Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity

Edited by

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Manuel de Góis: The Coimbra Course and the Definition of an Early Jesuit Philosophy

Mário S. de Carvalho

1 Introduction

Manuel de Góis (1543–97) was the leading figure behind the well-known editorial enterprise entitled Coimbra Jesuit College Commentaries (CJCC), or Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu.1 Published in Coimbra and Lisbon between 1592 and 1606, the eight volumes of the CJCC contain commentaries on Aristotle’s philosophy (commenting on Aristotle was a custom common to all sixteenth-century European universities and a duty within the Jesuits’ philosophical schools). Although usually known by the Latin formula “Conimbricensis,” which is derived from the majority of the titles that make up the CJCC, the name is slightly misleading given that other philosophical works were also printed in Coimbra (namely by members of the St. Benedict College) and because other Jesuit authors, such as António Cordeiro (c.1640–1722), for example, published their own Cursus philosophicus Conimbricensis.2

Góis joined the Society of Jesus on August 31, 1560 at the age of seventeen. After completing his philosophical and theological studies at the Jesuit University of Évora, he taught Latin and Greek in the towns of Bragança, Lisbon, and Coimbra (1564–72). In 1574–78 and 1578–82, Góis taught two courses of philosophy at Coimbra.3 This experience may have acted as a catalyst to him assuming a prominent role in the CJCC, which also benefited from the contributions of three other Portuguese Jesuits. When Góis died, Cosme de Magalhães (d.1624) wrote an appendix to the volume on De anima, entitled Problems Related to the Five Senses, and Baltasar Álvarez (d.1630) wrote another appendix to the same volume, the Treaty on the Separated Soul. Finally, Sebastião do Couto (d.1639)

2 António Cordeiro, Cursus philosophicus Conimbricensis (Lisbon: Regia Deslandesiana, 1714).
3 Rodrigues 1938b, 115–22.
published a commentary on *Dialectics*. With the exception of the volumes dedicated to ethics (1593) and logic (1606), the other works in the *cjcc* were almost entirely centered on natural philosophy: a commentary on *Physics* (1592), a commentary on *Meteorology* (1593), a commentary on the *Short Treatises on Natural History* (1593), commentary on *Heavens* (1593), commentary on *Generation and Corruption* (1597), and a commentary *On the Soul* (1598).

Before proceeding further, it is important to note the external circumstances that led to the *cjcc*. By the end of the sixteenth century, Coimbra had replaced Salamanca in terms of the new Iberian geopolitical complex. In 1555, King João III (r.1521–57) placed the Jesuits in charge of the Royal Humanist College, a move motivated by the ideological disagreements among the college’s professors, and the idea of editing the philosophy lessons taught at Coimbra, “so that the students would not waste time writing them,” quickly gained in currency among the Jesuits. However, the real motive was to establish a doctrine (*filum doctrinae*) that could be used in all of the Jesuits’ colleges, not only in Europe but also in the missions abroad. The *cjcc* were disseminated throughout the world, yet they were not always well received in European colleges, as René Descartes (1596–1650) testifies. Outside Europe, especially in China and South America, the *cjcc* had a different impact. This triple reception has yet to be studied but clearly deserves further attention. Aside from an incomplete list of the *cjcc*’s European editions, which testify to its remarkable diffusion in the European rationalist milieu, its actual reception in Europe has received very little attention.

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4 Couto wrote the commentary as a response to a counterfeit (apparently created by Gaspar Coelho [fl. 1584] after Francisco Cardoso’s [1547–1604] teaching [1571]), which had been published two years earlier in Central Europe. Friedrich Stegmüller, *Filosofia e teologia nas universidades de Coimbra e Évora no século xvi* (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1959), 98.


It is worth pointing out that the CJCC are not devoted to the complete works of Aristotle. *Metaphysics* is the most glaring omission, despite Góis's and Couto's intention of writing a commentary on it. Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain this omission (most recently in historian Cristiano Casalini's study\(^\text{11}\)), but the most likely reasons were the lack of time that would be needed to finish such a monumental project and the disagreements between Pedro da Fonseca (1528–99) and Góis over the exposition of philosophy. In Góis’s view, physics provided the basis to access philosophy, whereas, in 1574, Fonseca had already stated that:

All the philosophy students must be familiar with works on First Philosophy (so-called *Metaphysics*), because besides offering a careful discussion of the common difficulties involved in other philosophical works, they are often cited by the professors. Therefore I thought this was the easiest method for me to write and the easiest for the students to understand, especially if I decide to expose beforehand themes containing all the principles and fundamentals of philosophy. In fact [...] when such fundamentals are established and strengthened, the other themes are more accessible to students [...] and for me it is more convenient and [the fundamentals] can soon be developed.\(^\text{12}\)

Fonseca planned to write a commentary on *Metaphysics* that would have been integrated into the CJCC.

A study of how the CJCC was born has yet to be carried out. When Fonseca wrote the preface to the first volume, he alluded to a number of manuscripts that were circulating among the Jesuit teachers of the University of Évora and the College of Coimbra. It is certainly possible that the four writers already mentioned used the same materials (the CJCC also cite the names of Fonseca and Luis de Molina [1535–1600]). However, based on a comparative analysis of the manuscripts,\(^\text{13}\) it is possible to conclude that the work of each of these four Portuguese Jesuits is entirely original. *Metaphysica* was briefly commented on in a few books, given that it was taught between the third and

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fourth years at Coimbra (e.g., between March and May 1578, according to Lourenço Fernandes’s [dates unknown] manuscript BNL 4841, or from September to December 1562, according to Pedro Gómez’s [1535–1600] course). The commentary on Ethics was shortened in the penultimate semester. In 1563–64, Luís Álvares (1539–90) read Ethics in the second course but with the insertion of Physica into the plan of studies. The course on physics, the details of which can be found in Inácio Tolosa’s (1532–1611) manuscript BGUC 2318 (1563), began on March 6 with book 1; book 2 began on April 26; book 3 in June; books 4 and 5 on September 9 (one in the morning, the other in the afternoon); book 6 on November 2; book 7 on November 20; and, finally, book 8 on December 10. This indicates the contrast between what was actually taught at the College of Coimbra and the more than three-thousand pages of the CJCC.

With the exception of Ethics, all these works circulated under the designation “commentaries” (commentarii). However, only the editions that totally or partially transmit Aristotle’s text in Latin deserve such a title because they focus on the explanation (explanatio) of the Aristotelian text that precedes the questions (quaestiones), for the most part subdivided into articles (articulus) or sections (sectio). The Greek version does not appear in the Portuguese edition and is only present in some of the editions published abroad. The volumes on Meteorology and on the Short Treatises on Natural History (known as “Parva naturalia”), and the two appendices to On the Soul and the appendix to On the Heavens are more akin to philosophical treatises than commentaries. The volume on Ethics differs from the others because it follows the method of disputes, yet the authors were free to choose which subjects to dispute rather than following St. Thomas Aquinas’s (1224/25–74) Summa theologiae article by article. There is no consensus among scholars on how the methodological approach adopted in the CJCC was determined.

2 Coimbra Jesuit Philosophy

Rather than following the conventional analytical or comparative approaches, especially related to certain volumes of the CJCC, which is the prevailing

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14 Mário S. de Carvalho, Psicologia e ética no curso jesuíta Conimbricense (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2010), 107–39.
method in the existing literature, this chapter aims to provide a systematic and deductive doctrinal exposition. It should be added that the state of the art does not yet allow for any definitive explanation of the CJCC’s philosophical content.

2.1 Logic, Knowledge, and the Exposition of the Science

Logic was taught extensively in Coimbra. After Couto’s general introduction to the CJCC (1–54) (which should be read in counterpoint to the introduction to Physics, written by Góis and published fourteen years earlier), the volume on Dialectics discusses Porphyry’s Isagoge (55–225), the Categories (226–416), On Interpretation (1–169), the Prior (170–284) and the Posterior Analytics (285–524), the Topics (525–36), and the Sophistical Refutations (537–48). The praise given to Dialectics—“scale of truth,” “rule and measure of sciences,” “constituent of wisdom”—and its definition as “an art or doctrine of discovery,” demonstrates the heuristic and epistemological importance of this discipline. Dialectics or logic provide the ability to investigate the unknown on the basis of what is previously known through argumentation, making it possible to gain knowledge of affections and accidents through division, which enables knowledge of the parts, and through definition, which provides knowledge of the essence. In addition, dialectics explains how the human mind expresses thoughts correctly and without mistakes. In its dual perspective—theoretical (docens) and practical (utens)—dialectics is also at the service of science: its main goal is to prescribe the method and the rules of discovery and to place the result of the discovery in the service of the faculties. Thus can be understood the great importance of the Analytics in the CJCC and the correlation of its topoi: even if inventio is prior to dispositio, the transmission of the latter may precede inventio whenever one is unable to understand the former without the notion of dispositio.

In many of the CJCC’s chapters, such as the chapter devoted to the problems of universals, dialectics is used to combat Platonism and nominalism. The same goal applies in science, namely with the theory of propositional relations (connexiones propositionum), the necessity of which is emphasized in the Posterior Analytics. The unity of the universals, called “unity of precision,” can be considered an intermediate between a numeric and a formal unity, displaying its status as a non-real division, simultaneously sharing the intellective condition and the condition of extramental reality. From an epistemological perspective, thus revealing the close connection between logic (Isagoge) and

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17 The most comprehensive interpretation of dialectics in the CJCC can be found in Amândio Coxito’s papers, available in his book Estudos sobre filosofia em Portugal no século xvi (Lisbon: INCM, 2005).
knowledge (On the Soul), Couto argues that the intelligible species represent the singular nature, not the common nature, and this, ontologically speaking, is equivalent to seeing in such a relation the ultimate perfection of universals (i.e., the very foundation of universality).

For Góis, knowledge and science originate in the senses, and the idea of the soul as tabula rasa was never called into question. Knowledge and science are enlarged and strengthened through experience, by empirical or scholarly accumulation, and culminate in universal and intelligible concepts. Thus, in descending order of dignity, the senses of vision, hearing, taste, smell, and touch capture the images of singular things and allow the two internal senses—common sense and imagination—to take the first step toward universality. This process is explained in Isagoge (prooem. 5): when an external sensible is presented to one of the five senses, it projects the respective image (species/imago) to that organ, creating, for example, vision of a color. The image that represents the color then reaches the common sense through the optic nerve, despite experiencing some modification, thus allowing the common sense to acquire knowledge (notitia). As a sensible image, the species advances to imagination and expresses knowledge (cognitio) or a definite image. Henceforth, the image proceeds to the patient’s intellect so that this intellect, properly informed, can acknowledge the object. However, since the species created by the intellect must be of a spiritual nature, and the image is corporeal, the intervention of the agent intellect is required to raise the image to the former condition. Intellection is defined not in terms of a quality but in terms of an action. Intellection accordingly makes the object appear to the spirit not in its real being but in its intentional being. In other words: intellection is a process of assimilation between the intellective faculty and the thing understood consisting of the expression and representation of what is known. This assimilation leads to the formation and the intelligible expression of the thing in itself (i.e., the effective production of knowledge [notitia genita]), the mental verb, or thought. In this respect, the commentaries On Interpretation and On the Soul are essential. To compose, discuss, and judge are at the core of all forms of intellective apprehension (apprehendendo per intellectum) and, even if the syllogistic reasoning is among its privileged medium, any reader of the CJCC is capable of understanding that the hermeneutics of explicatio and the dilemmas posed in quaestiones are two essential discursive vehicles for the

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construction and didactic exposition of science. Furthermore, science requires the triple function of the agent intellect—to illuminate *phantasmata*, to turn the intelligible object into an act, and to produce the intelligible species in the patient intellect—and the superiority of the patient intellect, since it is solely responsible for judging, thinking, and contemplating. Both intellects are distinct and, against Averroes, individuals.\(^{19}\)

In relation to the conversion to the sensibles and the doctrine that reduces the number of the internal senses, the CJCC follow, for the most part, Fonseca’s views. This not only means strengthening the role of imagination but also Coimbra’s insistence on the autonomy of the sensible and the need for a new theory, a so-called “effective” illumination, responding to Thomas de Vio Cajetan’s (1469–1534) and Sylvester of Ferrara’s (1474–1528) theses.\(^{20}\)

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) noted the contribution made by the CJCC to a doctrine of signs, but this is again a matter that interferes with epistemology, psychology, metaphysics, and even theology.\(^{21}\) Since scholars such as Jennifer Ashworth have already highlighted Góis’s contribution to the study of the doctrine of the analogy,\(^{22}\) also responsible for the explanation and theoretical ground of the notion of transcendence, it is important not to ignore the influence of the *Categories* and of its reading as a temporary substitute for *Metaphysics* (especially books 4 and 5).

Historian of philosophy Amândio Coxito has recognized a certain insensitivity toward what would be the new trend in the study of the position of arguments, already welcomed by Fonseca, in the importance Couto attaches to science. Although Couto views dialectical syllogisms as inferior to demonstrative syllogisms, he also underlines the importance of the penultimate book for Scholastic debates, workshops (*colloquia*), an honest exchange of ideas (*honestus congressus*), and for the whole of philosophy and all its branches. It is worth noting that the last volume on Dialectics concerning the *Sophistical*
Refutations also had to be read under this broader perspective in order to avoid misinterpretations.

In the CJCC, the division of sciences can be considered from four different perspectives. The first is from the perspective of real sciences (i.e., sciences of things) versus sciences of speech (i.e., sciences of language, both external and internal; e.g., grammar, rhetoric [history and poetry], and dialectics). The second is that of the practical sciences versus theoretical or contemplative sciences, which include physics and mathematics (i.e., geometry, arithmetic, and mixed mathematics) and metaphysics (i.e., ontology, pneumatology, and theology). Similarly, practical sciences are divided into sciences related to practical activities (activa), such as logic and morality (ethics, economics, and politics) and sciences related to productive activities (factiva), such as grammar, rhetoric, painting, dancing, and so on. Third, there is a division based on their importance—superior sciences versus inferior sciences; mathematics, physics, ethics and metaphysics/theology are called superior sciences; the seven liberal arts (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) and the seven servile arts (agriculture, hunting, military arts, nautical, surgery, weaving, and mechanical arts) are among the inferior sciences. Finally, there is a fourth division based on the criterion of learning (ordo in disciplinis): in what concerns discovery (inventio) and teaching (doctrina), its ascending order is coincident—logic, mathematics, physics, ethics, and metaphysics; but in terms of dignity, the ascending order diverges a little: ethics, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. Note, however, that in the ideal plan of evidence and certainty, the ascending order would be metaphysics, physics, and mathematics.23

In its exposition of science, the CJCC seek to follow the criterion of learning, emphasizing the principles of near coincidence between dignity and discovery/teaching to the detriment of the principle of evidence, despite the “intrinsic reason of science” (An. Post. 1, c. 26). In fact, according to the historical order, it would be more accurate to speak of an ontology of evidence rather than an epistemology of evidence. On the one hand, the ascending order of evidence refers to an ideal conception of science (metaphysics per se, for example). On the other hand, the admission of evidence of a growing order refers to an ideal consideration of science (metaphysics in itself, for example) and on the natural and pragmatic order of human life and dignity of science. The criterion of dignity allows us to highlight the authority that theology will end

23 Coxito, Estudos, 155–93.
up having over the philosophical work. But what must be emphasized is the identification between the concepts of system and science that explains the importance of order and method. Dignitas is also a translation for “axiom,” an indemonstrable proposition held by all who want to learn something, the evidence (perspicuitas) for which has the nature of a primordial common principle shared by all sciences. When the intellect corrects the mistake or the uncertainty, this occurs as part of

a congenital light [inditum/nativum], by which the most general principles are approved [...] and by which it is possible to make deductions of many things by the use of reasoning [...], be it with clarity and certainty, be it with probability. Sometimes it is also possible to learn something not by the discourse, but through sheer observation.

*Physica*, prooem. 2

In conclusion, the epistemological order of doctrine (nota nobis) and the ontological order of nature (nota natura) coincide, but the educational exposition of science (through a system called filum doctrinae) can be materialized only in an incarnate, historical, or pedagogical form, developing between the orders of knowledge and nature (i.e., between the principles of knowledge and the principles or internal cause of being).

2.2 Nature and World

More than seventy-three percent of the CJCC’s pages deal with physics and the five accepted meanings of the word “nature” (*Physica* 2, c. 1). The main definition of nature matches physis, understood as “generation,” “appearance of life,” or “living.” Gois’s keen interest in physics has already been mentioned above.

Knowledge of the world (scientia de mundo) is gained through a deductive exposition from the most perfect and general principles to the less perfect ones. Or, expressed in the literary terms of the CJCC, the fight against contemporary authors who have deformed nature is carried out by an exhaustive treatment of

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broad principles, between motion and rest, from the most common principles such as matter, form and privation, nature and its causes, unity, species and parts of the motion, infinity, place, void and time, first Mover and its properties (Physica); by the study of the mobile being, structure, and composition of the universe, of the five simple bodies, the four elements, their respective natural spaces, and type of local motion (De caelo); and by the study of the corruptible dimension of the universe, generation, change, growth, mixed bodies (De generatione et corruptione), and of imperfect mixed bodies (Meteororum). This systematic reading of physics not only follows a deductive method of exposition but also implies that physics is able to envision the transcendent dimension as necessary to develop its discourse. This is especially true for psychology, since the De anima was read as a text belonging to physics and astronomy, since the De caelo provides an exemplary aesthetic (especially in De Caelo, 1 c. 1, q. 1, a. 3), which is valid for all the branches of the philosophy of nature.27

2.3 The Principles of Physics

All of the basic principles of physics mentioned above28 are at the service of an ontological perspective of plenitude mainly founded on the authority of what we could call the “rule of Pseudo-Dionysius,” to which we will return later, and are totally dependent on the motif of Creation. Consequently, and given that void is incompatible with unity, it must be rejected. Deriving like numbers from unity, forms embellish “the theater of the world” (an expression from De caelo), and consequently natural forms are superior to artificial ones. Following Bonaventure’s (1221–74) position, the CJCC claim that matter can be known either through negation (inficiatio), when any perfection in act is denied to it, or by affirmation, when any defect or potency is attributed to it. Since matter has been created with a substantial form, philosophers named it using several designations: “Non-being,” “big and small,” “dissimilarity,” “asylum,” “community,” “receptacle,” “multitude and duality,” “empty shadow of the first essences,” “mirror-like,” “element,” “substance,” or even “mother.”

Inhabited by motion, created nature seeks to rest, and its intelligibility, teleology, or economy (i.e., all its effort [conatus]) is aimed at the common good. Good and perfection are more easily identified by considering the species rather than the singulars. And order, stability, finitude, and eternity are among the other characteristics of nature. Although positively linked to existence, the concept of time is also viewed as a restraint, since it causes more death than birth (Physica 4, c. 12–13). Because time does not exist without the created world, its end will coincide with the recreation of the world (De caelo 1, c. 12). Infinity is also rejected in the CJCC because it is incompatible with the forces of nature (viribus naturae). However, if there is no place for actual infinity, in an explicit sense, Góis admits actual infinity in the improper way of the infinity of division and addition. It should be noted that, when questioning if actual infinity is within God’s power, the proposal that denies such an option is considered preferable (additionally, it should be emphasized that on this particular point, as well as on other ones, the probabilistic accent is a sign that a long-standing tradition is in crisis). All the four causes are under physical scrutiny. Even if the autonomy of the physical order is underscored, the mutual relation among exemplar, final, and efficient causes is to be duly considered. On this point, the most relevant thesis confirms that even if it belongs to the formal cause genre, exemplary cause is a true cause, because it is a “measure by which both the greater and lesser perfection of things is evaluated” (Physica 2, c. 7). Such a position is justified based on Fonseca’s ideas.

2.4 Motion and the Enchantment of the World

Incompletely framed by the categories, the truest sense of motion must be rooted in the first immobile Mover, provided that Aristotle conceived it as endowed with an infinite and perfect force. Although considered difficult, the study of motion is a very important part of physics due to its contribution to theology and because it is a touchstone of freedom. Hence, for example, there is an original identity between being and the reason to act in whatever is capable of moving itself, as noted by Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308). Although circular motion is considered the most perfect form of motion—“principle of all motions, divine light of all material qualities, endowed with such efficiency that by its own virtue or ability diverts all plagues of the world” (De caelo 2,

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c. 1)—Góis recognizes that circular motion is not the cause of the movement of the stars. Given that a variety of impulses is required to move the celestial machine, Góis acknowledges other types of motion, such as that of the heavens and light or even other occult faculties in the sub-lunar world. Among the six species of motion—generation, destruction, increase, decrease, alteration, and local motion—the last one is predominant. This is indicated by the variety of perspectives on place, identified with the mobility itself; the category of place can only be thought of from the point of view of immobility, which explains the introduction of the notion of imaginary surface. The CJCC welcome the ideas of Fonseca\textsuperscript{31} on imaginary space and its parallel, imaginary time.\textsuperscript{32}

Contrary to what Antonio Bernardi (1502–65) intended (his theses are recurrent targets of criticism in the CJCC), the CJCC state that \textit{De caelo} should not be used as an introductory book to the study of physics. As Jesuits were fascinated by the world and the beauty of its parts, it should not come as a surprise that the commentary on \textit{De caelo} opens with a quasi-theological–anthropological poem, showing the marvelous contemplation of heaven and announcing, in the spirit of Seneca, the utility and the benefits of studying heaven, promoting moral education, and contempt for transient things. The perfection of the world, all existing things, is the result of Creation, the product of the supreme architect and divine art.

Góis adopted the traditional cosmological interpretation that distinguished between the matter of heaven and the matter of the sublunary world \textit{in specie}.\textsuperscript{33} But by admitting as probable that the matter of the heaven of the sublunary world might be the same, “and perhaps without realizing the huge consequences of doing it,”\textsuperscript{34} the authors of the CJCC opened the door to other admissions (e.g., the impulse theory, also called the \textit{impulsus} or \textit{gravitas accidentaria}) that would prove to be destructive to the Aristotelian tradition.

Whereas \textit{De caelo} studies the elements in their own place and own motions with an appendix dedicated to the relevant problems of each of the four elements, \textit{De generatione} deals with the sublunary world. As an integral part of

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the doctrine of the elements, generation and corruption bear witness to God’s providence. In this chapter, Pseudo-Dionysius’s rule, mentioned above, can be translated as follows: the cream (flor) of the elements of the lower world is contained in the upper celestial body just as the dregs of the upper world are found in the lower world (De caelo 2, c. 1). Yet the CJCC also contain a statement according to which the conflict between the elements of a contrary physical nature not only disturb the order of the universe but are required for the maintenance of that order. The correlation between the elements and the variety of their links is expressed by a hermeneutic in which the first qualities are inserted in each element in a coherent concordia discors (discordant concordance), thus ensuring that the sublunary balance, or in other words, the harmony of the world, is guaranteed.

2.5 Mixed Bodies and the Notion of Experience

The third level of the study of physics, which falls under the scrutiny of De generatione and Meteororum, recognizes generation and alteration as essential dynamics; as such, it addresses the study of both mixed and imperfect bodies, which originate in the sub-lunar atmospheric region. Meteororum deals with non-living compounds such as snow, ice (glacies), hail (grando), comets, and phenomena caused by the refraction of light, such as rainbows, the bright meteors (caprae saltantes), the Saint Elmo’s fire (Castor et Pollux), the Milky Way (circulus lacteus), parhelia (parelia), floods, typhoons (Ecnephias), tsunamis (Euripus) and earthquakes, lightning bolts (fulgor), rays (fulmen), thunder (tonitrus), sea storms (marinus aestus), fog, frost, clouds, winds, rain, and other types of phenomena. In 1563, the teaching of Meteororum in the third course of the University of Évora was preceded by De sphaera, the reading of which was a Portuguese custom, as noted by Fonseca when he started preparing the CJCC. Several of the CJCC’s titles share a notion of “experience” that is wider in scope than that shared by modernity. This notion can be better understood in the light of what the Posterior Analytics meant for “experience.” According to the Posterior Analytics, experience did not belong to the epistemological field of induction; rather, experience had to be understood as a critical vestibule of induction, unable to achieve the universal but attentive to the individuals that belong to the sensible realm. Again, this is something that explains why non-Aristotelian topics were included in a commentary on the Aristotelian science, namely the option of Christianizing Aristotle whenever convenient to the “respublica Christiana.”

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35 Pedro da Fonseca, Commentariorum in Metaphysicam Aristotelis Stagiritae libros (Cologne: S. Lazari Zetzneri, 1615), i prooem. c. 5
sciences and arts. Even if this notion is excessively broad and imprecise, experience is time and again considered the mother of philosophy and physics its preferred field. As the criticism of mathematics falls under the exclusive framework of the Aristotelian epistemology, that is to say, quality over quantity, so experience is here understood as of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature. Moreover, in the framework of the categories, the preference given by Scotus to the third dimension of quantity—line, surface, and body, or continuous extension—is interpreted as more attentive to equality and inequality, to the material consideration of the relation of quantity, to excess, to defect, to measure and proportion. Bearing in mind the irregular teaching of mathematics within the College of Coimbra and the discussion at that time on the epistemic value of the discipline, there was a debate over the specific division of mathematics: arithmetic consists of the study of the discrete quantity while geometry is centered on continuous quantity. Although arithmetic surpasses geometry in terms of demonstrative certitude and nobility, the relevance of geometry is unquestionable due to its important role and the service it can provide to the philosophical horizon of CJCC.

2.6 **Man and World**

We mentioned earlier how we are supposed to explain the passage from *Meteororum* to *De anima*, in other words, the passage from the knowledge of the world to knowledge about man living in the world; or, in the CJCC’s sequential way, spiritual life, its causes, and reasons (*De anima*) and all of man’s achievements and diversity (*Parva naturalia*). Consequently, physics can explain the origin of the science of man or the science of the soul, meaning the knowledge of the self in the world. Finally, it is essential to study metaphysics, or even impose it, in order to surpass corruption and time (not, however, to surpass motion).

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2.7 Life, the Great World

Written according to the literary method of *Meteororum* but seeking “an explanation of certain conditions shared by all living beings, such as life and death, or in regard only to animals, such conditions as wakefulness, sleeping and breathing,” the *Parva naturalia* are an appendix to the volume on *De anima*. This relationship between the two works was discussed because of Paul of Venice’s (1369–1429) intention of reducing the *De anima* to the study of the living body. It is worth pointing out that, if the *De anima* follows the *Meteororum*, it is the definition of life, intrinsic to each form of life, that really matters. In that sense, the starting point is the vegetative state inherent to all living beings in general and the definition of life taken from the Aristotelian *De respiratione*. But the end point can only be the origin itself, which appears in every philosophical study concerning man and explains the greater relevance of the sensitive over the vegetative. Both vegetative and sensitive souls must be considered in a dual perspective—in common or separately—depending on their level in participating in life, which justifies that the vegetative soul (taken as separated from the rest) is not formally in the sensitive soul (taken as separated from the rest), the former differing from the latter in specie.

The importance of life is indisputable: defined by humidity and mainly by heat, the heart (which is compared to the sun) is considered its source, despite recent anatomical investigations, a few of them acknowledged by Góis. Moreover, all the living beings, even the herbs, are more noble by nature than the heavenly bodies. In the universe, life is superior to mere constituent animation of nature, and therefore it is nobler to move oneself than to be moved by someone else. (Only the living beings move themselves and have both a self-protection and self-preservation instinct: partially through food and partially through semen.)

There are four types of living beings, the result of four modes of life, captured by Aristotle’s definition of the soul—to vegetate, to feel, to move, and to think; however, only the last of these is characteristic of the human being. An expression of life, the soul does not operate without the body, and it cannot exist without it. Therefore, the soul is more perfect when within the body than without; it is worth underlining that the *CJCC* discuss the place of the soul in the human body more or less beyond the hylomorphic legacy of Aquinas. Two requisites must be fulfilled in order to attribute the condition of substantial form: (1) the form confers the substantial being, and (2) its union with matter constitutes an absolute unity (*unum quid*). According to the *CJCC*, some

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thinkers were wrong about the induction of the soul in the body as the result of childbirth. Actually, this process starts in the vegetative soul, goes to the sensitive one, and concludes with the intellective soul. Such a process always takes time (there is a discrepancy in time in what concerns the intellective soul in terms of gender) and presupposes the abolition of the previous states.

In a process of ascending complexity, there is a moment when the life of the spirit is attained: infused into the body, without any habit or species, the soul progressively acquires the habit of the science. This is the exact way Aristotle describes this process: namely first understanding the principles that have greater affinity with the light of the intellect; then the conclusions must be deduced, be it per se, for experience-sake, or by the work or the talent of a master. The operations of the soul can be immanent, as in the case of knowledge, or transitive or quasi-transitive, as in the case of motion, whether in the motion external to the soul, or whether in the motion of the soul (intellect and will). Reason plays a particular role in the motion of human beings, and imagination does the same with regard to all other animals. The animal spirits govern the movement of the members of the body, but not the freedom of reason.

As with the world, harmony is reflected in man's effective existence, something that can be described as "anthropological difference." The fabrica humani corporis was created by God, the true author of nature, by attributing a function to each part of the body. The result is a splendid harmony between the movements of the heart, of the arteries, and of breathing. However, Galen is not the only authority that the CJCJ refers to in order to perfect Aristotle’s thought. Citing Ambrose of Milan (337–97) and Marsilio Ficino (1433–99), Góis claims that the beauty of man’s body is an image (simulacrum) of the mind, such as the harmony between the body and soul (De generatione 2, c. 8). Starting from the motions of the will to the movements of the exterior members, harmony presides in all dimensions: the will servilely moves the external members without the intervention of sensitive desire; but, as regards the faculties of the soul, the will acts as a supreme agent. Perfection and beauty are mutually reciprocal; but if perfection refers to a complete order, beauty refers to the order itself, which, in the case of man (we must emphasize that Christ is the supreme beauty), appears first in his physical strength, second in the submission of the sensitive faculties to the will, and subsequently in the submission of the will to reason, and finally from the reason to natural law.

Therefore, the *scientia de anima*, rooted in physics and in necessity, points to the metaphysical dimension of separation where the perfection of the will, although required by nature, proclaims the culmination of the experience of freedom against necessity. I use the term "proclaim" because the human being is radically physical and only the resurrection of the body can fulfill nature.

2.8 *Man, the Microcosm*

The Cjcc’s physical exposition of the science of the soul culminates with the explanation of knowledge and motion, and the latter introduces us to ethics.\(^40\) In teaching the *De anima*, emphasis was given to the sensitive components of the soul and sensitive knowledge,\(^41\) which was largely studied in a dialogue with medicine,\(^42\) the role of the vision,\(^43\) or the problem of the activity of the senses.\(^44\) Attention has already been paid to the chapter on the rational soul,\(^45\) even within the framework of a dialogue with Lutheran Scholasticism.\(^46\) However, it should be emphasized that the human soul (i.e., man) embodies all forms of living beings in an eminent way.

The planet earth, home to the human being (dubbed *parvus mundus*), is where anthropology first appears in accord with the most traditional reasons from the Aristotelian geocentric model.\(^47\) The four elements correspond to

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\(^{40}\) Ibid.


\(^{42}\) Christoph Sander, “Medical Topics in the *De anima* Commentary of Coimbra (1598) and the Jesuits’ Attitude towards Medicine in Education and Natural Philosophy,” *Early Science and Medicine* 19 (2014): 76–101.


the same number of human humors: atrabilious, sanguinolent, pituitary, and bilious—and the respective temperaments: melancholic, sanguine, phlegmatic, and choleric.

Nature does nothing in vain; it does its best, hates the superfluous, and does not reject what is necessary. Nature is also fair, because it gives what belongs to each and every thing, not according to arithmetical equality (*aequaliter*), but according to geometric uniformity (*aequabiliter*). Its intelligent operation allows us to recognize the importance of Aristotelian final causality. It is also important to emphasize how the praise of order is supported in the CJCC by Saint Augustine (354–430) and Gregory Nazianzen (329–90); recommending beauty and stability, and connecting heaven and earth, the praise accentuates the teleological motive that fulfills and runs through nature, culminating in the supernatural state. It is man’s role to connect both dimensions, assuring the transcendence of nature. Therefore, the key to nature is below and beyond nature. Positioned on the horizon of time and eternity, and being the highest form or the last of the forms, the study of the rational soul can be carried out in three dimensions—in its essence, linked to the body, or out of the body—but only in the context of two sciences: natural philosophy for the first two dimensions and metaphysics for the third. After judgment day, the perfection and beauty of the elements will be brighter, and despite the fact that the qualities of the natural order have insurmountable limits, the qualities of supernatural order—such as grace and charity—can increase in this life.

The conception of man presented in *De anima* is based on the discussion of the Aristotelian definition of soul and on the notion of participation to which it adds the notion of separation. Aquinas’s notion of “subsistent substantial form” is read within an eclectic neo-Platonic frame, according to which man participates in reason through immateriality and spirituality, and at the same time emerges from the materiality of the earth (*De anima* 2, c. 2, exp. B). For this reason, man can be thought of as a “horizon between two worlds.” The soul's doctrine of the necessary bodily inflexion 48 explains one of the most central topics on human knowledge: man is given an opportunity to know himself in an indirect way by returning to the sensitive world; in such a process, imagination has an imperative role owing to its creative power; a power that crosses the boundaries between the sensitive and intellectual domains, and reveals a spiritualistic conception of thinking.49 The process by which the

soul attains self-awareness can be described as follows: the soul apprehends the things, whose species is initially understood by the senses (e.g., man's nature); then, through a reflective act, the soul understands it by attaining the faculty and the image that enabled the soul to achieve such an act. Finally, by discovering that the common image cannot be corporeal or even material, the soul reaches the conclusion that it is a spiritual potency and an incorporeal substance, and thus becomes aware of its participation in reason and intelligence (De anima 3, c. 8, 7).

3 Man and God

3.1 Ethics, Will, and Intellect

In a qualified sense, the absolute end exclusively concerns those beings that have an intellectual nature. Meanwhile, the importance of ethics is revealed by its dual utility: nobody can become a good philosopher without knowing moral philosophy; nobody can live well and be happy without knowing the difference between what is morally correct and what is not. This explains the expositive order of Ethics: it starts with the study of three metaphysical principles—good, end, and happiness—and proceeds with the study of human action; first, analyzing the fundamental principles of human action (will, intellect, and appetite); second, the goodness and badness of human actions; lastly comes the study of passions and virtues. Virtues are the object of a common approach in the CJCC, which also give space to prudence, the most important virtue, followed by a brief reference to justice, fortitude, and temperance. Besides Fonseca’s criticism of neo-Stoicism—which was based on the fact that Fonseca considered it as tightly connected to Lutheranism— the book on Ethics gives less importance to economics and politics. In a certain way, politics is recognized in the civil dimension of happiness that comprehends the possibility attributed to those who really use their minds to preserve and defend the public cause, instigated by the exercise of beneficence. A eudaimonist ethics with a theological basis is capable of explaining the Aristotelian contemplative definition of happiness, conceiving it as a style of life in harmony with the prescriptions and rules of a virtuous or right reason. According to the distinction between “man's acts” and “human acts,” the will is considered the most universal cause of motion in what concerns the faculties, while the intellect is the superior and nobler faculty. On De anima, the CJCC state that

50 Fonseca, Commentariorum, proem. i 4.
the will moves the intellect and the intellect leads the will. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the origin of freedom is in the intellect, even if the will is free to choose the good as its own object, producing it (by love) or giving it a certain order (by intellection). The CJCC’s discussion of the knowledge of human beings (as well as the circumstances that interfere in moral valorization of actions) acknowledges the tenacity of concepts, the demon’s incitement, or the role of organic dispositions, but also what is called a political domain of the will on the sensitive appetite. Since the last expression of human happiness can only be reached in the supernatural life, consisting of the intuitive contemplation of the divine nature, the CJCC again emphasize the importance of the intellect because it presents the object in a single perfect act. Despite that, the will is not totally indifferent with regard to human happiness. First, because the supernatural happiness cannot be only conceived as an intellexeative act (nor even as a single act of the will); second, because it is possible to reach a supernatural happiness in this mortal life, in both the speculative and practical dimensions. Molinism also had an influence on the CJCC, since the supernatural charity related to the blessed in the Gospel of Matthew appears as the highest expression of happiness, temporarily accessible to the human being.51 Before such a higher experience, man can access two other experiences: a naturally practical happiness, related to the virtue of prudence; and a naturally contemplative happiness, specific to the divine being and to immaterial beings, which belongs to a particular branch of metaphysics. It is thus possible to understand the reason why in 1561 Father Jerónimo Nadal (1507–80), writing to his brothers at Coimbra, had recommended an active life together with the contemplative one, in order to “seek charity and the union with God.” Nadal placed more emphasis on the importance of the capacity of embracing the acts of will and affection than understanding acts.52

3.2 Metaphysics and Theology

As noted above, the CJCC only has one title clearly dedicated to metaphysics, the Treaty on the Separated Soul. This appendix, written by Baltasar Álvarez to De anima, was nevertheless explicitly requested by Góis, and we know that both Góis and Couto intended to comment on Metaphysica. Besides Álvarez’s Treaty, it is possible to find metaphysical doctrines that are consistently held throughout the volumes of the CJCC: (1) the “being qua being” is the adequate subject of metaphysics; (2) God is its supreme subject; (3) creatures, subordinated to the being, are its partial subject. Couto also mentions

52 José Sebastião da Silva Dias, Correntes de sentimento religioso em Portugal (séculos XVI a XVIII) (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras, 1960), 643, 647 respectively.
a supernatural metaphysics, a knowledge that considers the dependency of the essence of things by reference to the first creative, final, and exemplar cause. Góis uses the expression “divine philosophy” to designate the contemplation of things that transcend nature, where human intelligence can reach the contemplative apex. The CJCC occasionally use the term theology rather than metaphysics, without confusing revealed theology and natural theology, the latter belonging to metaphysics. According to Góis, a formal distinction differentiates natural theology from revealed or biblical theology. Couto’s distinction is instead based on the respective light of the two kinds of knowledge.

After discussing the immortality of the soul, Álvarez’s studies the soul’s way of being out of the body and the soul’s operations of knowledge and motion. Despite only being referred to once in the CJCC, the well-known study of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) clearly had an influence on the Treatise. Álvarez strives to demonstrate that Aristotle was convinced of the immortality of the individual soul. Actually, his insistence on the rationality of such proof is also dependent on the Council of Trent’s (1545–63) exigencies. The immateriality of the soul imposes the separation, a theological topic with epistemological relevance, based on the idea that the separation of the soul makes the intellect more expeditious and perceptive, and the will much more ardent and evident. The rational soul has three prerogatives: instilled by God, without matter, and therefore extrinsic; originated in God’s innermost; a high spiritual condition, immune to any relation with matter, thus non-dependent on the support of the imagination, and being the only form able to receive spiritual activities. Álvarez’s work underlines the soul’s ability to reach right and evident self-awareness, clearly knowing the infused species and knowing the acquired species even more distinctively than had been the case during the soul’s historical life. The evidence that characterizes the state of the separated soul is perceived through: (1) the ability of knowing all the sensibles; (2) a distinct knowledge of itself and of other souls; and (3) the ability to know in a natural form all the possible things that exist in God. Besides the idea of progress in separated knowledge, the divide between Thomism and Scotism is surpassed thanks to a third modern thesis, influenced by St. Augustine, that seems to extend the “middle science” to the realm of the separated knowledge.

Since our theology is not apparent, because it depends on the dispositions of the Catholic faith, which intrinsically are not predisposed to evidence, faith in the biblical God requires an interdisciplinary approach involving physics,

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metaphysics, and obviously theology. First, the CJCC sustain the possibility of reaching the knowledge of God through causality (Physica 8), which achieves the first cause or first Mover, as allegedly proved by Aristotle. Second, the CJCC claim that the knowledge and contemplation of God must be satisfied by a metaphysical argumentation (Metaphysica 12, 7), where Aristotle reached the wider meaning of motion, comprising spiritual motions; allegedly, Aristotle foresaw the first Mover that acts according to a known and loved purpose. Finally, following Pseudo-Dionysius’s doctrine on the three ways of knowing, the separated soul can get to know God. Also according to this “prince of theology,” it is possible to know the infinite perfection of the divine nature, either by removing from God the non-absolute perfections, or affirming his absolute perfection, in a superlative way. The love for God is simultaneously an honest, useful, and pleasant action that can be permeated by pleasure and the mind's delight, allowing us access to the perfect happiness, to God himself. The greatest misfortune (summa miseria) is being distant by the eternal death from the supreme good and the true source of life—God: he who has created not only the heaven that man can see but also a new heaven and a new earth, a heavenly and happy city enlightened by divine clarity.

4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to provide a systematic presentation of Góis’s philosophical thought. Although he was the main author behind the CJCC, the chapter also discussed Couto’s and Álvarez’s contributions, given the important role they played in establishing the Jesuit philosophy course. Góis’s contributions marked the beginning of an organic exposition of the philosophical science. One of the most remarkable aspects of the Coimbra course is the clear emergence of a Jesuit Aristotelianism, and the ways in which the fundamentals of the Ignatian outlook inevitably modified Aristotle. Scotist philosophy and neo-Platonism also played a role in Góis’s transformation of Aristotle. This chapter has highlighted some of the elements that would benefit from further study in order to gain a better understanding of Góis’s philosophical contribution in Coimbra, and hence to the definition of an early modern Jesuit philosophy.

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