discuss is the number of individuals participating in this enterprise. The armada, having been prepared since January 1535, was composed of one galleon, two carracks and twenty caravels, and left Belém (near Lisbon) for Barcelona in early April. It comprised a socially heterogeneous group of 1,500 men – approximately 500 men-at-arms, 200 gunners and 600 sailors – plus some smaller groups. Logistically, it possessed almost 600 guns, 30,000 cannonballs, eighteen tons of gunpowder, 800 harquebus and over 1,000 fire pots¹⁰. It represented considerable firepower for such a small military force, when compared to the Italian and German fleets. Therefore, it was not surprising that it was widely used during the attack on La Goulette, the Tunisian port.

The fleet arrived in Barcelona on 29 April, being reinforced by the group of *Infante* Luís that arrived on 23 May, nearly a month later. The following contingents arrived during May, as the remainder of the imperial fleet – the forces sent by the Papal States, Naples, Sicily, Genoa, Monaco and the knights of the Order of Malta – joined the expedition during the voyage, when the convoy stopped at Sardinia. While there is no certainty about the total numbers involved, most authors based their opinion on accounts provided by Sandoval and Gonzalo de Illescas¹¹. According to them, nearly 50,000 men were present in the expedition. As other authors, we are led to discuss the possibility of a gross exaggeration in these figures, since other documents report smaller numbers. It is highly improbable that a coordinated web of suppliers at the time could realistically provide, with efficiency, such a large army. Other Castilian and Portuguese sources, in an anonymous relation of the journey, give a different perspective. Approximately 300 ships were prepared for the expedition, uniting between 26,000 and 30,000 men¹². Leaving Barcelona on 31 May and after some brief stops in Majorca and Sardinia for the purpose of gathering final contingents, the fleet arrived near Tunis on 16 June.

While there are no accurate numbers of the total of Portuguese effectives, a quantitative estimate should be done in order to tell the difference between the two contingents. An estimate of the total number of men that sailed from Belém, although uncertain, is close to 1,500 individuals. Also in doubt and lacking evaluation is the number of *fidalgos* and their respective servants that accompanied *Infante* Luís. Contemporary sources are misleading since they only consider the most renowned nobles and/or present erroneous estimates. Nevertheless, an exercise to estimate the

¹⁰ See the list published by José Virgílio Pissarra, “O galeão...”, 195, 215.

¹¹ Emrah Safa Gurkan, *Ottoman Corsairs in The Western Mediterranean and their Place in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry (1505-1535)*. Ankara 2006, 116-9.

¹² RAH, col. Lope de Soria, n° 86 [Letter of Charles V to Lope de Soria. La Goulette, 29th June 1535]. Published, CDCV, vol. I, 428; Francisco López de Gómara, “Crónica de los Barbarrojas” in *Memorial Histórico Español: colección de documentos, opúsculos y antigüedades que publica la Real Academia de la Historia*. Madrid 1853, 415; M. Gachard, *Collection des voyages de Charles-Quint, de 1514 a 1551*. Bruxelles 1874, 111; António Cruz, “A defesa do Ocidente em 1535 (colaboração das armas portuguesas na conquista de Tunes)”, in *Actas do Quarto Congresso da Associação Portuguesa para o Progresso das Ciências*. Porto 1943, 253.

total of this group is possible if one considers other evidence drawn from reports made by direct observers who were present when the group arrived in Barcelona. When the Emperor heard of the imminent arrival of *Infante* Luís' contingent, he quickly dispatched Fernando Álvarez de Toledo y Pimentel (1507-1582), the third duke of Alba, to receive them at the entrance to the city. Then Charles V himself received the aforementioned *infante* at the stairs of his palace, counting around 111 men on horseback, who allegedly belonged to his household¹³.

This evaluation raises two legitimate issues. On one hand, is it possible that this number is composed exclusively of men from Luís' household; or alternatively, formed of a combination of the latter and a group of nobles who followed Luís? It seems that the second hypothesis is more plausible, since it is unlikely that the emperor and his close servants could differentiate one group from the other. We could argue the possibility of the household members of the *infante* being identified by their own marks of distinction, such as special clothing and/or unique heraldic symbols, similar to the king's *armada*. Since this group had only a few days in which to prepare for the expedition, it is doubtful that such a procedure did occur. Moreover, it is known that two caravels of the armada transported some horses for the exclusive use of the group commanded by Luís¹⁴. Therefore, it is probably more correct to describe these 111 men on horseback as a mixed group. On the other hand, there is a second issue, the plausibility of the actual number. According to the collected data that was the basis of the social composition analysis, it is certain that approximately 50 *fidalgos* followed Luís, nearly 80 per cent of them from the king's household and the remaining from his own house¹⁵. It is clear that, depending on each individual rank and status, a nobleman would bring one or more servants to aid him in such a long journey. Complications arise when calculating the exact number of servants, since the sources did not mention the higher number of non-noble individuals who were present. Another problem is the fact that the nobles of higher rank – as for instance Afonso de Portugal, firstborn of Francisco de Portugal, first count of Vimioso or António de Almeida, son of Lopo de Almeida, second count of Abrantes – would probably recruit more servants, as they were wealthier than the average low/middle rank *fidalgo*. Even then, an acceptable estimate to sum up the entire group could range from 100 to 150 individuals. The margin of variation is exceptionally high given the possible disparity in the numbers of servants. Although politically relevant, it is clear that this was still a minority group compared to the king's armada, given the amount previously mentioned.

¹³ M. Gachard, *Collección...*, 111.

¹⁴ Letter of António de Saldanha to João III [Barcelona, 4 May 1535]. Published in António Cruz, "Cartas do capitão António de Saldanha sobre a empresa de Túnis de 1535", *Boletim Cultural da Câmara Municipal do Porto*, vol. II, fasc. I, 1939, 379, 382.

¹⁵ See the section dedicated to social composition analysis and annexes.

Sea, Land, or both?

One of the ideas concerning the participation of the Portuguese contingents relied on the fact that its only purpose was to accomplish naval activities, such as open naval combat or transportation of material and human resources. This idea was based on the reputation of the galleons and caravels, whose firepower became easily recognisable. Also, expansion towards South Asia was responsible for substantial development in the ordnance at sea, despite the low effectiveness of sixteenth-century artillery¹⁶. Historiography has always repeated this idea. To a certain extent, the fact that most studies of the period concentrate on naval warfare, neglecting topics of recruitment and battlefield combat, has also contributed to this general conclusion. After a careful analysis of the available sources, there is considerable evidence adding to this picture. At least, from the perspective of recruitment and assembling a military squad, Portuguese forces were also prepared for battlefield combat. In order to support this idea, we will note specific details.

First, let us reiterate specific instructions given by King João III on how to proceed while on land. For instance, orders were given to gunners to wear appropriate uniform when operating on the ground. This procedure would oblige them to march in ordnance formation, using musical instruments to set the pace (drums and fifes)¹⁷.

Another valuable indicator of this dynamic relies on the summoning of experienced officials to suppress coordination needs while on land. Some veterans of the Italian Wars, who had been committed to organising ordnances (mixed formations of pike men and arquebusiers, with a strong hierarchy of command and frequent training) in Portugal, with little success at that time, were then called up to join the armada¹⁸. Some of them were addressed directly by the king, as in the case of Jorge Peçanha, Diogo de Liscano, Jorge Coutinho and João Fernandes¹⁹.

¹⁶ See for instance John F. Guilmartin Jr., "The Military Revolution: origins and first tests abroad", in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*. Boulder 1995, 313-8 and Francisco Contente Domingues, "The state of Portuguese naval forces in the sixteenth century", in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger (eds.), *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*. Woodbridge 2003, 187-97. For the effectiveness of these weapons see Kelly Devries, "Catapults are not Atomic Bombs: Towards a Redefinition of 'Effectiveness' in Premodern Military Technology", *War in History*, 4-4, 1997, 454-70.

¹⁷ Letter of João III to António de Ataíde [Évora, 11 March 1535]. Published in *Letters of John III King of Portugal: 1521-1557*, ed. J.D.M. Ford. Cambridge 1931, 225-6 [doc. 188].

¹⁸ The reference work on the failed attempts to organise an ordnance system in early sixteenth-century Portugal is still Jean Aubin, "Le Capitaine Leitão. Un sujet insatisfait de D. João III" in *Le Latin et l'Astrolabe. Recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son expansion en Asie et les relations internationales*. Lisbon/Paris 1996, 309-69.

¹⁹ Letter of João III to Bartolomeu Ferraz de Andrade [Évora, 18 March 1535], published in *Letters of John...*, 232 [doc. 197]; Letter of João III to António de Ataíde [Évora, 18 March 1535], published in *Letters of John...*, 232 [doc. 198].

Lastly, a few battlefield descriptions allow us to understand the extent of this participation. An unpublished letter from an unknown participant in the expedition describes moments before and after the battle to conquer the city, a few days after the capture of the port. The mention in the council convoked by Charles V on whether or not they should conquer the city – considering that the lack of water and other supplies increased the likelihood of desertion – is in accordance with the chronicles²⁰. The Emperor struggled to maintain his position on conquering the city, despite the negative opinions given by his counsellors. The anonymous soldier also refers to *Infante* Luís as being the one who supported Charles V in his desire to advance²¹. The rest of the description focuses on the conquering of the castle and the consequent sack of the city.

Obviously, this perspective does not exactly correspond with the wishes of Charles V. In fact, it seems that the emperor was mostly interested in knowing about the particularities of Portuguese ships and the artillery they could carry. A letter was sent to João III in order to learn more about this, probably in order to coordinate the bombardment of La Goulette. Faced with this request, the King urged his *privado* António de Ataíde, Count of Castanheira, to hasten the preparation of the armada, so that news could be sent to his brother-in-law²². The Emperor himself visited the galleon while in Barcelona and observed the organisation of the ship. Andrea Doria also visited the vessel, stating that his own ordnance was larger but not as well organised²³. However, most sources recalled the prominent role of the Portuguese caravels, especially those four captained by António de Saldanha, Pêro Lopes de Melo, Henrique de Macedo and João de Castro, in the bombardment and conquest of La Goulette (14 July)²⁴. The galleon São João thus had little importance in this procedure, regardless of its incorporation into the general fleet²⁵. It seems incorrect to concentrate solely on naval warfare and disregard the considerable amount of information documenting the efforts made on land, not to mention the preparations made for this purpose or the selection of officials with strong credentials in battlefield combat. Containing only 600 soldiers (considering both groups) and 200 gunners, it is

²⁰ Manuel Fernández Álvarez, *Carlos V, el César y el Hombre*. Madrid 2006, 504-9.

²¹ B.A., cód. 50-V-20, fl. 155.

²² Letter of João III to António de Ataíde [Évora, 8 February 1535], published in *Letters of John...*, 208 [doc. 168].

²³ Letter of António de Saldanha to João III [Barcelona, 4 May 1535], published in António Cruz, *Cartas...*, 377-8.

²⁴ ANTT, *Gavetas*, gav. XVIII, mç. 5, n.º 34. Letter of Álvaro Mendes de Vasconcelos to João III with details of the siege [La Goulette, 15 July 1535], published in *As Gavetas da Torre do Tombo*. Lisbon: C.E.H.U., 1963-74, vol. VII, pp. 580-4 (581).

²⁵ As suggested by the interpretation of the text of Alonso de Santa Cruz, despite the prominence he gave to the galleon: see *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V*, vol. III, 274. The Portuguese ambassador wrote to João III mourning the shameful role of the galleon while blaming António de Saldanha's poor command skills: Letter of Álvaro Mendes de Vasconcelos to D. João III [1535], published in José Virgílio Pissarra, "O galeão...", 210-4 (214). Charles V referred only vaguely to the Portuguese fleet during the attack as "con las carabelas, galeón y naos del Sereníssimo rey de Portugal, nuestro hermano": see CDCV, vol. I, 246.


plausible that most Castilian sources comprised Portuguese forces (including noble cavalry) within the emperor's army. Therefore, specific mention of these men is rare. As one will see in the analysis of the social composition of these two contingents, military experience in North Africa/South Asia was one of the key criteria for the recruitment of this specialised force.

Social Composition

Portuguese forces in the conquest of Tunis comprised essentially the sum of two groups. In part, this must be interpreted as a political expression, as *Infante* Luís' participation was not initially authorised by his brother, King João III. In the beginning, the Portuguese contingent was composed only of an armada. This also explains the time these men had to prepare for battle. On the other hand, Luís, positioned in Arronches (on the Portuguese border with Castile) benefited from the belated consent of João III to participate, and had to team up with a mixed group of *fidalgos*. For operational purposes, we will name the latter as Group 2 and the individuals from the armada as Group 1.

In order to understand the motivation of these men, a social approach between the two groups was necessary. Both were formed with distinct purposes (one to take an active role, the other spontaneously selected to participate in the campaign) and their social composition reflects the factors that were decisive in the final choice: family ties, social capital, individual experience in warfare, and hierarchical status.

Fig. 1. Social Status of the Ancestors of Group 1 Members



Sources: ANTTANTT, CC, I, 100, 11; ANTT, CHR M, liv. 10, fl. 10v; liv. 19, fl. 3; liv. 24, fl. 38; ANTT, CHR III, *Doações...*, liv. 23, fl. 7; ANTT, VNC, cx. 21, n° 20; *Décadas*, déc. V, X, p. 417; LLP, pp. 61, 271–2, 364–5, 369, 461–81; NFP, vol. VI, p. 721; *Pedatura*, vol. IV, t. I, pp. 379–80, 387–90; PHGCRP, liv. II, t. II, pp. 469, 471, 488, 522.

Regarding Group 1, its most prominent characteristic is the relative homogeneity among its identifiable members. Regarding social status, the difference was not substantial, since there were no descendants of the high nobility. Apart from some exceptions, their rank in the royal house ranged between *escudeiro-fidalgo* and *fidalgocavaleiro*, thus in the highest *foro* that non-titled nobility could attain²⁶. The group itself can be divided into two segments. The majority of the group members (59 per cent) were born into families with a record of service to the Crown, chiefly in central administration (the most common being in the treasury, as tax collectors, and as household officers), but also with some individuals provided from overseas affairs. A second portion (27 per cent) has its origins in peripheral nobility and, with rare exceptions, consisted of second sons who took service to the Crown as a way of social ascendancy. Both segments were in a similar social echelon, although it is questionable whether the larger part — due to its proximity to the institutions of the monarchy — was in better shape to climb socially. Nonetheless, similarities in the collective profile of Group 1 are particularly visible when we analyse how these men served the Crown and the type of career they built.

Table 1. Number of Overseas Appointments before and after 1535 – Group 1

<i>Offices and services</i>	<i>Before 1535</i>	<i>After 1535</i>
Armada captain	10	8
Outpost captain	4	4
Governor/Viceroy	0	1
Other administration offices	4	1
Other military offices	5	2

Sources: ANTT, CC, I, 34, 95; I, 35, 57; I, 38, 35; I, 46, 19; I, 52, 140; I, 100, 11; II, 22, 105; II, 68, 120; II, 80, 141; II, 157, 63; ANTT, CHR III, *Doações...*, liv. 21, fl. 186v; liv. 24, fls. 16, 23v, 202v; liv. 31, fl. 41; liv. 42, fl. 58v; liv. 44, fl. 159v; liv. 49, fl. 109; liv. 71, fl. 91v; CRM, p. III, p. 343; *Décadas*, déc. III, VII, pp. 214-5; déc. IV, liv. IV, pp. 414-5, liv. VIII, p. 185; déc. X, XVI, pp. 133-4, 136-7, 139; *Lendas*, vol. I, pp. 412-6, 501-16, vol. II, pp. 535-70, vol. III, pp. 402-59, vol. IV, pp. 95, 99-103, 211, 275, 471-2; LOBATO, 1962.

From observing Table 1 it is clear that service overseas was the most common feature shared by these men, especially regarding the number of occasions they were appointed to captain the armadas that sailed to Portuguese India on a yearly basis. The captain of each ship was chosen for his expertise in naval warfare. For instance, the captain of the fleet, António de Saldanha, was a veteran of Portuguese campaigns in North Africa and South Asia. He had fought alongside Afonso de Albuquerque, gover-

²⁶ See annexes.

nor of the *Estado da Índia*²⁷, served as a captain in Sofala, Mozambique, while having been present in several armadas²⁸. Some of them had other valuable skills, such as Pêro Lopes de Sousa who was known for his activities in Brazil against French privateers and for his logbook of the journey to Brazil, of between 1530 and 1533²⁹.

The relative stability in the number of appointments before and after 1535 suggests that this group was acting from a conservative perspective. In other words, conditions such as status, age, family hierarchy and proximity to the king (or his private men), impelled them to continue to serve the Crown in the same way as they had before Tunis. There are, nevertheless, some exceptions to this general tendency. One can focus on the case of João de Castro, whose career became widely known for his being nominated governor/viceroy of Portuguese India³⁰. Earning recognition as a veteran of North African campaigns, he was in Tangier for some years before being nominated captain of regular fleets to defend the Portuguese coast and the Strait of Gibraltar against pirates. His proximity to *Infante* Luís is also a point to note in his ascending career. Therefore, exceptions such as João de Castro would fit better in a profile identified with the next group, whose political ambitions were more prevalent.

Some differences in the composition of these two groups can be found in the character of Group 2. Many of the men were appointed within a short timeframe, resulting in a combination of the king's household men and the *Infante*'s own, who had in common the political desire to interfere in Mediterranean affairs. It is relevant to highlight that only approximately half (45 per cent) of the *fidalgos* that followed Luís on his voyage to Barcelona were authorised by King João III to leave the kingdom. Apart from the *fidalgos* about which there is no information (circa 37 per cent), we know that at least a small number (18 per cent) left Portugal without royal consent. Among them were descendants of the titled nobility, such as Afonso de Portugal, son of Francisco de Portugal, first count of Vimioso, and Dinis de Almeida, son of Lopo de Almeida, second count of Abrantes.³¹

²⁷ The concept of "Estado da Índia" (the State of India) is used to describe the Portuguese presence in Asia as a discontinuous empire, linked by sea, that stretched (in the sixteenth century) as a network from Mozambique to Japan. See Luís Filipe Thomaz and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Evolution of Empire: The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean during the Sixteenth Century" in *The Political Economy of Merchants Empires – State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750*, ed. by James D. Tracy. New York 1991, 298-331.


²⁸ Alexandre Lobato, *António de Saldanha: his times and his achievements*. Lisbon 1962.

²⁹ See Pêro Lopes de Sousa, *Diário da navegação de Pêro Lopes de Sousa (1530-1532)*, ed. by A. Teixeira da Mota. Lisbon 1968.

³⁰ See for instance José Manuel García, "D. João de Castro: um homem de guerra e ciência", Francisco Faria Paulino (coord.), *Tapeçarias de D. João de Castro*. Lisboa 1995, 13-49.

³¹ See the annexes for the composition of both groups. BPE, Cód. CIII/2-17. Fr. Luís de Sousa, *Anais de El Rei D. João III...*, 386-8. BPMP, cód. 381/851. Published in António Cruz, "A defesa do Ocidente...", 249-64.

Fig. 2. Social status of the Ancestors of Group 2 Members



Sources: *LLP*, pp. 62, 93, 101, 121-1, 221, 273, 279, 314, 323-4, 338-9, 342, 369, 402, 436, 479, 482, 512, 519, 521, 528, 533-4, 542-4, 599; *PHGCRP*, vol. II, t. I, p. 446, vol. II, t. II, p. 462, 795; *HGCRP*, vol. XIII, pp. 80-2, 467-8, vol. XIV, p. 810, 899; *LL*, pp. 75, 132, 190-1, 265, 276, 283, 297, 305-6, 363; *Décadas*, V, liv. V, cap. VI; *NFP*, vol. II, p. 565, vol. IV, p. 65; *Corografia*, vol. II, p. 198, 491.

As one can tell from Figure 2, half of these men were descendants of nobles whose careers had been made through service to the Crown, whether in the form of offices in the central administration (court positions, monarchy institutions such as the treasury or justice court, among others) or overseas administration (outpost tenants, city governors, naval squad captains). With little more than a quarter of the total, the small/middling provincial nobility also contributed to this formation. Advantages that might come from participating in the expedition are connected with an eventual upgrade of their status and revenues. Their presence can be explained as a result of the impact these noblemen had on military recruitment in peripheral areas. A considerable number of them had the office of governor of the castle (*alcaide-mor*), of a town with its lordship, or the same office in locations controlled by the middling/high nobility or land tenants. Thus, nearly all of them were dependants of or have client/patron relationships with *Infante* Luís or another prominent nobleman. With smaller representation in this group were descendants of the high nobility (entitled noblemen). Apart from the exceptional presence of Afonso de Portugal (House of Vimioso), none of the other participants from the high nobility was a firstborn. Still, it was not very common for noblemen with this status to participate in overseas campaigns, especially if fought in remote locations. A controversy about this issue is well described by Diogo do Couto in his famed *Décadas da Ásia*. During the preparation of the *armada da Índia*³² of 1538, the king tried to force the heirs of the noble

³² The armada sent to Asia on an annual basis (so-called the *India Run*).

houses to sign up, thereby reinforcing the military structure of the *Estado da Índia* against the eminent threat of an Ottoman attack. The reaction of the latter was strong and conclusive. Refusing to participate, these noblemen argued that the king only had the authority to compel them to serve in North Africa, since this area was considered to be an extension of the realm itself. Apart from the long distance to the Asian continent, another pretext based on the commercial aspect of the maritime route to India was raised. After all, this was a social group that was still characterised by land tenure and contempt for trade activities³³.

Along with the participation of other lower/middling nobility firstborns, the motivation for these men to cooperate in the campaign should be discussed. This implies the analysis not only of social status and hierarchy, but also thinking about how a good performance abroad could improve their careers both in Portugal and in its overseas empire.

Table 2. Nominations to Office before and after 1535 – Group 2

<i>Office nomination</i>	<i>Before 1535</i>	<i>After 1535</i>
Court and royal house	14	7
Central administration	10	7
Overseas administration	13	12
Embassies	1	5

Sources: ANTT, CC, I, 36, 94; I, 42, 55; I, 43, 36; I, 66, 45; I, 74, 32; I, 104, 14; II, 104, 28; II, 122, 115; II, 157, 82; II, 167, 76; II, 168, 90; II, 173, 101; ANTT, CHR III, *Doações...*, liv. 1, fl. 67v; liv. 2, fl. 37v; liv. 6, fl. 88v; liv. 14, fl. 108v; liv. 20, fl. 84v; liv. 21, fls. 34, 110; liv. 23, fl. 66; liv. 26, fl. 154v; liv. 28, fls. 4v, 55v; liv. 30, fl. 164; liv. 35, fl. 91v; liv. 41, fl. 26v; liv. 42, fls. 1, 98; liv. 43, fl. 22; liv. 47, fl. 120; liv. 48, fl. 100; liv. 51, fl. 159; liv. 55, fls. 77v, 184; ANTT, CHR III, *Privilégios...*, liv. 2, fl. 32v; ANTT, *Gavetas*, Gav. XVIII, mç. 5, n° 11; ANTT, NA, n° 177, fls. 14-14v, 16v; NA, n° 179, fl. 35; *Corografia*, vol. II, pp. 198, 491; HGCRP, vol. XIII, pp. 80-2, 467-8; vol. XIV, pp. 810, 899; PHGCRP, vol. II, t. I, p. 446; vol. II, t. II, p. 462; RCI, p. 136.

Table 1 represents the number of offices in which individuals from Group 2 were promoted before and after 1535 (the year of the expedition to Tunis). Obviously, our intention is not to claim that this participation was responsible for the promotions mentioned. Instead, it must be viewed as if Tunis were representing only a single episode in an ascending career. A first look will indicate that Group 2 benefited the most from promotions in overseas administration. From a strict perspective, this would be true even if one thought that Tunis had little significance. However, given the high number of offices of this type that were already occupied by these individ-

³³ As mentioned in the original text, “El Rey não podia obrigar os Morgados a ir á Índia; porque como aquella terra fora descuberta pêra commercio, e trato, não tinham os Morgados obrigação de acudir a ella; e que só aos lugares de Africa, por serem fronteiros os poderia obrigar” – Diogo do Couto, *Ásia*. Lisboa 1780, 271.

uals, one should only acknowledge the maintenance of an already existing tendency. Since the majority of these men were second sons, this preference is not surprising, as war and/or administration were one probable careers³⁴.

Regarding the offices provided by the Crown in the court and royal house, a decline of 50 per cent is detectable (14 to 7 nominations), which indicates that these men were not very successful at positioning themselves close to the king and thus serving in a court post. This dynamic may also indicate that court positions were already established at that time and the margin for new promotions was reduced. In fact, almost all of these post-1535 offices belonged to the court of *Infante* Luís, indicating the potential for a political preference. Moreover, it is known that some servants of Luís were recruited after participating directly in this campaign. The number of embassy positions to which these men were appointed shows a different perspective. Five nominations to represent the king in external affairs after 1535 indicate that the services of these noblemen were still useful to the monarchy. Representation was a hard task for those involved, but a privilege in terms of possible claims to grants and other recompense.

What do these figures generally indicate in terms of the personal motivation of men in Group 2 to participate in the expedition? While some of these individuals joined the campaign for career purposes, it seems that other reasons contributed to a more generalised acceptance. At the top of the list are not only kinship relations, but also political differences and issues linked to social capital and overseas reputation. Some cases are particularly illustrative of such reasons. As regards family relationships, it should be noted that Group 2 is composed of men that shared close links, such as father – son or brother – brother, within and outside the house of *Infante* Luís. For example, João Freire de Andrade, firstborn of Simão Freire (?-c.1540), lord of Bobadela, participated in the expedition along with his father and brother Fernão Martins Freire, both of whom held office in the court of Luís³⁵. The same applies to the Sousa Chichorro family in Group 1. Manuel de Sousa Chichorro, a *fidalg*o of Luís, followed his lord knowing that his brother Henrique de Sousa Chichorro was in the *armada*. While it has not been proved to what extent family acted politically with one voice, the existence of a considerable number of cases such as the above-mentioned serves at least to suggest that one or more members might influence another relative.

Apart from material rewards, another reason worth developing is the possibility of gaining an enhanced reputation from participation in such events. A reasonable element of internal politics was necessarily conditioned by external influence. Thus, a

³⁴ On this subject see James L. Boone, "Parental Investment and Elite Family Structure in Preindustrial States: A Case Study of Late Medieval – Early Modern Portuguese Genealogies", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 88, n° 4, 1986, 859-878.

³⁵ ANTT, CR, NA, liv. 177, fl. 12; liv. 179, fl. 35. Simão Freire was the master huntsman (*monteiro-mor*) of *Infante* Luís, a post later inherited by his second son, Fernão Martins Freire.

good performance in Tunis could propitiate a welcome recommendation from abroad, which could be used for multiple purposes. Individuals from various social levels benefited from this experience. Soon after the expedition, Charles V wrote to João III praising the role played by Luís during the events³⁶. It is known that, apart from close contact with the emperor, the *infante* had assembled his own network of friendships with Castilian noblemen. A good example of these contacts is Luís de Ávila, who demonstrated his desire for a new campaign against the Ottomans alongside *Infante* Luís, a few years after the conquest of Tunis³⁷. Other examples can be found due to their familial and political affinity with the court circles. The best case is probably that of Francisco de Borja, whose connections with several members of both the royal houses of Avis and Habsburg – and especially with Luís – came from a young age³⁸. By taking these chances to enhance his social capital abroad, the *infante* was also combining political aspirations with his personal career. This dynamic of investment was also visible in individuals of other social strata.

Less noteworthy participants were recognised with honours while still in the field; for example, the brothers André and Brás Teles or Pêro Martins³⁹. However, there are a significant number of men who were rewarded by King João III for notable performances while in action, later in 1535 or in succeeding years⁴⁰. There is considerable heterogeneity among those envisaged and their provenience. The majority belonged to the same low/medium social status and were, directly or indirectly, connected to the *Infante* Luís, either serving in his household or in other noble houses belonging to individuals with whom he had close relations. By serving their masters these low ranked men also benefited from their participation in the campaign. The Crown was rewarding brave performance in battle while at the same time legitimating the social ascendancy of men who arguably had different political perspectives.

Conclusions

In order to conclude this paper, two general ideas must be highlighted. Firstly, that from a purely military perspective the idea that confined Portuguese participation in Tunis merely to naval combat and transportation needs to be reviewed. Historiography stressed that the major Portuguese contribution to this expedition relied

³⁶ Frei Luís de Sousa, *Anais...*, 394-5.

³⁷ AGS, Estado, Leg. 371, n° 119 [Letter of Luis Sarmiento to Francisco de los Cobos. Lisbon, 26 September 1538], published in Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, “Espoirs et désespoir de l’infant D. Luís”, *Mare Liberum*, n° 3, 1991, 234-98 (289-9).

³⁸ Enrique García Hernán, “D. Francisco de Borja y Portugal” in *A Companhia de Jesus na Península Ibérica nos séculos XVI e XVII: espiritualidade e cultura. Actas do Colóquio Internacional*. Porto 2004, 189-219.

³⁹ Frei Luís de Sousa, *Anais...*, 391.

⁴⁰ A list of these men can be found in Isabel Drumond Braga, *Um Espaço, duas Monarquias (Interrelações na Península Ibérica no Tempo de Carlos V)*. Lisboa 2001, 204-5.

on the attack on La Goulette. Indeed, the practice and accumulated knowledge of these fleets, already experienced from regular enterprises to African and Asian outposts, provided a significant advantage in the attack on the port. However, as demonstrated, there is enough evidence that points not only to preparation for land combat, but also to the existence of battlefield action. The fact that they were numerically of little significance (1,500-1,650 out of a total of 25,000-30,000 men) does not detract from their technical abilities. Therefore, a long list of literature on the subject should, in our opinion, be reviewed to include new material and further debate.

Secondly, the political implications of the expedition must be studied. In geopolitical terms, the outcome of Tunis contributed to an even closer proximity of the royal houses of Avis and Habsburg. This proximity was seen not only within the paradigm of royal marriages, but also in relation to naval cooperation around this space, especially against French corsairs. In parallel, we should underline that the political desire for greater participation in the North African/Mediterranean complex left its mark. By participating in Tunis, the *infante* and his counterparts were able to send a political message to the Crown, albeit with results in the medium term that were not what they expected. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that not all individuals were influenced by domestic politics. Hence, other kinds of motivation caused adherence to this expedition. As demonstrated, reasons such as family ties, friendship, and career purposes contributed to their participation. This is especially true of the men of the armada, a more experienced group of officers with many years of service to the Crown in overseas territories. Regarding the other group, the paradigm differs considerably. Many of the noblemen who decided to follow Luís did not even need to leave the realm in order to promote themselves. Additionally, those who regarded the participation in Tunis as an extra boost to their careers were also influenced by diverging political opinions as well as by homosocial practices, in which we can include the desire for a crusade against the Ottoman Sultanate.

Abbreviations

ANTT	National Archives/Torre do Tombo
AGS	General Archive of Simancas
BPE	Public Library of Évora
BPMP	Municipal Public Library of Oporto
BA	Library of Ajuda
CC	<i>Corpo Cronológico</i>
CDCV	<i>Corpus Documental de Carlos V</i> , ed. Manuel Fernández Álvarez, Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1973-81, 5 vols.
CHR III	<i>Chancelaria de D. João III</i>
CHR M	<i>Chancelaria de D. Manuel</i>
Corografia	António Carvalho da Costa, <i>Corografia Portuguesa e Descrição Topográfica do Famoso Reino de Portugal...</i> , Lisboa, Oficina de Valentim da Costa, 1706-1712, 3 vols.
CRM	Damião de Góis, <i>Crónica do Felicíssimo Rei D. Manuel</i> , Coimbra 1926, 4 vols.

Décadas	Diogo do Couto, <i>Ásia</i> , Lisboa 1778-1781, 12 vols.
HGCRP	António Caetano de Sousa, <i>História Genealógica da Casa Real Portuguesa</i> , Coimbra, Atlântida, 1947-55 [1739-48], 15 vols.
Lendas	Gaspar Correia, <i>Lendas da Índia</i> , ed. M. Lopes de Almeida, Porto 1975, 4 vols.
LL	<i>Livro de Linhagens do Século XVI</i> , ed. António Machado de Faria, Lisboa, Academia Portuguesa de História, 1956
LLP	Damião de Góis, <i>Livro de Linhagens de Portugal</i> , ed. António Pestana de Vasconcelos, Lisboa, CEPESE/Univ. Lusíada de Lisboa./Instituto Português de Heráldica, 2014
NA	Núcleo Antigo
NFP	Manuel da Costa Felgueiras Gayo, <i>Nobiliário de Famílias Portuguesas</i> , Braga, Carvalhos de Basto, 1992 [1938-41], 12 vols.
Pedatura	Cristóvão Alão de Moraes, <i>Pedatura Lusitana: nobiliário de famílias de Portugal</i> , Porto 1943-1948, 6 vols.
PHGCRP	António Caetano de Sousa, <i>Provas da História Genealógica da Casa Real Portuguesa</i> , Coimbra, Atlântida 1946-54, 12 vols.
RAH	Real Academia de la Historia
RCI	Luciano Ribeiro, <i>Registo da Casa da Índia</i> , Lisboa 1954
VNC	Viscondes de Vila Nova de Cerveira

Annexes

Group 1. Sample of the *armada*, containing X individuals identified in primary sources

Name	Royal House Rank (Foro)	Office in the armada
António de Azambuja	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	n/a
António de Mancelos	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	Caravela captain
António Saldanha	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	Head captain
Baltasar Banha	Cavaleiro-fidalgo	n/a
Baltasar Lobo Teixeira Sousa	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	n/a
Fernão Rodrigues Barba	Cavaleiro-fidalgo	n/a
Francisco Chamorro Garcês	Cavaleiro	n/a
Francisco Mendes de Vasconcelos	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	n/a
Gaspar Tibão	Cavaleiro	n/a
Henrique de Eça	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	n/a
Henrique de Macedo	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	Caravela captain
Henrique de Sousa Chichorro	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	n/a
Inácio de Bulhões	Cavaleiro	n/a
D. João de Castro	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	Caravela captain
Jorge Velho	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	n/a
Manuel Brandão	Cavaleiro	Caravela captain
Manuel de Brito	Escudeiro-fidalgo	n/a
Nuno Vaz de Castelo Branco	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	Head captain delegate

<i>Name</i>	<i>Royal House Rank (Foro)</i>	<i>Office in the armada</i>
Pêro Lopes de Sousa	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	n/a
Simão da Veiga	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	n/a
Simão de Melo	Fidalgo-cavaleiro	Caravela captain
Tomás de Bairros	Cavaleiro	n/a

Sources: BPE, Cód. CIII/2-7; PHGCRP, vol. II, t. II, pp. 453-524; Fr. Luís de Sousa, *Anais de El Rei D. João III...*, pp. 386-8; CRUZ, "A defesa do Ocidente...", pp. 249-64.

Group 2. Sample of the group who followed *Infante* Luís, containing X individuals identified on primary sources

<i>Name</i>	<i>Filiation</i>	<i>Royal House Rank (Foro)</i>
D. Afonso de Castelo Branco	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Afonso de Portugal	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Álvaro Botelho	Luís' household	Moço-fidalgo
André Teles de Meneses	Luís' household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
António de Albuquerque	Royal household	Moço-fidalgo
D. António de Almeida	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Belchior de Brito	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Brás da Silva	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Brás Teles de Meneses	Luís' household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Dinis de Almeida	Royal household	Escudeiro-fidalgo
Diogo Álvares da Costa	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Diogo de Castro	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Fernando de Noronha	Luís' household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Fernão de Silveira	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Fernão Mendes Freire	Luís' household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Fernão Soares	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Francisco Coutinho	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Francisco Lobo	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Francisco Pereira	Luís' household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Francisco Pereira Pestana	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Garcia de Castro	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Jerónimo de Melo	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. João d'Eça	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
João de Meneses	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro

<i>Name</i>	<i>Filiation</i>	<i>Royal House Rank (Foro)</i>
João de Sepúlveda	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
João Freire de Andrade	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. João Pereira	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
João Teixeira	Luís' household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Jorge de Lima	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Lourenço Pires de Távora	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Luís Álvares de Távora	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Luis Gonçalves de Ataíde	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Manuel de Sousa Chichorro	Luís' household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Pedro d'Eça	Royal household	Escudeiro-fidalgo
Pêro Botelho	Luís' household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Pêro da Fonseca	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Pêro da Silva de Meneses	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
D. Pêro de Mascarenhas	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Pêro Mascarenhas	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Rui de Melo	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Rui Lourenço de Távora	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Rui Mendes de Mesquita	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Tristão de Mendonça	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro
Tristão Vaz da Veiga	Royal household	Fidalgo-cavaleiro

Sources: BPE, Cód. CIII/2-7; PHGCRP, vol. II, t. II, pp. 453-524; Fr. Luís de Sousa, *Anais de El Rei D. João III...*, pp. 386-8; CRUZ, "A defesa do Ocidente...", pp. 249-64.