

European Integration between History and New Challenges

edited by

Ariane Landuyt

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
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BETWEEN HISTORY AND NEW CHALLENGES

EDITED BY
ARIANE LANDUYT

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MARIA MANUELA TAVARES RIBEIRO

IDEAS OF EUROPE: PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

1. *Portugal: between dream and reality*

«After four centuries of living outside Europe, we have not come back the same»¹, wrote Eduardo Lourenço in an article in the magazine *Oceanos* (1993). Indeed, with their vast empire, the Portuguese had put down roots in Africa, Asia and South America, accumulating «a vast memory that extends far beyond the centuries-old memory of Europe» (Jorge Borges de Macedo, 1979). Effectively, Portugal had gone back to the sea.

Although Portuguese demoliberals, socialists and republicans defined and dreamed utopically of a United States of Europe, it was the modernists who described it best². For Fernando Pessoa, Portugal was Europe's western face staring nostalgically at the sea («the complementary image of Portuguese ontological unity»), while Europe was ambitious, avidly awaiting creation («Europe is thirsty for creation, hungry for the future!») Almada Negreiros, for his part, likened Europe to Prometheus, thirsty for knowledge: «Europe functions as a true eternity, which it is, as far as the renewal of the spiritual sense is concerned»³. Europe was «a future dream», «a world waiting to happen»⁴.

The journal *Seara Nova*, founded in 1921, even propagated ideas of a longed-for peace, solidarity amongst

¹ E. Lourenço, *Portugal: entre a realidade e o sonho*, in «*Oceanos*», n. 16, 1993, p. 11.

² M. Albuquerque, *Portugal e a consciência da Europa*, in «*Oceanos*», n. 16, 1993, pp. 13-23.

³ A. Negreiros, *Sudoeste I. Europa e Portugal*, Lisboa, Contexto Editora, 1935, p. 21.

⁴ A. Casais Monteiro, *Europa*, s.l., Ed. Confluência, 1946, p. 13.

peoples and European spirit⁵. Many of its contributors, such as António Sérgio, Jaime Cortesão and Raúl Proença, expressed universalist and ecumenical notions – though, as Sérgio Campos Matos has pointed out, these men all had European backgrounds, which meant their ideas were underlain by the European model. Indeed, it was in the light of this they viewed the Portuguese national question⁶.

As for female republicans, women such as Ana de Castro Osório, Adelaide Cabete, and Alice Pestana fought passionately (in their writings for feminist magazines, conferences and professional lives) for the fraternization of people, for a Europe in peace, a European Federation, as well as a Union of Europe⁷.

2. *The construction of the «New Europe»*

António de Oliveira Salazar, like João Ameal (ideologue and historian of the *Estado Novo*), frequently urged the need to construct a *New Europe*. In their view, Europe lays sick, racked by a crisis that was not only political, social and ideological, but above all moral and spiritual. However, the *New Europe* they envisaged was not liberal, democratic or communist. As Luís Reis Torgal points out⁸, for Salazar and his followers, it was «liberal mystifications», democracy, universal suffrage and parliamentarism – factors of disaggregation – having actually caused this «great and painful crisis»⁹. For João Ameal, Europe meant the Europe of Being, a civilizational unit made up of distinct states, and

⁵ A. Ventura, *Republicanos, Anarquistas e Socialistas. A convergência possível (1892-1910)*, Lisboa, Ed. Cosmos, 2000.

⁶ S. Campos Matos, *António Sérgio europeísta?*, in «A construção da Europa», Lisboa, Ed. Colibri, 1999, p. 147.

⁷ M.M. Tavares Ribeiro, *A Europa dos Intelectuais nos alvares do século XX*, in «Estudos do Século XX», n. 2, 2002, pp. 129-132.

⁸ L. Reis Torgal, *Estados Novos. Estado Novo*, 2ª ed., Coimbra, CEIS20/IUC, 2009, pp. 499-564.

⁹ J. Ameal, *Ideia de Europa*, Lisboa, SCSPU, 1968, pp. 20-21.

the Europe of (religious) unity, which overlapped with geographical Europe and Europe as civilization. Europe would be regenerated through a spiritual reawakening, in which morality would be aligned with Christian ethics. For him, political Europeanism was an «absurd utopia»; therefore, he did not support supranational structures, federation or confederation¹⁰. Europe, threatened in the East by communism and in the West by American supremacy, needed to be able to exorcise those «ghosts»¹¹.

As for Salazar, he distrusted any formula that might override the «primary, vivacious, irreducible and unassimilable» core¹² that was the nation. Therefore, in his speech of 18th May 1946, Salazar reiterated his rejection of federalist or supranational ideas «hatched up in offices» and decreed by «hegemonic Super-States», and opposed the «chimera» of European union with an organicist nationalism. He was concerned, above all, with the stability of the *Estado Novo* regime. Thus, the essential unity of the nation and its independence in relation to external threats and the hegemony of the great powers stimulated his definition of Europe as synonymous with the West. In his view, Europe, weakened and divided, could recover a great part of its moral and physical strength in Africa. The Western European alliance in Africa would provide the front necessary to restrain «imperialist appetites». As Medeiros Ferreira¹³ explains, the *Estado Novo* regime was marginalized from the international scene. However, Salazar also felt a growing need for international cooperation, as Pedro Cantinho Pereira explains¹⁴. He was concerned with the survival and destiny of the Old

¹⁰ J. Ameal, *Jornal de Notícias*, 28.6.1931.

¹¹ J. Ameal, *A Europa e os seus Fantasmás*, Porto, Liv. Tavares Martins, 1945, p. 146.

¹² A. de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e notas políticas II, 1935-1937*, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 1937, p. 117.

¹³ J. Medeiros Ferreira, *Características históricas da política externa portuguesa entre 1890 e a entrada na ONU*, in «Política Internacional», vol. 1, n. 6, 1996, p. 144.

¹⁴ P. Cantinho Pereira, *Portugal e o início da Construção Europeia. 1947-1953*, Lisboa, Instituto Diplomático, 2005.

Continent, and believed the centre of political gravity for Europe and even the world had to shift westwards towards the Atlantic. In this way, «we would not stop being European, we would just acquire a broader sense of the West». In fact, Salazar did effectively consolidate the idea of Portugal in the international context, as the country became a member of NATO in 1949 and of the UN in 1955. Approximation to the United States was inevitable¹⁵. The uselessness of a federation and the Atlantic seaboard imposed limits upon European collaboration. In Salazar's view, it was important to consolidate the Portuguese Economic Space with Africa and the Ibero-American bloc, while the relationship with the United States was fostered with the ceding of the base in the Azores to the allies, justified by the idea of the «West», an enlarged Europe, and the defence of colonial Africa.

The 1960s brought new challenges for Portugal. It participated in the OECD and that organization's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), became a member of EFTA (1960) and GATT (1962), as well as Portuguese producers began to enter the European market and competitive system. There was thus a certain flexibility in relation to future connections between Portugal and the European Communities, proved in the letter of 18th May 1962 delivered by ambassador José Calvet de Magalhães to the Community headquarters.

It became clear, with the onset of the colonial war in 1961, Africa could not be an economic alternative for Portugal before Europe. Emigration increased, the first student uprisings occurred, and the forces opposed to the *Estado Novo* intensified. We should even recall that Great Britain applied for EEC membership in 1961, and the dissolution of EFTA was announced¹⁶.

¹⁵ M. Fernanda Rollo, *Portugal e o Plano Marshall*, Lisboa, Ed. Estampa, 1994.

¹⁶ A. Martins da Silva, *Portugal e a Europa. Distanciamento e reencontro*, Viseu, Palimage, 2005, pp. 396-397.

The Portuguese case was due to be analysed on 11 February 1963. However, this did not happen. Furthermore, De Gaulle's veto of negotiations with the United Kingdom had led to an interruption of talks between Portugal and the EEC.

Marcelo Caetano, who took over the reins of power in Portugal when Salazar was no longer physically able, pursued a policy of continuity with regard to foreign affairs. In March 1970, after the Hague Conference of 1969, negotiations resumed concerning the United Kingdom's approximation to the EEC. The diplomats Rui Teixeira Guerra and José Calvet de Magalhães, along with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rui Patrício, played a decisive role in bringing about the negotiations, which began on 24 November 1970 and continued throughout 1971, opening up the way for the signing of the trade agreement between Portugal and the EEC on 22 July 1972 in Brussels¹⁷.

3. «*Evolution in continuity*» – *The idea of Europe in Marcelismo*

For the government of Marcelo Caetano, which came to office between 1968 and April 1974, it was essential to maintain the connections to Africa and accelerate the process of approximation to the EEC. Priority was given to economic growth, foreign investment, increased productivity, the expansion of the domestic market and technological development. However, this orientation was upset by the world situation in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973. In Portugal, the economic crisis was exacerbated by political and social crisis, which led to the downfall of Caetano's government and accelerated the Armed Forces Movement that finally put an end to the dictatorship that had domina-

¹⁷ J. Calvet de Magalhães, *A participação de Portugal nas instituições internacionais do após-guerra*, in M.M. Tavares Ribeiro, A. Moreira Barbosa de Melo, M.C. Lopes Porto (eds.), *Portugal e a Construção Europeia*, Lisboa, Almedina, 2003, pp. 125-135.

ted Portugal for 48 years¹⁸. Caetano's conception of Europe was not so different from Salazar's, as Tavares Castilho explains¹⁹. And although European political unity and economic integration were denounced as myth by some (such as Franco Nogueira, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1970), there were others on the more liberal wing that considered Portugal's backwardness to be a direct result of the country's isolation from Europe.

4. *Public opinion*

Public opinion, as manifested in the periodical press, revealed a range of attitudes. Some people cautiously supported a new Europe within a European Federation, as suggested in the *Diário de Notícias* of 28 August 1949, while others identified with the government position, favouring Atlantic projection over European. «For us», wrote the columnist Augusto de Castro in the newspaper *O Século*, «Europe is more landscape than neighbourhood»²⁰.

However, the advantages of EEC membership did not begin to be formally debated until the 1970s, not only within opposition movements, but rather amongst liberal-minded deputies, diplomats and technocrats. For instance, the deputy Pinto Leite declared in the National Assembly on 15 April 1970 that «Europe is the cradle of Portugal». Nevertheless, unlike in Spain, this debate did not achieve a significant expression in civil society. That is to say, in the 1970s (i.e. before Portugal's accession) there was no significant echo in public opinion: intellectuals remained detached or expressed reservations as regards membership of the Common Market, while the press showed little interest in the subject.

¹⁸ R.L. Amaral de Almeida, *Portugal e a Europa. Ideias, Factos e Desafios*, Lisboa, Ed. Sílabo, 2005, pp. 254-265.

¹⁹ J.M. Tavares Castilho, *A ideia de Europa no marcelismo (1968-1974)*, Lisboa, Assembleia da República, 2000.

²⁰ A. de Castro, *O Século*, n. 24278 de 29.09.1949, pp.1-2.

5. The «rediscovery» of Europe

The democratic revolution of 25 April 1974 did not so much open the doors of Europe to Portugal as prepare the ground for an involvement in a pluralistic «supranational project», while preserving national identity and ideological tolerance²¹. In 1975, the Portuguese political scene was dominated by the process of decolonization. Its inevitability, combined with economic fragility and social pressures, impressed a need for urgent change on the domestic front and a new positioning as regards foreign policy. The redefinition of Portugal's strategic objectives was inevitable and irreversible. In truth, a dynamic of political evolution was under way that gave priority to accession to the European Communities. In the economist Ernâni Lopes's words, «with decolonization and EEC accession, Portugal has begun a new cycle in her history».

Thus, it became possible to consider Portugal within the project of European construction, and to rethink its place and role in Europe and in the world. The alternative would be isolation on the periphery of a United Europe, while its neighbour, Spain, was stepping up its own process of accession to the EEC.

However, Portugal had never been truly absent from Europe. This rapprochement should perhaps rather be seen as a «re-encounter with a historical vocation for openness» enabling Portugal to proceed «along its historic path». For some, accession meant joining a Europe in crisis; for others, it was a way of overcoming a specifically-Portuguese crisis.

Following the formation of the First Constitutional Government, the Prime Minister, Mário Soares formally submitted Portugal's membership application on 28 March 1977, claiming that by joining Europe, Portugal could best develop «her national potential and fulfil her universalist

²¹ M.M. Tavares Ribeiro, *Portugal e o novo desafio europeu*, in Id. (ed.), *Olhares sobre a Europa*, Coimbra, Quarteto, 2002, p. 122.

and African vocation». Thus, it was understood that membership of the EEC would accentuate Portugal's international dimension, as well as being necessary for political, economic, historico-cultural and social reasons²². The European challenge was translated into a modernization of methods, practices and mentalities.

Negotiations officially began on 17 October 1978. However, it took seven years of successive and insistent efforts before the Treaty was signed at the Jeronimos Monastery on 12 June 1985, on the same day that Spain signed its own Accession Treaty. On 1 January 1986, the Iberian countries became the newest members of a twelve-state Europe.

6. *Europe – fatality or need?*

The analysis of official documentation and publications, magazines, newspapers and conferences shows (as Martins da Silva points out)²³ that, in the revolutionary period between 1974 and 1975, European accession did not attract much attention from intellectuals and public opinion. It figured in political discourse but not in the manifestos of the various political parties.

After the revolutionary process was over, there was increased concern about Portugal's future and Europe, and for some, the Common Market became equated with strategic solutions. For others, however, it was an option to avoid.

The negotiation process was not all peaceful. There, a debate found support in public opinion, but it even aroused criticism, perplexity and reflection. There was not, therefore, a generalized consensus in Portugal as there was in

²² Id., *Il Portogallo in Europa (1945-1986)*, in A. Landuyt, D. Preda (eds.), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1970-1986*, t. 1, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, pp. 363-385.

²³ A. Martins da Silva, *Portugal e a Europa. Distanciamento e reencontro*, Viseu, Palimage, 2005, *passim*.

neighbouring Spain. One current of opinion (the largest) was optimistic. It sought to consolidate the young democracy, and saw this as the right path to enable economic development and the fulfilment of its social objectives. Thus, for supporters, Portugal's membership of Europe was a necessary and irreversible step.

However, many traditionalists and ultranationalists rejected the European option on the grounds it would damage Portugal's relationships with other Portuguese-speaking countries. For them, Africa was the alternative solution, in the context of a transcontinental multinational Portugal; joining Europe would therefore be fatal to this dream. For others, it was a lesser evil, while still others considered it an imperative of Portuguese history and culture. For them «Europe would be a platform of our identity». It would help Portugal overcome her lack of belief in herself, exorcising traumas and complexes that were clearly unfounded, and would also resolve the crisis arising from decolonization and political and military disaggregation. For this current of opinion, EC membership would be a stimulus not only for economic growth but also cultural and civilizational construction.

Amongst political parties, there was no unanimity on the subject. The Socialist Party (PS) and Social Democrat Party (PSD) supported EC membership unconditionally, while the Christian Democrats (CDS) were lukewarm. The Communist Party (PC), on the other, declared itself to be firmly against, on the grounds that it would represent an unacceptable submission to capitalist imperialism.

The *Eurobarometer* showed prospects of EEC membership did not stimulate the Portuguese. In 1981, 62% of Portuguese had no opinion on the matter; 19% considered membership to be positive, and 19% had doubts. In fact, it was the organs of sovereignty, democratic political class and business and socio-professional sectors that demonstrated the greatest determination in moving the process forward.

With time, the panorama gradually changed. Interest grew, as can be seen in the various publications that appeared. However, the titles and headlines of books and magazi-

nes show that the topics that were most covered concerned technical and sectoral aspects of EC policy, rather than institutional matters or the question of Europe's future.

After accession, support for the EC rose to 60%, and by October 1990 had reached 80%. Since then, the situation has changed only gradually, reflecting the fact the Portuguese continue to be ill-informed about the European Union.

It is not that EU membership was questioned by either the elites or the majority of the population. What could be seen was that Portugal's involvement in the European political system had an unexpectedly negative (though not unavoidable) impact upon democratic transparency and political mobilization in Portugal.

7. *Spain and Europe*

In the context of Spain's membership of the European Community, we might wonder about the attitudes of the «1898 generation» towards Spanish identity and the possibility of a «return to Europe». In 1910, the writer José Ortega y Gasset claimed: «Spain is the problem, Europe the solution».

In the context of the First World War, when Spain remained neutral, Europe became an important topic of debate between supporters of the Allies and Germanophiles, for various generations²⁴. Some of the representatives of currents of thought arising from the 98 Generation (such as Salvador de Madariaga, Miguel de Unamuno, Joaquín Costa and José Ortega y Gasset) hoped for the renewal of Europe. As Madariaga concluded, «it is important to make Spain a European country».

²⁴ M. Samaniego Boneu, *L'Europe de Salvador de Madariaga*, in A. Bachoud, J. Cuesta, M. Trebisch (eds.), *Les Intellectuels et l'Europe de 1945 à nos jours*, Paris, Publications universitaires Denis Diderot, 2000, pp. 43-55.

Those adolescents of 98, after finishing their university careers, travelled through Europe to places such as Berlin, Oxford, Paris and other European capitals. Many were prepared to «live in Europe» (that is, to educate themselves in European cultures, according to Unamuno), which meant that, when they returned to Spain, they brought with them ideals of academic socialism and scientific rigour. It was this 1914 Generation that struggled for educational policies, for education for all social classes and for social security. In 1910, Ortega y Gasset, along with other intellectuals, founded the magazine *Europa*. However, by the end of the first decade of the XX Century and during the first years of the 1920s, these European perspectives had withered. Thus, Ortega, analysing contemporary problems and the crisis of European culture, felt that Europe had not invented new principles and that the problems of Spain would not be solved with European recipes. That is, he thought of Spain as «the spiritual promontory of Europe» and as the «prow of the continent's soul». In considering the First World War as a consequence, rather than a cause, Ortega reflected on «the demoralization of Europe» and the crisis in values. Thus, the question raised was: «Who is in control?» («Quién manda en el mundo?»). In his work *La rebelión de las masas*, («The Rebellion of the Masses»), he proposed the construction of the United States of Europe as a great supranational state. In his words, «the construction of Europe as a great national state, the only undertaking that could counter the victory of the 'five year plan'»²⁵.

Ortega's pro-Europeanism underwent three distinct stages. From 1907 to 1914, he saw Europe as Spain's salvation. Then, between 1923 and 1929, Europe meant «crisis of Modernity»; while from 1929 to 1955, it implied past but even future – the transcendence of the nation state and the emergence of a supranational historic entity. For this

²⁵ J. Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas*, t. IV, Madrid, Taurus – Fundación José Ortega y Gasset, 2005.

philosopher, therefore, Europe was a historical reality and not just a political and cultural ideal²⁶.

The crisis of 1898, provoked by the loss of the colonies, produced in intellectuals and historians (such as José Ortega y Gasset, Miguel de Unamuno, Eugenio d'Ors, Américo Castro and Joaquín Costa) the idea that «Europeanization» was necessary for Spain's economic, scientific, technical and cultural modernization²⁷. With the civil war in 1936 and the Franco dictatorship, Spain (turned towards Latin America since the Second World War) experienced isolation on the periphery of Europe, condemned by the international community.

For the Spanish, Europe was a continent with three large areas of reference: Mediterranean Europe, Atlantic Europe and Germanic Europe²⁸. Indeed, Europe meant different things throughout the 20th Century, and was not the same before and after the Second World War. Thus, Europe was interpreted not only as a key to modernization, but rather in reactionary terms.

For some Europe was an ethical, social and cultural necessity, tied to a particular discourse, that of Europeanization; moreover, it meant «modernization» in the sense of «ratification» by Europe (i.e. a means of enabling the country to evolve towards the European «standard»). Finally, Europe, through Europeanization, represented a project of coexistence amongst Spaniards, becoming the great nationalizing and mobilizing objective of the Century. This project was seen by many Spaniards as a kind of «political manifesto». That is, Europe meant democracy and industrialization²⁹.

²⁶ J. Zamora Bonilla, *El mundo que pude ser. El concepto «Europa» en el proyecto político orteguiano*, in «Revista de Estudios Europeos», n. 40, Mayo-Agosto, 2005, p. 23.

²⁷ G. Bueno, *España frente a Europa*, Barcelona, Alba Editorial, 1999, pp. 26 ss.

²⁸ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2008.

²⁹ A. Pérez Sánchez, *Historia de la integración europea*, Barcelona, Ariel, 2001.

8. *Franco – the idea of Europe*

At the beginning of the XX Century, Spain was an internationally-marginalized country on the European periphery. It was economically weak until 1959, and, as Roberto Mesa points out, excluded from the political process of European construction prior to its transition to democracy³⁰. In fact, Spain experienced two different governments and various foreign policies. With the Franco dictatorship, Spain could not be part of the construction of Europe, for a country with a government that did not respect democratic values and human rights did not qualify for membership. Although becoming gradually involved in international relations³¹, it only formalised its application for EEC membership on 1 July 1977. In the meantime, many economic and political changes had taken place. That is to say, Spain had become a democracy, undergone considerable advances in agriculture and industry, and had tightened its ties with EC authorities. After a long period of difficult negotiations, official accession took place on 12th June 1985. According to Mathieu Trouvé, there was a broad consensus on this issue involving public opinion, civil society, the political class and economic circles. There was a concern to show that democratic Spain would not be an isolated nation, but would play an important role in the framework of international relations³². Berta Álvarez-Miranda adds it was now a country with a «complete political consensus»³³.

Spain's relations with the European communities, as well as its international relations, generated many academic conferences and a vast bibliography. Trouvé's work *L'Espa-*

³⁰ R. Mesa, *La posición internacional de España. Entre el centro y la periferia*, in «Leviatán», n. 33, 1988.

³¹ V. Morales Lezcano, *L'Espagne: de l'isolationnisme à l'intégration internationales*, in «Relations Internationales», n. 50, 1987, pp. 147-155.

³² M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit.

³³ B. Álvarez-Miranda, *El sur de Europa y la adhesión a la Comunidad. Los debates políticos*, Madrid, CIS, 1996.

*gne et l'Europe*³⁴ is a very thorough survey of the subject. For the period 1945-1960 (which was the most studied), he mentions the works of Ángel Viñas³⁵, Florentino Portero³⁶, Anne Dulphy³⁷, Pedro Martínez Lillo³⁸, Rosa Pardo³⁹. Other authors were concerned with Spain's relations with the European communities, though these were not very plentiful before 1986. There were even articles and book chapters that analysed the history of the democratic transition and international relations. However, in the 1940s to '60s, works about Spain's relations with the EEC were limited to the analysis of Spanish authors on very specific aspects. However, we should point out the work of diplomat Raimundo Bassols on *España en Europa*⁴⁰, which explains, drawing upon his personal testimony, the process of Spain's membership from 1957 to 1985. Other important works are those by María Teresa La Porte⁴¹ António Moreno Juste⁴² and Julio Crespo⁴³.

However, as I have previously said, Trouvé's work offers an important contribution to ideas of Europe in the Franco

³⁴ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit.

³⁵ Á. Viñas, *Guerra, Dinero, Dictadura. Ayuda fascista y autarquía en la España de Franca*, Barcelona, Editorial Crítica, 1984.

³⁶ F. Portero, *Franco aislado: la cuestión española, 1945-1950*, Madrid, Aguilar, 1989.

³⁷ A. Dulphy, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955. Entre idéologie et réalisme*, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 2002.

³⁸ P. Martínez Lillo, *Las relaciones hispano-francesas en el marco del aislamiento internacional del régimen franquista (1945-1950)*, Madrid, Universidad Autónoma, 1993.

³⁹ J. Tusell, J. Avilés, R. Pardo, *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*, Madrid, UNED/Biblioteca Nueva, 2000.

⁴⁰ R. Bassols, *España en Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la Comunidad europea, 1957-1985*, Madrid, Estudios de Política Exterior, 1995.

⁴¹ M.T. La Porte, *La política europea del régimen de Franco (1957-1962)*, Pampelune, EUNSA, 1992.

⁴² A. Moreno Juste, *Franquismo y construcción europea (1951-1962). Anhelo, necesidad y realidad de la aproximación a Europa*, Madrid, Tecnos, 1998.

⁴³ J. Crespo MacLennan, *España en Europa. 1945-2000. Del ostracismo a la modernidad*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2004.

period and the presence of Spain in the EEC/EU, as well as supplying an abundant bibliography and list of sources⁴⁴.

Franco's Spain suffered the consequences of European exclusion. By 1946, the UN had condemned the Franco regime. The Spanish government did not participate in the Hague Congress of 1948; Spain was not part of the Council of Europe; it was outside the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Western European Union (WEU). Nor was it represented in the debates about the Treaties of Rome in 1957, or the formation of the Common Market. It is interesting to see that in the memoirs of some of the protagonists of the process of European construction (as in works about that construction), Spain is scarcely mentioned until it joined the EEC⁴⁵.

However, between 1957 and 1975, approximation to the EEC became increasingly important for Franco, not only out of economic necessity, but even for political reasons. Thus, association agreements were negotiated (1962), a commercial accord was signed (June 1970) and diplomatic missions took place. According to Trouvé, from 1959, there was a greater approximation to the EEC in the field of an economic liberalization policy, and policies even became more coherent. Pro-Europe attitudes appeared, amongst technocrats (who considered first and foremost the question of economic development), diplomats (who saw approximation to Europe as the way out of Spain's isolation) and even amongst opponents of the Franco regime who desired democratization through closer contact with Europe⁴⁶.

Trouvé's study pays particular attention to important diplomatic sources, which prove essential to understand

⁴⁴ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*. See also H.-C. Senante Berendes, *España y Europa: El camino hacia la integración*, in S. Forner Muñoz (ed.), *La construcción de Europa. De las «guerras civiles» a la «unificación»*, Madrid, Colección Historia Biblioteca Nueva, 2007, pp. 263-280.

⁴⁶ J.C. Pereira, *Europeización de España/Españolización de Europa: el dilema histórico resuelto*, in «Documentación Social», n. 111, 1998, pp. 39-58.

the interest of European approximation during the Franco regime⁴⁷. It might be said there was «a European question at the heart of Spanish government and a Spanish question at the heart of the European Community»⁴⁸.

This approximation owed a great deal to the ministers that made up the government at that time, who included jurists, economists, professors and members of civil society. Men such as Alberto Lellastres Calvo, Mariano Navarro Rubio and Laureano López Rodó opposed autocratic rule, had legal training, and were members of Catholic Action and Opus Dei⁴⁹ (whose influence needs to be taken into account). Then, there were those ministers stimulating the government to give special attention to the Common Market, i.e. to the practice of economic liberalism.

Obviously, there was no unanimity amongst government bodies. In fact, the Phalangists demonstrated their scepticism about the European issue and defended Spain's ability to defend herself on the economic plane with regard to the Europe of Six. Before these two positions (the Catholic Europe-sympathising technocrats and the sceptical Phalangists), Franco tried to mediate, without abandoning his autocratic guidelines⁵⁰. In fact, he ultimately played a decisive role regarding Spanish foreign policy between 1939 and 1975⁵¹.

Franco's notion of foreign policy was limited; that is to say, what concerned him most was that the political regime should not be threatened. Analysis of his speeches shows Europe was not, for him, an essential idea. What, then, was Europe for Franco? He defined it as a legal, moral and spi-

⁴⁷ J.C. MacIennan, *El europeísmo español en la época de Franco y su influencia en el proceso de democratización política*, in «Espacio, Tiempo y Forma», série V, t. X, UNED, 1997, pp. 349-367.

⁴⁸ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit.

⁴⁹ G. Hermet, *Les Catholiques dans l'Espagne franquiste*, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 2 vols., 1980-1981, p. 243 e p. 270.

⁵⁰ A. Bachoud, *Franco*, Paris, Fayard, 1997.

⁵¹ J.C. Pereira Castañares, *La política exterior, 1939-1975*, in J. Paredes (ed.), *Historia contemporánea de España (siglo XX)*, Barcelona, Ariel, 2000, p. 725.

ritual entity, and therefore synonymous with Christianity. Furthermore, Europe was, and had to be in his opinion, the link binding Europe and America. In a speech on 31 December 1959, Franco described Europe as «a unity of destiny between the peoples of Europe». As such, he understood that Spain should develop economically and socially at the pace of Europe, without, however, losing sight of its political stability and national independence⁵². In this way, even if the country should sign trade agreements and respect the importance of the Common Market, the regime should nevertheless remain unchanged.

His conception of the nation, of national movement, was not compatible with supranational institutions or with intergovernmental organizations. For this reason, he left it to the diplomats and ministers to act in matters of foreign policy. It was Fernando Maria Castella, Minister of Foreign Affairs from February 1957, who launched a new phase of openness to Europe stimulating the pro-Europe current of diplomats and monarchic circles that desired democracy⁵³. This openness had the effect of accelerating the economic development following the European model⁵⁴.

As such, Spain under Franco enjoyed some degree of European recognition⁵⁵ and became involved with some European and international economic organizations, such as the ILO (1956), IMF and the World Bank (1958), and OECD (1959). These were, however, priority options, while approximation to the EEC and EFTA progressed much more slowly until 1961⁵⁶. Thus, Spain applied to

⁵² H. Paris Aguilaz, *España y el movimiento de integración europea*, in «Arbor», numero speciale, Madrid, IX/X, 1962, p. 76.

⁵³ J. Durán-Loriga, *Memorias diplomáticas*, Madrid, Siddhart Mehta ediciones, 1999.

⁵⁴ J. Larraz, *La integración europea y España*, Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1961.

⁵⁵ A. Bachoud, *L'Espagne et l'Europe ou le chemin de la démocratie*, in M. Catala (ed.), *Histoire de la construction européenne. Cinquante ans après la déclaration Schuman*, Nantes, Ouest Éditions, 2001, pp. 313-321.

⁵⁶ A. Moreno Juste, *España en el proceso de integración europea*, in R.M. Martín de la Guardia, A.G. Pérez Sánchez (eds.), *Historia de la integración*

join in February 1962. In fact, the main stimulus was the need for a development to overcome an economic backwardness, and to include Spain in the European economic circuit⁵⁷. Furthermore, these economic prospects were of interest to Europeans too. This approximation to the EEC and to EFTA was Spain's natural vocation in order to overcome international ostracism and become included in the economic and political community of Atlantic countries⁵⁸. Although a diplomatic isolation was pronounced, the same could not be said about the economic plane. Therefore, as the newspapers of the period insist, and as Moreno Juste has clearly documented, Spain had to choose between Europe or isolation⁵⁹.

9. *Images of Spain in Europe and of Europe in Spain*

After the Second World War, «Europeanization» gave way to «Europeism», which meant democratization and opposition to Franco's dictatorship; that is to say, it acquired strong political connotations. It was manifested through democratic and anti-regime movements⁶⁰, such as the Society for Spanish and European Economic Studies (1949), the Institute for European Studies in Barcelona, the Federal Council of the Spanish Committee of the European Movement (1951-1952), and various conferences and seminars were held on European studies in the Universities of Barcelona, Saragossa, Valladolid, Madrid, Santiago de Compostela, as well as in associations and clubs.

Debates between the unionist and federalist currents even occurred in Spain in the 1950s. The European Econo-

europaea, Barcelona, Ariel, 2001, pp. 167-214.

⁵⁷ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit.

⁵⁸ M.T. La Porte, *La política europea del régimen de Franco (1957-1962)*, Pampelune, EUNSA, 1992.

⁵⁹ A. Moreno Juste, *Franquismo y construcción europea (1951-1962). Anheles, necesidad y realidad de la aproximación a Europa*, Madrid, Tecnos, 1998.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

mic Cooperation League was set up in 1945-1947. Contacts with Coudenhove-Kalergi and Salvador de Madariaga were useful and the federalist movement was represented, though it acquired considerably more impulse after 1970 with Enrique Tierno Galván and Pablo Benavides. The Federalist European Centre was created in the 1960s, though without much representativeness.

Reference should be made to the importance of the Spanish Association for European Cooperation, formed in 1954 of members of various political sectors. This organised meetings, debates and conferences about the role of Spain and European construction⁶¹. It should even be mentioned that in the field of business, particularly in industrial sectors, there was a clear inclination towards EEC membership. Commerce and banking fostered the need to increase transactions with EC markets, while farmers, for their part, understood the Common Market would be in their interests.

9.1. *What Spain for Europe?*

For some Europeans, Spain was at that time a country living under a dictatorship. For others, however, it was exotic and different, and therefore attractive. These two images were therefore opposed. The negative one was predominant in France, while the more positive one, emphasizing the Spain's cultural wealth that attracted writers, politicians and intellectuals. Spain of course became a popular tourist destination, thanks to Franco propaganda; a 1959 slogan declaring «Spain is different» is revealing. However, the tourist flows were due more to the image of a country that aroused curiosity with its exoticism than a country in development⁶². On the other hand, the image persisted of a rural backward country from which many

⁶¹ M.T. La Porte, *La política europea del régimen de Franco*, cit.

⁶² R. Núñez Florencio, *Sol y sangre. La imagen de España en el mundo*, Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 2001.

people emigrated. However, this was not the whole picture. Trouvé emphasises how there began to be a turn towards Europe that was gradually fulfilled. Thus, he concludes that Europe was not, in the 1960s, a «new idea»⁶³. In fact, Spanish Europeanism already had roots in the ideas of intellectuals, politicians and the movements and associations cultivating the idea of Spain in a «United Europe»⁶⁴.

10. *Membership application: reactions*

The year 1962 was of considerable importance for Spain's application for EEC membership. At that time, the EEC was dealing with a series of other applications. This was a moment of debate in Spain and of vehement reactions to the Franco government. At the heart of the debate was the «Spanish question» which motivated the 4th Congress of the European Movement, held on 5 and 6 June 1962, which brought together various currents opposed to the regime, launching a new anti-Franco phase. This Congress was important, not only because of the debate about the relations between Spain and the EEC, but even because of the analysis of the development of the Franco regime. It was known the membership process would involve democratization, so the Congress' decision did not leave the government indifferent. The reaction was immediate. However, this caused the regime's image to deteriorate further, and both public opinion and the press were vehement in their indignation. Before the facts, external manifestations were not long in coming. From then on, the European debate was centred almost exclusively upon the democratization of the regime. The discussions did not focus so much upon the question of whether there should be a monarchy or a republic, rather upon the need for a democracy to over-

⁶³ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit.

⁶⁴ E. du Réau, *L'Idée d'Europe au XX^e siècle. Des mythes aux réalités*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 2001, p.15.

throw the dictatorship. Thus, Spain's gradual approximation to the EEC was a route to democracy⁶⁵.

Nevertheless, relations between Spain and the EEC declined in the last years of the Franco government. Similarly, there were no alterations in the regime. The opposition movements gained strength, and Prince Juan Carlos displeased the government with his Europeanist rhetoric and conviction according to which the dictatorship was not favourable to Spain's membership of the European communities⁶⁶. Then, in September-October 1975 came the rupture between Franco's government and the EEC. Democratic Europe could not enter into an agreement with an intensely repressive regime that had committed serious human rights offences. Franco's regime was condemned throughout Europe. The democratic experiments of Portugal and Greece animated democrats and opposition forces, and there was even, famously, opposition at the heart of the regime itself⁶⁷. The Spanish Socialist Party led by Felipe González, other parties and political associations, and the Spanish Communist Party supported the entry of democratic Spain into the EEC but, in 1975, relations were very fragile. However, with the death of Franco on 20th November 1975, hopes for democratization and of a new approximation to the European Community were renewed. From 1950 to 1975, there was a great deal of fertile reflection on ideas of Europe. Spain accompanied the process of European construction, but its accession was not consummated until 1985.

⁶⁵ A. Bachoud, *L'Espagne et l'Europe ou le chemin de la démocratie*, in M. Catala (ed.), *Histoire de la construction européenne*, cit., pp. 313-321.

⁶⁶ C. Powell, *Juan Carlos. Un Rey para la democracia*, Barcelona, Ariel-Planeta, 1995, pp. 88-91.

⁶⁷ S. Vilar, *História del antifranquismo, 1939-1975*, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 1984, pp. 457-460.

11. *Democratization and the European challenge*

Firstly, it was necessary to carry out the transition to democracy, because without it, there could be no membership of the European Communities. The second challenge was to prepare the membership application, to find out how public opinion would react, and finally undertake the necessary negotiations.

King Juan Carlos even believed in the need for a democratic transition. In his idea of Europe, Europe and Spain would be interconnected; that is Europe would be able to count on Spain, as he emphasised in his speech on 22 November 1975⁶⁸.

Democracy was definitively achieved after the elections of 1977 and the constitution of 1978, and both King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez played a crucial role. Foreign reactions were divided. Some countries (Italy and the Nordic countries) watched cautiously as the Spanish situation unfolded. France revealed serious reservations. Others (such as the FRG and Helmut Schmidt) welcomed it confidently, encouraging the acceleration of Spain's entry into the Common Market. However, the EEC Council of Ministers resumed negotiations with Spain, and the European Commission welcomed the Spanish decision to apply for membership on 28 July 1977. The European Parliament, for its part, rejoiced at the success of the democratic transition and reiterated its desire to count on Spain within the EEC. Public opinion and the press (*Le Monde*, *L'Express*) showed some concern in 1975, but enthusiastically accepted the change of Spanish politics in 1976, more than its image in the economic sphere. On the level of international relations, and with the legacy of Franco, the process was long and gradual.

The idea, according to which Europe had and should continue to have an important place, persisted; indeed,

⁶⁸ P. Preston, *Juan Carlos. El rey de un pueblo*, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 2003, pp. 359 ss.

King Juan Carlos claimed «Europe without Spain would be incomplete». This explains Spain's membership of the Council of Europe in November 1976. The fact that Portugal joined the Council of Europe on 22 September 1976 was surely a mobilizing factor. Spain's membership application to join the EEC was submitted on 28 July 1977.

12. A «Spanish-style» consensus

The consensus amongst Spanish society and public opinion regarding Spain's application for membership of the EEC was remarkable. According to Trouvé⁶⁹, there had been nothing of the kind in Greece or Portugal. There was a social consensus (i.e. a desire to see Spain a member of the EEC), a political consensus (the political elite had pronounced favourably), as well as an economic consensus (as the economic actors expressed an interest in Spain's membership of the Common Market)⁷⁰.

The Europeanism of the Spanish was manifest even before the application was formally made. Surveys, carried out between 1976 and 1983, show 68,25% accepted membership of the Common Market and 55,66% agreed with it, a figure that rose to 61% in 1984. According to the *Eurobarometer* (October 1982), 48% of Spaniards considered EEC membership to be positive and only 7% thought it negative, with 26,7% remaining undecided⁷¹. Thus, we might say (and Trouvé's sample is well grounded) that the idea of Europe persisted in the Spanish spirit. The consensus was therefore constant, and the idea of a European community, including Spain, overcame party divides. The Europeanism of the Spanish

⁶⁹ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit. See also *La opinión pública en la Comunidad europea. España y el Mercado común*, Madrid, Nuevo Horizonte, 1965, pp. 233-242.

⁷⁰ P. Oñate Rubalca, *Consenso y ideología en la transición política española*, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1998.

⁷¹ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit.

was manifested as a «natural and spontaneous feeling», in Fernando Morán's words or, as others expressed it, it was intuitive. Thus, there was a consensus on the idea of European community, and it was becoming a priority feeling. In fact, this sentiment was clear to the outside and the EC institutions, as this was what the Spanish wanted. It came from the desire to overcome political, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural isolation. And the consensus formed part of the discourse on the Spanish transition.

The political parties on the right, Adolfo Suárez' Union of the Democratic Centre and Manuel Fraga's People's Alliance were openly pro-Europe, while for the left, membership of the European Community was the realistic option. Even the Communist Party under Santiago Carrillo, critical of the Common Market, became manifestly pro-Europe since 1972. However, Europe did not mean the same thing to the right and the left. Rather, it brought together the necessary values and guarantees, and was thus seen as a sort of salvation⁷². In other words, the European community created a consensus from the syncretism of economic and political Europeanism.

Up to 1980, there was almost total consensus. However, after 1981, this began to evaporate. According to Trouvé, the consensus was «total» or «partial», «open» or «closed», «spontaneous» or «opportunistic» depending upon different phases of the negotiation, debates and criticisms as reflected in the polls.

The consensus is real but should be seen in proportion. What matters is that it is an effective myth, and as with all myths, what counts is that it exists, that it is conceived and perceived as something that both explains and mobilises⁷³.

With the socialist government of Felipe González (1982), the idea of a European community helped to consolidate the Spanish democratic system. That is to say, the

⁷² *Ibidem.*

⁷³ *Ibidem.*

democratic project and the European one were inseparable⁷⁴.

According to Fernando Morán, with the signature of the Accession Treaty on 12 June 1985, «Spain refound her place»⁷⁵ in the European whole. For the Spanish, the historic moment represented the end of ostracism, the «return» to Europe and the rediscovery of Spain by Europe⁷⁶. It also meant, in some way, the recovery of Spanish identity itself. The entry into the EEC on 1 January 1986 represented what Joaquín Costa called «regeneration». Pereira Castañares said the same thing in other words: «The Europeanization of Spain/Spanishification of Europe: The historical dilemma resolved»⁷⁷.

In the 1990s, Spain acquired a prominent position and under the Socialist government of Felipe González consolidated its importance in the field of international relations⁷⁸. The government of José María Aznar (1996) of the People's Party had national, Atlantic concerns and was concerned about economic and commercial progress; consequently, it gave priority to the United States connection and took a more cautious attitude in the revision of the European treaties. The present Socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, in power since 2004, relaunched the question of Europe in foreign policy, and during his second mandate, begun in 2008, pursued a policy of a strong efficient EU, particularly during the second Spanish presidency of the EU in 2010.

⁷⁴ F. Morán, *Una política exterior para España*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1980, p. 326.

⁷⁵ Id., *España en su sitio*, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés/Cambio 16, 1990, p. 452.

⁷⁶ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe: 1919-1992*, in S. Schirmann (ed.), *Penser et construire l'Europe (1919-1992)*, Paris, Sedes, 2007, pp. 171-189.

⁷⁷ J.C. Pereira, *Europeización de España/Españolización de Europa: el dilema histórico resuelto*, in «Documentación Social», n. 111, 1998, pp. 39-58.

⁷⁸ R. Mesa, *La politique extérieure*, in F. Moderne, P. Bon (eds.), *Espagne: les années Aznar*, Paris, La Documentation française, 2004, p. 77.

13. *The challenge of the EU today*

It is clear that this «Spanish-style consensus» gained strength in the 1970s and 1980s, and that after official accession, it underwent some change. That is to say, the attitude today is not always so euphoric. By 1987, Spanish public opinion was more reticent and even sceptical in relation to the EEC, as surveys show. The sample is significant. 58% of Spaniards responded in 1987, with an attitude that was clearly pessimistic, declaring they did not recognise the beneficial effects of EC membership. By 2001, euro-scepticism had become even more pronounced, with 60% claiming to be indifferent to the possible disappearance of the EU⁷⁹. However, we might conclude with Pierre Bon's opinion, who claims that a large sector of the political class and civil society still cultivates «Europhilism»⁸⁰, that is to say, that today there is an authentic existing and resisting «European passion in Spain».

⁷⁹ P. Bon, *L'intégration dans le système international*, in «Pouvoirs», n. 124, 2008, p. 124.

⁸⁰ M. Trouvé, *L'Espagne et l'Europe*, cit.