



Brunna Santana Bonfatti Pereira

Reshaping Wars and Borders - Conflict in the time of the All-Seeing eye.

Julho 2018



UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA



• U • C •

FEUC

FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA
UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA

Brunna Santana Bonfatti Pereira

Reshaping Wars and Borders – Conflict in the time of the All-seeing eye.

International Relations M.A

Coimbra

2017/2018

André Filipe de Carvalho Barrinha, P.h.D

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Professor André Barrinha, my advisor, for his guidance and, mostly, for his patience. I would also like to thank Professors Dario Battistella, Teresa Cravo, Patrick Zimmermann, Sofia José Santos and José Manuel Pureza, without whom I could not have finished this work.

Finally, I must express my profound gratitude to all my friends, family members and coworkers, who have dutifully listened to my ramblings on this subject for three years and not once complained.

Abstract

This dissertation attempts to examine the United States' administration policy for the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, commonly known as drones, under the Authorization for Use of Military Force, as a tool to carry on its counterterrorism policy in remote areas of the globe. This research examines how modern warfare technology advancements have deeply affected conflict-waging and how the territorial dimension of war seems to be increasingly disregarded, creating a situation of constant consciousness of permanent vulnerability amongst affected groups.

Studying the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan, this dissertation attempts to illustrate how profiling processes and exclusionary measures can deeply impact groups living thousands of miles away from where UAV attacks are planned and how such attacks contribute to the gradual disappearance of the Afghan-Pakistani border, as the Pakistani state has purposefully allowed a certain porosity of its border with Afghanistan due to its Islamisation policy of the region. The physical integrity of the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, specifically the North and South Waziristan regions, have been threatened by economical, ethnic and religious tensions, which are furthered by the menace of UAVs' all-seeing eyes.

List of Acronyms

AUMF – Authorization for Use of Military Force.

CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear.

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency.

CIVCAS – Civilian Casualties.

EBO – Effects Based Operation.

EKIA – Enemy Killed in Action.

FATA – Federally Administrated Tribal Areas.

FMV – Full Motion Video Analysts.

HVI – High Value Individual.

IHL – International Humanitarian Law.

ITC – Intelligence Tactical Coordinator.

JSOC – Joint Special Operations Command.

MAM – Military Aged Male.

NCW – Network Centric Warfare.

PID – Positive Identification.

PMC – Private Military Companies.

UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

UCAV – Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles.

USAF – United States Air Force.

Index

| | |
|--|----|
| Introduction | 2 |
| I. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles | 6 |
| 1.1 The Low constant humming sound..... | 7 |
| 1.2 Theoretical Framework..... | 12 |
| II. Redefining War | 20 |
| 2.1 Civilians versus Enemies..... | 24 |
| 2.2 The Chair Force..... | 28 |
| 2.3 Perpetual War..... | 33 |
| III. The Federally administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan | 36 |
| 3.1 The Pashtuns..... | 41 |
| 3.2 Islamabad's policy of Talibanization..... | 44 |
| 3.3 The Problem of Waziristan..... | 47 |
| 3.4 The disappearance of borders in the FATA..... | 52 |
| Conclusion | 56 |

Unseen Fire

This is a damned inhuman sort of war
I have been fighting in a dressing-gown most of the night
I cannot see the guns
The sweating gun detachments or the planes

I sweat down here before a symbol thrown
Upon a screen, sift facts initiate
Swift calculations and swift orders wait
For the precise split second to order fire

We chant our ritual words, beyond the phones
A ghost repeats the orders to the gun
One fire...two fire...ghosts answer, the guns roar
Abruptly; and an air craft waging war

Inhumanly, from the nearly five-mile height
Meets
Our bouquet of death – and turns sharp right.

R.N Currey

Introduction

One of the most prominent developments made possible by the twentieth century's technological advancements is a vastly increased capability to act at a distance. By the end of World War II, many had already begun to suspect that technology would eventually subvert war as a human experience (Coker, 2004: 87).

After the 9/11 events, and the subsequent rise of *securitarian* hysteria (Bauman and Lyon, 2013), the first few years of the new millennia were marked by the employment of easier and cleaner war tactics. This dissertation will attempt to address how the United States' policy for employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, in specific areas of the globe, can effectively illustrate how such technological advancements have a deeper, social and political, impact, and are fundamentally changing how conflict is waged and how conflict is perceived.

Surveillance cannot be considered a modern invention. How surveillance tactics have evolved, however, have fundamentally changed over the last few years and such changes have affect both Westerners and 'Others' alike. As Zygmunt Bauman explains, the issues of anonymity, privacy and confidentiality have also arisen in modern, liberal democracies. Such issues are often related to the advent of social media and its invasion of our most personal data. Social media, however, is not compulsory. In other words, the choice to share private information is ultimately in the users' hands. On the other hand, for certain groups labelled 'undesired' at best, 'threatening' at worst, no such choice is available: "*Panopticon*-like practices are limited to sites for humans booked to the debit-side, declared useless, fully and truly excluded" (Bauman and Lyon, 2013: 52).

It is believed that 40 or more countries are currently developing military unmanned systems (Kreps and Kaag, 2012: 5) and "in the last decade, this practice increased its geographic scope, including countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen" (Barrinha and Mota, 2016: 3). Studying this new type of warfare technology presents itself as a pressing matter, given the amplitude of the unknown, albeit presumable, consequences of its utilization. Our vision is increasingly mediated by, and through, technology. As such, examining how technology impacts conflict, on both ends,

is undoubtedly necessary for a better understanding of warfare today. Even more so if the speed of technological advancement is considered: “If it works, it is already obsolete” (Coker, 2004: 91). As this dissertation will argue, the technology behind Unmanned Aerial Vehicles has evolved remarkably fast and, as of today, a simple search through Amazon may allow us to find a selection of user-friendly drones equipped with facial recognition and ‘auto-follow’, a device that allows, through facial and body detection technology, a drone to accompany you hands-free. As Bauman would point out, for Westerners, such a device would simply allow the sharing of aerial pictures and videos through social media and other platforms. ‘Auto-follow’, however, may also have other, gloomier, consequences if used for other purposes.

As Cristopher Coker (2004) explains, the traditional split between man and machine, and man and nature, is disappearing. This dissertation aims to study this phenomenon and, furthermore, how geographical borders that usually define the battlefield are also gradually being erased. As Coker points out, war jargon speaks today of a battlespace, replacing the battlefield. It is plausible to argue that modern warfare technology has the potential to impact numerous aspects regarding conflict-waging, from how combatants are trained, how they work, to how conflict is perceived and, perhaps most importantly, where such conflicts are waged.

As such, this research was structured to examine the following question:

How is the American policy for the employment of UAV’s on the field fundamentally altering conflict-waging and contributing to the disappearance of borders on the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan?

Regarding its methodology, this dissertation will adopt the Poststructuralist approach to study the relationship between modern warfare, man, state-borders and technology that can, and often do, disrespect the existence of these borders. (Newman & Paasi, 1998).

To do so, this work will also borrow from Zygmunt Bauman’s conceptualization of Liquid Modernity (2000) and apply his understanding of ‘Liquids’ and ‘Liquefaction’ processes regarding the fluidity of borders in specific areas that are currently under the

constant vigilance of modern warfare technology. Those borders are, like the liquids described by Bauman, no longer fixed in time and space.

Moreover, this dissertation shall also rely on the perspective put forth by Grégoire Chamayou in his 2013 book *Théorie du Drone*. According to Chamayou, the redefinition of traditional zones of conflict, or warzones, and the disrespect of state borders potentially transforms conflict areas in “constant hunting grounds”, where time and space are undefined and, at the same time, crucial to the establishment of power relationships within those conflicts.

Adopting a post-structuralist approach to understand the phenomenon and the American policy for the employment of UAVs, this research aims, in its first chapter to analyze how Bauman’s notion of liquid modernity frames his conceptualization of liquid surveillance and how the Panopticon metaphor, theorized by Michel Foucault, from Jeremy Bentham’s project of moral architecture, connects to the issues brought to light by warfare technological advancements such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

Historically, the advent of UAV’s can be traced far back to American-Soviet confrontation and according to Coker (2004) synthetic vision, i.e. computer mediated, has a much longer history than imagined, dating back to the first military telescope used by Maurice de Nassau in 1609; The employment of such techniques in the form of UAVs, however, became frequent, and increasingly apparent, after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror. In May 2013, the United States’ president, Barack Obama, addressed, on a rare public admission of the American employment of UAVs on counter-terrorism operations¹. The underlying and ever-present idea of ‘saving lives’, as the president states so himself, has become an American fixation, and justification, for continuous UAV strikes.

As the second chapter attempts to explain, this new form of warfare represents a great change in the landscape of conflict-waging and military strategy. The U.S has, through the Authorization for Use of Military Force, been able to employ armed force against any

¹ “President Obama address the Use of Drones”, available through: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1tz9XiqqMQ>

entities perceived as threatening, and UAVs present themselves as the perfect enablers to this new one-sided *nanowars* (Rogers and Hill, 2014) waged by the US administration. In fact, since taking office, former president Barack Obama heavily relied on precision strikes as a counterterrorism tool (Barrinha and da Vinha, 2015:21). The second chapter of this dissertation will also endeavor to analyze the tangible impact that springs from the utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in areas of conflict, turning the world as we know in a *Constant Hunting Ground* (Chamayou, 2014). Furthermore, this chapter will also briefly look into how combatants themselves are deeply affected by long-distance killing, or the PlayStation mentality (Vallor, 2013).

The third and final chapter aims to study the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan – FATA – and how profiling processes and exclusionary measures can deeply impact minority groups living thousands of miles away from where UAV attacks are planned, orchestrated and operated and how such processes may have a counterproductive effect insofar as they fuel the vicious-circle of radicalization within such groups. Finally, this dissertation aims to analyze the gradual disappearance of borders between the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as State borders are often overlooked in drone operated strikes.

The issue of Pakistani-Afghani borders is one of great complexity, as several different factors must be considered in this equation: Islamabad's confusing policy towards Kabul and the ever-present Durand Line divide issue, the strength of the major ethnic-linguistic group inhabiting the area, the Pashtuns, and, ultimately, the constant vigilance and strikes perpetrated by the U.S, authorized by Islamabad, and to which the Pashtuns are subjected. The region, its population, and its physical integrity, is greatly put at risk, a fact that both Islamabad and Washington seem to overlook.

This seems to be a dystopia made to the measure of liquid modernity – one fit to replace the fears recorded in Orwellian and Huxelyan nightmares.
Zygmunt Bauman in *On Being Light and Liquid*

First Chapter – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

The first chapter of this dissertation will briefly present Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and their conception, to allow a better understanding of the mindset that cleared the path for such warfare technological advancements.

Subsequently, we shall analyze the theoretical framework that will structure the analysis of the tangible impact, and consequences, of UAV strikes on the battlespace of the War on Terror.

1.1 The continuous low humming sound

The term ‘drone’ was coined in 1936 by a pair of naval scientists (Cockburn, 2014: 136), after analyzing the names of several birds and insects, and finally settling on the reference to male drone bees, that, unlike worker bees, do not gather pollen and are the only male bees in the colony. The most common definition of the term drone is a ‘continuous low, humming sound’, like the sound produced by the bees whose name UAV’s borrowed from.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAV’s, are now a central piece of contemporary warfare, but their genesis can be retraced further back to Nikola Tesla’s 1898 invention of the radio-control system, as their systems are connected from a satellite to a ground station, from where they are remotely controlled. As UAV’s are remotely piloted, their very construction makes them more effective: with no pilot, the aircraft does not need a cockpit, thus allowing more weight to be carried in fuel or equipment. Drones are

therefore able to fly more hours and are more persistent, as there are no human needs to be considered. Drones need not to eat, sleep, or rest. Per Andrew Cockburn:

Remotely piloted aircrafts had been a topic of military interest ever since World War I, when a prototype radio-controlled biplane designed to attack enemy trenches had been tested and discarded for lack of accuracy and reliability, not to mention frequent crashes. (Cockburn, 2014: 54)

The first drone remotely similar to the technology the world is familiar with today became operational in 1962, during the Cold War, and was known as the ‘Lightening Bug’. Although drone technology was not seen, at the time, as a viable type of warfare technology, UAVs developed slowly but surely. During the Cuba missile crisis came another push, when USAF major Rudolf Anderson was killed by Cuban fire, resulting in the only death of the crisis (Rogers and Hill, 2014). Only then US officials opened the path to unmanned aircrafts that allowed reconnaissance missions without lethal risks.

With the advent of the Lightening Bug, The USAF had then successfully managed to operate a hands-free device that allowed the military to observe, or spy, on enemy territory, and enemies themselves, with no potential risks. Not only pilots were spared of dangerous flights but also diplomatic faux pas were avoided. Additionally, even when enemy governments captured unmanned aircrafts, the issue was rarely made public as the aircraft’s origin could not possibly be retraced and, even if retraced, their origin could always be denied. Finally, the very admission of a foreign aircraft trespassing national territory without permission would be an admittance of incompetence for the government in question.

In other words, drones provided a win-win situation for their operators:

The Cold war events also indicate that UAVs offer both a political and military solution. If a UAV crashes or is brought down while trespassing in sovereign airspace, it is much less significant diplomatically, and in domestic politics, than if a pilot is involved. (Rogers and Hill, 2014:28).

Such situations also show a certain bias regarding UAVs: as there is no human presence, governments do not necessarily feel as though their sovereignty is being disrespected, a subject which we will later further analyze. For a better understanding of where and how drones work, authors Rogers and Hill have summarized their missions as the *4 Ds*, defined as it follows:

Dull tasks include low intensity, time-consuming activities, such as persistent surveillance. Dirty tasks, those undertaken in environments hostile to human health, which would include chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) type missions. Dangerous tasks are missions where the relationship between importance and risk to personnel does not justify putting human operators in danger and, finally, Deep tasks, where missions carried out a long way inside enemy territory.

The company General Atomics manufactured the US Predator, which would later become a 'Poster-Drone' for the USAF, in 1994, adding cloud-penetrating 'Synthetic Aperture Radar', and, for the first time, the aircraft could use GPS positioning along with commercial satellite links. In other words, the Predator was the first of its class to function as the drones the world would come to know years later.



U.S AIR FORCE (2012) *A Predator Drone in US Air Force base in 2011's summer*. [photography]
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Predator_Drone_021.jpg?uselang=pt [May 15th 2017]

The key-moment on the evolution from drone-surveillance to drone-weaponizing came four years later of the birth of the Predator, in 1998, under the presidency of Bill Clinton, when the White House began to search for Al Qaeda's leader, Bin Laden. By that time, the company Big Safari, another drone manufacturer, started to work on equipping the Predator with the Hellfire AGM-114, a missile that had previously been used to arm the Seahawk Helicopter, the AH 64A Apache Helicopter, and others. The United States had then learned that UAVs could be useful for far more than simple reconnaissance missions:

From the start the arming of Predator was to do with the hunting and executing individuals in territories with which the US was not at war, and in which the hunter had no jurisdiction. (Rogers and Hill, 2014:36).

The advantageous characteristics that make UAVs the weapon of choice for the USAF must also be addressed. Regarding limiting expenditures, author Grégoire Chamayou states that, although it is not possible to confirm the exact production/retail price of the aircrafts, it is plausible to consider that one of the first advantages related to the use of UAVs is their general smaller cost, when compared to the deployment of troops or fighter jets.

Rogers and Hill agree, as they admit that, although UAVs may be expensive per unit, they offer a unique opportunity to lower overall cost during conflict, if compared to the deployment of troops. Cost is a very important point, as it can easily be turned into a convincing ploy in favor of the acquisition of drones in Western countries, whose populations grow increasingly resentful of high military expenditure, deduced of taxpayers' money.

As previously mentioned, UAVs offer a whole new level of strength when in conflict. The 4-D types of mission clarify that drones are usually employed to perform work that human beings cannot, or would not, accomplish, as satisfyingly. "In a time of endless conflicts, the UAVs patience makes it particularly valuable" (Rogers and Hill, 2014:44).

Finally, UAVs spare combatants' lives. The design of UAVs is thought and constructed

to favor the waging of long-distance conflicts without the need of human intervention on the scene. As Barack Obama explains in a speech from May 2013, these attacks save lives: the lives of the combatants and soldiers who have been spared of conflict and did not need to endanger their lives to protect their country. Additionally, insofar as they are more precise, they are also supposed to save more civilians lives, as they are believed to enable only the deaths of those recognized as enemies. Also, as put forward by Jean Baptiste-Vilmer, as combatants are safely removed from conflict zones, fear, and misconceived decisions triggered by fear, are avoided, since controllers are protected by a safe environment in which they can calmly decide what to do next (Vilmer, 2013). Additionally, as drone strikes are recorded, recording allows controllers to re-watch strikes and further improve their techniques.

This perspective, as Grégoire Chamayou explains, all but converts UAVs into a humanitarian weapon, as it saves civilians from the violence of the conflict that is perpetrated by war wagers. In other words, in Western discourse, drones are a lesser evil, as they minimize the violence to which civilians in attacked areas are subjected to.

However, and although their persistence is undeniable, UAVs' precision can be questioned. Drones can indeed be more precise but their precision efficiency rate depends on what kind of warfare compared they are compared to. UAVs tend to automatically be compared to military airplanes that have preceded it, however, as Chamayou (2014) aptly explains, this scale of comparison is wrong. When it came the time to choose the means to kill Bin Laden, for instance, the choice was between an armed UAV and a tactical force on ground (or a special force) - not between a drone and aerial bombs. The fact that drones engage in aerial warfare does not automatically mean UAV's server the same purpose as aerial warfare. Their design, nonetheless, creates this confusion.

Furthermore, while it is true that UAVs surveillance gear allows controllers to distinguish targets, it does not enable them to recognize the victims, or enemies, themselves. In other words, even if facial recognition technology is available, it is hardly foolproof. In practice, this translates to a simple choice between who represents a threat and who does not, as it will be further analyze on the second chapter of this dissertation.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

Post structuralism, as a philosophical current and movement, came to light during the 1970's, most famously under the writings of French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. It is essential to clarify, nonetheless, that Poststructuralism, as the Marxist, Feminist and Postcolonial approaches, is a broad intellectual movement, as defined by author Olivier Daddow (2013), trespassing, per se, International Relations as a discipline. To classify Poststructuralism as a cohesive, unified, theory is also problematic. To state it briefly, Post structuralism examines the 'How?' as opposed to 'What?': As David Campbell (2013) explains, Poststructuralism is, above all, a critical approach as opposed to a descriptive or explanatory theory.

Rather than setting out a paradigm through which everything is understood, poststructuralism is a critical attitude, approach, or ethos that calls attention to the importance of representation, the relationship of power and knowledge, and the politics of identity in an understanding of global affairs. (Campbell, 2013: 225).

Poststructuralism was first introduced to the IR discipline in the 1980's, through the contributions of Der Derian and Shappiro (Daddow, 2013), whose analyses questioned the supremacy of the Realist and Liberal theories in the study of International Relations. The 'first' Poststructuralists considered, quite simply, that the traditional frameworks largely marginalize the role of non-state actors and their importance. Poststructuralism had then set out to study the constructions, conceptions and interpretations of the essential concepts the analysis of IR. Per David Campbell:

Poststructuralism began by questioning how the state came to be regarded as the most important actor in world politics (...) This approach is not anti-state, it does not overlook the state, nor does it seek to move beyond the state. In many respects, poststructuralism pays more attention to the state than realism, because instead of merely asserting that the state is the foundation of its paradigm, poststructuralism is concerned with the state's historical and conceptual production, and its political formation, economic constitution and social exclusions. (Campbell, 2013: 226).

This dissertation will adopt the Poststructuralist critical approach to study the newly-established, delicate relationship between modern warfare, man, state-borders and technology that can, and often do, disrespect the existence of these borders. The discussion on the topic of the disappearance of borders (Newman & Paasi, 1998) presents several components as the proponents of the gradual evaporation of state borders as we have known them: the free market economy, technology, labor mobility – all of those causes and consequences to the process of Globalization. This study, however, aims not only to examine the ‘What’ but in what way – How – unmanned aerial vehicles, and furthermore, the idea behind their conception and construction, deepens, even further, such processes of border erasure.

To do so, this work will also borrow from Zygmunt Bauman’s conceptualization of Liquid Modernity (2000) and apply his understanding of ‘Liquids’ and ‘Liquefaction’ processes regarding the fluidity of borders in specific areas that are currently under the constant vigilance of modern warfare technology. Those borders are, like the liquids described by Bauman, no longer fixed in time and space.

Moreover, this dissertation shall also rely on the perspective put forth by Grégoire Chamayou in his 2013 book *Théorie du Drone*. Per Chamayou, the redefinition of traditional zones of conflict, or warzones, and the disrespect of state borders potentially transforms conflict areas in “constant hunting grounds”, where time and space are undefined and, at the same time, crucial to the establishment of power relationships within those conflicts. The analysis proposed by Chamayou also borrows from Bauman:

For all practical purposes, power has become truly exterritorial, no longer bound, not even slowed down, by the resistance of space. This gives the power holders a truly unprecedented opportunity: the awkward and irritating aspects of the panoptical technique of power may be dispersed of. (Bauman, 2000:11).

The technique to which Bauman connects the utilization of drones to Jeremy Bentham's conception of the Panopticon², as a penal reform concept, and later analyzed by Foucault in *Surveiller et Punir*:

Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power, even if discontinuous in its actions, that the perfection of power should tender to render its actual exercise unnecessary. (Foucault, 1998: 195).

UAV's work under the exact same premise, that of creating a situation of perpetual apprehension over the areas under attack. As Foucault explains, the Panopticon works as a machine that dissociates seeing from being seen: "In the periphery ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything, without ever being seen" (Foucault, 1998: 228).

Although the Panopticon refers to a specific type of architecture, conceived to allow constant vigilance, Foucault defines it as a machine, as the one this dissertation attempts to analyze.

Bauman explores two particularly interesting cases for this study. The Gulf and Yugoslavian Wars:

The reluctance to deploy ground-forces in the conduct of war was striking (...) that reluctance was dictated not only by the widely publicized body bag syndrome (...) but also (perhaps mainly) for its total uselessness and even counter productivity as far as the goals of the war were concerned. (Bauman, 2000:13).

As Bauman explains, the purposes of both conflicts did not, necessarily, involve territorial conquests – this was effectively avoided in some cases. With no boots on the ground, by

² In Bentham's work the Panopticon is conceptualized as a specific type of building, that serves as a prison, constructed to allow watchers to oversee inmates at all times.

using aerial vehicles equipped with targeting missiles, this military strategy reveals a profound change of the purposes of conflict:

Not the conquest of physical territories, but crushing the walls which stopped the flow of the new (...) war today, one may say (paraphrasing Clausewitz's famous formula), looks increasingly like a promotion of global free-trade by other means. (Bauman, 2000: 13).

It is undeniable that UAV attacks are effectively restructuring the perception of borders as a state's first and foremost proclamation of sovereignty. Within this framework, this dissertation must also analyze matters regarding space and territoriality in further detail, in what concerns state borders – the physical, legal and symbolic representation of state sovereignty. To do so, this work shall also employ the analysis proposed by authors David Newman and Anssi Paasi in their work *Fences and neighbors in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography*, by examining the subject under the Critical Geopolitics perspective and its relationship with International Relations as a discipline.

Boundaries have constituted a major topic in the tradition of political geography. Typically, they have been analyzed at the scale of the state, since international borders provide one of the most explicit manifestations of the large-scale connection between politics and geography. (Newman & Paasi, 1998: 186).

Borders, as the defining contours that constitute the State, are also a crucial topic in the study of International Relations and an essential concept to the Realist tradition, hegemonic in the study of the discipline until the 1990's. However, as Ashley explains, the Poststructuralist currents challenged such state-centric perspectives, as they understood borders as the product of constant imbrications and overlapping of material and social phenomena:

Displacing the state, Poststructuralism puts this boundary in doubt. The boundary itself is never simply there, Poststructuralism knows. It is always in the process of being marked, transgressed, erased and marked again. The questions to be asked are not ‘Where is the boundary? What marks the boundary?’ (...) Instead, the sort of question to be asked is a how question. How, by way of what practices, by appeal to what cultural resources, and in the face of what resistances in this boundary imposed and ritualized. (Ashley *apud* Newman and Paasi, 1998: 195).

It is precisely in this sense that this dissertation will discuss the relationship between borders and the practices that have the potential to create and impose, but also erase them. One observation made by former Israeli Prime-Minister Shimon Peres (perhaps as an auto-critic) aptly illustrates the situation:

In a world of ballistic missiles, which can accurately pinpoint their target from distances of thousands of miles, there is no longer any significance in the existence of localized boundaries. (Peres *apud* Newman and Paasi, 1998: 192).

The ballistic missiles Peres refers to are, today, replaced by the unmanned aerial technology, that highlight even further the potential uselessness of localized boundaries. Borders, a human construct, mark the space that separates ‘Us’ from the ‘Others’.

For the purposes of this work, the case study shall examine the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan, where the ethno-regional Pashtuns, who have historically claimed for a territory of their own, a *Pashtunistan*, have been largely left in control of the region, considering the Federal State of Pakistan was unable to successfully exercise control over the area, and its authority was questioned when confronted with the *jirga*. The continuous surveillance imposed by the American controlled aerial warfare over the region has had an impact of its own over the Pashtuns, fueling the identity-politics preached by the Taliban. The Pashtuns grow increasingly resentful of Islamabad’s complacency and increasingly suspicious of the government, questioning the territorial restrictions imposed by the Durand line, which separate Afghani and Paki Pashtuns.

Time and space are central concepts for the understanding of the use of drones. Christian Enemark (2016), considers that, if the attacks perpetrated by UAV's are regarded as acts of war, regular criminal justice and International Law conventions on Human Rights cannot, as such, be applied as a means of regulation. On the other hand, if seen as acts of law enforcement, the Just War theory of the 'Jus Ad Bellum' principle cannot be applied as a legitimate justification, for, accordingly to the Just War theory, a series of principles must be respected for that War acts are considered as morally acceptable.

As such, 'Just War' must have 'justifiable' causes – under the principle of Jus Ad Bellum, and certain procedural rules must be met, per 'Jus in Bello'.

Attempting to analyze the attacks perpetrated by UAVs under the light of the Just War can be particularly useful, seeing as the War on Terror is a preventive war, as those which the Just War theory endeavors to frame. Regarding the 'Jus Ad Bellum' principle, the United Nations charter recognizes the use of armed force in two cases, and two cases only: in defense of a third member state or in self-defense against an attack. Regarding 'just conduct', which tends to regulate, and limit, the resource to physical violence, forbidding the use of certain war technologies, such as chemical weapons. The utilization of UAVs , given their nature and specific characteristics, can also be analyzed through this principle, per Rogers and Hill:

Just Conduct governs the way force is applied, and finds its legal expression through international humanitarian law, particularly in the Geneva Conventions, as well as associated laws, conventions and treaties. Just Conduct seeks to limit the means of warfare, for example, by restricting certain technologies through treaties (...) and so speaks to the specific nature of what drones are permitted to do in the military theatre. (Rogers and Hill, 2014: 103).

As Enemark (2016) explains:

Since the War on Terror began, the language of the U.S government has often contained mixed messages regarding the moral status of America's use of force, with the result that it has variously take on the appearance

of war, law-enforcement, or some exotic mixture of the two. (Enemark, 2016: 369).

As such, it can be concluded that an effective categorization of the utilization of UAVs in the context of the War on Terror is substantially difficult. The American Administration uses, purposefully, a dubious discourse in its description of their UAV utilization police, especially when it comes to their justification: words as justice, moral, effectiveness and security form a confusing lexicon, used on the rare instances in which the White House chooses to dignify the public with an answer on the matter. The justifications regarding the lethal use of drones are, ultimately, given through numbers that attest their effectiveness, a purported imprecision that amalgams what is 'just' to what is 'effective'.

Still, it is even harder to categorize UAV strikes as mere acts of law enforcement. Firstly, and according to Enemark, because there is no effective criminal legislation that allows, internationally, one state to pursue an individual, national and resident of another state.

Secondly, and considering the American position, of victim (of possible terrorist attacks), judge and executor (of UAV strikes), the United States do not possess the necessary impartiality that is required in normal procedures of law enforcement. Furthermore, it is additionally difficult to consider UAV strikes as proceedings of law enforcement considering that it is not possible to appoint a defendant, or a suspect, as it would happen in normal procedures of law enforcement.

It is necessary to point out that, if such attacks are considered as law enforcement procedures, it must also be assumed that the actions of the state which orders the attacks are based on the notion of criminal culpability, which implies that the conventions that regulate the treating of criminals, such as Human Rights international treaties, must be respected. There is then, a legal void that does not allow, entirely, to conceptualize and categorize drone strikes satisfyingly and, as Enemark explains: "Such framing purportedly enables the U.S to avail itself of the moral permissions that are traditionally afforded to war fighters" (Enemark, 2016:370).

John Williams, in his article *Distant Intimacy: Space, Drones and Just War*, also examines such changes in the framing of war:

The concept of battlespace is now ubiquitous in military discourse, replacing the two-dimensional battlefield with a self-consciously four-dimensional concept, adding time and depth. (Williams, 2015:116).

Second Chapter – Redefining War.

Gates then moved on to a more upbeat topic. When first he arrived at the Pentagon in 2007, he said, he had found deep-rooted resistance to new technology among “flyboys with silk scarves”. But all that, he informed his rapt audience, had changed (...) So from now on, he concluded, his voice rising, “The Watchword is Drones, baby, Drones!”

Andrew Cockburn *in* Kill Chain

The second chapter of this dissertation aims to analyze the tangible impact, and consequences, that result from the utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in areas of conflict. To do so, this chapter will be divided into two different levels of analysis: firstly, on the study of how UAVs are effectively restructuring War, and what it means to be at War, relying upon the argument put forth by author Grégoire Chamayou in his book *Théorie du Drone*. His conceptualization of the world as a ‘Constant Hunting Ground’ will be essential to the purposes of this work. Secondly, this chapter intends to succinctly examine how UAVs are restructuring the debate on the distinction between Civilians and Combatants, one that springs from International Humanitarian Law and is, today, being actively questioned by modern warfare technology.

The second and third chapters of this work shall examine how borders, are actively being challenged and, in some cases, disregarded, as a direct outcome of UAV attacks in specific areas of the globe. The next chapter will attempt to study such areas, as it is the case of the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan, specifically the North and South Waziristan regions.

As established throughout the introduction and first chapter of this work, the 9/11 attacks have forever changed how and why conflicts are waged, considering war is no longer necessarily geographical. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are the perfect enablers of this new form of conflict-waging. Shortly after the World Trade Center attacks, the United States congress passed, on the 13th of September, with an overwhelming majority, the Authorization of Use of Military Force:

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States(...)

Section 1 – Short Title

This joint resolution may be cited as the 'Authorization for Use of Military Force'.

Section 2 – Authorization For Use of United States Armed Forces

IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001)

The approved text essentially gives the United States' President the power to use all necessary means, and force, against nations, institutions or individuals (Rogers and Hill, 2014: 92), meaning the US president has the power to use armed force, and perpetrate attacks, against any country, entity or individual seen as a threat. Rogers and Hill aptly conceptualize this as a *nanowar*, that is, a full-on war, considering the effects of the attacks, in an extremely reduced scale, as targets have deeply changed.

Although the United States is not formally at war with Pakistan, Afghanistan or Yemen, these countries constitute the primary targets of drone strikes since 2008, that have dramatically increased after 2010, under the Obama administration, who, ironically, had run an almost antiwar campaign in the 2008 elections: “Aides said Mr. Obama liked the idea of picking off dangerous terrorists a few at a time, without endangering American lives or risking the years long bloodshed of conventional war.”(Shane, 2015).

The US is, however, waging a war against Terrorism, its operatives and cellules, wherever they may be located. As author Grégoire Chamayou puts it:

Avec le concept de ‘guerre globale contre la terreur’, la violence armée a perdu ses bornes traditionnelles: indéfinie dans le temps, elle l’est aussi dans l’espace. Le monde entier, dit-on, est un champ de bataille. Mais il serait sans doute plus exact de dire un terrain de chasse. (Chamayou, 2013:79).

The conceptualization of the world as a ‘Constant hunting ground’³ comes from the observation of UAV’s employment on the ground – as predators that closely observe and follow their quarry before striking. Per Chamayou’s argument, armed violence is no longer confined within restricted, demarcated, territories, it is wherever the enemy might be located, giving rise to a new hybrid form of violence, that combines regular state police tactics of pursuit, in a military-like scale, enabling the continuity of the witch-hunt born after 9/11 (Chamayou, 2013: 79), materialized in the AUMF’s text, that clearly frees the US President from formal bounds against taking direct action on the ground, if the country’s security is perceived to be compromised by suspicious activities caught by the UAV’s all-seeing eyes. The conquest of territories is therefore no longer the confrontation’s purpose, the control of individuals and their daily activities, is.

This new form of overpowering “surveillance and punishment” takes place in specific areas, as stated above, and this tightly controlled areas are commonly described as ‘Kill Boxes’, three-dimensional spaces inside which strikes can occur, and often do:

La “kill box” se représente graphiquement par une ligne noire continue delimitant une aire spécifique, avec des diagonales en noir à l’intérieur. Il faut imaginer, à l’écran, en 3D, des cubes posés sur un terrain quadrillé. Le théâtre des opérations se couvre de boîtes transparentes. (Chamayou, 2013: 83).

³ Tradução livre do original em francês

These imaginary three-dimensional strike-lines therefore allow drone operators, which comprises the Intelligence Tactical Coordinator (ITC), the supervising screeners and full motion video analysts (FMV's), to act accordingly to their perception of danger, which can hardly be foolproof. The advent of UAVs, and their utilization inside the so-called 'Kill-Box', offers a wide range of new possibilities in this persistent aerial surveillance, and the displacement of conflict wherever strikes are deemed to be necessary.

2.1 - Civilians versus Enemies.

The matters of perception and the decision-making process that ultimately results in the attacks perpetrated by UAVs have systematically proven problematic and complex in their analysis. As author Eric Talbot Jansen explains, the law of armed conflict has always walked behind current methods of warfare.

Considering that, as of today, it is believed that “40, or more, countries are developing military unmanned systems” (Kreps and Kaag, 2012: 5), studying this decision-making process, and its consequences, is essential to a clearer understanding of what might be the long-term effects of drone strikes. How targets are defined inside this killing-space must also be discussed.

While it is true that UAV’s surveillance gear allows controllers to distinguish targets, it does not enable them to recognize the victims, or enemies, themselves. In practice, this translates to a simple choice between who represents a threat and who does not:

Some observers wrongly conflate increasingly sophisticated technology with increasingly sophisticated individual judgment. For example, the military’s Joint Vision 2010 notes that “in all operations technological advances allow them (the warfighters), to make better decisions (...) The weapons, however, do not ensure that a selected target is a legitimate target. That determination is of legal and ethical, rather than technological, nature. (Kreps and Kaag, 2012: 2)

Although the USAF’s goals are much easier to achieve using Unmanned aerial vehicles, this achievement is no less problematic then before, if not more.

At this point, it is necessary to clarify that there are two types of drone strikes: Personality and Signature strikes. Personality strikes target a specific individual, or a group, hence the name. The US intelligence services elaborate what it is commonly referred to as a ‘kill-list’, which is then presented to the POTUS, who ultimately decides which targets shall, and shall not, be subjected to strikes.

Signature strikes, on the other hand, work differently; signature, in this specific context, means trace and/or behavior. This means that such strikes are solely based upon the behavioral observation of several different possible targets in different areas. Controllers observe groups and individuals and, if the subjects manifest any kind of behavior that is deemed threatening, or ambiguous at the very least, this ‘signature’ can be enough to trigger an attack, whether the threat, individual or group, has been identified or not.

Signature strikes mark targets solely based upon their behavior. As soon as the exhibited behavior falls under one category perceived as a possible hazard, this individual/group ceases to be considered a civilian and is regarded as an enemy. As authors Rogers and Hill explain, the so-called ‘threatening behavior’ can be defined quite broadly and, for instance, in Pakistan, the United States Armed Forces regards all MAM’s – military aged male - (roughly between 18 and 35) as ‘fair game’ i.e. potential terrorists. As such, it poses no problem for the USAF to strike such targets because their very existence is a threat, and the fact that they are young men living in a conflicted area automatically transforms them into combatants, rather than civilians, which actively challenges all established requirements prescribed by International Humanitarian Law, and Law of Armed Conflict in general:

International Humanitarian Law seeks a balance between humanitarian concerns and the military requirements of states. Among other things, IHL expects states to differentiate between civilians and combatants, and to ensure that the incidental damage to civilians be proportional to the military advantage. (Kreps and Kaag, 2012: 2).

Furthermore, the Principle of Distinction established by Article 48 of the protocol additional to the Geneva Convention states that all parties of any conflict must always distinguish civilians and combatants. UAVs, however, are not actively regulated by any sort of legislation.

As Frank Sauer and Niklas Schornig explain, UAVs are arguably the most important development in terms of conventional military armament. Considering that status, it would be expected that Western countries, the proponents of International Humanitarian Law, would follow their own procedural rules.

Clearly, then, the liberal weapon of choice should make it possible to minimize civilian casualties and heed the laws of armed conflict while avoiding friendly casualties by substituting capital for labor. Yet this seems irreconcilable with limiting expenditures. (Sauer and Schornig, 2012: 69).

Moreover, it can also be argued that, no matter grave and regretful, civilian casualties – CIVCAS - are a usual part of armed conflict and do not necessarily constitute an unlawful behavior from one of the conflicting parties. Nonetheless, the 1998 Rome statute clarifies that the anticipated military advantage must be excessive in relation to the anticipated civilian damage or injury. As warfare now gravitates closer around civilian populations, and does not necessarily follow the established IHL conventions, the distinction between civilians and combatants appears to become more and more outdated, especially if considered how slowly the regulations on legitimacy of targets are developing in relation to the processes of military modernization (Kreps and Kaag, 2012: 5) and how subjective the military definitions of HVI's – High Value Individuals – and Positive Identification (PID), are. As of today, there is no clear classification that would allow the establishment of the military advantage gained in drone operated attacks against supposed high valued MAM's.

In the advent of a possible tragedy, in the Western sense of the word, it remains unclear to whom the blame would, or should, be appointed. Machines, UAVs or machines of any other kind, cannot be accused of war crimes. This is even more disturbing if the future possibility of drone operations and strikes relying solely on the hands of hired private contractors (chief screeners, for instance, are usually contracted civilians, per Cockburn) or strikes taking place with no actual human decision-making involved in the process, i.e., the advent of one hundred percent autonomous drones, what Chamayou calls the *Frankenstein Fear*, whose jurisdiction and accountability would be even more questionable.

This drift towards military robotizing is actively challenging jurists, policymakers and 'traditional' military personnel to make sense of such processes (Vallor, 2013: 480), and even though drones are undoubtedly effective, as seen in our introduction and first

chapter, their very effectiveness proves to be their most ambiguous characteristic; while certainly killing fewer civilians, if compared to bombing campaigns through military airplanes, they make it not only simpler, but also easier, to kill. Their precision, as opposed to their effectiveness, however, can be questioned, as Andrew Cockburn explains: However miraculous the technology, the information it delivers is inevitably ambiguous. The satellite-transmitted images are far from perfect, which creates yet another obstacle to the clear establishment of who, or what, does and does not represent a threat. Furthermore, “One has to know what to look for in order to be informed. The only problem is how to make sense of what we see when the data we collect are increasing exponentially” (Cockburn, 2004:87).

Additionally, drone operators are not in immediate contact with the real world in real time, seeing as footage is transmitted two to five seconds late. (Cockburn, 2015: 65). Considering the poor-quality footage transmitted, mixed with a delayed contact with reality, plus the near incomprehensible military jargon, described by Cockburn as laden with acronyms, drone operators are essentially working removed from reality and communicating in military *newspeak*.

2.2 – The Chair Force

Additionally, it is undeniable that long-distance killing may eventually have its own consequences on the minds of those who strike. One common analogy is that of the ‘PlayStation mentality’, regularly used by military ethical philosopher Shannon Vallor, when it comes to explaining how drones change the way soldiers and pilots themselves experience conflict. Drone operators can only visualize shapes and trust the information received from higher instances, ‘seeing’ the victim does not equal interacting with the target, as the attackers are not seen in return. This interaction qualifies more as spying, or prying, and there is no such thing as real contact, which explains the ‘PlayStation’ analogy – conflict is experienced through a lens, as a sort of videogame, and even though human interaction does not necessarily make war ‘more human’, neither does the lack of interaction, which leads us to the next point of discussion regarding how wars are actively being reshaped; the deskilling of the military force.

The paradox: This technology may valorize the life of the soldier by removing him to safety, but simultaneously undermines his value and identity as a soldier by making him interchangeable with, and replaced by, other soldiers, civilian contractors or smarter-than-him machines. (Rogers and Hill, 2014: 105)

As Rogers and Hill state, the pilots trained to work with remotely controlled aerial vehicles are commonly known as the *Chair Force*. This is an allusion to the nature of their task but, ultimately, it also represents the increasing futility of today’s Western military personnel, who maybe well under way to being replaced with more effective war machinery, seeing as military training, today, is increasingly design-oriented (Cockburn, 2004).

Shannon Vallor also defends that this *deskilling* of the military poses a profound ethical challenge. The deskilling is not only technical, as pilots are required to do less and less, but moral: in the training of soldiers and pilots in military academies and other sorts of training facilities, there are a certain number of professional ideals of military virtue, like courage, integrity, honor and compassion, that help soldiers themselves distinguish legitimates uses of force as opposed to criminal acts. This argument may always be

refuted on the basis that such values are only real insofar as they are believed on, but they are present in the mindset of the soldiers in training. War then, involves two debates, the first being the ethics of killing an enemy and the second the one of sacrifice; “Without sacrifice, war has always been considered morally questionable” (Cockburn, 2004: 130).

Once these ethical values are no longer present in battle, as the battlefield has deeply changed, soldiers may find themselves no different from the supposed criminals, or terrorists, they are attacking. Drones have so drastically changed the military personnel behavior that PTSD cases are now starting to be a reality within the groups of drone-operators (Vallor, 2013: 482), which shows that, although it is difficult to evaluate the extent of possible physiological damages, post-traumatic-stress disorder may not only be related to situations of extreme fear and distress, but also to circumstances under which the act of killing is perceived as immoral and/or wrong.

Even more so when pilots are entirely removed from a conflict scenario, when they work shifts, during which they may or may not make the decision to strike, and later go back to their daily routines.

Ideals of military virtue, when embedded in the practice and professional identity of military bodies, block the cultural displacement of war to an extra-moral realm where its conduct would be indistinguishable from criminal or mercenary violence. (Vallor, 2013: 482).

Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that the after-effects that spring from the employment of UAVs on the ground far surpass dilemmas of cost and effectiveness. Warzones are becoming an increasingly grey-area, the distinction between CIVCAS and EKIAs appears to gradually become obsolete, and the core values that would, supposedly, guide lawful behavior under situations of armed conflict are no longer actively engaged, as human interaction is progressively being removed from the scene.

This removal of human interaction from the scene, however problematic, is precisely pointed as one of the UAVs greatest characteristic, and not only in military terms. As Kreps and Kaag explain, UAVs insulate not only soldiers but the American population in general, who remains unaware, and disinterested, as long as the social, political and economic effects of an on-going war have no direct effect to their lives.

The ‘body-bag’ syndrome, a consequence of the unforeseen result of the Vietnam war, and the after effects of operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) have taught the American administration that American taxpayers would be less than satisfied with the prospect of a confrontation so soon after the quagmire in Iraq, specially during, and on the aftermath, of the 2008 economic crisis. This might have led the United States to what Sauer and Schornig conceptualize as the ‘Casualty Trap’, where military operations are stalled to avoid casualties: “But there is no blowback against a war that has little to no domestic cost” (Kreps and Kaag, 2012: 23).

Furthermore, and as previously mentioned, president Obama ran a strong liberal campaign, profiting from his quasi anti-war standpoint, which set him even further apart from his Republican rivals. The rationale behind this strategy is very straightforward: by reducing risk, and the costs, of war, UAVs can prolong violence and enable longer conflicts that might serve the administration’s purposes.

Such policing practices do not aim to provide security to the local populations, but rather to prevent security externalities against the interests of the intervening countries. (Barrinha and Mota, 2016: 14).

This mindset, however, is anything but new: “In the wake of the attacks of September 11, George Bush repeatedly has expressed his intention to round up terrorists on the grounds that these actors were evil” (Kreps and Kaag, 2012: 21). The evangelical neo-conservative lexicon, impersonated by George W. Bush, heavily relied on “the good” and “the bad” metaphors. If Americans are the good, and terrorists the bad, UAVs, today are “the ugly”. It is nonetheless interesting to note how similar the approaches of the Bush and the Obama administration were in the nitpicking of the ‘evil’ ones.

This new targeting reasoning, that encompass the previously explained Personality and Signature strikes, is related to the ‘Network Centric Warfare’ (NCW) and Effects Based Operation (EBO) that guides the USAF: “These military doctrines revolve around the belief that targeting carefully chosen nodes of a battlefield system can lead to a widespread transformation of that system” (Kreps and Kaag, 2012: 21). Very much like a religious system of beliefs, paradoxically enabled by a new-found faith in science and technology, these doctrines believe in removing the bad apples from the basket, as if evil itself had taken residence in those individuals, and failing to observe that the notion of eradicating evil ‘piece by piece’ might fuel violence and violent behavior, therefore spreading this so-called evil.

Additionally, there are several unpredictable variables in the field, and the slightest change of conditions, or of the information made available to the operators, may produce undesired, and unpredicted, consequences: “Planners, however, often downplay this practical impossibility and insist that modern technology can accomplish these computational feats” (Kreps and Kaag, 2012:22). But, as Cockburn explains, humans think in variables, whereas machines, in finite combinations (Cockburn, 2004).

Moreover, Sauer and Schornig explain in further detail the tactics used to dodge public attention:

Relying on Private Military Companies (PMCs) rather than regular service personnel to circumvent public scrutiny (...) while relying on a combination of air power and locals to limit the exposure of one’s own troops is another way of dealing with democracy-specific casualty-sensitivity. However, both have produced mixed results; the preferred solution is the third one – namely, the replacement of ‘labor’ (soldiers) by ‘capital’ (technology). (Sauer and Schornig, 2012: 369).

While still relying on PMCs, that provide trained drone-operators to the USAF, the ‘third way’ now combines the three mentioned tactics. Immanuel Kant, the proponent of the Democratic Peace theory believed, in 1795, that time and technological advances would make war increasingly dangerous and expensive, leading to a world where informed

agents would make a concerted effort to maintain peace. (Kaag and Kreps, 2013:1). What Kant underestimated was the technological potential for the development of warfare that would enable less costly and substantially easier – although he was correct insofar as war can be indeed more dangerous, but danger appears to be one-sided.

2.3 – Perpetual War

The utilization of UAVs on the field has been analyzed through several different lenses. Aside from IR scholars, philosophers, like Shannon Vallor, whose work has been presented in the previous section of this chapter, have taken a great interest in the study of drones, as they are simultaneously a “military dream” and an “ethical nightmare”. A thought-provoking parallel can also be traced with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his perception of Perpetual Peace, which heavily influenced the ‘Democratic Peace’ theory. As stated by Kant, under a constitution which is not republican, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon.

The Democratic Peace thesis finds its roots in the Liberal theory of International Relations, one that greatly emphasizes the role of domestic preferences in determining states behavior in the International System. Cotemporary Liberalism’s chronological roots can be traced back to Wilsonian Idealism (Battistella, 2009) exemplified by US President Woodrow Wilson and his famous 14-point speech. In turn, Wilsonian Idealism is heavily inspired by the Kantian conceptualization of the “Perpetual Peace” – per which democracies are less prone to war for several reasons such as the protection of citizens, an unwillingness to risk economic stability, all factors boiling down to the accountability to which leaders would be subjected to under a democratic regime, unlike the aristocratic ones analyzed by Kant.

Authors Reiter and Stam (2001), best known for their conception of the ‘Democratic Victory’ thesis, an offspring of the Democratic Peace theory, believe that the essence of democracy is a set of rules, or law, that provide for the direct or indirect control of a state’s leaders by the citizens of the state. Accountability then plays a major role, and democratic institutions assure this accountability.

Reiter and Stam generally argue that the constraints of representative democracy helps preventing democratic leaders to initiate what they call “foolhardy” or risky wars. The reasoning behind this analysis is a simple one: Democratic leaders’ will not initiate wars that may drag for too long or prove to be difficult to win because the internal consequences and eventual casualties may prove too much for their voters and public support would eventually cease. The authors also argue that differences in political

culture help democracies not only to avoid, but also to win wars they chose to fight, as democratic societies profit from what they call a superior culture in times of war. In other words, different societies, of different political regimes, display different values and norms. In Reiter and Stam's reasoning, a state's tendency to depend on a violent political culture, both in internal and international affairs, is an effect of their political regime.

This dissertation, however, has examined that with the advent of the AUMF after 9/11, deciding whether to engage in military action in remote areas of the globe, like the FATA, has not been exactly difficult – nor citizens have been actively engaged in decisions on the matter.

As the AUMF clearly states:

The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines (...) in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001)

As such, the employment of UAVs serves yet another purpose, of demystifying the notion that citizens are strongly engaged in political life under a democratic rule, or that society's consent is a sine-qua-non-condition for war, as it is not wanted, much less needed. Although, as Kaag and Kreps explain, the United States have indeed gone to great lengths to shield citizens from the effects of war: "For example, the U.S government has not levied a war tax, long a staple of war finance, since 1968" (Kaag and Kreps, 2013:4). This effort, however, must not be interpreted as a determination to avoid war, but to hide it from the same citizens who continue to pay the price for the bloodshed, albeit unknowingly.

As this dissertation has set out to analyze, UAVs are irrevocably changing what it means to be at war, or how war is defined. Citizens of the belligerent party may not necessarily perceive conflict as war, as they are increasingly one-sided and asymmetric, but the effects of the confrontation are no less felt for those on the receiving end.

Furthermore, Reiter and Stam's argument, according to which democratic leaders would avoid foolhardy conflicts is substantially problematic to prove, especially if applied to the War on Terror, one of choice, given that the lasting consequences of the constant vigilance and strikes are impossible to foresee for the time being, despite some visible results in the attacked areas, as it shall be examined on subsequent chapter.

Third Chapter – The Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan

Pakistan became a sovereign federation in August 1974, following the partition of British India. In the midst of enthusiasm for an Islamic state, racial, linguistic and cultural differences were overlooked as insignificant.

Renaud *in* Post-Colonial Pluralism, Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in the FATA of Pakistan

The third chapter of this dissertation aims to examine, in further detail, one specific geographical area that shall serve as a case study, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

For this purpose, this chapter will consist of a brief description, and historical context of the FATA, which have been subjected to a higher number of UAV strikes since 2008, followed by an attempt to clarify the reasons that have led the Pakistani state to adopt what can be described as a *laissez faire* policy over the area and consequently turn a blind eye to the strikes that plague the region and its population.

Furthermore, it is imperative to discuss on the political-strategic disadvantages UAV strikes may bring about, as well as their enormous damage potential. Aside from the effect on the military forces, discussed on the previous chapter, the potential for radicalization on the receiving end of the strikes may also be listed as another possible outcome. In the FATA, drones have exacerbated political divisions and have helped create new ones. Stopping the US bombardment in Pakistani soil became a major issue during the 2013 elections and, per Rogers and Hill, even though the Pakistani population has been facing a bombing campaign by an overwhelmingly superior technology – they refuse, however, to be dominated. In fact, as they explain, the population living under drone-targeted areas are less likely to be compliant and more likely to become resistant, therefore creating a never-ending circle of violence and radicalization.

Subsequently, this chapter shall consider how, and why, studying the FATA can illustrate the framework and analysis proposed throughout the first two chapters of this dissertation.



UN Maps (2009) *untitled* [map] <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Un-pakistan.png?uselang=pt> [June 1st 2017]

The remote Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan, an ambiguous, semi-autonomous region, located along Pakistan’s north-western Hamalaya zone and south-western Sulaiman mountains, in the Afghan-Pakistani border, are composed by seven different tribal agencies: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram and the North and South Waziristan agencies. The region, marked by the contested Durand Line, named after its architect, the British diplomat Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, has been, since 1974, a source of concern (Schu, 2013), as the Afghani state has continuously contested its

legitimacy. The authors Carin Zissis and Jayshree Bajoria (2007), aptly describe the Pakistani-Afghan borderland as *fluid*. The 25000 KM of the Durand line geographically divide the Pashtuns tribes between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Comprising 2% of the total Pakistani population, and being the most impoverished region of the State (Schu, 2013), the FATA poses a remarkable challenge to the domination of the Pakistani State, that has, since its foundation, governed the area through the Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, on behalf of the Federal Government. The region is home to around 3.17 million people, majorly from the Pashtun ethnic group, present in the FATA and throughout Afghanistan, and the seven tribal agencies embody the economic, ethnical and religious disputes the Pakistani State has failed, unwittingly or otherwise, to overcome.

The Khyber Agency was first established in 1879, under British ruling, and it draws its name from the historic Khyber Pass, covering an area of 2576 km. The Kurram Agency was created in 1892 and covers an area of approximately 2296 km. The Mohmand Agency was only established in 1951, four years after the British partition of India in 1947, being followed by the creation of the Bajaur and Orakzai agencies, both in 1973. The Orakzai agency is the only one which does not share a border with Aghanistan.

The North and South Waziristan agencies were both established in 1895. South Waziristan is the largest of all tribal agencies, followed by its Northern counterpart, comprising 6.620 km, while North Waziristan covers approximately 4.707 km.

All agencies comprised together, the Pakistan- Afghani border would “run from New York City to New Mexico” (Johnson and Mason, 2008: 42), and the region’s landscape, of mountains, valleys and desert plains, ensures the region’s seclusion from the outside world.

Historically, the governance of the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas has always been problematic:

Indeed the name for this area is actually a misnomer. It is not Federally administrated in any sense of the word. Constitutionally, Islamabad has never maintained legal jurisdiction over more than 100 meters to the left and right of the few paved roads in the tribal areas. (Johnson and Mason, 2008: 53).

Constitutionally, and in theory, the Pakistani president has executive control over the region, exercised through the NWFP Province governor. The governor, however, only manages the bureaus in charge of providing health care and education in the tribal areas (Zissis and Bajoria, 2007). The ‘Frontier Crimes Regulation’, an inheritance of the British colonial times, a set of laws, applied in the FATA and NWFP Province, is the mechanism through which most of federal control is exercised. Apart this set of laws, and the diminished authority of the NWFP governor, the FATA, as Johnson and Mason explain, are not federally administrated.

The previously mentioned *Jirga*, or council of elders, remains the first and foremost authority and the *Madrasas*, Islamic religious schools, are the institutions that provide education for the few school aged children who have access to it.

3.1 – The Pashtuns

All agencies of the Federally Administrated Tribal areas are home to several different ethnic tribes, such as the Afridi, Shinwari, Mulagoori and Shalmani, amongst many others. The region is, then, home to dozens of different groups and languages. The largest group of all is made up by the Pashtun tribes, of the Hanafi Sunni tradition, although a tiny minority of Pashtuns are Shiites (Johnson & Mason, 2008:47).

Although there is some dispute about the origins of the Pashtun ethnic group, anthropologists generally agree that the tribes that make up this group first moved into the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region about 1.000 years ago, from the area around Ghor. (Johnson & Mason, 2008: 50).

It is crucial to understand, however, that the Pashtuns are not, by any means, a homogeneous group. According to tradition, all members of the Pashtun are descendants of Karlan, the fourth son of Qais Abdur Rashid, descendant, on his turn, of the Prophet Mohammed (Johnson & Mason, 2008). There are many tribes within the Pashtun, and, contrary to what might be a first perception, these sub-identities do not erase their belonging to a larger group, a very important characteristic of the Pashtuns. The previously mentioned Afridis, along with the Dauris, Jadrans and Ketrans, for instance, are a few of the groups of the Pashtun tribe. Johnson and Mason suggest that there are as many as 350 major tribes.

The Waziris, of greater Waziristan (the undivided region that comprises both North and South Waziristan, plus the Paktika province of Afghanistan), are described, by authors Johnson and Mason, as perceived as the most conservative and irascible.

With approximately 25 million members splattered along several different regions of the FATA and Afghanistan, determining who is, and who isn't, a Pashtun, is no more than a matter of perception. Nonetheless, a few common points might be listed between the myriad of tribes that compose the Pashtuns: The profession of their descent from Qais

and the common language of Pashto, or the dialect Pahlto. From Pashto and Pahlto have sprang other different regional dialects.

The Pashtuns, as the largest ethnic-linguistic group, have therefore profited from many advantages unknown to their minority counterparts inside Pakistan. As the ties that connect this close-knit ethnicity are substantially strong, this has allowed formal organization and social and political engagement at their favor:

This segmentation is one reason why, historically, no foreign entity – whether Alexander, the British, the Soviets, the Afghans, or the Pakistanis – has been able to reconcile the Pashtun to external rule. (Johnson & Mason, 2008: 52).

As it shall be analyzed subsequently, not even the Soviet incursion in the 1980's could break and subjugate the Pashtuns, despite the span and brutality of the conflict. On the contrary, the Soviet occupation served extremists' purpose quite well.

According to Adrien Schu, in his 2013 work *Le Pakistan et l'Afghanistan : paradoxes d'une stratégie*, the Pashtuns have continuously fought for the recognition of an Independent *Pashtunistan*:

Les Pachtouns continuent à militer pour leur réunification, alors que le Pachtounistan (le « territoire des Pachtouns ») est traversé par la ligne Durand : il y aurait aujourd'hui environ 20 millions de Pachtouns du côté pakistanais et un peu plus de 12 millions du côté afghan. (Schu, 2013: 178).

As previously stated, the Pakistani law-enforcement authorities have an extremely diminished control of the area and of the Pashtun, as it is the *Jirga* that is regarded as the legitimate source of governance on social and political matters (Abbas, 2006).

Historically, the region has been a growing source of concern since the Soviet-American confrontation in Afghanistan, and the FATA have been likened to a sanctuary that served as a haven for religious organized groups willing to fight the Soviet forces independently (Abbas, 2009). One of the unforeseen, albeit expectable, consequences of the Soviet-

American confrontation on the area was the spreading of an anti-western sentiment that fueled many civilians to join, independently or otherwise, groups that fought foreign domination and religion served the purposes of a mass manipulation tool.

Years later, the invasion of Afghanistan after September 11, and the advent of the War on Terror, further completed the transfiguration of the FATA into a war training camp, consolidating religious extremists, from the Taliban and Al Qaida's ranks, grip over the region and its population. If blame is to be placed, it is plausible to state that Islamabad is partly at fault for overlooking the growing tensions in the area, as well as always conforming to the FATA's status as a sort of 'no man's land'. Granted, constructing a viable policy of 'inclusion' or 'integration' seems far-fetched, but leaving the region unsupervised has proved a less than wise decision, even if a conscious one.

After the United States succeeded to overthrow the Taliban regime, and Hamid Karzai (a symbol of the organized opposition against the Taliban) ceased power (Schu, 2013), the government of Islamabad interpreted the new administration's policies of dispute, regarding the Durand Line, as a direct threat to the weakened Pakistani sovereignty in the FATA region. Thus, "le Pakistan refuse de renoncer à son objectif de transformation du Pachtounistan en zone tampon et confirme son soutien aux Talibans." (Schu, 2013: 179).

The Federally Administrated Tribal Areas have thereafter become a stronghold for Taliban fighters, fueled by the resentment against the new Afghani administration, aided by the Islamabad administration and by the region's very specific geographic composition, where the mountains and natural landscape provide a shelter of extremely difficult access for outsiders, as the Pakistani state is not able to regulate movements across the border effectively (Abbas, 2009).

Such conditions have then cleared the path for the advent of a "melting pot for jihadists from all over the world" (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), which, eventually, caught the eye of the American Administration.

3.2 – Islamabad’s policy of ‘Talibanization’

In 1974, Islamabad took its first steps towards the consolidation of a damage-control policy regarding the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Schu, 2013), years before the Soviet excursion in Afghanistan.

In an attempt to get a stronger hold over the Pashtun inhabited areas, which comprises part of the borderland in Afghanistan, Pakistan promotes a policy of ‘Islamisation’ of the tribal areas and its population (Schu, 2013), in the hopes of substituting tribal liaisons with Pan-Islamic solidarity. Khalil Nouri (2012) speaks of a policy of “Depashtunisation”, through which Islamabad aims to reduce tribal alliances and “de-pashtounise” the proud Pashtuns.

Granted, the Taliban movement was not created by the Pakistani state, but its influence over the region is due to Islamabad’s instrumentalization of their presence in the area. As Nouri explains, Pakistan backed, and supported, Islamic movements, specially the Taliban, thanks to their dismissal of Pashtun nationalism and ambitions for a Pashtunistan.

Instead of slowly pushing for the modernization of the FATA, and the integration of the tribes through the access to public services, Islamabad consciously decided to “keep the Pashtun tribal belt as a regressive anthropological cattle ranch” (Nouri, 2012), therefore plunging its population into illiteracy and poverty, foreigners on their own country. For that reason, it is not uncommon to find an infinite number of metaphors to describe the FATA: “No man’s land” (Johnson and Mason, 2008) and “Wild Wild West” (Nouri, 2012).

However, it is wrong to assume the Pashtuns abide to no social rules of engagement. The *Jirga* enforces the *Pashtunwali*, the Pashtun social code, a set of non-written rules to which all Pashtuns must obey or face dishonor. Per Johnson and Mason, the region’s situation of degradation along with this unique social code, provide an explanation of the Pashtuns liaisons with the Taliban.

Pashtunwali is unwritten and self-forcing, it is not governance, nor a lynch mob (Johnson and Mason, 2008). A social code as such is tremendously at odds with Western views of a justice system, which makes their understanding even further complex for policy makers. As Pashtunwali is not institutionalized and it does not display its strength through courts and law enforcement, per se, its importance is often overlooked. However, Pashtunwali is “The explanation for (why) the Pashtuns provision of safe haven to the Taliban and Al Qaida lies in their unique social code” (Johnson and Mason, 2008: 59).

The Pashtun social code is remarkably similar to *jihad* in its individual dimension, by forcing the individual to embody a set of personal values, such as self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, forgiveness and tolerance, as interpreted by the Pashtun. According to Johnson and Mason, the fourth tenet, hospitality, explains why, at first, the Pashtun provided shelter and protection to Taliban fighters. From the obligation to provide hospitality – *melmastia* – ensues *nanawatey*, meaning surrendering oneself for the sake of another person. Completely alien to Western policy makers, this absolute obligation seems absurd, but:

(When) U.S officials demanded that the Taliban turn over Bin Laden after September 11, (they) experienced nanawatey without knowing it, when the Taliban refused on the grounds that Bin Laden was a guest in Afghanistan, and thus effectively in an inviolable sphere of protection. (Johnson and Mason, 2008: 64).

This rigid social code is applied on a region where, as previously stated, economic development has lagged behind the rest of the country, contributing only to 1.5% of Pakistan’s economy. Because of FATA’s tribal organization, most of its economy is structured around agriculture of subsistence and viable educational options other than the *madrasas* are virtually inexistent.

As such, and with the Taliban *guests* ever present on the area, joining the ranks of the organization becomes a viable option for many young males of the region. The logic is the same in other parts of the world where extremism, not only of the religious kind, is

present. From the young men living in the suburbs of Paris and Molenbeek-Saint-Jean to the MAM's of the FATA, exclusion, illiteracy, poverty and lack of opportunity are the ingredients for falling under extremists' grip.

In that respect, North and South Waziristan are the most challenging provinces. Facing the same economic challenges, and illiteracy rates, present throughout all other provinces of the FATA, it is in Waziristan where the Taliban have won many hearts and minds. This is due to several factors: Authors Johnson and Mason point out that ever since British colonial times, Waziris have been regarded as 'irascible' and it is on that region where the most conservative Pashtuns can be found. Additionally, the mountain landscape of the area has kept them not only socially and politically, but also geographically secluded.

Local elders interviewed by journalist Chris Sands (2012), have observed the perverse effects of this seclusion:

The one big problem the people have is they are illiterate, said Mohammed, who is from the same village as the dead man. (...)If a mullah preaches to them for a minute that there are infidels, go and kill them, immediately they are coming out to kill them.(...)People there do not obey their father's speech, but they are obeying a mullah's speech. One of my nephews was rearing goats and he could only read the Quran. Now he has long hair, a military radio and is a big commander, Mohammed said. (Sands, 2012)

As Aqil Shah (2018) explains, proving, or disproving, the local blowback directly caused by drone strikes is an extremely difficult task. After interviewing legislators, clerics, elders and local officials of the area, Shah concluded that:

The opinions of those I interviewed do not definitively prove or disprove the existence of local blowback. But again, context matters. Virtually every family in NWA has been affected by the conflict, whether through the death of a relative, the destruction of property, or displacement resulting from a military offensive. (Shah, 2018: 11)

The data collected through his research shows that, as this chapter tries to explain, a myriad of reasons contribute to the processes of radicalization and militant recruitment, which include the aforementioned weak governance and Pakistan's strategy of Talibanization as a foreign policy tool. Coercive recruitment as well, should be taken in consideration.

3.3 – The problem of Waziristan

| Strike ID | Date | Location | Area | Minimum Total People Killed | Maximum Total People Killed | Maximum CIVCAS reported killed | Maximum Children reported killed | Maximum reported injured |
|-----------|----------|------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| OB1 | 23/01/09 | Zharki | North Waziristan | 7 | 15 | 11 | 1 | 1 |
| OB2 | 23/01/09 | Ganki Khel | South Waziristan | 5 | 10 | 10 | 4 | 2 |
| OB3 | 14/02/09 | Narsi Khel | South Waziristan | 25 | 35 | 9 | 1 | 15 |
| OB4 | 16/02/09 | Sur Pul | Kurram Agency | 18 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| OB5 | 01/03/09 | Sararogha | South Waziristan | 3 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| OB6 | 12/03/09 | Barjo | Kurram Agency | 14 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 50 |
| OB7 | 15/03/09 | Jani Khel | Bannu Frontier Region | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| OB8 | 25/03/09 | Makeen | South Waziristan | 6 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| OB9 | 26/03/09 | Sokhel | North Waziristan | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| OB10 | 01/04/09 | Khazadei | Orakzai Agency | 10 | 14 | 5 | 3 | 16 |
| OB11 | 04/04/09 | Datta Khel | North Waziristan | 13 | 15 | 13 | 5 | 1 |
| OB12 | 08/04/09 | Ganki Khel | South Waziristan | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 5 |
| OB13 | 19/04/09 | Ganki Khel | South Waziristan | 5 | 12 | 7 | 4 | 0 |
| OB14 | 29/04/09 | Kaniguram | South Waziristan | 1 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 4 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|------|----------|---------------|------------------|----|----|----|----|----|
| OB15 | 09/05/09 | Tabbi Langhar | South Waziristan | 6 | 25 | 4 | 0 | 10 |
| OB16 | 12/05/09 | Sara Khwara | South Waziristan | 5 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| OB21 | 23/06/09 | Makeen | South Waziristan | 60 | 83 | 50 | 10 | 27 |

Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2017.

The data presented above has been collected and analyzed by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, an NGO that has, since 2010, published a comprehensive study under the subject of “Drone Wars”. The Bureau searches through news reports, official White House statements and press releases on the matter, as well as propaganda agencies operating under terrorist organizations, such as Voice of Jihad in Afghanistan.

For the purposes of this dissertation, the numbers present the attacks that occurred on the first few months of the Obama administration, for two reasons: Firstly, they illustrate how Barack Obama heavily relied on UAVs to perform the less-than desirable tasks of the War on Terror, as stated on throughout the second chapter of this dissertation. Secondly, the data shows to what extent the North and South Waziristan provinces are subjected to constant vigilance and strikes.

To begin with, data shows that the first attacks ordered by Barack Obama came only three days after he was sworn into office, on the 23rd January 2009. Both strikes on the same day targeted the Waziristan provinces and injured as many as 11 civilians, reportedly killing children as well. Strikes on the following months consistently targeted the same areas, except for OB4, 6, 7 and 10.

As data shows, strikes were consistent in the South and North Waziristan provinces, killing as many as 83 people (as reported on strike OB21). In total, 247 people were reported as killed as a consequence of the strikes. Of those, 116 were deemed as civilian casualties – CIVCAS – and the numbers point to as many as 25 children wrongfully targeted and killed.

Table 1 only presents strikes carried on between January and June 2009, i.e., the first six months of Barack Obama's first term, illustrating to what extent the administration, and president Obama himself, adopted a policy of knit-picking individuals deemed as threatening on the FATA. Although it is not possible to point out what kind of strikes were carried on, personality or signature, with the current available information, it is possible to observe that some strikes, as OB21, clearly targeted a greater number of individuals, consequently wrongfully killing a greater number of civilians as well.

Despite the distinction made by official documents, and by the data analyzed through the Bureau and presented here on table 1., the distinction between EKIAS and CIVCAS remains problematic, as explained on the second chapter. Considering all MAM's living under such areas might be subjected to strikes as EKIAS, the count of maximum CIVCAS killed might be far greater than what is officially presented to. Having in mind the distinction between Personality and Signature strikes, it is difficult to analyze which were ordered under each type of attack.

According to Aqil Shah, the 2009-2011 intensive drone campaign served its purpose, insofar as it forced militants to concentrate their efforts on surviving, rather than planning new attacks:

A letter possibly written by Osama bin Laden acknowledges the negative impact of drones on al-Qaida's operations: "Over the last two years, the spying aircrafts benefited the enemy greatly and led to the killing of many jihadi cadres, leaders, and others. This is something that is concerning us and exhausting us." (Shah, 2018: 12).

Such was the case precisely before Bin Laden's death, in May 2011. Osama Bin Laden was found, and killed, on the NWFP Province (also known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, not to be confused with the Khyber province of the FATA), on the 2nd of May 2011 under operation "Neptune Spear", led by the CIA, with the Joint Special Operations Command, JSOC.

The months that preceded his death were marked by constant strikes, both in North and South Waziristan, sometimes with attacks happening multiple times per day, as it was the case on January 23rd 2011, when North Waziristan suffered UAV three times on the same day. There was, afterwards, a brief interruption on strikes until the 20th of February – but the attacks carried on being launched with a high frequency until April 2011.

| Strike ID | Date | Location | Area | Minimum Total People Killed | Maximum Total People Killed | Maximum CIVCAS reported killed | Maximum Children reported killed | Maximum reported injured |
|-----------|------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| OB188 | 23/01/2011 | Doga Mada Khel | North Waziristan | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OB189 | 23/01/2011 | Doga Mada Khel | North Waziristan | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OB190 | 23/01/2011 | Razmak | North Waziristan | 4 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| OB191 | 20/02/2011 | Kazha Punga Area | South Waziristan | 6 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| OB192 | 21/02/2011 | Malik Jashdar | North Waziristan | 7 | 14 | 11 | 0 | 10 |
| OB193 | 24/02/2011 | Mohammad Khel | North Waziristan | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| OB194 | 08/03/2011 | Landidog | South Waziristan | 2 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 2 |
| OB195 | 09/03/2011 | Datta Khel | North Waziristan | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| OB196 | 11/03/2011 | Khesoor | North Waziristan | 4 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| OB197 | 11/03/2011 | Ghoroski | North Waziristan | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OB198 | 13/03/2011 | Azam Warsak | South Waziristan | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| OB199 | 13/03/2011 | Ishar Moor area | North Waziristan | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| OB200 | 14/03/2011 | Malik Jashdar | North Waziristan | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OB201 | 16/03/2011 | Datta Khel | North Waziristan | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OB202 | 17/03/2011 | Datta Khel | North Waziristan | 26 | 42 | 41 | 1 | 14 |
| OB203 | 13/04/2011 | Angor Adda | South Waziristan | 4 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 10 |
| OB204 | 22/04/2011 | Spinwan | North Waziristan | 20 | 26 | 9 | 5 | 10 |

Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2017.

As it can be observed, strikes were a constant reality in the lives of those living on the areas under attack. All data compiled by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism confirms a minimum of 417 strikes, and 3.835 people maximum reported killed, where 810 were reportedly civilians and 123 children.

The March 17th attack on Datta Khel, which ultimately killed 40 people (Shah, 2018: 21), was arguably a catastrophic strike:

According to a reporter who visited the strike site in Datta Khel and has interviewed family members of the victims, “I find drones to be useful in fighting the Taliban and other militants. But such callously misguided strikes are hard to swallow and make the local people question their utility.” (Shah, 2018:22).

Journalist James Bridle has compiled a series of screenshots and images of the locations of drone strikes to the popular social media website Instagram, under the name ‘Dronestagram’, to, in his words:

Make these locations just a little bit more visible, a little closer. A little more real. (...) The political and practical possibilities of drone strikes are the consequence of invisible, distancing technologies, and a technologically-disengaged media and society. Foreign wars and foreign bodies have always counted for less, but the technology that was supposed to bring us closer together is used to obscure and obfuscate. We use military technologies like GPS and Kinect for work and play; they continue to be used militarily to maim and kill, ever further away and ever less visibly. (Bridle, 2012)

The obscurity referred to by Bridle relegates those populations to a situation of extreme uncertainty, considering Islamabad’s refusal to exercise its constitutional power over the region. That situation, has, as presented on the next section, created a series of tangible consequences on the territory inhabited by the Pashtuns as well as fueled the anti-western sentiment, a growing reality since 1981.

3.4 – The disappearance of borders in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan

As stated throughout this work, the Pakistani state has, since the partition of the British India, had to deal with several internal challenges that undermined the countries' cohesion and, oftentimes, physical integrity. Political instability and contestation extends far beyond the territory of the FATA: from its border with China and the discontented Uighur Muslim minority to its shared frontier with Iran, plagued by smuggles and drug dealers (Johson and Mason, 2008).

This contestation is very present along the region that covers the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas due to the presence of the biggest ethno-linguistic group of the country, the Pashtuns. As previously explained, the Pashtuns conduct themselves, and organize their territory and political life, entirely separated from the rest of Pakistan: The Pashtun have their own system of tribal governance, clearly misunderstood by foreign authorities. Not able to, or unwilling to, deal with the Pashtun question, the Pakistani government made the conscious decision to step aside from the region and allow the creation of a quasi-parallel-state.

In 1974, however, Pakistan adopted its policy of Islamisation of the FATA (Schu, 2013), which essentially aimed to replace the Pashtuns first and foremost loyalty towards their tribal identity with Pan-islamist solidarity. By hoping to refashion the Pashtuns distinctiveness as a group, the Pakistani state displays a great deal of unawareness towards the Pashtun and Pashtunwali. As Adrien Schu explains, for the Pashtun, identities are not mutually exclusive and their adherence to Islam does not, in any measure, erase their Tribal loyalty. Furthermore, as examined by Johnson and Mason, Pashtunwali remains the upheld code of conduct to which all Pashtun must adhere to, or face dishonor.

Pakistan chose then, to instrumentalize organized religious groups and its presence over the region, hoping to gain the Pashtun hearts and minds, a goal indeed achieved, but not quite as Islamabad expected.

By making way to the Taliban, and later for Al-Qaida, to reign over the region, Pakistan essentially allowed the creation of war-training-camps, a melting pot for jihadists (Abbas, 2009). But Pakistan purposefully allowed, and accepted, a certain porosity of that border region – anything to avoid a Pashtun led rebellion in favor of the creation of Pashtunistan. If the Pashtun were under control, it mattered little who was in charge. What Pakistan had perhaps underestimated was the resentment its policies created, which combined with the level of underdevelopment, poverty and illiteracy, would further push the region to a state of disorder.

After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan and Afghanistan became frequent targets of American UAV strikes. As the AUMF clearly states, the POTUS is authorized to employ armed force to those who represent a threat to the security of the United States. Not necessarily a state or even an organization, the U.S is therefore allowed to pursue individuals. And many of those individuals happened to be located on terrorist-friendly soil created by the Pakistani state.

Not only Pakistan had allowed a certain porosity of its border with Afghanistan, to fulfill its policy of Islamization, it has subsequently allowed armed attacks over the border:

In an October 2012 meeting with President Obama, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reportedly emphasized the need to end the program because it was “a continued violation of our territorial sovereignty.” This official disapproval notwithstanding, the United States could not have operated drones in the country’s airspace without the consent of Pakistani authorities, as the military’s air defense weapons systems can easily shoot them down. (Shah, 2018:29).

Former president Pervez Musharraf disclosed, in 2013, that Pakistan and the United States had entered a covert agreement in 2004, that designated the flight boxes within which drones would operate in the Waziristans. Furthermore, the U.S used air-force bases in the Sindh and Balochistan provinces (Shah, 2018:29), which further demonstrates Islamabad’s acquiescence to drone strikes.

Reuters published, in 2011, that Islamabad had not only “tacitly agreed but explicitly asked for continuous predator coverage”:

According to a fresh batch of cables released by WikiLeaks, Pakistan's chief of army staff General Ashfaq Kayani asked Admiral William J. Fallon, then commander of U.S. Central Command, for increased surveillance and round-the-clock Predator coverage over North and South Waziristan, strongholds for Taliban militants (...)Referring to the situation in Waziristan, the February 11, 2008 cable says, "Kayani asked if Fallon could assist in providing continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area. (Reuters, 2011).

Documents and reports published by Wikileaks in 2010 and subsequently analyzed by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, confirm so. In 2009, still at the beginning of Obama's drone frenzy, former prime-minister Yousuf Raza Gilani reportedly stated "I don't care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We'll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it." (BBC,2013).

As such, the more aggressive drone campaigns became; the less distinction was made between territories. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has collected extensive data on the attacks perpetrated on the border provinces of Nangarhar, Paktika, Khost and Kunar, although their analysis is less precise, as fewer information is available, it is possible to observe that strikes are not targeting territories specifically, rather cellules and individuals, no matter where they may be located on that specific area. The already troubled Durand-line had encountered a new opponent, UAV technology.

As explained on the previous chapters, this dissertation attempts to examine this subject under a poststructuralist light. As such, the already delicate relationship between the FATA's borders and the practices that make, and erase, them, is further troubled by UAV technology. As Newman and Paasi point out, “The construction of boundaries at all scales and dimensions takes place through narrativity” (Newman, 2009: 11).

In the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan, matters of perception have proven to be crucial: Pashtun nationalism and Pakistan's instrumentalization of militancy as a foreign policy tool has created a situation in which the federal government cannot attempt to intervene, nor forbid a third party, such as the United States, to do so. By essentially cleaning their hands of the area, the Pakistani state has further pushed away FATA's population.

Boundaries are thus one part of the discursive landscape of social power, control and governance, which extends itself into the whole society and which is produced and reproduced in various social and cultural practices. (...)The boundary does not limit itself merely to the border area or landscape itself, but more generally manifests itself in social and cultural practices and legislation. (Newman, 2009: 12).

As this dissertation has also attempted to explain, the tensions already present in the FATA are deepened by terrorist cellules and operatives on its regions. As terrorism operations are no longer state-bound, the United States has fashioned a new counter-terrorism approach which no longer considers battlefields, but battlespaces. An enemy is no longer a state, but groups of individuals, sponsored by terrorist organizations or operating individually. Washington addresses the issues on a global scale, rather than a national, state-centered one. Furthermore, the US administration is interested in the ability to control movement of transnational groups, consequentially imposing its power wherever UAV's are operating.

It is clear then, that by allowing such porosity over the area, in the hopes of undermining a strong Pashtun coalition, Islamabad might have killed one head of the hydra and replaced it with two more.

Conclusion

This dissertation has attempted to address the United States' administration policy for the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and its social and political consequences. As analyzed, the US administration has heavily relied on precision strikes, both signature and personality, to carry on its counterterrorism policy in remote areas of the globe. Although the technology behind UAVs dates to the Cold War days, it was under Bill Clinton's presidency that drones started to be weaponized, and have since been heavily utilized by the neoconservative administration of George W. Bush and his democrat successor, Barack Obama.

Such strikes are permitted by the Authorization for Use of Military Force – AUMF – approved only a few days after 9/11, as a response to the attacks. As it was explained, the AUMF essentially gives the US president the power to act against any organization, cell, or individual, perceived as a threat to national security. The Red fear replaced by the Muslim fear, the U.S was now allowed to pursue individuals on an international level.

As the first and second chapters of this dissertation have attempted to examine, this “surveillance and punishment” method creates a deeply unsettling panorama of constant vigilance over minority groups living in conflicted areas. As it was argued, the world is gradually developing into a constant hunting ground (Chamayou, 2014). The “Panopticon-like” techniques of UAV's all seeing eyes allow drone operators to see, but never to be seen. This creates a situation of constant consciousness of permanent vulnerability amongst affected groups, which assures the automatic functioning of power (Foucault, 1995). By adopting the Poststructuralist lenses to the analysis of this phenomenon, this dissertation has relied upon a definition of power that has become extraterritorial, no longer bound, not even slowed down, by the resistance of space (Bauman, 2000).

As it was also argued, the decision-making process that leads to the definition of “who” or “what” is deemed dangerous is deeply subjective, especially when signature strikes are considered.

The second chapter of this dissertation has also analyzed how the effects of UAV strikes are felt not only on the receiving end of the strikes.

By gradually replacing labor for capital, or soldiers for machines, “technology may valorize the life of the soldier by removing him to safety, but, simultaneously undermines his value and identity as a soldier” (Rogers and Hill, 2014:105). As such, the ethics of killing without necessarily being at risk of being killed are also a subject of debate, given that such conduct may be perceived as immoral by soldiers themselves. As Coker points out “Without sacrifice, war has always been considered morally questionable” (Coker, 2004:130). But as this dissertation has attempted to examine, this erasure of human presence, no matter how harmful, is precisely what makes UAVs so valuable and, simultaneously, so dangerous, as they are the perfect enablers of long lasting, one-sided, asymmetrical conflicts that can easily be concealed from the public, who grows increasingly resentful of public expenditure.

As the number of UAV strikes have substantially increased since 2008, fears related to the future of UAV technology have also arose. Whether related to the “Frankenstein fear” (Chamayou, 2014), i.e., the advent of completely autonomous drones, or the utilization of privately hired drone operators, AI experts have been outspoken concerning an infinite number of gloomier possibilities for the future of warfare technology.

In its third chapter, this dissertation has attempted to study the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

The FATA are a semi-autonomous region located in the Afghan-Pakistani border and are composed by seven tribal agencies, comprising 2% of the country’s population. As it was argued, the region is severely troubled by different tensions within its population and concerning its territory. The Pashtuns, the major ethnic group of the region, pose a remarkable challenge to Islamabad’s administration. Historically, the Pashtuns have fought many foreign identities and would-be rulers, and the federal government itself is regarded as a foreign identity among the Pashtuns. This troubled border region has known discontent and unrest since the partition of the British India and the seven tribal agencies

embody the economic, ethnic and religious disputes the Pakistani state has failed, unwittingly or otherwise, to overcome.

North and South Waziristan, more specifically, have proved to be the most problematic provinces, and where jihadi fighters were able to win hearts and minds. As this research has examined, it is in Waziristan where the greater number of attacks have occurred, both North and South provinces. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has accounted for 428 minimum strikes confirmed strikes and a maximum of 4020 total people killed in Pakistan, since the beginning of UAV bombing campaigns.

Per Abbas (2009), the region is splattered with “Anti-Western” sentiment ever since the Soviet-American confrontation and this scenario has only worsened since the advent of the War on Terror and operation Enduring Freedom. A mixture of impregnable landscape, tribal tensions and the presence of terrorist groups has created the perfect conditions for “a melting pot for jihadists from all over the world” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). Furthermore, Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of conduct, also enticed the Pashtun to provide shelter and protection to Taliban fighters, a fact that both Pakistan and Washington officials seemed to completely overlook, proving a fundamental lack of knowledge of tribal allegiances and behavior.

Considering Islamabad’s laissez-faire policy over the region, and the US’ constant threatening presence, the FATA are suffering dire consequences at the hands of modern warfare technology. In order to keep the Pashtun down, Islamabad chose to support organized religious groups to fulfill its policy of *Islamisation* of the FATA, in the hopes of replacing tribal loyalty with Pan-Islamic solidarity. The Islamisation policy took its first steps in 1974 (Schu, 2013) and, a few years later, the Soviet Union began its incursion in Afghanistan.

As it was explained, the purpose of the UAV strikes this dissertation aimed to analyze, is no longer that of territorial conquest. As poststructuralism understands borders as the product of constant imbrications and overlapping of social phenomena, it was argued that practices and events, such as UAV strikes, create and erase borders.

As Pakistan purposefully allowed a certain porosity of its border with Afghanistan, due to its Islamisation policy, the administration increasingly lost its grip over the area, not able to counter the jihadi ‘infestation’. When drone-operated strikes began, Pakistan had little to no choice on the matters over the FATA.

The more aggressive drone bombings became, the less distinction was made between territories, as strikes do not necessarily target a space, but individuals, wherever they may be located. As such, it mattered very little to the White House administration in which side of the border Predators and Reapers would strike.

Documents and reports published by WikiLeaks in 2010, and subsequently analyzed by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism have shown how Islamabad has quietly acquiesced to the American policy for the employment of UAVs. Former Prime-Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani reportedly stated: “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it” (BBC, 2013).

It was argued that Islamabad, in its thirst to protect the country’s integrity from a possible strong Pashtun-led rebellion, lost control of the region. Its paradoxical policy of allowing a certain porosity of the border region created more complications than it did solutions, and the FATA are increasingly becoming a detached no-man’s-land, largely left to its own luck.

Bibliography

Abbas, Hassan. 2009. *President Obama's Policy Options in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)*. Washington: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

—. 2006. "Profiles of Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies." The Jamestown Foundation. Outubro. Accessed Março 2017. <https://jamestown.org/program/profiles-of-pakistans-seven-tribal-agencies/>.

Allen, Craig. 2012. "The Seabots are Coming Here: Should they be Treated as 'Vessels'?" *The Journal of Navigatio* 749-752.

Aslam, Wali. 2011. "A critical evaluation of American drone strikes in Pakistan: legality, legitimacy and prudence." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 313-329.

Barrinha, André, and Sarah da Mota. 2016. "Drones and the uninsurable security subjects." *Third World Quarterly* 49-65.

Battistella, Dario. 2015. *Théorie des Relations Internationales*. Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po Paris.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt, and David Lyon . 2013. *Liquid Surveillance - A conversation*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Boyle, Michael. 2015. "The legal and ethical implications of drone warfare." *The International Journal of Human Rights* 105-126.

Campbell, Brett. 2014. "Realist or Liberal?: Theoretical Interpretations of the Obama Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy." *Pregledni znanstveni članak* 31-48.

Campbell, David, and Tim Dunne. 2013. *International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity*. London: Oxford University Press.

—. 2013. *International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity*. London: Oxford University Press.

Chamayou, Grégoire. 2013. *Théorie du Drone*. Paris: La Fabrique Éditions.

Cockburn, Andrew. 2015. *Kill Chain*. London: Verso Books.

Coker, Christopher. 2004. *The Future of War - The re-enchantment of war in the 21st century*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Coker, Christopher. 2008. *Ethics and War in the 21st Century*. New York: Routledge.

Daddow, Oliver. 2013. *International Relations Theory*. London: Sage Publications.

Docherty, Bonni. 2012. *Losing humanity: the case against killer robots*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Enemark, Christian. 2014. "Risk and Perpetual Force." *Ethics and International Affairs* 365-381.

Foucault, Michel. 1998. *Surveillet et punir - Naissance de la prison*. Paris: Gallimard.

Heyns, Cristof, Dapo Akande, and Lawrence Hill. 2016. "The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones." *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 791-827.

Hussain, Murtaza. 2015. "Retired General: Drones Create More Terrorists Than They Kill, Iraq War Helped Create ISIS." Accessed Agosto 2016. <https://theintercept.com/2015/07/16/retired-general-drones-create-terrorists-kill-iraq-war-helped-create-isis>.

Iqtidar, Humeira, and David Gilmartin. 2011. "Secularism and the State in Pakistan: Introduction." *Modern Asian Studies* (Cambridge University Press) 491-499.

Jensen, Eric Talbot. 2014. "The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches, Butterflies and Nanobots." *Michigan Journal of International Law* 253-316.

Johnson, Thomas., Mason, Chris. 2008. "No sign until the burst of fire: understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier". *International Security*. 41-47

Kaag, John, and Sarah Kreps. 2013. "Drones and Democratic Peace." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 1-13.

Krisch, Nico. 2017. "Liquid authority in global governance." *International Theory* (Cambridge University Press) 237-260.

Leander, Anna. 2013. "Technological Agency in the Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise and the US Drone Program." *Leiden Journal of International Law* 811-831.

Linder, Harry Van der. 2015. "Drone Warfare and Just War Theory." In *Drones and Targeted Killing: Legal Moral, and Geopolitical Issues*, by Marjorie Cohn, 169-194. Northampton: Olive Branch Press.

Lyon, David. 2010. "Liquid Surveillance: The Contribution of Zygmunt Bauman to Surveillance Studies." *International Political Sociology* 325–338.

Mclaughlin, Jenna. 2015. "Specter of Drones Firing Tear Gas on Crowds Worries Human Rights Group." *The Intercept*. Accessed Setembro 2016. <https://theintercept.com/2015/12/01/specter-of-drones-firing-tear-gas-on-crowds-worries-human-rights-group/>.

Newman, David. 2009. "Revisiting good fences and neighbours after twenty years: theoretical reflections on the state of contemporary border studies". *Nordia Geographical Publications* 13-19.

Newman, David, and Anssi Paasi. 1998. "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography. ." *Progress in Human Geography* 186-207.

Nouri, Khalil. 2012. "Afghanistan: De-Pashtunization of Pashtuns by Taliban and Pakistan." *Veterans Today*. Accessed 2016. <https://www.veteranstodayarchives.com/2012/03/09/afghanistan-de-pashtunization-of-pashtuns-by-taliban/>.

Reiter, Dan. Stan, Allan. 2001. *Democracies at war*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Relations, Council on Foreign. 2001. "Authorization for Use of Military Force." *Setembro*. Accessed Outubro 2016. <http://www.cfr.org/911-impact/authorization-use-military-force-pl-107-40/p25703>.

Renaud, François. 2002. "Post Colonial Pluralism, Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in the FATA of Pakistan." *Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law* 541-596.

Rodgers, Ann, and John Hill. 2014. *Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security*. London: Pluto Press.

Ross, Alice, and Jack Serle. 2014. "Get the data: What the drones strike." *The Bureau of Investigative Journalism*. Accessed 2016. <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/05/23/get-the-data-what-the-drones-strike>

Sands, Chris. 2012. "North Waziristan: The problem no one wants to talk about." *Public Radio International*. Accessed 2016. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-08-03/north-waziristan-problem-no-one-wants-talk-about>

Sauer, Frank, and Niklas Schornig. 2016. "Killer drones: The 'silver bullet' of democratic warfare?" *Security Dialogue* 363-380.

Schu, Adrien. 2013. "Le Pakistan et l'Afghanistan : paradoxes d'une stratégie." *Politique Étrangère* 177-189.

Schwarz, Jon. 2015. "BM and the Big Data of Death." *The Intercept*. Accessed 2016. <https://theintercept.com/2015/10/23/drones-ibm-and-the-big-data-of-death>

Scott, Shane. 2016. "Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable Truth: U.S. Is Often Unsure About Who Will Die." *The New York Times* . Accessed 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/drone-strikes-reveal-uncomfortable-truth-us-is-often-unsure-about-who-will-die.html?_r=0.

Shah, Aqil. 2018. "Do U.S drone strikes cause blowback? Evidence from Pakistan and beyond." *International Security*. 47-84.

Sousa, Fernando de. 2005. *Dicionário de Relações Internacionais*. Porto: Edições Afrontamento.

Vallor, Shannon. 2013. "The Future of Military Virtue: Autonomous Systems and the Moral Deskillling of the Military." *The Future of Military Virtue: Autonomous Systems and the Moral Deskillling of the Military*. Tallinn: NATO CCDCOE. 471-486.

Vilmer, Jean Baptiste. 2013. "Légalité et légitimité des drones armés." *Politique Étrangère* 119-132.

Virilio, Paul, and Sylvère Lotringer. 2007. *Pure War*. Los Angeles: Semiotexte.

Walters, William. 2014. "Strikes, dingpolitik and beyond: Furthering the debate on materiality and security." *Security Dialogue* 101-118.

Williams, John. 2015. "Distant Intimacy: Space, Drones and Just War." *Ethics and International Affairs* 93-110.

Zissis, Carin, and Jayshree Bajoria. 2007. "Pakistan's Tribal Areas." Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed 2016. <https://www.cfr.org/background/pakistans-tribal-areas>.