



Fernando Cavalcante

COMING INTO LIFE:

The concept of peacebuilding in the United Nations,
from *An Agenda for Peace* to the Peacebuilding Commission

Tese de Doutoramento em Relações Internacionais — Política Internacional e Resolução
de Conflitos apresentada à Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra.

Coimbra, 2013



UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA



• U

C •

FEUC

FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA
UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA

Fernando Carlos Cavalcante Barros Rodrigues

Coming into life:

The concept of peacebuilding in the United Nations,
from *An Agenda for Peace* to the Peacebuilding Commission

Tese de Doutoramento em Relações Internacionais — Política
Internacional e Resolução de Conflitos apresentada à Faculdade de
Economia da Universidade de Coimbra para obtenção do grau de
Doutor.

Orientadora: Prof. Doutora Paula Duarte Lopes

Coimbra, 2013

À minha família.
And to peacebuilders everywhere.

Acknowledgements

In my first session as a PhD student, I was told that completing a doctoral research was a rewarding, but equally long, tortuous, challenging and solitary experience. I certainly agree, although I would now say that ‘solitary’ is, at a minimum, an inaccurate qualification. Of course, writing a monograph is by definition a lonely endeavour. But doing research, I learned, despite including periods of seemingly unending confinement for writing purposes, is an inherently social practice. It is about making sense of the world(s) in which we live by constantly interpreting ours and others’ experiences. It necessarily requires establishing dialogues and lines of communication with audiences in particular (and often distinct) contexts. And it requires documenting our progress to ensure that others can engage with our interpretations. This thesis represents a partial product of my social experience as a PhD student and a testament to the invaluable support I received from a range of institutions and individuals over the last five years. And I am afraid a short acknowledgment note would not do them justice.

This thesis would not have been written without a doctoral scholarship granted by Portugal’s *Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia* (FCT), which enabled me to conduct research full time and supported a three-month stay in New York in 2010. A fellowship from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme enabled me to write the bulk of this thesis based at the University of Bradford, in England. Research leading to this thesis also benefited from the support of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST), which funded a Short-term Scientific Mission that allowed me to carry out bibliographic research in Sweden. For ultimately financing this research, even in difficult times, I am grateful to the Portuguese and to the European taxpayer. I also thank the Academic Council of the United Nations System (ACUNS) for enabling my participation in its 2011 Summer Workshop, where I presented parts of this research to a most knowledgeable audience.

Dozens of individuals played a direct or indirect role in the process leading to the completion of this thesis. My supervisor, Paula Duarte Lopes, offered indescribable

guidance, support and encouragement throughout the entire journey, starting even before I first arrived in Portugal. She was a patient interlocutor and a meticulous reader, helping to flesh out emerging ideas and going through several (often unclear and poorly written) drafts of this thesis or parts thereof. Not rarely, Paula went out of her way to help coming up with solutions to bureaucratic hassles – and there were a few along the way! Despite the years, her ability to do so creatively never ceased to surprise me.

In Coimbra, professors and fellow PhD colleagues contributed to create a stimulating and friendly environment for dialogue and exchange of views. Maria Raquel Freire, Gen. Pedro Pezarat Correia and José Manuel Pureza led seminars most conducive to thought-provoking conversations on a range of topics of interest in contemporary peace and conflict studies. Over the years, they also posed challenging questions and made constructive comments that helped shape much of the scope and design of my research. I am also indebted to other faculty members and colleagues who generously offered their time on countless occasions to provide feedback and comment on early ideas and draft papers, including but not limited to: Maria João Barata, André Barrinha, Ramon Blanco, Marisa Borges, Teresa Cravo, Fernando Ludwig, Tatiana Moura, Daniela Nascimento, Gilberto Oliveira, Pascoal Pereira, Catarina Pimenta, Mónica Rafael, Rita Santos, Sofia Santos and Licínia Simão.

Sharon Wiharta was an unfailing host at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), granting me unrestricted access to a most specialised library and offering invaluable insights into the world of United Nations (UN) peace operations. Nenne Bodell and Olle Persson helped me navigate through the library's collection and facilitated my access to a wealth of bibliographic resources across Scandinavia.

The Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations agreed to host me for the first period of field research in New York and offered instrumental support in subsequent visits. João Lucas Quental created the opportunity and Norberto Moretti warmly welcomed me in the Security Council team. Norberto invariably found a way to accommodate any request related to my research and frankly shared his thoughts and experiences on multilateral diplomacy with me. Marcelo Böhlke, Christiano Figueirôa, Daniel Nogueira Leitão, Juliano Maia, Kassius Pontes and João Vargas were most kind and generous in sharing their insights and experiences into the workings of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council, as well as in helping establish contact with their counterparts. I am

grateful for the unending patience, availability and support of the Mission staff during my stay and subsequent visits.

At the University of Bradford, Jim Whitman opened the doors of the Department of Peace Studies and offered unfaltering support in the writing-up phase of this thesis. He carefully examined the first full draft, helping me find the right way to construct and the precise tone to convey my own narrative. Among several others individuals in the peace studies community, Libby Kerr (*in memoriam*), Roberta Maschietto, Laura O'Connor and James Wanki ensured that the writing process was not too overwhelming.

I have a great debt of gratitude to dozens of individuals who took the time to share their experiences and views with me, during either interviews or impromptu informal conversations in the corridors of the UN and elsewhere.

I am also deeply indebted to several scholars and researchers who supported my work in different ways over the last few years. Some of them acted as discussants and/or participants in conferences, offering insightful comments on preliminary versions of different chapters of this thesis. Some facilitated contacts with experts on specific topics or helped me reach out to potential interviewees. Others went out of their way to share preliminary or unpublished versions of their work. And a few did all of the above. Among those, I would like to thank especially: Christian Bueger, Charles T. Call, Roger A. Coate, Alistair Edgar, Shepard Forman, Johan Galtung, Branislav Gosovic, Stefano Guzzini, Piki Ish-Shalom, Lisa McCann, Gearoid Millar, Daniel Pinéu, Oliver Richmond, Timothy Sisk, Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, Thomas Weiss, Susan Woodward and Vanessa Wyeth.

James Sutterlin and Tapio Kanninen kindly granted me access to their personal files and offered their time generously on different occasions during a period of more than a year. Their extraordinary memories, as well as their profound knowledge of the intricacies of the workings of the Secretariat, gave life to names and events, contributing to make my research on the UN in the late 1980s and early 1990s a lot more vivid.

At Yale University, Jean Krasno facilitated by all possible means my access to some of the paperwork related to the War Risk Reduction Project.

Via correspondence, Nancy Watson provided support and invaluable information about records in the papers of Richard Thrnoburgh, kept at the Univerisy of Pittsburgh.

Neshantha Karunanayake, Amanda Leinberger and Cheikh Ndiaye, from the UN Archives, and Susan Kurtas and Joëlle Sciboz, from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, spared no efforts to help me identify and go through relevant old records and documents.

Of course, despite the support of all those institutions and individuals, the views herein advanced are my own and I take full responsibility for any mistakes and/or omissions in this thesis.

I extend my gratitude to *Projeto Portinari* and to the copyright owner for the kind and generous permission to reproduce in the cover a detail of the panel *Peace*, by Candido Portinari. The full image stands opposite to the twin panel *War* at the entrance hall of the UN General Assembly. The two timeless representations of the joys of everyday life in nonviolent times and of the unbearable suffering caused by armed conflicts, respectively, constantly remind officials and delegates of the UN mission to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (United Nations, 1945: Preamble).

Nenhuma palavra de agradecimento, nem mesmo na minha língua materna, fará jus ao apoio que recebi de amigos/as e da minha família durante a realização desta pesquisa. De perto ou de longe, conscientes ou não, deram-me o apoio e o ânimo necessários à consecução deste trabalho. Agradeço aos/às meus/minhas queridos/as amigos/as de Teresina, Brasília e Coimbra, da ‘turma XK’, e àqueles/as espalhados pelo mundo afora. Eles/as sabem os motivos.

A minha família foi e sempre será fonte de constante inspiração, motivação e encorajamento. Há mais dela nesta tese do que jamais poderão imaginar. Os meus pais fizeram a maior e mais difícil parte do trabalho, uma vez que deram a mim e ao meu irmão oportunidades com as quais não puderam sequer sonhar. Os seus esforços e a sua dedicação proporcionaram-me uma enorme vantagem ao iniciar o percurso que levou a esta tese. Talvez por isto mesmo, e por apoiarem os filhos constante e incondicionalmente, jamais duvidaram da minha capacidade de concluir um doutorado – ainda que eu mesmo possa ter perdido tamanha confiança em algum momento. O meu irmão é o melhor amigo que poderia ter, tendo estado sempre presente nos melhores e nos piores momentos. Os meus avós, tios e tias (que são pais e mães), primos e primas (que são irmãos e irmãs), comemoraram cada pequeno avanço e estenderam as mãos e os braços a cada tropeço. E a minha nova família

em Coimbra acolheu-me, apoiou-me e incentivou-me durante todo o percurso, tendo ainda proporcionado o ambiente mais favorável possível para a conclusão da tese na reta final.

A minha já companheira para a vida, Mara, foi a pedra mais fundamental neste caminho. Sem ela, não teria terminado, sequer iniciado, esta jornada. Ela deu-me forças e ofereceu palavras e gestos de incentivo a cada passo, inclusive durante os longos e frequentes períodos de ausência (e de ausências presentes também). Mais importante, ela e o seu amor foram lembranças constantes de que há coisas na vida mais essenciais que uma tese. A ela, agradeço por tudo. E por nada também.

Aos/às amigos/as e familiares, por falta de palavras à altura, um simples “muito obrigado”.

FC

Coimbra, September 2013

Esta pesquisa foi financiada por Bolsa de Doutoramento (ref. SFRH/BD/46799/2008) concedida pela Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT).



The value of a college education is not the learning of many facts, but the training of the mind to think.

Albert Einstein, 1921 (*apud* Isaacson, 2007: 299)

Abstract

This thesis analyses how the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ gained life in the United Nations (UN) in the early 1990s and the implications of this process for the Organisation’s approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. The main argument herein advanced is that the way the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ emerged and gained notoriety in the particular context of the United Nations had a profound and lasting influence in the Organisation’s provision of support to societies affected by armed conflict, as this process has not only influenced the core meaning of, but also prevented substantial changes to, ‘peacebuilding’ itself. From a concept advanced in the Secretary-General’s report *An Agenda for Peace*, of 1992, ‘peacebuilding’ became a core activity of the United Nations in the realm of international peace and security. It has offered the rationale, motivated, legitimated and informed the structures whose interplay enacted concrete policies in several post-armed conflict scenarios, from El Salvador to Mozambique to Cambodia to Timor-Leste. More recently, it assumed a core role in the establishment and functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). This thesis engages with the trajectory of this concept by constructing a theoretically informed narrative about the origins and different meanings and manifestations of ‘peacebuilding’ in the context of the United Nations. It dialogues with the so-called critique of the liberal peace scholarship, which characterises contemporary international peacebuilding in terms of a pro-active top-down agenda of promoting liberal democratic institutions, norms and values as a remedy to the challenges faced by societies affected by armed conflicts. Theoretically, this narrative departs from constructivist tenets about the social construction of reality to outline how specific academic theories, in a simplified and politicised version, helped shape the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations in different historical moments. Methodologically, the thesis is strongly based on participant observation of the workings of the UN in New York, on archival research and on first-hand interviews with individuals directly involved in UN peacebuilding from the late 1980s to the present. The theoretical and methodological approaches adopted in the thesis help open the

‘black box’ of international organisations and delve into the daily functioning of the United Nations, highlighting the importance of non-material aspects, of bureaucratic structures, as well as of the agency of purposive individuals in shaping the UN conceptualisation and practices in what concerns peacebuilding. The main contributions of this thesis are two-fold: shedding a new light into the origins of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations, particularly as defined in the aforementioned report *An Agenda for Peace*; and using insights produced by the critique of the liberal peace scholarship to examine the establishment and functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund from the perspective of developments taking place inside the United Nations.

Keywords: United Nations; peacebuilding; liberal democratic peace; *An Agenda for Peace*; Peacebuilding Commission.

Resumo

Esta tese analisa como o conceito de ‘consolidação da paz’ (*peacebuilding*) ganhou vida na Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) no início dos anos 1990 e as implicações deste processo para a abordagem da Organização em relação a sociedades afetadas por conflitos armados. O principal argumento aqui avançado é que a forma como o conceito de ‘consolidação da paz’ surgiu e ganhou notoriedade no particular contexto das Nações Unidas teve uma influência profunda e duradoura na prestação de apoio, por parte da Organização, a sociedades afetadas por conflitos armados, uma vez que este processo não apenas influenciou o significado central, como também impediu mudanças significativas do conceito de consolidação da paz. De um conceito avançado no relatório do Secretário-Geral *Uma Agenda para a Paz*, de 1992, a ‘consolidação da paz’ tornou-se uma atividade central das Nações Unidas no domínio da paz e da segurança internacionais. O conceito tem oferecido a base, motivado, legitimado e informado as estruturas cuja interação resultou na implementação de políticas concretas em vários cenários de pós-conflitos armados, incluindo El Salvador, Moçambique, Camboja e Timor-Leste. Mais recentemente, o conceito teve papel central no estabelecimento e no funcionamento da Comissão de Consolidação da Paz (PBC), do Escritório de Apoio à Consolidação da Paz (PBSO) e do Fundo de Consolidação da Paz (PBF). Esta tese ocupa-se da trajetória daquele conceito ao construir uma narrativa teoricamente informada sobre as origens e os diferentes significados e manifestações da ‘consolidação da paz’ no contexto das Nações Unidas. A tese dialoga com a chamada literatura da crítica da paz liberal, que caracteriza a consolidação da paz contemporânea em termos de uma agenda *top-down* (de cima para baixo) e proativa de promoção de normas e valores liberais democráticos como solução para os desafios enfrentados por sociedades afetadas por conflitos armados. Em termos teóricos, esta narrativa parte de princípios construtivistas sobre a construção social da realidade para delinear como teorias acadêmicas específicas, em uma versão simplificada e politizada, ajudaram a moldar o conceito de ‘consolidação da paz’ nas Nações Unidas em diferentes momentos históricos. Metodologicamente, a tese baseia-se fortemente na observação

participativa dos trabalhos da ONU em Nova York, em pesquisa documental e em entrevistas realizadas em primeira mão com indivíduos diretamente envolvidos em processos de consolidação da paz das Nações Unidas desde os finais dos anos 1980 até o presente. As abordagens teórica e metodológica aqui adotadas ajudam a abrir a ‘caixa preta’ das organizações internacionais e a investigar em profundidade o funcionamento diário das Nações Unidas, destacando a importância de aspectos não materiais, de estruturas burocráticas, bem como da agência de indivíduos na determinação da conceitualização e da prática da ONU no que respeita a construção da paz. As principais contribuições desta tese são duas: lançar um novo entendimento sobre as origens do conceito de ‘consolidação da paz’ nas Nações Unidas, especialmente conforme definido no já citado relatório *Uma Agenda para a Paz*; e utilizar conhecimentos produzidos pela crítica da paz liberal para examinar a criação e o funcionamento da Comissão de Consolidação da Paz, do Escritório de Apoio à Consolidação da Paz e do Fundo de Consolidação da Paz a partir da perspectiva de desenvolvimentos ocorridos no interior das Nações Unidas.

Palavras-chave: Nações Unidas; consolidação da paz; paz democrática liberal; *Uma Agenda para a Paz*; Comissão de Consolidação da Paz.

List of acronyms

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
CIC-NYU	Center on International Cooperation of the New York University
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSC	Country-Specific Configuration (PBC)
DAW	Division for the Advancement of Women
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECESA	Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECPS	Executive Committee on Peace and Security
EISAS	ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat
EOSG	Executive Office of the Secretary-General
EU	European Union
FNL	<i>Forces nationales de libération</i> (Burundi)
G77/China	The Group of 77 plus China
HLP	High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPI	International Peace Institute, formerly International Peace Academy
IR	International Relations (field of studies)

MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MPTF Office	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (UNDP)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OC	Organizational Committee (PBC)
ODS	Official Document System of the United Nations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUCA	Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOC	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
ORCI	Office for Research and Collection of Information
OUA	Organisation of African Unity
OUSG/DM	Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management
P5	Five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
PALIPEHUTU	<i>Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu</i> (Burundi)
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
POLISARIO	<i>Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sanguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro</i>
RUNO	Recipient United Nations Organisation (PBF)
SMG	Senior Management Group
SPA	Office for Special Political Affairs
SRF	Strategic Recovery Facility
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UN Women	UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFIP	United Nations Fund for International Partnerships
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIHP	United Nations Intellectual History Project
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNOL	United Nations Office in Liberia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea
USA	United States of America
USG	Under-Secretary-General
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WGLL	Working Group on Lessons Learned (PBC)

List of figures

Figure 1: Constitutive dimensions of the United Nations.....	72
Figure 2: Haack’s ideas and practices of democracy and the democratic continuum	103
Figure 3: Sample of conceptualisations of ‘peace’ in IR.....	105
Figure 4: The meanings of the liberal democratic peace as <i>theoretical construct</i>	108
Figure 5: The UN broader architecture for peacebuilding.....	215
Figure 6: Contributions to the PBF, 2006-2013	229
Figure 7: Level of deposits made to the PBF, per year.....	229

List of tables

Table 1: UNSC statements in connection with <i>An Agenda for Peace</i> , 1992-1996.....	164
Table 2: UNSC meetings on topics related to ‘peacebuilding’, 1997-2004	175
Table 3: The concept of peacebuilding in selected UN documents, 1992-2004.....	178
Table 4: Top 10 contributors to the PBF and respective roles in the PBC	230
Table 5: Distribution of PBF funding, by Thematic Areas and sub-categories	232
Table 6: Reference guide on the inclusion of countries in the PBC agenda.....	241
Table 7: PBC’s instrument of engagement with countries in its agenda	251

List of boxes

Box 1: The concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ in Boutros-Ghali’s discourse	120
Box 2: Summary of some of UN peacebuilding problems and challenges	193

Table of contents

Introduction.....	25
The scholarly contribution	28
On the influence of ideational aspects on world politics	37
Thesis outline	40
Chapter 1	
Theorising the influence of ideational aspects in world politics.....	43
Introduction.....	43
The origins of constructivism in IR	44
‘Social construction of’ in social sciences and IR	49
An IR theory inspired by constructivism: the hermeneutical mechanism and how social science theories may influence policy outcomes	58
Conclusion	64
Chapter 2	
Framework for analysis	67
Introduction.....	67
Conceptual apparatus: building blocks and terminology.....	68
The objects of analysis.....	73
Coming into life and remaining influential: conceptual proposal	87
Methodological approach.....	90
Conclusions.....	97
Chapter 3	
The origins of UN peacebuilding (I): the academic roots	99
Introduction.....	99
The liberal democratic peace as <i>theoretical construct</i>	101
From academe to public spheres: the liberal democratic peace as <i>public convention</i> . ..	109
Boutros-Ghali’s public use of theories about the liberal democratic peace.....	119
Conclusions.....	123
Chapter 4	
The origins of UN peacebuilding (II): the liberal democratic peace in the UN milieu	125
Introduction.....	125
The making of <i>An Agenda for Peace</i>	126

Seizing the ‘liberal peace’: the liberal democratic peace as <i>political conviction</i>	137
The academic foundations of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’	144
Reviewing the debate on the origins of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’	149
Conclusions.....	152
Chapter 5	
Towards UN liberal democratic peacebuilding(s)	155
Introduction.....	155
Factors facilitating the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace in the UN <i>milieu</i>	156
Liberal democratic peacebuilding under Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996).....	163
Liberal democratic peacebuilding under Kofi Annan (1997-2004).....	172
Conclusions.....	185
Chapter 6	
The ‘new’ peacebuilding architecture	187
Introduction.....	187
The limits of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding.....	188
The ‘new peacebuilding architecture’: origins and rationale.....	193
The politics behind the establishment of the ‘new architecture’	201
The ‘new elements’ of the UN peacebuilding architecture	211
Conclusions.....	216
Chapter 7	
The functioning of the ‘new elements’ of the UN peacebuilding architecture	219
Introduction.....	219
The bureaucratic dimension: the Peacebuilding Support Office and the PBF.....	221
The intergovernmental dimension: the Peacebuilding Commission	234
Conclusions.....	252
Conclusion	255
Summary of narrative constructed and main argument	257
Research implications	261
Future axes for research	264
List of bibliographical references.....	267
Bibliography	267
First-hand interviews	297
Archival records.....	299
Official documents of the United Nations	301

Appendixes

Appendix I: List of interviewees	311
Appendix II: List and financial requirements of UN political offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices and assistance missions	317
Appendix III: Contributors to the Peacebuilding Fund, 2006-2013 (USD thousands)	319
Appendix IV: Funding of PBF projects by country (in current USD)	321

Annexes

Annex A: UN system organisational chart.....	329
Annex B: DPKO List of Peacekeeping Operations, 1948-2013	331
Annex C: Background Note by the Secretary of the Task Force: Data Analysis on Wars and Conflicts from 1945 to the Present, 23 March 1992.....	333

Introduction

I knew that policy was made by the written word, that texts made things happen in the realm of high diplomacy and statecraft. Writing forces concepts into life.

Boutros-Ghali (1999: 26)

As a veteran diplomat, jurist and scholar of international law and politics when he became the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was well aware of the potential power of the ‘written word’, of texts, of concepts, in shaping the reality of world politics. This thesis departs from one particular concept advanced by the Egyptian diplomat and investigates how ‘peacebuilding’ ‘came into life’ in the UN of the early 1990s and the implications of this process for the Organisation’s approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. Boutros-Ghali first advanced that concept in a report titled *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, in which he defined peacebuilding, or more precisely ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111).

Since the release of *An Agenda for Peace*, the concept of peacebuilding has informed actions in “something like fifty to sixty post-conflict and fragile states” (Richmond, 2011: 1). When it comes to the United Nations, those actions have often, albeit not always, been carried out against the backdrop of peacekeeping operations.¹ From El Salvador (1991-1995) and Mozambique (1992-1994), to Cambodia (1991-1992) and Yugoslavia (1992-1995), to Kosovo (1999-present) and Timor-Leste (2006-2012), UN-led peacebuilding initiatives included, but were not limited to: the support and management of electoral

¹ Herein understood as field operations deployed “to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” (DPKO and DFS, 2008: 97). More often, peacebuilding tasks are carried out by multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which comprise a “a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace” (DPKO and DFS, 2008: 97).

processes; reform of security sector institutions; the training of police, judges and other law enforcement officials; the promotion of human rights; the drafting of national laws, including constitutions; and the administration of the most basic services in countries and territories. In addition to multidimensional peacekeeping operations that entail peacebuilding tasks, fourteen field missions (carried out by political offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices and assistance missions only) are operating in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia as of writing (Appendix II). In the UN Headquarters in New York, the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in 2005-2006 represents the ultimate embodiment of the concept of 'peacebuilding' in the United Nations. From the 'written word' contained in Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, the concept of peacebuilding has come into life in the UN context, that is, it has become influential to the extent of having concrete, tangible, manifestations in world politics.

My main argument in this thesis is that the way peacebuilding appeared and gained notoriety in the particular context of the United Nations in the early 1990s had a profound and lasting influence in the Organisation's provision of support to societies affected by armed conflict, not only influencing the core meaning underlying 'peacebuilding' in the UN but also preventing substantial changes in that meaning. Peacebuilding came into life (that is, became influential to the extent of having concrete, tangible, manifestations in world politics) via a process of simplification and politicisation of academic theories about the democratic peace thesis, which holds that democratic societies rarely fight with each other (e.g. Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1983a, 1983b). In the early 1990s, this simplified and politicised view gained foothold in the UN as a strong political view about the promotion, via peacebuilding, of democracies in societies affected by armed conflict. This political view, herein dubbed the 'liberal democratic peace', has ever since been at the core of the concept of peacebuilding around the United Nations, providing the rationale and informing the structures whose interplay motivate, legitimate, justify and enact concrete initiatives in the field. Given the influence of the liberal democratic peace, it is no coincidence that UN peacebuilding has, in concrete scenarios, been remarkably concerned with "democratization and marketization" since the early 1990s (Paris, 2004: 19; see also Mac Ginty, 2006: 45). And even the functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, PBSO and PBF, whose establishment in 2005-2006 may be seen as an attempt to solve some of the inconsistencies

of that particular meaning of peacebuilding, has not yet substantially changed the liberal democratic peace framework underlying the UN approach to peacebuilding. Rather, the three entities have more often replicated and reinforced the liberal democratic peace, which attests to its profound and lasting influence in the Organisation.

Examining how peacebuilding came into life and the implications of this process to the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict is both significant and interesting for two reasons. First, because it provides another illustration of the power of non-material aspects (e.g. ideas, concepts, theories, norms, worldviews) in shaping and in being shaped by social reality in general and world politics in particular. Analyses of the role of ideas in world politics, at least until the mid-1990s, have been largely neglected in the field of International Relations (IR) (Woods, 1995: 164). Whereas the interest of scholars on the role of ideas in world politics has flourished since then (see e.g., Chwieroth, 2010; Jolly *et al.*, 2009; Rushton, 2008; Mandelbaum, 2002; Philpott, 2001; Emmerij *et al.*, 2001; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000-2001; Checkel, 1997; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993),² only a few have engaged comprehensively with the trajectory of the concept of peacebuilding in the specific context of the United Nations (e.g. Jenkins, 2013). This thesis thus addresses an understudied case of the influence of concepts in international organisations in general and in the United Nations in particular.

Second, because the analysis herein carried out presents an unconventional vantage point to study the limits and shortcomings of United Nations peacebuilding. Scholars from different traditions and with different purposes have long highlighted the UN mixed results in bringing about peace, particularly via multidimensional peacekeeping operations encompassing peacebuilding tasks (e.g. Richmond and Franks, 2009; Berdal and Economides, 2007; Durch, 2006, 1996, 1993a; MacQueen, 2006; Dobbins *et al.*, 2005; Paris, 2004; Boulden, 2001; Cousens *et al.*, 2001; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Those studies, however, have generally examined the UN approach to peacebuilding either by highlighting the mismatch between the goals and the actual implementation of specific policies, or by

² In what concerns the United Nations, a particularly interesting initiative on the influence of ideas in world politics is the UN Intellectual History Project, which produced 17 studies over a period of more than ten years focusing on different social and economic ideas connected to the Organisation. A summary with some conclusions of the project was published as Jolly *et al.* (2005). In IR, the recent attention to the role of ideational constructs in world politics is related to the development of constructivism, a theoretical framework further explored in Chapter 1.

focusing on the inability of peacebuilders to create the conditions for sustainable peace. In both cases, the analyses were produced from the perspective of developments taking place in the field,³ that is, where peacebuilding initiatives are concretely carried out. In this thesis, however, I take a ‘step back’ and explore the limits and shortcomings of UN peacebuilding departing from the analysis of the underlying features associated with the conceptualisation and design of peacebuilding strategies and policies in the first place. Spatially, this thesis thus shifts the site of analysis from the field to the UN Headquarters in New York. Whereas not claiming that it is ‘better’ or ‘worse’, ‘more’ or ‘less’ important, to focus on one place or the other, I suggest that more complementarity is needed between analyses situated in multiple sites of relevance to contemporary peacebuilding.

In carrying out the proposed analysis, this thesis examines how the United Nations has conceived and envisioned peacebuilding programmes and actions over a period of more than twenty years, looking also into the interplay between concepts and practices of peacebuilding and their concrete manifestations in distinct historical contexts. In the ensuing chapters, I propose a theoretically informed narrative about the coming into life of peacebuilding, its continued relevance and its implications for the development of peacebuilding policies and programmes in the Organisation since the early 1990s. In constructing this narrative, my analysis produces reflections about the limits of the liberal democratic peace framework from its origins and straight to the site where policies and programmes are contemporarily envisioned in the United Nations, most particularly the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office. At the same time, this narrative opens the ‘black box’ of international organisations by delving into the daily functioning of the UN Secretariat, thus highlighting the importance of non-material aspects and bureaucratic structures, as well as the agency of purposive individuals in shaping the UN conceptualisation and practices in what concerns peacebuilding.

The scholarly contribution

The analysis herein carried out is located at the intersection of the fields of Peace Studies and International Relations, offering two original contributions to contemporary

³ Given their focus on developments in the field, it is unfortunate that some of those studies overemphasised desk research over *in loco* first-hand observation. Compare, for instance, the statistical methodology adopted by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) with the heavy reliance on fieldwork in Richmond and Franks (2009).

academic scholarship on peacebuilding. First, it sheds new light into the origins of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations, particularly as defined in the aforementioned report *An Agenda for Peace*. Second, it uses insights produced by the critique of the liberal peace scholarship to examine the establishment and functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund from the perspective of developments taking place inside the United Nations. What follows identifies the gaps found in the specialised literature in what concerns both aspects and outlines how this thesis contributes to bridging them.

The origins of the concept of peacebuilding in the United Nations

Whereas Boutros-Ghali was responsible for bringing the concept of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ to the political debate in the United Nations in 1992, the origins of the academic concept of ‘peacebuilding’ are usually associated with the tradition of the Nordic school of peace studies. In specialised circles, it is common to attribute the first mention of the term and concept to a book chapter published by Johan Galtung in 1976.⁴ The relationship between both concepts, however, seems unexplored in the academic literature, which has not delved into much detail on the historical origins of Boutros-Ghali’s concept or on whether Galtung’s concept might have gained foothold in the Organisation in the specific context of the 1990s.⁵ In engaging with such an underexplored matter, this research sheds light into how *An Agenda for Peace* and its concept of peacebuilding were conceived in the particular context of the UN in the early 1990s, while at the same time identifying the academic roots of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’.

Over the course of this research, I have identified two contending views about the origins of ‘peacebuilding’ in the particular context of the UN. The first of those views holds that ‘peacebuilding’ is in fact a brainchild of Boutros-Ghali, unrelated to Galtung’s earlier writings. Charles-Philippe David leaves no doubt about the authorship of ‘peacebuilding’,

⁴ The chapter expanded an article previously published as Galtung (1975). Its content is analysed at length in Chapter 2.

⁵ Karns (2012) is a notable exception, as she uses the concept of peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace* as a case study to shed light into the agency, autonomy and leadership of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat in world politics. I only came across her research, via an undated working paper, in mid-2012. Several months later, I learned that the paper had already been published as a book chapter in April 2012. Some of the references cited in her chapter were used in this thesis, and some of the individuals Karns and I interviewed are actually the same.

claiming that the “recognised origin of the concept is found in the 1992 and 1995 editions of *An Agenda for Peace*, proposed by then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali” (David, 2002: 20). Margaret Karns (2012), who has recently carried out the only fully-fledged in-depth research I came across focusing on the origins of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations specifically, also supports this view. According to her, the concept advanced in *An Agenda for Peace* has its deeper roots in the Organisation’s role in decolonisation processes, in the previous Secretary-General’s initiatives to end the armed conflict in Central America, and in the UN ambitious role in Cambodia in the early 1990s. Based on those past experiences and on Boutros-Ghali’s ability to innovate conceptually, Karns advances the view that ‘peacebuilding’ was carved in a moment of “conceptual epiphany” for the Secretary-General during a “trip to South America in April [1992]” (Karns, 2012: 72). This view seems to be partially corroborated by Jenkins, who writes that “Boutros-Ghali was reported to have first uttered the words [‘post-conflict peacebuilding’] at 30,000 feet, en route to examine progress on various Central American peace accords” (Jenkins, 2013: 19). Naturally, Boutros-Ghali himself claimed the authorship of the concept on a few occasions, saying that “[he] developed [...] this new concept of *peace building*, which is not included in the Charter, that means consolidation, or construction, of peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 2002: 72; see also UNIHP, 2007a: 38; Boutros-Ghali, 1999: 26-27).⁶

The second view, on the other hand, holds that Boutros-Ghali’s ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ is indeed connected to the original academic concept advanced within the tradition of peace studies. According to Ramsbotham,

[d]rawing on this tradition, but narrowing it so that it applied specifically to post-war reconstruction, the UN Secretary-General distinguished ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ from pre-conflict ‘preventive diplomacy’ in his June 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, while retaining the original contrast between peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peacemaking. (Ramsbotham, 2000: 171)

Trenkov-Wermuth also notes that Boutros-Ghali’s concept of peacebuilding is “entirely inspired by Galtung and it builds on his term, both in terms of the phraseology, as well as in terms of its underlying idea and aims” (Trenkov-Wermuth, 2007: 44). Other writings, both academic and policy-oriented, have also implied or referred to this connection, as if Boutros-Ghali’s concept stemmed from Galtung’s (e.g., Ponzio, 2011: footnote 1 of Introduction;

⁶ From the original in French: “*Je développais, par ailleurs, ce nouveau concept de peace building, qui ne figure pas dans la Charte, c’est-à-dire de consolidation, ou de construction, de la paix*”.

Väyrynen, 2010: 139; PBSO, 2010: 5; Chetail, 2009: 2; Call and Wyeth, 2008: 4; Call and Cook, 2003: 235; Richmond, 2002: footnote 5 of Ch. 5; Pugh, 1995: 321). Whereas those writings usually correctly identify similarities and differences in the concepts in terms of content, they rarely address the actual process through which one concept may have influenced the other.

In this research study, I engage with those two views by conducting an in-depth analysis not only of the *meaning* of the concept of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ in *An Agenda for Peace*, but also of the conditions under which the report was conceived. Based on the analysis of unpublished and archival documents, I construct a narrative recreating the process of drafting of that document, showing that the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ came out influenced by internal discussions of senior officials in Boutros-Ghali’s cabinet. In my research, I found out that some members of that team knew Galtung and were familiar with his work, including Boutros-Ghali himself. Moreover, *An Agenda for Peace* addressed not only peacebuilding, but also peacekeeping and peacemaking, as in Galtung (1976), thus leading to the tempting conclusion that both concepts are indeed related. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis of the *meaning* behind the labels of ‘peacebuilding’ in the two concepts reveals very different connotations, with Boutros-Ghali’s version being much narrower, restricted to the ‘post-conflict’ and overemphasising the support to electoral processes and the promotion of democracies, as explored in Chapters 3 and 4. Hence, the two concepts seem interrelated only to the extent that they share the same label of ‘peacebuilding’, with their substantial content varying significantly.

In carrying out this analysis and in showing that the content of Galtung’s and Boutros-Ghali’s concepts varies remarkably, this thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the underlying assumptions of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations in the early 1990s. Furthermore, since my research is supported by the analysis of several unpublished documents, some of which had never been made available to the public, this thesis contributes to shedding new light into the historical process leading to an oft-quoted definition of ‘peacebuilding’ in and around the United Nations.

Connecting the liberal peace and the ‘peacebuilding architecture’

The second original contribution of this thesis is to use insights produced by the so-called ‘critique of the liberal peace’ to examine the establishment and functioning of the

Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. The critique of the liberal peace has produced multiple readings to shed light into the more robust approaches to the challenges of post-armed conflict situations that emerged after the end of the cold war, which claimed to move beyond traditional conflict management and “towards the external engineering of post-conflict societies through the export of liberal frameworks of ‘good governance’, democratic elections, human rights, the rule of law and market relations” (Chandler, 2011: 174).

This critique has produced an impressive range of works challenging key assumptions and inconsistencies of the liberal (democratic) peace, highlighting several of the inherent problems and inconsistencies of contemporary peacebuilding.⁷ For instance, by identifying liberal internationalism as its core paradigm (Paris, 1997), Paris contended that contemporary peacebuilding efforts were working towards the globalisation of “a particular model of domestic governance – liberal market democracy – from the core to the periphery of the international system” (Paris, 2002: 638). For years now, Richmond has been exploring the implications of that paradigm in shaping the type of peace actually achieved by (liberal democratic) peacebuilding interventions in situations such as Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Cambodia (Richmond and Franks, 2009; Richmond, 2005). He has similarly explored issues such as the resistance of local populations to externally-driven frameworks and indigenous processes of peace formation that counterbalance liberal peacebuilding (Richmond, forthcoming 2013, 2011). In doing so, the critique of the liberal peace has contributed to evince the Western liberal ‘bias’ of contemporary peacebuilding as well as to recover invisible forms of subjectivity and agency left out of externally-led peacebuilding frameworks. As a whole, the critique of the liberal peace thus highlights a core problem: that “under the guise of universalising Western liberal frameworks of democracy and the market, the needs and interests of those subject to intervention are often ignored, resulting in the maintenance of inequalities and conflicts and undermining the asserted goals of external interveners” (Chandler, 2011: 174).

⁷ For good references, see, among many others, the works of Richmond (forthcoming 2013, 2011, 2005, 2004a, 2004b, 2002), Roberts (2011), Mac Ginty (2011, 2006), Chandler (2010, 2006), Richmond and Franks (2009), Duffield (2007, 2001), Pugh (2005, 1995) and Paris (2004, 2002, 1997). For good edited volumes exploring crosscutting themes or case studies of liberal peacebuilding, see, for instance, Campbell *et al.* (2011), Tadjbakhsh (2011), Richmond (2010b), Newman *et al.* (2009b), and Pugh *et al.* (2008). For reviews of this literatures, see, for instance, Chandler (2011), Cavalcante (2011b), Paris (2010) and Cooper (2007).

Despite its breadth and depth, the critique of the liberal peace has more often explored the inconsistencies and problems of contemporary peacebuilding from the perspective of implications and developments in the sites where peacebuilding policies are carried out (that is, in ‘the field’), usually not engaging considerably with those aspects from the perspective of political dynamics in and around the United Nations headquarters, where most of the Secretariat’s thinking and approach to the problematic is conceptualised. Moreover, the critique has rarely engaged with the establishment and functioning of the more recent Peacebuilding Commission and associated entities. By the same token, the vast majority of studies on those organs have largely focused on descriptive analyses on their formats and configurations, mandates and institutional assessments, often neglecting broader issues related to the internal inconsistencies or power discrepancies associated with the liberal peace framework that underlies contemporary peacebuilding.

The Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund were established in the United Nations in 2005-2006, following more directly a recommendation contained in the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP) (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 263). Together, they are often referred to as the UN ‘peacebuilding architecture’, a label that may be misleading given the prior existence of institutional structures dealing with peacebuilding before the PBC, PBSO and PBF, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. The first writings on the three entities appeared right after the release of the aforementioned report. Carried out in 2005-2006, such analyses were mainly policy-oriented, focusing primarily on the description of the political and institutional processes that led to the creation of the three organs, their mandates and functions, as well as recommendations, prospects for functioning and/or partial assessment of their early activities (see, e.g., Security Council Report, 2006; Ponzio, 2005; Almqvist, 2005; Forman, 2005; CSIS, 2005; Lidén and Eneström, 2005; Schneckener and Weinlich, 2005; Rusch, 2005). The primarily descriptive and prospective character of those early writings mainly reflect the broader context in which they were produced, when the concrete recommendation of the High-level Panel was still under the scrutiny of the UN Secretariat and member states – a peacebuilding commission was, at this stage, very much a ‘work in progress’.

After they were established, the concrete activities of the PBC, PBSO and PBF provided more empirical substance for analysis. In what concerns the origins and the process leading to the establishment of the PBC, Lisa McCann (2012) recently concluded a PhD

research examining the creation of the PBC as a case of global public policy. She identified the proposal of a Strategic Recovery Facility (SRF) as the “direct precursor” (McCann, 2012: 81) of the Peacebuilding Commission and how purposive individuals contributed to bring that proposal to the political agenda of the UN around 2004. Salomons (2010), one of the original authors of the SRF, goes further back in time and connects the earlier seeds of the PBC as we know it with the process leading to the establishment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1960s and 1970s. According to him, the PBC may be seen as part of the evolving extension of the UN’s development activities to states in transition (Salomons, 2010: 196). In both analyses, the Commission and the associated PBSO and PBF emerge as part of a gradual process that sought to overcome concrete problems identified, particularly in what concerns the coordination of global actors involved in peacebuilding. Whereas their readings are certainly accurate if one considers that international organisations tend to be reactive entities, McCann and Salomons do not engage with questions related to broader topics in world politics, such as, for instance, the extent to which those entities replicate underlying norms and representations of global order.

Roland Paris’ analysis of the origins and early workings of the PBC, PBSO and PBF points out how certain problems associated with peacebuilding, such as the “coordination problem”, on occasions became a “catch-all for deeper disagreements and uncertainties over the strategy and purposes of peacebuilding” (Paris, 2009: 60). The author does not deny that the lack of coordination is indeed a cause of severe problems for contemporary peacebuilding at several levels (Paris, 2009: 56). He notes, however, that there is “something peculiar” (Paris, 2009: 58) about the extent to which claims for better coordination are often assumed to solve and overcome those deeper disagreements, rightly claiming that too many issues have been misplaced under the rubric of ‘lack of coordination’. In the process leading to the establishment of the PBC, for instance, negotiations were frequently marked by overwhelmingly technical and procedural issues that hid deeper tensions and problems, which oftentimes obscured the “highly political – and contentious – core” of the challenges associated with contemporary peacebuilding (Paris, 2009: 60).

Those aspects become all the more apparent if one analyses the intergovernmental negotiations preceding the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. Two insider accounts are provided by John Bolton (2007: esp. 220-245), Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations in 2005-2006, and by Gilda Neves (2009: esp. 119-

150), diplomat in the Mission of Brazil to the United Nations who covered the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the creation of the three entities.⁸ The analysis of both accounts reveals that the final format and configuration of the Commission and the associated entities more often reflected political and diplomatic imperatives of member states in New York than the concerns of the recipients of peacebuilding in the field. Berdal's portrayal of this process as the "rise and fall of a good idea", hence, does not seem exaggerated (2008b: 356).

Other analyses have focused on different aspects and advanced distinct arguments about the functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF (e.g. Jenkins, 2013, 2008; Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2012; Bellamy, 2010; Bueger, 2010; Otobo, 2010a; Paris, 2009; Berdal, 2009: 135-169; Scott, 2008; CIC and IPI, 2008; Spornbauer, 2008; Ponzio, 2007; Wegter, 2007; Miall, 2007; Chesterman, 2005; Stahn, 2005). Some analysts followed the workings of the PBC focusing on specific countries in the agenda for the Commission. Forman *et al.* (2010), Iro (2009), Street *et al.* (2008), Lambourne (2008) and ActionAid *et al.* (2007), for instance, carried out field-based analyses of the PBC performance in Burundi and Sierra Leone, the first two countries included in the PBC agenda. Those analyses, however, have largely failed to engage with the scholarship produced by the critique of the liberal peace or to seriously engage on broader questions related to world order. In that regard, a notable exception is a book chapter produced by Caplan and Ponzio (2011), who explored some of the normative underpinnings of the Commission. In their analysis, they contended that the "promotion of liberal democracy and market-oriented economic reforms has been a centrepiece" in the Commission's efforts to engage with the countries in its agenda (Caplan and Ponzio, 2011: 189).

In 2010, Roland Paris coordinated a research project that produced several working papers focusing on different aspects of the so-called 'peacebuilding architecture'. Some of the papers focused on the institutional configuration of the three entities (Tschirgi, 2010), their current operational mechanisms (Aning and Lartey, 2010) and, although to varying degree, on potential alternatives that could or should be addressed to strengthen their political and institutional roles (de Coning, 2010; Jenkins, 2010; McAskie, 2010). In a particularly interesting paper, Biersteker and Jütersonke review what some IR theories say

⁸ See also Traub (2006: esp. 359-398), who accompanied Annan on relevant occasions during this period and describes several events in the run-up to the 2005 World Summit.

about the origins of the organs, about “their operational dynamics, their challenges, their constraints, their pathologies, and their realistic possibilities” (Biersteker and Jütersonke, 2010: 5). Eli Stamnes (2010), in her turn, attempts to offer some suggestions on how those entities could benefit from the work so far produced by the liberal peace critique. Her work represents an exception of serious engagement with this literature in the context of studies on the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF.

Among the aforementioned studies, Jenkins (2013) has engaged more extensively with the internal functioning and activities of those entities. Jenkins’ book is similar to this thesis in some key aspects, particularly as we both understand the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ as a driving force behind recent developments in the UN bureaucratic structures (such as the very creation of the PBC, PBSO and PBF). In addition, we carried out our research based on direct observation and interpretation of developments in New York (Jenkins worked in the PBSO for a few months in 2010), and we both relied on first-hand interviews and internal documents of the United Nations to support our analyses. There are, on the other hand, significant differences in Jenkins’ book and in this thesis. In terms of focus and scope, the weight of Jenkins’ analysis is on the so-called ‘peacebuilding architecture’: the influence of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in leading to its establishment, in shaping its format and in driving its workings. In this thesis, my main concern is on the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ itself. Hence, my analysis offers a continuous narrative (albeit one that is not necessarily linear and straightforward) connecting the period when peacebuilding gained foothold in the UN and the current workings of the PBC. This element of continuity is in practice advanced in Chapter 5, which focuses on the influence of the concept of peacebuilding in driving concrete policy outcomes in the UN throughout the 1990s and until the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF.

The single major different between both works, however, is that this thesis departs from the scholarship produced by the critique of the liberal peace to offer insights on both the ‘coming into life’ and the implications of this process to the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict. Whereas Jenkins (2013: e.g. 4, 26) only briefly and superficially refers to the critique of the liberal peace or to the notion of ‘liberal peacebuilding’, they both constitute one of the main objects of analyses of this research study. In addition, this thesis seeks to uncover and identify underlying assumptions about world politics that are replicated and/or simply taken for granted in and around the United Nations in what concerns

peacebuilding. My analysis, as such, is firmly based on a critical, rather than on a problem-solving approach to peacebuilding (see Pugh, 2004; Bellamy, 2004).

In sum, good studies were produced about the workings of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, but they have mostly focused on descriptions of the establishment and functioning of those entities. Fewer analyses, however, delved into, for instance, the normative underpinnings that led to the establishment of those organs in the first place, or on whether and how their workings may reproduce and sustain broader representations of global order and norms. The literature on the PBC, PBSO and PBF, in other words, has been more often informed by problem-solving than by critical approaches (see Pugh, 2004; Bellamy, 2004). By the same token, critical scholars have largely focused their analyses of peacebuilding initiatives and power disparities reproduced in the field, but they have not always elaborated on those aspects from the perspective of political dynamics inside and around the United Nations Headquarters, where UN-led peacebuilding initiatives are conceptualised and designed in the first place. In focusing on the New York-based implications of the ‘coming into life’ of the concept of peacebuilding in the UN, this thesis thus establishes a dialogue between those two strands of scholarship, potentially facilitating a broader dialogue between students of international organisations and peacebuilding scholars.

On the influence of ideational aspects on world politics

Studying how the concept of peacebuilding gained life and its subsequent trajectory in the United Nations is only possible if one embraces the importance of ideational/non-material aspects in shaping policy-making and its outcomes in world politics. In the field of IR, this understanding has been pushed forward perhaps most notably by social constructivism (or, more simply, constructivism), an approach mainly concerned with the construction of reality in general and of world politics in particular (see, e.g., Ish-Shalom, 2006a; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Paris, 2003; Hopf, 2002; Reus-Smit, 2001; Guzzini, 2000; Wendt, 1999, 1992; Weldes, 1999, 1996; Ruggie, 1998a; Kubáľková *et al.*, 1998; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Onuf, 1998, 1989; Checkel, 1997; Adler, 1997; Klotz, 1995; Kratochwil, 1989).

Conventional IR theories, especially those within the traditions of realism and liberalism, whilst subscribing to the tenets of positivism, have largely explained phenomena in world politics as highly dependent upon an individualistic understanding of material

resources such as military capabilities or economic wealth. For instance, in his *chef-d'œuvre*, neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1979: esp. 79-101) uses an analogy with microeconomic theories to depict an international system (structure) that is constituted by states (units) behaving according to their capabilities in order to serve their own interests. In theories such as Waltz's neorealism, world politics is thus seen as mostly made of "behavioral responses to the forces of physics that act on material objects from the outside" (Adler, 1997: 321).

Theories informed by constructivism, on the other hand, adopt a more sociologically-informed perspective that challenges the materialist assumptions underlying 'traditional' IR theories. They reduce the weight of material aspects and emphasise that the 'reality' of world politics is not exogenously given, but rather constructed by a combination of material aspects and meanings (non-material/ideational aspects) about reality that are shared by social agents. In those theories, non-material aspects are often discussed in terms of, for instance, norms (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995), identity (e.g., Hopf, 2002; Wendt, 1999), culture (e.g., Paris, 2003; Inayatullah and Blaney, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996), rules (e.g., Kratochwil, 1989; Onuf, 1989) and theories (e.g. Ish-Shalom, 2013). Within this understanding, the *social* dimension of world politics acquires a particular significance, as it is within this context that specific meanings become 'shared' – i.e. they become intersubjective to such an extent that they are simply taken for granted – and provide actors with collective understandings about themselves and others that will influence their own courses of action.

Piki Ish-Shalom (2013, 2006a) offers a theoretical model to explain the potential influence of social science theories (which may be generically understood as one 'kind' of ideas) in policy outcomes and political practice. According to the author, this influence happens via a 'hermeneutical mechanism' that converts those theories into simplified and politicised views outside academe; in other words, that converts one kind of discourse, eminently academic and theoretical, into a simplified and politicised discourse in public spheres (Ish-Shalom, 2013: esp. 14-38). Once those discourses are converted, simplified and politicised, they may shape individuals' understandings of world politics and consequently frame their choice of specific courses of political action. Given their potential to do so, social science theories, reformulated as social constructs by Ish-Shalom, thus have the potential to shape social reality and influence concrete policy outcomes. Whereas Ish-Shalom uses his theory to explore Israel's policies towards the Oslo peace accords and the United States of

America (USA) approach to democracy promotion in the Middle East, I use his theory in the context of the international organisation *par excellence*, the United Nations.

It is based on constructivist tenets about the social construction of reality and the importance of ideational aspects (such as concepts) in influencing world politics that I address the ‘coming into life’ of peacebuilding in the UN and the subsequent implications of this process to the Organisation’s approach to societies affected by armed conflict. This process, as theorised in Chapter 2, took place gradually as academic theories on the democratic peace thesis were simplified and politicised via a hermeneutical mechanism that resulted in a strong political view about the promotion of democracies in UN circles. This strong political view became the main framework through which individuals in UN circles understood ‘peacebuilding’ and thus shaped their choices of specific courses of action. Consequently, this strong political view (a simplified and politicised version of theories about the democratic peace) has served to legitimate, justify, motivate and enact UN concepts and practices in the realm of peacebuilding from the early 1990s to the present. In order to highlight the influence of that political view on contemporary UN concepts and practices, I delve into the establishment and workings of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund in New York.

With a view to taking seriously constructivist tenets about the construction of social reality and the influence of ideational aspects in policy outcomes and political actions, I adopt a “subjectivist-with-an-O methodology” (Pouliot, 2007: 367; see esp. 364-368) to carry out this research study. This methodological approach is theoretically justified because it reflects constructivism’s premise that the meaning of ideational aspects (such as the concept of ‘peacebuilding’) is not fixed, while at the same time locating the precise space and time wherein different meanings are produced. Hence, a subjectivist methodology is best suited for this analysis given its capacity to develop both subjective and objective knowledge about social reality. Based on a subjectivist methodology, I constructed a theoretically informed and contextually located narrative about how peacebuilding came into life and the implications of this process for the United Nations approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. Multiple methods were used and combined to gather and interpret the information required and to produce the final narrative presented in the following chapters. Those methods included participant observation of the workings of the United Nations in New York; qualitative semi-structured interviews with individuals directly involved in key

processes and dynamics herein analysed; content analysis, documental and archival research, used to both collect and analyse written texts; and the construction of a main narrative that allows for the apprehension of the argument herein sustained.

Thesis outline

What follows is organised into seven main chapters and the conclusion. Chapter 1 outlines the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying this research, which are influenced by constructivism due to its emphasis on the study of world politics as a reflection not only of material, but also of ideational aspects. In reviewing the origins of constructivism in International Relations and in exploring the implications of assuming reality as a social construct, this chapter provides the basis for the study of the influence of ideational aspects in social reality in general and world politics in particular. As constructivism is herein understood as a set of social science tenets for the study of world politics, the chapter also presents a theory about how social science theories may influence policy outcomes and political action in world politics via a ‘hermeneutical mechanism’ that attaches meaning to political concepts (Ish-Shalom, 2013, 2006a).

The framework for the analysis herein carried out is elaborated in Chapter 2. It outlines the main questions to be addressed and provides an analytical ‘toolkit’ for answering them. After defining precisely the core elements analysed in this research study, the liberal peace framework and the concept of peacebuilding, I theorise about the dynamics that help understanding how the latter came into life influenced by the former in the context of the United Nations as well as the implications of this process for the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. Finally, the methodological strategy adopted for the proposed analysis is also articulated in this chapter, according to the understanding that constructivist-inspired research should develop both subjective and objective knowledge about social reality.

Chapters 3 through 5 explore how ‘peacebuilding’ gained life in the context of the United Nations, thus shedding light into how a particular meaning of ‘peacebuilding’, that of ‘liberal democratic peacebuilding’, was constructed and became minimally intelligible in and around the United Nations. In Chapters 3 and 4, I explore the meaning that would be associated to ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations in the early 1990s by contending that the ‘liberal democratic peace’ is a successful case of theory as a hermeneutical mechanism that

attaches meanings to concepts and that may potentially drive political action (Ish-Shalom, 2013, 2006a). The two chapters analyse the functioning of this mechanism by creating a narrative on the migration of theories about the democratic peace thesis from academe to public spheres, being subsequently simplified and politicised in and around the United Nations. This simplified and politicised version was eventually embodied in a key UN document at the time: Boutros-Ghali's report *An Agenda for Peace*. The document, as aforementioned, essentially articulated a political view about the promotion of democratic structures in post-armed conflict situations via peacebuilding policies. In order to capture this process, Chapters 3 and 4 explore in detail the drafting of the report of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), highlighting how this politicised version of a social science theory was eventually incorporated in the document and subsequently in the United Nations lexicon.

In Chapter 5, I explore how 'liberal democratic peacebuilding' became generally accepted in and around the United Nations, subsequently serving as the main framework through which individuals understood and conceptualised 'peacebuilding'. I contend that this happened via the gradual assimilation of the meaning of peacebuilding pushed forward in *An Agenda for Peace* in the constitutive dimensions of the United Nations, both ideational and material. At the ideational level, concepts and ideas related to liberal democratic peacebuilding were pushed forward rhetorically both in oral statements and in relevant UN documents. At the level of material aspects, bureaucratic structures were created and/or modified based on the assumptions of the liberal democratic peace. This chapter also starts to analyse the implications associated with how peacebuilding came into life in the UN, particularly as it offers an overview of peacebuilding initiatives concretely carried out by the United Nations in the field from the early 1990s to mid-2000s.

Chapters 6 and 7 focus on some of the implications associated with liberal democratic peacebuilding for the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. Following the proposal to focus on developments taking place where peacebuilding policies and initiatives are conceptualised and designed in the first place, the two chapters analyse the establishment and the functioning of the so-called 'peacebuilding architecture', which encompasses the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. The three entities are discussed as a response to some of the challenges and problems associated with liberal democratic peacebuilding, such as repeated failures to avoid relapses into armed conflict or the need to more actively involve local civil society.

The two chapters show, however, that the establishment and the functioning of those three entities have provoked little substantial changes in the area, having more often contributed to reproducing and replicating the liberal democratic peace framework that informs the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding.

The conclusion summarises the proposed analysis and recovers the main argument of this research study, highlighting some of its academic and policy implications, as well as future avenues for further investigation on the topic.

Chapter 1

Theorising the influence of ideational aspects in world politics

(...) there is nothing so practical as a good theory.

Mark Neufeld (1993: 54)

Introduction

This chapter presents the broader theoretical framework informing this research study: social constructivism or, simply, constructivism. The standing of constructivism in the field of International Relations (IR) is not uncontested. While there seems to be an overall agreement that constructivism opposes rationalism on ontological grounds (Katzenstein *et al.*, 1998: esp. 670-678), some depict constructivism as a *via media* between different epistemological approaches: between “rationalists” and “adherents of interpretive epistemologies” (Adler, 1997: 319), or between “positivists” and “post-positivists” (Wendt, 1999: 38-40), for instance. These apparently divergent positions, which exist even among IR theorists inclined towards constructivism, stress that speaking of ‘constructivism’ in that field of studies entails different meanings and understandings at different levels. I use this chapter to outline a specific understanding of constructivism that sets the theoretical basis for this research study.

In the following section, I start the discussion by offering an account of the origins of constructivism in the field of IR. Constructivism was initially developed in other areas of inquiry within social sciences, but a conjunction of factors converging around the 1980s led IR scholars to resort to constructivism, amongst other theoretical frameworks, when striving to elaborate more critical readings of phenomena in world politics. With a basic understanding about its origins, the second section delves into a discussion of what constructivism generally is all about: a set of social theory tenets that provide helpful insights for the study of social relations in general and world politics in particular. In that section, I

also elaborate on the ontological and epistemological implications of assuming something as ‘socially constructed’ for IR theories. As constructivism thus understood is not an IR theory *per se*, but rather a set of tenets informing specific theories, the third section presents Piki Ish-Shalom’s theory about how social science theories may potentially influence political outcomes in world politics. By analysing what happens if and when such a potential is materialised (that is, if and when a ‘hermeneutical mechanism’ is completed), the following chapter presents the research framework that allows for a discussion on how the concept of peacebuilding gained life and its implications for the United Nations approach to societies affected by armed conflict.

The origins of constructivism in IR

At the outset, it should be stressed that what follows is not the only possible account of the origins of constructivism in this particular field of studies.⁹ Nor does it claim to account for all the views or represent every single IR theorist interested in constructivism. Rather, this section builds upon some of the more broadly accepted meanings absorbed by constructivism in IR to offer a plausible and consistent – thought not single and dominant – reading of constructivism as a broader social theory with relevant insights into the theoretical framework underlying this research.

Constructivism *per se* is not a direct product of theorising in IR, but a social science approach developed in other fields of studies – such as philosophy (Fierke and Jørgensen, 2001: 4-5), social theory (Onuf, 1989: 37), biology and sociology (Kratochwil, 2000: 74) – whose insights were later incorporated into IR theories and into the study of world politics. The term ‘constructivism’ itself is usually said to have been introduced in IR scholarship by Nicholas Onuf in his *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (1989).¹⁰ In the book, Onuf relied heavily on Wittgenstein’s theories about language and Giddens’ structuration theory to develop his own understanding of constructivism and thus propose a reconstruction of the “self-consciously organized field of study” of International Relations (Onuf, 1989: 1). According to Onuf (1989: 7), the field had

⁹ The narrative herein outlined is mainly built upon Jørgensen (2010: esp. 155-164), Kratochwil (2001), Fierke and Jørgensen (2001), Guzzini (2000) and Price and Reus-Smit (1998).

¹⁰ To the best of my knowledge, the best overview of and engagement with Onuf’s reading of constructivism in IR is found in Zehfuss (2002: 151-195).

been remarkably influenced from the beginning by Morgenthau's concern with clashes of power and interest, as well as his devotion to positivist scientific inquiry (see Morgenthau, 2006).¹¹ Onuf's rejection of Morgenthau's views would hence directly influence his robust attempt to 'reconstruct' IR.

Onuf's engagement with constructivism and his attempt to use it in the field of IR, however, cannot be dissociated from broader trends in social sciences and in the study of world politics. Indeed, the debut of constructivism in IR, as well as the engagement of IR theorists in either supporting or rejecting the 'new' approach, seems to have been facilitated by three factors, both external and internal to that particular field of studies. Externally, those factors refer to the idea of 'reflexive modernity' and to the theoretical implications of the end of the cold war for IR scholarship (Guzzini, 2000; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998). The former points to Ulrich Beck's conception of modernity as a still open and on-going – rather than an already accomplished – project of the European Renaissance. According to some, this project "is understood as the belief that, with its technical capacities, humankind can assure never ending progress" (Guzzini, 2000: 151). Such technical capacities were boosted in early modern Europe by the Industrial Revolution and would have an important effect in well-known developments in a number of areas of human activities, from trade relations to political institutions to scientific knowledge. Those changes were so profound that they would lead to the emergence of an industrial – as opposed to feudal – society in Europe from the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries onwards.¹² In the beginning of the twentieth century, however, some gradually started to become conscious about the fact that "the increase of individual and social power was not matched by any increase in moral certitudes" (Guzzini, 2000: 152), leading to critiques of modernity and its belief in never-ending progress. As those critiques grew, some – the so-called post-moderns – demanded abandoning modernity entirely and moving beyond it.

In his studies on the topic, however, Beck proposed a re-assessment of modernity, as it appeared that modernity had been regarded as an accomplished project due to a straightforwardly assumed link with the industrial society (Beck, 1992: 10). The consequence was that critiques against that particular form of social organisation were also

¹¹ Contemporary scholars, however, do not necessarily equate Morgenthau's defence of scientific inquiry with positivism. See, e.g., Ish-Shalom (2006b) and Bain (2000).

¹² For a good overview of this process, see Toulmin (1992: esp. 45-137).

quickly directed to modernity itself – hence, it appeared as if modernity was an already accomplished project. By proposing an assessment of modernity rather as an open project, and thus disconnecting it from the industrial society, Beck suggested that modernity has recently reached a new stage: a reflexive one. As such, “[j]ust as modernization dissolved the structure of feudal society in the nineteenth century and produced the industrial society, modernization today is dissolving industrial society and another modernity is coming into being” (Beck, 1992: 10; emphasis in the original). Modernity, hence, has turned against itself and became reflexive (Guzzini, 2000: 152-153); and just as modernity affects social sciences – and, of course, IR – so does this reflexive ‘other modernity’.

It is in this context, hence, that the entrance of constructivism in IR can be understood. According to Guzzini, when IR scholars in the early twentieth century realised that the European ‘international society’ – as in the English School’s concept – was simply one society in the midst of others, they could no longer assume their own rules as “universally shared” (Guzzini, 2000: 153). With the ‘entrance’ of the so-called ‘third world’ into the panorama of world politics, the European perspective of international politics would be deeply affected, making it impossible to “overlook the fact that the international system was ruled in a way which had little to do with [modern] liberal principles, and that the story of economic progress had forgotten several parts of the world” (Guzzini, 2000: 153). As such, Western social science – including IR – started to look into itself in search of “redefinitions of its own and hence [of] others’ identity” (Guzzini, 2000: 153). This broader critique of the modernity project and its related assumptions about ‘scientificity’, rationality and progress were thus decisive in shaping a number of post-modern social theories in the late twentieth century – including post-modernists in social sciences and IR. It is within this context of critiques against mainstream theories in social sciences that Onuf’s attempt to ‘reconstruct’ the field of IR may be understood. In fact, in *World of Our Making*, he proposed constructivism as a “place to begin” (Onuf, 1989: 40) theorising that aimed at moving beyond the positivist, rationalist and empiricist assumptions underlying theorising in IR at least since Morgenthau.

The second external factor in this account are the theoretical implications associated with the end of the cold war, with the subsequent peaceful dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). These events acquire particular relevance for any account of the origins of constructivism because they set the stage for fierce criticisms of the

explanatory power of the dominant positivist IR theories, most notably those associated with the realist tradition, which seemed to represent world politics well enough during the cold war. To be fair, scholars had already presented several concerns about the limits of mainstream schools of thought in IR before the end of the cold war. For instance, Richard Ashley, departing from a Bourdieusian perspective, vigorously criticised neorealism and depicted it as “a self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist, and structuralist commitments” that “anticipates, legitimizes, and orients a totalitarian project of global proportions: the rationalization of global politics” (Ashley, 1984: 228). Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), in another vein, emphasised the problematic nature of regime theories within the liberal tradition, as they rely on a fundamentally contradictory combination of an intersubjective ontology – regimes are constituted by shared principles and beliefs – and a positivist epistemology that claims a clear separation between object and subject (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986: 764). Those critiques may be said to follow what Onuf identified as a “revival of theory” in IR since the mid-1970s, having as its starting point “a repudiation of the positivist model of science as a canonical characterization of theory and its relation to methods of inquiry” (Onuf, 1989: 10). However, it would be only with the advent of the politically-driven end of the cold war and with the subsequent peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union that those criticisms would more vigorously reverberate within IR scholarship.

In this sense, the most important theoretical implication of the end of the cold war for constructivism was the failure of mainstream IR theories to explain the peaceful and domestically-driven nature of its demise. It is not that theories within the realist tradition were unable to predict the end of the cold war and the subsequent changes in world politics; rather, the problem was that they “did not even recognize the possibility that it would happen in the first place” (Guzzini, 2000: 155). Until then, mainstream theoretical traditions in IR mainly assumed that world politics developed within an objective, externally given structure that existed independently ‘out there’: the structure of international anarchy, wherein no entity was hierarchically superior to sovereign states and material aspects determined states’ interests and subsequent behaviour (see, e.g., Morgenthau, 2006; Keohane, 1984; Gilpin, 1981; Waltz, 1979, 1969). Unlike realist predictions that such a change would only take place as a result of defeat in armed conflicts or of changes in the distribution of capabilities among states, however, the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred via political processes driven by domestic forces. Against this backdrop, it thus became appealing for theorists

dissatisfied with the modernity tradition of positivism and rationalist theorising, including constructivist-led ones, to engage in meta-theoretical discussions concerning issues such as the explanatory power of mainstream theories or their underlying assumptions – in other words, they engaged in debates over the “very foundations of existing theories” (Jørgensen, 2010: 157).¹³

The internal factor leading to the entrance of constructivism in IR is intrinsically related to the external factors discussed above and refers to the most recent foundational debate of the discipline – the ‘third’ (Lapid, 1989) or the ‘fourth’ (Wæver, 1996), according to the perspective adopted. In this debate, positivists and post-positivists oppose each other on meta-theoretical grounds, most notably in what concerns their understanding of science and of how the study of world politics could or should be (better) conducted. In the ‘third’ or ‘fourth debate’, IR scholars discussed issues such as the emphasis given to agents and/or structure in their theories, the implications of such choices, the different ‘levels of analyses’ and the attitudes of cooperation or conflict adopted by states (see Jarvis, 2002; Rocha, 2002: esp. 201-259; Lapid, 1989). In addition, scholars on the post-positivist side of the debate challenged the epistemological and methodological assumptions of mainstream IR theories, thus addressing issues such as their philosophical foundations, what actually constitutes ‘knowledge’ in that field of studies and which meta-theoretical positions are more favourable for the production of such ‘knowledge’ (Rocha, 2002: esp. 201-259). Within this context, post-positivist insights brought from social theories provided critical IR scholars with different perspectives to challenge mainstream theories and their “positivist choice of the empirically corroborated law or generalization as the fundamental unit of scientific achievement” (Lapid, 1989: 239).

According to this brief account, it is then impossible to dissociate the inception of constructivism in IR from a critical impetus to challenge mainstream theories such as those in the realist and in the liberal traditions. Because its most distinctive feature was and remains a concern with the process of social construction of world politics, constructivism poses a serious challenge to the rationalist understanding of world politics that orients most theories within the realist and the liberal traditions. As discussed in the next section, constructivism

¹³ For references on what constitutes meta-theorising in social sciences and on the implications and usefulness of this exercise, see Ritzer *et al.* (2002) and Ritzer (1990). For good discussions about meta-theory in IR, see Chernoff (2007), Rocha (2002) and Neufeld (1995).

necessarily entails uncovering and understanding how that social construction came into being in the first place, as well as its constitutive parts. As such, constructivism is necessarily about providing a deeper and broader understanding of the current state of things – the *status quo*. In doing so, it may be considered a critical theory to the extent that it “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about” (Cox, 1981: 129; see also Price and Reus-Smit, 1998).¹⁴ Constructivism nevertheless should not be automatically equated with all critical theories because, unlike some critical counterparts such as post-structuralism, it usually acknowledges the “possibility of a social science and a willingness to engage openly in scholarly debate with rationalism” (Katzenstein *et al.*, 1998: 677). It is at this epistemological level that controversies tend to be raised about what constitutes constructivism in IR, as discussed in the following section.

‘Social construction of’ in social sciences and IR

From the narrative above, it emerges that constructivism is better understood as a social theory ‘approach’ rather than an IR theory *per se*. As it emphasises the social dimension of (social) reality, constructivism can thus be seen as a set of tenets in social theory that provide useful insights for the study of social relations in general and world politics in particular. Constructivism’s assumptions have informed a number of specific IR theories – whether or not authors have been explicit about it. For instance, rather than focusing simply on the role of military might or economic wealth, scholars such as Zehfuss (2002), Hopf (2002), Goldstein and Keohane (1993) and Checkel (1997) have also analysed the role of collective ideas in foreign policy decision-making and in policy change. Others have focused on, amongst others: the impact of norms in shaping states’ interests and positions (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995); how particular understandings, including scientific ones, are pushed forward by specific groups to advance their interests (e.g., Chwieroth, 2010; Pio, 2001; Haas, 1992); the influence of theories in policy outcomes (Ish-Shalom, 2006a); how institutions built upon specific ideas may contribute to reproducing a particular kind of world order (e.g., Ruggie, 1982); the structural nature of the

¹⁴ In another vein, Giddens suggests that social science – and theorising in social science – is a critique in itself, as it is a practice of social life. According to him, “theories and findings in the social sciences are likely to have practical (and political) consequences regardless of whether or not the sociological observer or policy-maker decides that they can be ‘applied’ to a given practical issue” (Giddens, 1984: xxxv).

‘international system’ (e.g., Wendt, 1992); the identity of specific agents such as the European Union (e.g., Jupille *et al.*, 2003) or Russia (e.g., Hopf, 2002); and on methodological strategies for research carried out based on the tenets of constructivism (e.g., Klotz and Lynch, 2007; Pouliot, 2007).¹⁵ In all those examples, the fundamental aspect to be stressed is that those authors, albeit to varying degrees and sometimes within different research traditions, have built their theories about specific aspects of world politics based on the assumption that their objects of study were somehow ‘socially constructed’.

Using a recurrent language in logics, philosopher Ian Hacking identifies the major claims of constructivists. According to him, the precondition for an analysis of the ‘social construction’ of a given *X* such as ‘gender’ or ‘national interest’ is that “[i]n the present state of affairs, *X* is taken for granted; *X* appears to be inevitable” (Hacking, 1999: 12). Hence, unless this precondition is met, there is no sense in considering something as socially constructed – presumably because otherwise “everybody knows that *X* is the contingent upshot of social arrangements” (Hacking, 1999: 12). When this condition is met, constructivists usually make the following claim about the social construction of *X*: “*X* need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. *X*, or *X* as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable” (Hacking, 1999: 6).¹⁶ If *X* is socially constructed, then *X* in its current form is not the same *X* that could otherwise have occurred or existed. In fact, *X* could have simply been something completely different. This is because *X* is not a product of a reality that exists independently ‘out there’ – ‘it is not determined by the nature of things’ – but it is rather dependent upon and is “brought into existence or shaped by social events, forces, history, all of which could well have been different” (Hacking, 1999: 7). If any of the social events, forces, moments of history or any other element leading to *X* had been different, they could have assumed a different meaning and *X* would not be as it currently is – or *X* could have not come into being in the first place! As a social construction, therefore, *X* is ‘not inevitable’.

¹⁵ For reviews of research inspired by constructivism in IR, see Checkel (2004, 1998), Pouliot (2004), Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) and Hopf (1998).

¹⁶ Hacking goes on, stating that constructivists often hold two other claims in their writings: that “*X* is quite bad as it is” and that “We would be much better off if *X* were done away with, or at least radically transformed” (Hacking, 1999: 6).

In a recently published textbook, IR theorist Karin Fierke provides a less philosophical and more concrete illustration of what it means to say that something is ‘socially constructed’:

To construct something is an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist. For instance, a material substance, such as wood, exists in nature, but it can be formed into any number of objects, for instance the beam in a house, a rifle, a musical instrument, or a totem pole. Although these represent material objects in and of themselves, they do not exist in nature but have come about through acts of human creation. Once created, each of these objects has a particular meaning and use within a context. They are social constructs in so far as their shape and form is imbued with social values, norms, and assumptions rather than being the product of purely individual thought or meaning. (Fierke, 2010: 179)

Hence, saying that something is socially constructed only makes sense if one takes due consideration of its meaning and use in a particular context constituted of norms, values and assumptions. In fact, it is only with a proper understanding of the meaning acquired by a given object in a particular context that one may consider, for instance, a hollow piece of wood (a material substance) as a musical instrument called ‘flute’ (a social construct).

Referring to a given *X* such as ‘anarchy’ or ‘national interest’ as social constructs thus means that *X* is not simply given and that it is dependent upon the social processes and forces that constituted *X* in the first place. A socially constructed *X* thus resembles an empty shell (Wendt, 1999: 249), as it may assume different meanings in different contexts. It is based on this assumption that Alexander Wendt (1999, 1992) affirms that anarchy may assume different configurations depending on its intersubjective logic (the ‘shared meaning’) according to which states interpret and act in world politics – hence his well-coined expression “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1999: 6, 1992: 395). Accordingly, what is defined as ‘national interest’ for one state may be – and often is – very different from the ‘national interest’ of another state, or it can simply assume completely different meanings for the same state in different historical moments. This is because the ‘national interest’ is a social construct that depends on the representations of world politics that are ‘shared’ by foreign policy decision-makers in a given time and space (see Weldes, 1999: esp. 97-119). In both cases, ‘anarchy’ and ‘national interest’ assume different meanings because the social events and forces that shaped and/or brought them into existence may vary greatly in terms of both space and time.

In what follows, I discuss the ontological and epistemological implications of stating that something is ‘socially constructed’, thus identifying what IR theories premised

on constructivism might look like. According to the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, ontology, or metaphysics, refers to “the philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality”. Ontological inquiries are carried out at a higher level of abstraction because they engage with “questions science does not address but [with] the answers to which it presupposes” (1999: 563). Inquiries at this level thus relate to assumptions about the nature, the structure, the components (units) and the dynamics that are to be known, which are all within what is generally referred to as ‘reality’. Ontological questions, in sum, relate to *what one assumes to constitute reality*.

Ontologically, saying that something is socially constructed means that reality is made of intersubjective understandings, i.e. of the meanings or functions that actors collectively attribute to such reality. Because intersubjective, this (socially constructed) reality or a given phenomenon of such reality can never be reduced to how a single individual experiences it or to a mere sum of beliefs individuals share about it (Adler, 1997: 327). Nor can reality be reduced to material aspects only, since “a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive construction of the world out there” (Guzzini, 2000: 159) – that is, they are associated to some material manifestation. Ontologically, constructivism is thus about the process that constitutes reality or a particular phenomenon of that reality. As for an illustration, one may think of a given *X* such as language. As a social construct, “language cannot be reduced to the simple material support for communication (voice or other)” (Guzzini, 2000: 164). Moreover, it “does not exist independently from its use” and “its use cannot be reduced to individual choices – language cannot be reduced to meanings that individuals attach to it” (Guzzini, 2000: 164). As such, language is always intersubjective, following its own rules and reproducing its own (intersubjective) practices. It is intersubjective phenomena such as language that are the core of what constructivism attributes to constitute social reality.

Constructivism’s intersubjective ontology thus entails some implications for specific theories. First, there are two distinct ‘worlds’ that co-exist: a natural and a social world. The former is a world external to our thoughts, which exists independently ‘out there’ and is constituted by facts that exist independently of human volition; the latter is constituted by ‘facts’ that “exist only because we attribute a certain function or meaning to them” (Guzzini, 2000: 160; see also Adler, 1997: 323). In other words, whereas the natural world is constituted by “brute facts”, the social world is constituted by social or “institutional facts”

(Searle, 1995: 2). Money is a recurrent illustration of the interplay between material and non-material aspects in social reality, between a natural and a social world. To be accurate, materially, money is a piece of paper or a metallic coin. However, it is a complex system of socially shared meanings that defines how individuals interpret that particular piece of paper or coin as 'money'. Similarly, but at a different level, it is another system of socially shared meanings that makes individuals associate relative values to 'money', or to convert those values into nominal figures in dollars, euros or yen, for instance. Hence, although constructivism is more interested in institutional facts (Guzzini, 2000: 160), it is important to stress that institutional facts often need some kind of material support.

The second ontological implication for theories inspired by constructivism is that agents and structures are mutually constituted in an interactive process that takes place over time. This process of mutual constitution of agents and structures has been approached from several angles in IR theories inspired by constructivism: for instance, Wendt (1987) explained this mutual constitution departing from Giddens' structuration theory; Guzzini (2000) adopted Bourdieu's sociology; and others departed from theories of discursive practice and communicative action (see, e.g., Risse, 2000; Onuf, 1989; Kratochwil, 1989). In all those cases, the interaction of agents and structures does not simply follow a behavioural response of utility-maximising agents, as in rationalist IR theories. Rather, in an intersubjective ontology, structures constitute and constrain agents by influencing their identities, interests and actions, whilst agents constitute structures as they understand social phenomena and act according to their interpretation of structural constraints. Because agents may potentially reinterpret their own interpretations during this process, they may eventually change structures by modifying the meanings they attach to social phenomena – i.e. they have the potential to change the content of those constraints and eventually the very structures in which they are embedded. This is a remarkable ontological implication, as it is this insight on the mutual constitution of reality that allows for constructivism to account for the possibility of systemic change in world politics.

Finally, the third implication of constructivism's intersubjective ontology refers to how actors act in social reality. In IR theories within the realist and liberal traditions, it is usually materialism and an individualist understanding of rationality that determines behaviour. According to Morgenthau, for instance, states act in order to guarantee their national interest, which is primarily defined in terms of power (Morgenthau, 2006: 5). Waltz,

on the other hand, draws from microeconomics theory to formulate a systemic theory in which the primary concern of states “is not to maximize power, but to maintain their position in the system” (Waltz, 1979: 126). In both cases, actions taken by individual states are simply a behaviouralist response to external structural constraints – nominally, international anarchy, an exogenously given state of affairs understood in realist accounts as the absence of entities hierarchically superior to states in world politics.¹⁷

For constructivism, it is not only materialism and rationality that account for actors’ behaviour, as non-material aspects play a role in framing how social actors attach meaning to phenomena and subsequently adopt specific courses of action based on those meanings. Moreover, as constructivism entails an intersubjective – as opposed to individualist – character, interests and whatever else may prompt actors to action are not given *a priori*, but they are formed in the very social context in which action takes place (Guzzini, 2000: 149). This means that the option for a specific course of action is also related to the collective meanings shared by actors in that context. Hence, what is ‘rational’ for an actor becomes a “function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests” (Fierke, 2010: 181). Consequently, how actors see themselves and others, as well as the collective norms, values and rules existing in that context, are important aspects for understanding the “material and structural conditions in which they [actors] find themselves” (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 574) and how they frame their actions subsequently.

There are also epistemological implications associated with considering something ‘socially constructed’. Epistemology or the theory of knowledge, according once again to the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, refers to “the study of the nature of knowledge and justification”, especially their defining characteristics, substantial conditions and sources, as well as their limits and justification (1999: 273). Hence, when one speaks of epistemology one speaks of what s/he considers as knowledge, of what s/he considers as the basis for that knowledge, of what can be known and of what criteria matters to justify his or her knowledge as knowledge – and not a belief or something else. Epistemology, therefore, relates to claims about *what is knowledge and how can one know about something*.

¹⁷ Elsewhere (Cavalcante, 2011a: esp. 24-27), I offer an overview of ‘anarchy’ in realist writings and discuss its meaning in Wendt’s earlier works.

Having an overall agreement about the intersubjective constitution of social reality in general and world politics in particular, constructivism is more debatable epistemologically in the field of IR. In fact, according to its epistemological assumptions, scholars have proposed different characterisations of constructivism as, *inter alia*, conventional and critical (see Hopf, 1998; Katzenstein *et al.*, 1998); modernist and postmodernist (see Price and Reus-Smit, 1998); conventional, interpretative and critical (see Checkel, 2004); and neo-classical, post-modernist and naturalistic (see Ruggie, 1998b). Instead of strictly assuming either one of those typified positions, however, I follow Klotz and Lynch's pragmatic and "less rigid" proposal. Hence, at the level of epistemology, I assume that constructivism may be more easily captured in terms of a spectrum that ranges from "positivist-leaning to post-positivist positions" (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 11). Consistent with this understanding and with the narrative of the emergence of constructivism in IR presented in the previous section, constructivism's epistemology as herein presented leans towards the post-positivist end of that spectrum.

As aforementioned, assuming that a given *X* is socially constructed basically means that there is a socially shared agreement about a specific meaning of *X* between actors in a specific space and at a given time. Ontologically, constructivism is thus interested in the actual process leading to the social construction of reality or of *X* itself. As this reality or *X* are socially shared, they cannot be reduced to a mechanistic/behaviouralist "stimulus-reaction chain" (Guzzini, 2000: 161). Rather, this reality or *X* only entails some meaning to the extent that they are intelligible and count as meaningful to social actors within a given societal context – which, by definition, is situated in a given time and space. The capacity of social actors to "attach the 'right' meaning to [i.e. to interpret] a social event depends on the[ir] capacity to share a system of meanings within the society" (Guzzini, 2000: 162). As such, "[w]hat counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive construction of the world out there" (Guzzini, 2000: 159). Hence, if ontologically constructivism is interested in the actual process leading to the social construction of reality or of a given phenomenon *X*, constructivism is epistemologically about the process of (social) construction of the meaning of *X*. In Guzzini's words, therefore, constructivism "is epistemologically about the *social construction of knowledge* [i.e. of the socially shared meaning of a given *X*], and ontologically about the *construction of social reality*" [i.e. of *X* itself] (Guzzini, 2000: 160).

Three epistemological implications follow for theories inspired by constructivism as herein presented. First, by ontologically distinguishing between a natural and a social world, as discussed above, constructivism does not deny the existence of a material reality, as opposed to ‘radical’ non-positivist theories such as post-structuralism, for instance. Epistemologically, what constructivism does assume, however, is that such a material reality cannot be meaningfully apprehended without the resort to socially shared practices that are constituted by non-material/ideational aspects such as norms, values, language, identities and/or rules (Guzzini, 2000: 160; Adler, 1997: 323). In fact, as Searle rightly states, one still requires language to state a brute fact (Searle, 1995: 2). This is because it is through the analysis of the meanings or functions that a given *X* collectively entails that one may understand how *X* came into being with those particular meanings or functions. For instance, recalling the illustration of money from above, “if everybody ceased to believe that this piece of paper was money, it would no longer be (although it would still be a metal coin or a piece of paper)” (Guzzini, 2000: 160). In analysing either language or money, therefore, theories inspired by constructivism should not restrict their analysis to human voice or the metallic property of coins alone, but also to the meanings and functions they assume socially in a given context.

Second, as constructivism is epistemologically about the process through which a given *X* acquires meaning, the very production of knowledge – and therefore the scientific exercise itself – is a meaningful action. Hence, ‘theories of action’ inspired by constructivism must be followed by a ‘theory of knowledge’ (Guzzini, 2000: 160). According to Guzzini (2000: 170), and following its double hermeneutical nature, constructivism thus must conjecture about the relationship between the social construction of meaning (epistemology) and the construction of social reality (ontology). In doing so, and bearing in mind Hacking’s definition of what the ‘social construction of’ entails, constructivism can be fundamentally seen as a statement “that the present is not determined by the [material] ‘nature’ of things”, as it is “always about a counter-factual and how things could have been different” (Guzzini, 2000: 150). For theories inspired by constructivism, hence, the relationship between power and knowledge assumes great relevance not only in the scientific inquiry, but also in (both academic and policy) practice and policy-making, since attributing meaning to social phenomena is in itself an exercise of power.

Finally, as constructivism grants relevance to the social context in which the production of knowledge takes place, it poses a challenge to empiricism and objectivism at the epistemological level. Epistemological empiricism, according to Steve Smith, relates to the position with a “tremendous reliance on the belief that it is empirical validation or falsification that is the hallmark of ‘real’ enquiry” (Smith, 1996: 16). This position, as Guzzini discusses in his article, underlies Waltz’s defence of testing, which may be roughly formulated as: “although we have no direct access to the outside world, and although our theories are only heuristic models with no claim to represent reality ‘as it is’, the testing procedure can be done on the neutral ground of empirical reality” (Guzzini, 2000: 157). As constructivism assumes that the production of knowledge takes place in a specific social context, it thus denies the possibility of ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ knowledge – in fact, in constructivism, knowledge is not simply gathered ‘out there’, but it is actually socially constructed (Guzzini, 2000: 160).

In sum, constructivism as herein presented is better understood as a social theory approach rather than an IR theory *per se*. Its main assumption refers to the idea that reality in general and phenomena in world politics in particular are socially constructed. Assuming a given *X* as socially constructed means that actors in a given time and space collectively share an agreement about a specific meaning of *X*.¹⁸ As a social theory ‘approach’, constructivism thus provides useful insights for specific IR theories. If such theories are to be consistent, they have to consider the ontological and epistemological implications of assuming something as socially constructed. Ontologically, those implications relate to the assumptions that: a natural and a social world co-exist; agents and structures are mutually constituted; and that both material and non-material aspects influence actors’ courses of action. Epistemologically, those implications refer to the following assumptions: reality cannot be apprehended without resort to the analysis of both material and non-material aspects; the production of meanings for and knowledge about social constructs is a meaningful action; and the production of strictly ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ knowledge is impossible.

Constructivism thus understood provides a useful approach to analyse phenomena of social reality in general and of world politics in particular. If incorporated as a substrate

¹⁸ That is, at least a minimum form of agreement. In the following chapter, I introduce the notion of ‘minimal intelligibility’ to highlight this requirement.

for specific IR theories, it helps to identify and explore issues such as, for instance, the worldviews of policymakers (i.e. how they understand world politics and which *locus* they assign to the institutions they represent, such as states or international organisations), as well as their identities (how they see themselves and the institutions they represent) and their interests (what they want and why). A constructivist analysis of social processes and interactions in world politics, hence, highlights the importance of non-material aspects in those processes, thus undermining the views that assign an excessive weight only to material aspects such as military capabilities.

An IR theory inspired by constructivism: the hermeneutical mechanism and how social science theories may influence policy outcomes

As the examples presented throughout the previous section demonstrate, IR scholars have developed many theories based on the assumptions of constructivism. According to Jørgensen (2010: 162), they did so fundamentally via two different strategies: engaging in a meta-theoretical exercise of assessing constructivism and IR theories in order to amend specific aspects of either or both when necessary; or employing broader theories compatible with constructivism in order to develop concrete analytical frameworks. Following the former strategy, for instance, Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: esp. 765-766) outlined concrete proposals for a reformulation of regime theories that could reduce the problematic tension between their social ontology and their positivist epistemology. Jutta Weldes (1999, 1996), in the same vein, re-theorised the concept of ‘national interest’ as a social construct in order to overcome the undetermined and perennial character it assumes in realist writings. A good illustration of the latter strategy outlined by Jørgensen, I suggest, is Piki Ish-Shalom’s ‘hermeneutical mechanism’, a concrete theoretical framework about the influence of theories in policy outcomes (Ish-Shalom, 2013, 2006a). To elaborate his own theory, the author mainly builds upon other compatible theories emphasising the social construction of reality, such as Freeden’s theories on ideology, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, and constructivist writings on the role of knowledge in the social construction of reality (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 567). The remainder of this section introduces this mechanism.

Ish-Shalom’s main goal is to elaborate a theory through which he seeks to explain the influence of the democratic peace thesis in policy outcomes outlined by decision-makers in the United States of America (USA) and Israel. According to him, this influence happens

via a ‘hermeneutical mechanism’ through which a specific kind of discourse (academic and theoretical) is converted into another at the public and political levels, thus “shaping the understanding of world politics [and consequently] framing the menu of acceptable policies” available to decision-makers (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 566-567). In accordance with constructivism’s tenets about the social construction of reality, and reformulating ‘theory’ as a social construct, it is via this mechanism that, according to the author, theories help to shape social reality and influence policy outcomes. In the author’s theory, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is used to reconstruct constructivism “a purely social theory to a sociopolitical theory that considers seriously the political dimension of social reality” (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 566; see also Ish-Shalom, 2011).

There are two key concepts for understanding Ish-Shalom’s mechanism: theory and hermeneutics. Theories are re-defined as ‘political thoughts’. Following Michael Freeden’s work on ideology (see Freeden, 1996), Ish-Shalom defines political thoughts as an “assembling together of political concepts”, which, in turn, are “the basic building blocks of every mode of political thought” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 17). Political concepts, however, do not entail meanings in themselves, but they gain “meaning, viability, and political significance only in the context of a complete configuration of political concepts” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 17). Hence, although political concepts such as ‘peace’ or ‘war’ may entail different understandings individually, they confer particular meaning to each other when arranged together within the framework of specific political thoughts – such as concrete political theories or ideologies. For instance, realism-inspired balance of power theories are only intelligible when conceived *vis-à-vis* a set of concepts (e.g. alliances, equilibrium, deterrence, military power) that provide particular meanings to each other; similarly, those concepts only acquire those particular meanings against the backdrop of balance of power theories.

A distinctive feature of re-defining theories as political thoughts is the latter’s capacity to eventually drive political action – a cornerstone assumption for the functioning of the hermeneutical mechanism (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 17-18). This mainly follows from the diversity of meanings political concepts may assume, as well as from the array of available political practices associated with each meaning. Within the tradition of peace studies, for instance, as discussed in the following chapter, the concept of peace may assume either a negative or a positive meaning: in the former case, it is the absence of direct violence,

whereas in the latter, peace is virtually equated with social justice (see Galtung, 1969: 183, also footnote 131). For each one of those meanings, there is a variety of political alternatives available for policy makers and practitioners interested in achieving peace. A viable policy for achieving a situation of negative peace, for instance, is the adoption of peacekeeping, the dissociative approach, wherein antagonists are kept away from each other – with or without the support of third parties (Galtung, 1976: 282). On the other hand, achieving a situation of positive peace could entail the adoption of peacebuilding, the associative approach, as it potentially removes the deep causes of violent conflict and simultaneously offer alternatives in situations where they may happen (Galtung, 1976: 298). The same rationale applies both for political concepts such as ‘social justice’, ‘war’, ‘security’ or ‘development’, as well as for the respective policies designed and eventually implemented to achieve them.

Given the multiplicity of meanings political concepts may assume, as well as the array of available political practices associated with each meaning, Ish-Shalom rightly ascertains that “persuading people to accept one meaning rather than another leads them into one political practice rather than another” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 17). Recalling the discussion carried out in the previous section, this follows from constructivism’s epistemological implication that the production of meanings is in itself a (political) action. Resuming the illustration above, persuading one to accept either a negative or a positive understanding of peace may lead to the adoption of different approaches to peace – either a dissociative or an associative approach. As such, if theories as political thoughts provide meaning to political concepts, and if political concepts are the basis of political thoughts, it follows that theories as political thoughts not only explain and/or make intelligible specific phenomena or dynamics in the social world, but they also provide “comprehensive readings” of those very phenomena and dynamics (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 18). As such, to the extent that they assign meaning to political concepts, theories as political thoughts may be used to “persuade people and motivate them to political action” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 17, 2006a: 568). In sum, theories as political thoughts not only make intelligible phenomena or dynamics in the social world, but they also shape them by driving people to political action.

The second concept for understanding Ish-Shalom’s mechanism is hermeneutics itself. Rather than understanding hermeneutics in its ‘traditional’ sense as simply the “art of reading and interpreting texts” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 14), the author stresses its double nature. In social sciences, according to Giddens, the double nature of hermeneutics implies duality,

since “reflection on social processes (theories, and observations about them) continually enter into, become disentangled with and re-enter the universe of events that they describe” (Giddens, 1984: xxxiii). Consequently, “the ‘findings’ of social science do not remain isolated from the ‘subject-matter’ to which they refer, but consistently re-enter and reshape it” (Giddens, 1993: 9). The double nature of hermeneutics thus means not only interpreting already-written texts, but also the context in which interpretation is produced, that is, the very process of interpretation. In these terms, reality is conceived “as an unwritten text that encompasses social entities such as practices, norms, and ideas” (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 566). Accordingly, if reality is understood as an unwritten text, Ish-Shalom suggests that the process of theorisation can be conceived as “a hermeneutical process of understanding reality” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 23). Recalling that theorising reality means attaching meaning to political concepts, the author thus ascertains that “*theoretical constructs* have the potential to frame both our understanding and our political action”. And when theory actually does so, he continues, “it uses what [he] describes as the hermeneutical mechanism – the active aspects and implications of hermeneutics – the art of interpretation” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 24). It is this hermeneutic mechanism that, according to Ish-Shalom, explains how theoretical constructs influence political practices by attaching meanings to political concepts and potentially driving political action.

Ish-Shalom’s hermeneutical mechanism is explained as a three-stage process. At first, since theories attach meanings to political concepts and provide a framework in which such concepts are understood in meaningful ways, they are understood as *theoretical constructs*. Such constructs not only help to understand specific aspects of social reality, but they may also frame individuals’ understanding and political action (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 17-18). This ‘framing’ does not occur *a posteriori*, but rather “on a prior and deeper level” where political concepts are defined and where they equip individuals with “a road map to navigate the world” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 68). In proving this ‘road map’, political concepts thus shape individuals’ views about the world, their position as well as their interests in this world. *Theoretical constructs* provide a framework wherein political concepts are assembled together, but they are predominantly elaborated and usually remain restricted to academia. At some points, however, a combination of material and ideational factors create an environment that is conducive to the expansion of *theoretical constructs* into the public

domain. It is only if and when these moments occur that theories may “have a real political impact” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 68).

The second stage, hence, refers to the transformation of *theoretical constructs* into *public conventions*, which happens when there is a convergence of enabling material and ideational conditions around an axis of common identity collectively shared by individuals (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 25). Identity, in this context, provides individuals with a common ‘reading’ that helps them to analyse, interpret and act according to how they understand their own condition *vis-à-vis* others (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 574). When those factors converge, *theoretical constructs* are then converted into *public conventions*. At this stage, theory is thus “politicized and simplified” (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 572; see also Ish-Shalom, 2013: 33-38), that is, they lose the critical sense typical of academia and are understood in quasi absolute terms, being uncritically taken for granted. At the public sphere, those theories are understood as “general background knowledge about the world that is taken for granted and shapes the commonsensical codes of thinking and behavior” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 5, 21).¹⁹ As such, although cautiously relying on Gramsci’s writings (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 19), the author notes that *public conventions* are nothing but Gramsci’s notion of hegemony understood in its political rather than in its ideologist meaning (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 571). In shaping codes of thinking and in providing a rationale for behaviour, *public conventions* acquire political relevance due to their potential to affect social reality. This potential is what enables the third stage of the hermeneutical mechanism: the transformation of *public conventions* into *political convictions*.

¹⁹ Thus understood, Ish-Shalom’s notion of *public conventions* may be closely associated with at least four other concepts. First, with Searle’s Background, which is defined as a “set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable intentional states of function” (Searle, 1995: 129). Second, to Berger and Luckmann’s definition of common-sense as “the knowledge I [impersonal ‘I’] share with others in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life” (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 37). Third, they are close to Habermas’ notion of lifeworld, understood as “the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements” (Habermas, 1987: 126). Finally, *public conventions* also mirror Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus*, understood as “a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a *matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions*” (Bourdieu, 1977: 82-83; emphasis in original). In all cases, individuals simply assume as correct and take for granted knowledge they have about social reality. It is worth noting that the first three concepts are very broad, referring to such things as money and its shared understanding among a large number of people. The concepts of *habitus* and *public conventions* are more restricted, in the sense that they refer to specific social groups in particular contexts.

This third stage of the hermeneutical mechanism includes political agency and may happen in two circumstances (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 25-26). In the first scenario, competent individuals mobilize *public conventions* with the purpose of advancing their own political interests (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 25). Those politically motivated individuals do so by building upon the rhetorical capital²⁰ of theories to create a discourse that justifies and enacts a specific course of action as the only one available – or at least, the most favourable for advancing the interest of the particular political constituency to whom the discourse is addressed. In the second scenario, *public conventions* are already embedded in influential sectors such as policy and political elites in issue-areas such as public health or world politics. When that is the case, *public conventions* frame the thinking of individuals in those sectors and consequently how they plan and implement policies in their respective fields (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 26). In either case, human political agency helps to gradually convert *public conventions* into *political convictions*, articulating *public conventions* in terms of a “strong, opinionated view that necessitates political action” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 22). *Political convictions*, in sum, ultimately represent *theoretical constructs* simplified as *public convictions* and subsequently “politicized and dogmatized (...) in absolute terms of yes and no” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 5).

Following this model, Ish-Shalom explains how the democratic peace thesis has influenced policies and political actions in two cases: Israel’s critical policies towards the Oslo peace accords, and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East by US Presidents Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and George W. Bush (2001-2009). The first case illustrates the first scenario depicted above, as political elites in Israel mobilized politically the rhetorical capital of the theory to secure their political agenda of delaying or avoiding negotiations with Palestinians after the signature of the 1993 Oslo Agreement (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 85-111). In the second case, a political (mis)representation of the theory framed the thinking of US neoconservatives and government offices, who were then prompted to push forward an agenda for regime change in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 112-141). In both cases, a simplified and uncritical version of a social science theory, reconfigured as *public convention* and subsequently as *political conviction*, helped to shape social reality by driving political action. Considering the double-hermeneutic nature of the

²⁰ The author elaborates in more detail the concept of rhetorical capital in Ish-Shalom (2008).

process, reality was thus being socially constructed throughout the process, and similarly, *public conventions* and *political convictions* were redefined as political actions unfolded.

It is worth stressing three aspects related to the hermeneutical mechanism outlined above. The first is that the migration of *theoretical constructs* to public spheres takes “an all-but-one-way route” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 70). This means that at the same time *theoretical constructs* are transformed into *public conventions*, the latter may also influence how *theoretical constructs* are discussed and formulated in academic circles (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 27). The second aspect is related: the hermeneutical mechanism is not necessarily linear and straightforward, either chronologically or spatially. Rather, the migration of *theoretical constructs* to public spheres is a fuzzy process, occasionally going back and forth in time and occurring at different paces in different spatial contexts. This is because the hermeneutical mechanism offers a framework for the analysis of the transformation of one kind of *discourse* (academic) into another (public and subsequently political), not necessarily how this process develops in concrete instances; in other words, the hermeneutical mechanism is more about *discourse*-tracing than *process*-tracing (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 3-4).

Finally, the third aspect worth stressing relates to the issue of agency. In the second step of the hermeneutical mechanism, individuals resort to *theoretical constructs* and simplify them rhetorically in their discourses. At this stage, however, those individuals do not necessarily have clear political goals in mind, nor are they necessarily conscious about their role in helping to transform a *theoretical construct* into *public convention*. Nevertheless, their rhetorical use of academic theories is marked by the lack of some distinctive attributes of academic discourses, such as their probabilistic nature (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 36). Hence, although most likely unaware and although it might not have been their primary intention, their rhetoric use of theories contribute to their simplification and migration away from academe and into public spheres. Those three aspects were taken due consideration when elaborating the framework for analysis presented in Chapter 2 and when constructing the narrative outlined in the subsequent chapters.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored the scholarship on constructivism in IR and presented a specific theory about the potential influence of social science theories, a type of ‘idea’, in policy practice. Although acknowledging different views and interpretations, I outlined

constructivism as a broader approach to the study of social relations in general and of world politics in particular. Understood as such, constructivism entails specific ontological and epistemological assumptions that were discussed in this chapter with a view of clearly delineating the main implications and limits of theorising about non-material (i.e. ideational) aspects for the study of world politics. As it is compatible with the understanding of constructivism herein proposed, I also presented Ish-Shalom's theory of how social sciences theories may eventually affect policy outcomes via a hermeneutical mechanism of attaching meaning to political concepts.

A key insight offered by constructivism for this research study is that 'peacebuilding' may be understood as an empty shell, as a label that may assume different connotations according to its inter-subjectively shared meaning in a given context. Based on that understanding, I use the hermeneutical mechanism to explore how one particular meaning of 'peacebuilding' became inter-subjectively shared in the United Nations in the early 1990s based on a simplified and politicised version of academic theories, that is, based on a particular *political conviction*. As *political convictions* require political action, the concept of 'peacebuilding' not only embodies meanings, but also presupposes different policy prescriptions and may lead to distinct concrete courses of political action. I turn to those issues in the following chapter as I present the framework for analysis that guides my investigation on how the concept of peacebuilding gained life and its implications for the United Nations approach to societies affected by armed conflict.

Chapter 2

Framework for analysis

In social science, (...) conceptual schemes that order and inform processes of inquiry into social life are in large part what 'theory' is and what it is for.

Anthony Giddens (1984: Preface)

Introduction

This chapter outlines the research design of the inquiry carried out in this research study. It outlines the main questions to be addressed, the concepts most recurrently used, the conceptual proposal as well as the methodological approach herein adopted.

Two main questions underlie this research study:

- ✓ how the concept of peacebuilding 'came into life' in the United Nations, that is, became influential to the extent of motivating, justifying, legitimating and/or enacting specific policy outcomes or concrete courses of action?
- ✓ whether and how the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund affected the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding after their establishment?

In addressing those questions, this study delves into contemporary debates about the underpinnings of the concept of peacebuilding and the influence of the liberal peace framework in the Organisation's approach to armed conflict and post-armed conflict situations. It engages, moreover, with the workings of the so-called 'peacebuilding architecture', the institutional arrangement designed to enhance the UN's capacities in peacebuilding following the identification of critical gaps and mixed results of the world body in providing assistance to societies affected by armed conflicts. In doing so, the thesis analyses the coming into life and the trajectory of the concept of 'peacebuilding', which is not mentioned anywhere in the UN Charter, but yet became one of the central concerns of the Organisation in the area of international peace and security at least since the end of the cold war.

Conceptual apparatus: building blocks and terminology

The conceptual ‘building blocks’ of this research study include the concept of United Nations, and the notions of minimal intelligibility and *milieu*. In order to avoid conceptual confusion and lack of clarity, this section spells out how they are understood in this thesis.

My understanding of what the United Nations entails is inspired by Inis Claude Jr. (1996), who approached the world body in terms of two images: first, the image of an international secretariat composed of international civil servants and bureaucratic structures located in places such as New York and Geneva; and second, the image of a body composed of member states “who employ an international secretariat to support their joint deliberations and activities” (Claude Jr., 1996: 290-291). With a view of avoiding defining those two images without conceptual substance, I analytically distinguish between them by attaching to each one the concepts of international bureaucracy and international organisation, respectively. In doing so, Inis Claude’s two images become more precise conceptually, rightly emphasising that the two cannot be separated, but that both rather co-exist.

International organisations are herein understood as a form of international institution, which in turn may be defined as “systems of norms, rules and decision-making procedures that give rise to social practices, that assign roles to participants in these practices, and that guide interactions among participants” (Biermann *et al.*, 2009: 39). International institutions are frequently informal and based on unwritten agreements, as it is often the case, for instance, of alliances in world politics (e.g. the ‘allied powers’ during World War II). International institutions (e.g. the ‘international trade regime’), however, are occasionally embodied in formal structures (e.g. the World Trade Organisation). When that is the case, those formal structures are usually in the form of organisations that entail “explicit rules, specific assignments of roles to individuals and groups, and the capacity for action” (Keohane, 1988: 384, footnote 382). Biermann *et al.* (2009: 39) approach *international organisations* as institutional arrangements combining a normative framework, member states and a bureaucracy. The latter, by definition, is also international; accordingly, an *international bureaucracy* is defined as “a hierarchically organized group of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures within the context of a policy area” (Biermann *et al.*, 2009: 37).

Whereas I follow the definitions of international institutions and bureaucracies as advanced by Biermann *et al.* (2009), I modify their third concept to capture more accurately the ideational aspects that constitute international organisations in general and the United Nations in particular. This modification is necessary because the authors did not elaborate on what exactly constitutes the ‘normative framework’, ultimately making their concept of international organisations somewhat vague. I thus modify their concept and define international organisations as an *institutional arrangement combining an ideational, an intergovernmental and a bureaucratic dimension*.²¹ The intergovernmental dimension refers not only to the member states *per se*, but also to the intergovernmental instances of international organisations that are responsible for making decisions and establishing the overall courses of action of international organisations. The bureaucratic dimension, in its turn, coincides with an international bureaucracy as defined by Biermann *et al.* (2009: 37) and outlined above.

The ideational dimension is the most distinctive feature of this modified definition and thus deserves a more careful consideration. As herein defined, the ideational dimension of international organisations is a non-material substrate that reflects ideas (broadly understood), values, principles, norms, concepts and beliefs that are inter-subjectively shared by individuals in the context of an international organisation.²² According to their level of generality and abstraction, those ideational aspects can be grouped into three categories: deep core, programmes and policies (Schmidt, 2008: 306). The first category, deep core, refers to the worldviews found at the deepest level of the ideational substrate. Ideational aspects at this level of abstraction and generality embody the strongest values, principles and philosophical underpinnings of the organisation. They represent the envisaged goals, as well as to the more general purposes that led to the founding of the organisation in the first place. At this level, ideas generally “sit in the background”, often being taken for granted and only rarely questioned or challenged (Schmidt, 2008: 306).

The second category of ideas constituting that ideational substrate is programmes, which refer to the main assumptions underlying specific policies and courses of action. Ideas

²¹ Given the scope of this research study, the international organisations herein addressed are intergovernmental in nature.

²² Or, in other words, that are minimally intelligible for individuals in the international organisation’s *milieu*. The notions of minimal intelligibility and *milieu* are elaborated below.

at the level of programmes “define the problems to be solved by such policies; the issues to be considered; the goals to be achieved; the norms, methods, and instruments to be applied; and the ideals that frame the more immediate policy ideas proposed to solve any given problem” (Schmidt, 2008: 306). Programme ideas thus provide a frame of reference for policymakers in identifying problems and coming up with solutions in specific areas of interest to international organisations. Finally, the third category refers to the specific policies outlined by policymakers, that is, to the proposed solutions they come up with as responses to identified problems in issue-areas such as human rights, refugees, or peace and security, for instance (Schmidt, 2008: 306). From the deep core to programmes to policies, ideas gradually become less general and are conceived at more superficial levels of abstraction in the ideational substrate of international organisations. Thus understood, the ideational substrate is an important modification in the understanding of international organisations outlined by Biermann *et al.* (2009: 37) since it allows for the identification and a more nuanced understanding of the non-material aspects that constitute international organisations.

Based on those distinctions, the United Nations is herein defined as an international organisation that encompasses an ideational substrate, an intergovernmental and a bureaucratic dimension. Its first constitutive dimension, the *ideational substrate*, is made of ideas at three different levels. The elements at the most basic level, the deep core, are embodied in the UN Charter, most particularly in its Preamble and in its Purposes and Principles. They are general ideas that undergird the United Nations in all areas and at all levels, being more often taken for granted and rarely challenged. At the levels of programmes and policies, the elements in the ideational substrate of the United Nations become more specific and vary according to particular issue areas such as international peace and security, human rights or development. The ideational substrate of the United Nations is further explored in Chapter 5, with particular attention on the Organisation’s international peace and security agenda in general and peacebuilding in particular.

The UN also entails an *intergovernmental dimension*. According to the Charter of the United Nations (1945), the Organisation is open to all “peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the (...) Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations” (Article 4(1)). Members of the United Nations have to meet specific criteria of statehood according to international law, nominally,

“a defined territory and a permanent population effectively controlled by an independent government” (Simma *et al.*, 2012: 346).²³ Established in 1945 with 51 original members, the United Nations is constituted by 193 member states as of writing.²⁴ In addition to membership *per se*, the second constitutive dimension of the Organisation includes a range of forums for intergovernmental decision-making, such as the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA). In this research study, I do not explore the second constitutive dimension to its full extent because membership as such (that is, provisions of Article 4(1), criteria of statehood in international law, number of UN member states) is not affected by how the concept of peacebuilding gained life in the UN. Hence, the second constitutive dimension of the United Nations is herein explored only to the extent that its intergovernmental structures are affected by that process.


Finally, the United Nations is also constituted by a *bureaucratic dimension*. Understood in terms of the definition proposed by Biermann and colleagues, the United Nations bureaucracy includes both material (e.g. organisational charts, staff, offices, buildings) and ideational aspects (e.g. mandate, rules, values, organisational culture). Whereas material aspects such as the configuration of administrative and institutional bodies reflect ideational assumptions, for instance, ideational aspects are also influenced over time by the continuity of material aspects such as the routine practices of member states and staff. Hence, the interaction between material and ideational aspects constitute international organisations as herein defined – and they should be analysed in both dimensions, as discussed below. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the United Nations as herein outlined.

The definition of United Nations outlined above is related to two notions recurrently used throughout this research study. The notion of minimal intelligibility opposes the phrase ‘inter-subjectively shared’, which is often found in IR studies informed by constructivism. It is herein used to highlight the possibility that individuals in a given context may not always necessarily agree on what exactly constitute ideational aspects. In addition, the notion of minimal intelligibility denotes that those individuals may have different understandings about the meanings underlying specific ideational aspects; or that individuals do not necessa-

²³ For an elaboration on the definition of ‘membership’ and on other criteria for admission into the UN, see Simma *et al.* (2012: 342-352).

²⁴ For an overview of the enlargement of the UN membership, see United Nations (2013).

Figure 1: Constitutive dimensions of the United Nations



rily take them for granted or abide by them to the same extent. Rather, minimal intelligibility leaves open the possibility that disagreement may exist over specific ideational constructs. The expression thus conveys the understanding that ideational aspects serve as a basic frame of reference for the interaction of individuals in a particular context. Although they may not agree on all of its features at all times, individuals rely on minimally intelligible ideational constructs to such an extent that they eventually become embedded in everyday discourses and practices.

For instance, although they do not necessarily agree on a precise definition of concepts such as ‘sovereignty’ or ‘non-interference’, representatives of member states to the United Nations are presumably conscious that sovereignty and non-interference are core principles underlying the UN Charter. As such, even though there may be intense political disagreement in the UN membership about, say, the extent to which those principles may or may not be breached under specific circumstances (e.g. in cases of flagrant violations of human rights), concepts such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ provide at a minimum a basis for the interaction of individuals in the context of the United Nations (e.g. permanent representatives in sessions of the General Assembly or the Security Council). In other words, both concepts are minimally intelligible because they allow for interaction among individuals in the UN *milieu*.

As for the notion of *milieu* (or environment, from French), it is herein adopted to indicate that the ideational substrate of international organisations is not necessarily restricted to the corridors of the concerned organisation. Recalling the illustration above,

there is a whole array of individuals and entities to whom discussions about ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ will not only be familiar, but will also be part of their own discourses, practices and activities. Such individuals may include, amongst many others: diplomatic representatives of UN member states based in national capitals; politicians and national civil servants working in specialised agencies; analysts in think tanks; representatives of specialised non-governmental organisations; academics and students of specific fields such as IR or human rights; correspondents and other media staff covering news about world politics; and even a portion of citizens well informed and/or concerned with particular issues in world politics. Although the reach of their opinions, views and positions in the UN itself vary enormously, and although they may not necessarily interact with permanent representatives during that illustrative session, the use of concepts such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ in the context of the United Nations will also be minimally intelligible to those individuals. As such, the notion of *milieu* as herein adopted refers not only to the physical structures of international organisations (e.g. headquarters or a huge chamber in the General Assembly building at First Avenue in New York City), but also to organisational structures (e.g. General Assembly, Secretariat), ideational constructs (e.g. norms, values, rules), as well as the whole array of individuals and institutions with potential influence on the activities of international organisations (e.g. foreign policy pundits, think tanks). In other words, the notion of *milieu* as herein outlined encompasses both concrete and ideational structures around international organisations.

The concepts of ‘United Nations’ and the notions of ‘minimal intelligibility’ and ‘*milieu*’ are thus the conceptual building blocks of this research study. They provide the basis for the whole discussion carried out in the following chapters and enable the proposed analysis on how the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ gained life in the UN and the implications of this process for the United Nations approach to societies affected by armed conflict.

The objects of analysis

In trying to address the main research questions outlined above, this research focuses on how peacebuilding gained life and the implications of this process to the United Nations approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. In doing so, it analyses two core elements: the liberal democratic peace framework and the concept of ‘peacebuilding’.

The liberal (democratic) peace

IR scholars have addressed the liberal peace both as a concept and as a framework: in the former sense, it refers to the ontological state of peace that is shared by liberal or democratic²⁵ states within an imaginary geographical zone; in the latter, it is said to inform specific policies and actions with the ultimate goal of establishing such a peace. With a view to stress the emphasis on the promotion of democracies that is associated with UN peacebuilding since the 1990s, I qualify the liberal peace as the liberal *democratic* peace in this research study (see also Mac Ginty, 2006: 36).

Either as a concept or as a framework, the notion of a liberal democratic peace emerges from a longstanding tradition of thinking in the West that goes back to at least as early as Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, first published in 1795 (Kant, 1917).²⁶ In the twentieth century, Kant's ideas were recovered and associated with a number of writings in the fields of Political Science and IR after a relevant empirical phenomenon was observed in the 1960s: the absence of wars among "independent nations with elective governments" between 1789 and 1941 (Babst, 1964: 10). Although this empirical observation could as well be seen as a simple correlation between 'democracy' and 'peace', some scholars rather tried to explain the virtual absence of wars among liberal/democratic societies as a result of their governance regime – i.e. they sought to show that a causal relation existed between a 'liberal' or 'democracy' society and 'peace' (see Owen, 1997; Owen, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1983a, 1983b; see also Rummel, 1983).

Michael Doyle has been one of the most vocal contemporary articulators of the concept of a liberal/democratic peace²⁷ in the fields of IR and Political Science. In a two-

²⁵ When referring to the liberal peace as a concept, the terms 'liberal' and 'democratic' are often used interchangeably in the specialised literature – see, for instance, the articles published in a special section of *International Security* (1994) dedicated to the topic and the exchange of notes published as Russett *et al.* (1995). When referring to the concept, I do not distinguish between 'liberal' and 'democratic' in this thesis for two reasons: first, because it facilitates dialogue with the specialised literature that makes no distinction between the two; and second, because the visions of 'democracy' in the United Nations are inherently based on the Western liberal tradition, as I discuss in Chapter 3.

²⁶ For a genealogical analysis of the origins and intellectual roots of the liberal peace, including sources other than Kant, see Richmond (2005: esp. 23-51).

²⁷ Henceforth, I use 'liberal/democratic peace' when referring to the concept, which denotes that 'liberal' and 'democratic' are interchangeable terms (see footnote 25). I use 'liberal democratic peace' when referring to the framework with the purpose of highlighting that the envisaged 'peace' is both liberal *and* democratic.

parted article in which he sought to update Kant's views, Doyle conceptualises the liberal/democratic peace as the "separate peace" that exists in an imaginary zone constituted by liberal/democratic states (Doyle, 1983a: 232). According to him, there are three conditions required for the achievement of that zone of peace: a representative republican government; a principled respect for non-discriminatory human rights; and social and economic interdependence (Doyle, 1997: 286-287).²⁸ In Doyle's writings, none of the three conditions alone is sufficient, "but together (and only where together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace" (Doyle, 1983a: 232; see also Doyle, 1986: 1162, 1997: 284). In the realm of world politics, Doyle contends that such a zone of liberal/democratic peace exists, that it began to take shape in the eighteenth century as liberal democratic states "gained deeper domestic foundations and longer international experience", and that this zone has been slowly expanding ever since (Doyle, 1997: 260). The most significant feature of interstate relations in that zone, according to him, has been the "apparent absence of war (...) for almost two hundred years" (Doyle, 1983a: 217).

With the concept outlined, scholars tried to formulate theories to account for the phenomenon of the absence of wars between liberal/democratic states – that is, to formulate theories to explain the liberal/democratic peace (as a concept). Bruce Russett (1993: esp. 24-42), another leading theorist on the topic, categorises explanations/theories about the liberal/democratic peace in two main strands.²⁹ The first, cultural/normative, explains the phenomenon as a result of states' adherence to democratic norms and cultures – as in Doyle's writings (see Doyle, 1997: 277-284). According to such theories, it is the ideas or norms they entail – such as "social diversity, perceptions of individual rights, overlapping group membership, cross-pressures, shifting coalitions, expectations of limited government, and toleration of dissent by a presumably loyal opposition" (Russett, 1993: 31) – that prevent liberal/democratic regimes from fighting one another. In those theories, liberal/democratic political processes and institutions may resolve disputes without the use of force by contending parties, with due balance given to ensure "both majority rule and minority rights"

²⁸ Doyle uses the three aspects to explain not only the tendency of liberal states to act peacefully toward each other, but also to make war with non-liberal states.

²⁹ A detailed review of theories within these two strands is found in Ish-Shalom (2013: 39-67). See also Kurki (2010: esp. 365-370).

(Russett, 1993: 31). As such, in case a conflict emerges, liberal/democratic societies act concurring with the norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts towards other liberal/democratic societies, while at the same time expecting that other liberal/democratic societies reciprocate (Russett, 1993: 35). The immediate consequence, according to normative theories about the liberal/democratic peace, is thus the absence of wars among liberal/democratic societies.

The second strand of theories, structural/institutional, on the other hand, explains the absence of wars among liberal/democratic states as a result of the structures of checks and balances found in their regimes. According to such theories, liberal/democratic states are constrained from engaging in war by “the need to ensure broad popular support” (Russett, 1993: 38), which is often a time-consuming process involving several instances of government bureaucracies. Moreover, as this process of mobilisation occurs much more publicly in liberal/democratic societies than in authoritarian regimes, citizens will often need to be convinced about the real necessity of resorting to warfare before giving their consent.³⁰ Consequently, “leaders will not readily embark on an effort to prepare the country for war unless they are confident they can demonstrate a favorable ratio of costs and benefits to be achieved, at acceptable risk” (Russett, 1993: 38). Once a situation of conflict emerges, liberal/democratic leaders will thus expect to have enough time for non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms to function before opting for a violent course of action (Russett, 1993: 41). It is, in sum, the proper functioning of processes and institutions that constrains liberal democratic states to go to war with each other. Although disagreeing on the specific causal relations and mechanisms, both cultural/normative and structural/institutional theories provide sound explanations for the absence of wars among liberal/democratic states, that is, about the liberal/democratic peace (the concept).

The liberal democratic peace as a framework is much broader than the liberal/democratic peace as a concept: whereas the concept is chiefly about the international implications of a specific domestic political system, the framework is about the “character

³⁰ Kant is rather eloquent in elaborating on citizens’ reluctance to give their consent to war easily: “If (...) the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which are always impending” (Kant, 1917: 122-123).

of peace in civil and societal, political, economic, security, and international spheres” (Richmond, 2011: 5). In this broader sense, the liberal democratic peace entails a wide and pro-active understanding about the promotion of liberal democratic societies based fundamentally on the assumptions that those are more peaceful than others in the conduct of their domestic and international relations (Newman *et al.*, 2009b: 11; Paris, 2004: 41).³¹ In this broader sense, the liberal democratic peace is often defined in terms of an “international security framework” (Chandler, 2004: 60), a “theoretical underpinning” (Newman *et al.*, 2009a: 11), an “intellectual framework” (Sabaratnam, 2011: 13) or a “core set of ideas and practices” (Mac Ginty, 2010: 146).³² Regardless of the specific label as a ‘framework’, in all those cases the liberal democratic peace justifies, supports, motivates, legitimates and/or impinges policies, programmes and actions with the projected goal of creating liberal democratic societies.

In peacebuilding scholarship, theorisations about the liberal democratic peace in this broader sense emerged out of a scholarly critique aimed at highlighting and moving beyond the inherent flaws and limits associated with the external promotion of democratic polities and free market economies in armed conflict and post-armed conflict situations (see, among others, Richmond, 2011, 2005, 2004b, 2004a; Roberts, 2011; Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Campbell *et al.*, 2011; Chandler, 2010, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2010, 2006; Newman *et al.*, 2009b; International Peacekeeping, 2009; Richmond and Franks, 2009; Pugh *et al.*, 2008; Duffield, 2007, 2001; Pugh, 2005; Paris, 2004, 2002). Oliver Richmond, one of the leading contemporary theorists in this body of scholarship, depicts the liberal democratic peace in this broader sense as a “discourse, framework and structure” (Richmond, 2005: 206) that embodies a longstanding, mainly Western-led, tradition of dealing with armed conflicts and theorising about peace. Within this context, a liberal/democratic peace (here as a concept) is assumed to be universal and achievable as long as the “correct methods” and agreed strategies are used effectively by different actors (Richmond, 2005: 183). Those methods and strategies include technologies such as conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, among others. Conceived as

³¹ Or, conversely, that “authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling parties” have more “aggressive instincts [that] make for war” (Doyle, 1986: 1151).

³² In this broader sense, the liberal peace is sometimes also referred to as ‘liberal internationalism’; see, e.g., Paris (1997) and Doyle (1997: esp. 258-277).

such, the liberal democratic peace framework entails a top-down approach that oftentimes ignores or neglects the everyday needs and social-economic realities of societies affected by armed conflicts, usually falling short of achieving a sustainable peace and preventing the emergence of a real social contract in those societies (Richmond, 2011: esp. 4-13).

The Western imprint in the liberal democratic peace framework is evident if one looks into its four constitutive strands of thinking or discourses about peace (Richmond, 2005: 202-214). The first is the victor's peace, the limited and short-lived peace that is essentially associated with the top-down use of military force, especially by hegemonic powers. The two following strands of thinking are heavily influenced by the Western European Enlightenment project: the constitutional peace, which reflects the defence, especially by early pacifist movements, of ideas such as cosmopolitanism, disarmament, democracy, free trade and humanitarian law; and institutional peace, based upon judicial norms and regulation via international institutions. Finally, the fourth strand of thinking that constitutes the liberal peace is the civil peace, which is strongly marked by humanitarianism and with a particular focus on social actors and movements (Richmond, 2005: 202-214). The "fine balance" of the four strands produces the liberal democratic peace while at the same time reflecting its aspiration for "freedom and mutual regulation" (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 5).

The liberal democratic peace can be broken into a three-level graduation that ranges from the conservative to the orthodox to an emancipatory version (see Richmond, 2005: 214-222). Those graduations have been adopted at different stages of peacebuilding, although all of them are usually "presented as emancipatory and highly legitimate in policy discourses", thus creating the (misleading) impression of a "higher degree of capacity, knowledge and so legitimacy for those guiding the peacebuilding process" (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 10). As such, the engagement of 'internationals' with peacebuilding seems to be supported by the idea of forcing a conservative liberal democratic peace that would later move to an orthodox and, ultimately, an emancipatory version of the liberal democratic peace.

At the Headquarters level, that is, in the places where peacebuilding policies and programmes are conceptualised and designed in the first place in the UN context, the liberal democratic peace reflects a rather technocratic nature. Roger Mac Ginty defines technocracy as the "systems and behaviours that prioritize bureaucratic rationality". It is, he continues, at least in theory, "directed from above, [it] pursues the imposition of a single policy paradigm

and is immune to social context” (Mac Ginty, 2012: 289). In the realm of peacebuilding, technocracy has led to the creation of homogenised technologies and languages that describe armed conflict situations within specific frames that tend to influence the very solutions elaborated as responses to problems. The technocratic approach associated with contemporary policies that are given expression by the liberal democratic peace may be “particularly intrusive and expansive, and is often associated with coercion” (Mac Ginty, 2012: 291). Whereas it may be, and often is, contested at different levels, technocracy is often fostered and sustained by arguments that seeks to emphasise neutrality and efficiency, although it inherently reflects ideological underpinnings – in fact, Mac Ginty (2012: 291) suggests that technocracy is an ideology in itself. The technocratic feature of the liberal democratic peace, hence, although often associated only with neutral bureaucratic practices and procedures at the Headquarters level, has an important role in shaping contemporary practices of peacebuilding.

It is worth stressing that understood as such, the liberal democratic peace framework is not a global Western conspiracy or the by-product of overt and goal-oriented decision-making processes. Rather, the liberal democratic peace framework, as further explored in the following chapters, results from a simplified and politicised discourse originally produced in academe. It reflects prolonged adherence to that discourse and its assimilation among key individuals who may genuinely believe it, but which is not necessarily an overt agreement about what to do in face of armed conflict situations. It is also worth stressing that the liberal democratic peace is not only shaped and sustained rhetorically by Western, liberal-inspired articulators, but also by concrete manifestations (institutions, bureaucracies, policies). Furthermore, the liberal democratic peace is not necessarily detached from local dynamics in the places where peacebuilding initiatives take place, but they are also “part of a complex process in which many local actors may be complicit and willing participants” (Mac Ginty, 2012: 302).

The historical record of virtual absence of wars among liberal/democratic states has thus been influential not only in academic, but also in policy and political circles. In academe, it has been conceptualised and theorised as the state of peace experienced among liberal/democratic states within specific geographical boundaries – the liberal/democratic peace as concept. In policy and political circles, it has also offered a substrate for the development of a broader and pro-active understanding that justifies, supports, motivates,

legitimizes and/or impinges concrete policies and programmes outlined and implemented by global actors with the view of creating liberal/democratic societies – the liberal democratic peace as framework. In the latter case, the liberal democratic peace framework has played a key role in how ‘peacebuilding’ gained life in the United Nations, particularly by providing meanings and influencing its content, as explored in the following chapters.

Peacebuilding: in academia and in the United Nations

The second key element in this research is ‘peacebuilding’, a concept which is difficult to define precisely. Ironically, this is not due to the lack, but rather to the abundance of definitions, each one pointing to a distinct understanding about what exactly it entails, where and how it should be carried out, by whom and under what circumstances (see Jenkins, 2013: 18-31). A survey of the academic literature carried out by Goetze and Guzina (2008), for instance, shows that peacebuilding has assumed very different meanings according to distinct scholarly paradigms: it has been addressed as a blueprint of democratisation, based on the belief that democracies rarely fight each other (e.g. Paris, 2004); as a security policy aimed at making states work (better), especially in the context of ‘failing’ or ‘fragile’ states and normally as a response to the chaos provoked by what Kaldor (1999) called ‘new wars’ (e.g. Helman and Ratner, 1993); as an activity aimed at saving and/or improving people’s lives in societies affected by armed conflict via external interventions concerned with human security (e.g. Thakur, 2006); and as a tool for the maintenance of the current macrostructures of global governance (e.g. Chandler, 2010); among others. Similarly, in policy circles, different global actors approach peacebuilding in distinct ways, according to how peacebuilding is framed in their organisational mandates (see Barnett *et al.*, 2007). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Carolyn McAskie, who would eventually become the first UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support in 2006, noted that “[t]here are as many definitions of peacebuilding as there are peacebuilders” (McAskie, 2010: 5).

In this research study, rather than carrying out yet another survey of existing definitions or advancing an ‘original’ one, I address ‘peacebuilding’ as a concept entailing a specific meaning that is minimally intelligible for individuals in the UN *milieu*. That specific meaning is not fixed, but it changes in different historical contexts, as it becomes clear if one looks into how UN documents approached ‘peacebuilding’ differently over the years. The different meanings of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

For reasons that will become clear in Chapter 3, however, the proposed analysis benefits from a brief overview of selected definitions of ‘peacebuilding’ in academe and in UN circles.

As anticipated in the Introduction, it is often assumed that peacebuilding has its conceptual roots in the tradition of fields such as peace studies and conflict resolution, most notably in the writings of scholars such as Johan Galtung, John Paul Lederach and Kenneth E. Boulding, to name but a few.³³ In proposing theoretical models for the formation and dynamics of armed conflicts, their writings provided insightful conceptualisations of peace as well as of how it could be achieved. More than simply reinforcing the understanding that peace was attainable by halting direct armed violence or by implementing the specific provisions of peace agreements (as in approaches that simply opposed peace to war), the tradition of peace and conflict studies focused rather on the more ambitious idea of eradicating the deepest underlying causes of armed conflicts. As such, this school of thought generally envisaged “liberating communities from the oppression and misery of violence in a project whose main goal was the cultivation of cultures and structures of peace” (Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011: 235). Within this tradition of thinking and theorising about peace, peacebuilding was generally understood as a process that aimed at overcoming the violence embedded in societies and at eradicating the structural barriers to the attainment of lasting peace.

The writings of Galtung are particularly interesting for illustrating the concept of peacebuilding in this tradition for at least three reasons. First, because he has fruitfully contributed to theorising about peace in the early stages of peace and conflict studies as institutionalised fields of academic research, especially in the 1960s and 1970s; and because he “remains a major contributor today” (Lawler, 1995: vii). Second, because his earlier writings were innovative and ground-breaking in their normative orientation towards theorising about peace; as a result, his “influence on the institutionalization and ideas of peace research [has been] seminal” (Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011: 44). Finally, because contemporary writings, including some produced in the UN Secretariat, usually imply that the concept advanced by Galtung is the same, or at least somehow connected, to the one

³³ For different accounts on the history, development and relevance of contemporary peace studies, see Wallensteen (2011, 1988), Wiberg (2005), Dunn (2005), Patomäki (2001), Singer (1976), and Reid and Yanarella (1976).

embraced at the United Nations in the early 1990s (e.g., McCann, 2012: 134; Ponzio, 2011: footnote 1 of Introduction; PBSO, 2010: 5; Väyrynen, 2010: 139; Call and Wyeth, 2008: 4; Call and Cook, 2003: 235; Richmond, 2002: footnote 5 of Ch. 5; Pugh, 1995: 321). Such inferences are usually simply assumed or inferred *en passant*, without any further substantial investigation to support them – contrary to this trend, Chapters 3 and 4 offer an in-depth investigation on how ‘peacebuilding’ gained strength as a concept in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s.

Galtung’s definition of peacebuilding is supported by his own theory of peace. In his earlier writings, peace is not directly linked to wars and armed conflicts, as in more conventional IR theories, but to violence instead (Galtung, 1969: 168; see also Galtung, 1996, 1981, 1964). For Galtung, violence is defined as “*the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual*” achievement in human activities (Galtung, 1969: 168; emphasis in original).³⁴ It is not, as such, understood only in terms of its narrower and commonsensical meaning as a physical or personal act, but also in terms of influence. Violence, hence, is present “*when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations*” (Galtung, 1969: 168; emphasis in original). When violence is inflicted by an actor, Galtung refers to direct or physical violence; in the absence of such an actor, he refers to structural or indirect violence (Galtung, 1969: 170).

Within this framework, Galtung relates the concept of peace to violence, defining the former as the absence of the latter (Galtung, 1969: 168; see also Galtung, 1996, 1981). Recalling the two-folded view on violence in terms of direct and structural, it follows that peace can be narrowly understood both as the absence of personal or direct violence (‘negative peace’) or, in a broader sense, as the absence of structural violence (‘positive peace’) (Galtung, 1969: 183). Conceived this way, peace may thus be intimately associated with both armed conflict and development. It is no coincidence, thus, that Galtung equates positive peace with social justice, that is, “the egalitarian distribution of power and resources” across society (Galtung, 1969: 183).

³⁴ The definition is followed by a lengthy discussion on several underlying dimensions of violence; see Galtung (1969: 168-174).

It is this theoretical framework that underlies Galtung's *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding*, the text usually referred to when connections are implied between the original academic concept and the one embraced in the United Nations in the early 1990s.³⁵ In the text, Galtung depicts a three-dimension framework on how peace may be achieved in world politics. The first is peacekeeping, or the dissociative approach, which aims to achieve peace by simply keeping antagonists separated from each other, with the support of third parties if necessary (Galtung, 1976: 282-290). Peacemaking, the conflict resolution approach, seeks to "get rid of the source of tension", thus leaving the "rest" to "take care of itself" (Galtung, 1976: 290). According to Galtung, resolving conflicts via peacemaking may involve either eliminating the incompatibility that caused violence in the first place or persuading actors not to pursue goals that lead to violent confrontation, even if ultimately preserving incompatibilities (Galtung, 1976: 290-297). Finally, anchored on his understanding of peace as opposed to structural violence, Galtung presents peacebuilding, the associative approach, which focuses on the deepest causes of armed conflicts between the parties involved (Galtung, 1976: 297). As such, peacebuilding in Galtung's writings is about the construction of structural conditions that "*remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur*" (Galtung, 1976: 298; emphasis in original); peacebuilding, in other words, is about positive peace (Galtung, 2012).

In this conceptualisation, the three approaches gradually move from mechanisms that potentially lead to situations of negative peace – absence of direct violence – to mechanisms leading to a situation of positive peace or social justice. Indeed, by keeping warring parties apart from each other via peacekeeping, the outcome is usually the absence of direct armed conflict between the antagonists. Peacemaking mechanisms seek to attain a situation beyond a negative peace, but which is still too fragile to be self-sustaining and to avoid a relapse into conflict. According to Galtung, one of the reasons for the fragility of such a peace is that agreements between antagonists are often reached under the pressure of a third party (Galtung, 1976: 296-297). On the other end of the spectrum, since it deals with the root causes of armed conflicts, peacebuilding is more likely to achieve a situation of

³⁵ The text is from a 1976 book chapter, but it first appeared the year before as an article published as Galtung (1975). I refer and quote the book chapter because it is the one more often cited in contemporary peacebuilding literature.

positive peace, according to the author. In the tradition of peace and conflict studies, in sum, peacebuilding was originally conceived as a broad and holistic process aimed at the achievement of positive peace.

The term and the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ became part of the UN lexicon more vividly only after 1992, following the release of the Secretary-General’s report *An Agenda for Peace*. The report is further explored in Chapter 4, but for now it suffices to mention that it defined peacebuilding, or post-conflict peacebuilding more precisely, as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, 1992: para. 21). Several other subsequent documents further elaborated definitions for peacebuilding and its associated tasks (see Chapter 5), but it remains difficult to outline a common and straightforward formulation of the concept in the UN *milieu*. In fact, right after the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, PBF and PBSO, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) pointed out in an internal report that the lack of agreement on a clear framework for what peacebuilding actually means was one of the main challenges affecting the UN’s capacities in that area (EOSG, 2006: 6).

With a view to minimise that gap, the Secretary-General’ Policy Committee adopted, in May 2007, a definition of peacebuilding that ought to be used as a ‘conceptual basis’ across the UN system – whether or not this basis has been harmoniously incorporated since then by the different entities in the system is still an open question. The conceptual basis is as follows:

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (United Nations, 2007: 1)

From this formulation and from the analysis of several definitions explored in Chapter 5, it follows that the concept of peacebuilding in the UN is not always necessarily related to a process, as in the tradition of peace studies. Rather, it is more often understood as a set of ‘measures’, ‘actions’ (UN Doc. A/46/882, 1992: para. 21) or ‘activities’ (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 2000: para. 13) that are carried out especially in post-armed conflict situations (although sometimes during conflicts) with the ultimate goal of avoiding a relapse into armed conflict and creating an enabling environment for peace.

Throughout the last two decades or so, a number of activities were carried out by the UN organs and agencies in the realm of peacebuilding, even though they were not always overtly classified and/or defined as such, especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Those activities have included, among many others: demining actions; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; assistance in security sector reform (SSR); support to the implementation of peace agreements and for national reconciliation processes; support for the promotion of democracy and human rights; training of national authorities for enhancing capacities in conflict management and resolution; support to the rebuilding of infrastructure after the end of armed conflicts; and even assuming the state authority of a given territory. In the subsequent chapters, the analysis of peacebuilding efforts in specific countries will help to identify further actions and how they are interrelated.

Due to the variety of areas covered by those tasks, it is no surprise that a number of entities in the UN system are involved in peacebuilding: in fact, a comprehensive internal study revealed that at least thirty-one departments, agencies, funds and programmes in the UN system were involved in peacebuilding activities by 2006, encompassing twenty-five different sectors (see EOSG, 2006: esp. Annex 3). Since 1997, following a decision of the Secretary-General, the Department of Political Affairs became the “focal point” for peacebuilding in the UN system (see A/51/950, 1997: 40). The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is involved in peacebuilding especially through the establishment of Special Political Missions or peacebuilding offices, acting mainly in the areas of early warning, mediation, conflict analysis and the provision of electoral assistance (see Barnett *et al.*, 2007: 46). As discussed in Chapter 5, however, this role of focal point is still a driver of confusion on the distribution of tasks within the UN system in what concerns peacebuilding.

In the Secretariat, other prominent entities in UN peacebuilding are the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). The main focus of both departments is peacekeeping, herein understood as “technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” (DPKO and DFS, 2008: 18). Despite their emphasis on peacekeeping, the DPKO and the DFS conduct a number of peacebuilding-related tasks, most notably in the realm of security stabilisation (Barnett *et al.*, 2007: 46). In fact, many of the tasks and aforementioned activities (e.g. DDR, demining,

support for SSR and the restoration of state authority) are in practice carried out by DPKO-led multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. In theory, however, the acknowledgement that multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations usually carry out peacebuilding tasks is more recent: it was explicitly incorporated in the so-called Capstone Doctrine of 2008, and in 2010, the DPKO and DFS (2010) elaborated a concept note exploring the idea that peacekeepers are also 'early peacebuilders'. It is worth noting that the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund are not operational entities: the PBC is an advisory body in nature, whereas the PBSO is a Secretariat entity and the Fund only provides financial support for peacebuilding projects that are implemented by other actors. As such, none of those organs directly performs or implements concrete actions in the realm of peacebuilding in the field (see Chapters 6 and 7).

In other realms of the UN system, entities not functionally related to the Secretariat also engage in peacebuilding activities, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The UNDP develops actions mainly in areas such as immediate crisis response, support for actions to strengthen the rule of law, DDR and conflict prevention. As UN specialised agencies, the World Bank and the IMF are important entities involved in peacebuilding, especially in providing technical expertise and financial assistance in areas such as reconstruction and conflict analysis (see Barnett *et al.*, 2007: 46). In the next chapters, the role and activities carried out by those entities will be fleshed out and further explored, although only to the extent that they are relevant to the main focus of this research study.

A final word is in order in what concerns terminology. In light of the above, and as it will become clearer in the subsequent chapters, UN peacebuilding actions may be carried out by multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations authorised by the UNSC and carried out by the DPKO and DFS, as well as by Special Political Missions led by the DPA. However, considering the terminology found in UN official documents and the usual parlance in the UN *milieu*, references to 'peacebuilding operations' as such are rare. In addition, they seem unwarranted and imprecise. Indeed, when references are made to 'peacebuilding operations', the expression usually seeks to encompass what the DPKO and other UN entities call 'multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations', which are peacekeeping missions with non-traditional mandates encompassing activities in a number of areas, including, *inter alia*, peacebuilding activities. In this research study, I follow this latter use, as it is more precise

according to the everyday usage of terms in the UN and it seems to reflect more accurately the wording of official documents.

Coming into life and remaining influential: conceptual proposal

This section outlines the conceptual proposal of this research study, that is, the set of theorised dynamics that helps to unpack the process through which the concept of peacebuilding gained life and the implications of this process in the UN *milieu*. To construct and sustain the main argument of this research study, I proceed in three analytical moves.

The first analytical move is to demonstrate that *the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as hermeneutical mechanism*. Theories about the liberal/democratic peace may be understood as *theoretical constructs* that assemble political concepts such as ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ together, serving as a framework wherein both concepts assume and endow particular meanings *vis-à-vis* each other. As a *theoretical construct*, however, the liberal democratic peace is restricted to academe and does not necessarily drive individuals to political action. It is only if and when it migrates to public spheres that it may have a real political impact in legitimating, justifying, informing and enacting concrete policies or political actions. Hence, if the liberal democratic peace framework indeed supports and enacts contemporary peacebuilding practices with the projected goal of creating liberal democratic societies, as pointed out by the critique of the liberal peace scholarship, the liberal democratic peace framework must have been converted from *theoretical construct* into *public convention* and *political conviction* via a hermeneutical mechanism of attaching meaning to political concepts.

The completion of the hermeneutical mechanism provides a meaning to ‘peacebuilding’ that requires political action, but it does not necessarily and straightforwardly lead to the implementation of policies by the United Nations. Before it can happen, that meaning needs to gain foothold among individuals in the UN *milieu*. The second analytical move in this research study is thus to demonstrate that *the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ informed by the liberal democratic peace as political conviction became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu after the release of An Agenda for Peace*. This is not to say that such a meaning was necessarily accepted by all individuals in the UN *milieu* at all times and to the same extent, but that the liberal democratic peace has served as the main

referential around UN circles when it comes to defining ‘peacebuilding’, the activities it entails and how peacebuilding initiatives should be carried out in the field.

I posit that the liberal democratic peace became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu* via two paths: rhetorical and bureaucratic. The rhetorical path refers to the assimilation of *political convictions* into the ideational substrate of the United Nations. This happened via the recurrent rhetorical use of *political convictions* (or associated ideational aspects such as concepts, norms and discourses) in the UN everyday activities, such as oral statements, topics of meetings or appearances in official documents. For instance, member states’ diplomats may use *political convictions* to legitimate and/or support their discourses, or international civil servants may use them, implicitly or explicitly, in relevant documents (e.g. working papers, internal reports). Whereas being referred to on such occasions does not necessarily imply acceptance of *political convictions* by other individuals, its recurrent appearance in discourses or official documents denotes the relevance and frequent use of *political convictions* or associated ideational aspects in the UN *milieu*.

The second path, bureaucratic, refers to the assimilation of *political convictions* into the UN bureaucratic structures. In this path, institutionalisation tends to occur – albeit this is not necessarily a prerequisite – after specific ideational constructs have already been assimilated in the UN ideational substrate, as outlined above. The ideational aspects and *political convictions* assimilated into the ideational substrate help to legitimate, justify and provide meaning for the proposed modifications in bureaucratic structures. For example, *political convictions* related to the importance of environmental considerations in international peace and security issues may become institutionalised in an international organisation via a variety of means, including, but not limited to: the appointment of a staff member to assume responsibilities (e.g. advisor) on environmental issues in an organ primarily dedicated to international peace and security; changes in the mandate of a security-oriented department to include environmental concerns; and the creation of new or the reform of existing intergovernmental bureaucratic structures to address both topics simultaneously. In all cases, it is likely that concepts, documents or policy directives have already taken root in the ideational substrate, thus providing the basis for the bureaucratic reforms.

Individuals who contribute to the assimilation of *political convictions* or associated ideas via the rhetorical path need not necessarily be part of the UN (e.g. member of staff) or

to have hierarchically high positions in its bureaucratic structures, but they need to be part in or to be vocal within the relevant policy-making community area to make their rhetoric effective. In other words, those individuals need to be part of and/or have influence in the UN *milieu*. When this is the case, individuals may foster their ideas and influence others, thus shaping the content of the elements found in the UN ideational substrate. On the other hand, in the bureaucratic path of assimilation, individuals who decide upon or carry out the specified course of action (e.g. creation of a new organ or reform of an existing one) need to be part of the UN, either as a member of staff or as a representative of a member state. This requirement does not exclude the potential participation of external individuals (i.e. non-members of staff) in proposing or advocating for the specified course of action; however, strictly speaking, they cannot be the ones effectively carrying out or approving such proposals at the level of the UN bureaucratic structures.

The first and the second analytical moves outlined above correspond to dynamics that took place in the UN *milieu* from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, approximately. In those years, the concept of peacebuilding came to life influenced by a particular meaning and then became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu*. This meaning, which was provided by the liberal democratic peace framework, subsequently served as the main framework through which ‘peacebuilding’ was conceptualised and implemented in the United Nations. Since the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* entails “a strong, opinionated view that necessitates political action” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 22), it is reasonable to assume that dissociating the meaning offered by the liberal democratic peace from the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ once it has been assimilated in the UN *milieu* is not an easy task. With a view to highlight the continued influence of the liberal democratic peace as the main source of meaning for ‘peacebuilding’ in the Organisation, the third and final analytical move in this research study is thus to demonstrate that *the establishment and functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund in the United Nations are predicated on and reinforce the concept of peacebuilding informed by the liberal democratic peace.*

Based on those three analytical moves, I construct and sustain the main argument of this research study: that the way the concept of peacebuilding came into life in the particular context of the United Nations in the early 1990s had a profound and lasting influence in the Organisation’s provision of support to societies affected by armed conflict.

From the early 1990s to the present, the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’, as informed by the liberal democratic peace, has not only served to shape and provide meaning to political concepts such as ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’, but also offered a rationale (at the ideational level) and informed the structures (at the bureaucratic level) that, combined, served to motivate, legitimate, justify and enact concrete UN peacebuilding activities in the field. This argument is developed in the form of a narrative that is constructed from Chapters 3 through 7.

Methodological approach

This research study is informed by a “subjectivist-with-an-O methodology” (Pouliot, 2007: 367; see esp. 364-368) that reflects constructivism’s tenets about the construction of social reality, the social construction of knowledge and the interplay between the two, as outlined in the previous chapter (see also Guzzini, 2000: 160). This methodology is simultaneously inductive, interpretive and historical. It is inductive because its starting point is what social agents take for granted rather than what analysts believe to be ‘real’ (Pouliot, 2007: 364). Induction allows for the identification of the meanings that relevant agents (e.g. individuals in the UN *milieu*) ascribe to relevant social aspects under analysis (e.g. the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’). The methodology is interpretive because the ‘explanations’ it helps to produce involve an in-depth comprehension of meanings. In a constructivist-inspired research, interpretation is not only about extracting conjectures from direct data analysis, but also about developing “meanings about meanings” (Pouliot, 2007: 365) – after all, the meanings derived from data analyses are eventually accepted or rejected by researchers (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 573). Finally, the subjectivist methodology herein adopted is historical, in a sense that social aspects do not exist independently ‘out there’, but rather they are created by social dynamics rooted in a particular spatial and temporal context (Pouliot, 2007: 367). In sum, a subjectivist methodology allows for the development of “both subjective knowledge (from the meanings that social agents attribute to their own reality) and objectified knowledge (which derives from ‘standing back’ from a given situation by contextualizing and historicizing it)” (Pouliot, 2007: 367).

In accordance with a subjectivist methodology, the analysis presented in the ensuing chapters was constructed following three non-linear steps (see Pouliot, 2007: 368-377). The first step was to identify the subjective meaning that relevant agents in the UN

milieu attribute to their social reality, that is, to understand social reality through their own perspective – at least to the extent that this is possible. This effort included being aware of, for instance, understandings and points of view that are often taken for granted by those individuals – e.g. concepts such as ‘peacebuilding’ or everyday practices in the UN Secretariat such as language. The second methodological step was to “objectify” those meanings by putting them in a wider context with the view of understanding “specific bits of intersubjectivity in terms of a larger whole” (Pouliot, 2007: 370). In fact, in constructivist-inspired research, it is hardly individual, isolated, meanings that matter for analytical purposes, but rather those that are minimally intelligible in a specific social context. When put into context, those meanings become “part of an intersubjective web [of meanings] inside of which every text or practice refers and stands in relation to others” (Pouliot, 2007: 374). Finally, the third methodological step was to introduce time and history, that is, to “historicize intersubjectivity so as to account for the temporal dimension in the mutual constitution of social reality and knowledge” (see Pouliot, 2007: 372). Interpreting webs of meanings in a temporal dimension is what allows for the consideration of power relations, as they highlight competition and contestation as meanings are formatted in a social and political setting.

A variety of methods was used to gather and analyse information that helped to operationalize the subjectivist-with-an-O methodology adopted in this research study – that is, to recover, objectify and historicise meanings. The methods adopted included: participant observation, qualitative (semi-structured) interviews, content analysis, documental and archival research, and the construction of narratives. The variety of methods herein adopted helped ensure a comprehensive basis for the interpretation (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 19) carried out in the second analytical step outlined above.

In order to develop the subjective knowledge necessary for step one, I carried out a three-month period of participant observation of the UN *milieu* in New York between October and December 2010. Given my affiliation to the permanent mission of a member state during this period, I was able to experience and better understand everyday practices and dynamics in the UN *milieu* from an insider’s perspective, as well as to develop what Neumann (2008: esp. 63-65) called “cultural competence”. For instance, by having access to and attending several meetings of the Security Council and of the Peacebuilding Commission, I came to understand how language was used to display power disparities or

to replicate socialised norms in the UN *milieu* (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 37). This period of *in loco* investigation also allowed for: further advancing my understanding of how policy processes develop inside the UN (e.g. competences of organs in specific issues); apprehending and comprehending the daily professional jargon in the UN *milieu* (e.g. a plethora of acronyms for organs, departments and posts); identifying potential interviewees and carrying out first-hand interviews; and gathering knowledge and insight that helped to interpret events and processes that took place before and after my period of participant observation. I was also able to hold countless informal, unstructured, conversations with individuals in the UN *milieu* that helped me to gain a nuanced understanding on different aspects related to specific processes and events that were taking place in simultaneous with my research or that had taken place before my arrival in New York. During this period, in sum, I was able to actively *participate* in several activities that are recurrent for individuals in the UN *milieu*, while at the same time making first-hand *observations* and elaborating *interpretations* about my own participation and observations in that context (Seligmann, 2005: 235).

Qualitative interviews were also extensively used to gather subjective meanings from individuals in the UN *milieu* (e.g. their understanding of ‘peacebuilding’ and of the UN role in building peace). The main purpose of these semi-structured, in-depth, conversations was to obtain insider knowledge and “understand the meaning of respondents’ experiences and life worlds” (Warren, 2001: 83). In fact, in this sort of interviews, rather than an accurate account of ‘hard’ facts, the “informant’s statement represents merely the perception of the informant, filtered and modified by his cognitive and emotional reaction and reported through his personal verbal usages” (Dexter, 2006: 101; emphasis omitted). Hence, interviews were more often used to gain background information or interpretations that helped me to obtain a more nuanced understanding of processes and dynamics analysed, than used as definitive sources to reconstruct those processes and dynamics – incidentally, this approach explains why all interviews were relevant but only some were directly cited and/or quoted in the thesis. The fact that I had acquired cultural competence on the UN *milieu* was instrumental because it usually helped to create empathy with interviewees and to demonstrate that I had substantial knowledge on the topics covered during the conversations.

Considering the time span of the process analysed in this research study, the interviewees represent a sample of individuals who were active in the UN *milieu* in the area

of peace and security in general and peacebuilding in particular, from the late 1980s to the present (mid-2013). They were initially identified based not only on my participant observation experience, but also from extensive readings of the specialised literature and of UN documents. Two distinct groups of interviewees were initially outlined, according to whether they worked in the UN Secretariat or in other entities in the UN *milieu*. The first group included individuals who have or had responsibilities over issues directly related to international peace and security in general and/or peacebuilding in particular in different organs of the Secretariat, including, for instance, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations, and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The second group included individuals with influence in the UN *milieu* but that were not necessarily members of staff of the Secretariat or the Organisation. Individuals in this group included, among others, representatives from Permanent Missions of member states to the UN in New York, staff from UN agencies, and experts in think tanks and academia. As interviews were carried out with individuals in both groups, further interviewees were identified and contacted following a snowball technique. This technique of “building an exponentially increasing network of research subjects from an original subject zero” (Gusterson, 2008: 98) was especially useful in cases where individuals were difficult to contact without referrals or guidance from previous colleagues, which often happened with individuals who were already retired or who had changed jobs and/or posts in the UN system.

Semi-structured interviews were carried out with fifty-nine individuals between November 2010 and April 2013,³⁶ the vast majority of which were conducted in-person in New York during three different field trips (October-December 2010, July 2011 and October 2012). On a few occasions it was also possible to carry out in-person interviews with individuals outside the New York area, including in other US cities and in other countries (Brazil and France). In cases where in-person interviews were not possible (e.g. when individuals had moved from New York, or when other appointments prevented New York-based individuals from receiving me in the course of visits to the city), interviews were carried out via video-conference over the internet or via regular telephone calls. Both

³⁶ A full list of interviewees, with a brief biographic note and the reference to interviews, is provided in Appendix I. The list refers to semi-structured interviews only, not to informal conversations carried out (often unexpectedly) over the course of my period of participant observation. The latter were used as background information to help me construct my own interpretations and as such, they are not cited or quoted in the thesis.

technologies allowed for reaching out to individuals based in continents such as Africa, the Americas, Asia and elsewhere in Europe at reasonable costs. Although every effort was made, it was sometimes impossible to hold first-hand interviews with specific individuals for a variety of reasons, including retirement, death or lack of availability (and/or perhaps interest) from individuals currently holding high hierarchical positions in the UN *milieu* (e.g. Under-Secretaries-General, Heads of Department, Ambassadors, directors of non-governmental organisations). On such occasions, subjective knowledge was gained through the analysis of other sources, including, for instance, their own books, articles, biographies, memoirs, collected papers, public statements and/or interviews granted to other individuals.

Prior to interviews, interviewees were told about the purposes of the research either in writing (when establishing first contact) and/or verbally (when interviews were arranged opportunistically). With a few exceptions, interviewees allowed me to take notes and record our conversations, which were subsequently transcribed with the support of specialised software. Transcribing recorded interviews is a lengthy (and rather boring) process, but it ensured that I would not miss important details or take interviewees' opinions out of context. Moreover, in recording the conversations, I ensured that I would always be able to revert to audio files to capture details not usually available in the transcripts, such as momentary hesitations, for instance. The vast majority of the interviews were carried out in English, but whenever my language skills allowed, I suggested we dialogued in the native language of interviewees based on the assumption that they would thus be able to express themselves more naturally.

The meanings identified in step one were put into a wider context with the resort to content analysis, a "flexible approach" (Druckman, 2005: 257) for identifying, analysing and comparing the content and characteristics of texts. In objectifying meanings, emphasis was placed on highlighting aspects that could help in interpreting "why something was said, how it was said, and with what effect" (Druckman, 2005: 258; emphasis omitted). On two occasions, however, particular attention was also given to questions related to "what was said, who said it, and to whom it was said" (Druckman, 2005: 258; emphasis omitted): when I identified that insufficient research had been carried out on specific processes or events; and when my analysis focused on events that were taking place almost concomitantly with this research. In those instances, the approach herein adopted allowed for substantially

interpreting events while at the same time documenting their sequence for the historical record and for paving the way for further research.

According to the constructivist framework outlined in the previous chapter, those texts were both written and unwritten (see Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 566). Unwritten texts were mostly gathered via participant observation and interviews, as outlined above. They included, among others, ideas, concepts, social practices, social hierarchies, oral statements and the background context in which discourses were produced. Written texts, on the other hand, included UN documents and other materials. UN documents are formally defined as “text[s] submitted to a principal organ or a subsidiary organ of the United Nations for consideration by it, usually in connection with item(s) on its agenda” (UN Doc. ST/AI/139/Add.3/Rev.2: para. 2). Documents may be in the format of meeting records of principal organs (e.g. verbatim records of UNSC meetings); publications, that is, any written text issued by or for the Organisation, such as reports of studies and the UN yearbook; and official records related to the proceedings of principal organs, such as UNSC and UNGA resolutions. UN documents thus may bear, for instance, the result of agreed positions over particular meanings (as in UNSC resolutions) or the record for the analysis of contending meanings (as in statements registered in meeting records). Documents are usually available online to the public via the Official Document System of the United Nations (ODS).³⁷ In addition to download via ODS, documents were occasionally collected from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library during field visits to New York.

Other materials vary significantly, but they may be defined as original written texts, often unpublished, that are normally intended for working purposes and not for general circulation. Those texts include, for instance, preliminary/advanced copies of reports, internal studies/reports, and memoranda between internal offices in the Secretariat. Their analysis helps to identify contending views about particular topics (e.g. concepts that appeared in previous versions of a report but that were removed from its final version) and in establishing an accurate chronology of events. I collected other materials during visits to the UN Archives in October 2012 and from the personal files of individuals directly involved in events relevant for the purposes of this research study. It should be stressed that in addition to helping put meanings into a wider subjective context, the analysis of UN documents and

³⁷ Available via the weblink <http://ods.un.org>.

other material helps to check against potential problems of interpretation derived from the inductive approach taken in step one – that is, to ‘triangulate’ interpretation by combining different inductive methods (Pouliot, 2007: 370). This technique was especially helpful when interviewees were not able to recall specific meanings or events, for instance. This was understandable, considering that I interviewed some individuals who were already retired or focused on events that dated back more than twenty years.

Finally, in the third step, I constructed a narrative with a view to historicise meanings and bring about a “new, objectified form of knowledge about the past and the present” (Pouliot, 2007: 373). In doing so, this research study proposes “an *explanatory* narrative which organizes a sequence of discourses and practices around a plot” (Pouliot, 2007: 377). The narrative constructed identifies relevant agents, the (minimally intelligible) meanings individuals in the UN *milieu* attach to the concept and practice of ‘peacebuilding’, and power relations among them. The main plot centres on the coming into life of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu* and the implications of this process for the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict.

The narrative starts by outlining how a particular meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ was originally constructed in the UN *milieu* in connection with the elaboration of the Secretary-General’s report *An Agenda for Peace*. It then continues into outlining how that meaning was gradually assimilated in the UN *milieu*, particularly in the UN constitutive dimensions, via the rhetorical and the bureaucratic paths outlined in the previous section. Finally, in a narrative-cum-case-study-analysis, I focus on the functioning of the so-called UN ‘peacebuilding architecture’ to demonstrate that the liberal democratic peace continues to be the main referential of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*, more than twenty years after the release of Boutros-Ghali’s report. Because the ensuing narrative is constructed from an interpretation, what follows is not *the*, but *a* story about the process through which the concept of peacebuilding gained life and its implications for the United Nations approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. I do not, therefore, claim or expect that all the individuals interviewed or involved in the processes and events herein described will necessarily agree with my narrative or conclusions.

Conclusions

This chapter outlined the framework for the analysis developed in the subsequent chapters. It introduced concepts and notions, and advanced a conceptual proposal that reflects constructivism's tenets about the construction of social reality and the influence of ideational aspects in policy outcomes and political actions. The proposed methodological strategy is also justified theoretically: it not only assumes that understandings over ideational aspects are not fixed, but also seeks to locate historically the contexts in which those understandings are produced as well as the power relations between different actors. In sum, the framework for analysis herein outlined reinforces the inherently contextual nature of knowledge and research production, and the existence of power relations between distinct actors in specific processes. In the following chapter, I start to construct a narrative about the institutionalisation of peacebuilding in the United Nations and its implications to the Organisation's approach to societies affected by armed conflict. The first analytical move, as discussed above, is to demonstrate that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as a hermeneutical mechanism.

Chapter 3

The origins of UN peacebuilding (I): the academic roots

*I developed (...) this new concept of peace building, which is not included in the Charter, that means consolidation, or construction, of peace. (...) [T]his concept lies on the idea that it is imperative, once the conflict is settled, to manage the post-conflict, if one wants to avoid a “relapse”, always possible. (...) This is an extremely important concept.*³⁸

Boutros-Ghali (2002: 72), during an interview in 2001

Introduction

According to the theoretical framework and to the conceptual proposal outlined in the previous chapters, ‘peacebuilding’ may be understood as a concept entailing a specific meaning that is minimally intelligible for individuals in the UN *milieu*. This meaning, as extensively explored over recent years by the critique of the liberal peace scholarship, is given by the liberal democratic peace, which, in essence, reflects “the idea that certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are” (Newman *et al.*, 2009b: 11). In this and in the following chapter, I use Ish-Shalom’s hermeneutical mechanism to shed light into how that particular meaning became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu*. In this narrative, the Secretary-General’s report *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, of 1992, has a pivotal role for contributing to the

³⁸ From the original in French: “*Je développais, par ailleurs, ce nouveau concept de peace building, qui ne figure pas dans la Charte, c’est-à-dire de consolidation, ou de construction, de la paix. Comme vous le disiez, ce concept repose sur l’idée qu’il faut impérativement, une fois le conflit réglé, gérer l’après-conflit, si l’on veut éviter une ‘récidive’, toujours possible. (...) Vous avez raison, mais permettez-moi de revenir au concept de peace building, qui était tout à fait nouveau. C’est un concept extrêmement important*”.

dissemination of that particular meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ around the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s.³⁹

By initially characterising the liberal democratic peace as a *theoretical construct*, I argue in this and in the following chapter that the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ that was minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s entailed a strong and entrenched view about the promotion of liberal/democratic states in post-armed conflict societies. This view was essentially built upon a politicised and simplified version of academic theories about the liberal/democratic peace (not upon the theories themselves), which had migrated from academe to public spheres as *public conventions* and subsequently became *political convictions*. This and the following chapter focus on this process of migration with the view of exploring the first analytical move proposed for this research study: to demonstrate that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as a hermeneutical mechanism that attaches meaning to political concepts such as ‘liberal democracy’, ‘peace’ and ‘peacebuilding’.

En route, both chapters challenge the two views outlined in the Introduction about the origins of peacebuilding in the United Nations: that ‘peacebuilding’ was created from scratch by Boutros-Ghali, and that ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ stems from Galtung’s earlier writings on peace and peacebuilding. I challenge the first view by delving into historical documents that ascertain Boutros-Ghali’s acquaintance with the term ‘peacebuilding’ as part of the drafting of his report. Hence, despite his direct influence in shaping the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in *An Agenda for Peace*, he was certainly influenced by earlier discussions on the issue before his alleged moment of “conceptual epiphany” (Karns, 2012: 72). I also challenge the second view by enquiring into the academic ‘sources’ of ‘peacebuilding’ in Boutros-Ghali’s report. Whereas a connection probably exists between Galtung’s and Boutros-Ghali’s concepts of ‘peacebuilding’, their meanings are rather distinct, with the latter being more directly influenced by the then growing scholarship on the democratic peace and on the Secretary-General’s views on democracy and democratisation. As a result, whereas Galtung advances ‘peacebuilding’ as a holistic process

³⁹ It is worth noting, however, that the term ‘peacebuilding’ appeared earlier in UN documents. Over the course of this research, I randomly found uses of the term in summary records of General Assembly meetings (e.g. UN Docs. A/C.5/45/SR.15, 1990; A/C.2/45/SR.26, 1990; A/C.1/45/PV.14, 1990) and even in a report of the Secretary-General issued during the mandate of Boutros-Ghali’s predecessor (UN Doc. A/46/549, 1991). The term and concept, however, only gained widespread currency in the UN *milieu* following the release of Boutros-Ghali’s report.

involving concerns with a broad range of social, political and economic issues, Boutros-Ghali heavily associates ‘peacebuilding’ with the promotion of democracies in post-armed conflict situations. The narrative presented in these two chapters is a key contribution of this thesis, as it recasts a new understanding about the origins and the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations in the early 1990s.

This chapter is organised into three sections. The first one characterises the liberal democratic peace framework (not the concept, as discussed in Chapter 2) as a *theoretical construct* that assembles political concepts such as ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ in an intelligible framework. As a *theoretical construct*, however, the liberal democratic peace was essentially restricted to academic circles, so it had to migrate to public spheres before it could have any potential influence in policy outcomes and in political courses of action. The remainder of the chapter outlines how the liberal democratic peace migrated from academic circles to public spheres in general and the UN *milieu* in particular in the early 1990s. The second section identifies the material and ideational factors facilitating this migration, whereas the third discusses how Boutros-Ghali’s public usage of the thesis that democracies rarely fight each other triggered and drove the gradual migration of the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct* away from academe and into the highest levels of decision making in the UN Secretariat. This chapter, in sum, explores the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from *theoretical construct* into *public convention*. The final step of the hermeneutical mechanism, the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from *public convention* into *political conviction*, is explored in Chapter 4.

The liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct*

The liberal democratic peace framework may be broken down into its two core concepts: ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’. Separately, each one of those concepts may assume such a variety of meanings that agreement on a categorical common definition of either ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘peace’ is virtually impossible. For each meaning those concepts may assume there is an associated discourse supporting specific policy practices. Hence, when arranged together against the framework of a configuration of contested concepts, the concepts of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ acquire viable meanings that potentially lead to political action. Since the different meanings of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ may be arranged in different configurations, it follows that the liberal democratic

peace may also entail different meanings – and consequently, a different pool of associated political praxis. In other words, the liberal democratic peace may be understood as a *theoretical construct*.

The concepts of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ are illustrative of what philosopher W. B. Gallie referred to as *essentially* contested concepts, that is, those “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users” (Gallie, 1956: 168). Democracy, he claims, is “*the* appraisive political concept *par excellence*” (Gallie, 1956: 184; emphasis in original). If etymologically the term entails the notion of ‘rule by the people’, as noted by Held at the outset of his textbook, the “history of the idea of democracy is complex and is marked by conflicting conceptions” (Held, 2006: 1). From Athens to today’s globalised world, the author thus identifies and explores over a dozen ‘models’ and variants of democracy in the Western tradition. In the same vein but in a less scholarly tone, Manglapus (1987) reviews democratic practices in several societies in non-Western traditions, including but not limited to ancient Mesopotamia, the Incas and some islands in Southeast Asia.

In this thesis, I employ Haack’s democratic continuum to represent the multiplicity of images and concepts entailed by ‘liberal democracy’ in the study of world politics in general and in the UN *milieu* in particular.⁴⁰ The continuum represents “the liberal democratic paradigm of Western democracy theory, and the numerous visions of democracy offered by it” (Haack, 2011: 33). Its reference point is a minimalist understanding of democracy as ‘rule by the people’, where ‘democracy’ focuses on procedural aspects such as elections and thus limits peoples’ exercise of rule “to the event of casting a vote” (Haack, 2011: 16). In this view, the electoral process is fundamental because it connects those who rule and those who are ruled both by enabling control (e.g. the rulers need to be accountable to the people if they wish to remain in power) and by conferring legitimacy (e.g. to the actors who run for office) (Haack, 2011: 16-18). Institutions contemporarily associated with ‘democracy’ in the West, such as the existence of free parties and parliament, state bureaucratic institutions and the separation of powers, are also important in this minimal version (Haack, 2011: 20-23). Haack contends, however, that in the minimalist view those institutions are “instrumental rather than conceptual” because their primary aim is “not to

⁴⁰ For different readings, see, e.g., Ish-Shalom (2013: 39-67) and Kurki (2010: 365-369).

define democracy but to manage the outcomes of competitive elections” (Haack, 2011: 23). As such, in its minimalist-procedural connotation, ‘democracy’ is understood as a system with effectively functioning democratic procedures and processes.

The visual representation of Haack’s democratic continuum is reproduced from her book in Figure 2. To the left of its reference point, indicated by a dotted line, the democratic continuum allows for the representation of conceptions of democracies outside the liberal paradigm of Western democracy. The author illustrates one such possibility with the *loya jirga*, a traditional decision-making instance in Afghanistan in which the people are represented by others not because they were voted by the majority, but by virtue of their age or position in their clans or tribes (Haack, 2011: 16).

Figure 2: Haack’s ideas and practices of democracy and the democratic continuum



Source: Haack, 2011: 34, figure 3.2.

To the right, the democratic continuum moves indefinitely towards a maximalist view of ‘democracy’, one that goes beyond the right to vote and to be voted, but that is also concerned with what takes place between elections in multiples facets of social life. In this view, the personal becomes political and ‘democracy’ is not only about elections and democratic institutions, but also about democratic outcomes such as the achievement of the “common good” and the “good life” (Haack, 2011: 23, 27). It aims at promoting the values of freedom and equality, having at its core “questions about equality, justice, human development and participation” (Haack, 2011: 23). In this clearly normative conceptualisation, ‘democracy’ does not entail a definitive concept, but it may be understood as “a form of polity in which some degree of communitarian responsibility leads to policies, institutions and structures that try to ameliorate the effects of market activity and other social dynamics in general and particularly for those without a voice and conflict potential of their own” (Haack, 2011: 28). The lack of a categorical definition indicates that this maximalist-substantive version of ‘democracy’ may thus be achieved through “various combinations of

institutions, principles, rights and processes” (Haack, 2011: 33). Consequently, it is in constant development, which explains why there is no end in the far right of the democratic continuum.

Haack’s democratic continuum is useful for the purposes of this research for two reasons. First, because it was developed in a research about ‘democracy’ in the context of the UN, which is also the focus of this research study. Hence, when outlining the trajectory of peacebuilding in the UN *milieu*, particularly in Chapter 5, her work serves as a reference on the visions of ‘democracy’ in the Organisation at different moments. The second reason is that, according to the author, the democratic continuum precludes descriptions of the different meanings of ‘democracy’ in terms of “better or worse” or “more and less” (Haack, 2011: 16). Rather than stalling with conceptual and methodological tensions to assess democracy *vis-à-vis* other systems or different ‘democracies’, the continuum thus offers a framework to “compare mainstream [Western liberal] democracy theory with possible interpretations used by the UN and to locate these interpretations between the poles of minimal-procedural and maximal-substantive” (Haack, 2011: 33).

Peace is the second core concept in the liberal democratic peace framework. It is also strongly contested. ‘Peace’ is understood differently by people(s) across space and time, assuming meanings that vary greatly within either societies and civilisations (e.g., Kende, 1989; Galtung, 1981), or specialised fields of study (e.g. Richmond, 2008). In IR, different theoretical traditions have perceived ‘peace’ in various ways – even if often implicitly (Richmond, 2008: 8). Realist theorists, for instance, mainly inspired by the writings of Hobbes (1909), conceive world politics chiefly as an everlasting struggle for power that is recurrently marked by war and armed conflicts. In *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz ascertains that “[a]mong states, the state of nature is a state of war” (Waltz, 1979: 102). Based on such a narrow ontological universe, ‘peace’ is then understood primarily in relation to those events: it can be the result of either a truce or the imposition of the will of the strongest. Either way, ‘peace’ is simply the temporary absence of, an interregnum in between, wars. Against this backdrop, ‘peace’ “will always be limited, brief, tragic and illusory” (Richmond, 2008: 49).

Theorists in the idealist tradition, on the other hand, refer to ‘peace’ as a “future possibility (...) in which states and individuals are free, prosperous and unthreatened” (Richmond, 2008: 9). Their view, as such, represents a normative view of a universal state


of affairs sustained by harmony between peoples and institutions, that is, the “absence of any form of violence” (Richmond, 2008: 154, see also 121-139). A good summary of many other conceptualisations of ‘peace’ in IR may be found in the following passage of Richmond’s investigation:

Structuralism and Marxist approaches see peace as lying in the absence of certain types of structural violence, often in structures which promote economic and class domination. Cosmopolitanism extends the liberal argument to include the development of a universal discourse between states, organisations and actors for mutual accord. Constructivism combines these understandings, allowing identities and ideas to modify state behaviour but retaining the core of realism which sees states as underpinning order and peace as limited to institutional cooperation and a limited recognition of individual agency. Critical approaches see peace as a consequence of a cosmopolitan, communicative transcendence of parochial understandings of global responsibility and action. Post-structuralism represents peace as resulting from the identification of the deep-rooted structures of dominance and their revolutionary replacement as a consequence of that identification by multiple and coexisting concepts of peace which respect the difference of others. (Richmond, 2008: 9-10)

In sum, ‘peace’ may acquire so many different meanings in IR scholarship that a common and categorical definition is virtually impossible among theorists of world politics.

In order to make sense of this variety of definitions, I adopt Galtung’s dual understanding of ‘peace’ and arrange the conceptualisations of ‘peace’ in IR in a spectrum ranging from negative to positive peace – Figure 3. In this spectrum, I consider IR conceptualisations according to both their ideal vision of ‘peace’ and their ontological correspondent. Whereas in theory they all seemingly converge to the positive side of the spectrum, what they actually accomplish is usually more limited, leaning towards the negative end. For instance, although they both seem to envision a situation of positive peace in theory, the realist ontological correspondent of peace as essentially the absence of war will be closer to the negative end of the spectrum, whilst the idealist correspondent will be

Figure 3: Sample of conceptualisations of ‘peace’ in IR



Source: based on Richmond (2008: esp. 154-155) and Galtung (1969).

closer to the positive end. The remaining conceptualisations mentioned above are placed within both poles, closer to one or to the other, according to whether they understand peace as the absence of direct or structural violence.

From this brief overview, it emerges that there is hardly a common and definitive concept of ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘peace’ upon which IR or peace scholars may agree. Both are heavily contested concepts, assuming a wide range of meanings when considered individually. Hence, they do not entail viable meanings in themselves, but rather, as political concepts, they gain “meaning, visibility, and political significance only in the context of a whole configuration of political concepts” (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 569). This configuration is given by the liberal democratic peace framework, which, I argue, may be understood as a *theoretical construct*. Understood against the framework of the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct*, the concepts of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ endow each other with meaning, with each meaning of the former providing a specific meaning to the latter and vice versa.

Consider, for instance, structural/institutional theories about the phenomenon of the liberal/democratic peace – that is, the liberal democratic peace as a concept, not as a framework. In those theories, as discussed in Chapter 2, wars between liberal/democratic societies are avoided due to the existence of effective institutional constraints such as a structure of division of powers and checks and balances (Russett, 1993: 38-40). Liberal democracy, hence, is depicted in its minimal-procedural sense as a political system of functioning processes, procedures and institutions (Haack, 2011: 16-23). Amongst those, one of the most crucial aspects of a minimal connotation of liberal democracy refers to citizens’ right to vote and to be voted, with free and fair elections guaranteeing control and legitimacy to the system. In case of disruption of this system, democracies may quickly revert into another type of political regime because the society itself is not ‘truly democratic’. In this scenario, liberal democracy is restricted to a political *system*, not to a *society*; as such, it is not very stable. Recalling that the existence of a zone of separate peace among liberal/democratic societies is dependent upon the stability of their domestic political system, it follows that the liberal/democratic peace in this scenario will only last as long as the respective domestic liberal/democratic political systems endure. Consequently, the liberal/democratic peace in this particular imaginary zone is ontologically less stable, leaning towards the negative side of the spectrum of peace depicted above. The liberal/democratic

peace shared by minimalist-procedural liberal democracies represented by elections, in sum, is a short-lived one.

On the other hand, normative/cultural theories stress the existence of liberal/democratic norms and values to explain the rare occurrence of wars among liberal/democratic societies (Russett, 1993: 30-38). In such explanations, internalised norms such as the peaceful settlement of disputes are more important than the existence of a functioning electoral system alone. Accordingly, 'democracy' is more closely associated with political *societies* with specific democratic elements, that is, with a maximalist-substantive version of 'liberal democracy' (Haack, 2011: 23-29). Liberal democracies are thus presumably more "stable and comprehensive", since they result from a combined set of "institutions, principles, rights and processes" (Haack, 2011: 33) deeply embedded in several aspects of societal life. The liberal/democratic peace that exists among such societies, consequently, is more 'stable and comprehensive', leaning towards the positive end of the spectrum of peace outlined above. Whether or not this peace achieves and/or represents an ideal-type condition of social justice is another matter, but peace in this context, at least in theory, certainly entails much more than the simple absence of war.

As discussed in Chapter 1, and as embraced in Ish-Shalom's hermeneutical mechanism, re-defining theories about the liberal/democratic peace as political thoughts means that they may ultimately drive political action. Indeed, the author contends, once "one accepts that democracies do not fight each other, the policy implication should be to support democratization abroad" (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 44). Consequently, for each understanding assumed by theories about the liberal/democratic peace, there is an associated pool of meanings assumed by the concepts of 'liberal democracy' and 'peace', and of policy practices about how to promote 'liberal democracies'.

In the first scenario outlined above, structural/institutional theories lead to democratisation policies and prescriptions that emphasise the creation of electoral structures and institutions for the functioning of a minimal-procedural democracy. This arises from the underlying conceptualisation of 'liberal democracy' as a system of universal suffrage and 'peace' in its negative-leaning connotation. In contemporary peacebuilding scholarship, Roland Paris may be said to represent this view given his assumption that a country is democratic when it "possesses all the political institutions characteristic of a modern representative government with universal or near universal suffrage" (Paris, 1997: 56,

footnote 58). On the other hand, normative/cultural theories about the rare occurrence of wars among liberal/democratic societies will generate policies and prescriptions for actions that aim not only at creating procedures, processes and institutions, but also at embedding those aspects, principles and rights in all societal aspects abroad. Of course, such policies and prescriptions stem from a conceptualisation of ‘liberal democracy’ in its maximalist-substantive version and of ‘peace’ in its positive-leaning understanding. Due to their emphasis on aspects such as political participation and the functioning of the rule of law in between elections, among other aspects, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) may be said to represent this view in contemporary peacebuilding scholarship. This discussion is visually summarised in Figure 4:

Figure 4: The meanings of the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct*

Liberal democratic peace framework		Policy implication
	Concept of ‘liberal democracy’ ↔ Concept of ‘peace’	
<i>Structural/institutional theories about the liberal/democratic peace</i>	Minimalist-procedural ↔ Negative	Structural democratisation
<i>Normative/cultural theories about the liberal/democratic peace</i>	Maximalist-substantive ↔ Positive	Normative democratisation

The liberal democratic peace framework may thus be understood as a *theoretical construct* that assembles the political concepts of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ together. Despite entailing different connotations separately, the two concepts endow specific meanings to each other when arranged together against the backdrop of the liberal democratic peace framework, resulting in different configurations and understandings about the imaginary zone of peace shared by ‘liberal democracies’. For each of those combined meanings, there is an associated discourse that supports particular policies and courses of action, which, in this case, refers to democratisation. Those combined meanings have the potential to affect the ‘reality’ of world politics to the extent that they assign meanings to each other and may be used to “persuade people and motivate them to political action” (Ish-

Shalom, 2013: 17, 2006a: 568). Having thus argued that the liberal democratic peace may be understood as a *theoretical construct*, the first step of the hermeneutical mechanism is taken. In order to become influential to such an extent as potentially influencing policy outcomes, however, the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct* has to go through a process of migration from academe to public spheres.

From academe to public spheres: the liberal democratic peace as *public convention*

In the remainder of this chapter, I address the second stage of the hermeneutical mechanism, which refers to its migration to public spheres in general and to the UN *milieu* in particular. Although what follows focuses on this transformation against the backdrop of the UN *milieu* due to the focus of this research, it is worth stressing that the migration of the liberal democratic peace framework to public spheres was not restricted to or occurred only due to dynamics confined to that particular socio-political environment. In fact, Ish-Shalom rightly notes that the migration of *theoretical constructs* to public spheres usually take “an all-but-one-way route” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 70). In his book, for instance, he provides a detailed account of how the democratic peace as *theoretical construct* was used by Bill Clinton in the United States presidential campaign of 1992 to gather support from neoconservative sectors (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 112-141). My focus in the UN *milieu* in this and in the following section should not preclude the analysis of this process in other spatial and/or temporal contexts.

Theories about the liberal/democratic peace had achieved a considerable status in academic circles in the early 1990s. By then, IR scholars had witnessed, among others, the publication of Doyle’s two-fold article outlined in Chapter 2, of Rummel’s study about the absence of violence between “libertarian states” (Rummel, 1983: 29), and Bruce Russett was already sowing the seeds of his 1993 *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (see, e.g., Russett and Antholis, 1992; Ember *et al.*, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1992; Russett, 1990b).⁴¹ By that time, despite the existence of dissonant voices (e.g., Spiro, 1994; Layne, 1994; Vincent, 1987; Chan, 1984; see also Rosato, 2003; Schwartz and Skinner, 2002), theories supporting the thesis that democracies rarely go to war with each

⁴¹ In fact, during an interview, Russett mentioned that he had been interested in the phenomenon of the absence of wars among democracies since the early 1980s. He believes that his published texts about the issue in the early 1990s were already “in pretty good shape”, but that he would only become fully “confident” after finishing the work for his 1993 book (Russett, 2012).

other due to their liberal/democratic form of government were reaching such a status in IR that they had already been hailed to be “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy, 1988: 662). Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that others went on to claim that there was an “overwhelming” agreement (Russett, 1990a: 123) or a “near-consensus” (Gleditsch, 1992: 369-370) about the empirical observation that liberal/democratic states do not go to war with each other.⁴²

The ‘near-consensus’ on the liberal/democratic peace thesis was mostly restricted to academic circles. The overall context created by the end of the cold war, however, created a propitious environment that facilitated its migration from academe to public spheres. In the UN *milieu* in particular, that overall context was strongly marked by an intricately related set of aspects, both material and ideational, that paved the way for the embracement of simplified versions of theories about the liberal/democratic peace thesis within the highest levels of decision making in the Secretariat.

Material aspects

Four major “objective, material, and structural” aspects (Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 574) contributed to the migration of those theories to the UN *milieu*. The first refers to the gradual rapprochement of the United States of America and the Soviet Union/Russia during the 1980s, which contributed to erode the structural constraints on the UN activities in the realm of international peace and security. In the cold war years, and hence during most of its existence, the United Nations activities in the area of international peace and security had been virtually paralysed because of the constant use (or the threat of use) of the veto power by the two countries. The stalemate prevented the effective functioning of the organ that was primarily responsible for peace and security issues within the world body, the Security Council: according to one count, this exclusive prerogative of the permanent members of the organ was used on 193 occasions until 1989 (Weiss, 2003: 150).⁴³ Against this backdrop, only in a few instances did the Security Council seem to work properly in matters related to

⁴² After Kant, as mentioned in Chapter 2, scholars have explored this observation empirically at least since Babst’s article of 1964. Gleditsch notes, however, that Babst was a criminologist and that his paper was published in an “extremely obscure” journal from the perspective of IR or peace studies. Hence, according to him, “professional jealousy” may help explain why it took so long before the empirical observation was widely accepted in IR circles (Gleditsch, 1992: 371).

⁴³ To put those in context, the veto was invoked on 27 occasions since January 1990 (UN Library, 2013).

international peace and security. In some of them, the Council was ‘bypassed’ by political manoeuvres that enabled the UN to play some role in conflict situations, as attested to by the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis via a UNGA resolution (see Adebajo, 2011: esp. 34-38). In others, Security Council members actually found a way to forge a minimum agreement on specific courses of action, as illustrated by the deployment of peace operations by the Security Council to places such as Cyprus, Lebanon, Yemen and the India-Pakistan border (see MacQueen, 2006: 92-107). Given the overall context of the cold war, however, most of those operations were rather limited in their purposes, as they chiefly aimed at halting direct armed confrontation between belligerent parties and supervising cease-fire agreements, normally without taking up further actions.⁴⁴ In short, they mostly represent what DPKO’s contemporary doctrine refers to “traditional” peacekeeping: peacekeeping operations involving essentially military tasks such as “observation, monitoring and reporting (...); supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms; interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measures” (DPKO and DFS, 2008: 21).

In addition to the recurrent use of the veto power in the Security Council, Paris and Sisk (2009: 5) identify and explore three other factors that account for the restricted mandates of UN peacekeeping during the cold war. The first factor refers to the prohibition contained in the UN Charter, as expressed in Article 2(7), which prevents and declares illegal the interference of the Organisation in the domestic affairs of member states.⁴⁵ The other reasons relate to the fact that the two major world powers would not allow interference in their ‘spheres of influence’ and to the ideological divergence regarding their respective models of domestic governance – liberal democracies versus socialist societies. These three factors also accounted for the reduced number of UN peacekeeping operations during the cold war, most particularly after the late 1970s. In fact, as the Security Council would not agree on the deployment of any new operation during those years, Diehl (2008: 47) refers to them as the “lost decade” of UN peacekeeping.

⁴⁴ The UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (UNTEA, 1962-1963) and the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-1964) are two important exceptions to the limited purposes of UN operations during the cold war; see MacQueen (2006: 107-111 and 180-192, respectively). The volume edited by Durch (1993a) remains an important reference for providing an overview of UN peacekeeping operations deployed during the cold war and the early 1990s.

⁴⁵ For an in-depth analysis of Art. 2(7), see Simma *et al.* (2012: 280-311).

In the late 1980s, however, the increasing rapprochement between the United States of America and the Soviet Union gradually allowed for the circumvention of those constraints. Fontoura (2005: 84-89) provides an overview of how this process unfolded by looking at several instances in which the two major powers progressively signalled their intention to soften overt confrontation and to engage more constructively in a multi-dimensional approach to items in the international security agenda of the UN. Amongst those occasions, the author mentions the publication of Mikhail Gorbachev's famous 1987 article in *Pravda*, and George Bush's address to the 44th UN General Assembly in 1989. Among others, the statements carried messages about a "new attitude" between the USA and the USSR (Bush, 1989), about the need for a "comprehensive system of international security" (Gorbachev, 1987: 3), as well as for a strengthened role for the UN in the realm of international peace and security.⁴⁶ In what is perhaps the most remarkable moment of this process in the context of the UN, the foreign ministries dignitaries of both countries addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in 1990 pledging to "implement and strengthen the principles and the system of international peace, security and international co-operation laid down in the Charter" (UN Doc. A/45/598-S/21854: 5). Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1997: 15), UN Secretary-General between 1982 and 1991, interpreted all those developments as a "new willingness", albeit "very cautious", on the part of both countries to cooperate more closely in the Security Council.⁴⁷ With their rapprochement and the end of the cold war, the structural constraints on the UN ability to carry out bolder and more robust peacekeeping operations seemed to be over.

Concomitantly, the second material aspect accounting for the creation of a propitious environment wherein the liberal democratic peace could migrate to public spheres refers to the intensification of the process of globalisation⁴⁸ in the late twentieth century,

⁴⁶ The US President asserted that the UN "must redouble its support for the peace efforts (...) underway in regions of conflict all over the world" (Bush, 1989). Gorbachev noted that the Soviets were "arriving at the conclusion that wider use should be made of United Nations' military observers and United Nations' peace-keeping forces" (Gorbachev, 1987: 9). Gorbachev's words are rather remarkable if one recalls the Soviet historical reticence about and lack of engagement with UN peacekeeping (see Sagramoso, 2003).

⁴⁷ In an internal analytical document produced in the Secretariat at the time, Gorbachev's article cited above was qualified as having "major importance" to the UN, as it represented "a significant departure from what has [until then] been judged as the Soviet Union's approach to the work of international organizations" (Jonah, 1987: 1).

⁴⁸ Following a 'transformationalist' perspective, globalisation is herein understood in broad terms as "*a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and*

which contributed to expand liberal norms and values worldwide. According to Held *et al.* (1999: esp. 424-435), the years following the end of World War II, but especially the last quarter of the twentieth century, were marked by a “renewed wave of global flows and interconnections” in several areas of social life, including, *inter alia*, political and military relations, trade and economics, migration and industrial production. In matters related to international peace and security, the impact of the intensification of globalisation became even more evident with the demise of the cold war, for the ‘victory’ of the West in 1989 enabled the “spread of the Western model of governance characterized by market economy, democracy and human rights to the rest of the world” (Jakobsen, 2002: 268). Thus understood, globalisation provided a platform for the expansion of Western liberal norms and values, as well as for changes in the ontological definitions of armed conflict and international security in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The third material aspect refers to the changing nature of armed conflicts globally, which highlighted that the UN had inadequate capacities to deal with armed conflicts within the boundaries of states. At the time, whereas the end of the cold war seemed to represent the end of inter-state armed conflicts, intra-state conflicts became more visible. Wallensteen and Axell (1994), for instance, pointed out that all armed conflicts fought in the world in 1993 occurred within the borders of states. In most cases, those conflicts were taking place in the global south, in countries that allegedly lacked the distinctive attributes of a sovereign state – they were hence, often labelled as ‘failed’, ‘collapsed’, ‘fragile’, ‘weak’ or ‘quasi-’ states (e.g., Rotberg, 2002; Zartman, 1995; Jackson, 1990; see also Bates, 2008). In most of those armed conflicts, violence was perpetrated by non-state actors (such as rebel groups and militias) and via non-official means (such as guerrilla wars). They were thus essentially different from the more traditional inter-states armed conflicts that had characterised the UN approach to international peace and security for most of its existence.

Finally, the fourth material aspect facilitating the migration of the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct* to the UN *milieu* was the UN past and growing experience in providing assistance to member states on electoral processes, which paved the way for the advocacy of an increased role for the Organisation in that area in the early 1990s.

transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power” (Held *et al.*, 1999: 16; emphasis in original). The definition is useful because it allows for a consideration of both material (e.g. flows of goods, people and capital) and ideational aspects (e.g. norms, rules and regimes in areas such as human rights or trade) associated with the contemporary process of globalisation.

During the cold war years, the UN played a key role in facilitating the conduct of elections, plebiscites and referenda in the context of decolonisation processes of trust and/or non-self-governing territories, particularly in Africa and Asia (Beigbeder, 1994). In articulation with the principle of self-determination alluded to in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter and with the objective of the trusteeship system in furthering international peace and security (Article 76(a)), the assistance was provided according to the idea that “peace would only be assured if people were free of external domination and oppression” (Haack, 2011: 62). During those years, the UN concern with democracy was limited by the strict respect for sovereignty and by the prohibition of UN interference in member states’ domestic affairs, as set forth in Article 2(7) of the Charter.

In the late 1980s, with its membership substantially increased due to independence and decolonisation processes, democratic principles were gradually accepted as a “universally recognized value” (Beigbeder, 1994: 91) by a series of five annual Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly between 1988 and 1992 under the title *Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections* (UN Docs. A/RES/47/138; A/RES/46/137; A/RES/45/150; A/RES/44/146; A/RES/43/157). At the same time, requirements for the provision of electoral support from member states increased substantially. The demand, according to Robin Ludwig (2004), a veteran UN expert on elections, was fuelled by the end of the cold war in three important ways: by enabling the signature of peace accords in armed conflicts that reflected the East-West confrontation (e.g. Cambodia and El Salvador), many of which included provisions related to the conduct of elections; by leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which resulted in several independent republics that were eager to establish more democratic forms of governance; and by eliminating the Soviet socialism as an alternative to “Western liberal-democratic modes of governance” (Ludwig, 2004: 115-116). In this context, and regarding the UN as a neutral actor, several countries turned to the Organisation for assistance to hold the transition processes they faced, particularly by supervising (e.g. Namibia in 1989) and providing technical assistance in electoral processes (e.g. Nicaragua in 1990, Angola in 1992) (Ludwig, 2004: esp. 133-162).

Ideational aspects

Interrelated with the material aspects outlined above, three ideational aspects also contributed to the transformation of the liberal democratic peace from *theoretical construct* into *public convention* in the context of the UN *milieu* the early 1990s. The first aspect refers to the changing nature of the concepts of ‘international security’ and of (armed) ‘conflict’ in the immediate years following the end of the cold war (Richmond, 2004a: 134-135). Considering the panorama of changes in the phenomenon of armed conflicts, as mentioned above, some scholars sought to rethink the Clausewitzian canons of warfare as violence among states (van Creveld, 1991). The ‘traditional’ concept of security was thus simultaneously broadened to include threats beyond the sphere of the state – such as economic or environmental security (Buzan, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1991) – and deepened to incorporate subjects of security alongside the state – such as individuals in the conceptualisation of human security (UNDP, 1994). Throughout the 1990s, hence, “new” forms of warfare were gradually incorporated into the realm of international peace and security (Kaldor, 1999), thus marking a gradual departure from the traditional sense of security defined mainly in terms of military inter-state security.

Accordingly, with the acceleration of globalisation, a number of those ‘new threats’ were gradually perceived to be of global reach. Outside academia and at the policy level, the responses formulated to those globalised threats went through a process of regionalisation that created new or reinforced existing mechanisms for international consultation and coordination on security issues, such as the Western European Union (WEU) or the Organisation of American States (OAS). This process, according to Held and colleagues, represented a shift from reigning attitudes on security issues during the cold war and reflected “a strong perception that, in an interconnected world order, effective security cannot be achieved merely through unilateral action. Rather, national and international security are considered in some degree indivisible” (Held *et al.*, 1999: 126). Questions were thus raised about “how intervention should develop and whether it [could] or should be centrally organized and based upon universally-agreed processes of intervention and conflict settlement” (Richmond, 2004a: 134). Policymakers sought to address those threats accordingly, including into their considerations over ‘security’ issues such as the promotion of human rights or the combat against poverty. Such developments perhaps became more evident in the actions carried out by international organisations, non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) and donors during the 1990s on the grounds of humanitarian duties with the view of enhancing the ‘security’ of individuals in fragile situations (see, e.g., Cohen and Deng, 1998).

The second ideational aspect relevant in creating an environment conducive to the migration of theories about the liberal/democratic peace from academia to public spheres relates to the sense of triumph of liberalism that emerged in the West as the cold war drew to a close end. The most representative feature of this ‘euphoria’ is perhaps Fukuyama’s 1989 article *The End of History?* In the article, the author went as far as to point out the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternative to Western liberalism”, thus categorically declaring the “end of history as such” (Fukuyama, 1989: 5). At the time, he noted that a “remarkable consensus ha[d] developed in the world concerning the legitimacy and viability of liberal democracy” (Fukuyama, 1989/1990: 22). This ‘euphoria’ about the ‘victory’ of liberalism soon inspired world leaders in Western capitals, who advocated for a “new world order” wherein “the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak” (Bush, 1990a). In the UN *milieu*, this euphoria eventually contributed to the generation of an optimistic sense that member states could cooperate more closely and that the Security Council would be more effective in discharging its duties in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Finally, the third ideational aspect is the optimistic sense of confidence that the UN Secretariat was then in better position to play a prominent role in supporting the Security Council in discharging its duties – at least as long as its members, particularly the permanent ones, cooperated. This confidence was essentially a result of the positive achievements of the Organisation in that area over the previous few years, particularly during Pérez de Cuéllar’s second mandate as Secretary-General (1987-1991). During those years, the UN successfully participated in negotiations that led to the settlement of armed conflicts in Nicaragua, Cambodia and El Salvador (see, respectively, Nasi, 2009; Song, 1997; Levine, 1997). In the three cases, but most particularly in the latter, the Secretary-General’s mediation and good offices efforts, with resort to the then innovative mechanism of ‘group of friends’ (see Krasno, 2003), played a key role in forging peace agreements between the parties to the armed conflicts. The Peruvian Secretary-General also addressed the Norwegian

Nobel Committee on behalf of UN peacekeeping forces, who were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 (see Pérez de Cuéllar, 1988).

The UN also experienced several positive developments in what concerns UN peacekeeping in the final years of Pérez de Cuéllar ahead of the Organisation.⁴⁹ In March 1990, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) ceased its operations after having assisted the transition of Namibia from South African rule to independency. At the time, UNTAG was quickly hailed as “one of the few examples of highly successful peaceful solutions to conflict” (Fortna, 1993b: 372) and today, it is usually referred to as the first multidimensional peacekeeping since the UN efforts in the Congo and West New Guinea in the 1960s (Adebajo, 2011: 110; Howard, 2008: 52). Between UNTAG’s termination and mid-1991, three ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations were completed with positive evaluations in what concerns their mandated tasks in the realm of security: the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) (see, respectively, Birgisson, 1993; Smith and Durch, 1993; Fortna, 1993a).

Other five operations were established in 1991 alone (in Iraq-Kuwait, Western Sahara, Angola, El Salvador and Cambodia), including the very ambitious UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The operation was tasked with a quasi-sovereign mandate that included, *inter alia*, organising the electoral process and responsibilities in the national civil administration. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Security Council members, including the USA and the then-Soviet Union, seemed to be entering a new era of cooperation: no veto was registered between June 1990 and February 1993 (UN Library, 2013). Moreover, in that short period, the Council had been able to concretely cooperate by authorising a multilateral ‘coalition of the willing’ sanctioned by Chapter VII to respond to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Malone, 2006: esp. 54-83; see also Pérez de Cuéllar, 1997: 237-282). In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Pérez de Cuéllar thus came to see the United Nations as “a stronger force for peace in the world” and to believe that the

⁴⁹ For volumes addressing several cases of UN peace operations since the end of the cold war, see, among many others, Adebajo (2011), Newman *et al.* (2009b), Richmond and Franks (2009), Howard (2008), Berdal and Economides (2007) and MacQueen (2006).

principle of collective security at its core “was shown to be achievable” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1997: 237).⁵⁰

A final event contributed significantly to create such an optimistic atmosphere in the UN *milieu* at that time. Inspired by the prospects of a potentially more effective Security Council in the wake of the armed conflict in the Persian Gulf, the foreign ministers of the five permanent members met in September 1991, subsequently pledging “their commitment to a revitalised role for the United Nations in the building of a new world order” (Müller, 2001: 48).⁵¹ The meeting was followed, apparently under the suggestion of then French President François Mitterrand, by the first gathering ever of the Security Council at the level of heads of state and government, which took place on 31 January 1992.⁵² The holding of such a high-level meeting at the cessation of decades of overt confrontation during the cold war indeed seemed to materialise the generalised optimism and hopes for a functioning Security Council and a more active United Nations in the decades to come. The meeting itself, as well as the Presidential Statement released afterwards, were such an important landmark that in an interview, Álvaro de Soto (2012), then senior advisor in the Secretariat, said that one could nearly depict those developments as “a first-class funeral for the cold war”. According to other interviewees, that was “an exciting time at the UN” (Thornburgh, 2012), a time when “[they] were very hopeful” (Dayal, 2012) with the prospects for the future of the Organisation.⁵³

It was around that time that the aspects addressed above, both material and ideational, converged to create an enabling environment for the migration of theories about the liberal/democratic peace from academe to public spheres. In the UN *milieu*, this migration was triggered by individuals at the highest instances of decision-making of the Organisation, including the Secretary-General. Based on their understanding about their

⁵⁰ Those words represent a stark contrast with the first years of Pérez de Cuéllar ahead of the UN. According to Burgess, “When [Pérez de Cuéllar] assumed the post in 1982, some observers were writing the UN’s obituary. By the time he left, there was renewed hope for the world body and for its role in promoting world peace” (Burgess, 2001: 7).

⁵¹ In a biography of Kofi Annan, Meisler also that “[t]he first Persian Gulf War created a grand illusion of power within the UN. That illusion spawned new attitudes towards the UN and greater expectations. (...) That feeling fostered a mood of optimism even in a world bursting with crises” (Meisler, 2007: 43).

⁵² For the official transcript of the meeting, see UN Doc. S/PV.3046 (1992).

⁵³ See also UNIHP (2007c: 36, 2007d: 37). As the interviews were carried out approximately twenty years after those events, some of the interviewees alluded to the fact that the ‘euphoria’ in the UN at that time seems rather naïve in retrospect.

professional role, those individuals perceived themselves as the ones responsible for ensuring an active role for the Organisation in the area of international peace and security in the post-cold war. In doing so, those individuals used theories about the liberal/democratic peace rhetorically in their discourse to help persuading their audiences. Rhetoric, according to Ish-Shalom, thus facilitated the migration by helping “to frame the common sense and the public discourse” (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 75).

Boutros-Ghali’s public use of theories about the liberal democratic peace

In the UN *milieu*, the transformation of the liberal democratic peace from *theoretical construct* into *public convention* was triggered by individuals at the highest instances of decision-making in the Organisation, most especially the Secretary-General. Based on his understanding about the role of the Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali perceived himself as responsible for ensuring an active part for the Organisation in the area of international peace and security in the post-cold war. In seeking to achieve that goal, he relied on theories about the democratic peace to advance this agenda rhetorically, particularly in public statements and subsequently in UN official documents. While doing so, Boutros-Ghali contributed not only to the migration of theories about the liberal/democratic peace from academic to UN circles, but also to their simplification in public spheres.

The conversion of the liberal democratic peace from *theoretical construct* into *public convention* may be seen as an incidental consequence of Boutros-Ghali’s efforts in pushing forward a norm of democratic governance while advancing one of the cornerstone themes of his mandate: democratisation. Rushton (2008) provides a good analysis of the Secretary-General’s attempts to advance this cause by looking particularly into how he ‘framed’ that norm in his discourse: first, by arguing that ‘democracy’ was a principle of the UN Charter and that as such, member states had an obligation towards democracy; and second, by linking ‘democracy’ with other widely accepted issues of relevance internationally, such as peace, human rights and development (Rushton, 2008: esp. 100-104; see also Haack, 2011: 67-75). While rhetorically linking ‘democracy’ and peace in his discourse, Boutros-Ghali relied gradually on the notion that ‘democracies do not (or rarely) fight each other’ to justify and legitimate the importance of democratisation to international peace. In doing so repeatedly over the years, he contributed, although possibly unaware

and/or unintentionally, to the migration of the liberal democratic peace from academe to public spheres, and to its conversion from *theoretical construct* into *public convention* (Box 1).

Box 1: The concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ in Boutros-Ghali’s discourse

Democracies almost never fight each other. Democratization supports the cause of peace.

Statement to CNN correspondents’ Conference, 5 May 1993, Atlanta (Boutros-Ghali, 2003g: 614); also appeared in an academic journal, Summer 1993 (Boutros-Ghali, 1993: 329)

Each passing day shows that authoritarian regimes are potential causes of war and of the extent to which, conversely, democracy is a guarantor of peace.

Statement at the opening of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 June 1993 (Boutros-Ghali, 2003f: 682)

Three challenges are before us: peace, development, and democracy. Without peace, there can be no development and there can be no democracy. Without development, the basis for democracy will be lacking and societies will tend to fall into conflict.

And without democracy, no sustainable development can occur. Without sustainable development, peace cannot long be maintained.

Remarks at the Foreign Correspondents Club, Tokyo, 20 December 1993 (Boutros-Ghali, 2003e: 905); repeated from the report on the work of the Organisation (UN Doc. A/48/1: para. 11)

[Democracy and development] are linked because democracy provides the only long-term basis for managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a way that minimizes the risk of violent internal conflict. (...) Without true democracy in international relations, peace will not endure, and a satisfactory pace of development cannot be assured.

An Agenda for Development, 6 May 1994, (UN Doc. A/48/935: para. 133)

Democracy within nations promotes respect for human rights and provides the conditions under which people can express their will. This process creates the social and political stability necessary for peace. And democracy among nations engages all States, large and small, in decision-making on world affairs. This promotes the mutual respect that is necessary for peace.

Gauer Distinguished Lecture, National Legal Center for the Public Interest, New York, 18 October 1994 (Boutros-Ghali, 2003a: 1299); repeated in lecture at the University of Warsaw, Poland, 10 November 1995 (Boutros-Ghali, 2003c: 1765)

(...) democracy is one of the pillars on which a more peaceful, more equitable, and more secure world can be built. (...) Democracies are likely to be peace-loving and not likely to wage war on other democracies. The promotion of peace and security, the promotion of economic and social development, and the promotion of democracy are all, therefore, part of the same process.

Article in academic journal, Winter 1995 (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 3, 4)

(...) whatever evidence critics of democracy can find (...) must not be allowed to conceal a deeper truth: democracy contributes to preserving peace and security, securing justice and human rights, and promoting economic and social development. (...) [A]cademia is providing important new evidence on the complementarity among peace, development and democracy[.]

An Agenda for Democratization, 20 December 1996 (UN Doc. A/51/761: paras. 16, 93)

A close aid to the Secretary-General at the time, Charles Hill conceded in an interview (Hill, 2012) that Boutros-Ghali, a scholar himself, used his writings and statements to develop his views and ideas on specific topics, laying the foundations for the UN role during his term and in the future. Boutros-Ghali would frequently do so not only in official documents and in the corridors of UN buildings, but also in public spheres while addressing informed audiences politically influential in the UN *milieu*. The Secretary-General also initiated the ‘Blue Books’ series, which was published by the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) as a public outreach measure to disseminate UN official documents and the Organisation’s activities in key areas of concern such as peacekeeping. On those instances, the Secretary-General used his statements to test and to refine arguments, as well as their acceptance in specialised and/or political audiences.⁵⁴ It is in this light that several of his texts as Secretary-General should be regarded, including articles in journals and newspapers, public statements and UN reports.⁵⁵ In several of them, it is possible to find instances in which he relied rhetorically upon a simplified version of the idea that democracies do not fight each other.

Boutros-Ghali’s first public reference to the link between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ in the UN *milieu* was made even before he had taken office as Secretary-General. This reference appeared in his acceptance speech, delivered to the General Assembly on 3 December 1991, when he claimed that the democratisation of international relations and of national institutions could “create a new dynamic for national peace and stability, which is as important as international peace and stability” (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 17). The connection between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ is rather timid, but it is important because it shows that Boutros-Ghali’s articulation of the two terms would gain in refinement and would be progressively reformulated over the years, becoming more explicit and well articulated. Furthermore, this passage seems to support a claim he made later in his *memoirs*, that “early in [his] term of office, [his] conviction had deepened that democracy – especially the process of democratization that may lead to it – is crucial for the betterment of peoples in every sphere of life” (Boutros-Ghali, 1999: 319).

⁵⁴ In a first-hand account, Lombardo (2001) reviews the drafting of *An Agenda for Democratization* and describes how the Secretary-General used a public lecture to help build the conceptual foundations of that report.

⁵⁵ The collected public papers of Boutros-Ghali are available as Hill (2003).

During the next few years, Boutros-Ghali alluded to the connection between ‘democracy’ and peace, human rights and development on several occasions (Rushton, 2008: esp. 100-104; Haack, 2011: 67-75). In what concerns the focus of this section, the connection with peace, Boutros-Ghali made an important remark when concluding the David M. Abshire lecture, delivered at the US Senate on 13 May 1992, noting that “in today’s multi-polar world, economic and social development, and the promotion and reinforcement of democratic institutions, are an intrinsic part of maintaining peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 2003d: 79). Boutros-Ghali’s underlying endorsement of the link between ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’ was repeated and/or reformulated in the following years as he actively attempted to frame democracy as “essential for meeting the UN’s other aims” (Rushton, 2008: 102).

Boutros-Ghali’s repeated remarks alluding to theories about the democratic peace incidentally contributed to their migration to public spheres in general and the UN *milieu* in particular and to their simplification outside academe (see Ish-Shalom, 2006a: 572). On some occasions, the Secretary-General essentially reiterated the liberal/democratic peace thesis, straightforwardly claiming that “[d]emocracies almost never fight each other” (Boutros-Ghali, 2003g: 614) or, conversely, that “authoritarian regimes are potential causes of war” (Boutros-Ghali, 2003f: 682). He also referred to the idea of a liberal/democratic peace similarly as in academic formulations, but without stressing the assumptions or conditions under which it is valid, nor the critical inclination that is distinctive of academic statements (e.g. ‘democracies are likely to be peace-loving and not likely to wage war on other democracies’). On other occasions, connections were inferred from theories without being necessarily true or they overlooked the probabilistic nature present in academic debates, giving in for a more straightforward assumption about the link between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ (e.g. reference to ‘deeper truth’ about the contribution of democracy to peace and security). On all such occasions, Boutros-Ghali was contributing to the gradual conversion of the liberal democratic peace from *theoretical construct* to *public convention*, a stage wherein the notion that liberal/democratic regimes were more peaceful than others was simply taken for granted as a truism out of its original academic context.

The context in which Boutros-Ghali took office, strongly marked by the material and ideational aspects outlined in the previous section, created the conditions under which he was able to build upon the thesis that liberal/democratic states rarely go to each other to advance one of the crosscutting themes of his mandate: democracy and democratisation. He

used the thesis to legitimate and justify the link between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ in his discourse. He did so not only in official documents and in UN corridors, but also in public spheres while addressing informed audiences politically influential around the UN. In drawing upon an eminently academic and theoretical discourse in his public statements, the then-Secretary-General contributed to the migration of theories to UN circles. As those theories departed the restricted circles of academe, they were simplified and subsequently politicised in Boutros-Ghali’s rhetoric at the public and political levels.

Conclusions

This chapter started to explore the first analytical move of this research study, demonstrating that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as hermeneutical mechanism. It focused on the first two steps of the hermeneutical mechanism by characterising the liberal democratic peace as a *theoretical construct*, and then by addressing its conversion into *public convention*. Formulated primarily in the restricted circles of academia, the understanding that liberal/democratic societies do not fight each other migrated to the public spheres in a simplified version following Boutros-Ghali’s rhetorical use of the liberal/democratic peace thesis in his public discourses in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s.

The following chapter continues the narrative by addressing the third step of the hermeneutical mechanism, that is, the transformation of the liberal democratic peace from *public convention* into *political conviction*. It outlines how that simplified version of theories about the liberal/democratic peace was politicised in the UN *milieu*, subsequently providing the meaning for the concept of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ in *An Agenda for Peace*. The analysis therein carried out offers an in-depth investigation not only of the ‘written word’ of *An Agenda for Peace*, but also of the history behind its elaboration; in doing so, I interpret both written and un-written aspects of social reality that influenced the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ as it appeared in the public version of Boutros-Ghali’s report.

Chapter 4

The origins of UN peacebuilding (II): the liberal democratic peace in the UN *milieu*

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, top bureaucrat at the United Nations, has given his political bosses in the Security Council the report they ordered up in January. Meeting at the summit level, the council had asked him to outline the ways that the U.N., freed from a Cold War confrontation that produced 279 council vetoes, could better contribute to peace. Mr. Boutros-Ghali now responds in the can-do spirit of the day.

Editorial of *The Washington Post* (1992) on 21 June 1992, only a few days after the release of *An Agenda for Peace*

Introduction

The previous chapter characterised the liberal democratic peace as a *theoretical construct* and explored its transformation into a *public convention* via Boutros-Ghali's simplified use of the thesis that liberal/democratic societies do not, or rarely, fight each other. This chapter continues the narrative and analysis by addressing the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from *public convention* to *political conviction*, the third and final step of Ish-Shalom's hermeneutical mechanism. At this stage of the mechanism, social science theories are politicised and rhetorically used by purposive individuals to advance their own political agendas. In this chapter, I discuss how this process unfolded by carefully analysing the elaboration of the Secretary-General's report *An Agenda for Peace*, the document through which the concept of 'peacebuilding' initially gained foothold in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s. I show in this chapter that the meaning of 'peacebuilding' in that document reflects Boutros-Ghali's articulation of the liberal democratic peace framework as a *political conviction* in the UN *milieu*. This chapter thus concludes the narrative of the transformation of one discourse into another as it migrated from academe to public spheres, showing how

it gradually acquired the potential to shape the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ and to influence courses of political action in the UN *milieu*.

The remainder of the chapter is organised into four sections. The first section delves into the circumstances under which the document was produced as well as how it was produced, offering substantial elements for the analysis of its content in the second section. This approach allows for a better understanding not only of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ in the United Nations in the early 1990s, but also of how this concept was gradually constructed in a specific social context. Based on an in-depth understanding of how the document was produced and its content in what concerns ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, the third section looks for the most direct academic sources of ‘peacebuilding’ in *An Agenda for Peace*. The section identifies those sources in the US scholarship on the democratic peace thesis rather than on the Nordic tradition of peace studies, as commonly assumed in specialised circles. Finally, the fourth section engages with the two contending views about the origins of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations that were presented in the Introduction, partially corroborating and partially challenging each one of them.

The making of *An Agenda for Peace*

When he took office as Secretary-General on 1 January 1992, Boutros-Ghali was immediately absorbed in the optimistic atmosphere in the UN milieu that was outlined in the previous chapter, wherein expectations were fairly high about the future role of the Organisation in the post-cold war years. In fact, in a first-hand interview, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that he was then under the impression that the end of the cold war had created a moment of opportunity similar in character to the ones created by the end of the Napoleonic Wars or the World Wars of the twentieth century (Boutros-Ghali, 2013). This impression is captured in a passage of his first Report on the Work of the Organisation, dated 11 September 1992:

it is possible to sense a new stirring of hope among the nations of the world and a recognition that an immense opportunity is here to be seized. Not since the end of the Second World War have the expectations of the world’s peoples depended so much upon the capacity of the United Nations for widely supported and effective action. (A/47/1, 1992: paras. 4)

In a stark contrast to the nearly paralysed UN of 1982, the year Pérez de Cuéllar took office, it seemed that the UN of 1992 could finally become the purposeful actor envisaged in San

Francisco to maintain international peace and security. And the newly appointed Secretary-General was one of those who not only believed, but also tried to fulfil this potential.

In taking over as the head of the world body at that crossroad, and in abiding by what he perceived to be his role as Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali sought to prepare the world body for what he saw as a “new era” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 89). Early on in his mandate, he was “under the illusion that [his] job would be to create a new United Nations, or at least to do drastic changes in the system of the United Nations” (Boutros-Ghali, 2013). And at least at that time, not only did he take this as one of his main goals, but he was also confident that the ‘international community’, alongside the Secretariat he was leading, were in position to “seize this extraordinary opportunity to expand, adapt and reinvigorate the work of the United Nations so that the lofty goals as originally envisioned by the charter [could] begin to be realized” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 89). He registered the same conviction in the report cited above, claiming that “[c]learly, it is in our power to bring about a renaissance – to create a new United Nations for a new international era” (A/47/1, 1992: paras. 5). And for that, the new Secretary-General had a clear and broad conceptual blueprint around four main areas, as stated in his inaugural speech: ensure the maintenance of international peace and security; strive for the attainment of economic development; reform the UN bureaucratic structures; and foster the role of the United Nations in promoting democracy (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 12-17; see also Boutros-Ghali, 2002: 49-50).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Security Council held its first meeting ever at the level of heads of state and government on 31 January 1992. At the conclusion of the summit meeting, the Council “invite[d]” the UNSG to prepare an “analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework of provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping” (UN Doc. S/23500: 3). The invitation enabled the Secretary-General to submit his own views and proposals on the matter through this report. Looking backwards during an interview conceded in 2001, Boutros-Ghali recalled that it was almost as if he had been given a *carte blanche*:

On the 31st of January, it was held this summit (...) and if you read the discourses of the fifteen members of the Security Council – one must read them – the Heads of State give me some sort of full powers. They tell me: “Sir, you have reached a

historical moment, it is incumbent on you to manage the post-cold war, that is, to reform the United Nations”.⁵⁶ (UNIHP, 2007a: 33)

Determined to live up to the role of political leader entrusted to him by his mandate, as well as to assert the independence of his office, the new Secretary-General seemed determined to seize this opportunity and use the report to imprint his own agenda ahead of the United Nations in the post-cold war (see Boutros-Ghali, 1999: 26).

Three distinct phases of drafting were carried out in the Secretariat before Boutros-Ghali's report was made available to the public.

The first phase of drafting

To produce the required report, Boutros-Ghali adopted a rather unconventional approach at the time. Usually, speeches, reports, statements and public addresses of the Secretary-General were – and remain – primarily prepared by a team of speechwriters in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG). The team receives input from relevant organs and departments on the substantial content of the issue at hand and then drafts a text that is subsequently submitted to the Secretary-General or close aides for approval – or for reviews, comments and subsequent corrections (see Lombardo, 2001). For writing the report requested by the Security Council, however, Boutros-Ghali created a task force composed of senior officials in his *cabinet*, which was envisaged to serve as a “collegial body” for brainstorming ideas and assisting in preparing the draft of the report (Petrovsky, 1992c). The Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, as it was known, was established in the Secretariat as an informal group, which allowed for holding meetings at short-notice in the UN Headquarters, as well as for flexibility in receiving assistance from staff members based in different organs and departments. The option, as elaborated below, would also allow for inputs from external experts, former UN staff and other individuals in the UN *milieu* who were not members of the UN staff.

The idea of establishing the Task Force started as early as February, with a preliminary exchange of views on possible arrangements between Jean-Claude Aimé and Virendra Dayal, two of the closest aides of Boutros-Ghali at the time, and Vladimir

⁵⁶ From the original in French: “*Oui, l’Agenda pour la paix. Le 31 janvier, s’est tenu ce sommet (...) et, si vous lisez les discours des quinze membres du Conseil de Sécurité – il faut les lire – les chefs d’État me donnent une sorte de pleins pouvoirs. Ils me disent: “Monsieur, vous arrivez à un moment historique, c’est à vous de gérer l’après guerre froide, c’est-à-dire de réformer les Nations Unies”.*”

Petrovsky, who would start as co-head of the new Department of Political Affairs (DPA) on 1 March 1992 (Aimé, 1992). The task force was constituted in March and was composed by the following individuals:

- ✓ *Vladimir Petrovsky*, Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Political Affairs, who acted as chair of the group;
- ✓ *James Jonah*, USG for Political Affairs;
- ✓ *Virendra Dayal*, former chief of staff for Pérez de Cuéllar and then USG and Senior Advisor in Boutros-Ghali's *cabinet*, who served as rapporteur of the group;
- ✓ *Álvaro de Soto*, Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) and Senior Political Advisor to the Secretary-General under Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali;
- ✓ *Marrack Goulding*, USG for Peacekeeping Operations;
- ✓ *Jan Eliasson*, USG for Humanitarian Affairs; and
- ✓ *Richard Thornburgh*, USG for Administration and Management.⁵⁷

In addition, Tapio Kanninen, a Secretariat official who had previously worked in the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI)⁵⁸, provided secretariat and research support as secretary of the Task Force.

The first meeting of the Task Force was held on 10 March 1992 and served for members to discuss the scope, organisation, structure and tone of the report. According to a record in Kanninen's personal files,⁵⁹ the Task Force was initially divided about the scope of the document it would have to produce: whereas some members argued that the report should contain considerations about peace enforcement and peacebuilding, claiming that both were "implied" in the Security Council's Presidential Statement of 31 January 1992 and that the moment was opportune; others felt that moving beyond and including issues that

⁵⁷ List of participants compiled from the analysis of the documents cited throughout the section and from interviews with Álvaro de Soto (2012), Richard Thornburgh (2012), James S. Sutterlin (2012a, 2012b), Tapio Kanninen (2012, 2013), Virendra Dayal (2012) and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (2013). Carl-August Fleisschhauer, head of the Office of Legal Affairs, was mentioned as possible participant of the Task Force in the initial note prepared by Aimé (1992). His name, however, never came up in any of the interviews carried out, or figured among the sender/recipient of several memos and notes exchanged among the members of the Task Force – except for a memo sent to him by Petrovsky (1992a) that requested Fleisschhauer's comments on a working draft of the document; I found no record of a response in the documents analysed.

⁵⁸ The Office was responsible for, *inter alia*, carrying out research in the Secretariat and for producing drafts for the UNSG (UN Doc. ST/SGB/225). It was established in 1987 and closed in 1992 in the context of Boutros-Ghali's first restructuring of the Secretariat. For further details, see Kanninen and Kumar (2005) and Ramcharan (1991).

⁵⁹ In addition to working drafts of what would later become *An Agenda for Peace*, Kanninen kept several of the notes exchanged within the members of the Task Force, as well as between the Chair of the group and the Secretary-General. Those documents were used to keep record of past decisions and to regularly brief Boutros-Ghali on progress achieved, which makes his files invaluable for reconstituting the process herein depicted. I am indebted to Tapio Kanninen for granting me access to his personal files and for the attention and support with which he corresponded with me via e-mails for a period of over a year.

were not explicitly requested by the Security Council could shift attention away from the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Petrovsky, 1992e). Advice was thus requested from the Secretary-General on the matter.

In this meeting and over the following days, discussions started to focus on sketching the conceptual approach of the report, as well as on the compilation of an inventory of previous proposals aimed at strengthening the UN in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Petrovsky, 1992e). One of the core formulations found in *An Agenda for Peace* was already present in a paper produced at this early stage, even if only incipiently formulated: that “[p]reventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping should be seen as an integrated system, constituting basic elements for the structure of an enhanced collective security” (Kanninen, 1992c). The document is in bullet-point format, lacks coherence and cohesion, especially conceptual, but it further elaborates that the Task Force

should move towards the broadening of a structure of collective security, including peace-building (e.g. creating socio-economic foundations for stability) as well as peace-enforcement. This new, even broader concept includes preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping as well as peace-building and peace-enforcement. These elements together should constitute a *new enhanced collective system in the making*, or the new world order in the making. (Kanninen, 1992c; emphasis in the original)

Despite successive discussions, intensive meetings, drafting and re-drafting by different individuals, a key message and a cornerstone concept (that of ‘peacebuilding’) delivered by the final version of the report apparently emerged already in the earlier brainstorming sessions of the Task Force.

On 19 March 1992, Boutros-Ghali attended a meeting (presumably the third) of the Task Force. By then, according a note with his talking points for the meeting, the Secretary-General had decided to include the topics of peace enforcement and peacebuilding in his future report, while “concentrating on the 3Ps of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, and peace making” (Kanninen, 1992b). In the discussions of the Task Force, the ‘3Ps’ could become ‘4Ps’ when members also referred to ‘peacebuilding’ (e.g., UNIHP, 2007d: 10), and ‘5Ps’ when ‘peace enforcement’ was added to the list. This highlights that the Task Force considered the full range of conflict management and resolution in their earlier brainstorming sessions.

Boutros-Ghali, a scholar himself, used the 19 March 1992 meeting to present some quantitative data on wars and on the nature of armed conflicts since 1945, requesting that

those were considered by the Task Force when drafting their report (Kanninen, 1992a: 1). In a note submitted to the Task Force for the meeting, Boutros-Ghali mentions that 177 wars have taken place between 1945 and 1989, the majority of which was no longer typified as “classical international war”. Rather, according to his analysis, armed conflicts during the period, at least those occurring in the “Third World”, were associated with processes of decolonisation, with confrontation between “modernistic and traditional societies” and wars of insurrection (Kanninen, 1992a: Attachment 1). Still in the meeting, participants further discussed the proposed concept of the paper and considered a preliminary outline of the report that had been prepared by the secretary and by the rapporteur of the Task Force (Kanninen, 1992b).

Following the 19 March 1992 meeting, Boutros-Ghali requested the Task Force to make a “prognosis of the future trends in war and conflicts in order to give a solid factual basis for [his] recommendations” (Kanninen, 1992a: 1). To support the Task Force’s assignment, Kanninen prepared a note, dated 23 March 1992, with “detailed factual evidence” to support and complement the statistics already presented by Boutros-Ghali (Kanninen, 1992a: 1). The note was essentially a compilation of quantitative data drawn from academic research, including, for instance, information that seemed to confirm that ‘civil wars’ had become more recurrent and the rise of armed conflicts related to terrorism, anti-regime movements and natural resources, *inter alia*.⁶⁰ The content of the note provided some basis for the ‘changing context’ outlined in the public version of *An Agenda for Peace* (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: paras. 8-19).

Another meeting of the Task Force took place in the last weekend of March 1992, once again with the presence of Boutros-Ghali. Prior to the meeting, two working documents were prepared for consideration: an updated inventory of proposals previously made for enhancing the United Nations in the realms of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992a); and a comprehensive listing of questions raised during informal consultations of the Security Council over the past few years (Peck, 1992). The meeting, according to Petrovsky (1992d), served to consolidate the group’s understanding on the scope of the ‘3Ps’ of preventive

⁶⁰ The note is reproduced in Annex C with kind permission from the United Nations Archives. It also contains, as an annex, the data presented by Boutros-Ghali on the 19 March 1992 meeting. For reasons that will become clear in the following section, this note is rather important for the narrative herein constructed.

diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, whereas only briefly reviewing the other 2Ps – peace-enforcement and peacebuilding.

The meeting also served to consolidate a detailed outline for the future report (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992c). The outline sketched an ‘enhanced system of collective security’ that was composed by “measures to prevent or eliminate conditions which create conflict”, by non-coercive measures to control or solve armed conflicts, and by coercive measures to enforce peace and security (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992c). The ‘3Ps’ of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping fell within the non-coercive measures, which, judging by the proposed outline, would be the primary concern of the future report. Peace enforcement was addressed to the extent that the outline raised questions about the need for enforcement capabilities in the peacekeeping scenarios emerging at the time – and which would first be put to test in Somalia in 1993. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, was not overtly mentioned anywhere, but the section of the report on the required conditions to prevent and eliminate armed conflict would include, according to the 27 March 1992 outline, concerns on topics such as institution-building (including in the sectors of elections and judiciary), development and human rights, among others (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992c). Those aspects, as explored below, would be some of the core aspects of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ in the final and public version of the report. This first detailed outline of the report thus reflected previous discussions of the Task Force, which have opted for a heavier emphasis on the ‘3Ps’ mentioned in the original request from the Security Council. At the same time, it did not completely dropped attention from the other ‘2Ps’ of peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy.

By late March/early April, the Task Force had already held a number of meetings and discussed at length several topics related to the future report, such as its scope, structure, and parts of its content, to name but a few. Until this stage, however, no attempt had yet been made to produce a fully-fledged draft of the document requested by the Security Council. To advance in that direction, a small ‘draft team’ was constituted. Composed by Kanninen and a third UN staff, the team was led by Bertrand Ramcharan, then head of the Secretary-General’s speechwriting services and former officer in the ORCI (Petrovsky, 1992b). According to Ramcharan (2012) and Kanninen (2012), the detailed report outline agreed to by the members of the Task Force, and later by the Secretary-General himself, served as the

basis for their work. As the drafting team advanced towards the writing of a preliminary version of the report, Ramcharan and Kanninen received written inputs from James Sutterlin on some occasions (Sutterlin, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d).⁶¹ An already retired officer in the US foreign services, Sutterlin had worked for years in the Secretariat, mainly as speechwriter and advisor to Pérez de Cuéllar (Krasno, 2005). In 1992, he was based at Yale University leading the War Risk Reduction Project, which is explored in more detail in the third section of this chapter. Sutterlin would become more actively involved in the drafting of the document at a later stage.

The first full draft of the Secretary-General's future report was presented to the members of the Task Force during the weekend of 24-25 April 1992 under the title *Peace, Security and Stability through Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping* (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992d). A careful analysis of the fifty-page long text reveals that its substance closely mirrors the content of the previous working documents produced by the Task Force, with the '5Ps' referred to as concepts that offer "the elements for a comprehensive and effective international security system" (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992d: 13). Unsurprisingly, given the content of previous discussions outlined above, the text centred primarily on the '3Ps', which were addressed separately. The '2Ps' of 'peace enforcement' and 'peacebuilding' received less attention in the text, being mentioned only in a few passages but without further elaboration.

The decision not to go in depth beyond the '3Ps' in the report was reinforced during a meeting of the Task Force held on 22 April 1992 (Chakravartty, 1992). During the meeting, an old question came to the fore once again: whether or not the report should go beyond preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. On this occasion, it was recalled that the Permanent Representative to the United Kingdom to the UN had recently expressed his view on the issue in what concerns peace enforcement specifically. During an informal session held at the Ford Foundation on 7 April 1992, David Hannay, the main drafter of the Security Council's Presidential Statement of 31 January 1992 had explained that

peace enforcement was neither included nor excluded [from the UNSC declaration]; that it was up to the Secretary-General how he wished to look at this. *The only exclusion was Charter change* as that would 'open too many cans of worms'. Nothing already in the Charter was excluded. If the SG decided on

⁶¹ Some records contained in the personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force also refer to the participation of Sutterlin in meetings of the drafting team.

innovative use of Chapter 7 he should do so. (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992b: 2)

Notwithstanding the clarification, the Task Force agreed that the report should avoid the matter and “concentrate on the 3-Ps”, noting that the “SG had decided to stick to the 3 Ps” (Chakravartty, 1992: 2, 3).

Despite its marginal focus, the preliminary version produced by the Task Force’s drafting team approached peacebuilding as follows:

Peace-building embraces the efforts of the United Nations to remove the root causes of conflict, building the socio-economic foundations for stability. It, thus, includes efforts to enhance human dignity and freedom; to promote development and social progress; and to enhance equity in the governance of societies, national and international. This is what the founders of the United Nations had in mind in the Preamble to the Charter. This is also what they had in mind in Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter, which envisages the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992d: 13-14)

In this first draft, peacebuilding appears as a rather broad undertaking, one that bears some resemblance with the concept of peacebuilding in the tradition of peace studies to the extent that it focuses on the removal of the ‘root causes of conflict’ and it provides due consideration to multiple aspects in the social, economic and development realms (see Galtung, 1976: 297-298). Moreover, it was not a ‘post-conflict’ endeavour: in fact, it is the very first definition advanced for each one of the ‘5Ps’ in the draft report, before preventive diplomacy.

After the draft was presented, members of the Task Force considered the text and provided detailed written comments on their specific areas of competence back to Ramcharan and Kanninen. Boutros-Ghali also provided handwritten comments in his own copy of the draft (Kanninen, 2012). In general, members of the Task Force seemed pleased with the report, but noted that more work was necessary on this preliminary text. Goulding (1992: 5), for instance, remarked the draft as “an excellent basis for the Task Force’s continuing work”, and Jonah (1992: 1) considered the draft a “good one as a working document”, but noted that the text was “too long”. By the end of the month, another meeting had been held by the Task Force to consider the draft. After the meeting, new comments were incorporated into the draft and a revised version of the preliminary text was subsequently submitted to the Secretary-General (Kanninen and Piiparinen, forthcoming). For the purposes of the narrative herein outlined, the submission represents the end of the

activities of the Task Force and the conclusion of the first phase of drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* – although, technically, as the Task Force was never officially established, it was also never officially dismantled.

The second phase of drafting

According to some interviewees, Boutros-Ghali was not satisfied with the document he had at hand and as such, he requested Dayal to re-write it. With the Secretary-General's consent, Dayal invited James Sutterlin to assist in his assignment, as they knew each other well from Pérez de Cuéllar's days in office.⁶² According to interviews with Dayal (2012) and Sutterlin (2012a), both individuals worked separately on the document and, at Boutros-Ghali's request, they did so under secrecy.⁶³ Dayal would make most of the contacts with Boutros-Ghali about their new draft, discussing, for instance, specific passages for clarification.⁶⁴ According to Krasno (2005: 35), Sutterlin only attended one of those meetings and it was in that meeting that the title *An Agenda for Peace* came up for the final report. At this stage, the usual process of editing, writing and re-writing was quickly advanced, with close contacts between Dayal and Boutros-Ghali whilst several consecutive drafts were produced.⁶⁵ Sutterlin (2012a) recalls that relevant Secretariat departments provided further inputs on their areas of competences, but most of them were eventually discarded.

I had access to a draft dated 8 May 1992 (Dayal and Sutterlin, 1992), which may have been one of the earliest produced at this second stage of drafting.⁶⁶ The new draft mostly presented ideas re-worked from the draft produced by the Task Force. Indeed, a

⁶² In his interview to the UNIHP, Dayal's recollection is as follows: "We had some meetings, discussed some ideas, and all the rest of it. But you know how it is. Basically, someone has got to pick up a pen and start writing the wretched thing. So I rang my friend Jim Sutterlin. I said, 'Jim, you and I have struggled along in this area terribly hard together. Why don't we try and sit down, you and I, and put together some thoughts on this whole thing?' Jim said, 'Sure.' So he and I sat down, and we said, 'I think these are the ideas we have between us. Why don't I write up some of them, you write up some of them, and then I'll match them together and we will see if it makes sense. Let that be our first working draft.'" (UNIHP, 2007c: 36-37).

⁶³ Sutterlin (2012a) recalls, for instance, being requested to print out copies of his writings by the end of each day, rather than saving them on the workstation he had been given at the UN Secretariat building. Dayal (2012), in his turn, remembers that the translation of the document into other UN official languages, which took place at a later stage, was made in the anteroom of his office to avoid potential leaking.

⁶⁴ Dayal notes, however, that he and Sutterlin kept discussing "these things" (UNIHP, 2007c: 37).

⁶⁵ Boutros-Ghali (1999: 26) recalls in his memoirs that he "stopped counting" after "twelve or thirteen versions" of the draft.

⁶⁶ In fact, this version was not yet titled *An Agenda for Peace*.

careful analysis of the document, supported by interviews with Sutterlin (2012a), Ramcharan (2012) and Kanninen (2012), reveals that despite obvious differences in terms of style, content, structure and order of some passages, the core message of the draft reflects the substantial content offered by the discussions of the Task Force: that “in conjunction with a broad peace-building undertaking”, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping “can provide a systemic means of realizing the collective security foreseen in the Charter” (Dayal and Sutterlin, 1992: 10). Dayal and Sutterlin also included in the new draft ideas of their own. Both claimed, for instance, that the proposal of ‘peace enforcement units’ was included by Sutterlin at this stage (Dayal, 2012; Sutterlin, 2012a, 2012b). Absent from the 24 April 1992 draft, the proposal for such units feature for the first time in the draft authored by Dayal and Sutterlin (1992) – and it would make it to the final version of *An Agenda for Peace*. In the draft, peacebuilding was elaborated under a section titled “Building Peace”, which departed from an all-encompassing understanding that “[p]eace in its fullest sense depends on the well-being of humanity” and required aspects such as the “respect for the principles of justice and international law, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, cooperation in the resolution of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems” (Dayal and Sutterlin, 1992: 40).

The third phase of drafting

A third and final stage of drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* started with the involvement of yet another drafter. It was already late May 1992 and Boutros-Ghali, although seemingly pleased with its content, was not “satisfied stylistically” with the text (UNIHP, 2007c: 38). Hence, he handed it to Charles Hill, who would soon become the head of the speechwriting services in the Secretariat. According to a record in the United Nations Archives, Hill initially proposed changing the document at three levels: its tone and style, which should be in the form of a bold statement rather than a speech to be delivered; the “*tour d’horizon*” in the section outlining the changing context in which the Organisation was to take action, which in his view needed to be sharpened and deepened; and finally, he suggested using editorial and rhetorical means to display “initiative and ingenuity” more clearly in the recommendations contained in the draft (Hill, 1992: 1). An analysis of the text ultimately adopted as *An Agenda for Peace* and the draft prepared by Sutterlin and Dayal, however, reveals that changes made were essentially restricted to issues of structure,

language, style and analysis, without major substantial modifications on ideas, messages and proposals being carried out – according to Dayal, “about 80 percent of that remained totally unchanged” (UNIHP, 2007c: 38).

This in-depth analysis of the process of drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* reveals that although the report was essentially a by-product of in-house efforts in the UN Secretariat, it received substantial inputs from other individuals in the UN *milieu*, including scholars. Interaction with scholars took place indirectly via the ORCI and/or more directly via individuals involved in the War Risk Reduction Project led by James Sutterlin – explored in the third section. It is also worth stressing that despite the way the document was produced, Boutros-Ghali was closely involved during all stages of writing of the document, helping to shape its overall scope and pointing out his views on the report’s contents. His influence may be seen for instance, by the fact that ‘peacebuilding’ ultimately received substantial consideration in the final version of the report, despite the earlier decision of the Task Force not to delve too much attention to the issue. Moreover, the qualifier ‘post-conflict’ for peacebuilding only appeared in the final version of Boutros-Ghali’s report and not in the ones produced by the Task Force or by Dayal and Sutterlin. According to Sutterlin (2012a), the full expression ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ was subsequently adopted by the insistence of Boutros-Ghali, which ultimately limited the scope of peacebuilding to the ‘post-conflict’ phase of armed conflicts. Given the strong role played by the Secretary-General in shaping the report, and the strength of his own ideas in the document, it is thus not surprising that “the final fifty-two-page manuscript was widely regarded as his personal testament and blueprint” (Meisler, 1995: 286).

Seizing the ‘liberal peace’: the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*

Having outlined how *An Agenda for Peace* was produced, this section delves into the content of Boutros-Ghali’s report, most particularly in what concerns peacebuilding. The document provided the platform wherein Boutros-Ghali could articulate a simplified and politicised version of academic theories about the liberal/democratic peace to support his political agenda of strengthening the United Nations’ role in peace and security in the post-cold war. He did so by offering a rationale and a concrete ‘toolkit’ of mechanisms available for the Organisation, including ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’.

The final version of *An Agenda for Peace* was presented on 17 June 1992. Because the UNSC had requested the Secretary-General to make his report available “to the members of the United Nations” (UN Doc. S/23500: 3), Boutros-Ghali submitted the text not only to the Council, but also to the General Assembly. He decided to give it even more visibility by publishing the document as a volume in the ‘Blue Books’ series, which had a reach beyond the UN itself (Boutros-Ghali, 1999: 26-27). Those actions might have contributed to the far reach of the report in public spheres over the following years, as the text is possibly one of the most widely known documents ever published by the Organisation.

An Agenda for Peace is a rather bold report, charting an active role for the United Nations in a ‘new era’. Remarkably, it asserted that the “time for absolute and exclusive sovereignty” has passed and that “leaders of States today [have] to understand this” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 17). This was a result of the perceived changing context following the end of the cold war, which was explored in detail in the first part of the document (paras. 8-19). The report also reflects the complexity and the changing nature of the concept of international security within that context, as it entailed an understanding that was expanded to include a number of risks to global stability that were no longer restricted to the ‘international’, as discussed in the previous chapter. Hence, racial tensions, environmental degradation, poverty, disease and famine were recognised in *An Agenda for Peace* as serious risks for global stability, which featured together with ‘traditional’ threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (paras. 12-13). It was necessary, therefore, to adapt and legitimate UN actions to this changing and ‘new’ context of “civil strife” (para. 55) – at least as long as they could be characterised as threats to international peace and security by the Security Council. This core idea, as noted earlier, was essentially outlined during the initial deliberations of the Task Force constituted by Boutros-Ghali.

Perceiving this changing context of both the international system and the concept of international security, *An Agenda for Peace* sought to systematise and conceptually re-define the entire scope of the United Nations actions in the maintenance of international peace and security. This would be achieved via the use of a range of mechanisms, tools, that were available to the UN in performing its primary role in the area of peace and security, thus reflecting the Task Force conception that such elements constituted the structure of an ‘enhanced collective security’, as outlined above. The final document included considerations over the 5Ps after all, although not necessarily along the lines discussed by

the Task Force. Peace enforcement, for instance, rather than equated with the other '4Ps', was outlined as part of peacemaking efforts of forces called to restore or maintain cease-fires via the deployment of 'peace enforcement units' (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 44). The proposal for those units appeared only in the second phase of drafting by James Sutterlin, out of his own reading that peacekeeping had become "restricted" and "not adequate for the situations that were arriving" (Sutterlin, 2012a). The concept, dubbed in an early analysis as "perhaps the most eye-catching of all the recommendations" in the report, would eventually prove to be one of the most controversial in the wider UN membership (Cox, 1993: 10).

As mechanisms, as techniques, available to the UN in performing its role in the realm of international peace and security, preventive diplomacy (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: paras. 23-33), peacemaking (paras. 34-45), peacekeeping (paras. 46-54) and "post-conflict peacebuilding" (paras. 55-59) were envisaged to respond to different stages of armed conflicts. In the document, the rationale connecting the '4Ps' is as follows: "preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out"; peacemaking and peacekeeping after the cessation of hostilities; and "post-conflict peace-building", rather obviously, after the "termination" of the armed conflict (para. 21). More precisely, the latter was defined as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (para. 21). Preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding were thus seen as somehow complementary activities: the former was designed to avoid a crisis, whilst the latter, to prevent its recurrence (para. 57).

Although this conceptualisation apparently assumed the four mechanisms as responses to specific phases of armed conflicts, the document in fact embodied a rather linear continuum from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict peacebuilding in outlining the UN activities in that area. A very good illustration of this sequential understanding is found in an article authored by two senior officers during Boutros-Ghali's term. In the text, they summarise the UN-sponsored peace process in El Salvador as follows

It began with the two-year negotiations that led to the January 1992 peace agreement – the peacemaking phase. It was followed by U.N. supervision of the dissipation of the military conflict – the peacekeeping phase. The U.N. then continued to play a central role in ensuring that far-reaching political, social, and institutional reforms agreed to in the negotiations were carried out to prevent recurrence of violence – the post-conflict peace-building phase. (de Soto and del Castillo, 1994: 70)

One could then argue – which Boutros-Ghali did in the 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, as discussed in the following chapter – that the continuous support for those measures

would contribute to preventing another crisis in the future, thus reverting to the beginning of the circle with the preventive diplomacy phase.

The section dedicated exclusively to post-conflict peacebuilding was the shortest amongst those concerning the four instruments separately, with five paragraphs in length. Although the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding defined in paragraph 21 is rather broad, and consequently vague, it gains more substance as this section refers to the tasks and actions the UN can/should carry out in peacebuilding. Amongst many others, they may include: the disarmament of warring parties, as well as the custody and even the destruction of weapons; repatriation of refugees; “monitoring elections”, “reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation” (para. 55); cooperative bilateral or multilateral projects contributing to economic and social development, or projects aiming at cultural and education exchange to reduce hostilities (para. 57); and de-mining (para. 58). Post-conflict peacebuilding, hence, reflected the expanding notion of international security at the time, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, was moving beyond the ‘traditional’ strict concern with military security to include a broad range of activities in the social and economic spheres.

A key aspect of the document is the strong association of peacebuilding with the promotion of democracy internationally. This relationship is addressed in the last of the five paragraphs in the section dedicated to post-conflict peacebuilding and it is justified by an explicit reference to the core idea of the liberal democratic peace framework. The full paragraph reads as follows:

There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. *There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.* These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities. (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 59; emphasis added)

During an interview with Boutros-Ghali (2013), the former Secretary-General ascertained that the connection between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ stemmed from the philosophical writings of Immanuel Kant. As such, he continued, “this is not a new idea” – at least as a *theoretical construct*. In *An Agenda for Peace*, however, the connection appeared simplified

and politicised as a view that required political action: since there is such an *obvious connection* between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’, the former should be promoted to achieve the latter. And judging by the fact that the rationale is articulated in this particular section of the Secretary-General’s report, the promotion of democracy should be carried out via post-conflict peacebuilding in societies emerging from armed conflict.

The same argument connecting ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ generally and, in particular, ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘democratisation’ in post-armed conflict situations, would be repeated a few months later in Boutros-Ghali’s first report on the work of the Organisation. In the document, he expressed his view that the “United Nations must foster, through its peace-building measures, the process of democratization in situations characterized by long-standing conflicts, both within and among nations” (UN Doc. A/47/1: para. 166). The argument would continue to be pushed forward in the following years, especially as he issued two other agendas: *An Agenda for Development* in 1994 and *An Agenda for Democratization* in 1996. In the former, Boutros-Ghali argued that “democracy provides the only long-term basis for managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a way that minimizes the risk of violent internal conflict” (UN Doc. A/48/935: para. 120). In the latter, he claimed that the promotion of democratisation internationally “amounts to nothing less than peacebuilding at the international level, in the aftermath of the cold war” (UN Doc. A/51/761, 1996: para. 115).

The underlying meaning of ‘democracy’ in Boutros-Ghali’s post-conflict peacebuilding

The tacit endorsement and use of the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* in Boutros-Ghali’s rhetoric and in *An Agenda for Peace* entailed particular meanings of ‘democracy’ and of how to promote it in post-armed conflict situations. ‘Democracy’, according to the former-Secretary-General, is fundamentally a “tool” to ensure that “decisions are not taken by one person”, but rather by the majority, reflecting “different points of view” (Boutros-Ghali, 2013). Some of the core constitutive elements of democracy in this view include “human rights, equal rights, and government under law” (Boutros-Ghali, 2003b: 540), “strong domestic institutions of participation” (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 81) as well as “informed citizens” (Boutros-Ghali, 2003g: 614). It requires, moreover, “elections”, “independent justice”, “division of power” and limitations on how long elected rulers can remain in power (Boutros-Ghali, 2013).

According to this understanding, democracy is present at both the national and the international levels. At the national level, it can assume “many forms and differ from culture to culture”, but it may be “be found in all parts of the world, and in many different philosophies and religions” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 3). Democracy is, hence, “an ideal [that] belongs to all of humanity” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 3). Internationally, Boutros-Ghali (1995: 9) believed that democracy had lagged behind sovereignty, but there were some instances where it might emerge. For instance, based on his understanding of democracy, Boutros-Ghali alluded to the democratic nature of the UN by contending that “[w]hether or not its Member States are democracies themselves, they are joined in a structure of equal representation” (Boutros-Ghali, 2003b: 540).

Boutros-Ghali’s understanding of ‘democracy’ is thus closer to the one that essentially equates democracy with the rule of the people, as outlined in the previous chapter (see Haack, 2011: 16-23). It does presuppose elements contained in the substantive conceptualisation of democracies (e.g. division of powers), but it overemphasises the procedural and institutional elements of democracy, particularly the holding of elections. This understanding underlies Boutros-Ghali’s reading of the initial words of the Preamble of the UN Charter (“We the peoples of the United Nations”), which he would later take to infer that the “notion of democracy” was “central to the foundational document of the United Nations” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 3; see also Rushton, 2008: 100-102). The same rationale supports his reading of the UN as ‘democratic’ due to the equal representation of member states in terms of votes, outlined above. Finally, in his *An Agenda for Democratization*, which was released in his last days in office, after years of refinement in different public statements and texts, ‘democracy’ was defined in terms of “a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people”(UN Doc. A/51/761: para. 1). And democracy was an important aspect of peace because “[i]ndividual involvement in the political process enhances the accountability and responsiveness of government. Governments which are responsive and accountable are likely to be stable and to promote peace” (UN Doc. A/51/761: para. 64). For Boutros-Ghali, in sum, the essence of democracy lies in the rule of the majority; it is a minimalist-procedural form of democracy.

Based on this understanding, Boutros-Ghali argued for the promotion of democracies at different levels, nationally and internationally, that is, of promoting

democracies “within member states” and “among member states”, respectively (Boutros-Ghali, 2013; see also UNIHP, 2007a: 32-35, 1995; UN Docs. A/51/761: paras. 63-65; A/47/277-S/24111: para. 81-82; A/46/PV.59: 17). The difference between the two, hence, was not one of essence, but of scope. At the national level, the promotion of democracy was intrinsically associated with the promotion of development, as it was an “an essential and indispensable stage in the economic and social development of nations” (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 16). In articulating his idea of promoting democratic values both ‘within’ and ‘among’ states at the international level, Boutros-Ghali highlighted that this was a mutual process: “[t]he democratisation of international relations should complete and amplify the democratisation of national institutions. This dual process can create a new dynamic for national peace and stability, which is as important as international peace and stability” (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 17). In this formulation, the strengthening of “fundamental freedoms and democratic institutions” (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 17), which was part of the new role envisaged for the UN, was hence related to the maintenance of peace at both the national and the international levels.

An Agenda for Peace thus embodies the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from *public convention* to *political conviction* in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s, epitomising the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in that particular context as the promotion of a minimalist version of democracies as a remedy to the challenges faced by societies affected by armed conflicts. Hence, rather than simply explaining or providing an analytical framework – albeit a politicised and simplified one – for understanding the absence of armed conflicts between liberal/democratic regimes, the liberal democratic peace also provided the basis upon which individuals in the UN *milieu* understood phenomena in world politics and how they positioned themselves *vis-à-vis* the variety of available courses of political action. Over the following years, as explored in Chapter 5, the liberal democratic peace would thus become minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu*. Accordingly, as a *political conviction* that requires political action, the liberal democratic peace would gradually also serve to motivate, legitimate, justify and enact concrete peacebuilding initiatives carried out by the Organisation in post-armed conflict scenarios.

The academic foundations of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’

From the narrative above, it becomes clear that the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* was essentially a by-product of in-house efforts in the Secretariat. It should be stressed, however, that the drafters of the report regularly interacted with and received input, directly or indirectly, formally or informally, from other individuals in the UN *milieu*, including scholars. Indirectly, inputs were received, for instance, via research carried out by the members of the Task Force to support their analyses, as illustrated by the abovementioned note dated 23 March 1992 (see Kanninen, 1992a), which was prepared by Kanninen with a compilation of data on armed conflicts and provided the basis for the ‘changing context’ section of *An Agenda for Peace* (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: paras. 8-19). Directly, the Task Force received input from other individuals in the UN *milieu*, such as during the aforementioned meeting at the Ford Foundation early in April 1992 (see Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, 1992b). Michael Doyle (2012), then Senior Fellow and future Vice-President of the then International Peace Academy (IPA),⁶⁷ also recalls a similar event held at the New York-based think tank to brainstorm ideas for the upcoming report of the Secretary-General. Those instances are important because they help to trace the process through which an academic discourse (theories on the liberal/democratic peace) was converted into a non-academic discourse while it migrated to public spheres.

Among those instances, the aforementioned background note dated 23 March 1992 is of the utmost importance for tracing the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from academe to the UN *milieu*. Over the course of the workings of the Task Force, Petrovsky decided at some point that all references to academic works or policy proposals should be eliminated from drafts and documents produced in connection with the future report of the Secretary-General (Kanninen, 2012). In the context of the immediate end of the cold war, the decision was obviously related to fears that proposals originated from one of the former East or West blocks could be opposed by the other. Despite Petrovsky’s directive, and for unknown reasons, the aforementioned background note dated 23 March 1992 does explicitly mention not only the sources used in its preparations, but also a lengthy endnote explaining the origins of the sources (Annex C). The note thus assumes a rather great importance within

⁶⁷ In 2008, the IPA was renamed International Peace Institute (IPI).

the context of an in-depth research on the process leading to the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace*.

The endnote of the document explains that the sources therein used were mainly produced by North-American or US-based scholars who mostly “came from the so-called quantitative school of international relations that remained committed to the United Nations throughout the dark days of the Cold War” (Kanninen, 1992a: endnote 1). Contact with those scholars had been made mainly via the extinct ORCI, which had been led by Jonah and de Soto, and where Kanninen and Ramcharan had worked in the past. As the organ responsible for activities such as research and drafting texts for the Secretary-General, ORCI had been in constant contact with academics during its brief five years of existence (1987-1992). Amongst the scholars with whom ORCI had contact and which are explicitly cited in the elaboration of the 23 March 1992 note, one finds, among others: Bruce Russett (Yale University), Lincoln Bloomfield and Hayward Alker (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT), Ernst Haas (University of California at Berkeley), J. David Singer (University of Michigan) and Peter Wallensteen (Uppsala University) (Kanninen, 1992a: endnote 1). The note itself does not refer to theories about the liberal/democratic peace, but the name of Bruce Russett as a ‘contact scholar’ demonstrates that individuals in the Task Force, at least the ones with previous experience in the ORCI, were probably familiar with his earlier ideas about the connection between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’.

In addition to ORCI, Russett’s participation in the so-called War Risk Reduction Project represents another door through which theories about the liberal/democratic peace may have made their way into the Secretary-General’s report. The origins of the War Risk Reduction Project were laid out in 1984-1985, when a few officials in the UN Secretariat started to get together with scholars to discuss some of the major issues related to the UN practice in the area of international peace and security.⁶⁸ Since there was not much dialogue between the USA and the USSR at the time, one of the main concerns of the project was to engage academics and policymakers from both superpowers through a conference on conflict prevention and nuclear war prevention (Kanninen, 2012). Their ambition was to create closer relationships between academics and policymakers from both sides with a view

⁶⁸ James Sutterlin authorised and Jean Krasno facilitated my access to some files and paper records of the War Risk Reduction Project. I am indebted to their invaluable support and attention since long before I visited Yale University to analyse those documents.

to discuss and come up with proposals and recommendations to make the UN work more effectively in preventing an eventual nuclear war (Sutterlin, 2012a; Krasno, 2012). Participants in the project could not yet predict the end of the cold war, but a short while later, after Gorbachev ascended to power in the Soviet Union, some of them sensed an emerging context in which change could be possible (Krasno, 2012).

By the time of their first preliminary meeting at Yale University in 1984/1985, some of the individuals involved in the project included: James Sutterlin, Tapio Kanninen and David Biggs, from the UN Secretariat; Bruce Russett and Paul Bracken, from Yale University; Thomas Boudreau, from the School for International Training; David Cox, from Queen's University (Canada); Raimo Väyrynen, then at the University of Helsinki (Finland); and James F. Tierney and Jean Krasno, from non-governmental organisation The Fund for Peace (Sutterlin, 2012a, 2012b; Kanninen, 2012; Krasno, 2012).⁶⁹ Those individuals initially constituted what they called the 'Core Group' of the War Risk Reduction Project. Some of them remained close for years in terms of academic interest on the UN and of research agendas (Sutterlin, 2012a, 2012b; Krasno, 2012).

When Sutterlin retired from the UN in 1987, he became a fellow at Yale University and had more time to lead the Core Group (Krasno, 2005). He thus went on to expand the scope of the War Risk Reduction Project beyond conflict prevention and to organise several conferences on other topics in both sides of the 'iron curtain', including, for instance, in Canada, Poland and Ukraine (Sutterlin, 2012b). Those conferences were important not only for providing an opportunity for exchanges between scholars and UN officials, but also for exchanges between ideas and proposals coming from the West and some more progressive officials under Gorbachev. In the conferences organised by the Core Group in the late 1980s, some participants from the then Soviet Union included, for instance: Vladimir Petrovsky, then Deputy Minister in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and later Chair of Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General); and Andrei Kozyrev, who would become the Russian Foreign Minister under Boris Yeltsin in 1991.⁷⁰ As summarised by Bruce Russett in the foreword to one of Sutterlin's books, those conferences "brought together scholars and

⁶⁹ There are several correspondences between those individuals in the files of the War Risk Reduction Project.

⁷⁰ The reports of the conferences held in Poland and Canada were published as Cox *et al.* (1989) and International Security and Arms Control (1989), respectively. Both reports include lists of participants and the former, in addition, contains the speech delivered by Petrovsky on the occasion.

policymakers who, perhaps to their surprise, found they had much to share, in terms of experience, ideas, and a growing sense that some enhancement of the UN's role in international peace and security might indeed be feasible" (Russett *apud* Sutterlin, 2003: viii).

Whereas it is not my intention to assess the project or its accomplishments, three points must be stressed. The first point is that there is compelling evidence that the discussions carried out within the framework of the War Risk Reduction Project reached out to those involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace*. Interaction between the two groups may not have been through official channels or carried out openly, and many of the drafters of the report may not even have been aware of the existence of the Yale-based project. However, in addition to Petrovsky, who participated in some activities of the War Risk Reduction Project, two of its core members (Sutterlin and Kanninen) were also involved in the drafting of the Secretary-General's report. As such, it seems only natural that they would take this opportunity to circulate ideas between the two groups – which they did. Kanninen (2012) notes that several of the concrete proposals he outlined in advance of Task Force meetings had previously been discussed within the framework of the War Risk Reduction Project. Sutterlin (2012a) also recalls building upon some of the discussions and proposals outlined within the framework of the Project to inform his drafting of Boutros-Ghali's report. Both of them thus served as links between the two groups, between academe and policy-makers in the UN *milieu*. Furthermore, there were also less direct exchanges between the two groups, as illustrated by the note dated 23 March 2013 (Annex C), which was circulated for members of the Task Force and cited directly one member of the Yale-based project: Bruce Russett.

Consequently, the second point to be stressed is that individuals involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* in different stages were not unfamiliar with the empirical observation that democracies rarely fought with each other. Evidence here is plenty. First, as aforementioned, Russett appears as 'contact scholar' of ORCI on the 23 March 1992 note. As aforementioned, he had not yet published *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, his major statement on the subject, but he had by then already published academic journal articles that would be relevant for his future research agenda. As such, members of the Task, at least those in the ORCI, were presumably acquainted with the connection between 'democracy' and 'peace' in academic circles. Second, individuals involved in the Core Group were also

familiar with the democratic peace thesis. In a letter dated 28 January 1991, contained in the records of the War Risk Reduction Project, Sutterlin expresses to a Soviet scholar his interest in promoting a conference on the UN role in strengthening democratic processes under the framework of the War Risk Reduction Project. Among the subjects tentatively proposed to be covered in the conference, there is one that reads “Democracy and Peace – The Encouragement of Democratic Trends as within the Mandate of the UN for the Preservation of Peace – A Viable Assumption?” (Sutterlin, 1991).

A third illustrative instance that individuals involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* were aware of the academic claim that democracies do not fight each other refers to informal interactions between Sutterlin and Russett, who were both based at Yale University around the same time. According to interviews with Russett (2012) and Sutterlin (2012a, 2012b), Russett’s research on the liberal/democratic peace was not carried out within the framework of the War Risk Reduction Project. Sutterlin and Russett, however, shared similar academic interests in what concerns the UN and multilateralism⁷¹ and constantly exchanged views about their academic works, including on Russett’s on-going work towards the formulation of explanations for the liberal/democratic peace. Russett (2012) recalls, for instance, that Sutterlin encouraged him to flesh out the connections underlying his theory at an early stage. Sutterlin was aware of the connection between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ when he became involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* – and he believed it in its validity (Sutterlin, 2012a). All those instances highlight that individuals in the War Risk Reduction Project and those involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* were indeed aware of the connection between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ in academic circles.

The final point worth of stress is that within the framework of the War Risk Reduction Project, the idea of ‘peacebuilding’ emerged before the public release of *An Agenda for Peace* and that it was somehow connected with proposals for the innovative use of UN peacekeeping operations. Sutterlin (2012a) notes that in the late 1980s, those proposals were not clearly articulated in terms of ‘peacebuilding’ in discussions within the framework of the Project, but that they were already framed according to the understanding that “in order for peacekeeping to ultimately be successful, it has to be combined with social and economic measures that would provide a sounder basis for peace in the future”. The

⁷¹ They even co-authored journal articles about the United Nations, one of which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* about a year before the release of *An Agenda for Peace* (see Russett *et al.*, 1996; Russett and Sutterlin, 1991).

formulation points to a departure from the ‘traditional’ understanding of peacekeeping as primarily a military endeavour focusing primarily on ‘hard’ security aspects, as it was the case during most of the cold war years.

The explicit allusion to ‘peacebuilding’ within the framework of the Yale-based project was made by Sutterlin in May 1992, a month before the public release of *An Agenda for Peace*. In that month, Sutterlin published a paper referring to peacebuilding as an “amorphous” concept that meant “strengthening the bases for peaceful societies and for peace among nations” (Sutterlin, 1992a: 14). With such a vague understanding, he argued that peacebuilding could potentially cover a wide range of “well-meaning platitudes”, from education to economic development (Sutterlin, 1992a: 14). According to him, one of the areas in which the UN peacebuilding support could make a difference was the strengthening of democratic processes. This was justified by the author on the basis that

[d]omestically, freely elected governments tend to be responsive to the will of the people and therefore show respect for the human rights of the population. Internationally, [because] *in the modern era democratic countries have, almost without exception, not fought against other democratic countries.* (Sutterlin, 1992a: 14; emphasis added)

As elaborated in the previous section, the concept of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ in Boutros-Ghali’s report bears a clear resemblance with the conceptualisation of ‘peacebuilding’ in Sutterlin’s text of May 1992. Sutterlin (1992a), however, at no point referred to peacebuilding as a ‘post-conflict’ endeavour, whereas Boutros-Ghali restricted the scope of his concept in *An Agenda for Peace* to the aftermath of armed conflicts. Furthermore, the passage quoted above shows that Sutterlin’s understanding of peacebuilding included a component of democracy promotion based on a simplified version of the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct*, which would also underlie Boutros-Ghali’s ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’.

Reviewing the debate on the origins of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’

Identifying the direct influences of academic research in reports of the Secretary-General is not a direct and straightforward exercise because those documents usually do not bear references to the sources of data and ideas they reproduce. In the case of *An Agenda for Peace*, it becomes even more difficult to identify such influences because references to academic sources or authorship of previous policy proposals were deliberately omitted even in draft versions of the document, as requested by Petrovsky. By delving at length into the

circumstances under which *An Agenda for Peace* was produced, as well as into its drafting process, however, this and the previous chapter offer a detailed backdrop against which one may identify the influence of academic scholarship into the concept of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ advanced by the UN Secretary-General early in the 1990s.

As outlined in the Introduction of this thesis, there are two contending views about the origins of ‘peacebuilding’ in *An Agenda for Peace*. The first view holds that the concept was a brainchild of Boutros-Ghali and as such, unrelated to Galtung’s earlier concept (e.g. Jenkins, 2013: 19; Karns, 2012: 72; David, 2002: 20; Boutros-Ghali, 2002: 72). The second view, on the other hand, holds that Boutros-Ghali’s definition stemmed from Galtung’s concept in the tradition of peace studies, as implied or directly referred to in several academic (e.g., Ponzio, 2011: footnote 1 of Introduction; Väyrynen, 2010: 139; Chetail, 2009: 2; Call and Wyeth, 2008: 4; Trenkov-Wermuth, 2007: 44; Call and Cook, 2003: 235; Richmond, 2002: footnote 5 of Ch. 5; Ramsbotham, 2000: 171; Pugh, 1995: 321) and policy-oriented writings (PBSO, 2010: 5). Based on the narrative constructed in this and in the previous chapter, this section partially deconstructs and partially corroborates both views, arguing that ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ may indeed bear Galtung’s label of ‘peacebuilding’, but that the meaning of both concepts is remarkably different.

The narrative herein constructed corroborates the first view to the extent that the concept of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ was largely shaped by Boutros-Ghali and his views on democracy and democratisation, as discussed in the previous sections. As such, it may be said that, as it appeared in *An Agenda for Peace*, the meaning of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ was heavily shaped by the former Secretary-General. This is not to say, however, that the former Secretary-General “coined” the term peacebuilding in a moment of “conceptual epiphany” during a trip to “South America” (Karns, 2012: 72) or “at 30,000 feet, en route to examine progress on various Central American peace accords” (Jenkins, 2013: 19). In fact, as explored in the first section of this chapter, there are documents in the personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force attesting that Boutros-Ghali was involved in discussions about the ‘5Ps’, which included peacebuilding. Furthermore, in addition to the term itself, an attempt had been made to define peacebuilding in the first preliminary draft produced by the Task Force, which Boutros-Ghali read and commented. Boutros-Ghali, hence, had

already been introduced to ‘peacebuilding’ by the time he allegedly created the concept of ‘peacebuilding’.⁷²

As for the second view about the origins of ‘peacebuilding’ in *An Agenda for Peace*, it is corroborated to the extent that the concepts of Galtung and Boutros-Ghali both bear the label of ‘peacebuilding’ in their core. The use of the term may be a result of personal acquaintances and familiarity with the earlier writings of Galtung. In fact, some individuals involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* knew Galtung and were familiar with his work. According to an interview with Galtung (2012), he and Boutros-Ghali had met in 1971, during his stay as Visiting Professor at the University of Cairo, in Egypt, where the future Secretary-General taught international law and politics between 1949 and 1977.⁷³ Similarly, as Galtung was one of the most reputed social scientists from the Nordic countries at that time, he was also known to Kanninen, a national of Finland: they had both met in person before Kanninen was appointed secretary of Boutros-Ghali’s Task Force (Kanninen, 2012, 2013). Notwithstanding personal acquaintances and familiarity with Galtung’s work, Kanninen, who acted as secretary of the Task Force and who was largely involved in its drafting, does not recall any discussion about Galtung’s work within the framework of the Task Force. Moreover, he does not believe that Galtung’s concept of ‘peacebuilding’ had any particular and direct influence in the thinking about ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ in connection with Boutros-Ghali’s report (Kanninen, 2013). Nevertheless, *An Agenda for Peace* addresses the ‘three approaches to peace’ outlined by Galtung (1976), which cannot

⁷² The record of Boutros-Ghali’s travels in the first half of 1992 also raises questions about the historical accuracy of this first view. According to those records (see Hill, 2003: Appendix 2), Boutros-Ghali made only one trip in connection with the Central American peace accords in that period: he visited Mexico on 15-16 January 1992 to sign the Salvadorian peace accord, and then El Salvador, on 16-17 January 1992, to visit the Headquarters of ONUSAL. He also travelled to Colombia on 7-10 February 1992 for a meeting with the President in connection with the eighth UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which might have included considerations about Central American peace accords given Colombia’s position as a member of the Contadora Group. Whereas the first travel occurred before the Security Council meeting of 31 January 1992, the second took place too shortly afterwards, so it is unlikely that the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ was created in either of those trips. Similarly, Boutros-Ghali only travelled to anywhere in South America again in June: he was in Brazil for the opening and closing of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) on 1-4 June 1992 and on 8-14 June 1992; and he paid an official visit to Uruguay between 4 and 8 June 1992. By the time he made this last trip, the Task Force had already produced the preliminary draft paper bearing the term and a definition of ‘peacebuilding’.

⁷³ Galtung recalls that Boutros-Ghali helped to promote a community plan he designed for the Middle East at the time. In fact, according to Venturi (2009: 290), Boutros-Ghali requested permission to translate into Arabic an article in which Galtung argued for a two-state solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Boutros-Ghali’s years at the University of Cairo, see UNIHP (2007a: 6, 11).

be understood as a simple coincidence given the aforementioned personal acquaintances and Galtung's reputation in academic circles.

Regardless of whether a direct connection exists in what concerns the label 'peacebuilding' in the two concepts, the narrative constructed in this and in the previous chapter challenges the second view about the origins of 'peacebuilding' in *An Agenda for Peace* by looking more deeply into its meaning – and into the process that constructed this meaning. The analysis carried out in the previous sections shows that the meaning of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' in *An Agenda for Peace* was more closely influenced by the academic scholarship on the democratic peace thesis than by the Nordic school of peace studies. This influence was seen particularly via interactions with individuals who were aware and believed on the validity of the thesis, and who had a direct role in the drafting of Boutros-Ghali's report. In the document, 'post-conflict peacebuilding' is heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* and is closely associated with the promotion of liberal/democratic states in post-armed conflict situations. Understood as such, 'post-conflict peacebuilding' bears a rather narrow meaning in comparison with the earlier version advanced by Galtung (1976, see also 1975). As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Galtung's understanding of peacebuilding was directly opposed to structural violence and as such, its main concern was the elimination of the deepest causes of armed conflicts (Galtung, 1976: 297) rather than the promotion of liberal democracies in its minimal-procedural connotation. In Galtung's writings, consequently, peacebuilding is related to the promotion of social justice or positive peace'. In sum, despite similarities in their labels, the meanings underlying Boutros-Ghali's concept of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' and Galtung's concept of 'peacebuilding' are therefore remarkably different.

Conclusions

This and the previous chapter demonstrated that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as a hermeneutical mechanism of attaching meanings to political concepts. Formulated primarily in the restricted circles of academia, the understanding that liberal/democratic societies do not or rarely fight each other migrated to the public spheres in a simplified and politicised version following the convergence of intricately related material and ideational aspects by the late 1980s and early 1990s. This migration was triggered and made possible by key individuals in the UN milieu, most especially Boutros

Boutros-Ghali, in connection with his efforts in linking ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’ to rhetorically justify and legitimate his views on democratisation. In *An Agenda for Peace*, however, the connection made between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ was not incidental: it was used with the political aim of legitimating and justifying the UN role in ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, most particularly in what concerns the support to electoral processes. This and the previous chapter, in sum, explored the process of conversion of the liberal democratic peace framework from *theoretical construct* to *public convention* to *political conviction*.

To demonstrate that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as hermeneutical mechanism, I carried out an in-depth analysis and constructed a narrative about the drafting of Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace*. In addition to providing a more nuanced understanding of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu* at a critical moment in the early 1990s, my narrative challenged two other views about the origins of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN: one holding that Boutros-Ghali created the concept from scratch during one of his official travels as Secretary-General; and another claiming that Boutros-Ghali’s concept stemmed fully from the earlier academic writings of Johan Galtung. By recasting the origins of peacebuilding in new light, this narrative thus associate the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ more closely to academic writings in the democratic peace scholarship. It is worth noting that it was not the academic theories per se that influenced and gave meaning to peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace*, but rather a simplified and politicised version of those theories, one that entailed a strong view in need of concrete political action. The narrative herein constructed is thus one of the key original contributions of this thesis to contemporary scholarship on peacebuilding.

The concept of ‘peacebuilding’ that appeared in Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* was informed by a strong and entrenched view (the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*) about the promotion of liberal/democratic societies as a remedy to the challenges faced by societies affected by armed conflict. The liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* frames understandings about phenomena in world politics and consequently influences how individuals position themselves *via-à-via* several possible courses of political action. Moreover, as a strong and opinionated view, the liberal democratic peace requires political action. Hence, in the United Nations of the early 1990s, the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ informed by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* was gradually used to motivate, legitimate, justify and enact one particular course

of action: the promotion of a minimalist version of democracies as a remedy to the challenges faced by societies affected by armed conflict. The following chapter explores how this liberally inspired version of ‘peacebuilding’ became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu* following the release of *An Agenda for Peace*, thus serving as the main framework underlying most of the UN peace operations deployed in post-armed conflict situations throughout the 1990s.

Chapter 5

Towards UN liberal democratic peacebuilding(s)

We have only to look at the mandates given to the United Nations forces to see the connection which the Organization is making, at the operational level and in the most concrete terms possible, between peace-keeping, the establishment of democracy, and the safeguarding of human rights.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Statement at the opening of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 June 1993 (2003f: 682)

Introduction

The concept of ‘peacebuilding’ entered the United Nations heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace. It was essentially based on the *political conviction* that a minimalist-procedural sort of democracy should be promoted in societies affected by armed conflict with a view to achieve peace – a liberal/democratic peace (as a concept). This particular connotation of liberal democratic peacebuilding was embodied in Boutros-Ghali’s report *An Agenda for Peace* and was constructed out of a simplified and politicised version of academic theories about the liberal/democratic peace, as I explored in Chapters 3 and 4.

In this chapter, I argue that this liberal democratic version of ‘peacebuilding’ became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu* from the early 1990s onwards, gradually informing how individuals understood ‘peacebuilding’ and offering the rationale for the promotion of liberal democracies in post-armed conflict situations. As a *political conviction*, however, the liberal democratic peace is not immutable and its meaning is not fixed. Rather, as discussed in Chapter 3, the meaning assumed by the liberal democratic peace framework is dependent upon the meanings of its core concepts: ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’. Hence, I further argue in this chapter that whereas the liberal democratic peace framework remained the main referential for how ‘peacebuilding’ was understood by individuals in the UN *milieu*

and carried out by the United Nations, its meaning gradually moved away from the promotion of a minimalist, procedural, version of ‘liberal democracy’ towards a maximalist, substantive, version of ‘liberal democracy’. Either in its minimalist or maximalist version, the *political conviction* of the liberal democratic peace served to motivate, legitimate, justify and enact concrete ‘peacebuilding’ initiatives carried out by the United Nations in the field since the release of *An Agenda for Peace*.

This and the following two chapters explore the trajectory of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu* from the early 1990s to the present. This chapter focuses on the period spanning from the release of *An Agenda for Peace* to 2004, one year before the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF. The following section explores the factors facilitating the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace as the minimally intelligible meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in and around the UN following the release of *An Agenda for Peace*. The two subsequent sections explore the UN approach to ‘peacebuilding’ under Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, respectively. The analysis herein carried out reinforces Charles Call’s argument that ‘peacebuilding’ was progressively expanded over the years in terms of scope, phases and activities that ought to be undertaken by the Organisation, particularly in post-armed conflict situations (Call, 2004: 3; see also Call and Cousens, 2008: 3). This expansion took place as the core concept of ‘liberal democracy’ that constitutes the liberal democratic peace framework moved away from a minimalist, procedural, to a maximalist, substantive, understanding. Whereas this reflected different views on ‘liberal democracy’ and how to promote it, the UN approach to peacebuilding remained nevertheless influenced by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* during the whole period under review.

Factors facilitating the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace in the UN *milieu*

The strong Western, liberal, imprint found at the most basic level of the Organisation’s ideational framework and its previous experience in providing support to democratic processes via peacekeeping operations facilitated the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace as the minimally intelligible meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s. This section briefly outlines those two sets of aspects before discussing the different meanings of ‘liberal democratic peacebuilding’ in the United Nations from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s.

The deep core of the United Nations ideational substrate

A good starting point to identify and understand the elements in the deep core of the UN ideational substrate are the worldviews upon which the United Nations itself was founded. Essentially, they resemble the Western European experience of inter-state relations and multilateral institutional arrangements since the seventeenth century. This is not to say that different views did not (co-)exist: Hilderbrand (1990), Plokhy (2010) and Schlesinger (2003), for instance, provide detailed and well-informed accounts of the negotiations in Dumbarton Oaks (August-October 1944), Yalta (February 1945) and San Francisco (April-June 1945), respectively. The narratives offered by the three authors identify contending views on a range of topics related to what would later become the United Nations, such as, for instance, the number and the exact prerogatives of the future permanent members of the Security Council.⁷⁴

In essence, however, the UN constitutive treaty agreed upon in 1945 ultimately reflects views and experiences that include, but are not limited to: the practice of great power management, particularly as embodied by the Concert of Europe; the Austinian legal positivism and the Grotian natural law tradition, which sought to create stability and reduce uncertainty in inter-state relations; the notions of pacific settlement of disputes, disarmament and collective security, all of them mechanisms that experienced attempts of global institutionalisation after the Hague Conferences; self-defence, following earlier attempts to make illegal the threat or the use of force in inter-states relations; the tenets of non-intervention and state sovereignty, which conditioned Western inter-states relations for centuries following the treaties of Westphalia; the practice of multilateral meetings convened to address common problems; and the legacy of functionalism, particularly as advanced by the experience of technical and specialised international entities created during the nineteenth century (Knight, 2000: 61-81). Those legacies, elements found at the deep core of the UN ideational substrate, provided the basis for the establishment and the subsequent functioning of the Organisation itself.

The legacies outlined above are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations (1945), particularly in its Preamble, Purposes (Article 1) and Principles (Article 2) . The first

⁷⁴ A good summary is also found in Luard (1982: 17-68).

is considered an integral part of the Charter, serving as a “statement of motivating ideas and purposes that the members of the Organization have in mind” (Goodrich *et al.*, 1969: 20). It is in the Preamble that one reads the widely quoted remark that the United Nations was founded to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. At the same time, the Purposes stated in Article 1 offer the basis for the interpretation of the obligations derived from the Principles outlined in Article 2; in other words, “the principles [Article 2] provide the means to achieve the purposes [Article 1]” (Simma *et al.*, 2012: 122).⁷⁵ For instance, whereas Article 1(1) defines the primary purpose of the Organisation as the maintenance of “international peace and security”, this purpose must be pursued in accordance with the respect to the principle of state sovereignty, as contained in Article 2(1). Considered together, in sum, the three parts offer a “guide” (Simma *et al.*, 2012: 108), the “standards of conduct” (Goodrich *et al.*, 1969: 36) for the United Nations.

The Preamble, Purposes and Principles reflect the abovementioned understandings about world politics, about the United Nations and about its role in the world, while at the same time they create the basis for the existence and functioning of the Organisation itself. The functioning of the Security Council, for instance, is shaped and constrained by the Purposes and Principles to the extent that the Council must act in accordance with them while “discharging [its] duties” (Article 24(2)). The Preamble, Articles 1 and 2 may also constitute the basis for decisions taken by such organs: the General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions that operationalized the Peacebuilding Commission, for instance, were “guided” (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: 1; S/RES/1645: 1) by the United Nations Purposes and Principles. The Preamble, Purposes and Principles are thus a constant feature of the activities of the Organisation, even if they are not always visible at first sight. They constitute, as such, part of the United Nations ideational substrate and they were conceived based on worldviews and experiences that are typically characteristic of Western, liberal, inter-state relations.

In order to fulfil its primary purpose, the United Nations was built upon a system of collective security whose assumptions and design are also very telling about the macro views on world politics held by the delegates that met in San Francisco in 1945.

⁷⁵ This understanding also underlies the words of Edward Stettinius, the Head of the US Delegation in the San Francisco conference. When reporting back to the US President about the outcome of the conference, he remarked that the Purposes “are binding on the Organization, its organs, and its agencies, indicating the direction their activities should take and the limitations within which their activities should proceed” (Stettinius *apud* Goodrich *et al.*, 1969: 25).

Conceptually, collective security refers to a complex system of pledged commitments made by states in a community of states that is intended to protect themselves in case of aggression from another member of that community (Claude Jr., 1964: 223-260).⁷⁶ In such a system, all members of that community, even those “not directly violated in their rights” (Kelsen, 1948: 784), are obliged to provide assistance to the one under assault. In other words, in a system of collective security, any aggression or attack directed to a member state is considered as an attack to all – hence the resemblance with the maxim of ‘one for all, and all for one’.

The UN system of collective security is centred on the Security Council and on the provisions of the Charter, particularly those contained in Chapters VI and VII. The Security Council has the “primary responsibility” for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24). Its structures reflect the power disparities of the post-World War II, as the then major powers (USA, United Kingdom, France, USSR and China) were not only given a permanent seat at the Council, but also benefited from constitutional prerogatives that essentially granted each and all of them the power to reject proposals they disapproved – the so-called ‘veto power’, as outlined in Article 27(3).⁷⁷ Chapters VI and VII outline several courses of action available for the Council in the discharge of its duties. The former refers to mechanisms available for the pacific settlement of disputes, including, amongst others, negotiation, mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement. If and when such measures fail or are deemed inadequate, and where it is determined the existence of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39), the Council may then adopt the stronger measures outlined in Chapter VII. Those gradually range from non-forceful actions, such as the interruption of economic relations (Article 41), to others “as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 42). The wording of the latter article, in practice, grants the Council the power to authorise the use of force under specific circumstances defined as such by the Council itself.

⁷⁶ Weiss *et al.* (2007: 4-5) depict the concept of collective security as an expansion of the notion of collective self-defence, where states may use force to protect themselves from an external attack. A system of collective security should thus not be confused with a system of collective self-defence.

⁷⁷ For in-depth analyses of Art. 27, see Simma *et al.* (2012: 911-927) and Goodrich *et al.* (1969: 215-231). This arrangement was a significant departure from the system of collective security of the League of Nations, where the organ assigned responsibilities on peace and security matters worked on the basis of consensus (Goodrich, 1947: esp. 16-18).

One of the measures currently available for the Security Council in discharging its duties refers to the establishment and deployment of peace operations, currently understood as “[f]ield operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence” (DPKO and DFS, 2008: 98). Such operations were not foreseen in the Charter, but developed over the years out of the observation missions and peacekeeping operations established by the Security Council – and less frequently the General Assembly – on different circumstances since the early days of the UN.⁷⁸ Originally established with purposes such as the interposition of belligerent parties, the Council later gave peace operations powers to carry out a plethora of complex tasks in the military, political, social and economic domains.⁷⁹

Early ‘multi-dimensional’ peacekeeping operations

The second set of aspects facilitating the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace framework as the minimally intelligible meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN in the early 1990s refers to the peacekeeping operations deployed to carry out ‘multi-dimensional’ activities during Pérez de Cuéllar’s second mandate (1987-1991). The first of such operations was the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, a territory under South Africa’s administration that was officially known as South West Africa. The region had long suffered from colonial exploitation and from the dynamics inherent to the cold war, but from the 1960s onwards, it would also experience armed violence between local armed groups fighting for independence (Adebajo, 2011: 104-110; Howard, 2002: 100-102). With the involvement of Western powers and the UN in negotiations for the independence of Namibia, a peace settlement plan was eventually agreed in 1978. The plan called for the establishment of a UN operation tasked with overseeing elections for a Constituent Assembly and supervising the transition to independence (Fortna, 1993b: 355). Responsibility for the overall electoral process, including administering the actual casting of ballots, would remain with South Africa’s Administrator General for the territory, although the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) could “make proposals in regard to any aspect of the political process” (UN Doc. S/12636: para. 5).

⁷⁸ For good overviews on the origins of peacekeeping and on early operations, see, among others, Bellamy *et al.* (2010: 71-92), Berdal (2008a), Fetherston (1994: 8-16), Goulding (1993) and Diehl (1993: 14-31).

⁷⁹ For a list of UN peace operations since 1948, see Annex B.

As mediation and negotiation over the plan for settling the conflict were lengthy and difficult, UNTAG was deployed only in 1989. Notwithstanding the prolonged wait, the operation, unlike its cold war predecessors, was mandated to carry out tasks in spheres other than the essentially military, including support for the electoral process and, for the first time, the use of civilian police monitoring (Adebajo, 2011: 111). UNTAG's mandate performed activities in three main areas: monitoring elections, the South African police and the cease-fire (Fortna, 1993b: 360). Overall, despite failure to deter a military incursion led by the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), the mission's performance was highly praised. According to Fortna:

In many ways, UNTAG was the first operation of its kind. It was a large composite mission, with a substantial non-military component. UNTAG involved more police work than had previous operations and was the first mission charged with preparing a nation for elections and independence. (Fortna, 1993b: 372; see also Howard, 2002: 100)

Above all, from the perspective of future developments in UN activities in building peace, UNTAG was important for departing from the strictly military mandates of 'traditional' operations deployed during the cold war.

The second operation reflecting broad mandates was deployed to the North of Africa. In April 1991, following years of mediation efforts by the UN Secretary-General and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Security Council authorised the deployment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1976, when Spain withdrew and ceded control over the territory to Mauritania and Morocco. Soon afterwards, the former renounced any claims over the land, but Morocco intended to integrate Western Sahara into its domains – a decision strongly contested by the Algeria-backed *Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sanguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro* (POLISARIO Front) (Adebajo, 2011: 40-45). Against this backdrop, the deployment of MINURSO was thus intended to give Sahrawis an opportunity to choose between independence, as advocated by the POLISARIO Front, or full integration into Morocco (Durch, 1993b: 406-409). In addition to the traditional component of monitoring a cease-fire between the parties involved, UN peacekeepers were tasked with the full implementation of the referendum "from start to finish" (Durch, 1993b: 413).

Whilst the ceasefire has largely been kept by MINURSO since 1991, the transitional period preceding the referendum was never really implemented due to sustained divergence among the parties on issues such as the identification of voters. At the time of writing, the

referendum has not yet taken place and there is “little prospect of a settlement in sight”, according to Adebajo (2011: 55). Nevertheless, what is important to emphasise at this stage is the very ambitious and unusual mandate tasked to MINURSO: not only to monitor and oversee elections, as in Namibia, but also to carry out and *de facto* administer the entire electoral process. Although not yet fully implemented, the innovative aspect of MINURSO’s mandate would soon become a remarkable aspect of the UN engagement with post-armed conflict situations in the following years. Similarly, it would provide ‘hands-on’ experience for the Organisation in that area.

Finally, the third peacekeeping operation with a ‘multi-dimensional’ mandate established by the Security Council in the last years of Pérez de Cuéllar’s term was the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). By the late 1980s, the UN was involved in El Salvador through both its mediation efforts and its Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The Observer Group was a ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operation responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Esquipulas II peace accords, which had been signed in 1987 by the governments of Central American as a plan for settling the armed conflicts in the region (Smith and Durch, 1993: 444-446). In March 1990, ONUCA’s mandate was extended to include support for demobilisation and disarmament, which represented the first time the Security Council mandated a peacekeeping operation to engage in demobilising and disarming a guerrilla (Smith and Durch, 1993: 453). However, it is ONUSAL’s mandate in the area of human rights that makes the operation even more distinctive by the standards of UN peacekeeping at the time. In fact, owing to “monumental violations of human rights” (Orr, 2001: 157), ONUSAL was mandated not only to monitor the human rights situation, but also to investigate alleged cases of human rights violations, as well as to promote human rights *per se* (UN Doc. S/22494: para. 8). The deployment of the Mission thus broke new ground in UN peacekeeping due to its emphasis on actively promoting rather than simply monitoring the human rights situation.

These peacekeeping operations, deployed right in the transitional period created by the end of the cold war, are precursors of the ‘multi-dimensional’ peacekeeping operations that would become recurrent from the 1990s onwards. I contend that their emphasis in areas such as elections and human rights would also provide the basis for the advancement of peace operations supported by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*. At this stage, however, during the final years of Pérez de Cuéllar as Secretary-General, those

activities were carried out in response to specific cases on an ad hoc and unarticulated way, according to an interview with de Soto (2012). This would change with the release of *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, as the document provided the framework that was missing (the liberal democratic peace) for an explicit articulation of future UN peace operations with the full support to electoral processes and the promotion of human rights.

The two sets of aspects outlined in this section facilitated the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s. The Western imprint found at the most basic level of the UN ideational substrate facilitated the acceptance of the tenets associated with the liberal democratic peace in the everyday rhetoric of individuals in the UN *milieu*. At the same time, the gradual expansion of peacekeeping operations to include tasks and responsibilities in the area of electoral support and the promotion of human rights, for instance, offered a platform from which liberal democratic peacebuilding initiatives could be carried out.

Liberal democratic peacebuilding under Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996)

The United Nations approach to peacebuilding during Boutros-Ghali's mandate became heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework, which provided a rationale and informed the bureaucratic structures of the Organisation in that area. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the meaning associated to the liberal democratic peace is not fixed and Boutros-Ghali favoured a more restricted version of the framework that was based on his understanding of 'liberal democracy' in a minimalist-procedural connotation. Those views influenced the concepts of 'peacebuilding' produced in the Secretariat and discussed in the UN *milieu* during Boutros-Ghali's mandate, and were also instrumental in shaping the UN's bureaucratic structures associated with peacebuilding in those years. Whereas standing bureaucratic structures specifically for peacebuilding were only created in 2005-2006, some of the previous attempts to consolidate organisational arrangements and to advance key features of the liberal democratic peace are rather telling about the influence of this framework in the UN *milieu* at the time. In the field, the interplay between the concepts of 'peacebuilding' advanced at the ideational level and the structures created in the bureaucratic dimension of the UN led to initiatives that ought to promote a restricted, procedural, form of liberal democracy. As such, UN peacebuilding gradually became 'UN liberal democratic peacebuilding'.

Ideational dimension

An Agenda for Peace spurred considerable debate in the UN *milieu*. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly considered the content of the report on several occasions. Between June 1992 and the end of Boutros-Ghali's term, the Security Council, following consultations, meetings or informal discussions, issued fifteen statements on *An Agenda for Peace* or on issues directly connected to the report, including on the 'new' concept of peacebuilding (Table 1). The General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the report in its 47th Session (UN Docs. A/RES/47/120A; A/RES/47/120B). In fact, it had started discussing the report early in that session following the establishment of a working group to analyse and assess the recommendations advanced by the Secretary-General in his report (see UN Doc. A/47/WG/WP.1).⁸⁰ Moreover, Boutros-Ghali's document was also considered in other instances, such as in the Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening the Role of the Organisation, and in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping

Table 1: UNSC statements in connection with *An Agenda for Peace*, 1992-1996

UN Doc.	Date	Main topic
S/24210	30 June 1992	Report as a whole
S/24728	29 October 1992	Council's examination of <i>An Agenda for Peace</i>
S/24872	30 November 1992	Fact-finding as a tool of preventive diplomacy
S/25036	30 December 1992	Economic problems of states as a result of sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter
S/25184	29 January 1993	Cooperation with regional arrangements and organisations
S/25344	26 February 1993	The question of humanitarian assistance and its relationship with peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding
S/25493	31 March 1993	The safety of UN forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife
S/25696	30 April 1993	Post-conflict peacebuilding
S/25859	28 May 1993	Report as a whole
S/PRST/1994/22	3 May 1994	Peacekeeping (improving the UN capacity for peacekeeping)
S/PRST/1994/36	27 July 1994	Peacekeeping (stand-by arrangements for peacekeeping)
S/PRST/1994/62	4 November 1994	Peacekeeping (communication between members and non-members of the UNSC, in particular troop contributing-countries)
S/PRST/1995/9	22 February 1995	Supplement to <i>An Agenda for Peace</i>
S/PRST/1995/61	19 December 1995	Peacekeeping (stand-by arrangements for peacekeeping)
S/PRST/1996/13	28 March 1996	Peacekeeping (communication between members and non-members of the UNSC, in particular troop contributing-countries)

⁸⁰ Kanninen and Piiparinen (forthcoming) offer an overview of the activities of the working group with a special focus on issues related to early warning and preventive diplomacy.

Operations (UN Doc. A/49/1: para. 397). References and discussions on issues and themes raised in *An Agenda for Peace* thus contributed to the dissemination of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ as defined in *An Agenda for Peace* in the UN *milieu* and its gradual assimilation in the UN ideational substrate.

In the context of discussions about the Secretary-General’s report, the meaning underlying references to ‘peacebuilding’ in the Secretariat was closely connected to a specific understanding: one that emphasised democratisation and the provision of support to electoral processes in post-armed conflict situations. Representative of this association is the 15 June 1993 report in which the Secretary-General informs the UN membership about the actions taken to implement the recommendations he had outlined a year before in *An Agenda for Peace* (UN Doc. A/47/965-S/25944). In the document, ‘democratisation and electoral assistance’ appears as a core feature of peacebuilding. More interestingly, the whole section on peacebuilding identifies only one concrete, tangible measure taken up by the Secretary-General over the past year: the creation of DPA’s Electoral Assistance Unit (UN Doc. A/47/965-S/25944: para. 37). This highlights that in official documents produced at the highest levels of decision-making in the United Nations at the time, peacebuilding continued to be strongly associated with the promotion of democracies – and a minimalist version of democracy. A narrow view of peacebuilding as the promotion of elections was thus the one minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu* at the time.

Although *An Agenda for Peace* was generally well received in the midst of the optimistic euphoria that reigned at the highest levels of the UN Secretariat in 1992, some of its proposals have not been concretely taken up by member states. In early 1995, in the aftermath of the ill-fated operation in Somalia and the failure to deter the genocide in Rwanda, Boutros-Ghali set forth another document revisiting some of the areas in which difficulties have been more evident: a position paper titled *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1: para. 6). As in the original *Agenda*, the *Supplement* remained clearly supported by the understanding that armed conflicts developed in a linear sequence and hence, the instruments available to the UN (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding) were to be used accordingly. In the *Supplement*, however, Boutros-Ghali attributed a clearer preventive dimension to the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ by adding that it was “valuable in preventing conflict as in

healing the wounds after conflict has occurred” (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1: para. 47).⁸¹ Furthermore, the document acknowledged that peacekeeping operations could carry out peacebuilding activities (para. 50), meaning that ‘peacebuilding’ was now understood as a necessary component for addressing conflicts in different stages. Nevertheless, peacebuilding was still outlined in terms of “post-conflict peace-building” (paras. 47-56), denoting that it remained essentially in the far end of the linear continuum outlined in *An Agenda for Peace*.

Given this broader understanding, Boutros-Ghali recognised in the document that activities in the realm of peacebuilding “fall within the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system with responsibilities in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields” (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1: para. 53). Peacebuilding activities were said to include “improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development” (para. 47). Thus understood, peacebuilding no longer seemed to be so closely associated with the ‘traditional’ mandates of peacekeeping operations, but it was now expanded to include more clearly activities in the realms of politics and development, reflecting the nascent ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping operations that would flourish during the 1990s. Against this backdrop, the Secretary-General acknowledged that the implementation of peacebuilding can be “complicated” (para. 48) if it was not integrated and coordinated both at the UN headquarters and in the field.⁸² Despite this seemingly expanded understanding, peacebuilding remained concerned with the “creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace” (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1: para. 49), which continued to reflect the idea of ‘identifying and supporting structures to strengthen and solidify peace’, as it appeared in the 1992 *Agenda*.

In the United Nations ideational dimension, the minimally intelligible meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ during Boutros-Ghali’s tenure in office was thus closely associated with the understanding of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ advanced in *An Agenda for Peace*. As explored at length in the previous chapter, that meaning was heavily influenced by the liberal

⁸¹ As anticipated in the previous chapter, this contention adds a fourth part to the sequence outlined by de Soto and del Castillo (1994: 70) when illustrating the UN intervention in El Salvador.

⁸² Following the identified need for integration and coordination, Boutros-Ghali established an interdepartmental task force to make an inventory of the instruments available at the time to the United Nations in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding. The inventory is available as DESIPA (1996).

democratic peace framework and essentially entailed the promotion of a minimalist-procedural version of democracies in post-armed conflict situations. This connotation of the concept gradually gained foothold in the UN *milieu* as *An Agenda for Peace* was discussed in several instances in the Organisation, contributing to the dissemination and assimilation of the content of the report and of its concept of ‘peacebuilding’. Thus understood, this liberal democratic version of ‘peacebuilding’ gradually informed individuals’ views on the issue and offered the rationale for the promotion of liberal democracies in societies emerging from armed conflicts. It also informed bureaucratic arrangements and reforms carried out in the Secretariat at the time.

Bureaucratic dimension

Reforming the United Nations was a priority for Boutros-Ghali from his very first days in office (UNIHP, 2007a: 32; Burgess, 2001: esp. 200-202; Boutros-Ghali, 1999: 15). By February 1992, the new Secretary-General had already been introduced to a variety of concrete proposals to reform the United Nations by several sources, including former UN civil servants, non-governmental organisations and Ambassadors to the UN in New York (Müller, 2001: 41-53). In one of his first concrete measures, Boutros-Ghali implemented major changes in the structures of the Secretariat, including the abolishment of several high-level posts and the creation, extinction and/or merge of several departments. The cuts in posts alone, according to the then Secretary-General, saved the Organisation approximately USD 4 million (Boutros-Ghali, 1999: 16). The main rationale for such a bold restructuring was to adapt the Secretariat to “respond to the needs of a world in rapid transformation” (UN Doc. A/46/882: para. 1), which he pursued by attempting to rationalise and streamline “structures and procedures, as well as managerial improvements” in the Organisation (UN Doc. A/47/1: para. 23). With those reforms, he sought to decentralise the structures of the Secretariat, reducing problems of coordination and making the Organisation more effective from a management perspective.⁸³ Boutros-Ghali’s early measures in this area, according to

⁸³ The latter had become particularly high in the priority of UN reforms following the conservative administration of Ronald Reagan in the USA (1981-1989), which held back funding to the UN system based on claims over inefficiency and lack of accountability. For an overview of the UN financial crisis in the 1980s, see Taylor (1991). In 1993, in his report as the outgoing USG for Administration and Management, Thornburgh (1993) depicted the UN as an institution that lacked efficient and adequate management systems to deal with the requirements of the post-cold war world.

Thant and Scott (2007: 86), represented “the most sweeping” package of Secretariat reforms since UNSG Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961).

In the area of peace and security, the most relevant aspect of the Secretariat reform at that time was definitely the creation of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The creation of both organs, effective on 1 March 1992, reflected concerns about enhancing the world body’s capacity in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, as envisaged in the medium-term plan for 1992-1997 (see UN Doc. A/45/6/Rev.1) and highlighted during the Security Council high-level meeting of 31 January 1992. According to a directive of the Secretary-General, the new DPA was an amalgamation of several existing departments and offices, including the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) and the Department for Special Political Questions (UN Doc. ST/SGB/248). The DPKO, in its turn, was essentially a new name for the Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA). According to an interview with de Soto (2012), the Soviet Union occasionally resisted the practice of peacekeeping during the cold war years and opposed the establishment of any organ in the Secretariat bearing the word ‘peacekeeping’, arguing that the activity was not envisioned in the Charter. With the end of the cold war, it was possible to abandon the “euphemism” ‘special political affairs’ and create a department overtly tasked with peacekeeping (Goulding, 2002: 3).

The creation of the two Departments made some officials confused as to the precise boundaries between their respective roles. According to Marrack Goulding, the first Head of the DPKO, Boutros-Ghali tried to eschew the confusion by insisting that the arrangement was actually rather “simple”: the DPA was responsible for the “political work” and the DPKO, for the “operational work” (Goulding, 2002: 31-32). Later in that year, the roles of the DPA and the DPKO started to gain more defined contours. The mandate of the DPA was outlined to, among others, support the use of the Secretary-General’s good offices and mediation, the settlement process in the Middle East and the support for electoral assistance (UN Doc. A/C.5/47/CRP.2: 2-5). The DPKO kept the structure and overall mandate of the old SPA, additionally incorporating responsibilities for the operational tasks of missions deployed in the field, which have until then been carried out by the Field Operations Division of the Department of Administration and Management (UN Doc. A/46/882: para. 7; see also Shimura, 2001: 49). Despite this apparently clear division of responsibilities and tasks,

however, Thant and Scott (2007: 85) note that, in practice, “DPKO led all the new peacekeeping operations, while DPA was left looking for a role”. According to them, what was supposed to be the latter’s main function, conflict prevention, never really materialised. Goulding, in his turn, was never convinced about the possibility – or desirability – of establishing the two Departments based on a straightforward distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘operational’ in what concerns peace operations (Goulding, 2002: 31-32).

In 1993, Boutros-Ghali strengthened the DPA’s role in the area of electoral support by designating one of its USGs as focal point in the Secretariat for electoral assistance. The designated focal point would be responsible to

assist the Secretary-General to coordinate and consider requests for electoral verification and to channel requests for electoral assistance to the appropriate office or programme, to ensure careful consideration of requests for electoral verification, to build on experience gained to develop an institutional memory, to develop and maintain a roster of international experts who could provide technical assistance as well as assist in the verification of electoral processes and to maintain contact with regional and other intergovernmental organizations to ensure appropriate working arrangements with them and the avoidance of duplication of efforts. (UN Doc. A/RES/46/137: para. 9)

In addition, the Secretary-General created an Electoral Assistance Unit (EAU) in the Department (Beigbeder, 1994: 102-103). Later in that year, Boutros-Ghali reported that the Unit had already provided assistance to thirty-six member states (UN Doc. A/48/1: para. 464).

The creation of the EAU is a symptomatic development in the process of assimilation of the liberal democratic peace framework in the United Nations in the early 1990s for two reasons. First, because Boutros-Ghali’s initiative to establish the Unit was inspired by a proposal originally outlined by the United States of America (Beigbeder, 1994: 102-103), a country whose foreign policy, albeit to varying extents and intensity, has been historically marked by the promotion of democracy abroad (Smith, 1994). George H. Bush (1990b) had proposed the creation of a ‘special coordinator’ for electoral assistance in his 1990 address at the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly. This was only a few days after setting the basis of his views on the post-cold war “new world order” (Bush, 1990a), which entailed a component of democracy promotion. The proposal was later reinforced by the US Ambassador to the UN in discussions related to the adoption of the third General Assembly Resolution bearing the title *Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections* (UN Doc. A/C.3/45/SR.38: 11-12). Hence, although not

necessarily related to theories about the liberal/democratic peace, the EAU was ultimately inspired in a proposal that carried the Wilsonian legacy of democracy promotion abroad as a mean to achieve peace.

The establishment of the EAU is also revealing about the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace in the United Nations for a second reason: the Unit was established within the DPA, the Secretariat entity responsible for the ‘political work’ in what concerns peace operations. According to Robin Ludwig, officer in the EAU for over twenty years, there was some quarrel over the organisational location of the new entity in the beginning: some member states and UN officials favoured placing the new Unit in the Centre for Human Rights, in Geneva, while others favoured its installation in the New York-based DPA (Ludwig, 2004: 119). The latter view eventually prevailed because at the time electoral assistance was closely associated with conflict resolution efforts in the UN *milieu*, especially as an “adjunct to peacekeeping operations” (Ludwig, 2004: 119). This perception was partially generated by the fact that most of the requests for electoral assistance in the late 1980s and early 1990s were associated with the holding of elections following the signature of peace accords, as it had been the case in Namibia or Nicaragua (Ludwig, 2004: 119; see also 133-161). The institutional location of the EAU in the Department of Political Affairs thus indicates that democracy promotion, and most particularly a minimalist-version of democracy, had been assumed as a key element in responding to armed conflicts in the UN *milieu* by the early 1990s.

Towards procedural ‘liberal democratic peacebuilding’

Following the trend started in the late 1980s, Boutros-Ghali’s first years as Secretary-General expanded UN peacekeeping considerably. As shown in Annex B, the UN deployed 19 DPKO-led peacekeeping operations during his mandate – a remarkable number, considering his tenure in office lasted only five years. In these operations, rather than simply overseeing cease-fires, substantial attention was given to issues such as electoral assistance, the protection of civilians and the promotion of human rights, as reflected in Boutros-Ghali’s words in the epigraph of this chapter. The UN growing and expanding role in peace operations reflected not only the overall material and ideational context of world politics in the early 1990s (outlined in Chapter 3), but also the minimal intelligibility of the liberal

democratic peace framework in the UN *milieu* at the time and the following bureaucratic arrangements initiated earlier in Boutros-Ghali's mandate.

The most representative operation of this group of 'multi-dimensional' peacekeeping in the early 1990s is perhaps the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Established by the Security Council in March 1992, UNTAC was mainly tasked with the implementation of the Paris Agreement, reached in 1991 by the warring parties and which followed years of armed conflict over political power in the country (Berdal and Leifer, 1996: esp. 26-36). With UNTAC, the UN assumed responsibilities of national civil administrator in areas such as public security, agriculture and foreign affairs in the country (see Richmond and Franks, 2009: 18-53; Paris, 2004: 79-90; Berdal and Leifer, 1996). According to Richmond and Franks, elections acquired the greatest importance among those aspects given the assumption that they could create "a power-sharing political alternative to the violent struggle of the civil war" (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 21). This was reflected in the Security Council's conviction that "free and fair elections [were] essential to produce a just and durable settlement to the Cambodia conflict, thereby contributing to regional and international peace and security" (UN Doc. S/RES/745: preamble). With the extensive powers granted to UNTAC, the UN operation in Cambodia became responsible for tasks such as organising the whole electoral process, including "establishing electoral laws and procedures, invalidating existing laws that would not further the settlement, setting up the polling, responding to complaints, arranging for foreign observation and certifying the elections as free and fair" (Doyle and Suntharalingam, 1994: 122). Only a few months after the elections were held (in May 1993) and a new constitution was proclaimed (September 1993), the Security Council praised the "successful completion" of the mission's mandate on 5 October 1993 (S/26531, 1993).

In December 1992, the Security Council established the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, from the acronym in Portuguese) to play a central role in the peace process, assuming the leadership of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission in charge of implementing the General Peace Agreement (UN Doc. S/RES/797). ONUMOZ also held responsibilities in the electoral process, including in the organisation and monitoring of presidential and legislative elections where former belligerents opposed each other as political parties (MacQueen, 2006: 199-200; Howard, 2008: 186-188). As in Cambodia, the UN multidimensional peacekeeping left Mozambique in December 1994, shortly after the

results of the elections were confirmed (MacQueen, 2006: 200). The cases of Cambodia and Mozambique both illustrate that supporting electoral processes and holding elections were not only key aspects of UN peacebuilding efforts in the early 1990s, but also that elections represented a signpost towards the goal of building ‘liberal democracies’ in its minimalist-procedural connotation. At that time, the holding of elections was a cornerstone underlying the meaning of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*, particularly as it entailed an “election-as-exit strategy” (Haack, 2011: 77) that reflected the minimalist-procedural view of ‘liberal democracy’ underlying *An Agenda for Peace*.

During Boutros-Ghali’s tenure in office, the UN thus sought to assist states in their transition from war to peace by fostering peacebuilding processes that essentially envisaged creating liberal/democratic political structures in post-armed conflict societies. In the ideational dimension, mainly inspired by the framework created by *An Agenda for Peace*, the concept of ‘liberal democracy’ underlying UN programmes and policies in the area of peacebuilding at the time was closely associated with the structural/institutional strand of theorising about the liberal/democratic peace. ‘Liberal democracy’ thus understood emphasises processes and procedures of a democratic *system* (such as the holding of elections) over norms and institutions typical of a democratic *society*, as discussed in Chapter 3. As a result, UN peacebuilding activities under Boutros-Ghali were mostly carried out via policies that aimed at creating minimalist-procedural rather than maximalist-substantive ‘liberal democracies’ in post-armed conflict situations.

Liberal democratic peacebuilding under Kofi Annan (1997-2004)

The United Nations approach to peacebuilding during Annan’s tenure in office remained heavily motivated, legitimated and justified by the liberal democratic peace framework. Annan, however, had a different understanding of ‘liberal democracy’ than Boutros-Ghali, which ultimately resulted in a somewhat different approach to ‘liberal democratic’ peacebuilding. This section focuses on the United Nations approach to liberal democratic peacebuilding during most of Annan’s years ahead of the United Nations, from 1997 to 2004 – 2005 and 2006 are discussed in the following chapters, in connection with the establishment and the first years of functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF. During the period under review, the interplay between the concepts of

‘peacebuilding’ advanced in the UN and its bureaucratic structures resulted in initiatives in the field that aimed at promoting broader, substantive, forms of liberal/democratic societies.

Annan’s views on ‘liberal democracy’ and its connection with peace were mainly articulated in some speeches he delivered around 2000-2001 (Annan, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d).⁸⁴ The views contained in those speeches differ significantly from Boutros-Ghali’s to the extent that Annan “realised that the promise of the democratic peace [as concept] was not as straightforward as Boutros-Ghali and other politicians had asserted in the early 1990s” (Haack, 2011: 99). This is not to say that Annan dismissed the proposition that liberal/democratic societies rarely fight each other: in fact, in a lecture delivered at the University of Oxford on 19 June 2001, Annan contended that “the history of the last 200 years has proved [Kant] right” (Annan, 2012a: 1529).⁸⁵ Annan contended, however, that a qualification of the proposition was necessary in the present, since “history shows that young democracies, or ones that are just emerging as great Powers, can behave in quite an aggressive way. (...) So perhaps”, he continued, “we should confine ourselves to saying that war is less likely between *mature* democracies” (Annan, 2012a: 1529; emphasis added).

In Annan’s view, ‘democracy’ was more than elections, which, as discussed in Chapter 4, was overemphasised in the procedural-minimalist understanding that was minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu* during Boutros-Ghali’s tenure in office. The Ghanaian Secretary-General did not neglect the importance of elections for democracies, but he stressed the key role of norms, values and institutions that make for a ‘liberal democratic state’. In fact, opposing mature democracies, Annan defined “fig-leaf” democracies as those regimes wherein “rulers attempt to legitimize or perpetuate their power by holding flawed elections, that are not really free” (Annan, 2012a: 1531). In face of those scenarios, “what happens in between elections is at least as important for democracy as what happens during them” (Annan, 2012a: 1530-1531). Hence, in addition to free and fair elections, mature democracies entailed several other aspects, such as guarantees for the rights of minorities, mechanisms to ensure participation from opposition parties, the rule of law, functioning

⁸⁴ One of the individuals directly involved in the elaboration of those statements was Michael Doyle, who was then serving as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. Interview with Doyle (2012).

⁸⁵ In his statement, Annan contended that what Kant defined as ‘republic’ is “essentially what today we call liberal or pluralistic democracies” (Annan, 2012a: 1529).

independent courts and police, a framework for the protection of human rights and good governance, among others (Annan, 2012a: 1530-1531).

With the foundations of an agenda for democracy in the post-cold war laid down by his predecessor, Annan recast a new conceptualisation of ‘democracy’ in the UN milieu by linking democratisation and governance (UN Doc. A/52/513: para 6). According to Haack, this enabled Annan to create a new framework for democracy-assistance, one that was multi-disciplinary in nature and “joined up the loose ends that remained from Boutros-Ghali’s conceptual development” (Haack, 2011: 100). This new framework was advanced against the backdrop of the UN previous experience in the area and included 11 principles:

(1) an effective public sector; (2) accountability/transparency of processes and institutions; (3) effective participation of civil society/political empowerment; (4) effective decentralization of power; (5) access to knowledge, information and education; (6) political pluralism/freedom of association and expression; (7) rule of law/respect for human rights; (8) legitimacy/consensus; (9) attitudes and values fostering responsibility, solidarity and tolerance; (10) equity/voice for the poor; and (11) gender equality. (UN Doc. A/52/513, 1997: para. 24)

Those principles, according to Annan, “reflect the fundamental principles of a democratic *society*” (para. 25; emphasis added). And if considered in conjunction with a twelfth principle of ‘free and fair elections’, he continued, “all essential elements for a solid framework for democratization assistance by the United Nations anywhere in the world today would be in place” (para. 25).

Thus defined, democracy and democratisation were closely connected to practices of ‘good governance’ that went far beyond elections only. Rather than an overwhelming concern with democratic processes and procedures, this version of ‘liberal democracy’ was more concerned with democratic norms and institutions, thus leaning towards a maximalist-substantive version of ‘liberal democracy’. As a core concept in the liberal democratic peace framework that informed the minimally intelligible concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN milieu during Annan’s tenure in office, this maximalist-substantive understanding of ‘liberal democracy’ consequently led to a variant of UN *liberal democratic* peacebuilding that was broader in aims and scope than the one minimally intelligible during Boutros-Ghali’s years.

Ideational dimension

‘Peacebuilding’ remained in the international peace and security agenda in the UN milieu during Annan’s tenure in office. The Security Council, for instance, considered topics directly related to peacebuilding on nine different occasions (Table 2), excluding the

Council’s consideration of particular countries where peacebuilding activities were carried out. As the concept was disseminated and gained widespread recognition in the UN *milieu*, references to peacebuilding in UN official documents were also accompanied, implicitly or explicitly, by definitions and elaborations of what sort of activities were ‘part’ of peacebuilding as well as under what circumstances the UN should be involved in those activities.

Table 2: UNSC meetings on topics related to ‘peacebuilding’, 1997-2004

Date of meeting	Topic	Security Council action
16 and 23 December 1998	Post-conflict peacebuilding	No action
29 December 1998	Post-conflict peacebuilding	S/PRST/1998/38
8 July 1999	Post-conflict peacebuilding (DDR in peacekeeping environment)	S/PRST/1999/21
23 March 2000	Post-conflict peacebuilding (DDR in peacekeeping environment)	S/PRST/2000/10
5 February 2001	Peacebuilding: towards a comprehensive approach	No action
20 February 2001	Peacebuilding: towards a comprehensive approach	S/PRST/2001/5
15 April 2004	Role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding	No action
22 June 2004	Role of civil society in post-conflict peacebuilding	No action
22 September 2004	Civilian aspects of conflict management and peace-building	S/PRST/2004/33

A key document focusing on issues related to ‘peacebuilding’ in Annan’s earlier years as Secretary-General was his report *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, of 1998. The document was elaborated following a Security Council meeting held at the level of foreign ministers on 25 September 1997 that sought to “focus the attention of the international community on the situation in Africa” (UN Doc. S/PV.3819: 2). Annan’s report on the theme defined peacebuilding as “actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation” (UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318: para. 63). It is in the list of identified tasks that may fall within the realm of peacebuilding, however, that Annan stressed the character of peacebuilding as requiring more than “purely diplomatic and military action”, as it may include tasks in the realm of ‘institution-building’ and the promotion of human rights, among others (para. 63). Despite concern with other areas, security remained “crucial underlying need” (para. 64) in this conceptualisation.

A couple of years later, Annan convened a high-level Panel on UN Peace Operations to carry out a thorough review of, and propose recommendations on, the Organisation's activities in the realm of international peace and security (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: i).⁸⁶ The report of the Panel, informally known as the Brahimi report owing to the chair of this blue-ribbon commission, Lakhdar Brahimi, provided a rather frank assessment on the UN record in peace operations in general and peacekeeping in particular. The report defined peacebuilding in terms of "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 13). The definition was clearly faithful to the original formulation of *An Agenda for Peace*, particularly as armed conflicts were still perceived as part of a *continuum* wherein peacebuilding would only be employed 'on the far side of conflict'. The activities enlisted as part of 'peacebuilding' in the Brahimi report (para. 13) added substantially to lists previously outlined in Boutros-Ghali's and in Annan's reports, including, for instance, the reintegration of combatants and concerns about the development of conflict resolution techniques. Whereas the report does not develop the concept of peacebuilding any further, it explicitly formulates the goal of building a peace in post-armed conflict situations that was more than the absence of war, i.e. of building a positive peace.

In 2001, two other documents explicitly tackled peacebuilding and provided some guidance about how peacebuilding was conceptually addressed in UN policy circles, although not necessarily trying to foster further definitions. In February, the UNSC adopted a Presidential Statement recognising that peacebuilding "is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms" (UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/5: 1). It encompasses actions focused on "fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights" (UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/5: 2). In Annan's report *No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of*

⁸⁶ The members of the Panel were: J. Brian Atwood (United States), Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago), Ann Hercus (New Zealand), Richard Monk (United Kingdom), Klaus Naumann (Germany), Hisako Shimura (Japan), Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation), Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe) and Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland) (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: Annex I).

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, peacebuilding was understood as “an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution” (UN Doc. S/2001/394: para. 11). Peacebuilding activities, hence, were to be included in the mandate of peace operations to facilitate a transition from armed conflicts to an institutional framework for the settlement of disputes (para. 10) or they could serve as a “follow-on” UN presence after the departure of peacekeeping operations (paras. 33 and 56). In both documents, as in the Brahimi report, it is remarkable that despite the wide range of envisaged peacebuilding activities, they are nevertheless seen as almost as a ‘natural’ step following the exit of peacekeepers, that is, as an instrument to be deployed only in the ‘post-’ phase of armed conflicts.

The Report *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, authored by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004, and which proposed a commission for peacebuilding within the UN system, offers a two-folded concept of peacebuilding. In the document, peacebuilding is understood both as part of the role of peacekeepers (UN Doc. A/59/565: paras. 221-223) and as a ‘larger task’ that is closely related to the “longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions” (para. 224). In the former case, peacebuilding is associated with post-conflict actions, especially during the phase of implementation of peace agreements. Peacekeepers could thus undertake peacebuilding activities and initiatives in areas such as confidence building, provision of security, mediation, implementation of peace agreements and policing (paras. 221-223). In the latter case, the broader understanding of peacebuilding concretely entails the performance of activities such as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation of combatants; police, judicial and rule-of-law reform; capacity-building for human rights; reconciliation and public sector service (paras. 224-230). Whereas the short-term, narrower, understanding of peacebuilding is more concerned with security-related issues, the longer-term and broader concept is closely related to the building of institutions. In fact, according to the report, along “with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law” (para. 229). Table 3 offers a summary of key features of the selected documents reviewed in this section.

Table 3: The concept of peacebuilding in selected UN documents, 1992-2004

	Definition	Phase	Actions / activities envisaged
An Agenda for Peace (1992)	action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict	post-conflict	disarmament of combatants, custody of weapons, restoration of order, advisory for security personnel, elections, advancing HR, reforming governmental institutions
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995)	creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace	post-conflict, but there is reference to the preventive role of peacebuilding	demilitarization, control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development
The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa (1998)	actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation	post-conflict	creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development. It builds on, adds to and reorients ongoing humanitarian and development activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations – Brahimi Report (2000)	activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war	post-conflict	reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. Complemented by support for fight against corruption, implementation of humanitarian demining programmes, combat against HIV/AIDS
UNSC Presidential Statement S/PRST/2001/5 (2001)	peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political,	short- and long-term actions	sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence

	Definition	Phase	Actions / activities envisaged
<p>No Exit without Strategy (2001)</p>	<p>developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms</p> <p>an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution</p>	<p>before (preventive action), during (included in PKO) and post-conflict (follow-up on UN presence)</p> <p>immediate post (during the phase of implementation of peace agreements) and long term (long-term recovery)</p>	<p>monitoring the separation of forces and technical assistance in humanitarian mine action; coordinating and assisting UN actors in the return and resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced;</p> <p>tasks that may be performed by peacekeepers: build confidence, provide security, mediation, implementation of peace agreements, policing.</p> <p>Long-term recovery: “process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions”: disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation of combatants; police, judicial and rule-of-law reform, capacity-building for HR, reconciliation and public sector service</p>
<p>A More Secure World (2004)</p>	<p>along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law</p>		

From Boutros-Ghali to Annan, the minimally intelligible meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu* reflected deeper understandings about the core concept of ‘liberal democracy’ in the liberal democratic peace framework. As that understanding gradually shifted from Boutros-Ghali’s minimalist-procedural to Annan’s maximalist-substantive version of ‘liberal democracy’, so did the UN approach to ‘peacebuilding’. This is in line with Call’s argument that the concept of peacebuilding was gradually expanded in the United Nations in terms of scope, phases and related activities (Call, 2004: 3; see also Call and Cousens, 2008: 3). In fact, the way peacebuilding was addressed in the UN *milieu* via the documents reviewed above points to a gradual widening of the solutions envisaged in the area of peacebuilding not only in terms of security, but also increasingly in terms of development tasks. Peacebuilding was also increasingly related to preventive actions and, perhaps most notably during the 1990s, to activities carried out via multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. In the process, the number of activities and the range of areas associated under the umbrella of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN over the last two decades are also remarkable. Despite those variations, the UN approach to ‘peacebuilding’ remained generally informed by the liberal democratic peace.

Bureaucratic dimension

As a veteran officer in the UN system, Annan started his term conscious of the need to reform several parts of the Organisation. Whereas Boutros-Ghali had previously framed his reform proposals against the changing context of the end of the cold war, Annan articulated his proposals *vis-à-vis* the perceived need to re-adapt and revitalise the Organisation for the twenty-first century (Annan, 1998). In his acceptance speech, Annan voiced “his wish to make the United Nations leaner, more efficient and more effective, more responsive to the wishes and needs of its members and more realistic in its goals and commitments” (Müller, 2006: 8) With those goals in mind, he carried out a ‘quiet revolution’ that aimed at fostering a “fundamental, not piecemeal, reform” capable of narrowing the gap between the purposes aspired by the United Nations and its actual achievements (Annan, 1998: 128). At the core of those efforts, stood the “[r]eorganization, consolidation of country-level efforts and reaching out to civil society and the private sector as partners” (Müller, 2006: 9). Annan’s reform proposals thus focused more on strengthening existing

structures and making them work better than on proposing new rearrangements almost from scratch, as Boutros-Ghali had done before him.

In his first months as Secretary-General, Annan established a new form of management of the world body and decided to gather several departments, offices and programmes around four main cluster-areas (Müller, 2006: 8). For each area, he established a cabinet-style forum which resulted in Executive Committees on Peace and Security (ECPS), on Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA), on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and on Development Cooperation – the so-called UN Development Group (UNDG) (UN Docs. A/51/950: paras. 27-33; A/51/950/Add.1). The Committees were designed, according to Annan, as “instruments of policy development, decision-making and management” (UN Doc. A/51/950: para. 29). The convenors to the Committees, alongside other senior managers at the UN system, would constitute the Senior Management Group (SMG), tasked to “assist the Secretary-General in leading the process of change and instituting sound management throughout the Organization” (UN Doc. A/51/950: para. 35).

In the area of peace and security in general and peacebuilding in particular, one of the earlier measures adopted by Annan was to institute the DPA as ‘focal point’ for peacebuilding in the UN system. The measure stemmed from a proposal elaborated earlier by Margaret Anstee, a veteran UN official and former USG with a wealth of field-based experience. The idea started to take shape in connection with a high-level event on strategies for post-conflict reconstruction strategies held in Vienna in 1995 with key players in the realms of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief across the UN system. The proposal of establishing a focal point for peacebuilding in the Secretariat appeared later in the synopsis of the event (UN Doc. A/50/345: para. 38). Subsequently, Anstee further developed and presented the proposal in the form of reports to Boutros-Ghali, in 1996, and then to Kofi Annan in 1997 (UNIHP, 2007b: 158). She contends that her reports described “very simply how the UN should function in a conflict situation in an absolutely integrated fashion without creating any new organizations or any new coordinating mechanisms” (UNIHP, 2007b: 158). The DPA was eventually instituted ‘focal point’ by Annan in July 1997 due to its position as convenor of the ECPS (UN Doc. A/51/950: para. 121). The measure, however, created some confusion and internal discussions about what this precise role entailed. As result, although the efforts to advance some deficiencies in the system by establishing a focal

point for peacebuilding in the Secretariat had started in 1995, “peacebuilding arrangements [were] still not functioning properly” late in 2000 (UNIHP, 2007b: 159).

The convening of the aforementioned panel by led Brahimi, which was tasked with reviewing the UN peace operations in general, can also be understood within the broader reform efforts pushed forward by Annan. In fact, the Panel was tasked not only to review UN peace operations, but also to offer “specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities in the future” (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: i). The Brahimi Report identified several of the causes of UN weaknesses and deficiencies in peace operations, including “a fundamental deficiency in the way [the United Nations system] has conceived of, funded and implemented peace-building strategies and activities” (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: ix). Against this backdrop, the Report concluded with several proposals for enhancing UN capacities in peace operations, many of which included reforms in the UN institutional structures for peacekeeping and peacebuilding (paras. 54-58). Despite recommendations in the realm of peacebuilding both at the doctrinal (e.g. para. 47) and bureaucratic levels (e.g. para. 243), those proposals would take many years before taking root in the UN system.

The reforms proposed and carried out by Boutros-Ghali and Annan were not only matters of an administrative or organisational nature, but they reflected deeper conceptual underpinnings and assumptions about the UN role in the area of peace and security. The creation of the DPA and the DPKO by Boutros-Ghali is an elucidative example, as their domains of responsibilities, ranging from prevention to peacemaking to peacekeeping, were clearly inspired by the conceptual framework outlined in *An Agenda for Peace*. In addition, the strengthening of the Secretariat’s capacity to perform more peacekeeping operations after the establishment of DPKO should not be dissociated from the expansion of mandates of the newly created operations – not least because the Department was now better structured and staffed than the former SPA. With the new structure, attention could thus be given to the reformulation of military actions and to the ‘new’ activities carried out in the political, humanitarian, social and economic realms, including the promotion of democracy and human rights. Such activities were essential aspects in the mandates of the operations created at that time and reflected a view of ‘peacebuilding’ that was essentially informed by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*. Under Kofi Annan, however, the resulting

practice of liberal democratic peacebuilding would gradually assume broader contours than it had during the first half of the 1990s.

Towards substantive 'liberal democratic peacebuilding'

Between 1997 and 2004, under Annan's tenure in office, the United Nations established 17 peacekeeping operations (Annex B), many of them entailing a strong component on peacebuilding initiatives such as those aiming at strengthening the rule of law or reforming institutions in the security sector. Only a few of those operations (in the Central African Republic, 1998-2000; in Sierra Leone, 1999-2005; and in Burundi, 2004-2006) contained provisions directly related to the support to electoral processes. This shift in the focus is partially due to Annan's broader understanding of 'liberal democracy' in its maximalist-substantive version, which privileged governance and democratic norms and institutions over processes and procedures such as elections.

The best illustration of the UN use of peacebuilding with a view to construct a maximalist-substantial sort of liberal democracy during this period is perhaps the Organisation's initial involvement in Timor-Leste.⁸⁷ In the context of a civil war following decades of Indonesian domination, the Security Council established, in June 1999, the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to "organize and conduct" a referendum about the self-determination of the territory (UN Doc. S/RES/1246: op. 1). Following the announcement that the vast majority of the population had opted for independence, violence erupted and a Security Council-sanctioned multinational force was deployed to the territory to "restore peace and security" (UN Doc. S/RES/1264: op. 3). Subsequently, the Security Council established the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to assume "overall responsibility for the administration" of the territory and therein empowered to "exercise all legislative and executive authority" (UN Doc. S/RES/1272: op. 1). As Howard simply puts it, UNTAET was charged not only with Chapter VII responsibilities in "peacekeeping, civilian policing, and humanitarian assistance, but also [with] the governing of an entire country" (Howard, 2008: 260).

This approach was a significant departure from what Haack (2011: 77) called the "election-as-exit strategy" that prevailed during Boutros-Ghali's tenure in office. Rather, in

⁸⁷ For in-depth analyses of the UN role in the country, see Hughes (2009), Richmond and Franks (2009: 83-108), Howard (2008: 260-298), Smith and Dee (2006) and Chopra (2000).

Timor-Leste, as the Organisation seemed to embrace the growing sense that elections were rather an entry point for assistance (Haack, 2011: 110), it might be said that the UN was adopting an ‘election-as-entry-strategy’. The rationale underlying UNTAET was in essence “to assume full control in order to build a sustainable liberal state and indeed prepare national government for independence” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 87). In fact, according to its mandate, the UN Authority would have to provide security, maintain law and order, establish and keep functioning the administration of the territory, help developing civil and social services, coordinate the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance, offer capacity-building for the self-government of the population and support the creation of conditions for development (UN Doc. S/RES/1272: op. 2). By focusing heavily on those aspects of societal life, the UN clearly mirrored what, according to Annan, constituted the “fundamental principles of a democratic society” (UN Doc. A/52/513, 1997: para. 25), which were listed earlier in this section.

In addition to promoting democratisation and other peacebuilding initiatives under the framework of ‘multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations’, the United Nations also established ‘peacebuilding offices’ in the field under Annan. Such offices, which should not be confused with the New York-based Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), grew out of attempts to strengthen the Organisation’s capacities in sustaining assistance to post-armed conflict societies after the departure of peacekeepers. The first of such offices was the UN Office in Liberia (UNOL), established in 1997 as a follow-up field presence to the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) amid considerations about the potential instability in the country after the peacekeepers had left (DPA and UNDP, 2001: 9). According to an internal report, peacebuilding offices would assist “newly-elected authorities” in continuing the “support to nurture and consolidate a fragile peace”, thus strengthening the UN efforts in addressing the root causes of armed conflicts (DPA and UNDP, 2001: 9). According to Call, however, the establishment of a “troopless, and thus toothless” office in Liberia in fact mirrored the lack of diplomatic support for larger and more resourced military deployments to the country after the election of Charles Taylor (Call, 2012: 89). Other peacebuilding offices would subsequently be established during this period in places such as Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, Tajikistan and Sierra Leone (DPA and UNDP, 2001).

From Boutros-Ghali’s to Annan’s tenure in office, the United Nations approach to peacebuilding has been heavily motivated, justified, legitimated and informed by the liberal

democratic peace framework, which has also enacted concrete peacebuilding initiatives in the field. For sure, the UN field operations that carried out peacebuilding and the so-called peacebuilding offices entailed differences in what concerns their mandates, focus, constitution or personnel. Despite all differences, however, they have in essence sought to promote “free and fair elections, the construction of democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties, and market-oriented economic reforms” (Paris, 1997: 63). As UN peace operations became more ambitious in terms of envisaged goals and tasks performed throughout the 1990s, they were articulated rhetorically as instruments or techniques that sought to achieve global peace through the promotion of liberal/democratic societies and market-oriented economies. This meant, according to Richmond, that “interveners (peacekeepers, NGOs, donors, and officials) were now required to focus on democratisation, human rights, development, and economic reform” (Richmond, 2010a: 22). Consequently, at least since the late 1980s, the UN would progressively link the promotion of ‘liberal democracies’ and the establishment of market economies with the goal of achieving peace, thus framing its political actions accordingly.

Conclusions

This chapter explored the trajectory of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ from *An Agenda for Peace* to circa 2004. Since it was outlined in Boutros-Ghali’s report, the concept remained heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework, which served to motivate, legitimate and justify the UN approach to peacebuilding as well as to enact concrete courses of action in several contexts. The core concept of ‘liberal democracy’ underlying those policies, however, did not remain fixed and changed significantly, particularly as the two top diplomats in the Organisation ascribed different meanings to it. Whereas Boutros-Ghali overemphasised processes and procedures in his view of ‘liberal democracy’, Annan attributed an equally relevant degree of importance to norms and institutions typical of ‘liberal democracies’. As ‘liberal democracy’ is a core concept in the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*, the political courses of action implemented by the Organisation from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s varied accordingly. Similarly, despite its adherence to the promotion of liberal democracies, the liberal democratic peace framework was not necessarily fixed, but it has assumed different facets in distinct historical moments. Liberal democratic peacebuilding, consequently, also entailed different meanings.

The following two chapters continue to analyse the trajectory of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN by focusing particularly on the establishment and functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. Created in 2005-2006 with a view to overcome some of the limits and shortcomings associated with the UN approach to peacebuilding throughout the 1990s, those entities may as well be seen as an attempt to solve some of the inconsistencies of liberal democratic peacebuilding. What the analysis of the following chapters shows, however, is that those entities have stumbled in the deeper underlying influence of the liberal democratic peace in the UN constitutive dimensions. Hence, rather than provoking any truly substantial change in UN liberal democratic peacebuilding(s), those three entities have more often replicated and reinforced the liberal democratic peace framework as the minimally intelligible reference for understanding ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*.

Chapter 6

The ‘new’ peacebuilding architecture

Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge [of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war]; and it can do no better today. Without significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of Member States, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years.

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-called Brahimi Report (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 1)

Introduction

Chapters 3 through 5 explored how the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ gained life in the context of the United Nations. It entered the UN ideational dimension informed by a *political conviction* about the promotion of a minimalist-procedural version of ‘liberal democracy’ to societies emerging from armed conflicts. This understanding gradually informed the views of individuals in the UN *milieu* in what concerns ‘peacebuilding’ while at the same time offered a rationale for bureaucratic arrangements in the Secretariat and for concrete policies outlined towards several post-armed conflict situations. This and the following chapter continue the analysis of the trajectory of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ as informed by the liberal democratic peace in the UN *milieu*, focusing particularly on a key development in the UN headquarters: the establishment and the subsequent functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in 2005-2006. Notwithstanding the gradual assimilation of ‘peacebuilding’ as informed by the liberal democratic peace in the UN *milieu* and its manifestation in concrete policies since the 1990s, as discussed in the previous chapters, the UN still lacked a formal “home” for peacebuilding in its structures by the mid-2000s (Tschirgi, 2004: 5). As such,

the establishment of those entities represents, to a great extent, the ultimate embodiment of liberal democratic peacebuilding in the constitutive dimensions of the Organisation.

The remainder of the chapter is organised into four sections. The first one offers a brief overview of some key problems identified in connection to the UN approach to peacebuilding throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s. The following section reviews some of the responses outlined in the UN *milieu* as reactions to those problems – or at least some of them. Whereas acknowledging that the arrangement constituted by the PBC, PBSO and PBF are no panacea, the three entities were conceived in response to some problems clearly related to the UN practice, such as the lack of coordination among donors and UN entities or the need to more actively involve local civil society organisations. To the extent that some of those problems are connected to ‘peacebuilding’ as informed by the liberal democratic peace, the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF may be seen as responses to the limits and shortcomings of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding. The third section reviews some of the concrete proposals that affected the final shape and format of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. Its main purpose is to highlight that despite the aim of responding to problems and shortcomings often identified in the field, the format and configuration of the three entities were largely shaped by political and diplomatic concerns in the UN *milieu* in New York. The fourth and final section presents the three entities as they operate today, thus providing the basis for the discussion carried out in Chapter 7.

The limits of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding

Shortcomings related to the United Nations practice in providing support to societies emerging from armed conflict became evident as ‘peacebuilding’ (informed by the liberal democratic peace) became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu*. During the 1990s, successive ‘failures’ of peace operations with a ‘peacebuilding’ component starkly exposed the UN deficiencies in realms that included, but were not limited to, politics, doctrine, organisation and management.⁸⁸ In the cases of Angola and Rwanda, for instance, UN peace operations failed to implement the provisions of the 1991 Bicesse Agreement and the 1993 Arusha Accords, respectively. Those failures would result in “[t]he two worst outbreaks of

⁸⁸ Distinctions in terms of categories such as these ones are analytically relevant for academics and policymakers, but the reality in which peace operations carry out their functions is much more complex. For a first-hand account evincing the interrelationship of those four categories, see, for instance, the *memoirs* of Roméo Dallaire (2004), force commander of the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda.

massive violence in the 1990s”, claiming the lives of approximately 350,000 persons in Angola and 800,000 in Rwanda (Stedman, 2002: 1). In Somalia, the UN failed to create a secure environment and was eventually associated with the murder of US soldiers in the field, whereas in the former-Yugoslavia it failed to prevent the terrifying massacre in Srebrenica. In other cases, such as Cambodia, the Organisation was simply unable to achieve all the ambitious goals initially set, although it was able to successfully help the return and resettlement of a significant part of the population.⁸⁹ The problems or causes of those ‘failures’ included aspects such as the lack of political will, problems in the command of the operation, lack of adequate resources or an inadequate ability to fully understand the causes of armed conflicts, highlighting that the UN was facing severe challenges in multiple spheres while supporting countries towards building sustainable peace.

In addition to shortcomings faced in specific instances, the relapse into conflict in countries where the United Nations had acted in the past through ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping operations contributed to focus the attention of individuals in the UN *milieu* on the need to further develop peacebuilding activities after the departure of peacekeepers. Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti and Burundi, for instance, are illustrative of situations where local populations experienced renewed violence after the closure of a UN peace operation. In 2004, for instance, as Haiti was about to revert to violence due to internal instability, the world body deployed a major peacekeeping operation to the country. This would perhaps be another instance in which the world body was called to act, had it not been for the fact that Haiti had already hosted four UN operations throughout the 1990s (Mani, 2006; Shamsie and Thompson, 2006; Daudet, 1996). In Timor-Leste, the same happened after the resumption of violence in the country after 2006, following the departure of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) (Hughes, 2009). Hence, it seemed that the UN was not only failing, but that those failures were connected to subsequent outbreaks of violence. The UN was, in sum, unable to avoid the relapse into conflicts in places where it has already tried to ‘maintain’, ‘keep’ or ‘build’ peace.

The shortcomings associated with the UN practice were not restricted to the countries where the world body carried out concrete actions, but they were also detected in

⁸⁹ For good volumes exploring multiple peace operations since the 1990s, see, among others, Adebajo (2011, 2002), Bellamy *et al.* (2010), Richmond and Franks (2009), Fortna (2008), Berdal and Economides (2007), Durch (2006, 1996), MacQueen (2006), Paris (2004), Goulding (2002), Otunnu and Doyle (1998) and Doyle *et al.* (1997).

policy-oriented and academic studies in the UN *milieu*. One of such analyses was conducted in 2000 by the Panel on UN Peace Operations, which was already introduced to the reader in Chapter 5. The Panel led by Brahimi was tasked to “undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities” and to provide a “clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations” on the future UN activities in that area (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: i). It was commissioned, according to William Durch, principal researcher in the Office of the Panel’s chairperson, “because UN peace operations, and peacekeeping in particular, were in crisis” (Durch *et al.*, 2003: 3). In addition to the UN failures throughout the 1990s, as outlined above, the decision to assemble this high-level group followed a number of other factors, including: the adoption of a General Assembly resolution that ended DPKO’s prerogative to use ‘gratis military personnel’ (see UN Doc. A/RES/51/243); the rapid surge in demand for peacekeeping in the late 1990s, including the call to act as *quasi*-sovereign entities in Kosovo and Timor-Leste; as well as the release of the reports about the UN failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in Srebrenica (Durch *et al.*, 2003: 3-5). Against this backdrop, it seems that the decision to establish a high-level panel to comprehensively address UN peace operations was in itself another reminder of the underperformance of UN peace operations.

The Panel presented a comprehensive review of the UN past experience and current capacities to carry out peace operations. Right in its first paragraph, quoted in the epigraph of this chapter, the Brahimi report bluntly ascertained that “the United Nations ha[d] repeatedly failed to meet the challenge” of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 1). More specifically, the report pointed out that UN peace operations “addressed no more than one third of the conflict situations of the 1990s” (para. 29). It identified several of the causes of UN weaknesses and deficiencies in the area, which ranged from doctrinal and strategic issues (e.g. mismatch between mandates and resources effectively available to implement peace operations (paras. 56-64)) to operational (e.g. deficiency in deploying peace operations rapidly and effectively (paras. 84-169)) to managerial/administrative issues (e.g. shortage of staff and funding (paras. 172-197)). In what concerns peacebuilding, the Panel identified “a fundamental deficiency in the way [the United Nations system] has conceived of, funded and implemented peace-building strategies and activities” (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: ix). Against this context of repeated failures and lack of operational and bureaucratic capacities, the Brahimi report thus

claimed for “renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support” (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: viii).

In academia, there was no shortage of analyses of the UN record in building peace. George Downs and Stephen Stedman noted that between 1980 and 1997 the UN was clearly successful in only five (Namibia, Nicaragua, Mozambique, El Salvador and Guatemala) of the ten cases in which the world body acted as the main implementer of peace agreements reached among warring parties in civil wars (Downs and Stedman, 2002: 59). The authors indicated that in cases where the UN failed (fully in Somalia, Rwanda and twice in Angola; and partially in Cambodia), it was due to the Organisation’s incapacity to, among others, understand the nuances and complexities of particular contexts or to gather the necessary resources to effectively implement agreements once they have been made (Downs and Stedman, 2002). In another study, Paris argued that out of the fourteen ‘major peacebuilding missions’ established between 1989 and 1999 by the UN, only two were “clear successes”: UNTAG in Namibia and the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) (Paris, 2004: 151). In the other cases, he claims that the situation did not improve significantly. In particular instances, such as Nicaragua, El Salvador or Guatemala, Paris even contended that not only the UN did little to remedy inequality, but that it prescribed policies of economic liberalisation that in fact contributed to reinforce the social inequalities that had led to armed conflict in the first place (Paris, 2004: esp. 112-134). Similarly, looking into policies aimed at political liberalisation, Call and Cook pointed out that thirteen out of eighteen UN-led operations carried out since 1988 were “classified as some form of authoritarian regime as of 2002” (Call and Cook, 2003: 234).

One study authored by a World Bank team under the leadership of University of Oxford’s Paul Collier would become particularly relevant in the UN *milieu*: *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (2003). The study focused on the economics of civil wars, including considerations on their determinants worldwide and on how civil wars both affected and were affected by development – “[w]ar retards development, but conversely, development retards war” (Collier *et al.*, 2003: 1). One of the main contentions of the study is that the failure of economic development is the most important cause of conflict and as such, the persistence of economic underdevelopment increases the chances of a country falling into a ‘conflict trap’, that is, a situation in which

“powerful forces keep a conflict going, while the international community appears almost impotent to stop it” (Collier *et al.*, 2003: 83). The researchers pointed out that about 44 per cent of post-conflict countries will fall into that conflict trap within five years (Collier *et al.*, 2003: 83). This estimate, as discussed by Suhrke and Samset (2007) and elaborated below, gained widespread acceptance in the UN *milieu* and would be rhetorically used to justify the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005.

The problems related to the UN liberal democratic approach to peacebuilding were also made evident by a substantial body of critical scholarship. Richmond and Franks, for instance, evinced a major gap in contemporary UN peacebuilding: despite its wide-ranging ambitious goals, peacebuilding has seldom achieved anything more than a negative peace in post-armed conflict societies (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 203). In the African context, for instance, where peacebuilding efforts have been intense, Salih showed that the liberal democratic approach to peacebuilding “failed to address major developmental problems such as poverty, exclusion, the social justice deficit and inadequate access to basic human needs” (Salih, 2009). What the scholarly critique of the liberal peace has shown is that contemporary liberal democratic peacebuilding efforts have been closely associated with an intrusive practice that often “promotes a form of economic control and regulation to establish marked correctives in societies that have been resistant to conventional marketisation imperatives” (Pugh, 2005: 24). Against this backdrop, the positive peace envisaged by liberal interveners is thus rarely achieved. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, in sum, a number of academic studies have exposed that UN peacebuilding actions in post-conflict situations were no guarantee of a successful transition of states from war to peace, let alone durable peace in the long term. All those academic studies thus showed that the ultimate goal of achieving sustainable peace via the promotion of liberal policies had not produced the results initially expected by the United Nations.

The studies outlined above were produced by different individuals and with different purposes, both in the UN and in academia. Nevertheless, their analyses converge to identify several problems associated with the United Nations (liberal democratic) approach to peacebuilding in several areas and at different levels (Box 2). Those limits and shortcomings included, for instance, the inability to implement peace agreements and to gather the necessary resources for bold actions, the inappropriate sequencing of liberalisation policies, or even the inherent flaws associated with the external assistance via liberal

democratic peacebuilding. Those factors had a very negative impact on UN peace operations and proved major setbacks to the aspiration that the UN could effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-cold war. Indeed, the relapse of armed conflicts in places where peace operations had been deployed previously, such as Haiti or Liberia, as well as the challenges and difficulties increasingly associated with building peace in a number of other situations, gradually highlighted that inasmuch as a peace operations can be successful, further efforts are necessary to effectively create sustainable conditions for peace in the long term.

Box 2: Summary of some of UN peacebuilding problems and challenges

Ideational dimension

Inability to fully grasp the causes of armed conflict
Mismatch between peacebuilding policies and realities in the field

Bureaucratic dimension

Mismatch between mandates and organisational capacities
Lack of adequate resources (e.g. personnel, structures, financial)
Lack of capacity to ensure support after the departure of peacekeepers
Lack of intra-system coordination

Member states politics

Lack of political will
Limited financial support

Implementation level

Failure to implement peace accords
Lack of coordination between agencies in the field
Failure to achieve ambitious goals
Failure to prevent relapse into armed conflict

The ‘new peacebuilding architecture’: origins and rationale

In light of the problems identified above, specific responses were outlined and implemented as responses to them – or at least to some of them. The responses were not restricted to the UN Secretariat and related to several other activities carried out by the Organisation. In the late 1990s, for instance, some officials advocated for the creation of a unit for peacebuilding in the Department of Political Affairs (Anstee, 1998; see also DPA, 2003). More recently, as mentioned below, the UNDP also established a Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) to address some issues related to security sector reform, mine action and natural disaster recovery, although it never became a “comprehensive international post-conflict unit” (McCann, 2012: 82). A more recent example is the DPKO-

led development of an integrated planning framework that seeks to improve the coordination between several entities working on peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues in the UN system (Benner *et al.*, 2011: 187-196). Those proposals had different goals, rationales and implementing agencies, but they were mostly outlined with a view of addressing identified shortcomings and failures, as well as enhancing the UN's capacities in international peace and security issues.

The single most important and comprehensive recent initiative carried out as a response to the shortcomings and limits of the United Nations in the realm of peacebuilding, however, was undoubtedly the creation of what became known as the 'new peacebuilding architecture': an institutional arrangement encompassing the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. The arrangement focuses on both the bureaucratic and intergovernmental components of the UN, besides having been conceived to respond to different limits and shortcomings, including, for instance, in the realms of political coordination and financing. This and the following section focus on the rationale for the creation and the process that preceded the establishment of this innovative institutional arrangement. They are both rather telling about the influence of the liberal democratic peace framework in the UN approach to 'peacebuilding'. First, because the rationale advanced was essentially that the limits and shortcomings associated with the UN (liberal democratic) approach to peacebuilding required responses formulated at the bureaucratic and intergovernmental levels in New York rather than field-based responses. Second, because the political and institutional imperatives of the UN *milieu* in New York have shaped much of the format and configuration of those entities.

It is worth stressing that the Peacebuilding Commission and the associated PBSO and PBF are no panacea. They were not designed to, and neither could they, provide responses to *all* the problems identified in the previous section, but only to *some* of them, including, for instance, the lack of: preventive engagement in the support for countries risking a lapse or relapse into armed conflict; enhanced strategic direction and coordination of peacebuilding efforts; better involvement of civil society in UN peacebuilding efforts; and quick and sustained funding for peacebuilding initiatives (Berdal, 2009: 141). Those problems, as outlined in the previous section, are closely associated with some of the limits inherent to the liberal democratic peace framework that has provided the meaning for peacebuilding in the UN *milieu* over the last two decades, approximately.

The “direct precursor” idea to the Peacebuilding Commission, according to Lisa McCann (2012: 81), is the Strategic Recovery Facility (SRF), a mechanism conceived by a team of researchers led by Shepard Forman, from the New York University’s Center on International Cooperation (CIC-NYU). Based on the findings of a multi-year research (see Forman and Patrick, 2000), the team proposed the SRF with the ultimate goal of addressing the problem of coordination and of lack of sustainable funding in peacebuilding by “bringing key actors to the table” (Forman, 2012). The Facility was envisioned as a multilateral mechanism to facilitate the coordination of entities in the UN system, regional organisations, international donors and NGO representatives (Forman *et al.*, 2000: 26). In addition, the SRF would facilitate interaction with local representatives to ensure they could take ownership of the reconstruction and peacebuilding processes, and would involve experts to carry out adequate needs assessments. According to Forman (2012), the Facility was essentially conceived as a multilateral mechanism for coordination, but it would neither be constituted as an international organisation *per se* nor be part of the United Nations.⁹⁰ The SRF would have a small governing board with representative from different sectors (e.g. UN, World Bank, governments, NGOs), would be co-chaired by the President of the World Bank and the UN Secretary-General, and it would receive secretariat support from the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Finally, the SRF was supposed to have “a standing trust fund or a pre-negotiated stand-by funding arrangement to jump-start recovery” (Forman *et al.*, 2000: 26).

McCann (2012: 49-50) contends that the proposal for such a facility gained the support of individuals in important multilateral and bilateral donors, such as the World Bank and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Kingdom and Norway. Despite disagreement about specific details of the proposal, such as the physical location or the funding levels for the SRF, those individuals essentially agreed with the establishment of the mechanism. In the UN, however, Secretariat organs such as the DPA and DPKO were not very interested in seeing the implementation of the Facility (Forman, 2012). Efforts aimed at creating the SRF virtually came to an end after one of its key supporters, Marc Malloch Brown, left the World Bank to the UNDP and started working

⁹⁰ When addressing the SRF, Jenkins seems to overlook the latter aspect of the Facility, claiming that the presentation of the proposal outlined by Forman and colleagues was “the moment when the idea of a dedicated, *UN-centered*, but genuinely inclusive, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction entity came recognizably into view” (Jenkins, 2013: 56; emphasis added).

towards the establishment of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). The BCPR was not a replacement for the Strategic Recovery Facility, but both had the same overall goal (McCann, 2012: 50). The SRF *per se* thus never became operational.

Similarly, it may be said that the forerunner of the Peacebuilding Support Office was an equally ill-fated proposal to create a peacebuilding unit in the Department of Political Affairs. Such a proposal first emerged following Annan's 1997 decision to turn the DPA into the 'focal point' for peacebuilding in the UN system, as discussed in the previous chapter. Margaret Anstee, who had pushed forward the proposal in the first place, was required to present recommendations on how the Department could fulfil such a role (UNIHP, 2007b: 158). Among her recommendations, she proposed the creation of a special peacebuilding unit in the Department whose main functions would be, *inter alia*: to promote and coordinate the activities of DPA in the area of peacebuilding; to liaise and cooperate with other UN entities; and to advise the Head of Department on peacebuilding matters (Anstee, 1998: paras. 18-19). The proposal did gain support in the DPA and an internal decision was made to implement the unit (DPA, 2003: 1). Some member states even pledged commitment for extra-budgetary resources to fund the unit, but the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) later rejected the DPA's request for resources to fund the unit (DPA, 2003: 1).

In 2000, the Brahimi Report provided further support to the proposal, noting that "there is great merit in creating a consolidated and permanent institutional capacity [for peacebuilding] within the United Nations system" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 44). By the time of this endorsement, the proposal started to face resistance at both the intergovernmental and the bureaucratic dimensions of the UN. Among member states, the resistance was due to the unit's association as a "close affiliate" (para. 71) to a brand new proposal presented by the Panel: the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). Idealised as an analytical arm to support the Executive Committee's advisory role on peace and security issues, EISAS was conceived to improve the UN's capacities in information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: paras. 65-74). According to William Durch, lead research of the team that wrote the Brahimi report, EISAS "drew suspicions" among members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), especially because some feared that it could threaten their sovereignty by exposing risks of instability or armed conflicts (Durch *et al.*, 2003: 39). In the Secretariat, according to

Michael Doyle, then Special Advisor in the EOSG, some members of staff were doubtful that the DPA, mainly tasked with peacemaking, mediation and good offices, was the ideal place for addressing peacebuilding needs (Doyle, 2012). Against such resistance, and owing to other factors, including a new rejection of budgetary provisions from the ACABQ in 2002, a unit for peacebuilding was never established in the DPA (Call, 2005: 2; see also DPA, 2003).

The proposals of the Strategic Recovery Facility and of a peacebuilding unit in the DPA were never implemented, but they provided some of the key elements that shaped debates in the UN *milieu* concerning the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. In fact, both proposals were eventually recovered and modified in connection with the workings of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP).⁹¹ This blue ribbon commission was established in November 2003 by Kofi Annan, who had earlier in that year claimed that the Organisation had reached a “fork in the road” and that it was necessary to reassess whether its structures, rules and instruments were still adequate to respond to the challenges of the twenty-first century (Annan, 2003). The Panel was thus tasked with “examining the major threats and challenges the world face[d] in the broad field of peace and security, including economic and social issues insofar as they relate[d] to peace and security, and making recommendations for the elements of a collective response” (UN Doc. A/58/612: 1). In its final report, entitled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, the Panel offered a number of recommendations in the area of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (paras. 210-230), amongst which the establishment of a commission for peacebuilding (para. 263) and of peacebuilding support office in the Secretariat (para. 266) to enhance the UN’s capacities in the area.

According to Lisa McCann (2012: 118-119), the recommendation of a commission for peacebuilding in the Report of the High-level Panel stemmed partially from the advocacy efforts of Bruce Jones, Forman’s deputy in the CIC-NYU and member of the Panel’s research team. Jones, who was familiar with the SRF proposal and later succeeded Forman

⁹¹ The Panel was chaired by Anand Panyarachun (Thailand). The other fifteen members were: Robert Badinter (France), João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), David Hannay (United Kingdom), Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana), Gareth Evans (Australia), Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Satish Nambiar (India), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation), Qian Qichen (China), Nafis Sadiq (Pakistan), Salim Ahmed Salim (Tanzania) and Brent Scowcroft (United States of America) (UN Doc. A/58/612: Annex II).

in the CIC, “revived” the dormant proposal of the SRF, bringing it to the attention of the Panel and pushing for its acceptance among Panel members (McCann, 2012: 119). Jones, however, made some modifications in the original proposal, such as changing its name to avoid its association with the ill-fated SRF and to its institutional *locus*: rather than a stand-alone multilateral arrangement, the proposed commission would be part of the United Nations (McCann, 2012: 83-85). The Panel’s endorsement of the revised proposal of the SRF brought to the UN *milieu* the questions of whether or not to establish such a commission, and under what specific format or configuration, as explored in the following section.

Identifying and understanding the proposals that eventually informed the current format and configuration of the actual Peacebuilding Commission, however, do not answer the question of *why* such a commission was needed in the first place. The rationale offered by the Panel for the establishment of the commission was a rather simplistic one, formulated along the lines of a particular institutional deficiency. According to the Panel, the United Nations and the so-called ‘international community’ were not “well organized to assist countries attempting to build peace” due to a “key institutional gap”: the lack of organisational structures “explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace” (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 261). Hence, in the Panel’s assessment, what was needed was “a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding” (para. 225). In addition, “a Peacebuilding Support Office” was needed to provide support “on the broader aspects of peacebuilding strategy” (para. 230) and to deliver appropriate secretariat support to the proposed commission for peacebuilding (para. 266).

It is worth noting that the Panel’s rationale is not unprecedented; in fact, it has been influenced by developments in multilateral and bilateral donors. Over the last few years, some key donors had started to restructure their domestic organisations as responses to, among others, “[f]rustrations with persistent gaps in international civilian capacities, the short attention span of donors once crisis have fallen from the headlines, and problems of interagency coordination” (Call and Wyeth, 2008: 4). Key members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted ‘whole of government’ approaches with a view of bringing together the wide array of government structures working in the realms of foreign and economic affairs, defence and development (OECD,

2006).⁹² Among those members, the United States of America, for instance, created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation, while the United Kingdom created the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit and Canada established a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Bensahel, 2007; Patrick and Brown, 2006). By the same token, international organisations such as the World Bank and the European Union (EU) have recently rearranged their organisational structures in order to enhance their capacities in peacebuilding (Call and Wyeth, 2008: 4; Bensahel, 2007). As those actors gained specialised bureaucratic capacities, they gradually developed their own tools for conflict analysis and for management and evaluation of their interventions, presumably enhancing their ‘effectiveness’ (Mac Ginty, 2012; Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009: 58-60). In academe, those developments led Nora Bensahel to claim that reforms in organisational structures are the “least glamorous but most important” way to address the lack of capacity of governments and international organisations in performing peacebuilding tasks (Bensahel, 2007: 43).

Underlying the rationale elaborated by those actors, lies the assumption that reforms in the organisational structures of international organisations (such as the United Nations or the EU) or of member states (such as the USA or Canada), will necessarily lead to substantial improvement of peacebuilding initiatives in the field. This assumed connection is flawed to the extent that it relies on a “project management philosophy” according to which “peace can be externally engineered if one possesses the adequate knowledge, local partners and financial means” (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009: 62). By proposing the commission as a response to the limits and shortcomings of the UN approach to peacebuilding, it was expected that a New York-based organ would provide adequate responses to problems faced by peacebuilders at the local levels.

The assumed causal connection between headquarters-based organisational reforms and the improvement of peacebuilding efforts in the ‘field’ is problematic at best, considering that it has not necessarily been proved right. Nevertheless, it has informed the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and associated bodies. This assumed causal relationship may be seen, for instance, in the words of Jan Eliasson, President of the General Assembly in the year the Peacebuilding Commission was established. Minutes before

⁹² The approach is defined as “one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives” (OECD, 2006: 14).

putting for a vote the resolution that would create the new organ, Eliasson argued that establishing the Peacebuilding Commission

would be our best chance to reverse the trend which we have seen around the world in recent years, where half of the countries emerging from conflict are lapsing back into it again within five years. It would help to bring an end to the pattern of conflicts erupting again simply because support for the healing process was not there when it was needed. (A/60/PV.66, 2005: 1)

Whereas his words might as well be regarded as an overstatement preceding the General Assembly's vote, it is clear that the organisational arrangement first proposed by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was expected to have clear direct impacts in 'the field', in concrete scenarios where the UN carried out peacebuilding initiatives.

The rationale produced by the Panel while advocating the creation of a commission for peacebuilding is rather telling about technocracy and the bureaucratic imperative associated with the liberal democratic peace (see Mac Ginty, 2012). First, because it depoliticises highly political issues (peace and 'peacebuilding') for the sake of bureaucratic and managerial rationality (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009: 57), thus ensuring that decisions on those issues would remain within the purview of New York-based actors. Second, and consequently, because the Panel's recommendation in essence entailed a shift in the locus of power (Mac Ginty, 2012: 302) from the contexts where peacebuilding initiatives are carried out to an intergovernmental organ based New York. Hence, although several of the limits and shortcomings associated with the UN approach to peacebuilding were identified at the field level, as outlined in the previous section, the major response outlined in the UN *milieu* was an organisational rearrangement at the headquarters level. The single major consequence of this shift was that future peacebuilding initiatives would be "oriented with external interests and values" (Mac Ginty, 2012: 302) set by politics, diplomatic and bureaucratic concerns of New York, rather than by the priorities and needs identified by the local populations affected by armed conflict.

Whereas the following chapter explores the consequences of the Panel's recommendations against the backdrop of the functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, PBSO and PBF, the following section shows that the political and diplomatic concerns of member states were instrumental even before they were created. In fact, a brief overview of the contentious process leading to their establishment highlights how the final format and configuration of those three entities were responsive to political and diplomatic dynamics of the UN *milieu* in New York rather than local peacebuilding contexts.

The politics behind the establishment of the ‘new architecture’

Notwithstanding the narrow and problematic rationale offered by the Panel, the proposal for establishing a commission for peacebuilding became part of the political agenda of the UN *milieu* in 2005. The proposal for such a commission, alongside any other recommendation of the Panel that required a decision from member states, was subsequently addressed at length in negotiations in the United Nations throughout the year. As the proposal was considered, it went through modifications that substantially affected the final format and configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission as we know it. A set of four documents embody original proposal and the gradual modifications that eventually contributed to shape the actual PBC, PBSO and PBF: the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, of 2 December 2004; Annan’s report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, dated 21 March 2005; the *Outcome Document* adopted on 16 September 2005 during so-called 2005 World Summit; and three resolutions adopted almost simultaneously by the Security Council and the General Assembly in late December 2005 with a view to ‘operationalize’ the Commission.

What follows briefly outlines the main features of the proposed Commission in each one of those four documents, highlighting particularly the political and bureaucratic aspects that ultimately shaped the format and configuration of the PBC, PBSO and PBF as we know them.⁹³ By the end of this section, it will become clear that those bodies were mainly constituted as responses to New York-based requirements rather than to the needs and priorities identified in peacebuilding scenarios. It is thus doubtful (or at least questionable) that those entities could in the end have significant impacts in the field.

The Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

Under the title *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, the Report of the High-level Panel proposed that a commission for peacebuilding was established by the Security Council, “acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations” (UN Doc.

⁹³ For other analyses, see Jenkins (2013: 51-72), Bellamy (2010: 196-201), Berdal (2009: 135-169) and Ponzio (2007, 2005). Relevant first-hand, non-academic, accounts of the processes revised in this section are provided by John Bolton (2007: esp. 220-245), Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations in 2005-2006, and by Gilda Neves (2009: esp. 119-150), diplomat of the Mission of Brazil to the United Nations who covered the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the establishment of the PBC.

A/59/565: para. 263). This meant, in theory and in practice, that the new body would be constituted as a subsidiary body of the Council: the new commission would thus have its powers and functions determined by the Council, to whom it would report directly.⁹⁴ As for the mandate, the report of the Panel offered some general guidance by outlining the primary functions of the proposed intergovernmental body as:

to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary. (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 264)

A More Secure World refrained from defining precisely the composition, internal procedures and the specific lines of reporting of the proposed commission, limiting itself to offering some general guidelines. Amongst them, the report recommended that the commission was to be constituted as a “reasonably small” body and to function under multiple configurations (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 265(a) and (b)). The proposed entity should be chaired by “a member approved by the Security Council” and it should be represented by member states from the Security Council and from the Economic and Social Council (para. 265(c) and (d)). In addition, other actors were supposed to be invited and represented: national representatives from the countries under consideration; representatives from the International Monetary Fund and from the World Bank, and from regional development banks, when appropriate; representatives from donor countries and, when appropriate, from troop contributing countries; and representatives from regional and sub-regional organisations, when they are active in the country concerned (para. 265(e) to (h)). The proposal of the High-level Panel thus closely resembled the SRF idea of enhancing the coordination among key actors by bringing them to the table, as outlined in the previous section.

Alongside an intergovernmental body, the Report proposed the creation of a support office in the Secretariat. This bureaucratic entity was supposed to provide the necessary “Secretariat support” for the commission and to “ensure that the Secretary-General [was]

⁹⁴ Peacekeeping operations, sanctions committees and international tribunals are perhaps the best examples of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council. For a detailed comment of Art. 29, see Simma *et al.* (2012: 983-1027). For a good analysis of the functions and workings of Security Council subsidiary bodies, see Bailey (1998: 333-378).

able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations” (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 266). The office envisioned by the authors of the Report was relatively small – “about 20 or more” – but adequately skilled, as its staff should have “different backgrounds” and “significant experience in peacebuilding strategy and operations” (para. 267). Further to its secretariat role, the office could, upon request, assist and advise the UN leadership in the field as well as national authorities (para. 267). The new office was also tasked with maintaining a roster of experts on peacebuilding (para. 268). The idea of a support office in the Secretariat was a departure from the mechanism originally proposed by Forman *et al.* (2000), as the SRF, had it been implemented, would receive secretariat and administrative support from the UNOPS.

A More Secure World also proposed the establishment of a standing fund for peacebuilding with a two-fold scope: finance “the recurrent expenditures of a nascent Government” and “critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration” (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 228). The Panel did not go into detail about the fund, but no direct connection was made in the report between the proposed fund and the commission. Forman and colleagues had also envisioned the SRF equipped with a standing trust fund or a “pre-negotiated stand-by funding arrangement to jump-start recovery activities” (Forman *et al.*, 2000: 26).

As conceived by the Panel, the new organ was thus supposed to play a major role in contemporary peacebuilding, with responsibilities that ranged from preventing countries from lapsing into armed conflict in the first place to ensuring sustained attention and availability of resources to the reconstruction of countries once armed conflicts were over. This original mandate, in sum, would cover “everything from early-warning to post-conflict reconstruction” (Bellamy, 2010: 198). Those functions, unsurprisingly, reflected the understanding of armed conflicts as part of a linear continuum that should be tackled by different mechanisms according to the phase of conflict. This understanding of armed conflicts and of the role of the UN, as discussed at length in Chapter 3 and 4, has its roots in Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace*, highlighting the continued influence of the liberal democratic peace framework in the UN approach to peacebuilding since the early 1990s.

The Secretary-General's In Larger Freedom report

Following the release of the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the tone of the discussions about the establishment of a commission for peacebuilding seemed promising, with individuals in the UN *milieu* excited about the prospects for such a new body. During a meeting with high-level figures in the UN milieu held by a non-profit organisation in New York on 11-13 February 2005, participants regarded the commission as an idea “whose time ha[d] come” and as a proposal that “most countries could support” (The Stanley Foundation, 2005: 12). Enthusiasm for the proposal, however, did not necessarily imply general agreement about its operationalization. In fact, the overall tone of the negotiations that would take place until the end of the year would be marked by a relatively clear political divide in the UN membership among developing and developed countries. The following passage, extracted from an internal document summarising one of the first informal meetings of the General Assembly to consider *A More Secure World*, aptly captures the general lines of the division:

Though the alignment of both delegations and regional groups along the north-south/security-development axis was obviously foreseen, the degree of entrenchment frequently indicated and the polarization of views expressed were both somewhat surprising. Delegations on both sides of the divide clearly felt compelled to use these meetings to leverage points and positions with a view to influencing the upcoming March report by the Secretary-General [*In Larger Freedom*], which they seemed to anticipate as both a synthesis of the HLP [*A More Secure World*] and Sachs Report [*Investing in Development*] processes and as a watershed in its own right. Beyond it, the September summit clearly loomed equally large on their horizon as well. (DGACM: Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, 2012: 3293)

The divide along the north-south/security-development axis would become gradually more polarised over the following months, as outlined below.

On 21 March 2005, Kofi Annan presented his consolidated views on the broader reform of the UN he had initiated following his ‘fork in the road’ speech in a report titled *In Larger Freedom*. The report was partially inspired on two broad reviews of the UN activities in the areas of peace and security and development: respectively, the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, outlined above; and the final report of the UN Millennium Project (2005), titled *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, which proposed a plan of action to implement the Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000. As it had been the case with the HLP

Report, Annan's document was also received in hyperbolic terms as "without question the most sweeping program of reform ever proposed by the UN itself" (Traub, 2006: 320).

In what concerns topics in the realm of international peace and security in general and peacebuilding in particular, Annan's report did not differ substantially from *A More Secure World*. The Secretary-General did not delve into conceptual elaborations on the topic, but he straightforwardly endorsed the Panel's recommendation to establish a commission for peacebuilding. The rationale offered by Annan mirrored the one outlined by the High-level Panel: according to him, a commission for peacebuilding was necessary to fill in a "gaping hole" in the UN, since "no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace" (UN Doc. A/59/2005: para. 114). At the core of both rationales, hence, lies the belief that the challenges of contemporary peacebuilding could be addressed via the establishment of a New York-based intergovernmental organ.

In terms of content, however, Annan modified two key aspects of the proposal presented in *A More Secure World* based on "reactions from Member States" (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2: para. 3). In the realm of high-level diplomacy, the modifications were undoubtedly an attempt to minimise the north-south/security-development divide with a view of ensuring the broadest basis of support as possible from member states. In fact, although the Secretary-General was presenting a report with his own views on the issue, the proposal for a peacebuilding commission would need to be discussed and negotiated by the UN membership at large. Subsequently, member states would need to decide, by a vote or a consensual decision, on whether or not to create the new organ. Amending the proposal of the High-level Panel thus required aptly elaborating and transmitting to member states a tangible, concrete and acceptable outline for the commission.

The first key modification proposed by Annan referred to the institutional *locus* and to the reporting lines of the new commission for peacebuilding. Rather than a subsidiary body reporting exclusively to the Security Council, he argued that the commission for peacebuilding "would best combine efficiency with legitimacy if it were to advise the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in sequence, depending on the state of recovery" (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2: para. 25). The proposed modification was certainly an attempt to mediate the diverging views on the institutional *locus* of the Commission. On the one hand, some developed countries, including the five permanent

members of the Security Council (P5), favoured addressing peacebuilding as a security issue and were “determined that the PBC not become a backseat driver for the Security Council” (Bolton, 2007: 226). On the other hand, developing countries tended to see the need to include developmental concerns when addressing peacebuilding and thus favoured more balance between the principal organs of the United Nations, especially in what concerns linking the proposed commission to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Neves, 2009: 114).

The second key modification refers to the removal of the preventive function of the commission, as originally outlined in *A More Secure World*. The reasons behind the Secretary-General’s decision lay both in the intergovernmental and bureaucratic components of the United Nations. On the one hand, member states are normally reticent about measures aimed at seriously strengthening the UN’s capacities in conflict prevention: whereas member states such as the permanent members of the Council are normally wary that increasing the UN capacities might be detrimental to the Council’s primary role in international peace and security issues (Bellamy, 2010: 198), members such as developing countries fear that granting bolder early warning and monitoring roles for the UN potentially threatens the principle of non-intervention (Berdal, 2009: 152). In this connection, the brief existence of the ORCI in the late 1980s and early 1990s is a telling illustration of such difficulties (see Kanninen and Kumar, 2005; Ramcharan, 1991). On the other hand, given that a range of conflict prevention activities were already in place across the UN system, it was doubtful that the proposed new commission and its support office would be able to play any meaningful distinctive role in the area (Almqvist, 2005: 7). It should not, as such, come as a surprise that Annan justified removing an early-warning function in his revised proposal by arguing that “other mechanisms” already existed in the UN system (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2: para. 17). Moreover, it is not unlikely that other entities in the system, acting with the view of protecting their ‘turf’, resisted the inclusion of yet another active player in issues of conflict prevention.

The Outcome Document

The Outcome Document was adopted as a General Assembly resolution on 16 September 2005 and reflected lengthy negotiations among member states following the release of *In Larger Freedom*. The High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the

General Assembly, the so-called 2005 World Summit, was originally conceived as a follow-up to the 2000 Millennium Summit. However, Annan's reform proposals, elaborated against the backdrop of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent split in the UN membership over the US-led invasion of Iraq, generated a change in the global agenda that resulted in a meeting that would more directly review the broader issues of UN reform and matters related to international peace and security rather than concerns over development alone (Neves, 2009: 117-118). According to Gilda Neves, a Brazilian delegate in the negotiations preceding the World Summit, "the impressive range of topics under discussion, the short time available and the lack of leadership (the Secretary-General [was] initially absorbed with the oil-for-food issue)" contributed to make that process of intergovernmental negotiations a "rather troubled" one (Neves, 2009: 126).⁹⁵ The burst of enthusiasm with which member states had initially greeted the proposal for a peacebuilding commission in February 2005 was thus soon accompanied by an intense and controversial period of intergovernmental negotiations, which were once again marked by the membership and Secretariat divide along the north-south/security-development axis.

According to individuals directly involved in the process, two broad sets of issues proved to be more contentious until virtually the end of the negotiations: the institutional *locus* and the membership of the Peacebuilding Commission (Neves, 2009: 127; Bolton, 2007: 229). In what concerns the former, member states were divided as to whether the Commission should be organisationally located either as a subsidiary body of the Security Council or elsewhere under a different arrangement. The existing options in the latter case included creating a commission that reported to the Security Council *and* to the General Assembly and/or the ECOSOC. Member states such as Brazil, India, Iran and Switzerland, for different reasons, showed discontent with the proposal to create the commission as a subsidiary body of the Security Council without additional reporting lines to other organs (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66). Conversely, according to John Bolton, then Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, the permanent members of the Security Council were "determined that the PBC not become a backseat driver for the Security Council" (Bolton, 2007: 226). As for membership, division lines

⁹⁵ From the original in Portuguese: "(...) o contexto geral das negociações, bastante conturbado em razão da impressionante variedade de temas em discussão, do curto prazo disponível e da falta de liderança (o Secretário-Geral inicialmente absorvido com a questão do petróleo-por-alimentos), (...)".

emerged in terms of the number and origins of members of the Commission: whereas developing countries seemed to favour a more inclusive body, Western donor countries seemed interested to keep the Commission “restricted to 20 member countries [...] and to limit the categories of members to those foreseen in the Secretary-General’s report (Security Council, ECOSOC, financial contributors and troop contributors), as well as to ensure that the five members [elected] from the Security Council were the P5” (Neves, 2009: 130).⁹⁶

As no consensus could be forged on those issues before the World Summit, the deadline for the intergovernmental negotiations, the *Outcome Document* eventually adopted was somewhat vague on some features of the Peacebuilding Commission. In the *Document*, the main purpose of the Commission was envisaged as “to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery” (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: para. 98). In addition, the Commission should: focus on relevant issues for reconstruction and assist in the development of “integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development”; offer recommendations and information aiming at improving the coordination of actors involved in peacebuilding efforts; develop best practices; help ensure predictability in the availability of funds for “early recovery activities”; and “extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery” (para. 98). Despite its wide-range functions, the Commission had thus been precluded to carry out early warning functions, as in Annan’s proposal.

The *Outcome Document* defined that the Commission should make decisions on the basis of consensus (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: para. 98). It also further specified the distinct configurations under which the Commission would operate: as country-specific meetings (currently the Country-Specific Configurations, or CSCs) and as an Organizational Committee (OC) (paras. 100-101). The Commission would be composed by members chosen from the four categories previously outlined in *A More Secure World* and *In Larger Freedom*: representatives from the Security Council; from the ECOSOC; from the major financial contributors; and from the major troop contributing countries (para. 101). It is worth noting that the wording of the document referred to the ‘categories’ of members, but

⁹⁶ From the original in Portuguese: “manter o órgão restrito a 20 países membros (...) e limitar as categorias de membros àquelas previstas no documento do Secretário-Geral (Conselho de Segurança, ECOSOC, contribuintes financeiros e contribuintes de tropas), bem como garantir que os cinco membros provenientes do Conselho de Segurança fossem os P-5”.

did not specify the number of members to be represented in the Commission from each category, or how they would be chosen. This issue would only be addressed in the context of the negotiations of the resolutions that were subsequently adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly to ‘operationalize’ the Commission, as discussed below.

The *Outcome Document* also requested that the Secretary-General established the Peacebuilding Fund and a support office in the Secretariat (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: paras. 103-104). The document connected the three entities for the first time, given that the Report of the High-level Panel did not tie the recommendation of a fund for peacebuilding to its proposed commission for peacebuilding. Finally, the document conveyed member states’ decision that the Peacebuilding Commission “begin its work no later than 31 December 2005” (para. 105).

The Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions

The adoption of the *Outcome Document* did not solve the contending issues related to the PBC, which were largely left purposely unresolved in the wording of the resolution.⁹⁷ Hence, further negotiations were carried out among member states between September and December 2005. The purpose of this new round of negotiations was to adopt a resolution with a more specific text in order to enable the functioning of the new body (Neves, 2009: 133-134). The negotiations, according to Neves (2009: 133), were a “*déjà-vu*” of the process preceding the World Summit, but with one additional issue of contention:

the Western countries wanted to “create” the Peacebuilding Commission in the body of the resolution that was beginning to be discussed and position it functionally under the aegis of the Security Council, while most of the other countries argued that the organ had already been created by the previous resolution (Outcome Document) and [that] it remained [for member states] to define its parameters of action and make it operational. (Neves, 2009: 134)⁹⁸

Discussions about the new UN body thus remained polarised along the north-south/security-development axis.

⁹⁷ The use of ambiguous wording in this and in other instances related to the establishment of the PBC is a recurrent practice in high-level diplomacy. This practice is called constructive ambiguity, which may be defined as “[t]he deliberate use of imprecise language in the drafting of an agreement on a sensitive issue. The aim is to secure its approval in the hope (perhaps purported and often in vain) that its actual approval will encourage further and more substantive steps towards an agreement” (Berridge and James, 2003: 51).

⁹⁸ From the original in Portuguese: “os países ocidentais desejavam ‘criar’ a Comissão para Consolidação da Paz no corpo da resolução que se começava a discutir e posicioná-la funcionalmente sob a égide do Conselho de Segurança, ao passo que a maioria dos demais países argumentava que o órgão fora criado pela resolução anterior (Documento Final) e restava definir-lhe os parâmetros de atuação e torná-la operacional”.

On 20 December 2005, member states adopted, almost simultaneously, two identical resolutions in the Security Council and in the General Assembly with a view to “operationalize” the decision of the World Summit and to “establish” (once again) the Peacebuilding Commission (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 1; S/RES/1645: op. 1). The second operative paragraph of UNSC Resolution 1645 and of UNGA Resolution 60/180 outlined the purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission with the exact same wording of the Outcome Document (see A/RES/60/1: para. 98). Substantially, the Resolutions specified that the Commission would be composed of thirty-one member states chosen from the four categories outlined above, in addition to a fifth category of members from the General Assembly (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 4; S/RES/1645: op. 4). This category was allegedly included with a view to balance the geographical membership of the Peacebuilding Commission.

In a rather illustrative case of how diplomacy works in the United Nations, all the permanent members of the Security Council became, in practice, permanent members of the Peacebuilding Commission as well. This was a result of the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1646, tabulated by Denmark and France only a few hours before the voting of Resolution 1645 was expected to take place (Neves, 2009: 141-142). The whole issue revolves around the particle *the*: paragraph 101(a) of the *Outcome Document* stated that, among others, the Organizational Committee of the PBC should comprise “Members of the Security Council, including permanent members”. Without the particle, the wording purposely denoted that not all, but only some of the P5 would also be members of the Peacebuilding Commission. In Resolution 1645, however, the Council was explicit, deciding that

pursuant to paragraph 4(a) of resolution 1645 (2005) that *the* permanent members listed in article 23(1) of the Charter shall be members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission and that, in addition, the Council shall select annually two of its elected members to participate in the Organizational Committee. (UN Doc. S/RES/1646: op. 1)

The P5 of the Security Council thus became, in practice, permanent members of the Peacebuilding Commission.⁹⁹

From the Panel’s recommendation of a commission for peacebuilding, in November 2004, to the actual establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, in September or

⁹⁹ Given the proportions of the debate over a single particle, John Bolton ironically noted, not without a stint of personal satisfaction, that “[n]o wonder defending the United States at the UN requires picky negotiators!” (Bolton, 2007: 230).

December 2005 (depending on the perspective adopted), the Peacebuilding Commission in particular had its format and configuration dramatically changed. In the words of Mats Berdal (2009: 148), the new entity suffered a “death by many cuts”. From an entity designed with a view to make the UN more effective in the “whole continuum that runs from early warning through preventive action to post-conflict peacebuilding” (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 263), the Peacebuilding Commission was eventually constituted with a much more limited mandate, with no provisions on early warning and preventive diplomacy. This process, unsurprisingly to a certain extent, reflected the political and diplomatic dynamics of New York. However, at no moment were the concerns or the needs and priorities of societies affected by armed conflict taken into consideration to inform whether or not a specific composition would have had a more direct impact in designing peacebuilding strategies, in providing advice to the Security Council, in ensuring predictability of funds or in enhancing better coordination among UN agencies. Although somewhat unsurprising, since the arrangement was implemented in the realm of an intergovernmental organisation, this remark is equally puzzling if one considers the rather positive impact the Peacebuilding Commission was expected to have in the field.

The ‘new elements’ of the UN peacebuilding architecture

In light of the contentious processes and dynamics outlined above, this section describes the exact contours of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund as they became operational in the United Nations in 2005-2006. This overview is intended to provide the reader with a better view of the structures and mandates of those entities, which will facilitate the discussion carried out in the following chapter.

The Peacebuilding Commission was established as an intergovernmental advisory body in the UN with the following purposes:

- a) To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery. (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 2; S/RES/1645: op. 2)

The Peacebuilding Commission operates under three different configurations. The first is the Organizational Committee (OC), which sets the agenda of the PBC and tackles operational and administrative matters as well as some crosscutting substantial peacebuilding issues. The OC is composed by thirty-one member states who serve two-year renewable mandates.¹⁰⁰ They are elected from the members of the following organs and groups: Security Council (seven members elected); Economic and Social Council (seven); General Assembly (seven); the group of the top contributors to the UN budget and voluntary contributions (five); and the group of the top five contributors of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 4). The second configuration under which the PBC operates is the Country-Specific Configuration (CSC),¹⁰¹ wherein issues related to each one of the countries on the PBC agenda are discussed separately. Membership of CSCs is defined according to the specificities of each one of the countries concerned, usually including member states from the same region, international financial institutions and civil society organisations. Finally, the third configuration is the Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL), responsible for drawing lessons from past experiences and for preparing recommendations on the planning and implementation of peacebuilding actions.

The participation of other international organisations in the Peacebuilding Commission meetings is a distinctive feature of this intergovernmental body. According to Resolutions 60/180 and 1645 (2005), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are to be invited to all meetings of the Commission (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 9; S/RES/1645: op. 9). In addition, on 16 May 2007, the OC decided to issue a “standing invitation” to the European Community (which is to be represented by the European Commission) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) to attend all meetings of the PBC (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.7).

The Country-Specific Configurations are created after countries are placed in the PBC agenda by the Organisational Committee. There are no substantial provisions or criteria guiding the decision to include one country over the other in Resolutions 60/180 and 1645 (2005), which means that such decisions are inherently political. The aforementioned

¹⁰⁰As of writing, the updated membership of the Peacebuilding Commission in its different configurations is available as Peacebuilding Commission (2013).

¹⁰¹ Previously known as Country-Specific Meetings (CSMs).

Resolutions outline only the modalities through which countries may be included in the agenda: via requests for advice from the Security Council; from the ECOSOC or the General Assembly; from member states themselves; and from the Secretary-General (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 12). When countries are referred to the PBC by the ECOSOC or the General Assembly, three requirements need to be met: the countries concerned have to consent to the referral; they have to be in “exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict”; and they should not be “seized” by (that is, they should not be in the agenda of) the Security Council (op. 12(b)). Finally, when member states themselves require advice to the PBC, they also need to be on “exceptional circumstances” and not on the agenda of the Security Council. As of writing, six countries are in the PBC agenda: Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea (Conakry), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.


The PBC was created alongside an office in the Secretariat and a Secretary-General’s standing fund for peacebuilding. In the Resolutions that operationalized the PBC, the Secretary-General was again requested to establish a “small” peacebuilding office in the Secretariat, “within the existing resources” and “staffed by qualified experts” (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 23; S/RES/1645: op. 23). The main purpose of the office was to “assist and support” the PBC, which potentially included “gathering and analysing information relating to the availability of financial resources, relevant United Nations in-country planning activities, progress towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals and best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues” (op. 23). In addition, the PBSO was envisioned with the view of coordinating and fostering coherence in the UN system by assisting the Secretary-General with strategic guidance and policy advice, and of managing the Peacebuilding Fund (United Nations, 2005a). Whereas the PBSO mandate of assisting the PBC and of managing the PBF emanated from the General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions that operationalized the Commission, the PBSO mandate of coordinating and fostering coherence across the system (the so-called ‘second mandate’) derived from the “Secretary-General’s standing mandate to coordinate the UN system’s peacebuilding efforts” (United Nations, 2007: 4). The management of the Fund is carried out in accordance with the PBF Terms of Reference, as outlined below. Institutionally, the PBSO is placed in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General (ASG). This arrangement allows for an Office with direct

contact with the EOSG, rather than a mediated contact via another entity such as the DPKO or the DPA.

The creation of the Peacebuilding Fund was a response to the needs of countries undergoing a transition from a situation of war to a situation of peace, with special emphasis on the early stage of the process of peacebuilding and when there were no other sources of funding available. The Fund was envisaged as a quick and flexible mechanism for the provision of direct support to the immediate peacebuilding needs, rather than long-term development processes. Contrary to what a casual observer may think, however, the PBF is not a Peacebuilding Commission's fund, but rather a multi-year standing fund established by the Secretary-General, following the request originally contained in the Outcome Document (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: para. 103). As such, rather than financing all peacebuilding activities in specific contexts, the PBF was designed to provide essential funding for focused efforts that could potentially spill over to other areas, thus creating the conditions for sustained engagement from traditional international donors and development agencies (Williams, 2010).

From a functional perspective, the PBF was placed under the responsibility of the Head of the PSBO, who provides “overall direction and guidance on programme management of the Peacebuilding Fund and monitor[s] its operations”, under the authority of the Secretary-General (UN Doc. A/63/818: Annex, para. 4.1). As such, relevant policy decisions concerning the PBF are usually taken by the head of the PBSO, acting under the authority of the UN Secretary-General and often in consultation with senior officials from relevant UN entities – for instance, determining the amount of funding envelopes in the programme-based mechanism of the Fund (Annex, para. 3.5). The financial management of the Fund is made by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office of the UNDP, which acts as the PBF administrative agent under the authority of the Head of the PBSO (Annex, para. 4.1). An independent Advisory Group composed of individuals with reputable knowledge and experience in peacebuilding issues provides advice and oversees the allocations of the PBF (Annex, para. 5.3). Figure 5 offers a visual sketch of these three new entities *vis-à-vis* some older organs in the UN structures.

Soon after the creation of those three new entities, they would be collectively referred to as the UN ‘peacebuilding architecture’ in the UN *milieu*, including in unofficial (e.g. United Nations, 2010) and official documents (e.g. UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393).



According to McAskie (2012), first ASG for Peacebuilding Support, the expression sought to capture the notion of an infrastructure composed of closely related organisational entities dealing with the particular issue of peacebuilding.¹⁰² The use of the expression attracted some resistance from entities such as the DPA and DPKO, as it seemed to imply that activities in the realm of peacebuilding are only carried out by those three entities and that other parts of the UN system were not involved in peacebuilding at all before they were established (Ulich, 2012; Morrice, 2011). As discussed in Chapter 5, however, other entities in the UN system have indeed carried out peacebuilding tasks much sooner than 2005-2006. Hence, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund are perhaps better understood as ‘new elements’, ‘new entities’, in a broader UN ‘peacebuilding architecture’.

The formats, mandates and structures of the PBC, PBSO and PBF reflect entities whose activities take place primarily at the UN Headquarters level in New York. They were not envisaged as operational bodies; rather, strictly speaking, they were conceived, respectively, as an intergovernmental consultative forum, as a bureaucratic structure to support the functioning of that forum, and as a funding mechanism. All three entities receive limited direct input from entities outside the UN or outside the clout of member states. The formats, mandates and structures of the ‘new elements’ in the UN broader peacebuilding architecture thus reflect processes and dynamics typical of the UN *milieu* in New York rather than the needs and priorities identified in the ‘field’. And the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ informing those processes and dynamics in the UN *milieu* is heavily informed by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*. This meaning underlies the content of the new institutional arrangement to the extent that they reflect particular (liberal democratic) views about ‘peace’ and ‘peacebuilding’, as well as the top-down and technocratic approach associated with the liberal democratic peace.

¹⁰² During my period of participant observation, which was held only a few months after the establishment of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), I occasionally came across references to a ‘gender architecture’ or ‘gender equality architecture’. UN Women embodies this architecture following the merging of entities such as the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

Conclusions

As the liberal democratic peace as *political convention* was assimilated in the UN *milieu* and in the UN constitutive dimensions, several problems and obstacles associated with its operationalization and practice became more evident. They were mainly associated with the relapse into armed conflict by societies who had already received some support from the Organisation – often via multidimensional peacekeeping operations entailing peacebuilding tasks. Those problems highlighted the inconsistencies generated by a top-down focus on building states institutions rather than addressing other more immediate needs of post-conflict societies, for instance. When faced with the urge to engage with those situations, however, the responses implemented were in essence shaped by dynamics intrinsically related to the UN *milieu* in New York. In fact, the overview of the process leading to the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund revealed that diplomatic and political concerns of member states and the Secretariat played a stronger role in shaping the format and configuration of those three entities than the actual needs of societies affected by armed conflicts. The following chapter focuses on the workings of those three entities and enquires the extent to which they may have affected the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ informed by the liberal democratic peace that is minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu*.

Chapter 7

The functioning of the ‘new elements’ of the UN peacebuilding architecture

I believe that the adoption of the draft resolution today would be truly historic. That word – “historic” – is often overused, but in this case I have no doubt that it is merited. Why? Because the draft resolution would, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, create a mechanism ensuring that for countries emerging from conflict the term “postconflict” would not mean post-engagement of the international community. It would be our best chance to reverse the trend which we have seen around the world in recent years, where half of the countries emerging from conflict are lapsing back into it again within five years. It would help to bring an end to the pattern of conflicts erupting again simply because support for the healing process was not there when it was needed.

Jan Eliasson, President of the General Assembly in 2005-2006, minutes before the adoption of the draft resolution that would ‘operationalize’ the Peacebuilding Commission (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66: 1)

Introduction

Eliasson’s words might have been an overstatement, but they were not standing alone. In the same meeting where the then President of the General Assembly voiced the words in the epigraph, others followed suit and labelled the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission as a ‘historical’ moment (e.g. Annan and representatives from the United Kingdom, India, Haiti, El Salvador) and in expressing hopes that it would have a real impact in the field (e.g. representative from the United States of America, Australia). The format and configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF, however, were not necessarily shaped by the needs and priorities identified in the field. Rather, as explored in the previous chapter, the three entities were shaped by political and

diplomatic concerns of member states in New York. In this chapter, I explore the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF after their establishment, showing that the functioning of the three entities has been largely predicated upon the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ informed by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*. As such, I am less concerned with assessing the performance or the impact of those organs organisationally than in examining the extent to which they may have affected the UN concept and practice in the area of peacebuilding – that is, the very concept of ‘peacebuilding’ informed by the liberal democratic peace and its implications for practice.

It is my argument in this chapter that the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF have thus far changed little of significance in the UN approach to ‘peacebuilding’ and to societies affected by armed conflict, having mostly contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace framework as the minimally intelligible meaning for ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*. In different moments, as elaborated below, those organs have designed priorities envisioned to serve as overarching strategies for peacebuilding in societies affected by armed conflict; they have provided technical expertise and advice across the UN system and to national authorities in the field; and they have offered incentives for local and international peacebuilders to carry out their initiatives in areas such as elections or the reform of state institutions. In doing so, they have operated primarily by responding to political, diplomatic and bureaucratic concerns typical of the UN *milieu* in New York rather than to the needs faced by societies affected by armed conflict. Consequently, notwithstanding modifications in the UN bureaucratic dimension with the inclusion of three ‘new elements’, the PBC, PBSO and PBF have not provided a significant departure from the limited approach to peacebuilding that prevailed in the UN milieu between 1992 and the mid-2000s. Rather, their creation has in fact contributed to reproduce and reinforce the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* in the United Nations.

The chapter is organised into two extended sections that analyse the functioning of those three entities against the backdrop of the UN bureaucratic and intergovernmental dimensions, respectively. The first focuses on the workings of the PBSO and the PBF, highlighting how the bureaucratic dimension of the so-called ‘new elements’ of the ‘peacebuilding architecture’ have contributed to replicate and reinforce the liberal democratic peace as the minimally intelligible meaning for ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN. The second focuses on the PBC and on how member states have used the new body to determine

what counts as ‘peacebuilding’, as well as to elaborate peacebuilding strategies that more often reflect their own political agendas than the needs and priorities identified by the subjects of peacebuilding policies in the field.

The bureaucratic dimension: the Peacebuilding Support Office and the PBF

As outlined in the previous chapter, the key functions of the PBSO are: to provide secretariat support for the Peacebuilding Commission; to ensure coherence across the UN system in what concerns the design and implementation of adequate strategies for peacebuilding; and to manage the Peacebuilding Fund. It is possible to identify the footprint of the liberal democratic peace in all three main functions of the Office: the PBSO provides technical expertise and advice in supporting the elaboration of the PBC peacebuilding strategies, all of which have a strong focus on enhancing institutions, processes and norms typically found in Western liberal/democratic societies; it pushes forward specific views about the problems associated with ‘peacebuilding’ and about what constitutes ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN Secretariat; and in managing the Peacebuilding Fund, the PBSO defines priorities and channels monies to areas closely associated with the (effective) functioning of a Western liberal/democratic state. Inasmuch as it is not an operational office, the workings of the PBSO and its outcomes may be felt on a range of concrete areas due to its role in the stages of policymaking in the UN *milieu*. My concern in what follows is not to make an assessment of the PBSO as a Secretariat office, but to identify the imprint of the liberal democratic peace in informing its functioning. Before focusing on its activities more specifically, I briefly sketch the internal process leading to the creation of the Office, as it is telling about the environment in which it operates in the UN *milieu*.

The Peacebuilding Support Office was officially launched in May 2006, with the appointment of Carolyn McAskie as Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Peacebuilding Support and Head of the PBSO. Preparations for the creation of the Office, however, had begun at least as early as July 2005, when the newly established Secretary-General Policy Committee¹⁰³ spelled out the terms of reference of the still inexistent office. In essence, the

¹⁰³ The Policy and the Management Committees were created by Annan in 2005 with the view of strengthening decision-making processes at the executive level in the Secretariat. Both consider issues requiring policy and/or strategic guidance and direction, with the former focusing on thematic and country-specific issues and the latter on internal reform and other management-related matters. The Policy Committee normally meets once every week and is constituted, among others, by the chairs of the ECPS, ECESA, ECHA and UNDG, and the head of the DPKO (UN Doc. ST/SGB/2005/16).

terms referred to the provision of support to the substantial functions of the Peacebuilding Commission, and to assisting the Secretary-General in developing effective strategies for peacebuilding across the UN system (United Nations, 2005b). Outlined as such, the initial terms of reference for the PBSO closely reflected some of the tentative functions delineated by Annan in his report *In Larger Freedom* (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2: para. 21).

In January 2006, a transitional team was constituted to start working “immediately” to set up the Office (Malloch Brown, 2012b: 3794). The team was composed of five staff members from different departments and agencies¹⁰⁴, and was coordinated by Mark Malloch Brown, then Annan’s chief of staff, and Robert Orr, ASG for Policy Planning in the EOSG and one of the principal drafters of *In Larger Freedom*. In addition to working towards setting up the PBSO, this very small group assumed two other tasks: to support the start-up of the Peacebuilding Commission and its country-specific configurations, and to prepare the terms of reference for the Secretary-General’s standing fund for peacebuilding (Bartsch, 2012).

The launch of the PBSO, however, was not immediately translated into smooth functioning of the office due to the lack of adequate resources. By the time the Office was launched, member states were still divided over what they expected or where they wanted the PBC, PBSO and PBF to go (McAskie, 2008: 12). Moreover, the divisive lines created during the run-up to the World Summit were still visible (McAskie, 2008: 16-17). The allocation of actual resources to the PBSO, for instance, involved rather politicised debates that were once again dictated by New York-based political and diplomatic concerns rather than by the needs identified in peacebuilding contexts. A distinctive illustration of such dynamics is the cut, by the Fifth Committee, of Annan’s required resources for creating the PBSO. Initially, the Secretary-General had estimated that the new office would need 21 staff members and USD 4.2 million (of which USD 3.3 million referred to staff posts) to carry out its functions (UN Doc. A/60/537: paras. 40-43). Based on the recommendation that the office should be “small” and established “from within existing resources” (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: para. 104), however, the Fifth Committee decided that the Secretary-General

¹⁰⁴ The staff members were drawn from the UN Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP), the UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), the EOSG, DPKO and from the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management (OUSG/DM) (Malloch Brown, 2012b: 3794).

should submit a new proposal revising his initial estimates (UN Doc. A/60/598: para. 5).¹⁰⁵ The Committee's decision and rhetoric disguised the position of some developing countries, who were still dissatisfied with the issue of representation of developing countries in the PBC. In the end, after more exchanges between the Secretary-General and the Fifth Committee,¹⁰⁶ the General Assembly approved only USD 1.6 million to the PBSO and decided to "revert to the issue" of its structures later, in connection with the discussions for the next biannual programme budget (UN Doc. A/RES/60/255: op. 5).

Reducing costs and making the management of the UN more effective and transparent are indisputably highly praised (and needed!) goals in such a large organisation. What matters to highlight, however, is that the overemphasis on budgetary technicalities, which camouflaged political and diplomatic concerns of member states, were hardly responsive to the needs and priorities of societies affected by armed conflicts. In what concerns the PBSO more specifically, those discussions had the result of directly shaping the format, configuration and capacities of the new Office, which was established with a smaller budget than originally foreseen and with a reduced temporary structure in virtue of the diplomatic struggle along the axes of the north-south/security-development divide. Those constraints were not imposed with the view of moulding a highly-specialised entity capable of developing a coherent and integrated approach to peacebuilding in the Secretariat and across the UN system, but they rather reflected the political and diplomatic concerns of member states in New York and their capitals.

According to an internal report authored by McAskie by the end of her assignment in the Office, the PBSO have had a hard time in securing the re-allocations promised by member states, effectively operating with only three professional staff until December 2006 (McAskie, 2008: 11). A fairly small number of posts were created in the new office, but they were all on short-term contracts or were seconded temporarily from other agencies and/or departments in the UN system (Bartsch, 2012). Furthermore, there was a significant change of officials at the top echelons of the UN following the inauguration of Ban Ki-moon's tenure in office in January 2007. Finally, the first budget allocations for the Office did not occur

¹⁰⁵ The decision of the Fifth Committee was based on two reports of the ACABQ: UN Docs. A/60/7/Add.13 (2005: para. 35) and A/60/7/Add.25 (2005).

¹⁰⁶ For the revised estimates of the Secretary-General, see UN Doc. A/60/694 (2006: para. 24). For the report of the ACABQ on the revised estimates, see A/60/7/Add.36 (2006).

before January 2008 (McAskie, 2008: 10-11). In light of this general context, it is no wonder that the role of the PBSO as convenor of the UN system in what concerns peacebuilding remained a “faint hope” at that time (McAskie, 2008: 11). Meanwhile, the Office remained with limited resources to provide the adequate secretariat support for the two countries already placed in the PBC agenda: Burundi and Sierra Leone.

Providing technical expertise and advice in the Secretariat

One instance is especially representative of the PBSO role in seeking to fulfil its mandate to provide advice and technical expertise in the Secretariat: the elaboration of a ‘conceptual basis’ for peacebuilding in the United Nations. Although it has been around since the early 1990s, the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ remains a difficult one to grasp harmoniously throughout the entire UN system, with “critical differences” existing in what concerns its conceptualisation and operationalization (Barnett *et al.*, 2007: 36). According to an inventory elaborated by the EOSG (2006) in the context of the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, there were at least 31 entities in the UN system carrying out tasks and activities that could be placed under the label of ‘peacebuilding’.¹⁰⁷ The report was precise in diagnosing different views on ‘peacebuilding’ that existed across the UN system and their consequences in the field:

Some actors associate peacebuilding with ‘security’ and therefore differentiate it from ‘development’ activities. Others regard peacebuilding as a ‘transitional’ set of activities and distinguish it from the ‘security’ field. ‘Crisis’ (combining natural disaster and conflict-related situations), ‘humanitarian,’ ‘peacekeeping,’ and ‘development’ remain the dominant conceptual frameworks and funding channels, in large part as a result of existing organizational mandates and interests. This lack of a common understanding on the meaning of peacebuilding has operational consequences, as donors and UN entities hold differing views as to how it should be approached and funded. (EOSG, 2006: 6)

The report thus contended that a clearer framework for ‘peacebuilding’ remained a major challenge for the Organisation in the area (EOSG, 2006: 6).

With a view to minimising that gap, the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee decided that the PBSO should lead consultations to reach a common definition of ‘peacebuilding’ to inform the UN efforts in the area. To that end, the Policy Committee offered the following formulation as a starting point:

¹⁰⁷ For a somewhat similar inventory produced a decade earlier, see DESIPA (1996).

In determining strategies and operational plans, 'peacebuilding' entails efforts to support a country's transition from conflict to sustainable peace, with a stable political order and basic institutions in place, the risk of relapse into conflict substantially reduced, and the country able to move to more normal development processes. Peacebuilding strategies must be tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (United Nations, 2006a: 1)

Outlined as such, the basis reflects a somehow sequential understanding, essentially locating peacebuilding efforts in the area between 'armed conflict' and 'normal development'. Members of the Policy Committee agreed that this was a "good starting point" for further discussions, but they diverged on other aspects: some believed that the inherently political character of peacebuilding was not present in the formulation; some claimed it missed considerations over human security at the local level; and others thought it was "too top down" or "supply driven" (United Nations, 2006b: para. 3).

This tentative formulation provided the basis for a consultative process with other UN entities led by the PBSO. As a result of the PBSO-led consultations, the following conceptual basis was elaborated and subsequently endorsed by the Policy Committee in its meeting of 22 May 2007:

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (United Nations, 2007: 1)

Whereas the earlier formulation seemed to disregard the issue of human security, members of the Policy Committee with peacekeeping background seemed to consider the revised conceptual basis as too oriented towards development (Ulich, 2012).

At the core of the different readings of those conceptual bases, one finds two stylised views about 'peacebuilding' in the United Nations. The first formulation was carved by the secretariat team of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee, which had been drawn from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. DPKO is one of the entities that normally associate peacebuilding with 'security', differentiating it from 'development' (EOSG, 2006: 6). This view, according to Oliver Ulich, who was then part of the secretariat team of the Policy Committee, holds that peacebuilding is basically focused on "the specific sets of actions that are necessary to prevent a relapse into conflict", which is a "fairly faithful" understanding of the definition outlined in Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (Ulich,

2012). Ulich believes that this view does not preclude some development activities in peacebuilding contexts, which may be attested to by the range of peacebuilding activities carried out by multidimensional peacekeeping operations. What this view contends, however, is that not all development activities should necessarily be carried out in societies affected by armed conflict via peacebuilding (Ulich, 2012). In the initial formulation outlined by the Policy Committee, it thus becomes clear the reason why peacebuilding aims primarily at avoiding a relapse into conflict and involves a ‘relatively narrow’ set of activities towards that goal.

On the other hand, the definition endorsed in May 2007 following the PBSO-led consultations leans closer to the view of the ‘development’ side of the United Nations. Within this perspective, peacebuilding is more closely associated with a range of development activities carried out in societies affected by armed conflicts, such as the reconstruction of state institutions, for instance. In McAskie’s view, hence, the idea of peacebuilding as “ceasefire and then (...) development (...) is a very incomplete way of looking at it” (McAskie, 2012). In other words, peacebuilding in this view is not a sequel to peacekeeping. Given that some senior officials in the PBSO shared a background in peacebuilding and development rather than peacekeeping,¹⁰⁸ the ‘development’ view of peacebuilding seemed to predominate in the Office at that time. Possibly reflecting their influence as leaders of the consultative process, this view strongly underlies the ‘conceptual basis’ endorsed by the Policy Committee.

At their core, both formulations reflected traces of the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*. They entailed the idea of peacebuilding not necessarily as the holistic process of removing all kinds of violence from societies, as in the tradition of peace and conflict studies. Rather, peacebuilding was understood as a set of ‘measures’, ‘actions’ (e.g. A/46/882, 1992: para. 21) or ‘activities’ (e.g. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 2000: para. 13) that ought to be carried out especially in post-armed conflict situations (although sometimes during armed conflicts) with the ultimate goal of avoiding a relapse into armed conflict and

¹⁰⁸ Other senior staff members of the PBSO during this time were also drawn from the ‘development’, not the ‘peacekeeping’ side of the UN. The Director and Deputy Head of the Office since late 2006, Ejeviome Otobo, had previously held high-level positions in several entities of the economic sector of the United Nations. Necla Tschirgi, a Senior Policy Advisor between early 2007 and early 2009, had several years of experience in peacebuilding from the ‘development’ side, having incidentally led a research project on the relationship between security and development from that perspective (see Tschirgi *et al.*, 2010). Interviews with Tschirgi (2012) and Otobo (2010b).

creating an enabling environment for sustainable peace. They also had in common a too broad and generic focus, which is certainly not the sort of specific guidelines that operational entities in the field would have expected from a broad ‘common definition’. Finally, references to ‘national ownership’ notwithstanding, both formulations were predicated upon a top-down in what concerns the provision of external assistance.

Outlining the process leading to the endorsement of a conceptual basis by the Policy Committee reveals that the PBSO played a substantial role in advancing particular views about ‘peacebuilding’ in the Secretariat in virtue of its institutional mandate and expertise. While it is true that the final text of the conceptual basis endorsed by the Policy Committee did not necessarily reflect the views of the PBSO alone, the new Office was able to have a voice and advance particular understandings on topics such as what kind of activities were part of ‘peacebuilding’, or when they should be carried out by the UN. Those views implicitly carried out traces of the liberal democratic peace framework to the extent that they were conceived on a top-down fashion.

Shaping peacebuilding initiatives in the field through the Peacebuilding Fund¹⁰⁹

The Peacebuilding Fund was established under the authority of the Secretary-General and is administered on his behalf by the Peacebuilding Support Office. The PBSO played an important role in the elaboration of the PBF Terms of Reference (ToR), thus shaping the scope and priorities of the Fund itself. In this section, I review the priorities of the Fund, as defined in its ToR, and its pattern of disbursement of monies. The analysis aims to verify that the Fund has, in practice, offered incentives for local and international peacebuilders to focus their efforts on particular areas of concern in the liberal democratic peace framework, such as reform of the security sector, for instance. Those areas, as elaborated below, project the construction of liberal/democratic societies as a remedy to the consequences of armed conflict. Consequently, inasmuch as the PBF may have contributed to ease the scarcity of sustainable funding for more immediate peacebuilding needs,¹¹⁰ it still operates predicated on the liberal democratic peace.

¹⁰⁹ Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this section are in current US dollars and are based on data retrieved from the website of the MPTF Office (2013). All figures for 2013 are as of 30 June 2013.

¹¹⁰ For evaluations of the PBF in general, see especially Ball and van Beijnum (2009) and OIOS (2008). Other evaluations, including on the PBF support to initiatives on specific countries, are available on the website of the PBF (UNPBF, 2013).

The ToR is essentially a technical document outlining aspects such as the scope, the process of allocation of resources, the management and governance, lines of reporting of the Fund. Those aspects, however, are of fundamental political importance because they ultimately define who may receive support from the Fund, the modalities of support as well as under what conditions the Fund may be used. Hence, the influence of the PBSO in the final stages of defining the ToR exceeds the purely technical and acquires rather political contours.

Efforts in outlining the ToR of the Fund were initiated by the transitional team established by Annan in January 2006. The original document (UN Doc. A/60/984) was conceived following the workings of a technical team of experts and “extensive consultations” with relevant parts of the system, interested member states and the then Chair (Angola) and Vice-Chairs (El Salvador and Norway) of the PBC (Malloch Brown, 2012a: 4150). According to Malloch Brown, then Deputy Secretary-General, the ToR reflected the “consensus” of the technical team and the member states consulted (Malloch Brown, 2012a: 4151). When adopting the original ToR, the Secretary-General determined that they should be reviewed “no later than two years after their adoption” (UN Doc. A/60/984: Annex, para. 8.1). As foreseen, the terms were revised in 2008, following consultations with the PBF Advisory Group and the results of an independent external evaluation by Ball and van Beijnum (2009). The ensuing discussion focuses on the most recent ToR of the PBF (UN Doc. A/63/818).

According to its Terms of Reference, the Fund provides direct financial support in four main areas:

- a) Activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, in particular in relation to strengthening of national institutions and processes set up under those agreements;
- b) Activities undertaken to build and/or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peacebuilding activities;
- c) Activities undertaken in support of efforts to revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends for the population at large;
- d) Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities which may include, in exceptional circumstances and over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs. (UN Doc. A/63/818: para.2.1)

As the three entities created in 2005-2006 were not operational, it is not the PBSO that carries out concrete actions with funding provided by the PBF; rather, PBF funds are channelled to

concrete projects exclusively through other entities in the UN system, such as the UNDP and UNICEF – the so-called Recipient UN Organisations or RUNOs. Under this arrangement, NGOs or other civil society entities cannot have direct access to PBF support, although they are entitled to implement specific activities when carried out in partnership with eligible RUNOs (PBSO, 2009: 3).

Contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund are made on a voluntary basis and have their origins in member states, intergovernmental organisations and other sources such as the private sector. Cumulative from its launch in October 2006 to June 2013, fifty-two donors have contributed with USD 512.4 million to the PBF (Figures 6 and 7). The bulk of contributions, unsurprisingly, are made by member states though national agencies such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). To date, the overwhelming majority of deposits (96% or USD 491 million) had origins in twenty-eight OECD countries, with twenty-two non-OECD countries contributing with only USD 21.4 million (4%) to the Fund. The top five major contributors, cumulative as of June 2013, were from the former group (Appendix III).

Sweden and the United Kingdom stand out as the single major donors to the Fund, each of them having made almost one fifth (19% and 18%, respectively) of all contributions. The amount of contributions to the Fund from member states in the global North should come as no surprise due to the sheer size of their economies. The issue, however, is that four have assumed key coordination positions in the PBC (Table 4). This apparent connection

Figure 6: Contributions to the PBF, 2006-2013





Figure 7: Level of deposits made to the PBF, per year



Source: based on MPTF Office (2013). See also Appendix III.

Note: All figures in current USD. Figures for 2013 are as of 30 June 2013.

revives some concerns that the Commission might “look more like a standing pledging conference” (Chesterman, 2005: 171) than a robust body dedicated to effectively enhancing coordination, sustaining attention and marshalling resources to post-armed conflict societies. This apparent connection is indicative of the imprint of the liberal democratic peace to the extent that it carries the weight of traditional donor countries from the North in potentially shaping the content of peacebuilding strategies with their direct financial contribution to the Fund.

Table 4: Top 10 contributors to the PBF and respective roles in the PBC

	Member state	Cumulative contributions (USD million)	% of total contributions to PBF	PBC coordination role
1	Sweden	94.5	19	Chair of CSC-Burundi (2008-2009); Chair of CSC-Liberia (since 2012)
2	United Kingdom	92.3	18	-
3	Netherlands	60.7	12	Chair of CSC-Sierra Leone (2006-2009)
4	Norway	42.5	8	Chair of CSC-Burundi (2006-2008)
5	Canada	33.9	7	Chair of CSC-Sierra Leone (since 2009)
6	Japan	32.5	6	Chair of the PBC (2007-2008); Chair of the WGLL (2009-2010)
7	Germany	25.5	5	Chair of the PBC (2009-2010)
8	Denmark	17.8	4	-
9	Spain	17.5	3	-
10	Finland	17.1	3	-
	Total	434.3	85%	

Source: Based on MPTF Office (2013) and annual reports of the PBC. See also Appendix III.

Note: Figures are in current USD and are cumulative from 2006 to 30 June 2013.

PBF support may be channelled through RUNOs to support countries via two different mechanisms: the *project-based mechanism*, known as the Immediate Response Facility (IRF), and the programme-based mechanism or Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF).¹¹¹ In the first mechanism, beneficiaries are countries emerging from emergency situations and in need of immediate support to carry out peacebuilding and reconstruction actions. The PRF, on the other hand, is designed to support structured processes of peacebuilding via a needs-driven priority plan that is jointly elaborated by national authorities and the UN country presence (UN Doc. A/63/818: para.3.3). In the latter

¹¹¹ The IRF was formerly known as PBF Emergency Window (Window III), whilst the PRF was once divided between the PBF Window I (for countries in the PBC agenda) and Window II (for countries not on the PBC agenda, but declared eligible by the Secretary-General).

mechanism, the priority plans developed for countries in the PBC agenda are informed by the integrated peacebuilding strategy outlined by the Commission, as discussed in the following section.

From its launch in October 2006 to June 2013, the Peacebuilding Fund has provided support for 251 peacebuilding initiatives in twenty-six countries across the globe (Appendix IV). The initiatives supported by PBF monies are distributed in four main Thematic Areas, in accordance with the most recent ToR of the Fund. The pattern of disbursements of the Fund reveals that its support tend to privilege areas more closely associated with characteristics typical of a functioning Western liberal/democratic state.

The vast amount of all PBF resources are allocated to Thematic Areas 1 (*Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue*) and 2 (*Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict*). Together, they account for USD 245.8 million (67%) of PBF global net transfers and correspond to 71% (176) of all the initiatives supported by the Peacebuilding Fund. Initiatives in Thematic Area 1 include activities such as the strengthening and/or reform of security and justice institutions, as well as support for processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). As aforementioned, those are key areas in the liberal democratic peace framework, as they are associated with functioning liberal/democratic societies. Eighty-nine peacebuilding initiatives whose priorities were identified as Thematic Area 1 had received USD 154.3 million from the Peacebuilding Fund until June 2013, which corresponds to 42% of its global net funded amount (Table 5). The single major project in this Area was designed with the primary purpose of enhancing the capacities of the National Police in Burundi, enabling its “transformation” into a “neighbourhood police” (MPTF Office, 2010b: 6).¹¹² The project, implemented by UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) and national security forces of the country, received USD 6.8 million in transfers from the Fund to, among others, acquire individual uniforms and equipment such as vehicles and computers to the Police (MPTF Office, 2010b: 15-18).

¹¹² From the original in French: “*permettre la transformation de la Police Nationale du Burundi en une police de proximité ayant la capacité d’assurer la sécurité des personnes et des biens dans le respect des principes républicains et des droits des individus*”.

Table 5: Distribution of PBF funding, by Thematic Areas and sub-categories

Priority areas and sub-categories	Projects		Net transfers	
	Number	%	USD million	%
1. Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue	89	36	154.3	42
1.1. Security Sector Reform (SSR)	30	12	70.0	19
1.2. Rule of Law (RoL)	33	13	44.7	12
1.3. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)	21	9	36.1	10
1.4. Enhancing political dialogue	5	2	3.5	1
2. Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict	87	35	91.5	25
2.1. National reconciliation	68	27	76.2	21
2.2. Democratic governance	16	7	11.8	3
2.3. Management of natural resources (including land)	3	1	3.5	1
3. Revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends	41	16	66.8	18
3.1. Creating short-term job opportunities	21	8	30.6	8
3.2. Creating sustainable livelihoods	20	8	36.2	10
4. (Re)establish essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities	33	13	53.0	15
4.1. Restoring administrative infrastructure (public administration)	19	8	18.4	5
4.2. Provision of basic public services (including infrastructure)	14	5	34.6	10
Not applicable	1	-	0.3	-
TOTAL	251	100	365.9	100

Source: based on MPTF Office (2013).

Note: The sub-categories were obtained from interviews with PBSO officials and they are reflected in the latest annual report on the PBF (MPTF Office, 2012: 8-9). Figures in current USD. For the full list of PBF projects and priorities until June 2013, see Appendix IV.

Initiatives under Thematic Area 2 typically aim at the promotion of democratic governance and human rights, as well as at the strengthening of institutions that promote social cohesion. One of the PBF-supported initiatives in Liberia under the sub-category of national reconciliation, for instance, supported a series of social dialogues with a view of promoting reconciliation and alleviating potential armed conflict between distinct ethnic groups in Nimba County (MPTF Office, 2010a). In what concerns democratic governance, PBF monies were used, among others, to assist the Southern Sudanese diaspora in several countries worldwide vote in the referendum that would decide whether or not the South would remain united with the North (MPTF Office, 2011). Projects receiving support under Thematic Area 3 (*Revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends*), focus on the creation of opportunities and conditions for job creation (especially for the youth), as well as other initiatives aiming at improving the economy. Finally, projects under Thematic

Area 4 (*Establish or re-establish essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities*), seek to create and/or rebuild the infrastructures and services of governments at the country level.

This brief analysis of the pattern of disbursement of PBF funds reveals that the areas receiving the largest amount of monies from the Peacebuilding Fund are those usually associated with the effective functioning of a Western liberal/democratic state, such as elections, police and the rule of law. This does not contradict other analyses that attest to the importance of the Fund (e.g. UNPBF, 2013; OIOS, 2008): in fact, the PBF has filled an important gap in what concerns the provision of financial support for peacebuilding initiatives supported by the United Nations. It has also, according to an independent assessment, been successful in other fronts: it has learned from its initial experiences; it quickly exceeded its funding targets; it promoted discussion and learning on peacebuilding-related topics at the Headquarters and field levels; and it promoted on-going peacebuilding processes in different countries (Ball and van Beijnum, 2009: 7-9). In a field often marked by the lack of sustained financial support (e.g. Forman and Patrick, 2000), the fact that the UN has been able to ensure a sustained level of funding to peacebuilding initiatives in countries emerging from armed conflicts over the last few years is indeed a very welcome development.

Whereas acknowledging the achievements in the UN activities in the realm of peacebuilding with the establishment of the PBF, it should be noted, however, that at a more fundamental level the Fund remains largely a mechanism reinforcing the understanding of the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* in the world body. As discussed above, most of the contributions to the PBF are made from 'traditional' donor countries, most recurrently national agencies for development and cooperation from Western developed countries in the global north. The top-five single major contributors to the Fund are all part of that group and they account for 64% of all contributions (Table 4). Bearing in mind that most of those countries have been or remain involved in key positions in the PBC, their prominence as major contributors to the Fund may, if anything, raise suspicions from developing countries about the added value of the peacebuilding architecture in the UN. In fact, as discussed in the following section, some developing countries, in the early days of the PBC, expressed concerns that the PBC might be a new body designed to serve as a forum for 'rubber-stamping' decisions adopted by donor countries (e.g. UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5:

2). In a different vein, the figures of PBF funding distribution also indicate that activities such as the promotion and/or the strengthening of security sector institutions, the support for activities aimed at the strengthening of the rule of law and processes such as DDR, all of them typically associated with the liberal democratic peace framework, remain a priority for the United Nations in peacebuilding contexts.

The Peacebuilding Support Office has thus played a crucial role in reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace framework in the United Nations. It has been able to influence policy making processes both in the Peacebuilding Commission and in the Secretariat, advancing particular views about ‘peacebuilding’ and what it entails. It has also shaped the scope and the priorities of funding of the PBF, allocating monies to areas of priorities that are in line with its views on ‘peacebuilding’. While doing so, the Office has not only shaped concrete initiatives in the field, but also helped to disseminate views on what kind of activities are associated with ‘peacebuilding’. The analysis herein carried out, in sum, demonstrates that the Office is predicated on the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*, attesting to its continuity as the minimally intelligible meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*.

The intergovernmental dimension: the Peacebuilding Commission

The Peacebuilding Commission corresponds to the intergovernmental element of the institutional arrangement established in the United Nations in 2005-2006. Its workings reveal the footprint of the liberal democratic peace framework to the extent that the Commission, in essence, shifts the locus of power from peacebuilding contexts to New York. It does so particularly by outlining the so-called ‘integrated peacebuilding strategies’, which are not necessarily representative of the needs and priorities identified in peacebuilding contexts, and which subsequently focus on areas that are particularly relevant in functioning Western liberal/democratic states. The remainder of this section focuses on the process of formulation of those strategies in the Peacebuilding Commission and in their content. Before doing so, I provide a brief overview of the formative years of the Commission.

The first two years of functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission were strongly marked by procedural and organisational discussions that would allow for the effective functioning of the Commission (Jenkins, 2013: 74-107; CIC and IPI, 2008). Whereas such discussions were a necessary part of the process leading to the setup of a new body in the

UN structures, their overemphasis on such aspects contributed to make the Commission a body often unresponsive to the needs and challenges faced by societies affected by armed conflicts. In fact, following its first formal meeting on 23 June 2006,¹¹³ the Organizational Committee (OC) held four other meetings until the end of the year, most of them focusing particularly on matters such as procedural issues such as its own working methods and the participation of international organisations and civil society in PBC sessions.¹¹⁴

Two episodes in the last of those meetings, on 12 December 2006, are particularly representative of the sort of debates held in the OC at the time. First, upon the decision to appoint the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands as Chair of the CSC-Sierra Leone, the Brazilian Ambassador noted that not appointing one of the Vice-Chairpersons of the OC as Chair of the CSC-Sierra Leone, as envisaged in the rules of procedures, might send a “troubling signal” as to the nature of the PBC (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 2). The statement was a clear reference to the fact that El Salvador was not appointed to the position due to resistance from some member states, whereas the representative of Norway had already been appointed Chair of the CSC-Burundi. Neves contends that such resistance was due to the “perhaps distorted perception” that donor countries should play the role of CSC Chairs so that the “Commission had greater capacity to raise contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund” (Neves, 2009: 161).¹¹⁵ Contrary to that view, the diplomats of countries such as Brazil, India and Egypt believed that having yet another European donor country in the Commission might signal that it had become a forum to “rubber-stamp agreements reached between donors and recipients” (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 2).

The second episode took place immediately afterwards, when the OC members debated a proposal to invite the representative of Canada to attend the meeting of the CSC-Sierra Leone scheduled for the following day. At the time, Canada was not yet a member of either the Organisational Committee or the CSC-Sierra Leone, but its representative was the Chairperson of the Management Committee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Given the

¹¹³ The first time the members of the PBC met was in an informal environment, during a one-day seminar jointly held by the then-International Peace Academy (IPA, currently International Peace Institute) and the CIC-NYU (see IPA and CIC, 2006). It was not an official meeting of the PBC, but it ended up by serving as an informal meeting due to the presence of all the newly appointed members of the OC.

¹¹⁴ For a summary of the formal meetings of the OC, see UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458, Annex I.

¹¹⁵ From the original in Portuguese: “*Havia talvez percepção distorcida dos países recipiendários de assistência financeira, que a presidência deveria ser exercida por país doador, para que a Comissão tivesse maior capacidade de captação de contribuições para o Fundo de Consolidação da Paz*”.

position of the Canadian representative, the Dutch Ambassador proposed the invitation with the view of informing CSC members on the “integral part played by the Special Court in peacebuilding” in the country (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 3). The Dutch proposal faced resistance from countries such as Egypt, India and Russia, this time out of concerns that addressing topics directly related to the security situation in Sierra Leone was in fact a matter under the responsibility of the Security Council, not the PBC. In light of the lack of necessary support for the proposed invitation, it was subsequently decided that Canada would not attend the CSC meeting in the following day (see UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5).

Behind these seemingly superficial and procedural discussions in the OC, there were genuine political concerns from some member states. In the first event, the call for strict compliance with the rules of procedures reflected the view of developing countries such as Brazil, Egypt and India, that the Commission had become too unbalanced towards developed countries, most particularly European donor countries. In the second event, the position expressed by Russia reflected concerns that the new body might be meddling with the Security Council’s primacy in addressing peace and security issues. In both instances, member states were essentially continuing the heated discussions that marked the negotiations leading to the adoption of the *Outcome Document* over issues such as representation/membership and the reporting lines with other entities in the UN system, as discussed in the previous chapter. They would also continue to do so more consistently within the framework of a working group established in November to address procedural and organisational matters that had not yet been agreed upon – an understanding on the particular issue of the participation of civil societies, for instance, would only be reached by June 2007 (see UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/12).

Although they may be authentic and legitimate from the perspective of the politics at the level of UN membership, especially in New York, such discussions hardly reflected the most pressing peacebuilding needs or concerns in the countries under consideration, such as immediate material needs, basic public services such as health care or employment (see esp. Richmond, 2011; Roberts, 2011). Hence, rather than proving itself as a body with a real impact in the field, as echoed in Eliason’s words quoted in the epigraph of this chapter, the Peacebuilding Commission initially served only as another intergovernmental forum wherein member states could carry on their political and diplomatic struggles as usual. Moreover, the sort of discussions held at the PBC, according to an early assessment, only

helped to create the overall impression of “many meetings and new acronyms, but an absence of dynamism” regarding the Commission (Scott, 2008: 9-10).

The very existence of such debates about operational and procedural aspects of the Commission should not come as a surprise: the new body could not function without an agreement on such topics, which had not been reached before it was launched. Debating over such issues only after the new body was established, however, took too long and eventually resulted in undesirable polarisations either within the PBC membership, especially between members of the Security Council (particularly France, UK and USA) and the G77/China (Wegter, 2007: 344-345), or between developing countries and the Secretariat (Neves, 2009: 161-162). What is perhaps more surprising about that contentious process, however, is that despite such vivid discussions in the OC, it later emerged that only a few countries seemed to be clear about the Commission’s actual mandate (McAskie, 2008: 12). As a consequence, a major challenge in the first months of functioning of the PBSO, for instance, was “talking to individual member states that were on the Commission, the donors, the developing countries, the troop contributing countries, etc., and trying to get them to have a cohesive concept of what the Commission was all about” (McAskie, 2012). Hence, rather than an entity capable of delivering the positive feedback initially expected, the Peacebuilding Commission opened a renewed forum wherein member states could continue to address their usual political and diplomatic issues.

The agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission

As outlined in the previous chapter, the Peacebuilding Commission may include particular countries in its agenda to consider their situations in Country-Specific Configurations (CSCs). Except for provisions concerning the routes through which countries may be included in the PBC agenda (UN Docs. S/RES/1645: op. 12; A/RES/60/180: op. 12), however, there are no clearly defined criteria or guidelines to orient the selection of those countries. This is, as such, a rather political decision. Whereas the lack of specific criteria creates the opportunity for flexibility in the workings of the Commission, it also made some member states initially less clear about the actual role of the new body. Similarly, countries that might have considered expressing their interest and willingness to be included in the agenda of the Commission in its early stages of functioning were not very clear about what exactly this would require from them. For one, being placed in the PBC agenda might as

well represent another layer of contact with other actors in the UN system, in addition to bilateral donors and the Peacebuilding Commission itself. The issue is not only one of duplication, but also of capacity, since potential ‘candidates’ for the agenda of the Commission usually do not have the adequate resources (e.g. financial and personnel) to adequately equip their diplomatic representations in New York in order to ensure an appropriate level of interaction and engagement with such a wide range of interlocutors.¹¹⁶ Moreover, as stated during an interview by a diplomat from one of the countries concerned, “being on the agenda of the PBC itself gives a different picture of that country to the world, so no country really wants to be there. And when you are there, you do not want to be there forever” (Nallo, 2012).

The first countries included in the agenda of the PBC were Burundi and Sierra Leone, following the Security Council’s request for advice on their particular situations (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.1). The Council’s request, in turn, was informed by previous expressions of interest from both countries to be considered by the Commission.¹¹⁷ The inclusion of both countries was a politicised issue among PBC members and the Secretariat, one that would be discussed in private rather than in open meetings. Carolyn McAskie, who had been appointed as Head of PBSO in May 2006, advocated for the inclusion of both countries. Some member states, however, advocated the inclusion of countries that were not “too far” beyond their armed conflicts (McAskie, 2008: 11), whilst others still had a concern in ensuring some geographically balanced representation in the agenda of the new organ (Neves, 2009: 166-167). As such, a few countries were initially thought of as the first options for the PBC: Burundi and Sierra Leone, supported by France and the UK, respectively, as well as by the PBSO; Liberia, supported by the USA and apparently the preferred option for “some member states” at first (Wilton Park Conference, 2006: 14); and Haiti, Timor-Leste and Guinea-Bissau, with the backing of countries such as Brazil. Eventually, however, it

¹¹⁶ In April 2006, as the Commission prepared to start working, the UN ‘Blue Book’ listed three and six individuals, respectively, in the Permanent Missions of Burundi and Sierra Leone to the UN (UN Doc. ST/SG/SER.A/295). As of writing, the latest ‘Blue Book’ listed seven and eleven individuals in the same diplomatic representations (UN Doc. ST/PLS/SER.A/303). Not to mention deficiencies in other areas (e.g. financial), the personnel in the missions of those countries are not comparable to those of Western developed member states, such as Germany (over 85 persons) and the USA (over 160), or even developing countries such as India (approximately 30) and Brazil (45) (UN Doc. ST/PLS/SER.A/303).

¹¹⁷ By a letter dated 27 February 2006 to the President of the General Assembly, the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone submitted a request for the PBC to “operate” in the country (Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations, 2006: 1). The Mission of Burundi reiterated the same desire via a letter to the President of the General Assembly on 8 June 2006 (Permanent Mission of Burundi to the United Nations, 2006).

seems that no other country except for Burundi and Sierra Leone (see footnote 117 117) formally expressed interest in being addressed by the Commission at the time. Hence, in the OC meeting of 13 July 2006, it was decided that the PBC would address the situation of both countries, thus including them officially in the agenda of the new organ (see PBC/1/OC/SR.2, 2007).

In the absence of official criteria, McAskie clarifies some of the elements that made Burundi and Sierra Leone the first two countries addressed by the Commission:

- ✓ they have expressed their interest in being addressed by the PBC;
- ✓ they were “far enough” in their post-conflict peace process, meaning that they “have both gone through accepted and recognised election processes that have produced legitimate governments able to speak on behalf of the country and its population”;
- ✓ they had experience in dealing with the UN;
- ✓ both countries have been neglected by the international community in the past, attracting interest and attention from only few donors and multilateral agencies; and
- ✓ they helped to reach some balance, as one was French and the other was English-speaking. (McAskie, 2012)

In addition, it is only reasonable that PBC members and other individuals involved with its functioning at the time had a particular interest in including countries that could provide good results in a relatively short period – that is, that could produce ‘quick wins’ for the new Commission.

Guinea-Bissau was included in the PBC agenda in the following year. As aforementioned, the country had initially been thought of as one of the first to be addressed by the Commission, particularly as it had been previously addressed within the framework of ad hoc groups established in the ECOSOC to consider some development aspects associated with states emerging from armed conflicts in Africa (see Prantl, 2006). Interest from the country in being included in the PBC agenda, however, was formally expressed only in July 2007 via a letter to the Secretary-General. On 11 December, the Security Council submitted a request for advice from the PBC on the country’s situation. Contrary to its request on Burundi and Sierra Leone, however, the Council now outlined specific areas in which it would prefer to receive advice. Those areas were: government capacity in the areas of national finance, public sector reform and anti-corruption; previous actions aimed at developing or strengthening the security system, the judiciary and the rule of law; and developments on democratic practices and the preparation of the 2008 elections (UN Doc.

S/2007/744). On 19 December 2007, the OC decided to include Guinea-Bissau in its agenda and to establish a CSC for the country under the leadership of the Permanent Representative of Brazil (PBC/2/OC/SR.5).

The fourth country included in the PBC agenda was the Central African Republic. The initial request of the country to have its situation considered by the PBC was addressed in a letter dated 6 March 2008 to the Commission itself, but as the country figured in the agenda of the Security Council, the request was forwarded to this organ. On 30 May, the Council requested advice from the Peacebuilding Commission on the situation in the Central African Republic on the following areas: establishment of an inclusive political dialogue; previous actions aimed at developing an “effective, accountable and sustainable” national security sector system; and restoration of the rule of law, including good governance and respect for human rights (UN Doc. S/2008/383). On 12 June, the OC decided to include the Central African Republic on its agenda, thus establishing a CSC for the country under the Chairpersonship of the Belgian Ambassador to the UN (UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.6). Table 6 summarises key aspects related to the inclusion of countries in the PBC agenda.

Liberia would become the fifth country in the PBC agenda following its request, dated 27 May 2010 to the Secretary-General, who forwarded it to the UNSC. On 20 July 2010, the Security Council requested the PBC advice on peacebuilding in Liberia in the following areas: rule of law; security sector reform; and national reconciliation (UN Doc. S/2010/389). If the country’s referral by the Security Council did not differ from previous cases, the engagement of the PBC with Liberia started much earlier. In fact, upon the request of the Liberian government, a PBC delegation undertook a two-week field visit to the country in August, even before it had been formally included in the PBC agenda. The main purpose of the two-week visit was, according to its report, “to identify the main challenges and risks to peacebuilding in the country, including current gaps, and discuss how best the PBC should support the Government of Liberia in addressing the peacebuilding priorities” already identified by the government.¹¹⁸ The holding of a mission at this early stage facilitated the identification of priorities for the country, as it was reported that the PBC delegation spoke with more than 500 individuals in Liberia: during an informal meeting of the CSC-Liberia held on 6 October 2010, one member of the mission referred that they had

¹¹⁸ The report of the mission is available as Peacebuilding Commission (2010).

Table 6: Reference guide on the inclusion of countries in the PBC agenda

Country	Form and date of first formal request	Modality of inclusion in the PBC agenda*	Related UN Doc.	Date of inclusion in the agenda
Burundi	Letter to the UNGA dated 8 Jun 2006 (retransmitted to the SC on 16 June 2006)	Request for advice from the SC	PBC/1/OC/2 16 May 2007	13 Jul 2006 (PBC/1/OC/SR.2)
Sierra Leone	Letter to the UNGA dated 27 Feb 2006	Request for advice from the SC	PBC/1/OC/2 16 May 2007	13 Jul 2006 (PBC/1/OC/SR.2)
Guinea-Bissau	Letter to the UNSG dated 11 Jul 2007 (forwarded to the UNSC on 26 Jul 2007)	Request for advice from the SC	A/62/736- S/2007/744 14 Dec 2007	19 Dec 2007 (PBC/2/OC/SR.5)
Central African Republic	Letter to the PBC dated 6 Mar 2008 (forwarded to the UNSC on 10 Apr 2008)	Request for advice from the SC	A/62/864- S/2008/383 11 June 2008	12 Jun 2008 (PBC/2/OC/SR.6)
Liberia	Letter to the UNSG dated 27 May 2010 (forwarded to the UNSC on 14 Jun 2010)	Request for advice from the SC	A/64/870- S/2010/389 20 Jul 2010	16 Sep 2010 (PBC/4/OC/SR.2)
Guinea	Letter to the PBC dated 21 Oct 2010	Request for advice from member state that is not in the SC agenda	Letter dated 2 Mar 2011 from the PBC [†]	23 Feb 2011 [†]

* In accordance with op. 12 of UNGA Res. 60/180 and UNSC Res. 1645.

† No record found as UN official document, but available on the PBC website.

followed a “wisdom of the crowd” methodology to identify those preliminary priorities.¹¹⁹ It was only on 16 September, with priorities already identified, that the OC would formally include Liberia in the PBC agenda, thus officially creating a CSC for the country under the Chairpersonship of the Ambassador of Jordan to the UN (UN Doc. PBC/4/OC/SR.2).

The most recent addition to the pool of countries considered by the PBC was Guinea (Conakry). The country’s request was submitted directly to the PBC by a letter of 21 October 2010. Unlike the case of the Central African Republic, however, Guinea was not on the SC agenda and the letter was thus shared directly among the membership of the Commission on 26 October. Following the holding of presidential elections in November 2010, the new government reaffirmed its request, paving the way for the inclusion of Guinea as the sixth country in the PBC agenda during the OC meeting of 23 February 2011. In the same meeting, the CSC for the country was formally created under the chairpersonship of Luxembourg (United Nations, 2011). Subsequently, two missions to Guinea were undertaken, first by the CSC-Chair in April and then by a UN technical mission in May. By June, an initial draft orienting the PBC’s engagement with the country had been produced. Before it was adopted, however, the CSC-Chair carried out a second field visit to finalise the document with national authorities at the country level. On 23 September 2011, the Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Guinea was adopted during a CSC meeting (UN Doc. A/66/675-S/2012/70: para. 83).

Designing New York-based peacebuilding strategies

What follows focuses in more detail into the process leading to the adoption of the strategic frameworks for Burundi and Sierra Leone. The relevance of the two cases lies in the fact that they turned out to influence, to a larger extent, how future strategies would be designed and adopted in the PBC. Moreover, perhaps because they are relatively older in the history of the Commission, there are more information and analyses focusing on them than on the other more recent cases in the PBC agenda.

The first formal meeting of the country-specific configurations for the first two countries in the PBC agenda, Sierra Leone and Burundi, took place separately on 12 and 13 of October, respectively. A few days before the sessions, a conference room paper was

¹¹⁹ Informal meeting of CSC-Liberia, 6 October 2010, New York, NY, USA; meeting attended by the author.

circulated for each one of the CSCs with background information on the social-political and economic situation of their respective countries. The documents also identified existing development strategies under way and some of the most critical issues for the consolidation of peace in each one of the two countries (see UN Docs. PBC/2/SIL/CRP.1; PBC/2/BUR/CRP.2). The meetings counted with the participation, including via videoconference,¹²⁰ of high-level authorities from the government of Sierra Leone and Burundi, who provided comprehensive overviews detailing specific measures undertaken by national authorities, as well as their own readings of the most pressing challenges ahead for each country. Although the tone of the statements made by CSC members was rather general,¹²¹ some critical challenges were identified for each situation in the respective meetings, providing a basis for further conversations.

Following the first meeting, efforts were made by national authorities, with the support of entities in the UN system, international financial institutions and donors, to identify priorities and gaps to be addressed in both countries. Early UN efforts included, for instance, a visit of PBSO staff to Burundi and Sierra Leone in November. The visit, which was said to be “fruitful” on one account (UN Doc. PBC/1/SLE/SR.3: 2), provided input for a preliminary mapping of current and/or planned external interventions on relevant areas for peacebuilding in both cases. As a result of these early efforts, by the second meeting of the respective CSCs, in December 2006, broad thematic areas have already been outlined by the government of the countries concerned in close cooperation from entities in the UN system: for Burundi, they included, for instance, good governance, security, the strengthening of justice and the promotion of human rights (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/SR.3: 2); for Sierra Leone, they comprised social and youth empowerment and employment, consolidation of democracy and good governance, and justice and security sector reform (PBSO, 2006: 1-2).

It was from January 2007, however, that a more structured plan was adopted for each CSC by the PBSO (PBSO, 2007b, 2007c). The plans were conceived in three phases. Phase I referred to the identification of peacebuilding priorities by national authorities and

¹²⁰ Videoconferencing would become a recurrent practice in OC and CSC meetings, as it potentially allowed for the engagement of the PBC in New York with relevant stakeholders at the country level – including national authorities, UN country representatives and civil society. Between October and December 2010, I attended several meetings in New York in which this mechanism was used.

¹²¹ The Summary Records of the meetings are available as PBC/1/SLE/SR.1 (2007) and PBC/1/SLE/SR.2 (2007), for CSC-Sierra Leone, and PBC/1/BDI/SR.1 (2007) and PBC/1/BDI/SR.2 (2007), for CSC-Burundi.

relevant stakeholders, which had already taken place between June and December 2006. Phase II, expected to last between January and June 2007, referred to the development of an integrated peacebuilding strategy for each country. Finally, from June 2007 onwards, the final phase was the review, monitoring and sustained implementation of each strategy, which envisaged eventual modifications in light of new developments (PBSO, 2007b, 2007c). The Burundi workplan was implemented according to the initial schedule, but the Sierra Leonean would be delayed for a few months due to the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, initially scheduled for July and later postponed to August. The elaboration of these workplans was important for establishing the general lines and rationale that would later be used by the Commission, more or less explicitly, upon the inclusion of new countries in its agenda.

With the first stage already concluded, Phase II was initiated with a consultative process aimed at developing and consolidating integrated strategies for the PBC's engagement with Burundi and Sierra Leone. This phase unfolded in different fronts, in New York and at the country level. The objective was to try to include voices coming directly from the field in the design of those strategies. In the UN Headquarters, the Commission promoted several 'informal country-specific thematic discussions' on the specific priority areas previously identified. The discussions were open and brought together not only representatives of member states in New York, but also relevant external actors, including at the country level. One of those sessions, for instance, took place on 9 May 2007 and focused on community recovery in Burundi. In addition to member states in New York, representatives of the national government, UN agencies at the country level and other relevant stakeholders participated in the meeting via videoconference from Bujumbura (amongst them, there were, for instance, the Director from Burundi's Ministry of External Relations and Cooperation, the UNDP Country Director and an expert from a US University) (PBSO, 2007a). Other discussions on Burundi focused on the promotion of good governance (in February) and on rule of law and security sector reform (also in May). Informal thematic discussions on Sierra Leone addressed justice sector reform and development (in February) as well as youth employment and unemployment (in May).¹²²

¹²² A detailed list of relevant events and meetings for each CSC in that year is available as Annex IV of UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458.

Two other initiatives were carried out in New York as part of the efforts to develop the integrated peacebuilding strategies for the two countries. First, it was proposed that the Vice-Chair of the PBC established a mechanism for wider discussions on ‘lessons learned’ and experiences that could “enrich the deliberations and the work of the Commission with respect to the countries on its agenda” (UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458: para. 25) – the creation of this mechanism, it appears, was in fact an agreed solution to relieve the diplomatic distress caused by the appointment of the Netherlands in preference of El Salvador as the Chair the CSC-Sierra Leone. When the proposal was presented, it was initially envisaged that the Working Group would focus on the priority areas initially identified for Sierra Leone in Phase I of its workplan. Eventually, however, those priorities were discussed within the framework of the aforementioned ‘informal country-specific thematic discussions’ and the Working Group on Lessons Learned held its initial session in February 2007 on the Sierra Leone upcoming elections (see PBSO, 2007d).¹²³

The second initiative was the holding of a seminar on integrated peacebuilding strategies, which was co-organised by the PBSO, the then International Peace Academy (IPA, currently IPI) and the NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) on 1 March 2007. As it was not yet clear at this stage what the integrated peacebuilding strategies should look like, the event served as a platform wherein PBC members, staff from the PBSO and other organs in the Secretariat as well as external experts could gather inputs and discuss the format and content of such strategies (see IPA and CIC, 2007). It is worth noting that many of the individuals who were involved in the process leading to the establishment of the PBC continued somehow involved in these early phases of functioning of the new body. In fact, Bruce Jones, who, as elaborated in the previous chapter, may be partially credited for pushing forward the proposal of a commission for peacebuilding in the UN in the first place, was a participant in that meeting (IPA and CIC, 2007: 6-7).

Still as part of Phase II, two inter-related processes unfolded at the country level, first as PBC delegations travelled to Sierra Leone in March and to Burundi in April 2007¹²⁴, and then as information started to be more regularly exchanged with relevant actors in both countries. In essence, the field missions were envisaged to: gather information about the

¹²³ A summary of the meeting is available as Annex VI of UN Doc A/62/137-S/2007/458.

¹²⁴ Reports of each field mission are available, respectively, as UN Docs. PBC/1/SLE/2 (2007) and PBC/1/BDI/2 (2007).

situation on the ground; assess the main challenges to peacebuilding; discuss with relevant stakeholders the priorities areas to be included in the respective integrated peacebuilding strategies; and focus the attention of the ‘international community’ on the peacebuilding efforts in the two countries (see UN Docs. PBC/1/SLE/2: Annex; PBC/1/BDI/2: Annex I). At the same time, the UN presence at the country level launched consultations with stakeholders in both countries. In Burundi, the process was facilitated by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), whereas in Sierra Leone, it was made possible with the support of an interoffice technical mission from the UN Headquarters in New York. In particular, such consultations included “civil society organizations, the private sector, religious communities, political parties, United Nations agencies and bilateral and multilateral partners, with input from the Commission including during its field visit”(A/62/137-S/2007/458: para. 16).

Almost a year after the inclusion of Burundi in the PBC agenda, the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the country was adopted on 20 June 2007 during a meeting of the relevant CSC. The document was conceived as an “important step” of the integrated peacebuilding strategy for the country (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4: 1), one that was envisaged to serve as the Commission’s primary instrument of engagement and dialogue with Burundi. It outlined the main principles guiding the engagement of the involved stakeholders, including the principles of national ownership and mutual cooperation – both of which would be present in all the instruments of engagement adopted by the Commission in the future, as discussed below. In addition to the principles, the document contained an analysis of the major peacebuilding priorities identified for the country over the past six months as well as the specific commitments assumed by the several stakeholders relevant in the process.

In the case of the CSC-Sierra Leone, the implementation of the work plan for the elaboration of the integrated peacebuilding strategy was delayed for a few months due to the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in the country. Consultations held in New York were suspended during that period (McAskie, 2008: 14), but they were later resumed once the process was completed. Subsequently, the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework was adopted by the PBC on the CSC-Sierra Leone meeting of 12 December 2007, eighteen months after the country was included in the PBC agenda. Once again, the document laid out the principles that guided the elaboration of the document and then

outlined the peacebuilding priorities agreed between the government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission.

Whereas working towards the elaboration of integrated peacebuilding strategies, the PBC replicated and reinforced key aspects of the liberal democratic peace, such as its top-down nature. The activities aforementioned continued, in essence, to be developed against the backdrop of political and diplomatic dynamics of New York. There were attempts to engage more consistently with national authorities and other stakeholders at the country level, as outlined above, in response to this top-down approach to peacebuilding and lack of engagement with the local population. Those are, of course, remarkable features, especially as other entities such as the Security Council, are not nearly as opened. Enhanced contact and communication, however, does not necessarily lead to enhanced engagement with entities 'in the field'. The visits of PBC delegations, for instance, were deemed "useful in providing crucial information from the ground", according to the Secretariat (UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458: para. 35). However, a careful analysis of the programme of the mission to Burundi, for instance, reveals that most of the meetings were scheduled with representatives from the national government and from the UN system in the country. As such, there was only very limited time scheduled for engagement with representatives of the civil society: seventy-five minutes were arranged for a meeting with religious groups and forty-five minutes were assigned to representatives from the private sector, for example (see UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/2: Annex II). In addition, the four-day programme included only a few hours outside of Bujumbura. Hence, despite its best intentions, the attempt to develop a peacebuilding strategy in close cooperation with stakeholders at the country level eventually resulted in only "a distorted picture of needs and a lack of involvement from rural areas" (Scott, 2008: 10). In the same vein, the voice of such groups in the PBC meetings in New York was still underrepresented during most of the process of drafting of the strategic frameworks for Burundi and Sierra Leone, especially as the actual guidelines for the participation of entities from the civil societies would not be adopted before June 2007.

Establishing the priorities for peacebuilding support

As a result of how they were produced (i.e. in New York, informed by member states' and Secretariat's concerns rather than by more direct involvement from local populations), the peacebuilding strategies outlined by the PBC remained largely associated

with priorities in the broader areas of security and institutional reforms. As such, they ultimately reflected the continuity of the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* as the minimally intelligible meaning for ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*. There is thus little evidence that the Peacebuilding Commission has in fact been able to have a substantial impact in concrete peacebuilding scenarios, as it has more often contributed to replicate and reinforce an approach overwhelmingly informed by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*.

The strategy outlined for Burundi included four peacebuilding priorities (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4: 5; 7-12). First, *the promotion of good governance*, which was understood in terms of consolidating the culture of democracy in the country, particularly via engagement with all actors of society (including the *Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu – Forces nationales de libération* PALIPEHUTU-FNL), strengthening the emerging democracy and enhancing the legitimacy of new institutions. The second priority was the *strengthening of the rule of law within the security forces*, necessary to effectively integrate former belligerents, and to restore the confidence of the population on the National Defence Force and on the Burundi National Police. The *strengthening of justice, promotion of human rights, reconciliation and action to combat impunity* was the third peacebuilding priority in Burundi, as the independence of the judiciary seemed compromised. Efforts in this area would focus particularly on reaching a broad understanding on transitional justice mechanisms. Finally, the fourth priority identified was *the land issue and community-based recovery*, necessary to ensure the resettlement of repatriated Burundians in their own lands during the armed conflict, with special attention to the needs of women and young people (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4: 5; 7-12).

The PBC’s instrument of engagement with Sierra Leone identified five priorities for the integrated peacebuilding efforts (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1: 4-8). The first was *youth employment and empowerment*, understood not only in terms of creating economic opportunities and jobs for the youth, but also of creating long-term economic growth and of creating an enabling environment for the private sector. Second, *justice and security sector reform*, including concerns with access to justice as well as programmes for constitutional reviews and reforms. The third priority was the *consolidation of democracy and good governance*, particularly via the strengthening of national institutions (e.g. Parliament, National Commission for Democracy and the Human Rights Commission) and the

enhancement of civil society participation. Fourth, *capacity-building*, “in its broadest sense and at all levels” (para. 20), including reforms in the civil service and a broad review of existing institutions. Finally, *the development of the energy sector in the country*, since the enormous electricity needs in Sierra Leone were identified as a cross-cutting challenge to all priority areas (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1: 4-8).

On 1 October 2008, the CSC-Guinea-Bissau adopted the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the country, with six areas of concern. First, *elections and institutional support to the Electoral Commission*, with a particular focus in ensuring sufficient funding for the holding of the 2008 legislative elections, considered an “important milestone” in the country’s stability and democracy. Second, *measures to jump-start the economy and rehabilitate the infrastructure, in particular in the energy sector*, identified as necessary to reactivate and diversify the economic activities of the country in order to generate wealth for the population and income for the government. Considering the poor conditions of infrastructure in Guinea-Bissau, especially in the energy sector, the area was included as a priority in the peacebuilding strategy. The third priority was *security and defence sector reform*, which reflected concerns over the previous history of armed conflict in the country due to the strong role of the military in national politics. Fourth, *strengthening of the justice sector, consolidating the rule of law and fighting against drug trafficking*, which essentially focused on reforms aimed at enhancing the capacities of the judiciary. The combat against drug trafficking was included considering its transnational dimensions. The fifth priority was *public administration reform*, which was essentially concerned with making the state more efficient and accountable, with improving its capacity to manage public finance and to implement public policies. Finally, *social issues critical to peacebuilding*, including areas such as education, public health and youth employment, were also identified as a priority area in the PBC’s engagement with the country (UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3: 5-12). It was the first explicit mention to such aspects in the integrated peacebuilding strategies outlined by the PBC.

For Central African Republic, three priorities were identified in the integrated strategy for the country (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7: 6-10). The first priority was *security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*, primarily aimed at the reorganization and training of security forces in the country, as well as restoring the confidence of the population on national security institutions. Particular attention was also

given to the development and implementation of a DDR programme for former combatants. Second, *governance and the rule of law*, which would give particular attention to the organisation of general elections in the country and the strengthening of state institutions in the area. Finally, the PBC strategy for the country prioritised the implementation of *development poles*, envisaged as “regional growth engines” spread throughout the country and aimed at the rehabilitation and reconstruct of a series of community services (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7: 6-10).

The Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Liberia was adopted on 15 November 2010. The document included three priority areas. First, the *strengthening the rule of law*, including a review of the legislative, increased access to and strengthening of the justice system. The second priority was identified as *supporting security sector reform*, aimed at filling some gaps for the successive completion of actions in the area of legislative in the country. Finally, the third area was the *promotion of national reconciliation*, with a particular attention to issues related to land rights and the strengthening of national identity (UN Doc. PBC/4/LBR/2: 2-7). Worth of mention is the fact that the meeting was made via video-conference, with the CSC-Chair presiding the session from Monrovia, alongside Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf.¹²⁵ As aforementioned, the recurrent use of video-conferencing would become a distinctive feature of PBC meetings, as it was supposed to facilitate exchanges with stakeholders based far away from New York.

The priorities outlined in the PBC peacebuilding strategy for Guinea reflect the country’s lack of experience with armed conflict, but rather with a long period of authoritarian regime (UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2: 2-8). As such, the first priority outlined for the country was the *promotion of national reconciliation and unity*, with a special focus on the combat against impunity with respect to the government of a series of regimes over the past decades. The second priority identified was *security and defence sector reform*, which aimed at consolidating the rule of law and strengthening justice institutions under civilian control. Finally, *youth and women’s employment policy*, particularly via the development and implementation of training and employment programmes focused on those two segments of the population (UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2: 2-8). Some of the key aspects of the PBC’s instruments of engagement towards the six countries in its agenda are outlined in Table 7.

¹²⁵ I attended this meeting in the UN Headquarters in New York.

Table 7: PBC's instrument of engagement with countries in its agenda

Country	PBC's Instrument of engagement	Date of approval	Priority areas*
Burundi	Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi (PBC/1/BDI/4)	20 June 2007 (PBC/1/BDI/SR.5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good governance • Strengthening the rule of law within the security forces • Strengthening of justice, promotion of human rights, reconciliation and action to combat impunity • Land issue, with particular reference to the reintegration of affected populations, and community-based recovery • Youth employment and empowerment
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework (PBC/2/SLE/1)	12 December 2007 (PBC/2/SLE/SR.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of democracy and good governance • Justice and security sector reform • Capacity-building • Energy-sector development
Guinea-Bissau	Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau (PBC/3/GNB/3)	1 October 2008 (PBC/3/GNB/SR.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elections and institutional support to the Electoral Commission • Measures to jump-start the economy and rehabilitate the infrastructure, in particular in the energy sector • Security and defence sector reform • Strengthening of the justice sector, consolidating the rule of law and fighting against drug trafficking • Public administration reform • Social issues critical to peacebuilding • Security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration • Governance and the rule of law • Development poles
Central African Republic	Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic, 2009-2011 (PBC/3/CAF/7)	6 May 2009 (PBC/3/CAF/SR.3)	
Liberia	Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Liberia (PBC/4/LBR/2)	15 November 2010 (PBC/4/LBR/SR.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening the rule of law • Supporting security sector reform • Promoting national reconciliation
Guinea	Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Guinea between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC/5/GUI/2)	23 September 2011 (PBC/5/GUI/SR.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promotion of national reconciliation and unity • Security and defence sector reform • Youth and women's employment policy

* The areas in bold represent those of particular relevance for the functioning of Western liberal/democracies in the liberal democratic peace framework.

Whereas including six countries in its agenda and designing their respective peacebuilding strategies, the Commission has also sought to provide advice and engage with concrete peacebuilding situations. However, what emerges from the processes of inclusions outlined above is a restricted participation of relevant parts of the societies concerned in the identification of priorities in the integrated peacebuilding strategies, especially as they are designed by national authorities, with support from UN entities (both PBSO in New York and the UN presence in the country) and with only limited involvement of civil society entities – except in the case of Liberia, perhaps, due to an extended preliminary visit. Consequently, the strategies outlined tended to be formulated in terms of a top-down external support, with limited and superficial involvement from the societies in peacebuilding contexts. The extent to which the involvement of the Peacebuilding Commission has led to tangible results in the peacebuilding processes at the country level is not yet clear; however, as mentioned by several of the interviewees, concrete peacebuilding results in the countries concerned would hardly come from an advisory body sitting in New York.

Conclusions

This chapter analysed the functioning of the new entities of the UN broader peacebuilding architecture. It reviewed the role of the Peacebuilding Support Office in providing technical assistance, scrutinised the provision of financial support via the Peacebuilding Fund and analysed the concrete activities carried out within the framework of the Peacebuilding Commission in different configurations. In doing so, I argued that the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF have thus far changed little of significance in the UN approach to peacebuilding and to societies affected by armed conflict, having mostly contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace framework as the minimally intelligible meaning for ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*.

The PBSO was designed as a Secretariat office composed of the “best expertise available” (A/RES/60/1, 2005: para. 104), clearly reflecting the provision of technical knowledge associated with the liberal democratic peace. The provision of technical support and advice by the PBSO has often focused on promoting values, norms and institutions most commonly found in Western liberal/democratic societies. On different instances, the Office also advanced particular views and positions about issues such as the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ or what kind of activities may be characterised as such. By the same token,

PBF funds have been channelled to peacebuilding initiatives in areas closely associated with the functioning of Western liberal democratic societies, such as electoral processes, institutional reforms in the security sector and the strengthening of the rule of law. Hence, although the PBSO is not an operational entity such as the DPKO, for instance, the outcomes of its activities since 2006 were felt on how ‘peacebuilding’ was addressed and conceptualised in the UN *milieu*, and influenced several ‘practical’ dimensions of the Organisation’s approach to peacebuilding given its position in key policymaking processes in the Secretariat.

The analysis of the PBC’s activities in its first years shows that the Commission also ‘operates’ reflecting the tenets of the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction*. Although the PBC is not an operational body, it outlines strategies that seek to establish a coordinated and coherent approach in the area of peacebuilding. In doing so, the PBC has often served as an institutional locus for peacebuilding discussions that ultimately shifts the power of decisions from the level of the country concerned to the UN Headquarters in New York. Similarly, as discussed above, the priority areas outlined for the PBC ‘integrated peacebuilding strategies’ focused on goals that ultimately sought to project liberal democratic norms, institutions and values to societies affected by armed conflict. Those areas were often related, for instance: to the promotion of democracy and good governance; to the creation, reform and/or strengthening of institutions in the security sector and in the judiciary; and to the enhancement of the rule of law. Hence, by identifying the areas that should be priority in the peacebuilding efforts made by a plethora of global entities at the country level, the Commission inevitably influences the outcomes of concrete peacebuilding initiatives in the field.

What the analysis carried out in this chapter reveals is that rather than an innovative institutional arrangement that some argued it would become, the workings of those three new entities have so far essentially contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace as the minimally intelligible meaning for ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*. This means that the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict has changed little in substantial terms: the establishment of the three ‘new elements’ modified the UN bureaucratic dimension to the extent that they created new organisational actors and interlocutors, new processes and policies, for instance; at a deeper level, however, they have thus far largely continued to address peacebuilding processes based on the liberal democratic

peace framework. Consequently, the 'new elements' may represent a superficial 'solution' that did not necessarily address the complex problems and challenges that impinge UN contemporary peacebuilding in the first place. In essence, therefore, the UN approach to society affected by armed conflicts after the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF continues closely associated with a strong political view about the promotion of a maximalist-substantial version of liberal/democratic states to societies affected by armed conflict.

Conclusion

The whole new concept of peacebuilding developed in the 1990s is a fascinating example of how ideas evolve in and through the UN.

Margaret J. Anstee, former senior official in the UN (UNIHP, 2007b: 160)

From the written word of a concept advanced by one Secretary-General in a report, ‘peacebuilding’ has come fully into life in the context of the United Nations. It is now a core activity of the Organisation in the realm of international peace and security. For more than twenty years, the meaning(s) behind that concept provided the rationale, motivated, legitimated and informed the structures whose interplay enacted concrete policies in several post-armed conflict scenarios, from El Salvador to Mozambique to Cambodia to Timor-Leste. This research study engaged with the trajectory of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations by examining its origins in the early 1990s and its implications for the Organisation’s approach to societies affected by armed conflict ever since, including an analysis of the recently established Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. I explored this trajectory by constructing the narrative presented in the previous chapters. This narrative offers a better understanding of the origins of ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations and its minimally intelligible meanings in the UN *milieu* in distinct historical moments afterwards. Given the insights it adopted and produced, this narrative also created a platform for dialogue between the critique of the liberal peace scholarship and students of the so-called ‘peacebuilding architecture’.

Against the backdrop of the trajectory of ‘peacebuilding’ from a concept to concrete policy in the UN, I engaged with two main research questions in this thesis. The answers to those questions are drawn from the narrative constructed in the previous chapters. The first question posed was:

- ✓ how the concept of peacebuilding ‘came into life’ in the United Nations, that is, became influential to the extent of motivating, justifying, legitimating and/or enacting specific policy outcomes or concrete courses of action?

The answer to this question is mainly found in chapters 3 through 5, and may be summarily formulated as: in the UN context, the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ gained life via a hermeneutical mechanism that attaches meanings to political concepts. In the early 1990s, against the overall backdrop of the end of the cold war, theories about the liberal/democratic peace migrated from academe to the highest levels of decision-making in the UN Secretariat, going through a process of simplification and politicisation as they were converted from *theoretical constructs* to *public conventions* to *political convictions*. The simplified and politicised version of those theories, herein addressed the ‘liberal democratic peace’ framework, gained foothold in the UN *milieu* as a strong and politicised view about the promotion of (liberal) democracies to societies affected by armed conflicts. As such a strong view, it required political action, which was articulated in Boutros-Ghali’s report *An Agenda for Peace*. The document built upon the liberal democratic peace and fostered the concept of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, which, in essence, referred to actions aimed at promoting a minimalist-procedural version of liberal democracies in societies affected by armed conflict. This concept of ‘peacebuilding’ as informed by the liberal democratic peace gradually became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu*, subsequently providing the rationale and informing the structures whose interplay motivate, legitimate, justifies and enact concrete UN peacebuilding initiatives in the field. In doing so, the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ came fully into life, having informed the UN actions towards post-armed conflict in several contexts since the early 1990s.

The second research question outlined in this thesis was as follows:

- ✓ whether and how the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund affected the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding after their establishment?

According to the narrative constructed in the previous chapters, particularly in Chapters 6 and 7, the three ‘new elements’ in the UN broader ‘peacebuilding architecture’ have thus far changed little of significance in the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding. The three entities were created in 2005-2006 partially as a response to some of the problems and challenges associated with the UN contemporary approach to peacebuilding, such as the lack of coordination among donors or the need to more actively engage civil society in local peacebuilding contexts, for instance. The design of the formats, mandates and constitution of those entities, however, was heavily shaped by political, diplomatic and bureaucratic concerns typical of the UN *milieu* in New York rather than by the actual needs of societies

affected by armed conflicts. As a result, the functioning of those ‘new elements’ has been largely shaped by the liberal democratic peace framework, which endures as the minimally intelligible meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*. Hence, despite having modified the UN broader architecture for peacebuilding by creating new organisational actors and spaces for discussion or by outlining new ‘integrated strategies’, the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the PBF have mostly contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace framework in the UN *milieu*. Therefore, the establishment and functioning of those new entities has not yet been able to significantly affect the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding after their establishment.

The remainder of this concluding chapter summarises the main narrative constructed in the substantial chapters of this thesis and discusses some implications of the analysis carried out. It concludes with forward-looking thoughts on some potential axes for further research.

Summary of narrative constructed and main argument

The starting point of the narrative constructed in Chapters 3 through 7 was the restricted circles of Western International Relations (IR) and political science academe. My initial contention was that the liberal democratic peace framework could be characterised as a *theoretical construct* that assembles the political concepts of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ together. Separately, the two concepts assume a plethora of meanings that are not necessarily related. However, when considered against the backdrop of academic theories that seek to explain the apparent absence of wars among liberal/democratic states, the concepts of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘peace’ endow viable meanings to each other. In doing so, the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct* not only offers a framework for understanding a particular aspect of social reality (the absence of wars among liberal/democratic societies), but also assumes the potential to shape individuals’ views about social reality and about their position and interests in that reality. By the early 1990s, the *theoretical construct* of the liberal democratic peace was rather prominent in academic circles, but it only started to become known and accepted in and around the United Nations following the migration of that theoretical, eminently academic discourse, to public spheres.

The migration of the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct* from academe to public spheres in general and to the UN *milieu* in particular was facilitated by

the convergence of key material and ideational aspects intricately interrelated against the broader context of the end of the cold war. Among those factors, stood, among others: the UN past experience in supporting electoral processes; a sense that Western liberalism had overcome all alternative models of governance; and an unusual feeling, at the highest levels of decision making in the Secretariat, that the United Nations was in position to play a substantial role in the area of international peace and security in a 'new era' after 1989. In this context, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was instrumental in contributing to the migration of the liberal democratic peace to public spheres by rhetorically connecting the concepts of 'democracy' and 'peace' in his discourses and statements. When he did so, Boutros-Ghali often resorted to the simplistic rhetorical construction that 'democracies do not (or rarely) fight each other' to reach out to his audiences. As this process unfolded, the liberal democratic peace as *theoretical construct* was gradually converted into a *public convention*, that is, a simplified discourse that is readily taken for granted and that shapes "commonsensical codes of thinking and behavior" (Ish-Shalom, 2013: 5, 21).

Boutros-Ghali soon started to build upon this simplified version of theories about the liberal/democratic peace to advance a clear political agenda of supporting electoral processes and promoting democracies in societies affected by armed conflict with a view to achieve peace. The rationale and goals of this agenda are embodied in the Secretary-General's report *An Agenda for Peace*, released on 17 June 1992. The document was produced by a task force composed of senior officials in the Secretariat and which received substantial intellectual and strategic guidance from Boutros-Ghali himself. The Task Force of the Secretary-General had direct and indirect contact with the growing academic scholarship on the democratic peace, which by that time was starting to develop more robust quantitative models to sustain the thesis that liberal/democratic societies do not or rarely fight against each other. Drawing insights from this scholarship and from Boutros-Ghali's own thoughts on democracy and democratisation, the report advanced a simplified, politicised and dogmatised version of theories about the liberal/democratic peace, one that advocated the promotion of a minimalist-procedural version of (liberal) democracies to societies affected by armed conflict via 'post-conflict peacebuilding'. In advancing this view, Boutros-Ghali contributed to the gradual conversion of the liberal democratic peace (as a framework) from *public convention* to *political conviction*. In the context of the UN *milieu*, the release of *An Agenda for Peace* epitomises this moment of conversion.

The concept of peacebuilding – or, more accurately, ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ – thus entered the United Nations heavily informed by the liberal democratic peace framework. As *An Agenda for Peace* attracted a great deal of attention and member states and the Secretariat discussed the concept, this particular meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ gradually became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu*, informing debates and deliberations among member states in the General Assembly or in the Security Council, and being addressed in several documents of the Organisation. In the aftermath of *An Agenda for Peace* and for the remainder of the 1990s, ‘peacebuilding’ was not overtly converted into concrete structures in the UN bureaucracy, but the liberal democratic peace underlying and informing the concept provided the rationale for bureaucratic (re)arrangements that sought to make the Secretariat better equipped to support societies affected by armed conflict. For instance, an Electoral Assistance Unit was created in the Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs in 1993. Accordingly, peacekeeping operations deployed at that time reflected the political view favouring the promotion of (liberal) democracies to achieve peace to the extent that their mandates gradually included provisions in support to electoral processes.

As it became minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu* and informed bureaucratic arrangements in the Organisation, ‘peacebuilding’ gradually gained life, leading to concrete manifestations in the field throughout the 1990s. Those manifestations reflected the liberal democratic peace framework underlying ‘peacebuilding’ at the time, which varied in accordance to the meaning of ‘liberal democracy’ it entailed. During Boutros-Ghali’s tenure in office, the minimally intelligible connotation of ‘liberal democracy’ in the UN *milieu* overemphasised processes and procedures, leading to initiatives that ought to create liberal democratic *systems* in peacebuilding contexts such as Cambodia and Mozambique, for instance. This understanding of ‘liberal democracy’ was gradually expanded during Annan’s tenure in office towards a maximalist-substantive version that emphasised norms and institutions over elections only. As a result, UN liberal democratic peacebuilding initiatives sought to create liberal democratic *societies*, as illustrated by the UN involvement in Timor-Leste. Despite differences in what concerns the envisaged ‘liberal democracy’, the UN approach to peacebuilding remained heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* throughout the 1990s and the 2000s.

Despite having become minimally intelligible in the UN milieu, and despite its manifestations in concrete initiatives in the field, liberal democratic peacebuilding only became ultimately embodied in the UN bureaucratic structures in 2005-2006, with the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. The three entities were established partially as a response to some of the problems associated with the UN (liberal democratic) approach to peacebuilding, such as the repeated failures to avoid relapses into armed conflict or the need to more actively involve local civil society in contexts of post-armed conflict. The formats, mandates and structures of those 'new elements' in the UN broader peacebuilding architecture, however, were mainly shaped by political and bureaucratic interests of member states and the Secretariat than by concerns associated with the needs and priorities of societies affected by armed conflicts.

As a result of their own design and of the minimally intelligible meaning of 'peacebuilding' in the UN *milieu*, the functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund has been largely predicated on the liberal democratic peace framework. For instance, the PBC's instruments of engagement towards the countries in its agenda are clearly focused on priorities that reflect a maximalist-substantial version of 'liberal democracy', which is the meaning of 'liberal democracy' minimally intelligible in the UN *milieu*. The PBSO works by providing specialised technical assistance to national authorities of the countries in the PBC agenda, thus reproducing the project management philosophy and technocracy features of the liberal democratic peace. The PBF, finally, offers incentives for local and international peacebuilders to carry out their initiatives in areas such as, for instance, the holding of elections or the reform of state institutions, which are key priorities in the liberal democratic peace framework. As those organs operate according to political and diplomatic concerns typical of New York, as well as to the meaning of liberal democratic peace that informs the minimally intelligible concept of 'peacebuilding' in the UN *milieu*, the establishment and functioning of those entities have so far contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace as *political conviction* in the United Nations.

Based on that narrative, I argued in this thesis that the way peacebuilding 'came into life' in the particular context of the United Nations in the early 1990s had a profound and lasting influence in the Organisation's provision of support to societies affected by

armed conflict, not only influencing the core meaning underlying ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN but also preventing substantial changes in that meaning. Pushed forward by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in the early 1990s, the concept of peacebuilding gained life as a concrete policy via a hermeneutical mechanism that attaches meaning to political concepts. Through this mechanism, academic theories on the liberal/democratic peace (a type of discourse) were simplified and politicised in terms of a strong, opinionated and dogmatised view about the promotion of liberal democracies in post-armed conflict situations. As it became evident in the narrative summarised above, this same view remained the main source of meaning informing the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu*. Consequently, the UN approach to peacebuilding has, since the early 1990s, been remarkably concerned with the promotion of liberal democracies – defined first in its minimalist-procedural, and then in its maximalist-substantive connotation. Therefore, the establishment and the functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund have not thus far affected that meaning substantially; rather, they have contributed to its reproduction and reinforcement in the UN *milieu*.

Research implications

The research herein presented has implications in at least three relevant areas: IR constructivism, peacebuilding scholarship and UN peacebuilding policy.

For constructivist scholarship in IR

The narrative presented in the previous chapters was constructed based on the constructivist understanding that non-material aspects such as ideas, discourses, academic theories, norms, rules and social practices are relevant in shaping policy-making and its outcomes in world politics. This standing represents a challenge to ‘traditional’ IR theories in the realist and liberal traditions, which place heavier emphasis on material aspects such as military might or economic wealth in the study of world politics. In this thesis, constructivist premises and its overarching framework as a social theory ‘approach’ (as opposed to a theory *per se*) was instrumental for enabling an understanding of ‘peacebuilding’ as an empty shell. This allowed for advancing the view that what ‘peacebuilding’ means and represents precisely is largely dependent upon the views and interpretations of actors in a specific context. This insight, in turn, allowed for the

exploration of the different meanings assumed by peacebuilding in the UN *milieu*, which, as discussed in the previous chapters, have been largely influenced by the liberal democratic peace. Nevertheless, the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ entailed internal variations to the extent that one of its core components, ‘liberal democracy’, also assumed varying meanings to individuals in the UN *milieu*. In this connection, the use of constructivism enabled for a more nuanced understanding of the different conceptualisations and practices related to ‘peacebuilding’ in the United Nations during a period of more than twenty years.

To explore the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ as it gained foothold in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s, I applied Ish-Shalom’s hermeneutical mechanism. The author had originally formulated his theory in the context of domestic and foreign policy to explain Israel’s positions towards the Oslo peace accords and US democratisation policies in the post-cold war. In this thesis, I adopted Ish-Shalom’s theory in the context of the international organisation *par excellence* and successfully followed the discursive process through which an academic discourse (theories on the liberal/democratic peace) was simplified and politicised as it migrated from academic circles to the UN *milieu*. The fruitful use of Ish-Shalom’s theory in this case further demonstrates the validity of the hermeneutical mechanism. In this thesis and in Ish-Shalom’s original work, however, the focus of our analyses was the academic discourse on theories about the liberal/democratic peace, which thus raises the question of whether the mechanism may also be used to explore the influence of other social science theories in policy outcomes.

This thesis went further than Ish-Shalom’s original work on the hermeneutical mechanism to the extent that it combined his discourse-tracing methodology with process-tracing. In fact, in Chapters 3 and 4, I explored not only how academic theories on the liberal/democratic peace were transformed into a simplified, politicised and dogmatised discourse in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s, but also the process through which events and dynamics shaped and were shaped by that transformation. In my narrative, the discourse-tracing approach helped to identify relevant actors and meanings for the concept of peacebuilding, which, in turn, facilitated the identification of points of contacts and interrelationships between them. Combined, then, both approaches helped to trace not only the changes in the discourse about the thesis that ‘democracies do not or rarely fight each other’, but also how those changes took place in the specific context of the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s. Ish-Shalom’s hermeneutical mechanism was thus instrumental in the

construction of the narrative outlined in the previous chapters. Simultaneously, the validity and applicability of that specific constructivist theory were reinforced as they were successfully employed out of its original context.

For peacebuilding scholarship

The analysis herein carried out offered two original contributions for peacebuilding scholarship. First, it offered a better understanding on the origins of the concept of peacebuilding as pushed forward by Boutros-Ghali in the UN *milieu* in the early 1990s. In doing so, I challenged two views on that process, nominally: that the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ was a brainchild of the Egyptian Secretary-General, and that the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in *An Agenda for Peace* stemmed from Galtung’s early writings. In my narrative, I delved into those two views by acquiescing that personal acquaintances and the similarity in the labels of ‘peacebuilding’ make Galtung’s and Boutros-Ghali’s concept rather close – in fact, it is indeed likely that Galtung’s writings played some role in shaping the overall conceptual framework of Boutros-Ghali’s report. However, when one looks into the meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ in *An Agenda for Peace* and in Boutros-Ghali’s approach to that issue in the next few years, it becomes clear that Boutros-Ghali adopted a narrower meaning of ‘peacebuilding’ than Galtung. Indeed, ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN *milieu* at that time was strongly associated with the promotion of a minimalist-procedural version of ‘liberal democracies’ in post-armed conflict situations. This was a by-product of Boutros-Ghali’s own readings about democracy and democratisation, as well as about the growing scholarship on the democratic peace thesis, which reached the UN *milieu* in a simplified and politicised version. By challenging parts of the two contending views on the origins of the concept in the UN, this thesis carried out an in-depth analysis of the historical process leading to *An Agenda for Peace* with a view to offer a more nuanced understanding of peacebuilding at the time, one that reflected not only the content of Boutros-Ghali’s report, but that also captured the unwritten aspects associated with its elaboration.

This narrative has also established a dialogue between the critique of the liberal peace and students of the ‘new elements’ of the broader UN ‘peacebuilding architecture’: the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. As explored in the Introduction, those two strands of contemporary research on peacebuilding have produced insightful studies, but they have largely failed to exchange

views – with a few exceptions (e.g. Caplan and Ponzio, 2011; Stamnes, 2010). Hence, we know relatively little about the influence of the liberal democratic peace framework in the workings of those entities. By exploring their establishment and functioning based on concepts and insights gained by a close reading of the critique of the liberal peace scholarship, the narrative herein constructed established a bridge that potentially facilitates future dialogues between both strands of research as well as between students of peacebuilding and international organisations.

For UN peacebuilding policy

The single major implication of this research to UN peacebuilding policy is connected to the argument that the establishment and functioning of the ‘new elements’ in the UN broader peacebuilding architecture have not yet produced significant changes in the Organisation’s approach to peacebuilding and to societies affected by armed conflict. As outlined in Chapter 6, those elements were partially established as a response to some of the problems identified in the UN approach to peacebuilding throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s, such as the need for more active involvement with local civil societies or the lack of coordination among donors. Although recognising that the PBC, PBSO and PBF are no panacea, the observation that they reproduce, at a prior and deeper level, the same commitments to the liberal democratic peace framework that informed the UN approach to (liberal democratic) peacebuilding during most of the post-cold war seems to represent a major blow to efforts aimed at enhancing the UN’s capacities in international peace and security. As such, this observation raises the question of what is thus the real ‘added-value’ of those entities *vis-à-vis* the UN approach to peacebuilding prior to the PBC, PBSO and PBF. Considering that the continued reliance of the PBC, PBSO and PBF on the liberal democratic peace framework is likely to entail only limited impacts in the countries in the Commission’s agenda, the analysis herein carried out also raises the question of whose interests were served, and for which purposes, following the creation of those three new entities in the UN broader peacebuilding architecture.

Future axes for research

Two straightforward axes for future research stem from this thesis. The first is still centred on the sites where peacebuilding policies are outlined and decisions are made, such

as the UN Headquarters. Considering the questions asked and the insights gained in this research, it would be interesting and relevant to enquire the extent to which some of the dynamics herein depicted (which focused mostly in the structures and workings of the UN Secretariat) also occurred in other parts of the UN system. In fact, as I made clear in Chapter 6, the PBC, PBSO and PBF were not the only responses outlined in the UN as responses to some of the problems and challenges associated with peacebuilding. Hence, slightly changing one of the main questions raised and addressed in this thesis, one might as well ask *whether and how the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has affected the UNDP and/or the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding after its establishment*. Such an enquiry could help understand the implications of bureaucratic changes in the UNDP for its own and for the UN approach to peacebuilding. Moreover, as I found surprisingly little bibliographic references to the establishment and to the role played by the BCPR in peacebuilding since its establishment, such an enquiry would have increased relevance to those interested in the UNDP role in peacebuilding.

In pursuing this axis of research, one could also change the locus of investigation from the UN to the Headquarters of other key international organisations involved in peacebuilding, such as the European Union or the African Union, for instance. In doing so, one could delve into the origins and the meanings of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in each one of those organisations, or one could conduct a cross-comparative study of the potential connections, similarities and differences on how those organisations conceive and implement peacebuilding policies. The insights gained from such a research would most likely feed into contemporary debates about the possibilities and limits of the agency of international organisations in enabling post-liberal and emancipatory forms of peacebuilding. Another potential area of research could focus on recent organisational and bureaucratic changes in those same international organisations. For instance, to what extent the African Peace and Security Architecture or the European External Action Service affected, respectively, the African Union’s and the European Union’s approach to peacebuilding after their establishment?

The second axis of future research stemming from this thesis shifts the focus of the analysis away from the headquarters level and back into the countries where internationally-led peacebuilding initiatives take place. Several possible questions would merit a careful consideration: was there any substantial improvement in the coordination of agents in the

field (e.g. UN country teams, civil society organisations) in comparison with the period before the establishment of the PBC? To what extent is the PBSO role in convening the UN system reaching UN entities based in the field? What has been the impact of the integrated peacebuilding strategies outlined by the Peacebuilding Commission in New York in the everyday lives of populations in Bissau, Bujumbura or Monrovia, for instance? What would have been the progress of peacebuilding in places such as Bangui, Freetown or Conakry had the PBC, PBSO and PBF not been established? Or if they had been established with different formats and mandates? Such potential questions are relevant not only for their intrinsic academic merit, but also for their potential to inform and shape the review of the 'peacebuilding architecture' that member states carry out once every five years – the next one is scheduled to take place in 2015.

List of bibliographical references

Bibliography

- (1999), *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ActionAid; CAFOD; CARE International (2007), “Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission”. 41 p. Johannesburg and London: ActionAid, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development and CARE International UK. Last accessed on 21 September 2013, at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C4E201DB9B41CEF7C12573A2004B133C-actionaid_nov2007.pdf.
- Adebajo, Adekeye (2002), *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Adebajo, Adekeye (2011), *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Adler, Emanuel (1997), “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3), 319-363.
- Almqvist, Jessica (2005), “A Peacebuilding Commission for the United Nations”. *Policy Paper*, 4, June 2005. 24 p. Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, FRIDE.
- Aning, Kwesi; Lartey, Ernest (2010), “Establishing the Future State of the Peacebuilding Commission: Perspectives on Africa”. *Working Paper, The Future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project*, January 2010. 23 p. Ottawa, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Policy Studies (University of Ottawa).
- Annan, Kofi (1998), “The Quiet Revolution”, *Global Governance*, 4(2), 123-138.
- Annan, Kofi (2003). “Opening Statement of the United Nations Secretary-General, H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan, at the General Debate of the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2003”. Last accessed on 5 September 2013, at <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm>.
- Annan, Kofi (2012a), “Speech Delivered by the Secretary-General at the Cyril Foster Lecture, Titled ‘Why Democracy is an International Issue’, at Oxford University, United Kingdom, 19 June 2001”, in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, v. 2, 1528-1532.

- Annan, Kofi (2012b), "Speech Delivered by the Secretary-General at the International Conference Titled 'Towards a Community of Democracies', in Warsaw, Poland, 27 June 2000", in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, v. 2, 1137-1140.
- Annan, Kofi (2012c), "Speech Delivered by the Secretary-General to the 4th International Conference of New and Restored Democracies, in Cotonou, Benin, 4 December 2000", in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, v. 2, 1317-1319.
- Annan, Kofi (2012d), "Speech Delivered to the Conference of Presiding Officers of National Parliaments, Organized by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, in New York, 20 August 2000", in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, v. 2, 1195-1197.
- Anstee, Margaret J. (1998), "Strengthening the Role of the Department of Political Affairs as Focal Point for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding", 30 October. 19 p. New York: Department of Political Affairs.
- Ashley, Richard K. (1984), "The Poverty of Neorealism", *International Organization*, 38(2), 225-286.
- Babst, Dean V. (1964), "Elective Governments – A Force for Peace", *The Wisconsin Sociologist*, 3(1), 9-14.
- Bailey, Sydney D. (1998), *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [3rd ed.; orig. 1975].
- Bain, William (2000), "Deconfusing Morgenthau: Moral Inquiry and Classical Realism Reconsidered", *Review of International Studies*, 26(3), 445-464.
- Ball, Nicole; van Beijnum, Mariska (2009), "Review of the Peacebuilding Fund". 4 June 2009. 40 p. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090604%20PBF_Review.pdf.
- Barnett, Michael; Finnemore, Martha (2004), *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Barnett, Michael; Kim, Hunjoon; O'Donnell, Madalene; Sitea, Laura (2007), "Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?", *Global Governance*, 13(1), 35-58.
- Bates, Robert H. (2008), "State Failure", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, 1-12.
- Beck, Ulrich (1992), *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage. [orig. 1986].
- Beigbeder, Yves (1994), *International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

- Bellamy, Alex J. (2004), "The 'Next Stage' in Peace Operations Theory?", *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), 17-38.
- Bellamy, Alex J. (2010), "The Institutionalisation of Peacebuilding: What Role for the UN Peacebuilding Commission?", in Oliver P. Richmond (ed.), *Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 193-210.
- Bellamy, Alex J.; Williams, Paul D.; Griffin, Stuart (2010), *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Polity Press. [2nd ed.].
- Benner, Thorsten; Mergenthaler, Stephan; Rotmann, Philipp (2011), *The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bensahel, Nora (2007), "Organising for Nation Building", *Survival*, 49(2), 43-76.
- Berdal, Mats (2008a), "The Security Council and Peacekeeping", in Vaughan Lowe; Adam Roberts; Jennifer Welsh; Dominik Zaum (eds.), *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175-204.
- Berdal, Mats (2008b), "The UN Peacebuilding Commission: The Rise and Fall of a Good Idea", in Michael Pugh; Neil Cooper; Mandy Turner (eds.), *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 356-372.
- Berdal, Mats (2009), *Building Peace after War*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Berdal, Mats; Economides, Spyros (eds.) (2007), *United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berdal, Mats; Leifer, Michael (1996), "Cambodia", in James Mayall (ed.), *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 25-58.
- Berger, Peter L.; Luckmann, Thomas (1991), *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Penguin Books. [orig. 1966].
- Berridge, G. R.; James, Alan (2003), *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. [2nd ed.].
- Biermann, Frank; Siebenhüner, Bernd; Bauer, Steffen; Busch, Per-Olof; Campe, Sabine; Dingwerth, Klaus; Grothmann, Torsten; Marschinski, Robert; Tarradell, Mireia (2009), "Studying the Influence of International Bureaucracies: A Conceptual Framework", in Frank Biermann; Bernd Siebenhüner (eds.), *Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 37-74.
- Biersteker, Thomas J.; Jütersonke, Oliver (2010), "The Challenges of Institution Building: Prospects for the UN Peacebuilding Architecture". *Working Paper, The Future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project*, January 2010. 14 p. Ottawa, Oslo: Norwegian

Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Policy Studies (University of Ottawa).

- Birgisson, Karl Th. (1993), "United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan", in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 299-313.
- Bolton, John R. (2007), *Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad*. New York: Threshold Editions.
- Boulden, Jane (2001), *Peace Enforcement: the United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1977), *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992), "Empowering the United Nations", *Foreign Affairs*, 71(5), 89-102.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1993), "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later", *Orbis*, 37(3), 323-332.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1995), "Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative", *Global Governance*, 1(1), 3-11.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1999), *Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2002), *Démocratiser la Mondialisation: Entretiens Avec Yves Berthelot*. Monaco: Éditions du Rocher.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2003a), "The 1994 Gauer Distinguished Lecture in Law and Public Policy of the National Legal Center for the Public Interest, New York, 18 October 1994", in Charles Hill (ed.), *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. New Haven: Yale University Press, v. 2, 1298-1306.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2003b), "Address to the American Publishers Association, Washington, DC, 25 March 1993", in Charles Hill (ed.), *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. New Haven: Yale University Press, v. 1, 539-546.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2003c), "Lecture at the University of Warsaw, Poland, 10 November 1995", in Charles Hill (ed.), *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. New Haven: Yale University Press, v. 3, 1764-1768.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2003d), "The Ninth Annual David M. Abshire Lecture, Delivered at the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., 13 May 1992", in Charles Hill (ed.), *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. New Haven: Yale University Press, v. 1, 70-79.

- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2003e), "Remarks to the Foreign Correspondents Club, Tokyo, 20 December 1993", in Charles Hill (ed.), *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. New Haven: Yale University Press, v. 2, 904-909.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2003f), "Statement at the Opening of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 June 1993", in Charles Hill (ed.), *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. New Haven: Yale University Press, v. 1, 672-684.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2003g), "Statement to CNN Correspondents' Conference, Atlanta, 5 May 1993", in Charles Hill (ed.), *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. New Haven: Yale University Press, v. 1, 612-615.
- Brooks, Stephen G.; Wohlforth, William C. (2000-2001), "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas", *International Security*, 25(3), 5-53.
- Bueger, Christian (2010), *The New Spirit of Technocracy? Ordering Practice in United Nations Peacebuilding*. PhD thesis in Political and Social Sciences. European University Institute. 311 p.
- Burgess, Stephen F. (2001), *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997*. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press.
- Bush, George H. (1989), "Address to the 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York, 25 September 1989". *Public Papers*. George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=950.
- Bush, George H. (1990a), "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, 11 September 1990". *Public Papers*. George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217.
- Bush, George H. (1990b), "Address before the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York, 1 October 1990". *Public Papers*. George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2280.
- Buzan, Barry (1991), *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. [2nd ed.].
- Call, Charles T. (2004), "The Problem of Peacebuilding: How UN Thinking has Evolved in Recent Years". 12 p. New York: Department of Political Affairs.
- Call, Charles T. (2005), "Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for DPA". 43 p. New York: Department of Political Affairs.
- Call, Charles T. (2012), *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

- Call, Charles T.; Cook, Susan E. (2003), "On Democratization and Peacebuilding", *Global Governance*, 9(2), 233-246.
- Call, Charles T.; Cousens, Elizabeth M. (2008), "Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies", *International Studies Perspectives*, 9(1), 1-21.
- Call, Charles T.; Wyeth, Vanessa (eds.) (2008), *Building States to Build Peace*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Campbell, Susanna; Chandler, David; Sabaratnam, Meera (eds.) (2011), *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books.
- Caplan, Richard; Ponzio, Richard (2011), "The Normative Underpinnings of the UN Peacebuilding Commission", in James Mayall; Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*. London: Hurst & Company, 183-196.
- Cavalcante, Fernando (2011a), "A Construção da Paz em Cenários de Anarquia: Uma Inversão do Foco de Análise", *Relações Internacionais*, 32, 23-32.
- Cavalcante, Fernando (2011b), "Contemporary Debates on Peacebuilding", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 5(4), 419-429.
- Chan, Steve (1984), "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28(4), 617-648.
- Chandler, David (2004), "The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the 'Liberal Peace'", *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), 59-81.
- Chandler, David (2006), *Empire in Denial: the Politics of State-Building*. London: Pluto Press.
- Chandler, David (2010), *International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance*. London: Routledge.
- Chandler, David (2011), "The Uncritical Critique of 'Liberal Peace'", in Susanna Campbell; David Chandler; Meera Sabaratnam (eds.), *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books, 174-190.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1997), *Ideas and International Political Change*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998), "The Constructivism Turn in International Relations Theory", *World Politics*, 50(2), 324-348.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2004), "Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics: a Review Essay", *Review of International Studies*, 30(2), 229-244.

- Chernoff, Fred (2007), *Theory and Metatheory in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chesterman, Simon (2005), "From State Failure to State-Building: Problems and Prospects for a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission", *Journal of International Law and International Relations*, 2(1), 155-175.
- Chetail, Vincent (2009), "Introduction: Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – Ambiguity and Identity", in Vincent Chetail (ed.), *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-33.
- Chopra, Jarat (2000), "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor", *Survival*, 42(3), 27-39.
- Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. (2010), *Capital Ideas: the IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- CIC; IPI (2008), "Taking Stock, Looking Forward: a Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission". *Policy Papers*, April 2008. 33 p. New York: Center on International Cooperation, International Peace Institute.
- Claude Jr., Inis L. (1964), *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*. New York: Random House. [3rd, revised ed.; orig. 1956].
- Claude Jr., Inis L. (1996), "Peace and Security: Prospective Roles for the Two United Nations", *Global Governance*, 2(3), 289-298.
- Cohen, Roberta; Deng, Francis M. (1998), *Masses in Flight: the Global Crises of Internal Displacement*. Washington: The Brookings Institution.
- Collier, Paul; Elliot, V.L.; Hegre, Håvard; Hoeffler, Anke; Reynal-Querol, Marta; Sambanis, Nicholas (2003), *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
- Cooper, Neil (2007), "Review Article: On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace", *Conflict, Security and Development*, 7(4), 605-616.
- Cousens, Elizabeth M.; Kumar, Chetan; Wermester, Karin (eds.) (2001), *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Cox, David (1993), "Exploring An Agenda for Peace: Issues Arising from the Report of the Secretary-General". *Aurora Papers*, 20. 52 p. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security.
- Cox, David; Lee, Steve; Sutterlin, James (1989), "The Reduction of the Risk of War through Multilateral Means: A Summary of Conference Proceedings". *Working Paper*, 18, September. 32 p. Ottawa: Canada Institute for International Peace and Security.
- Cox, Robert W. (1981), "Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10(2), 126-155.

- CSIS (2005), “Making Peacebuilding Work: Reforming UN Peacekeeping Operations”. March 2005. Drafted by Craig Cohen. 16 p. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Dallaire, Roméo (2004), *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. London: Arrow Books.
- Daudet, Yves (ed.) (1996), *La Crise d’Haïti (1991-1996)*. Paris: Editions Montchrestien.
- David, Charles-Philippe (2002), “Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?”, in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), *Approaches to Peacebuilding*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 18-58.
- de Coning, Cedric (2010), “Clarity, Coherence and Context: Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding”. *Working Paper, The Future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project*, January 2010. 28 p. Ottawa, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Policy Studies (University of Ottawa).
- de Soto, Álvaro; del Castillo, Graciana (1994), “Obstacles to Peacebuilding”, *Foreign Policy*, 94, 69-83.
- DESIPA (1996), “An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities”. 62 p. New York: Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis.
- Dexter, Lewis Anthony (2006), *Elite and Specialized Interviewing*. Essex: ECPR Press. [orig. 1970].
- DGACM: Department for General Assembly and Conference Management (2012), “DGACM Synopsis by Major Issue of the Informal Plenary Meetings on the Recommendations Contained in the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 27- 31 January 2005”, in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, v. 4, 3293-3296.
- Diehl, Paul F. (1993), *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Diehl, Paul F. (2008), *Peace Operations*. Cambridge: Polity press.
- Dobbins, James; Jones, Seth G.; Crane, Keith; Rathmell, Andrew; Steele, Brett; Teltschik, Richard; Timilsina, Anga (2005), *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John (2002), “Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation”, in Stephen John Stedman; Donald Rothchild; Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 43-69.
- Doyle, Michael W. (1983a), “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12(3), 205-235.

- Doyle, Michael W. (1983b), "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12(4), 323-353.
- Doyle, Michael W. (1986), "Liberalism and World Politics", *The American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1151-1169.
- Doyle, Michael W. (1997), *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Doyle, Michael W.; Johnstone, Ian; Orr, Robert C. (eds.) (1997), *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Doyle, Michael W.; Sambanis, Nicholas (2000), "International Peacebuilding: a Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis", *The American Political Science Review*, 94(4), 779-801.
- Doyle, Michael W.; Sambanis, Nicholas (2006), *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Doyle, Michael W.; Suntharalingam, Nishkala (1994), "The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping", *International Peacekeeping*, 1(2), 117-147.
- DPA (2003), "DPA Peace-Building Unit – Background to and Current Status of Proposal", October. 4 p. New York: Department of Political Affairs.
- DPA; UNDP (2001), "Report on UN Post-Conflict Peace-Building Support Offices", July. 34 p. New York: Department of Political Affairs and United Nations Development Programme.
- DPKO; DFS (2008), "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines". 100 p. New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
- DPKO; DFS (2010), "Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus". No number, September. 4 p., Internal document. [n.l]: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support.
- Druckman, Daniel (2005), *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Duffield, Mark (2001), *Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.
- Duffield, Mark (2007), *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Dunn, David J. (2005), *The First Fifty Years of Peace Research: a Survey and Interpretation*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Durch, William J. (ed.) (1993a), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Durch, William J. (1993b), "United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara", in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 406-434.
- Durch, William J. (ed.) (1996), *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Durch, William J. (ed.) (2006), *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, The Henry L. Stimson Center.
- Durch, William J.; Holt, Victoria K.; Earle, Caroline R.; Shanahan, Moira K. (2003), "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations". 142 p. Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center.
- Ember, Carol R.; Ember, Melvin; Russett, Bruce M. (1992), "Peace between Participatory Polities: A Cross-Cultural Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis", *World Politics*, 44(4), 573-599.
- Emmerij, Louis; Jolly, Richard; Weiss, Thomas G. (2001), *Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- EOG (2006), "Inventory: United Nations Capacity in Peacebuilding". September. 164 p. New York: Executive Office of the Secretary-General, United Nations.
- Fetherston, A. B. (1994), *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*. London: Macmillan.
- Fierke, Karin M. (2010), "Constructivism", in Tim Dunne; Milja Kurki; Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 177-194.
- Fierke, Karin M.; Jørgensen, Knud Erik (2001), "Introduction", in Karin M. Fierke; Knud Erik Jørgensen (eds.), *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 3-10.
- Finnemore, Martha; Sikkink, Kathryn (1998), "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", *International Organization*, 52(4), 887-917.
- Finnemore, Martha; Sikkink, Kathryn (2001), "Taking Stock: the Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4, 391-416.
- Fontoura, Paulo Roberto Tarrisse da (2005), *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz das Nações Unidas*. Brasília: FUNAG.

- Forman, Shepard (2005), "High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change: Recommendation to Establish a Peacebuilding Commission". *Background contribution to roundtable discussion*, June 2005. 8 p. Madrid: FRIDE.
- Forman, Shepard; Patrick, Stewart (eds.) (2000), *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Forman, Shepard; Patrick, Stewart; Salomons, Dirk (2000), "Recovering from Conflict: Strategy for an International Response". *Paying for Essentials, Policy Paper Series*. 30 p. New York: Center on International Cooperation.
- Forman, Shepard; Sorensen, Gigja; Chandran, Rahul (2010), "A Field-Based Review of the Peacebuilding Commission in Burundi". 15 p. New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University.
- Fortna, Virginia Page (1993a), "United Nations Angola Verification Mission I", in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 376-387.
- Fortna, Virginia Page (1993b), "United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia", in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 353-375.
- Fortna, Virginia Page (2008), *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Freeden, Michael (1996), *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989), "The End of History?", *The National Interest*, 16, 4-18.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989/1990), "A Reply to My Critics", *The National Interest*, 18, 21-28.
- Gallie, W. B. (1956), "Essentially Contested Concepts", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56(1), 167-198.
- Galtung, Johan (1964), "An Editorial", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1(1), 1-4.
- Galtung, Johan (1969), "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167-191.
- Galtung, Johan (1975), "Three Realistic Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding", *Impact of Science on Society*, 26(1/2), 103-115.
- Galtung, Johan (1976), "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding", in Johan Galtung (ed.), *Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research*. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, v. II, 282-304.
- Galtung, Johan (1981), "Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace", *Journal of Peace Research*, 18(2), 183-199.

- Galtung, Johan (1996), *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Prio and Sage Publications.
- Giddens, Anthony (1984), *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens, Anthony (1993), *New Rules of Sociological Method*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. [2nd ed.; orig. 1976].
- Gilpin, Robert (1981), *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1992), "Democracy and Peace", *Journal of Peace Research*, 29(4), 369-376.
- Goetschel, Laurent; Hagmann, Tobias (2009), "Civilian Peacebuilding: Peace by Bureaucratic Means?", *Conflict, Security and Development*, 9(1), 55-73.
- Goetze, Catherine; Guzina, Dejan (2008), "Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Nationbuilding – Turtles All the Way Down?", *Civil Wars*, 10(4), 319-347.
- Goldstein, Judith; Keohane, Robert O. (eds.) (1993), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Goodrich, Leland M. (1947), "From League of Nations to United Nations", *International Organization*, 1(1), 3-21.
- Goodrich, Leland M.; Hambro, Edvard; Simons, Anne Patricia (1969), *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*. New York: Columbia University Press. [3rd and revised ed.; orig. 1946].
- Gorbachev, Mikhail (1987), *Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World*. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.
- Goulding, Marrack (1993), "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", *International Affairs*, 69(3), 451-464.
- Goulding, Marrack (2002), *Peacemonger*. London: John Murray.
- Gusterson, Hugh (2008), "Ethnographic Research", in Audie Klotz; Deepa Prakash (eds.), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 93-113.
- Guzzini, Stefano (2000), "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, 6(2), 147-182.
- Haack, Kirsten (2011), *The United Nations Democracy Agenda: A Conceptual History*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Haas, Peter M. (1992), "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", *International Organization*, 46(1), 1-35.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1987), *The Theory of Communicative Action*. v. 2: Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hacking, Ian (1999), *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Held, David (2006), *Models of Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press. [3rd ed.; orig. 1987].
- Held, David; McGrew, Anthony; Goldblatt, David; Perraton, Jonathan (1999), *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Helman, Gerald B.; Ratner, Steven (1993), "Saving Failed States", *Foreign Policy*, Winter(89), 3-20.
- Hilderbrand, Robert C. (1990), *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Hill, Charles (ed.) (2003), *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. 3 v. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1909), *Leviathan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [orig. 1651]. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://www.dominiopublico.gov.br/pesquisa/DetalheObraForm.do?select_action=&co_obra=3886.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1991), "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict", *International Security*, 16(2), 76-116.
- Hopf, Ted (1998), "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", *International Security*, 23(1), 171-200.
- Hopf, Ted (2002), *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policy, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Howard, Lise Morjé (2002), "UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success", *International Peacekeeping*, 9(1), 99-132.
- Howard, Lise Morjé (2008), *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hughes, Caroline (2009), "'We Just Take What they Offer': Community Empowerment in Post-War Timor-Leste", in Edward Newman; Roland Paris; Oliver P. Richmond (eds.), *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 218-242.

- Inayatullah, Naeem; Blaney, David L. (1996), "Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory", in Yosef Lapid; Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 65-84.
- International Peacekeeping (2009), "Special Issue: Liberal Peacebuilding Reconstructed", *International Peacekeeping*, 16(5), 587-734.
- International Security (1994), "Special Section: Give Democratic Peace a Chance?", *International Security*, 19(2), 5-125.
- International Security and Arms Control (1989), "Report of the Seminar on the Establishment of War Risk Reduction Centres, Warsaw, Poland, April 24-25, 1989". 8 p. New Haven: International Security and Arms Control, Yale University.
- IPA; CIC (2006), "Next Steps for the Peacebuilding Commission: Seminar Report". 24 May 2006. Drafted by Charles T. Call, with Elizabeth Cousens, Amy Scott and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth. 5 p. New York: International Peace Academy and Center on International Cooperation.
- IPA; CIC (2007), "Meeting Note: Seminar on Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies". 1 March 2007. 10 p. New York: International Peace Academy and Center on International Cooperation.
- Iro, Andrea (2009), *The UN Peacebuilding Commission – Lessons from Sierra Leone*. Potsdam: University of Potsdam.
- Isaacson, Walter (2007), *Einstein: His Life and Universe*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- Ish-Shalom, Piki (2006a), "Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics of Democratization", *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(4), 565-598.
- Ish-Shalom, Piki (2006b), "The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism", *International Studies Review*, 8(3), 441-468.
- Ish-Shalom, Piki (2008), "The Rhetorical Capital of Theories: The Democratic Peace and the Road to the Roadmap", *International Political Science Review*, 29(3), 281-301.
- Ish-Shalom, Piki (2011), "Political Constructivism: The Political Construction of Social Knowledge", in Corneliu Bjola; Markus Kornprobst (eds.), *Arguing Global Governance: Agency, Lifeworld, and Shared Reasoning*. Abingdon: Routledge, 231-246.
- Ish-Shalom, Piki (2013), *Democratic Peace: A Political Biography*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Jackson, Robert (1990), *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2002), “The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s: Adding Globalization to the Conventional ‘End of the Cold War Explanation’”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(3), 267-282.
- Jarvis, Darryl S. L. (ed.) (2002), *International Relations and the “Third Debate”: Postmodernism and its Critics*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
- Jenkins, Rob (2008), “Organizational Change and Institutional Survival: The Case of the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission”, *Seton Hall Law Review*, 38(4), 1327-1364.
- Jenkins, Rob (2010), “Re-Engineering the UN Peacebuilding Architecture”. *Working Paper, The Future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project*, January 2010. 34 p. Ottawa, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Policy Studies (University of Ottawa).
- Jenkins, Rob (2013), *Peacebuilding: From Concept to Commission*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Jolly, Richard; Emmerij, Louis; Weiss, Thomas G. (2005), *The Power of UN Ideas: Lessons from the First 60 Years*. New York: United Nations Intellectual History Project. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://www.unhistory.org/publications/UNIdeas.pdf>.
- Jolly, Richard; Emmerij, Louis; Weiss, Thomas G. (2009), *UN Ideas that Changed the World*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Jørgensen, Knud Erik (2010), *International Relations Theory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan”.
- Jupille, Joseph; Caporaso, James A.; Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2003), “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(1/2), 7-40.
- Kaldor, Mary (1999), *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Kanninen, Tapio; Kumar, Chetan (2005), “The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the United Nations System”, in Bertrand G. Ramcharan (ed.), *Conflict Prevention in Practice: Essays in Honour of Jim Sutterlin*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 45-70.
- Kanninen, Tapio; Piiparinen, Touko (forthcoming), “Why Bureaucracies Matter in the Global Age: A Post-Weberian Explanation with the Case Study of Preparing and Implementing the UN’s An Agenda for Peace”, *International Relations*.
- Kant, Immanuel (1917), *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*. London: George Allen and Unwin. [orig. 1795].
- Karns, Margaret P. (2012), “The Roots of UN Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Case Study of Autonomous Agency”, in Joel Oestreich (ed.), *International Organizations as Self-Directed Actors: A Framework for Analysis*. New York: Routledge, 60-88.

- Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J.; Keohane, Robert O.; Krasner, Stephen D. (1998), "International Organization and the Study of World Politics", *International Organization*, 52(4), 645-685.
- Kelsen, Hans (1948), "Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United Nations", *American Journal of International Law*, 42(4), 783-796.
- Kende, Istvan (1989), "The History of Peace: Concept and Organizations from the Late Middle Ages to the 1870s", *Journal of Peace Research*, 26(3), 233-247.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1984), *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1988), "International Institutions: Two Approaches", *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4), 379-396.
- Klotz, Audie (1995), *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Klotz, Audie; Lynch, Cecelia (2007), *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
- Knight, W. Andy (2000), *A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Krasno, Jean (2003), "The Group of Friends of the Secretary-General: A Useful Leverage Tool", in Jean Krasno; Bradd C. Hayes; Donald C. F. Daniel (eds.), *Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations*. Westport: Praeger, 171-200.
- Krasno, Jean (2005), "The Quiet Revolutionary: A Biographical Sketch of James S. Sutterlin", in Bertrand G. Ramcharan (ed.), *Conflict Prevention in Practice: Essays in Honour of Jim Sutterlin*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 7-38.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich (1989), *Rules, Norms and Decisions: on the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich (2000), "Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29(1), 73-101.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich (2001), "Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study", in Karin M. Fierke; Knud Erik Jørgensen (eds.), *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 13-35.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich; Ruggie, John Gerard (1986), "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State", *International Organization*, 40(4), 753-775.

- Kubáľková, Vendulka; Onuf, Nicholas G.; Kowert, Paul (1998), "Constructing Constructivism", in Vendulka Kubáľková; Nicholas G. Onuf; Paul Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 3-21.
- Kurki, Milja (2010), "Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion", *International Studies Review*, 12(3), 362-386.
- Lambourne, Wendy (2008), "Towards Sustainable Peace and Development in Sierra Leone: Civil Society and the Peacebuilding Commission", *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 4(2), 47-59.
- Lapid, Yosef (1989), "The Third Debate: on the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(3), 235-254.
- Lawler, Peter (1995), *A Question of Values: Johan Galtung's Peace Research*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Layne, Christopher (1994), "Kant or Cant: the Myth of the Democratic Peace", *International Security*, 19(2), 5-49.
- Levine, Mark (1997), "Peacemaking in El Salvador", in Michael W. Doyle; Ian Johnstone; Robert C. Orr (eds.), *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 227-254.
- Levy, Jack S. (1988), "Domestic Politics and War", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4), 653-673.
- Lidén, Anders; Eneström, Anna-Karin (2005), "The Peacebuilding Commission: Linking Security and Development", in Felix Dodds; Tim Pippard (eds.), *Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change*. London: Earthscan, 17-26.
- Lombardo, Caroline E. (2001), "The Making of An Agenda for Democratization: A Speechwriter's View", *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 2(1), 253-266.
- Luard, Evan (1982), *A History of the United Nations*. v. I: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955. London: Macmillan.
- Ludwig, Robin (2004), "Free and Fair Elections: Letting the People Decide", in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), *The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 115-162.
- Mac Ginty, Roger (2006), *No War, no Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mac Ginty, Roger (2010), "No War, No Peace: Why So Many Peace Processes Fail to Deliver Peace", *International Politics*, 47(2), 145-162.
- Mac Ginty, Roger (2011), *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Mac Ginty, Roger (2012), "Routine Peace: Technocracy and Peacebuilding", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(3), 287-308.
- MacQueen, Norrie (2006), *Peacekeeping and the International System*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Malloch Brown, Mark (2012a), "Interoffice Memorandum to Several Heads of Departments from Mark Malloch Brown, Deputy Secretary-General, and the Following Draft Terms of Reference, 15 August 2006", in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, v. 5, 4150-4153.
- Malloch Brown, Mark (2012b), "Letter to Jan Eliasson, President of the General Assembly, from Mark Malloch Brown, the Secretary-General's Chief of Staff, 25 January 2006", in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, v. 5, 3794.
- Malone, David M. (2006), *The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980-2005*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mandelbaum, Michael (2002), *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Manglapus, Raúl S. (1987), *Will of the People: Original Democracy in Non-Western Societies*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Mani, Rama (2006), "Déjà Vu or Something New? Lessons for Future Peacebuilding from Haiti", *S+F: Sicherheit und Frieden*, 24(1), 11-16.
- Maoz, Zeev; Russett, Bruce M. (1992), "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?", *International Interactions*, 17(3), 245-267.
- Maoz, Zeev; Russett, Bruce M. (1993), "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986", *The American Political Science Review*, 87(3), 624-638.
- McAskie, Carolyn (2008), "United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture: Two Years on – A History with Recommendations for the Way Forward". 27 p., Internal document. New York: Peacebuilding Support Office.
- McAskie, Carolyn (2010), "2020 Vision: Visioning the Future of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture". *Working Paper, The Future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project*, January 2010. 26 p. Ottawa, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Policy Studies (University of Ottawa).
- McCann, Lisa Marie (2012), *Peacebuilding as Global Public Policy: Multiple Streams and Global Policy Discourse in the Creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission*. PhD thesis in Public Affairs. University of Colorado. 237 p.

- Meisler, Stanley (1995), *United Nations: The First Fifty Years*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Meisler, Stanley (2007), *Kofi Annan: A Man of Peace in a World of War*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
- Miall, Hugh (2007), “The EU and the Peacebuilding Commission”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20(1), 29-45.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (2006), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Boston: McGraw-Hill. [7th ed.; orig. 1948].
- MPTF Office (2010a), “Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report”. 8 p. New York: Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, United Nations Development Programme. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/6425>.
- MPTF Office (2010b), “Rapport Narratif Final sur les Progrès Réalisés”, 31 December 2010. 21 p. New York: Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, United Nations Development Programme. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/10032>.
- MPTF Office (2011), “Project Report: IOM Report to UNDP on Implementation of the out of Country Voting Element of the Southern Sudan Referendum”. 9 p. New York: Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, United Nations Development Programme. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/8776>.
- MPTF Office (2012), “Fifth Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund”. May. 145 p. New York: Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, United Nations Development Programme. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/5th-Consolidated-Annual-Progress-Report.pdf>.
- MPTF Office (2013). “Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office Gateway: The Peacebuilding Fund”. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000>.
- Müller, Joachim (ed.) (2001), *Reforming the United Nations: The Quiet Revolution*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Müller, Joachim (ed.) (2006), *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Effectiveness*. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Nasi, Carlo (2009), “Revisiting the ‘Liberal Peace’ Thesis Applied to Central America: New Insights for and against the Wilsonian Approach”, in Edward Newman; Roland Paris; Oliver P. Richmond (eds.), *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 336-367.
- Neufeld, Mark (1993), “Reflexivity and International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 22(1), 53-76.

- Neufeld, Mark (1995), *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Neumann, Iver B. (2008), "Discourse Analysis", in Audie Klotz; Deepa Prakash (eds.), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 61-77.
- Neves, Gilda Motta Santos (2009), *Comissão das Nações Unidas para Consolidação da Paz: Perspectiva Brasileira*. Brasília: FUNAG.
- Newman, Edward; Paris, Roland; Richmond, Oliver P. (2009a), "Introduction", in Edward Newman; Roland Paris; Oliver P. Richmond (eds.), *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 3-25.
- Newman, Edward; Paris, Roland; Richmond, Oliver P. (eds.) (2009b), *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- OECD (2006), "Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States". *DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*. 55 p. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- OIOS (2008), "Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Independent Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund: Fund Fills Clear Niche and has Seen Early Results, but Must Become Speedier, More Efficient and More Strategic to Fulfil its Vision", 30 December 2008. 28 p. New York: Office of Internal Oversight Services. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?evalid=4309>.
- Olonisakin, 'Funmi; Ikpe, Eka (2012), "The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Problems and Prospects", in Devon Curtis; Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 140-157.
- Onuf, Nicholas G. (1989), *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Onuf, Nicholas G. (1998), "Constructivism: A User's Manual", in Vendulka Kubáľková; Nicholas G. Onuf; Paul Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 58-78.
- Orr, Robert C. (2001), "Building Peace in El Salvador: From Exception to Rule", in Elizabeth M. Cousens; Chetan Kumar; Karin Wermester (eds.), *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 153-181.
- Otobo, Ejeviome Eloho (2010a), "The New Peacebuilding Architecture: An Institutional Innovation of the United Nations", in Peter G. Danchin; Horst Fischer (eds.), *United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 212-234.

- Otunnu, Olara; Doyle, Michael W. (eds.) (1998), *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Owen, John M. (1994), "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace", *International Security*, 19(2), 87-125.
- Owen, John M. (1997), *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Paris, Roland (1997), "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism", *International Security*, 22(2), 54-89.
- Paris, Roland (2002), "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'", *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), 637-656.
- Paris, Roland (2003), "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture", *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(3), 441-473.
- Paris, Roland (2004), *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Paris, Roland (2009), "Understanding the 'Coordination Problem' in Postwar Statebuilding", in Roland Paris; Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*. Abingdon: Routledge, 53-78.
- Paris, Roland (2010), "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding", *Review of International Studies*, 36(2), 337-365.
- Paris, Roland; Sisk, Timothy D. (eds.) (2009), *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Patomäki, Heikki (2001), "The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at the Start of the New Century", *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(6), 723-737.
- Patrick, Stewart; Brown, Kaysie (2006), *Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing "Whole of Government" Approaches to Fragile States*. New York: International Peace Academy.
- PBSO (2006), "Chairman's Summary of Sierra Leone Country-Specific Meeting". 3 p.
- PBSO (2007a), "Burundi Informal Thematic Discussion on Community Recovery – 9 May 2007, Summary Note of the Chair", 14 May. 5 p. New York: Peacebuilding Support Office.
- PBSO (2007b), "Draft Outline of a Country-Specific Workplan for Burundi", 7 February. 3 p. New York: Peacebuilding Support Office.
- PBSO (2007c), "Draft Outline of a Country-Specific Workplan for Sierra Leone", 7 February. 3 p. New York: Peacebuilding Support Office.

- PBSO (2007d), "Summary Note of the Chair on the Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned Meeting on Sierra Leone", 20 February. 2 p. New York: Peacebuilding Support Office.
- PBSO (2009), "Guidelines for Applying to the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund – Part I". New York: Peacebuilding Support Office. Last accessed on 20 September 2012, at <http://www.unpbf.org/document-archives/application-guidelines/>.
- PBSO (2010), "UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation". 51 p. New York: Peacebuilding Support Office.
- Peacebuilding Commission (2010), "Report of the PBC Delegation Mission to Liberia, 16-27 August 2010". 22 p. New York: Peacebuilding Commission. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/lib/pbc_visits/stmt_pbc_mission_report_16_Aug_2010.pdf.
- Peacebuilding Commission (2013). "PBC Membership". Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/membership.pdf>.
- Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier (1988). "Acceptance Speech: Acceptance by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, on the Occasion of the Award of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, 10 December 1988". Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1988/un-acceptance.html.
- Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier (1997), *Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General's Memoir*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Permanent Mission of Burundi to the United Nations (2006), "Lettre Datée du 8 Juin 2006, Adressée Au Président de L'assemblée Générale". 2 p. New York. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/bur/key_docs/country_request.pdf.
- Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations (2006), "Letter dated 27 February 2006 to the President of the General Assembly, Invitation to the Peace Building Commission to Operate in Sierra Leone". 2 p. New York. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/sl/key_docs/country_request_sl.pdf.
- Philpott, Daniel (2001), *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pio, Carlos (2001), "A Estabilização Heterodoxa no Brasil: Idéias e Redes Políticas", *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 16(46), 29-54.
- Plochy, S. M. (2010), *Yalta: The Price of Peace*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Ponzio, Richard (2005), "The Creation and Functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission". *Briefing*, November 2005. 8 p. London: Safeworld.

- Ponzio, Richard (2007), "The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Origins and Initial Practice", *Disarmament Forum*, 2, 5-15.
- Ponzio, Richard (2011), *Democratic Peacebuilding: Aiding Afghanistan and Other Fragile States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pouliot, Vincent (2004), "The Essence of Constructivism", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 7(3), 319-336.
- Pouliot, Vincent (2007), "'Subjectivism': Toward a Constructivist Methodology", *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(2), 359-384.
- Prantl, Jochen (2006), "Ecosoc Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on African Countries Emerging from Conflict: The Silent Avant-Garde". 160 p. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination.
- Price, Richard; Reus-Smit, Christian (1998), "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism", *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(3), 259-294.
- Pugh, Michael (1995), "Peace-Building as Developmentalism: Concepts from Disaster Research", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 16(3), 320-346.
- Pugh, Michael (2004), "Peacekeeping and Critical Theory", *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), 39-58.
- Pugh, Michael (2005), "The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 10(2), 23-42.
- Pugh, Michael; Cooper, Neil; Turner, Mandy (eds.) (2008), *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*. London: Palgrave.
- Ramcharan, Bertrand G. (1991), *The International Law and Practice of Early-Warning and Preventive Diplomacy: The Emerging Global Watch*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Ramsbotham, Oliver (2000), "Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), 169-189.
- Ramsbotham, Oliver; Woodhouse, Tom; Miall, Hugh (2011), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge: Polity Press. [3rd ed.].
- Reid, Herbert G.; Yanarella, Ernest J. (1976), "Toward a Critical Theory of Peace Research in the United States: the Search for an 'Intelligible Core'", *Journal of Peace Research*, 13(4), 315-341.
- Reus-Smit, Christian (2001), "Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty", *Review of International Studies*, 27(4), 519-538.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2002), *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

- Richmond, Oliver P. (2004a), "The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 39(2), 129-150.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2004b), "UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus", *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), 83-101.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2005), *The Transformation of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2008), *Peace in International Relations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2010a), "A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory", in Oliver P. Richmond (ed.), *Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 14-38.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (ed.) (2010b), *Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2011), *A Post-Liberal Peace*. London: Routledge.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (forthcoming 2013), "Failed Statebuilding Versus Peace Formation", *Cooperation and Conflict*.
- Richmond, Oliver P.; Franks, Jason (2009), *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Risse, Thomas (2000), "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics", *International Organization*, 54(1), 1-39.
- Ritzer, George (1990), "Metatheorizing in Sociology", *Sociological Forum*, 5(1), 3-15.
- Ritzer, George; Zhao, Shanyang; Murphy, Jim (2002), "Metatheorizing in Sociology: the Basic Parameters and the Potential Contributions of Postmodernism", in Jonathan H. Turner (ed.), *Handbook of Sociological Theory*. New York: Kluwer Academic, Plenum Publishers, 113-131.
- Roberts, David (2011), *Liberal Peacebuilding and Global Governance: Beyond the Metropolis*. London: Routledge.
- Rocha, Antônio Jorge Ramalho da (2002), *Relações Internacionais: Teorias e Agendas*. Brasília: IBRI.
- Rosato, Sebastian (2003), "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory", *American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 585-602.
- Rotberg, Robert I. (2002), "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure", *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3), 85-96.

- Ruggie, John Gerard (1982), "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order", *International Organization*, 36(2), 379-415.
- Ruggie, John Gerard (1998a), *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. London: Routledge.
- Ruggie, John Gerard (1998b), "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization*, 52(4), 855-885.
- Rummel, R. J. (1983), "Libertarianism and International Violence", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(1), 27-71.
- Rusch, Silke (2005), "Peacebuilding: Advice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations". *OCGG Security Advice*, 2, August 2005. 14 p. Salisbury: The Oxford Council on Good Governance.
- Rushton, Simon (2008), "The UN Secretary-General and Norm Entrepreneurship: Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Democracy Promotion", *Global Governance*, 14(1), 95-110.
- Russett, Bruce M. (1990a), *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Russett, Bruce M. (1990b), "A More Democratic and Therefore More Peaceful World", *World Futures*, 29(4), 243-263.
- Russett, Bruce M. (1993), *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Russett, Bruce M.; Antholis, William (1992), "Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War", *Journal of Peace Research*, 29(4), 415-434.
- Russett, Bruce M.; Layne, Christopher; Spiro, David E.; Doyle, Michael W. (1995), "Correspondence: the Democratic Peace", *International Security*, 19(4), 164-184.
- Russett, Bruce M.; O'Neill, Barry; Sutterlin, James S. (1996), "Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam", *Global Governance*, 2(1), 65-80.
- Russett, Bruce M.; Sutterlin, James S. (1991), "The UN in a New World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, 70(2), 69-83.
- Sabaratnam, Meera (2011), "The Liberal Peace? An Intellectual History of International Conflict Management, 1990-2010", in Susanna Campbell; David Chandler; Meera Sabaratnam (eds.), *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books, 13-30.
- Sagramoso, Domitilla (2003), "Russian Peacekeeping Policies", in John Mackinlay; Peter Cross (eds.), *Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 13-33.

- Salih, M. A. Mohamed (2009), "A Critique of the Political Economy of the Liberal Peace: Elements of an African Experience", in Edward Newman; Roland Paris; Oliver P. Richmond (eds.), *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 133-158.
- Salomons, Dirk (2010), "On the Far Side of Conflict: The UN Peacebuilding Commission as Optical Illusion", in Peter G. Danchin; Horst Fischer (eds.), *United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-211.
- Schlesinger, Stephen C. (2003), *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (2008), "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, 303-326.
- Schneckener, Ulrich; Weinlich, Silke (2005), "The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Tasks, Mandate, and Design for a New Institution". *SWP Comments*, 38, September 2005. 8 p. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Schwartz, Thomas; Skinner, Kiron K. (2002), "The Myth of the Democratic Peace", *Orbis*, 46(1), 159-172.
- Scott, Amy (2008), "The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: An Early Assessment", *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 4(2), 7-19.
- Searle, John R. (1995), *The Construction of Social Reality*. London: Penguin Group.
- Security Council Report (2006), "Peacebuilding Commission". *Special Research Report*, 3, 26 June 2006. 12 p. New York: Security Council Report.
- Seligmann, Linda J. (2005), "Ethnographic Methods", in Daniel Druckman (ed.), *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 229-254.
- Shamsie, Yasmine; Thompson, Andrew S. (eds.) (2006), *Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State*. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Shimura, Hisako (2001), "The Role of the UN Secretariat in Organizing Peacekeeping", in Ramesh Thakur; Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 46-59.
- Simma, Bruno; Khan, Daniel-Erasmus; Nolte, Georg; Paulus, Andreas (eds.) (2012), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*. 2 v. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [3rd ed.; orig. 1994].
- Singer, David J. (1976), "An Assessment of Peace Research", *International Security*, 1(1), 118-137.

- Smith, Brian D.; Durch, William J. (1993), "UN Observer Group in Central America", in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 436-462.
- Smith, Michael G.; Dee, Moreen (2006), "East Timor", in William J. Durch (ed.), *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 389-466.
- Smith, Steve (1996), "Positivism and Beyond", in Steve Smith; Ken Booth; Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11-44.
- Smith, Tony (1994), *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Song, Jin (1997), "The Political Dynamics of the Peacemaking Process in Cambodia", in Michael W. Doyle; Ian Johnstone; Robert C. Orr (eds.), *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53-81.
- Spernbauer, Martina (2008), "Musical Chairs Revisited: Status and Terms of Participation of the European Union in the UN Peacebuilding Commission", *International Organizations Law Review*, 5, 299-322.
- Spiro, David E. (1994), "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace", *International Security*, 19(2), 50-86.
- Stahn, Carsten (2005), "Institutionalizing Brahimi's 'Light Footprint': A Comment on the Role and Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission", *International Organizations Law Review*, 2(2), 403-415.
- Stamnes, Eli (2010), "Values, Context and Hybridity: How Can the Insights from the Liberal Peace Critique Literature be Brought to Bear on the Practices of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture?". *Working Paper, The Future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project*. 30 p. Ottawa, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Policy Studies (University of Ottawa).
- Stedman, Stephen John (2002), "Introduction", in Stephen John Stedman (ed.), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1-40.
- Street, Anne M.; Mollett, Howard; Smith, Jennifer (2008), "Experiences of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone and Burundi", *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 4(2), 33-46.
- Suhrke, Astri; Samset, Ingrid (2007), "What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War", *International Peacekeeping*, 14(2), 195-203.
- Sutterlin, James S. (1992a), "Enhancing the Capacity of the United Nations in Maintaining Peace and International Security: A Common Interest of Japan and the United

- States”. *Occasional Papers*, 5, May. 44 p. New York: United States Association of the United States of America.
- Sutterlin, James S. (2003), *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to be Met*. Westport: Praeger. [2nd ed.; orig. 1995].
- Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou (ed.) (2011), *Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Taylor, Paul (1991), “The United Nations System under Stress: Financial Pressures and Their Consequences”, *Review of International Studies*, 17(4), 365-382.
- Thakur, Ramesh (2006), *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thant, Myint-U; Scott, Amy (2007), *The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (1945-2006)*. New York: International Peace Academy.
- The Stanley Foundation (2005), “Accepting ‘Our Shared Responsibility’”. *Report of the 36th United Nations Issues Conference*, 11-13 Feb 2005. Drafted by Craig Cohen. 18 p. Muscatine: The Stanley Foundation.
- The Washington Post (1992), “279 Security Council Vetoes Later [Editorial]”. *The Washington Post*, 21 June, C6.
- Thornburgh, Dick (1993), “Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary General for Administration and Management”, 1 March. 43 p., Internal document. New York: (s.n.).
- Toulmin, Stephen (1992), *Cosmopolis: the Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Traub, James (2006), *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Trenkov-Wermuth, Calin (2007), *Legal and Judicial Reform in United Nations Governance Operations*. PhD thesis in International Relations. University of Cambridge.
- Tschirgi, Necla (2010), “Escaping Path Dependency: a Proposed Multi-Tiered Approach for the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission”. *Working Paper, The Future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project*, January 2010. 21 p. Ottawa, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Policy Studies (University of Ottawa).
- Tschirgi, Neclâ (2004), “Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges”. October 2004. 32 p. New York: International Peace Academy and WSP International.
- Tschirgi, Neclâ; Lund, Michael S.; Mancini, Francesco (eds.) (2010), *Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

- UN Library (2013). “United Nations Security Council – Veto List”. Last accessed on 18 July 2013, at http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml.
- UN Millennium Project (2005), *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- UNDP (1994), *Human Development Report 1994*. Oxford: United Nations Development Programme, Oxford University Press.
- UNIHP (2007a), “The Oral History Interview of Boutros Boutros-Ghali”. *The Complete Oral History Transcripts from UN Voices*, 5 May 2001. CD-ROM. 82 p. New York: United Nations Intellectual History Project.
- UNIHP (2007b), “The Oral History Interview of Margaret Joan Anstee”. *The Complete Oral History Transcripts from UN Voices*, 14 December 2000. CD-ROM. 169 p. New York: United Nations Intellectual History Project.
- UNIHP (2007c), “The Oral History Interview of Virendra Dayal”. *The Complete Oral History Transcripts from UN Voices*, 15 July 2002. CD-ROM. 75 p. New York: United Nations Intellectual History Project.
- UNIHP (2007d), “The Oral History Interview of Vladimir Petrovsky”. *The Complete Oral History Transcripts from UN Voices*, 18 November 2000. CD-ROM. 56 p. New York: United Nations Intellectual History Project.
- United Nations (1945). “Charter of the United Nations”. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>.
- United Nations (2005a), “Decisions of the Secretary-General Policy Committee Meeting of 13 July 2005: Decision No. 2005/11”. 3 p. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2005b), “Submission to the Policy Committee: Peacebuilding Support Office”. 5 p. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2006a), “Decisions of the Secretary-General 5 September 2006 Policy Committee Meeting: Decision No. 2006/33 – Peabuilding”. 2 p. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2006b), “Policy Committee Meeting, 5 September: Summary Record of Discussion”. 3 p. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2007), “Decisions of the Secretary-General 22 May 2007 Policy Committee Meeting: Decision No. 2007/28 – Peabuilding Support Office”. 4 p. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2010), “The United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture”. October 2010. New York: United Nations. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/pbso_architecture_flyer.pdf.

- United Nations (2011). “Press Release PBC/78: Peacebuilding Commission, Placing Guinea on its Agenda, Names Luxembourg to Chair New Country-Specific Configuration”. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/pbc78.doc.htm>.
- United Nations (2013). “Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present”. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml>.
- UNPBF (2013). “United Nations Peacebuilding Fund: Document Archives – Evaluations”. Last accessed on 14 September 2013, at <http://www.unpbf.org/document-archives/?category=14>.
- van Creveld, Martin (1991), *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press.
- Väyrynen, Tarja (2010), “Gender and Peacebuilding”, in Oliver P. Richmond (ed.), *Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 137-153.
- Venturi, Bernardo (2009), *Il Demone della Pace: Storia, Metodologie e Prospettive Istituzionali della Peace Research e del Pensiero di Johan Galtung*. PhD thesis in Dottorato di Ricerca. University of Bologna. 339 p.
- Vincent, Jack (1987), “Freedom and International Conflict: Another Look”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 31(1), 103-112.
- Wæver, Ole (1996), “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, in Steve Smith; Ken Booth; Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 149-185.
- Wallensteen, Peter (1988), *Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges*. London: Westview Press.
- Wallensteen, Peter (2011), “The Origins of Contemporary Peace Research”, in Kristine Höglund; Magnus Öberg (eds.), *Understanding Peace Research: Methods and Challenges*. London: Routledge, 14-32.
- Wallensteen, Peter; Axell, Karin (1994), “Major Armed Conflicts”, in *Sipri Yearbook 1994*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 81-85.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. (1969), *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Book Co.
- Warren, Carol A. B. (2001), “Qualitative Interviewing”, in Jaber F. Gubrium; James A. Holstein (eds.), *Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 83-101.

- Wegter, Bartjan (2007), "Emerging from the Crib: The Difficult First Steps of the Newly Born UN Peacebuilding Commission", *International Organizations Law Review*, 4(2), 343-355.
- Weiss, Thomas G. (2003), "The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform", *The Washington Quarterly*, 26(4), 147-161.
- Weiss, Thomas G.; Forsythe, David P.; Coate, Roger A.; Peace, Kelly-Kate (2007), *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Boulder: Westview Press. [5th ed.].
- Weldes, Jutta (1996), "Constructing National Interests", *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(3), 275-318.
- Weldes, Jutta (1999), *Constructing National Interest: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wendt, Alexander E. (1987), "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", *International Organization*, 41(3), 335-370.
- Wendt, Alexander E. (1992), "Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425.
- Wendt, Alexander E. (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wiberg, Håkan (2005), "Investigação para a Paz: Passado, Presente e Futuro", *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais*, 71, 21-42.
- Wilton Park Conference (2006), "Putting Decisions into Practice: How Will the UN Peacebuilding Commission Fulfil its Mandate?". *Report on Wilton Park Conference WPS06/2*, 9-10 February 2006. Drafted by Amy Scott and Vanessa Wyeth. 15 p. Steyning: Wilton Park.
- Woods, Ngaire (1995), "Economic Ideas and International Relations: Beyond Rational Neglect", *International Studies Quarterly*, 39(2), 161-180.
- Zartman, William (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. London and Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Zehfuss, Maja (2002), *Constructivism in International Relations: the Politics of Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

First-hand interviews

- Bartsch, Dominik (2012), Former Officer in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2006-2007), via phone, 27 October 12.

- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (2013), Former United Nations Secretary-General (1992-1996), Paris, France, 17 January.
- Dayal, Virendra (2012), Chief of Staff under Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and Special Advisor for Boutros Boutros-Ghali, via phone, 26 October.
- de Soto, Álvaro (2012), Former Senior Advisor in the Offices of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, via video-conference, 3 May.
- Doyle, Michael W. (2012), Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law, and Political Science, Columbia University, and Former Special Advisor to Kofi Annan (2001-2003), New York, NY, USA, 15 October 2012.
- Forman, Shepard (2012), Director Emeritus and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, via video-conference, 7 May 2012.
- Galtung, Johan (2012), Founder and Director, Transcend International, via phone, 29 October 2012.
- Hill, Charles (2012), Brady-Johnson Distinguished Fellow in Grand Strategy, Yale University, and Former Speechwriter under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, New Haven, CT, USA, 11 October 2012.
- Kanninen, Tapio (2012), Former Secretary of the Task Force on Report of the Secretary-General Requested by the Security Council on 31 January 1992, New York, NY, USA, 16 October.
- Kanninen, Tapio (2013), Former Secretary of the Task Force on Report of the Secretary-General Requested by the Security Council on 31 January 1992, via phone, 24 April.
- Krasno, Jean E. (2012), Senior Lecturer, Yale University, and Former Member of the Core Group of the War Risk Reduction Project, New Haven, CT, USA, 10 October.
- McAskie, Carolyn (2012), Former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support and Head of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2006-2008), via video-conference, 25 September 2012.
- Morrice, Adrian (2011), Political Affairs Officer, Policy Planning Unit, UN Department of Political Affairs, New York, NY, USA, 14 July 2011.
- Nallo, Saidu (2012), Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations, New York, NY, USA, 17 October 2012.
- Otobo, Ejeviome Eloho (2010b), Director and Deputy-Head, UN Peacebuilding Support Office, New York, NY, USA, 18 November 2010.
- Ramcharan, Bertrand G. (2012), Former Official in the United Nations Secretariat, via phone, 15 May.

- Russett, Bruce M. (2012), Dean Acheson Research Professor of International Relations and Political Science, Yale University, and Former Member of the War Risk Reduction Project, New Haven, CT, USA, 10 October 2012.
- Sutterlin, James S. (2012a), Former Director in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General under Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and Leader of the War Risk Reduction Project, via phone, 6 June.
- Sutterlin, James S. (2012b), Former Director in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General under Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and Leader of the War Risk Reduction Project, Larchmont, NY, USA, 12 October.
- Thornburgh, Richard (2012), Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management (1992-1993), via phone, 4 June.
- Tschirgi, Necla (2012), Former Senior Policy Advisor in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2007-2009), San Diego, CA, USA, 3 April 2012.
- Ulich, Oliver (2012), Head, Partnerships Team, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, NY, USA, 8 October 2012.
- Williams, Brian J. (2010), Chief, Financing for Peacebuilding Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office, New York, NY, USA, 16 November 2010.

Archival records

- Aimé, Jean-Claude (1992), Note to the Secretary-General: Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General Requested by the Security Council in its Presidential Statement of 31 January 1992 (S/23500), 2 p., 6 February 1992, United Nations Archives, S-1082-0023-02.
- Chakravartty, Indu (1992), File Note: Task Force Meeting on 22 April 1992, 7 p., 23 April 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Dayal, Virendra; Sutterlin, James S. (1992), Peace, Security and Stability through Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping – Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Security Council on 31 January 1992 [Draft], 47 p., 8 May, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Goulding, Marrack (1992), Memorandum to Vladimir Petrosky – Subject: Peace, Security and Stability through Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping, 5 p., 27 April 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Hill, Charles (1992), Fax to Jean-Claude Aimé, 22 May 1992, United Nations Archives, S-1082-0023-02.

- Jonah, James (1987), Note to the Secretary-General, 5 p., 24 September 1987, United Nations Archives, S-1048-0056-0007.
- Jonah, James (1992), Comments by Mr James Jonah on the Preliminary Draft Report of the Secretary-General's Summit Report dated 24 April 1992, 3 p., 27 April 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Kanninen, Tapio (1992a), Background Note by the Secretary of the Task Force: Data and Analysis on Wars and Conflicts from 1945 to the Present, 22 p., 23 March 1992, United Nations Archives, S-1082-0023-02.
- Kanninen, Tapio (1992b), Talking Points for Meeting with Task Force with the Secretary-General, 19 March 1992, 5.00 Pm, 1 p., n.d., personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Kanninen, Tapio (1992c), Thinkpiece for Discussion: Tentative Ideas for the Framework of the Report, 4 p., 17 March 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Peck, Connie (1992), Brief Summary of Some of the Existing Problems and Proposals Regarding Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, 7 p., n.d., personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Petrovsky, Vladimir (1992a), Memorandum to Carl-August Fleischhauer, 1 p., 5 May 1992, Personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Petrovsky, Vladimir (1992b), Memorandum to Members of the Task Force – Subject: Drafting Team for the Sg's Report Called for under Security Council's Declaration in S-23500, 1 p., 3 April, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Petrovsky, Vladimir (1992c), Memorandum to the Members of the Task Force – Subject: First Meeting of the Task Force, 2 p., 9 March 1992, United Nations Archives, S-1082-0023-02.
- Petrovsky, Vladimir (1992d), Memorandum to the Secretary-General – Subject: Outline of the Secretary-General's Report on Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peacekeeping Requested by the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 1 p., 3 April 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Petrovsky, Vladimir (1992e), Memorandum to the Secretary-General – Subject: Secretary-General's Report Called for by the Security Council by its Declaration in S/23500, 13 March 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Sutterlin, James S. (1991), Letter to Gregory M. Kovrizhenko, 4 p., 28 January 1991, files of the War Risk Reduction Project.
- Sutterlin, James S. (1992b), Memorandum to Tapio Kanninen [Facsimile] – Subject: SG Report, 14 April 1992, 3 p., personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.
- Sutterlin, James S. (1992c), Memorandum to Tapio Kanninen [Facsimile] – Subject: SG Report, 22 April 1992, 5 p., personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.

Sutterlin, James S. (1992d), Memorandum to Tapio Kanninen [Facsimile] – Subject: SG Report, 23 April 1992, 3 p., personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.

Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General (1992a), Condensed Inventory of Proposals Presented in the Past for Strengthening Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping at the United Nations, 2nd Inventory, 22 p., 26 March 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.

Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General (1992b), Discussion at the Ford Foundation on the Topic of ‘Strengthening the Capacity of the United Nations for Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping, on Tuesday, 7 April 1992, from 1.30-6.00 P.M – Summary of the Discussion, 21 p., n.d., personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.

Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General (1992c), Outline, 11 p., 27 March 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.

Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General (1992d), Peace, Security and Stability through Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping – Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to a Request of the Security Council dated 31 January 1992 [Confidential First Preliminary Draft], 50 p., 24 April 1992, personal files of the Secretary of the Task Force.

Official documents of the United Nations

A/45/6/Rev.1, UN General Assembly, 45th Session, *Medium-Term Plan for the Period 1992-1997 (Vols. I and II)*, 28 May 1991.

A/45/598-S/21854, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *Letter dated 3 October 1990 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United Nations of America Addressed to the Secretary-General [Joint Statement on “Responsibility for Peace and Security in the Changing World”]*, 9 October 1990.

A/46/549, UN General Assembly, 46th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: Programmes and Activities to Promote Peace in the World*, 11 October 1991.

A/46/882, UN General Assembly, 46th Session, *Restructuring of the Secretariat of the Organization: Note by the Secretary-General*, 21 February 1992.

A/46/PV.59, UN General Assembly, 46th Session, 59th plenary meeting, *Provisional Verbatim Record*, 5 December 1991.

A/47/1, UN General Assembly, 47th Session, *Report Of the Secretary-General on the Work Of the Organization*, 11 September 1992.

- A/47/277-S/24111, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*, 17 June 1992.
- A/47/965-S/25944, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the Recommendations Contained in "An Agenda for Peace"*, 15 June 1993.
- A/47/WG/WP.1, UN General Assembly, 47th session, *Informal Open-Ended Working Group on Agenda Item 10, An Agenda for Peace*, 17 November 1992.
- A/48/1, UN General Assembly, 48th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, 10 September 1993.
- A/48/935, UN General Assembly, 48th Session, *An Agenda for Development, Report of the Secretary-General*, 6 May 1994.
- A/49/1, UN General Assembly, 49th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, 2 September 1994.
- A/50/60-S/1995/1, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, 3 Jan 1995.
- A/50/345, UN General Assembly, 50th Session, *Letter dated 7 August 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General [Chairman's Synopsis and Conclusions of the International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies]*, 10 August 1995.
- A/51/761, UN General Assembly, 51st Session, *Letter dated 17 December 1996 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly: Supplement to Reports on Democratization [An Agenda for Democratization]*, 20 December 1996.
- A/51/950, UN General Assembly, 51st Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*, 14 July 1997.
- A/51/950/Add.1, UN General Assembly, 51st Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform – Addendum: Establishment of the Post of Deputy Secretary-General*, 7 October 1997.
- A/52/513, UN General Assembly, 52nd session, *Report of the Secretary-General Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies*, 21 October 1997.
- A/52/871-S/1998/318, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General: The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, 13 April 1998.

- A/55/305-S/2000/809, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report]*, 21 Aug 2000.
- A/58/612, UN General Assembly, 58th Session, *Letter dated 3 November 2003 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly [Terms of Reference and Composition of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change]*, 28 November 2003.
- A/59/565, UN General Assembly, 59th Session, *Note by the Secretary-General [Transmitting Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Entitled "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility"]*, 2 December 2004.
- A/59/2005, UN General Assembly, 59th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, 21 Mar 2005.
- A/59/2005/Add.2, UN General Assembly, 59th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All – Addendum: Peacebuilding Commission, Explanatory Note by the Secretary-General*, 23 May 2005.
- A/60/7/Add.13, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, *14th Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: 2005 World Summit Outcome – Revised Estimates to the Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2006-2007 under Sections 1, 2, 3, 11, 16, 23, 28a, 28c, 28d, 28e, 28f and 29, and Revised Estimates to the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006*, 8 December 2005.
- A/60/7/Add.25, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, *26th Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: The Peacebuilding Commission Programme Budget Implications of Draft Resolution A/60/L.40*, 16 December 2005.
- A/60/7/Add.36, UN General Assembly, *37th Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: 2005 World Summit Outcome: Peacebuilding Support Office – Revised Estimates to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2006-2007*, 9 March 2006.
- A/60/537, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: 2005 World Summit Outcome : Revised Estimates to the Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2006-2007 under Sections 1, 2, 3, 11, 16, 23, 28a, 28c, 28d, 28e, 28f and 29, and Revised Estimates to the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006*, 3 November 2005.
- A/60/598, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, 5th Committee, *The Peacebuilding Commission: Programme Budget Implications of Draft Resolution A/60/L.40, Statement Submitted by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Rule 153 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, and Report of the Fifth Committee*, 30 December.

- A/60/694, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: 2005 World Summit Outcome: Peacebuilding Support Office – Revised Estimates to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2006-2007*, 23 February.
- A/60/984, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: Arrangements for Establishing the Peacebuilding Fund*, 22 Aug 2006.
- A/60/PV.66, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, 66th plenary meeting, *General Assembly Official Records*, 20 Dec 2005.
- A/62/137-S/2007/458, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its First Session*, 25 Jul 2007.
- A/63/818, UN General Assembly, 63rd Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: Arrangements for the Revision of the Terms of Reference for the Peacebuilding Fund*, 13 Apr 2009.
- A/64/868-S/2010/393, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *Identical Letters dated 19 July 2010 from the Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council: Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, 21 Jul 2010.
- A/66/675-S/2012/70, UN General Assembly; UN Security Council, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its Fifth Session*, 30 January 2012.
- A/67/346, UN General Assembly, 67th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: Estimates in Respect of Special Political Missions, Good Offices and Other Political Initiatives Authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*, 18 October 2012.
- A/67/346/Add.3, UN General Assembly, 67th Session, *Report of the Secretary-General: Estimates in Respect of Special Political Missions, Good Offices and Other Political Initiatives Authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council – Thematic Cluster III: United Nations Offices, Peacebuilding Support Offices, Integrated Offices and Commissions*, 15 October 2012.
- A/C.1/45/PV.14, UN General Assembly, 45th session, 1st Committee, *Verbatim Record of the 14th Meeting*, 31 October 1990.
- A/C.2/45/SR.26, UN General Assembly, 45th session, 2nd Committee, *Summary Record of the 26th Meeting*, 19 November 1990.
- A/C.3/45/SR.38, UN General Assembly, 45th Session, 3rd Committee, *Summary Record of the 38th Meeting*, 20 November 1990.
- A/C.5/45/SR.15, UN General Assembly, 45th session, 5th Committee, *Summary Record of the 15th Meeting*, 12 November 1990.
- A/C.5/47/CRP.2, UN General Assembly, 47th Session, 5th Committee, *Structure and Functioning of New Departments: Note by the Secretariat*, 5 Nov 1992.

- A/RES/43/157, UN General Assembly, 43rd Session, *Resolution 43/157 [Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections]*, 8 December 1988.
- A/RES/44/146, UN General Assembly, 44th Session, *Resolution 44/146 [Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections]*, 15 December 1989.
- A/RES/45/150, UN General Assembly, 45th Session, *Resolution 45/150 [Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections]*, 18 December 1990.
- A/RES/46/137, UN General Assembly, 46th Session, *Resolution 46/137 [Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections]*, 17 December 1991.
- A/RES/47/120A, UN General Assembly, 47th Session, *Resolution 47/120a [An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and Related Matters]*, 18 December 1992.
- A/RES/47/120B, UN General Assembly, 47th Session, *Resolution 47/120b [An Agenda for Peace]*, 20 September 1993.
- A/RES/47/138, UN General Assembly, 47th Session, *Resolution 47/138 [Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections]*, 18 December 1992.
- A/RES/51/243, UN General Assembly, 51st Session, *Resolution 51/243 [Gratis Personnel Provided by Governments and Other Entities]*, 10 October 1997.
- A/RES/60/1, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, *Resolution 60/1 [2005 World Summit Outcome]*, 24 October 2005.
- A/RES/60/180, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, *Resolution 60/180 [The Peacebuilding Commission]*, 30 Dec 2005.
- A/RES/60/255, UN General Assembly, 60th Session, *Resolution 60/255 [Special Subjects Relating to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2006-2007: II – 2005 World Summit Outcome: Peacebuilding Support Office; Revised Estimates to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2006-2007]*, 15 June 2006.
- PBC/1/BDI/2, PBC, *Report of the Mission of the Peacebuilding Commission to Burundi, 9 to 15 April 2007*, 21 May 2007.
- PBC/1/BDI/4, PBC, *Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi*, 30 Jul 2007.
- PBC/1/BDI/SR.1, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Burundi Configuration, 1st meeting, *Summary Record*, 18 May 2007.
- PBC/1/BDI/SR.2, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Burundi Configuration, 2nd meeting, *Summary Record*, 18 May 2007.

PBC/1/BDI/SR.3, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Burundi Configuration, 3rd meeting, *Summary Record*, 18 May 2007.

PBC/1/BDI/SR.5, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Burundi Configuration, 5th meeting, *Summary Record*, 24 July 2007.

PBC/1/OC/12, PBC, *Provisional Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society in Meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission, Submitted by the Chairperson on the Basis of Informal Consultations*, 29 June 2007.

PBC/1/OC/SR.1, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Organizational Committee, 1st meeting, *Summary Record*, 18 May 2007.

PBC/1/OC/SR.2, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Organizational Committee, 2nd meeting, *Summary Record*, 16 May 2007.

PBC/1/OC/SR.5, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Organizational Committee, 5th meeting (closed), *Summary Record*, 23 May 2007.

PBC/1/OC/SR.7, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Organizational Committee, 7th meeting, *Summary Record*, 24 Jul 2007.

PBC/1/SLE/2, PBC, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission Mission to Sierra Leone, 19-25 March 2007*, 23 April 2007.

PBC/1/SLE/SR.1, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Sierra Leone Configuration, 1st meeting, *Summary Record*, 18 May 2007.

PBC/1/SLE/SR.2, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Sierra Leone Configuration, 2nd meeting, *Summary Record*, 17 May 2007.

PBC/1/SLE/SR.3, Peacebuilding Commission, 1st Session, Sierra Leone Configuration, 3rd meeting, *Summary Record*, 16 May 2007.

PBC/2/BUR/CRP.2, PBC, *Conference Room Paper for the Country Specific Meeting on Burundi*, 10 October 2006.

PBC/2/OC/SR.5, Peacebuilding Commission, 2nd Session, Organizational Committee, *Summary Record of 5th Meeting*, 6 February 2008.

PBC/2/OC/SR.6, Peacebuilding Commission, 2nd Session, Organizational Committee, 6th meeting, *Summary Record*, 22 July 2008.

PBC/2/SIL/CRP.1, PBC, *Conference Room Paper for the Country Specific Meeting on Sierra Leone*, 10 October 2006.

PBC/2/SLE/1, PBC, *Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework*, 12 Dec 2007.

PBC/2/SLE/SR.1, Peacebuilding Commission, 2nd Session, Sierra Leone Configuration, *Summary Record of the 1st Meeting*, 22 January 2008.

- PBC/3/CAF/7, PBC, *Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic 2009-2011*, 9 Jun 2009.
- PBC/3/CAF/SR.3, Peacebuilding Commission, 3rd Session, Central African Republic Configuration, *Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting*, 18 June 2009.
- PBC/3/GNB/3, PBC, *Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau, 31 July 2008*, 2 Oct 2008.
- PBC/3/GNB/SR.1, Peacebuilding Commission, 3rd Session, Guinea-Bissau Configuration, *Summary Record of the 1st Meeting*, 16 October 2008.
- PBC/4/LBR/2, PBC, *Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Liberia*, 16 November 2010.
- PBC/4/LBR/SR.1, Peacebuilding Commission, 4th Session, Liberia Configuration, *Summary Record of the 1st Meeting*, 10 January 2011.
- PBC/4/OC/SR.2, Peacebuilding Commission, 4th Session, Organizational Committee, *Summary Record of the 2nd Meeting*, 12 October 2010.
- PBC/5/GUI/2, PBC, *Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Guinea between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission*, 23 September 2011.
- PBC/5/GUI/SR.1, Peacebuilding Commission, 5th Session, Guinea Configuration, *Summary Record of the 1st Meeting*, 18 October 2011.
- S/2001/394, UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General "No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations"*, 20 April 2001.
- S/2007/744, UN Security Council, *Letter dated 11 December 2007 from the President of the Security Council to the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission [on the Request that Guinea-Bissau be Placed on the Agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission]*, 14 Dec 2007.
- S/2008/383, UN Security Council, *Letter dated 30 May 2008 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission [on the Request of the Central African Republic to be Placed on the Agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission]*, 11 June 2008.
- S/2010/389, UN Security Council, *Letter dated 19 July 2010 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission [on the Request that Liberia be Placed on the Agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission]*, 20 July 2010.
- S/12636, UN Security Council, *Letter dated 10 April 1978 from the Representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America Addressed to the*

President of the Security Council [Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibia Situation], 10 April 1978.

S/22494, UN Security Council, *Informe del Secretario General: Centroamerica: Esfuerzos En Pro de la Paz*, 16 April 1991.

S/23500, United Nations Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council [Note on the Summit Meeting of the Security Council held on 31 January 1992]*, 31 January 1992.

S/24210, UN Security Council, 3089th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping”]*, 30 June 1992.

S/24728, UN Security Council, 3128th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping”]*, 29 October 1992.

S/24872, UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on Fact-Finding as a Tool of Preventive Diplomacy]*, 30 November 1992.

S/25036, UN Security Council, 3154th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on the Question of Special Economic Problems of States as a Result of Sanctions Imposed under Chapter Vii of the Charter of the United Nations]*, 30 December 1992.

S/25184, UN Security Council, 3166th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on Secretary-General’s Report Entitled “Agenda for Peace”]*, 29 January 1993.

S/25344, UN Security Council, 3178th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on the Question of Humanitarian Assistance and its Relationship to Peacemaking, Peace-Keeping and Peace-Building]*, 26 February 1993.

S/25493, UN Security Council, 3190th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on the Security and Safety of UN Forces and Personnel]*, 31 March 1993.

S/25696, UN Security Council, 3207th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping”]*, 30 April 1993.

S/25859, UN Security Council, 3225th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping”]*, 28 May 1993.

S/26531, UN Security Council, 3287th meeting, *Note by the President of the Security Council [on the Successful Completion of the Mandate of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia]*, 5 October 1993.

- S/PRST/1994/22, UN Security Council, 3372nd meeting, *Statement by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping]”, 3 May 1994.*
- S/PRST/1994/36, UN Security Council, 3408th meeting, *Statement by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping]”, 27 July 1994.*
- S/PRST/1994/62, UN Security Council, 3448th meeting, *Statement by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Peace-Keeping”], 4 November 1994.*
- S/PRST/1995/9, UN Security Council, 3503rd meeting, *Statement by the President of the Security Council [on the Secretary-General’s Position Paper Entitled “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace”], 22 February 1995.*
- S/PRST/1995/61, UN Security Council, 3609th meeting, *Statement by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled “Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping”], 19 December 1995.*
- S/PRST/1996/13, UN Security Council, 3645th meeting, *Statement by the President of the Security Council [on Item Entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Peace-Keeping”], 28 March 1996.*
- S/PRST/1998/38, UN Security Council, 3961st meeting, *Presidential Statement 38 (1998) [on “Maintenance of Peace and Security and Post-Conflict Peace-Building”], 29 December 1998.*
- S/PRST/1999/21, UN Security Council, 4021st meeting, *Statement by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled ‘Maintenance of Peace and Security and Post-Conflict Peace-Building’], 8 July 1999.*
- S/PRST/2000/10, UN Security Council, 4119th meeting, *Tatement by the President of the Security Council, 23 March 2000.*
- S/PRST/2001/5, UN Security Council, 4278th meeting, *Presidential Statement 5 (2001) [on “Peace-Building: Towards a Comprehensive Approach”], 20 February 2001.*
- S/PRST/2004/33, UN Security Council, 5041st meeting, *Statement by the President of the Security Council [on the Item Entitled ‘Civilian Aspects of Conflict Management and Peace Building’], 22 September 2004.*
- S/PV.3046, UN Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3046th Meeting [First Security Council Summit Meeting], 31 January 1992.*
- S/PV.3819, UN Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3819th Meeting [on the Situation in Africa], 25 September 1997.*

- S/RES/745, UN Security Council, 3057th meeting, *Resolution 745 (1992) [on the Establishment of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Untac)]*, 28 February 1992.
- S/RES/797, UN Security Council, 3149th meeting, *Resolution 797 (1992) [on the Establishment of the UN Operation in Mozambique]*, 16 December 1992.
- S/RES/1246, UN Security Council, 4013th meeting, *Security Council Resolution 1246 (1999) [on the Establishment of the UN Mission in East Timor (Unamet)]*, 11 June 1999.
- S/RES/1264, UN Security Council, 4045th meeting, *Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999) [on the Establishment of a Multinational Peace Force in East Timor]*, 15 September 1999.
- S/RES/1272, UN Security Council, 4057th meeting, *Resolution 1272 (1999) [on the Establishment of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (Untaet)]*, 25 October 1999.
- S/RES/1645, UN Security Council, 5335th meeting, *Resolution 1645 (2005) [on the Establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission]*, 20 December 2005.
- S/RES/1646, UN Security Council, 5335th meeting, *Resolution 1646 (2005) [on the Establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission]*, 20 December 2005.
- ST/AI/139/Add.3/Rev.2, Secretariat, *Administrative Instruction 139: Regulations for the Control and Limitation of Documentation – Addendum: Distribution of Documents, Meetings Records, Official Records and Publications*, 17 Dec 1985.
- ST/PLS/SER.A/303, Secretariat, *Permanent Missions to the United Nations [Blue Book]*, March.
- ST/SG/SER.A/295, Secretariat, *Missions Permanentes Auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies N° 295 [Blue Book]*, April.
- ST/SGB/225, Secretariat, *Secretary-General's Bulletin: Office for Research and the Collection of Information*, 1 March 1987.
- ST/SGB/248, Secretariat, *Secretary-General's Bulletin: Restructuring of the United Nations Secretariat*, 16 Mar 1992.
- ST/SGB/2005/16, Secretariat, *Secretary-General's Bulletin: New Mechanisms to Strengthen the Executive Management of the United Nations Secretariat*, 22 Aug 2005.

Appendix I

List of interviewees¹²⁶

1. (Prince) *Zeid Ra'ad Zeid AL HUSSEIN*, Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the UN and Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission Configuration for Liberia. New York, NY, USA, 2 December 2010.
2. *Dominik BARTSCH*, former officer in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2006-2007). Via phone, 27 October 2012.
3. *Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI*, former Secretary-General of the United Nations (1992-1996). Paris, France, 17 January 13.
4. *Henk-Jan BRINKMAN*, Chief, Policy, Planning and Application Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. Via phone, 12 December 2012.
5. *Sammy Kum BUO*, Director, Africa II Division, UN Department of Political Affairs. New York, NY, USA, 16 November 2010.
6. *Charles T. CALL*, Professor, American University and former external consultant for the UN Department of Political Affairs (2004-2005). San Diego, CA, USA, 3 April 2012.
7. *Simone DATZBERGER*, former consultant in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2007-2010). Via video-conference, 25 September 2012.
8. *Virendra DAYAL*, former Chief of Staff under UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, and Special Advisor under UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. Via phone, 26 October 2012.
9. *Álvaro DE SOTO*, former Senior Advisor in the UN Executive Office of the Secretary-General under Secretaries-General Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali. Via video-conference, 3 May 2012.
10. *Luc DOCKENDORF*, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Luxembourg to the United Nations. New York, NY, USA, 15 October 2012.

¹²⁶ Positions reflect interviewees' relevant posts and affiliations at the time of interviews.

11. *Charles-Armel DOUBANE*, Permanent Representative of the Central African Republic to the United Nations. New York, NY, USA, 9 October 2012.
12. *Michael W. DOYLE*, Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law, and Political Science, Columbia University, and former Special Advisor to Kofi Annan (2001-2003). New York, NY, USA, 15 October 2012.
13. *Renata DWAN*, Senior Project Officer, UN Civilian Capacities Projects, and former Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support (2009). New York, NY, USA, 15 October 2012.
14. *Réachbha FITZGERALD*, Advisor, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations. New York, NY, USA, 30 November 2010.
15. *Shepard FORMAN*, Director Emeritus and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University. Via video-conference, 7 May 2012.
16. *Johan GALTUNG*, Founder and Director, TRANSCEND International. Via phone, 29 October 2012.
17. *Enkhtungalag GANBOLD*, Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 15 November 2010.
18. *Jan GRAULS*, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations and Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission Configuration for the Central African Republic (2008-2012). New York, NY, USA, 15 July 2011.
19. *Philip HELMINGER*, Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 15 November 2010, and 15 July 2011.
20. *Charles HILL*, Brady-Johnson Distinguished Fellow in Grand Strategy, Yale University. New Haven, CT, USA, 11 October 2012.
21. *Confidential*. 20 July 2011.
22. *Youssef JAI*, Associate Political Affairs Officer, Africa II Division, UN Department of Political Affairs. New York, NY, USA, 22 November 2010, and 19 July 2011.
23. *Tapio KANNINEN*, former officer in the UN Secretariat. New York, NY, USA, 16 October 2012, and via phone, 24 April 2013.
24. *Vincent KAYIJUKA*, Senior Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 21 July 2011.

25. *Jean KRASNO*, Senior Lecturer, Yale University. Via phone, 17 May 2012, and New Haven, CT, USA, 10 October 2012.
26. *Hervé LECOQ*, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. New York, NY, USA, 22 November 2010.
27. *Danilson LOPES DA ROSA*, Political Affairs Officer, Africa I Division, UN Department of Political Affairs. New York, NY, USA, 18 July 2011.
28. *Kishore MANDHYAN*, former Director of Political, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Executive Office of the Secretary-General. Via phone, 30 November 2012.
29. *Malibongwe MCAKUVANA*, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations. New York, NY, USA, 20 December 2010.
30. *Carolyn MCASKIE*, former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support and Head of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2006-2008). Via video-conference, 25 September 2012.
31. *Adrian MORRICE*, Political Affairs Officer, Policy Planning Unit, UN Department of Political Affairs. New York, NY, USA, 1 December 2010, and 14 July 2011.
32. *Ihab Awad MOUSTAFA*, Senior Officer, Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 18 November 2010, and 21 July 2011.
33. *Confidential*, 15 July 2011.
34. *Jari MUSTONEN*, former officer in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2008-2009). Via video-conference, 18 June 2012.
35. *Saidu NALLO*, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations. New York, NY, USA, 17 October 2012.
36. *Gilda Motta Santos NEVES*, Counsellor, Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, and member of the UN Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group (2010-2011). Brasília, DF, Brazil, 6 January 2011.
37. *Kristoffer NILAUS TARP*, Programme Officer, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA 9 October 2012.
38. *Ejeviome Eloho OTOBO*, Director and Deputy-Head, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 18 November 2010, and 20 July 2011.
39. *Vincent PASQUINI*, Political Affairs Officer, Africa I Division, UN Department of Political Affairs. New York, NY, USA, 20 July 2011.

40. *Stefania PIFFANELLI*, Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 19 July 2011.
41. *Maria José POSADA*, Advisor, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations. New York, NY, USA, 9 December 2010.
42. *Betrand G. RAMCHARAN*, former official in the UN Secretariat. Via phone, 15 May 2012.
43. *Bruce RUSSETT*, Dean Acheson Research Professor of International Relations and Political Science, Yale University. New Haven, CT, USA, 10 October 2012.
44. *Elisabeth SCHEPER*, former consultant, Financing for Peacebuilding Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2008-2009). New York, NY, USA, 15 October 2012.
45. *Paul SEGER*, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations and Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission Configuration for Burundi. New York, NY, USA, 14 July 2011.
46. *Tammi SHARPE*, Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 18 July 2011.
47. *Kaori SHIOTSU*, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. New York, NY, USA, 21 July 2011.
48. *Jenna SLOTIN*, former fellow, International Peace Institute (2007-2010). Via video-conference, 16 November 2011.
49. *Dan SMITH*, Secretary-General of International Alert, and Chairperson of the UN Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group. Via video-conference, 5 April 2011.
50. *João SOARES DA GAMA*, Permanent Representative of Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations. New York, NY, USA 20 July 2011.
51. *Leontine SPECKER*, Program Analyst, Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme. New York, NY, USA, 21 July 2011.
52. *James S. SUTTERLIN*, former Director of the Executive Office under UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar. Via phone, 6 June 2012, and Larchmont, NY, USA, 12 October 2012.
53. *Richard THORNBURGH*, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management (1992-1993). Via phone, 4 June 2012.
54. *Alessandra TRABATTONI*, Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 18 July 2011.

55. *Necla TSCHIRGI*, former Senior Policy Advisor in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2007-2009). San Diego, CA, USA, 3 April 2012.
56. *Oliver ULICH*, Head, Partnerships Team, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. New York, NY, USA, 8 October 2012.
57. *Maria Luiza Ribeiro VIOTTI*, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations and Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission Configurations for Guinea-Bissau. New York, NY, USA, 17 December 2010.
58. *Brian J. WILLIAMS*, Chief, Financing for Peacebuilding Branch, UN Peacebuilding Support Office. New York, NY, USA, 16 November 2010.
59. *Vanessa WYETH*, Research Fellow, International Peace Institute (IPI). New York, NY, USA, 21 July 2011.

Appendix II

List and financial requirements of UN political offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices and assistance missions

Title	Functioning since	Total financial requirement for 2013 (USD thousands)
1. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA)	29 November 2011	9,735.2
2. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	16 February 2007	9,073.7
3. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East (UNSCO)	1 October 1999	16,949.2*
4. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	14 August 2003	141,694.7
5. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	28 March 2002	196,231.4
6. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	3 June 2013	18,733.8†
7. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)	1 January 2010	19,902.5
8. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)	1 October 2008	12,435.4
9. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)	1 January 2010	20,341.3
10. United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB)	1 January 2011	15,639.8
11. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA)	10 December 2007	2,962.4
12. United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)	1 January 2011	6,235.4
13. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)	17 March 2004	6,956.8
14. United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)	16 September 2011	46,673.4
Total		523,565.0

Source: based on UN Docs. A/67/346 (2012) and A/67/346/Add.3 (2012).

Note: Except for UNAMA, whose lead department is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, all field missions in the table are led by the Department of Political Affairs and receive administrative support from the Department of Field Support.

* Figures for the 2012-2013 biennium.

† Figures are for the predecessor of UNSOM, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS).

Appendix III

Contributors to the Peacebuilding Fund, 2006-2013 (USD thousands)

Donor	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013*	Total
Australia	-	786	916	712	1705	4172	2094	1027	11,413
Austria	657	670	782	-	-	-	-	-	2,109
Bahrain	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Bangladesh	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	5
Belgium	-	3647	-	-	703	701	-	-	5,051
Brazil	-	20	570	-	-	-	-	-	590
Canada	8573	10193	-	-	4985	5092	5013	-	33,855
Chile	10	50	-	101	101	101	101	-	466
China	-	1000	1000	1000	1000	-	1000	1000	6,000
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	20
Croatia	10	20	33	-	60	-	-	25	148
Cyprus	-	20	20	-	-	-	-	-	40
Czech Republic	50	168	129	-	-	-	-	-	347
Denmark	8879	-	-	-	-	-	8872	-	17,751
Egypt	20	-	-	25	-	50	-	-	95
Finland	-	2117	4427	-	2698	2661	5209	-	17,113
France	-	1359	1523	-	-	-	-	-	2,882
Germany	-	-	11000	2984	5000	-	6468	-	24,451
Iceland	-	1000	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
India	2000	-	-	-	-	2000	-	-	4,000
Indonesia	-	20	20	-	40	20	20	-	120
Ireland	12600	-	-	-	997	968	1308	-	15,873
Israel	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10
Italy	-	5767	-	208	-	-	-	-	5,975
Japan	20000	-	-	-	-	12500	-	-	32,500
Korea, Republic of	3000	-	-	300	200	500	500	-	4,500
Kuwait	250	250	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
Libya	-	50	-	-	50	-	-	-	100
Luxembourg	130	724	403	438	403	786	498	329	3,710
Mexico	-	50	50	50	-	100	80	-	330
Morocco	-	5	-	-	10	-	20	-	35
Netherlands	-	18519	27938	-	-	-	14286	-	60,742
Nigeria	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	8
Norway	32124	-	-	-	-	5215	5191	-	42,530
Pakistan	-	-	-	-	-	5	10	-	15
Peru	-	-	-	5	-	-	5	5	15
Poland	50	50	-	44	-	-	32	-	176
Portugal	-	-	-	1000	-	-	-	-	1,000
Qatar	-	200	-	-	-	200	-	-	400
Romania	-	147	-	-	-	-	-	-	147
Russia	-	-	2000	-	4000	2000	-	-	8,000
Saudi Arabia	-	500	-	-	-	-	-	100	600
Slovenia	-	-	20	22	-	-	-	-	42
Spain	3430	4019	4553	5018	-	528	-	-	17,548
Sweden	27165	15113	12277	9628	8730	11522	10069	-	94,504
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	516	-	-	-	516
Thailand	-	10	-	10	-	-	-	-	20
Turkey	800	200	200	-	100	-	-	-	1,300
United Arab Emirates	-	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
United Kingdom	-	11811	24086	17063	-	8969	19729	10682	92,340
Org. Islamic Cooper.	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	20
Private Sector	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
Total	119,747	79,033	91,947	38,617	31,309	58,091	80,530	13,168	512,441

* Figures in current USD thousands, as of 30 June 2013.

Source: based on MPTF Office (2013).

Appendix IV

Funding of PBF projects by country (in current USD)

Project number and title	Priority*	Net funded amount [†]
PBC agenda countries		US\$ 210,823,236.72
Burundi		48,406,033.50
PBF/EMER/5 Support to the Dialogue between the Burundi Government and Palipehutu-FNL	1.4	1,000,000.00
PBF/EMER/8 Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration Process in Burundi	1.3	915,354.08
PBF/IRF-18 Emergency Support to the Burundi Electoral Process	2.1	2,788,266.48
PBF/BDI/A-1 Appui au renforcement des mécanismes de lutte contre la corruption et les malversations diverses à travers tout le pays	2.2	1,410,147.40
PBF/BDI/A-2 Appui a la mise en place de cadres de dialogue et de concertation entre les partenaires nationaux	2.1	3,063,774.08
PBF/BDI/A-3 Réhabilitation du rôle de la femme dans le processus de réconciliation et de reconstruction communautaire	2.1	3,105,193.00
PBF/BDI/A-4 Participation des jeunes à la cohésion sociale au niveau communautaire	3.1	3,782,003.12
PBF/BDI/A-5 Appui a la réinsertion sociale des familles déplacées vivant dans les casernes militaires	3.2	211,798.78
PBF/BDI/A-6 Promotion du rôle des petites et micro-entreprises dans la consolidation de la paix	3.1	403,994.23
PBF/BDI/A-7 Appui à l'amélioration de la qualité des services publics locaux	4.2	3,000,000.00
PBF/BDI/A-8 Appui à la réintégration socioéconomique des populations affectées par les crises et au relèvement communautaire dans les provinces de Bubanza, Bujumbura rural et Cibitoke	3.2	1,756,463.80
PBF/BDI/A-9 Consolidation de la Paix à travers l'appui à la réintégration socio-économique durable en faveur des personnes affectées par le conflit	3.2	9,994,133.88
PBF/BDI/B-1 Lancement des activités de désarmement de la population et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre	1.3	499,169.91
PBF/BDI/B-2 Casernement de la Force de Défense Nationale (FDN) pour atténuer l'impact de leur présence au sein des populations	1.1	4,790,814.14
PBF/BDI/B-3 Appui pour un service national de renseignement respectueux de l'état de droit	1.2	489,859.16
PBF/BDI/B-4 Appui pour une Police Nationale du Burundi de proximité opérationnelle	1.1	6,777,908.12
PBF/BDI/B-5 Promotion of Discipline and Improvement of relationships between the National Defense Forces (FDN) and the population through moralization of troops	1.1	398,928.19
PBF/BDI/C-1 Appui à la mise en place d'une Commission Nationale Indépendante des Droits de l'Homme et au lancement de ses activités	1.2	372,839.82
PBF/BDI/C-2 Réduction des violences et suppression des règlements de compte par la relance du Programme national de constat et d'exécution des arrêts et jugements rendus par les cours et tribunaux accompagné du renforcement de l'appareil judiciaire	1.2	1,153,694.06
PBF/BDI/C-3 Promotion et Réhabilitation du système judiciaire de base pour une réduction des conflits au sein des communautés par le biais de la construction et l'équipement de tribunaux de résidence	2.2	795,790.53
PBF/BDI/C-4 Appui aux consultations nationales sur la mise en place des mécanismes de la justice de transition au Burundi	1.2	995,900.72
PBF/BDI/F-1 Appui au règlement pacifique des litiges fonciers	2.3	700,000.00
Central African Republic		33,392,532.23

PBF/EMER/2	Political Dialogue (2nd Tranche)	2.1	1,001,975.00
PBF/IRF-48	Appui à la Réinsertion/Réintégration des ex-combattants démobilisés et au Relèvement communautaire en République Centrafricaine	1.3	2,397,345.00
PBF/CAF/A-1	Autonomisation des Femmes affectées par les conflits	3.2	1,192,567.00
PBF/CAF/A-2	Formation des femmes en droits humains dans l'Ouham Pende et Bamingui Bangoran	1.2	368,090.00
PBF/CAF/A-3	Appui au réseau des femmes leaders des zones de conflit pour la promotion et la protection des droits de la femme et de son autonomisation	2.1	390,000.00
PBF/CAF/A-4	Projet d'Appui au Cycle Electoral en République Centrafricaine (PACE)	2.1	1,500,000.00
PBF/CAF/A-5	Renforcement de l'offre de services judiciaires et facilitation de l'accès à une justice de qualité	1.2	2,200,000.00
PBF/CAF/A-6	Amélioration de la protection et de la réinsertion sociale des enfants et des femmes en contact avec la justice et des enfants affectés par les conflits armés et renforcement du système de protection judiciaire et de soutiens psychosocial	2.2	666,913.00
PBF/CAF/A-7	Construction de deux Prisons modernes	1.2	1,700,000.00
PBF/CAF/A-8	Projet d'appui à la promotion des droits de l'homme et à l'accès au droit	1.2	554,653.00
PBF/CAF/B-2	Prévention de recrutement, Démobilisation et Réintégration socio-économique des enfants associés aux forces et groupes armés et autres enfants et femmes vulnérables dans les zones de conflits	1.3	2,000,000.00
PBF/CAF/B-3	Projet d'Appui au démarrage du processus Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration des groupes Armés	1.3	3,955,710.00
PBF/CAF/B-4	Construction de casernes militaires et de brigades de la Gendarmerie nationale	1.1	5,000,000.00
PBF/CAF/E-1	Fonctionnement du Secrétariat FCP et renforcement des capacités des partenaires	4.1	800,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-1	Appui à la relance des activités agro-pastorales à Paoua, Bozoum et Ndélé	3.2	300,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-2	Relance socio-économique des populations affectées par les conflits	3.2	300,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-3	Formation professionnelle et promotion de l'emploi des jeunes	3.1	450,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-4	Radios communautaires pour le renforcement de la cohésion sociale intra et inter-communautaire	2.1	641,806.00
PBF/CAF/K-5	Redynamisation des Centres de formation professionnelle de Bozoum, Bossangoa et Bria	3.1	351,812.56
PBF/CAF/K-6	Expression et Reconciliation	2.1	367,399.67
PBF/CAF/K-7	Formation socioprofessionnelle et réintégration des jeunes grâce l'emploi (Youth Education Pack - YEP)	3.1	500,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-8	Accès des communautés rurales aux services financiers de proximité	3.2	800,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-9	Jeunesse Pionnière	3.1	650,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-10	Appui à la mise en œuvre des activités génératrices de revenus et d'auto-emploi dans le secteur agropastoral des zones de conflits	3.2	1,800,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-11	Appui a la redynamisation socio-économique des femmes et des jeunes affectées par les conflits dans la sous-préfecture de Markounda	3.1	504,261.00
PBF/CAF/K-12	Prévention de recrutement, Démobilisation et Réintégration socio-économique des enfants associés aux forces et groupes armés et autres enfants et femmes vulnérables dans les zones de conflits	1.3	1,500,000.00
PBF/CAF/K-13	Education à la Citoyenneté et Promotion de la Culture de la Paix pour la Coexistence Pacifique dans les communautés et les écoles (ECPCPCP)	4.2	1,500,000.00
Guinea			28,425,728.55
PBF/EMER/3	Support National Dialogue in Guinea	2.1	963,284.00
PBF/IRF-19	Support to International Mediation in Guinea	2.1	634,935.00
PBF/IRF-20	Urgent Support to the Security Force FOSSEPEL (Guinea)	1.1	1,808,300.00
PBF/IRF-26	Réintégration socio économique d'enfants recrutés de manière irrégulière dans les Forces Armés de la République de Guinée et enfants vulnérables	1.3	2,995,045.00
PBF/IRF-28	Accompagnement Postélectoral en Guinée	2.1	449,265.00
PBF/IRF-49	Establishment of a Strategic Advisory Team	4.1	1,617,033.62
PBF/IRF-52	Programme conjoint de prévention et réponse aux Violences Basées sur le Genre en Guinée	1.1	1,000,000.00
PBF/GIN/A-1	Appui au mouvement féminin et renforcement de la capacité des femmes dans la prévention des conflits, la consolidation de la paix et le renforcement de l'unité nationale	2.1	627,718.09
PBF/GIN/A-2	Projet Conjoint d'appui au mouvement de la jeunesse et à certains groupes de jeunes les plus déshérités	3.1	1,650,000.00
PBF/GIN/A-3	Projet d'appui a la promotion d'un dialogue inclusif et durable en Guinée	2.1	1,594,835.00

PBF/GIN/A-4	Renforcement de la Confiance des Partis Politiques et de l'Electoral "RECOPPEL"	1.4	900,000.00
PBF/GIN/B-1	Projet d'appui prioritaire à la justice et à la sécurité en Guinée	1.2	1,708,801.00
PBF/GIN/B-2	Promotion de l'Education Civique et de la Culture de la Paix	2.1	349,922.00
PBF/GIN/B-3	Projet de renforcement du contrôle démocratique et civil des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) en Guinée	1.1	1,353,015.00
PBF/GIN/B-4	Projet d'appui au processus de recensement biométrique des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité	1.1	3,035,483.29
PBF/GIN/B-5	Projet d'appui de la mise a la retraite de 4300 militaires	1.1	4,219,224.00
PBF/GIN/B-6	Projet conjoint appui aux victimes de Tortures et de Violences basées sur le genre	2.1	249,140.00
PBF/GIN/D-1	Projet d'appui a l'insertion économique des jeunes et des femmes	3.1	2,100,000.00
PBF/GIN/D-2	Projet d'appui à l'Emploi des Jeunes et des Femmes dans l'agenda de consolidation de la paix en Guinée "Étude des opportunités dans les secteurs Minier et Agricole"	3.1	433,350.00
PBF/GIN/E-1	Renforcement des capacités de coordination en faveur de la consolidation de la paix en Guinée	2.1	441,210.00
PBF/GIN/E-2	Renforcement des capacités du Secrétariat du Comité de Pilotage du PBF Guinée Conakry	4.1	298,867.00
PBF/GIN/H-1	Support to the Promotion of Inclusive and Sustained Dialogue	2.1	1,200,067.00
Guinea-Bissau			23,712,834.00
PBF/IRF-50	Quick and Multilevel Impact for Women's Economic Empowerment and Improvement of Working Conditions in Guinea-Bissau	3.2	1,000,000.00
PBF/GNB/A-1	Support Project to Guinea Bissau's Electoral Cycle, Phase I (2008)	2.1	1,381,889.00
PBF/GNB/A-2	Support to National Reconciliation and Political Dialogue	2.2	1,000,000.00
PBF/GNB/B-1	Rehabilitation of Selected Prisons	1.2	812,834.00
PBF/GNB/B-2	Project for the Rehabilitation of Military Barracks	1.1	1,905,000.00
PBF/GNB/B-3	Feasibility Study in Guinea Bissau: Pre-training for Military and Police Personnel Baseline Assessment; Pre-Reintegration Baseline assessment	4.1	49,755.00
PBF/GNB/B-4	Support for the Preparatory Conferences for the Defense and Security Sectors within the National Conference process	1.1	101,047.00
PBF/GNB/B-5	Military SSR- Support to Security and defense sector reform and socio-economic reintegration	1.1	5,000,000.00
PBF/GNB/B-6	Strengthening Internal Security and Criminal Justice Systems in Guinea-Bissau	1.1	5,000,000.00
PBF/GNB/D-1	Youth Professional Training and Employment	3.1	1,500,000.00
PBF/GNB/D-2	Appui à la création d'emplois et de revenus en Guinée Bissau	3.1	5,000,000.00
PBF/GNB/E-1	Guinea Bissau – National PBF Secretariat Office Support	4.1	962,309.00
Liberia			28,760,546.14
PBF/EMER/4	Supporting Reconciliation in Nimba County	2.1	788,644.00
PBF/EMER-12	Critical intervention to strengthen corrections facilities, addressing immediate security threat, and supporting the rule of law (Liberia)	1.2	930,826.00
PBF/LBR/A-1	Community Empowerment: Peace, Human Rights and Civic Partnerships	2.1	932,400.00
PBF/LBR/A-2	Implementation of Peace, Human Rights and Citizenship education in the School System in Liberia	4.2	900,000.00
PBF/LBR/A-3	Volunteers for Peace Programme	2.1	450,000.00
PBF/LBR/A-4	Platform for Dialogue and Peace in Liberia	2.1	1,000,000.00
PBF/LBR/A-5	TRC Final Reconciliation Initiatives: County Consultations and National Reconciliation Conference	2.1	347,910.00
PBF/LBR/A-6	Strengthening Liberian Government Capacity to Consolidate Peace	2.1	600,000.00
PBF/LBR/A-7	Youth Empowerment Services for Peace Building and Stability	2.1	1,000,000.00
PBF/LBR/A-8	Support for the Extension, and Functioning of the Government of Liberia Peacebuilding Office/PBF Secretariat and for Monitoring and Evaluation of the PBF Portfolio and Projects	4.1	1,577,506.00
PBF/LBR/B-1	Justice and Security Joint Programme (UNOPS, UNDP)	4.2	7,576,494.05
PBF/LBR/D-1	Rapid Rule of Law Assistance in Grand Bassa County	1.2	25,847.20
PBF/LBR/D-2	Rapid Rule of Law Assistance in Maryland County	1.2	48,150.00
PBF/LBR/D-3	Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme	1.3	1,123,500.00
PBF/LBR/D-4	Psychosocial and Community Support Project	4.2	880,201.69
PBF/LBR/D-5	Supporting Peaceful Reintegration of High Risk Youths into their Communities through Facilitating Rural Transport Livelihood Opportunities	3.1	250,000.00

PBF/LBR/D-7	Rapid Rule of Law Assistance to Reduce Overcrowding in Monrovia Central Prison	1.2	50,000.00
PBF/LBR/D-8	Inter-ethnic Reconciliation in Nimba County	2.1	50,000.00
PBF/LBR/D-9	Inter-County Reconciliation Project in Nimba and Grand Gedeh Counties	2.1	50,000.00
PBF/LBR/D-10	Small Grant to Support initiative for peace Consolidation in Liberia	3.2	462,606.00
PBF/LBR/D-11	National Youth Service Programme for Peace and Development	2.1	1,000,000.00
PBF/LBR/E-1	Strengthening the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Liberia	1.2	1,167,610.00
PBF/LBR/E-2	Government of Liberia Peacebuilding Office	4.1	902,759.00
PBF/LBR/E-3	Supporting the Ministry of Justice in Improving Prosecution Services	1.2	1,082,000.00
PBF/LBR/E-4	Strengthening Public Defense	1.2	750,066.00
PBF/LBR/E-5	Support to Establishment and Initial Functioning of the Land Commission	2.3	750,000.00
PBF/LBR/E-6	Strengthening Prosecution of SGBV Offices	1.2	714,026.20
PBF/LBR/E-7	Enhancing the Relationship Between the Police and Civilians in Communities	1.1	750,000.00
PBF/LBR/E-8	Supporting the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission	2.2	500,000.00
PBF/LBR/E-9	Facilitating the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Implementation of the Liberia PBF	4.1	100,000.00
PBF/LBR/F-1	Support to the Establishment of a Land Disputes Prevention and Resolution System in Liberia – Phase I	2.3	2,000,000.00
Sierra Leone			46,921,795.85
PBF/EMER-10	Political Reconciliation, Promotion of Peace and Restoration of Political and Democratic Institutions	2.1	946,950.00
PBF/EMER-11	Support to the Sierra Leone Police Public Order Maintenance Capacity and Integrity	1.1	999,870.00
PBF/IRF-21	Support to the Government of Sierra Leone Police and the Armed Forces	1.1	961,350.00
PBF/IRF-25	Amputee Support, Sport Development and Advocacy in Sierra Leone	2.1	100,000.00
PBF/IRF-57	Peace Consolidation through increased Participation of Women in Decision Making in Sierra Leone	2.2	331,648.00
PBF/SLE/A-1	Support to National Elections Commission (NEC) Polling Staff	2.1	1,598,727.36
PBF/SLE/A-2	Support to Capacity Building and Programmes of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy Secretariat	2.2	349,034.00
PBF/SLE/A-3	Supporting Gender Capacity, Women's rights Protection and Child Protection in Recovery and Peacebuilding	2.2	802,640.00
PBF/SLE/A-4	Support to the Implementation of the Reparations Programme as part of the Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)	2.1	2,960,229.00
PBF/SLE/A-5	Capacity Building for Sierra Leone Parliament for enhanced performance of its core functions of representation, oversight and legislative enactment	2.1	625,931.00
PBF/SLE/A-6	Support to Attitudinal and Behavioural Change	2.1	140,000.00
PBF/SLE/A-7	Development of an Independent National Public Broadcasting Service for Sierra Leone	2.1	1,650,000.00
PBF/SLE/A-8	Promoting non-violent, free and credible elections through enhanced participation of non-state actors	2.1	5,000,000.00
PBF/SLE/B-1	Improved Public Order Management Capacity	1.1	1,042,564.91
PBF/SLE/B-2	Capacity Development of the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone	1.2	1,522,055.70
PBF/SLE/B-3	Emergency Support to the Security Sector	1.1	1,822,823.94
PBF/SLE/B-4	Capacity Development to the Justice System to Prevent Delays in Trials and to Clear Backlog of Cases	1.2	3,959,772.54
PBF/SLE/B-6	Rehabilitation of the Water and Sanitation facilities for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) barracks in Freetown	1.1	1,955,706.00
PBF/SLE/B-7	Support to the Office of National Security (ONS)	1.1	1,582,436.48
PBF/SLE/B-8	Contribution to Improved Reformation, Justice and Security for Prison Inmates	1.2	1,606,751.00
PBF/SLE/B-9	Promoting Regional Cooperation in the MRU	4.2	130,000.00
PBF/SLE/B-10	Support to the Establishment of a Peace Museum	2.1	195,000.00
PBF/SLE/C-1	PBF Coordination Office	4.1	100,000.00
PBF/SLE/C-2	Support to the implementation of the Sierra Leone Reparations Programme as part of the Recommendation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission	2.1	1,550,000.00
PBF/SLE/C-3	Promoting human rights culture through support to the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone	2.2	800,000.00

PBF/SLE/C-4	Strengthening national responses to the prevention and management of sexual gender-based violence	2.2	450,000.00
PBF/SLE/D-1	Youth Enterprise Development	3.1	4,080,906.92
PBF/SLE/E-1	Support to Government's Capacity for Engagement in Peacebuilding Issues	4.1	348,125.00
PBF/SLE/E-2	Strengthening the Capacity of Civil Society Organizations including CSPEC, Women's Organizations etc to effectively engage and contribute to the peace consolidation process	2.1	140,000.00
PBF/SLE/I-1	Emergency Support to the Energy Sector	4.2	9,000,000.00
PBF/SLE/J-1	Supporting the Implementation of the Joint Communiqué through an Independent Investigation into Allegations of Rape and Sexual Violence against Women at the SLPP Headquarters on 16 Mar 2009	2.2	29,463.00
PBF/SLE/J-2	People-Centred Security Governance: Special Initiative to Promote Community Women's Participation in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Process in Sierra Leone	2.1	45,261.00
PBF/SLE/J-3	Supporting the Implementation of the Joint Communiqué through the refurbishment of the SLPP Headquarters	1.4	69,550.00
PBF/SLE/J-4	Independent Review Panel	2.2	25,000.00
Non-PBC agenda countries			US\$ 155,109,842.71
Chad			4,788,011.00
PBF/IRF-24	Operational Support for the Intergrated Security Detachment Unit (DIS)	1.1	2,728,500.00
PBF/IRF-59	Conflict Prevention through Community Stabilization	2.1	2,059,511.00
Comoros			9,400,000.00
PBF/IRF-27	Revision of Electoral Register	2.2	400,000.00
PBF/COM/A-1	Réhabilitation du rôle de la femme dans le processus de réconciliation nationale et de consolidation de la paix	2.1	500,000.00
PBF/COM/A-2	Développement des capacités d'analyse et de réponse en matière de cohésion sociale, en Union des Comores	2.1	300,000.00
PBF/COM/A-3	Programme d'appui au renforcement de l'efficacité de la Justice et au respect des droits humains	1.2	500,000.00
PBF/COM/B-1	Réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Union des Comores	1.1	1,900,000.00
PBF/COM/B-2	Restructuration et renforcement des capacités opérationnelles de la Police nationale	1.1	900,000.00
PBF/COM/B-3	Plan National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration	1.3	500,000.00
PBF/COM/D-1	Appui à la pérennisation de la paix par la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes aux Comores (APROJEC)	3.1	1,000,000.00
PBF/COM/D-2	Promotion et accompagnement des initiatives de consolidation des acquis éducatifs au profit des jeunes exposées ou en situation de précarité	4.2	350,000.00
PBF/COM/D-3	Appui à l'intégration socio économique des femmes et filles associées au conflit dans le cadre du DDR	1.3	700,000.00
PBF/COM/D-4	Appui pédagogique et préparation à la réinsertion professionnelle des jeunes	4.2	300,000.00
PBF/COM/D-5	Promotion des conditions économiques et sociales des jeunes et femmes dans l'île de Mohéli au travers l'appui à l'agriculture	3.1	1,100,000.00
PBF/COM/E-1	Développement des capacités nationales techniques en matière de consolidation de la paix/Renforcement de la capacité de gestion du projet	4.1	950,000.00
Congo, Democratic Republic of			19,397,491.00
PBF/COD/A-1	Bio-économie intégrée pour l'amélioration des conditions et de la qualité de vie des populations rurales / Sud Kivu	4.2	770,000.00
PBF/COD/B-1	Programme de réintégration communautaire et de relèvement a l'est de la RDC	1.3	4,405,342.00
PBF/COD/B-2	Appui aux blessés de guerre	1.3	228,962.00
PBF/COD/B-3	Promotion du dialogue intercommunautaire et préparation des conditions pour le retour et la réintégration des déplacés et des réfugiés en toute sécurité et dignité dans les zones sortant des conflits armes a l'Est de la RDC	2.1	2,650,000.00
PBF/COD/B-4	Désarmement et démobilisation des éléments résiduels congolais au Nord, Sud Kivu	1.3	636,650.00
PBF/COD/E-1	Appui aux Structures de Coordination du STAREC et l'UNSSSS	4.1	1,130,456.00
PBF/COD/E-2	Création des Centres de Négoce à l'Est de la RDC. 1ere Phase	3.1	500,000.00
PBF/COD/E-3	Restauration de l'autorité de l'Etat à l'Est de la RDC	4.1	1,500,000.00
PBF/COD/E-4	Soutien à la Planification et l'Accessibilité dans l'Est de la RDC (SPACE)	4.1	1,300,879.00

PBF/COD/E-5	Soutiens à la sélection, à la formation et au déploiement de la Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC)	1.1	2,190,000.00
PBF/COD/E-6	Cellules d'appui à la justice militaire	1.2	857,131.00
PBF/COD/E-7	Appui aux institutions judiciaires et pénitentiaires des provinces de l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo	4.1	1,822,822.00
PBF/COD/E-8	Renforcement Capacites des Structures de Coordination et de Planification Strategique du STAREC/ISSSS	2.1	1,405,249.00
Côte d'Ivoire			18,577,750.00
PBF/EMER/1	Soutien à la facilitation et au suivi de l'Accord Politique d'Ouagadougou	2.1	2,527,750.00
PBF/IRF-44	Projet d'appui au rétablissement de la sécurité, de l'autorité de l'Etat et de la cohésion social	2.1	3,000,000.00
PBF/IRF-60	Support to the development of a national strategy for SSR in Cote d'Ivoire	1.1	550,000.00
PBF/CIV/A-1	Projet d'appui aux activités de démarrage de la Commission Dialogue, Verité et Réconciliation (CDVR)	2.1	1,000,000.00
PBF/CIV/A-2	Etude sur les dynamiques et les capacités de gestion de conflit à l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire	2.1	100,000.00
PBF/CIV/B-1	1000 micro-projets pour la réintégration des ex-combattants et d'ex-miliciens en Côte d'Ivoire	1.3	4,000,000.00
PBF/CIV/B-2	Appui à la restauration de l'ordre public et de l'autorité de l'Etat	1.1	3,000,000.00
PBF/CIV/C-1	Appui à l'état civil: Promotion de l'enregistrement des naissances et des personnes non déclarées dans les délais	1.2	3,000,000.00
PBF/CIV/E-1	Renforcement des Capacités du Secrétariat Technique	4.1	400,000.00
PBF/CIV/H-1	Soutien au Dialogue Direct à Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso	2.1	1,000,000.00
Guatemala			7,495,523.12
PBF/GTM/B-1	Strengthening of National Capacities for Criminal Investigations	4.1	1,960,000.00
PBF/GTM/B-2	Strengthening national capacities to support victims of crime	1.2	980,000.00
PBF/GTM/B-3	Institutional Strengthening of Ministry of Interior to ensure safety and promote a culture of peace	1.1	3,575,523.12
PBF/GTM/H-1	Support to the consolidation of the right to truth, justice and reparations	2.1	980,000.00
Haiti			3,800,000.00
PBF/EMER/6	Renforcement de la securité à la prison civile de Port-au-Prince, Haïti	1.2	800,000.00
PBF/IRF-17	Recovery through Employment generation, environmental rehabilitation and disaster mitigation	4.2	3,000,000.00
Kenya			1,000,000.00
PBF/EMER/7	Emergency Volunteers Scheme (Kenya)	1.4	1,000,000.00
Kyrgyzstan			10,110,158.30
PBF/IRF-22	Empowering Youth, Women and Vulnerable Communities to Contribute to Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan	2.1	2,999,948.30
PBF/IRF-36	Infrastructure for Peace - Policy Dialogue and Preventive Action (Kyrgyzstan)	1.2	3,000,000.00
PBF/IRF-37	Cultivating Peace - Using Water-based Agriculture to Facilitate Reconciliation among Multi-ethnic Residents of Kara Suu (Kyrgyzstan)	2.1	400,000.00
PBF/IRF-38	Administration of Justice (Kyrgyzstan)	1.2	1,799,997.00
PBF/IRF-39	Empowering Youth to Promote Reconciliation and Diversity (Kyrgyzstan)	3.1	910,003.00
PBF/IRF-40	Women Building Peace, Trust and Reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan	2.1	559,892.00
PBF/IRF-41	Strengthening Media Capacity to Promote Peace and Tolerance in the Kyrgyz Republic	2.1	330,108.00
PBF/KGZ/E-1	Surge Support for Project for the Consultation and Prioritization of PBF Peacebuilding priorities in Kyrgyzstan	4.2	110,210.00
Lebanon			3,008,472.00
PBF/IRF/61	Addressing Urban hot spots in Lebanon	2.1	1,005,753.00
PBF/IRF-45	Empowerment of Youth at Risk through Job Creation Programme in Areas of Tensions (Lebanon)	3.1	2,002,719.00
Libya			1,923,860.00
PBF/IRF-47	Support to Civic Engagement in Libya's Transition	2.1	1,923,860.00
Myanmar			2,030,192.64
PBF/IRF-53	Promoting Responsible Business in times of transition - towards inclusive job creation and sustainable development	3.2	16,587.64

PBF/IRF-62	Effective Implementation of the 1612 Action Plan agreed between the Government of Myanmar and the CTFMR	1.3	1,536,179.00
PBF/IRF-64	Start-up of the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC)	1.4	477,426.00
Nepal			18,880,317.97
PBF/IRF-54	Gender Responsive Recovery for Sustainable Peace	3.2	898,800.00
PBF/NPL/A-1	Catalytic Support on Land Issues	2.1	1,224,662.00
PBF/NPL/A-2	Rule of Law and Human Rights Project (ROLHR)	1.1	2,200,000.00
PBF/NPL/A-3	Increasing the safety of journalists	2.2	566,526.00
PBF/NPL/B-1	Programme of Support for Children and Adolescents Formerly Associated with the Maoist Army in Nepal (UNPFN/A-4)	1.3	622,969.00
PBF/NPL/B-2	Support to Female Members of Maoists Army among the 4008 Verified for Discharge and Host Communities in the Divisions as well as in the Discharge and Peace Building Processes (UNPFN/A-5)	1.3	224,613.97
PBF/NPL/B-3	Transitional Justice Project: "Peace through Justice" (UNPFN/E-2)	1.2	1,999,830.00
PBF/NPL/B-4	Ensuring recognition of sexual violence as a tool of conflict in the Nepal peace building process through documentation and provision of comprehensive services to women and girl victims/survivors (UNFPA/UNICEF)	1.2	2,100,000.00
PBF/NPL/D-1	Jobs for Peace - 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach (FAO/ILO)	3.1	2,656,000.00
PBF/NPL/D-2	Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Children Affected by Armed Conflict	2.1	1,500,000.00
PBF/NPL/D-3	Building Peace in Nepal: Ensuring a participatory and secure transition	1.1	2,500,000.00
PBF/NPL/E-1	Fairness and Efficiency in Reparations to Conflict-Affected Persons (IOM/OHCHR) (UNPFN/E-4)	1.2	1,007,913.00
PBF/NPL/E-2	Monitoring, Reporting and Response to Conflict-Related Child Rights Violations (UNICEF/OHCHR)	1.3	1,379,004.00
Niger			2,999,650.00
PBF/IRF-65	Jeunes, Paix et Developpement dans la region de Tahoua	3.2	2,999,650.00
Somalia			3,995,100.00
PBF/EMER/13	Quick Impact Police and Security Reform in the Puntland State of Somalia	1.1	999,915.00
PBF/IRF-31	Somalia: Permanent Shelter and Social Infrastructure (UNHCR)	3.2	1,111,715.00
PBF/IRF-32	Somalia: Peaceful Co-Existence in Puntland (UNHCR)	2.1	302,411.00
PBF/IRF-33	Somalia: Capacity Building (UNHCR)	2.2	115,000.00
PBF/IRF-34	Somalia: Urban Solid Waste Management (UNHCR)	2.1	470,959.00
PBF/IRF-55	Ending the transition in Somalia	2.1	995,100.00
South Sudan			12,410,602.32
PBF/IRF-42	Stabilization and Reintegration Support for Returnees in South Sudan	3.2	2,000,000.00
PBF/IRF-43	Strategic Grain Reserve in South Sudan	4.1	1,990,200.00
PBF/IRF-51	Support Women Peace	2.1	531,790.00
PBF/SSD/D-1	South Jonglei Youth Literacy and Peace Building Initiative	3.1	768,260.00
PBF/SSD/D-2	Peacebuilding Secretariat - South Sudan	4.2	1,200,000.00
PBF/SSD/E-1	Conflict Prevention Through Access to Water Points (Hafirs and Boreholes)	4.2	5,920,352.32
Sri Lanka			2,993,456.36
PBF/IRF-14	Mine Action in Sri Lanka (UNICEF/UNDP)	3.2	2,993,456.36
Sudan			12,491,551.00
PBF/IRF-15	Consolidating Peace through DDR in Sudan: Abyei	1.3	98,313.00
PBF/IRF-16	Consolidating Peace through DDR in Sudan : Eastern Sudan	1.3	1,728,050.00
PBF/IRF-23	South Sudan Out-of-Country Registration and Voting (OCRV)	2.2	1,621,176.00
PBF/IRF-29	Consolidating Peace through DDR in Southern Kordofan State and Khartoum State	1.3	4,680,010.00
PBF/IRF-30	Immediate Response for the reinsertion/reintegration of IDP returns to Abyei	3.2	2,000,900.00
PBF/IRF-35	Immediate Response for protection and peacebuilding in Southern Kordofan/ Nuba Mountain State	2.1	2,014,817.00
PBF/IRF-58	Empowering Women for Peace and Recovery	3.2	348,285.00
Timor-Leste			993,625.00
PBF/EMER/9	Return, Relocation and Reintegration Support to IDPs and IDP-Affected Communities in Timor-Leste	3.2	993,625.00

Uganda			15,019,756.00
PBF/IRF-63	Peacebuilding and Enhancing Protection Systems	2.1	1,020,000.00
PBF/UGA/A-1	Peacebuilding through Justice for All and Human Rights	1.2	5,899,756.00
PBF/UGA/A-2	Peacebuilding and Enhancing Protection Systems (UNFPA/UNICEF)	2.2	2,500,000.00
PBF/UGA/D-1	Livelihoods and Local Economic Recovery	3.2	5,000,000.00
PBF/UGA/E-1	Ensuring Coordination, Evidence-Based Programming and Monitoring of the Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Uganda	4.1	600,000.00
Yemen			3,499,862.00
PBF/IRF-46	Yemen - Support to Elections during the Transition Period	2.1	1,000,000.00
PBF/IRF-56	Support to the National Dialogue Process in Yemen	2.1	2,000,000.00
PBF/IRF-68	Support to the implementation of Yemen's political transition	2.1	499,862.00
Various countries			294,464.00
PBF/IRF-67	PBF Review	n/a	294,464.00
TOTAL	251 projects		US\$ 365,933,079.43


* Priorities listed in accordance with matrix used in the PBSO for internal purposes.

† All figures in current USD, as of 30 June 2013.

Source: based on MPTF Office (2013).

Annex A

UN system organisational chart



Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI/2470 rev.2—11-36429—October 2011)

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/un-system-chart-color-sm.pdf> [last accessed on 14 September 2013].

Annex B

DPKO List of Peacekeeping Operations, 1948-2013

		LIST OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1948 - 2013	
Acronym	Mission name	Start Date	End Date
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	May 1948	Present
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	January 1949	Present
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force	November 1956	June 1967
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	June 1958	December 1958
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo	July 1960	June 1964
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea	October 1962	April 1963
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	July 1963	September 1964
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964	Present
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	May 1965	October 1966
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	September 1965	March 1966
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force	October 1973	July 1979
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	June 1974	Present
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978	Present
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May 1988	March 1990
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August 1988	February 1991
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989	June 1991
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989	March 1990
ONUSCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America	November 1989	January 1992
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April 1991	October 2003
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	April 1991	present
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	June 1991	February 1995
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	July 1991	April 1995
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	October 1991	March 1992
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force	February 1992	March 1995
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March 1992	September 1993
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992	March 1993
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992	December 1994
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March 1993	March 1995
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993	September 1994
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	August 1993	June 2009
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993	September 1997
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti	September 1993	June 1996
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October 1993	March 1996
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May 1994	June 1994
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	December 1994	May 2000
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	February 1995	June 1997
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	May 1995	January 1996
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	March 1995	February 1999
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 1995	December 2002
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	January 1996	January 1998
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	January 1996	December 2002
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	July 1996	July 1997
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	January 1997	May 1997
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	June 1997	February 1999
UNTMH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August 1997	December 1997
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	December 1997	March 2000

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf> [last accessed on 14 September 2013].



LIST OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1948 - 2013

Acronym	Mission name	Start Date	End Date
UNCPSG	UN Civilian Police Support Group	January 1998	October 1998
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	July 1998	October 1999
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June 1999	Present
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	October 1999	December 2006
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	October 1999	May 2002
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	November 1999	June 2010
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	July 2000	July 2008
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002	May 2005
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	September 2003	Present
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	Present
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	June 2004	Present
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi	June 2004	December 2006
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan	March 2005	July 2011
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	August 2006	December 2012
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	July 2007	Present
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	September 2007	December 2010
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	July 2010	Present
UNISFA	United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei	June 2011	Present
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	July 2011	Present
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria	April 2012	August 2012
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	April 2013	Present

Annex C

Background Note by the Secretary of the Task Force: Data Analysis on Wars and Conflicts from 1945 to the Present, 23 March 1992

7 APR REC'D

Seco
(Summit Report)

25 March 1992

Mr. Secretary-General,

Subject: Secretary-General's report called for by the Security Council by its Declaration on 31 January 1992

In response to your interest in statistics and prognosis on wars and conflicts, discussed in length when you met the Task Force on 19 March 1992, we have prepared a paper that brings together academic research which has been done on the subject. The paper is attached for your background information.



Vladimir Petrovsky

Source: United Nations Archives, S-1082-0023-2. Reproduced with kind permission.

Task Force on the Secretary-General's
Summit Report

Confidential
23 March 1992

Background Note by the Secretary
of the Task Force

DATA AND ANALYSIS ON WARS AND CONFLICTS FROM 1945 TO THE PRESENT

In our meeting with the Secretary-General on 19 March 1992 the Secretary-General provided us with some statistics of wars and information on the changes of the nature of conflicts since the Second World War. He mentioned that we should take this into account in drafting the report (see a separate note forwarded to us by him, Attachment 1). The Secretary-General also asked us to make a prognosis of the future trends in wars and conflicts in order to give a solid factual basis for our recommendations. To provide detailed factual evidence to support and complement the information given by the Secretary-General, this note analyses some basic trends in armed conflicts after the Second World War and gives some tentative projections, based on available scientific data collected by selected leading (although mostly American) scholars in the international relations field.¹ (Background and sources, see endnote 1.)

In reference to the Secretary-General's comments and the first draft outline of the report (dated 19 March 1992) the following results seem to emerge from the current quantitative research in international relations:

1. Changing nature of conflicts

The Figure 1 in Attachment 2 by Karin Lindgren of Uppsala University, describing major armed conflicts in the period 1945-1989, supports the statement by the Secretary-General that civil war has become dominant after the Second World War. Note also the almost constant number (2-5 per year) of international armed conflicts during the period. It might be envisaged that this rather constant level of international conflict will continue. This preliminary finding suggests that, irrespective of the dominance of the civil wars, the UN should continue to be prepared to manage traditional international conflicts between states. However, more and more attention should be given to the civil wars.

Attachment 3 provides more detailed factual information about all the wars and war-related conflicts in the period 1945-1989. Note that the total number of deaths during this period was close to 22 million. For some sceptics this figure proves that the UN has failed in its major function. However, one has to ask how many more deaths we might have witnessed without the United Nations. In fact, the statistics later in this note shows that the UN has been quite helpful even during the Cold War.

Figure 1 in Attachment 2 also reveals a light downturn of internal conflicts after 1985 (note that the figures end in 1989 and might not be statistically significant). One explanation is the following: The onset of the Gorbachev era and the Soviet Union's new UN policy gradually helped the Organization and other conflict managers to solve, and maybe prevent, a number of armed conflicts after 1985 (see Attachment 4 for more data). In the 1990s, however, we might expect an upsurge of civil wars in connection with the end of the Cold War (although we don't have hard data to support this; this information could be acquired later as needed). Cold War antagonism and nuclear deterrence provided a protective cover or straitjacket which prevented some ethnic, or religious claims and old injustices to come to the surface. When, in the 1990s, new "ideologies" (democracy, human rights observance, rule of law, etc) were introduced into the national debate of the former East Bloc countries as well as a number of developing countries, new problems have arisen. We now face the task of making this new "modernization" a smooth process with the help of the UN in the years to come.¹

2. Prognosis of the future nature of armed conflicts

Attachment 5 (a-h) provides data of the nature of conflicts in 1945-1986 (taken from the dissertation of Frank Sherman, Pennsylvania State University, 1987, see endnote). We see especially the rise of conflicts related to human rights, terrorism, anti-regime movements, borders/territorial disputes and somewhat to resource questions. Although we have no data on late years (Sherman might have continued to update his database; to be checked as needed) we might expect that these trends will continue, especially the first two -- conflicts on human rights and terrorism

¹ Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington in his seminal 1968 work "Political Order in Changing Societies" (one of the most quoted books in political science) found, based on a comprehensive analysis of historical data, that political order in societies depends mainly on the relation between the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces into politics. One should add to these at least four new factors: (1) economic decay and distress (to the degree it does not lead to complete apathy which has been witnessed in a number of Third World countries plagued by starvation), (2) wide or even widening inequalities within these new "modernizing" societies, (3) rising expectations through wider use of mass media in these countries, and (4) upsurge of radicalism and fanaticism, also made more powerful with the help of modern technology. To bring more peace, security and stability to the world the UN has to take all these factors into account in the years to come.

- and on the question of resources (water in the Middle East, etc.)

3. periods of collective security practices in 1945-1989

In our draft outline we draw some lessons from the earlier periods. To provide more data for our reflection it is useful to see what some leading scholars on the United Nations describe as the characteristics of the first 40 years of the United Nations. Ernst Haas from the University of California at Berkeley, and Frank Sherman from the Miami University, describe the periods as follows:

Concert or honeymoon: 1945-1948: Collective security was the primary function of the United Nations and occasional successes were attained (Palestine Partition, Indonesia, Kashmir). Permissive enforcement: 1949-1955: The dominant motive was identification of collective security with the military-political aims of the Western Bloc, successfully asserted in Korea and in the Uniting For Peace resolution. Demands for changes in world economic policy and discussion on human rights were raised, although the economic demands were not fully implemented and the human rights concerns revolved around Western attempts to penetrate East Bloc governmental policies.

Permissive engagement 1956-1971: The era of "balancing" lasted until 1964 and was characterized by the efforts of "non-Cold War" aligned states to provide the basis for organizational response to peace and security issues. These countries sought compromise solutions acceptable to both superpower blocs. The strength of balancing developed from important change in the environment. There was a significant increase in UN membership. Colonial and human rights policies began to be joined and economic needs surfaced as the Western nations were forced to obtain more general support from non-Western states. The years 1964-71 were marked by the end of colonial era and the increase in the extent and strength of economic demands. The period 1972-1984 revealed no pattern which could be characterized as "fragmentation and disagreement."

Although not dealt by Haas or Sherman the period 1985-present was the period of gradual decline of the Cold War and, consequently, new opportunities were created for the UN.

If we compare these periods to the successes of the Organization (Figure 2 in Attachment 6) we see that achievements were greatest within the first 20 years of the Organization, especially the period 1955-1960, if one does not count the last few years when the Organization's success rate has increased. The regional organizations share a somewhat similar rate and pattern of

success as the UN. Tables 1 and 2 in Attachment 7 show that the UN has been used as a primary conflict manager even during the Cold War, sometimes less successfully, but the UN was never bypassed totally. Table 7 in Attachment 8 shows that even though the veto was used quite often the UN still had a lot of influence on the management of conflicts.

In discussing the findings of his comprehensive quantitative study of the UN as a conflict manager in 1945-1981, Ernst Haas found the following characteristics of UN achievements (see also Table 4 in Attachment 9, the UN success by issues; note that the findings are written in 1983 when few scholars saw the potential of the UN in the positive light Haas did):

- 1) The most intense disputes are the most likely to be managed.
- 2) Success comes more readily when fighting is very limited though the impact is usually slight.
- 3) The most contagious disputes are the ones most frequently influenced by the UN, very often with great success.
- 4) Decolonization disputes are most readily managed, Cold War disputes very rarely.
- 5) Cold War alignments complicate the management of conflicts considerably.
- 6) Disputes involving middle powers yield most easily to UN action.
- 7) Strong decision bring results. However, the failure to make a decision does not necessarily imply the failure of conflicts management.
- 8) Energetic measures to enforce a truce and separate the contestant bring results, overwhelmingly with great success. But small-scale mediation and conciliation also pay off over half of the time.
- 9) No effective action is possible without a wide and consensus among the members.
- 10) When superpowers exercise their leadership together they are usually successful. "The single most effective mode of leadership is the initiative of the Secretary-General, acting either alone or in concert with one of the larger states." (Emphasis added).

The last finding is illustrated graphically in Figure 7 in Attachment 10. This finding stresses the potential of the Secretary-General to take initiatives and achieve results even if the Security Council and the other UN bodies do not want to act for various reasons in the context of changing scene of world politics.

ENDNOTE

1. This note was prepared in a limited time period based on readily available data in the Secretariat. Time and confidentiality involved did not allow any further research to be carried out.

Since the Secretary-General wants our recommendations to be based on solid scientific grounds an explanation is provided here about the sources.

The findings are based on the results of research contacts the former research and analytical arm of the Secretary-General, ORCI, made during its existence in 1987-1991, first under the leadership of Mr. Jonah and then Mr. de Soto. The statistics and analysis above are based on the data found in the research papers of these contact scholars (They came from the so-called quantitative school of international relations that remained committed to the United Nations throughout the dark days of the Cold War; note that many other scholars now showing interest in the UN are just late converts to the multilateralism).

Former contacts: Prof. Bruce Russett at Yale, Prof. Lincoln Bloomfield and Hayward Alker at MIT, Prof. David Singer at University of Michigan, Prof. Ernst Haas at University of California at Berkeley, Prof. Frank Sherman at Miami University. Due to lack of funds, contacts with non-Americans were less frequent, but included Prof. Peter Wallensteen and Karin Lindgren at Uppsala University and Prof. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, an Italian, now working at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Correspondence with the German Group mentioned by the Secretary-General "War, Armament and Development Research Unit of the Institute of Political Science at the University of Hamburg" was also undertaken.

Sources for this note:

Eckhardt, W. , Wars and War-related Deaths, 1945 - 1989, Prepared by the Lentz Peace Research Institute, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989.

Haas, Ernst B., Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945 - 1981. International Organization 37,2 , Spring 1983.

Huntington, S. P., Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1968

Lindgren, K. (ed), States in Armed Conflict 1989, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1991.

Sherman, Frank L., Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere. The Graduate School, The Pennsylvania State University, 1987.

Wallensteen, P., Heldt, B. and Lingren, K., Locations and Number of Major Armed Conflicts by Region, 1986 - 1990, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Report 32, 1991.

Written Comments by the Secretary-General to the Task Force
on 19 March 1992

- In states that have been newly created as part of the process of decolonization, it is difficult to make the "state", the "member state" of the UN, the point of departure for an analysis of conflict behaviour.

- For the peripheral societies (developing societies) statehood is for mere a frame of reference that has been forced onto them by the historical process of "mondi"; it is an external shell within which the various component parts (cultural, religious, ethnic and particularistic groups) have to develop.

Definition of war

- 1) two or more armed forces must be involved in the fighting;
- 2) there must be a minimum of central organization of the parties waging war and the fighting on both sides;
- 3) the armed operation must occur with a certain degree of continuity.

Statistics

From the end of World War II until 1989 there were 177 wars worldwide; North America remained completely free of war and only very few wars are to be registered in Europe.

- Unlike during the 19th century and the period up to the end of the second world war, it is no longer classical international war that predominates but the "civil war", anticolonial war - antiregime war.

- The industrialized nations still intervene indirectly (arms supplies - military aid). However direct action is decreasing after the end of the cold war.

Characteristics of the conflicts

- (1) There are no different or new sources of conflict in the Third World if one compares them with the conflicts already known from the history of Europe.
- (2) Conflicts of the Third World are related with the process of modernization imposed from outside.

- (a) conflicts related to the process of decolonization
- (b) conflicts resulting from the confrontation between modernistic and traditional societies (the inherent contradictions of the modernistic from conflict related)
- (c) civil war - war of insurrection

conflicts did not continue from 1988 to 1989 (Iranian government versus Iranian National Liberation Army, and Malaysia and Thailand jointly against the Communist Party of Malaysia), while one new one was added (Romania).

1.4 Reflections on Developments in Major Armed Conflicts since 1945

The total number of major armed conflicts going on in the world today is higher in the late forties (see figure 1). The often used name (perhaps Eurocentric) for the post-1945 period, "the post-war period", does not seem to be appropriate; Over 100 conflicts, defined as major conflicts, have taken place between 1945 and 1989²².

During these 45 years there were over three times as many internal and state-formation conflicts (taking these two categories as one) as international conflicts. In an even longer perspective, i.e. from the beginning of the 1800s, the trend is that international conflicts are declining while internal conflicts are increasing²³.

Figure 1: Developments in Major Armed Conflicts 1945 to 1989, International and Internal Conflicts*



* Internal conflicts here include both state-formation conflicts and internal conflicts as defined above

Source: Lindgren, Karin, *Världens Krig*, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 1990. (*Världens Fakta*: 5), pp. 26-32.

²² Lindgren, Karin, *Världens Krig*, Stockholm, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1990 (*Världens Fakta*: 5), pp. 26-32.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

(Source: States in Armed Conflict 1989. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
BY KARIN LINDGREN

Uppsala University
 Department of Peace and
 Conflict Research

Perer Wallensteen
 Birger Heldt
 Karin Lindgren

Locations and number of Major Armed Conflicts by Region, 1986 - 1990

Location of major armed conflict(s)	Year joined a)	Major armed conflict(s) active during the year					Entire period 1986-1990
		1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	
<i>Europe</i>		1	1	1	2	1	2
Romania	1989	-	-	-	1	-	
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	1969	1	1	1	1	1	
<i>Middle East</i>		6	6	6	5	5	7
Iran	1979	1	1	1 b)	1	1	
Iraq	1979	1	1	1	1	1	
Iran-Iraq	1980	1	1	1	-	-	
Israel/Palestine	1964	1	1	1	1	1	
Lebanon	1975	1	1	1	1	1	
Syria	1976	1	1	-	-	-	
Turkey	1984	-	-	1	1	-	
<i>Asia</i>		12	13	11	10	10	14
Afghanistan	1978	1	1	1	1	1	
Bangladesh	1981	-	-	-	1	1	
India	1981/1982	1	1	1	1	1 b)	
India-Pakistan	1982	-	1	1	1	1	
Myanmar (formerly Burma)	1948	1	1	1 c)	1 c)	1 b)	
Pakistan	1972	1	1	-	-	-	
Sri Lanka	1983/1987	1	1	1 b)	1 b)	1 b)	
Cambodia/Kampuchea	1979	1	1	1	1	1	
China-Vietnam	1979	1	1	1	-	-	
Indonesia/East Timor	1975	1	1	1	1	1	
Laos	1975	1	1	1	1	1	
Malaysia/Malaysia, Thailand d)	1945	1	1	1	-	-	
Philippines	1986/1990	1	1	1 b)	1	1 b)	
Thailand	1965	1	1	-	-	-	
<i>Africa</i>		11	11	11	10	10	13
Angola	1975	1	1	1	1	1	
Chad	1987/1989	1	1	1	1	1 b)	
Ethiopia	1971/1976	1	1	1	1 b)	1 b)	
Ethiopia-Somalia	1969	1	1	1	-	-	
Liberia	1989	-	-	-	-	-	
Morocco/Western Sahara	1976	1	1	1	1	1	
Mozambique	1976	1	1	1	1	1	
Somalia	1981	-	-	1	1	1	
South Africa	1984	1	1	1	1	1	
South Africa/Namibia	1967	1	1	1	1	1	
Sudan	1983	1	1	1	1	1	
Uganda	1986	1	1	1	1	1	
Zimbabwe	1980	1	1	-	-	-	
<i>Central & South America</i>		5	5	5	6	5	6
Colombia	1978/1979	1	1	1 b)	1	1	
El Salvador	1979	1	1	1	1	1	
Guatemala	1968	1	1	1	1	1	
Nicaragua	1981	1	1	1	1	1	
Panama-USA	1989	-	-	-	1	-	
Peru	1981	1	1	1	1	1	
Total no. of locations		35	36	34	33	31	42
Total no. of major armed conflicts		n.a.	n.a.	40	37	37	50




Figure 22. Distribution of Continuing Colonial Conflicts

(Source: Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere by Frank Sheehan)



Figure 23. Distribution of Continuing Borders/Territorial Conflicts

(Source: Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere?
by Frank Sheznan)




Figure 24. Distribution of Continuing International Personality Conflicts.

(Source: Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere by Frank Sherman)




Figure 25. Distribution of Continuing Anti-Regime Conflicts.

(Source: Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere by Frank Sherman)




Figure 26. Distribution of Continuing Human Rights Conflicts.

(Source: Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere? by Frank Sherman)




Figure 27. Distribution of Continuing Resource Conflicts.

Source: Pathway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere?
by Frank Sheehan




Figure 28. Distribution of Continuing Navigation Conflicts.

Source: Pathway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere by Frank Sheehan




Figure 29. Distribution of Continuing Terrorism Conflicts.

(Source: Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere, by Frank Sherman)




FIGURE 2. Referrals and success by era. United Nations ($N = 123$), left, and regional organizations ($N = 80$), right

declined, but less dramatically.¹⁶ The United Nations' record in stopping hostilities remains high, though it worsened after 1965.¹⁷ Abatement, clearly the least demanding activity in the management of conflict, has been quite good throughout the life of the organization. Decay does not yet amount to irrelevance.¹⁸

(1960–61), Kuwait independence, Sarawak Sabah, Tutsi restoration attempt, Panama Canal / Falkland Islands, Katanga exiles, Arab-Israeli confrontation (1967–73), Equatorial Guinea independence, Bahrain independence, Panama Canal 2, Chilean repression, Farakka barrage, Transkei border, South African race policies (1976–), Western Sahara war, Benin coup, Burmese refugees, Israeli raids in Lebanon (1978–82), U.S. hostages in Iran.

16. The cases of "great" success in isolating disputes: Corfu Channel, Greek civil war, Azerbaijan, Kashmir secession, Kashmir negotiations, Korean negotiations (1951–53), Suez war, status of British Cameroon, Sakiet raid, Lebanon/Jordan civil wars (1958), Bizerta, status of African High Commission Territories, independence of South Yemen, Cyprus civil war, status of Panama Canal, second Kashmir war, Iran expansion in Persian Gulf (1969–75), Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Benin coup, Litani River war.

17. The cases of "great" success in stopping hostilities: Korean negotiations (1951–53), West Irian, Congo independence, Cyprus civil war, Iran expansion in the Persian Gulf (1969–75).

18. High and very high intensity cases that the United Nations failed to manage though they were referred: Korean War (1950–51), Soviet intervention in Hungary, status of Portuguese colonies, Cuban missile crisis, repression in South Africa (1962–76), Yemen civil war, Portuguese Guinea, status of Rhodesia, Vietnam war, Entreat independence, Rhodesia-Zambia border fighting, status of Timor, repression in Israeli-occupied territories, South African attacks on Angola, Rhodesia-Mozambique border fighting, invasion of Kampuchea, repression in El Salvador, Afghanistan.

(Source: Regime decay: conflict management and international organizations, 1945–1981 by Ernst B. Haas International Organization)

TABLE 1. All disputes involving military operations and fighting ($N = 217$), in percent

	Referrals by Era						
	Total N	To UN		To regionals		Nonreferred	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
1945-50	24	10	42	1	4	13	54
1951-55	20	9	45	4	20	7	35
1956-60	26	9	35	5	19	12	46
1961-65	49	21	43	15	30	13	27
1966-70	21	12	57	4	19	5	24
1971-75	25	8	32	8	32	9	36
1976-81	52	18	35	14	27	20	38
1945-81	217	87	40	51	24	79	36

Note. Excludes double-counting of disputes referred to more than one organization. Most successful organization is credited.

TABLE 2. Serious disputes involving military operations and fighting ($N = 103$), in percent

	Referrals by Era						
	Total N	To UN		To regionals		Nonreferred	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
1945-50	19	8	42	0	0	11	58
1951-55	5	3	60	0	0	2	40
1956-60	11	7	64	0	0	4	36
1961-65	23	10	44	7	30	6	26
1966-70	11	7	64	2	18	2	18
1971-75	12	4	33	5	42	3	25
1976-81	22	13	62	8	33	1	5
1945-81	103	52	51	22	21	29	28

Note. Excludes double-counting of disputes referred to more than one organization. Most successful organization is credited.

(Source: Regime decay: conflict management and international organizations, 1945-1981 by Ernst B. Haas International Organization)

dom: defe
of sp
situa
aid f
dispu
and s
(glob

Glo
the q
strugg
to the
civil v
interv
are al
either
they f
pacts:
is alig
Finally
from s

Vize
mount
Decisic
of a re
stantiv
state
in turn
binding
one to
and enl
armies.
to be ad
erised
by mid
leadersh
the secu
The con
olution
satisfact
beyond

is see it
to den

TABLE 7. *The Veto and UN success (N = 46)*

Era	N	Vetoes Cast on Disputes in Data Set ^a					UN Impact Despite Veto			
		USSR	US	UK	France	China	None	Some	Great	Percent
1945-50	8	6	0	1	1	0	2	2	4	75
1951-55	3	3	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	33
1956-60	7	5	0	1	1	0	1	0	6	86
1961-65	5	4	0	1	0	0	3	2	0	40
1966-70	3	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	33
1971-75	9	0	5	2	1	1	5	3	1	44
1976-81	11	4	2	2	3	0	7	4	0	36
Totals	46	24	8	7	6	1	22	12	12	52

a. The actual number of vetoes cast on issues relating to conflict management was 93, 58 of which were cast by the USSR and 15 by the United States. The difference in Ns is accounted for by the fact that more than one veto was cast on most of the 32 disputes in the set, whereas I counted only one veto per case per state. However, I counted multiple vetoes in a given dispute as separate votes, e.g., when both France and Britain voted against the Suez peacekeeping force.

atives. It should be between 1955 and ed by Dag Hammarskjöld. Under Kurt Waldheim prominent, abandoned conflicts increasingly actively unchanging energy.

complete lack of great that the United in some situations tes moderated its involvement, in the ode. South Africa and reopened the against Rhodesia Secretary-General id Burmese refugee immediate vicinity

levance requires a ada. If it turns out utes involving the olonial possessions, ent for the United Table 4. "Easy derial power seemed ited Nations; "hard part of the imperial ndant on managing ass the rest. Success e the proportion it 6-60.

tions?

s to be undergoing urope seem to have e.²³ In the aggregate

are discussed in Gordon rsity Press, 1966); Joseph s are discussed in Hussein obs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, on: Princeton University *African Unity* (Metuchen, anagement by the Orga- 1974), pp. 345-76.

TABLE 4. World political issues and all UN cases of success (N = 63), in percent
World Political Issues

Era	N	Decolonization		Cold War	Arab-Israeli ^d	India-Pakistan ^e	Cyprus ^f	Misc ^g
		Easy ^a	Hard ^b					
1945-50	13	15	23	32	15	15	0	0
1951-55	4	0	25	50	0	0	0	25
1956-60	12	8	46	8	8	0	0	31
1961-65	10	30	50	0	0	0	10	10
1966-70	9	33	11	0	22	11	0	22
1971-75	5	20	0	0	20	0	40	20
1976-81	10	20	20	0	20	0	0	40

a. Cyrenaica, Togoland, British Cameroon, African High Commission Territories, Kuwait, Panama Canal 1, Djibouti, Bahrain, Equatorial Guinea, Panama Canal 2, Transkei, New Hebrides.

b. Indonesia, French withdrawal from Levant, Namibia, West Irian, Algerian independence, Mauritania/Morocco, Sakiet raid, attack on Bizerta, Congo independence, Suez War, Aden independence, Ifni, Sarawak/Sabah, Rhodesian U.D.I., Falkland Islands, Western Sahara, persecution in South Africa.

c. Greek civil war, Azerbaijan, Korean negotiations, Russian wives, Corfu Channel, China Seas piracy, status of Laos.

d. Palestine independence, Palestine truce (1948-56), Israeli borders (1957-66), Six-Day war, Israeli borders (1967-73), Yom Kippur War, Litani River campaign, Israeli raids into Lebanon.

e. Kashmir secession, Kashmir negotiations, second Kashmir war.

f. Cyprus civil war, Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Cyprus negotiations.

g. KMT troops in Burma, Lebanon-Jordan civil wars, Wadi Halfa, Buraimi Oasis, Thai-Cambodian border, Tutsi restoration attempt, Katanga exiles, Persian Gulf access, Chilean repression, U.S. hostages in Iran, Burmese refugees, coup in Benin, Farakka barrage.

(Source: Regime decay: conflict management and international organizations, 1945 - 1981 by Ernst B. Haas)
International Organizations)

ATTACHMENT 10

anging
failure
pates,
d with
inality
regime

United
s often
ntinue
United
e Cold
umber
sharply
rking
to lead

nd of the
rnational
al Peace-
ordenker,
Columbu
ew York
1946-7




FIGURE 7. Decisions and operations by era, United Nations, (N = 123), in percent