

Chapter 6 – Are we humans or are we (queer) dancers? The Fascinating Paradox of Queer Rights

Mara Pieri

SciELO Books / SciELO Livros / SciELO Libros


PIERI, M. Are we humans or are we (queer) dancers? The Fascinating Paradox of Queer Rights. In: MARTINS, B.S., SANTOS, A.C., and LOPES, S., eds. *As sociedades contemporâneas e os direitos humanos* = Contemporary societies and human rights [online]. Ilhéus: EDITUS, 2018, pp. 415-436. ISBN: 978-85-7455-525-6.
<https://doi.org/10.7476/9788574555256.0021>.



All the contents of this work, except where otherwise noted, is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license](#).

Todo o conteúdo deste trabalho, exceto quando houver ressalva, é publicado sob a licença [Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0](#).

Todo el contenido de esta obra, excepto donde se indique lo contrario, está bajo licencia de la licencia [Creative Commons Reconocimiento 4.0](#).



CHAPTER 6

Are we humans or are we (queer) dancers? The Fascinating Paradox of Queer Rights

*Mara Pieri**

Introduction

In recent years, several organizations and nations have acknowledged the importance of rights connected to sexual orientation and gender identity. Nevertheless, the struggles that activists faced to see those rights recognized mostly involved specific claims which were considered representative of all LGBT people in the world, such as protection against discrimination, right to marriage and rights to create families.

Not surprisingly, queer subjects were basically not participating in the party: the more LGBT rights were included in the global human rights project, the more queer claims were perceived as radical and marginal voices. Michael Warner opens his enlightening book *Fear of a queer planet* (1993) with a question: what do queers want? Within the debate on human rights, we could reframe the question as: what do queers claim? Is what they claim different from what has been recognized as LGBT rights? Is it possible to think of an encounter between the human rights global system and queer rights? Also, do queer theories have something to add to counter-hegemonic perspectives on human rights?

* PhD Human Rights in Contemporary Societies. Email: marapieri@ces.uc.pt

The aim of the article is to explore the areas of debate opened by these questions, in particular the complex but fascinating contradictions contained in the *queer rights* concept. In the first part, I will analyse the emergence of a debate on queer rights within the contemporary human rights discourse. Taking contradiction as an epistemological starting point, I will refer to queer rights as a figuration and a concept, in order to explore three paradoxes. I will finally argue that the paradoxical features of queer rights represent a counter-hegemonic perspective on human rights, as they enlighten normative presumptions on which the mainstream discourse on human rights is based.

1 Queer rights as a paradox

The first necessary step to look into the issue is to acknowledge that the term *queer* has been the object of multiple misunderstandings, manifold manipulations and careless uses. While it gained visibility and accountability within social sciences, its radical trait was lost in translation and *queer* ended up being a useful, appealing, cool substitute of the dull acronym *LGBT*. As frequent as in other disciplines also within the human rights context it is not uncommon to find *queer* used as an umbrella term for gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans and non-conforming identities (with being left to the most various interpretations). So, the first step is to acknowledge that queer rights are not *LGBT rights*, nor more general *sexual rights*; neither are they the leftovers of LGBT rights, or what is left to discuss after a large amount of sexual rights have been defined and recognised. *Queer* is used here to refer to practices rather than identities, to epistemologies rather than objects: as a standpoint that starts from a deviation line in order to read hegemonic grids (Ahmed, 2006). In this sense, it relates to a permanent disidentification, a deconstructive approach committed to the impossibility of inclusivity and the unwillingness to stick with fixed terms.

A discussion on *queer rights* does not only question if and how it is possible to think of them as a fruitful political figuration; in doing so, it also casts light on some of the contradictions, abyssal lines (Santos, 2007) and fractures that characterize the hegemonic discourse on human rights as rooted in a neoliberal, capitalist, Western-centred perspective.

As Sabsay (2013) and Thoreson (2011) note, though, queer perspectives were themselves born within a Western-centred context: we then need to approach human rights recognising hegemonic understandings of *queer*, acknowledging that what is queer in a place, in others could be not queer at all, or could even be normative. *Queer* is regarded here as a floating signifier: as the emergence of homonationalism (Puar, 2007) and queer liberalism (Eng *et al.*, 2005) shows, the danger of reification of a universal *queer approach* may lie in different contexts.

Nevertheless, this floating character of the term *queer*, which has been both considered a mark of unreliability and a sign of epistemological positioning, should not scare. Indeed, in a counter-hegemonic discourse on human rights, the concept of *human* has also been recognized as a floating signifier. As Douzinas (2007) underlines, what *human* means has been rooted into historical, socio-economic and political discourses so deeply that it has become an empty signifier: while its enormous symbolic capital grows, it is more and more likely to be claimed or vanquished by very different subjects.

Therefore, the combination of two floating signifiers turns out to be a triggering perspective: not only with the aim of reading specific connections between human rights and queer politics, but also in order to understand global dynamics of politics and power.

A debate on queer rights thus opens space for an intersectional, anti-normative, critical perspective within human rights: a perspective that starts from sexuality and gender to encompass various issues. As Warner states:

Every person who comes to a queer self-understanding knows in one way or another that her stigmatization is connected with gender, the family, notions of individual freedom, the state, public speech, consumption and desire, nature and culture, maturation, reproductive politics, racial and national fantasy, class identity, truth and trust, censorship, intimate life and social display, terror and violence, health care, and deep cultural norms about the bearing of the body. (Warner, 1993: xii)

Therefore, queer politics are not only a matter of sexuality. Just as feminist theories opened an immeasurable field of production when they de-centred the issue of women in favour of more comprehensive analyses of social and power relations through gender (Sabsay, 2013), queer works as a lens through which it is possible to have a broader, deeper understanding of social and power relations: a way to analyse the *given* and frame the *chosen* (Warner, 1993).

Given this framework, we may include in the definition of *queer rights* claims and voices that specifically challenge understandings of sexuality, such as the debate on non-monogamous relationships (Klesse, 2014); families based on friendship, care or choice (Goldberg and Allen, 2013); sexualities and disabilities (McRuer, 2006); genderqueer/agender narratives (Halberstam, 2012). These are only a few examples of a varied and expanding body of knowledge related to queer perspectives.

For the present discussion, though, I will focus on *queer rights* particularly as a figuration, as a malleable concept, in order to explore its effective viability in political practice. I thus choose to begin from the imaginary potential of the concept, as exploring its contradictions may lead us to a better understanding of contradictions in reality. Given this premise, it appears evident that *queer rights* may constitute an oxymoron: the anti-normative, fluid character of queer epistemology seems to have no possibility of embracing the normative consistence of human rights. However,

it is precisely in this paradox that we shall find the most interesting insights for debate. In ancient Greek literature, a paradox is something that goes *against* (παρά) the *common opinion* (δόξα) and turns surprisingly truthful or useful in order to understand human condition. It is based on a potentially negative tension that turns out to be awkwardly positive, still without losing its contradictory elements: a paradox does not have a happy ending, but it does not result in an apocalypse. A paradox constitutes a powerful tool in analysing the core contradictions of the human rights project and critiquing the *doxa*, challenging hegemonic discourses.

The paradox of queer rights may be analysed through the lens of the inner tensions that emerge from different perspectives. In order to do so, the original meaning of the Latin expression *versus* represents a valid aid: it indeed describes the opposing reciprocal direction of two elements towards each other, a contraposition between two parts that find themselves in disagreement only in the action of encountering. In this sense, I will use the expression *versus* in order to explore three paradoxical aspects of queer rights.

2 Queer versus human

In her poem “Mi derecho a ser un monstruo”, the Argentinian transactivist and artist Susy Shock (2011: 23) states:

Yo, reivindico mi derecho a ser un monstruo.
Ni varón ni mujer.
Ni XXY ni H2O.
[...] Mi derecho a explorarme,
a reinventarme.
Hacer de mi mutar mi noble ejercicio.¹

¹ “I claim my right to be a monster. / Neither man nor woman. / Neither XXY nor H2O. [...] My right to explore myself, / to reinvent myself. / To transform my variance into a noble practice”.

In the poem, Susy Shock claims her right to be abnormal and to be free to explore her identities outside normalcy: the right to be recognized in her *noble practice* of undoing categories, walking the wire of identity and mixing roles.

While proposing a clear discourse on rights, the poem also talks about the monstrosity of normativity, about the violence hidden in the process of labelling identities. Queer perspectives actually nurture a form of Otherness, which is freeze-dried in the origin of the word itself: *queer* results from a re-appropriation of an insult, a process of positive re-nomination and a will to transform oppression into liberation (Halberstam, 2011). It recalls and worships the history of oppression of all those subjects which in different times and places were denied humanity because of their *chosen* identity, labelled as beasts, animals, freaks, monsters or identified as what Gopinath defines “the impure, the inauthentic and the non-reproductive” (*apud* Eng *et al.*, 2005: 8).

As Butler (2009) notes, in order to access human rights, a previous recognition of *being human* within certain boundaries is needed. This same kind of humanity is thus exactly what is often denied to queer subjects. In queer politics, it is also a distinguishing feature claimed as a mark to be proud of. Through time, scholars such as Mario Mieli (1977), Michael Foucault (1976), Judith Halberstam (1995), together with artists and activists, have challenged the idea of humanity as a representation of a specific idea of normality.

Being human means being movable within a system of power, being recognized as a passive subject in a certain role: the recognition and subsequent allocation of humanity is guaranteed if no deviant lines are performed. As Butler states, “a subject emerges through a process of abjection, jettisoning those dimensions of oneself that fail to conform to the discrete figures yielded by the norm of the human subject” (2009: 141). The refusal of this process leads to being recognized as a spectre, a monster: a condition of

sub-humanity, part of a more complex allocation of power dynamics. Within the same logic, while drawing from a universal claim of equal humanity for all living people, the human rights normative discourse actually regulates which kind of humanity is to be allocated and which subjects are then worthy of being recognized as humans. When it comes to queer subjects, then, it is not only a matter of being allocated with a certain recognition of humanity (i.e., a certain protection through rights) but also an issue of what kind of humanity is required. This discourse is oriented to a natural conception of humanity, which sees it as an objective feature: so, whenever queer subjects focus on the disruption of normalcy, they actually perform against this same idea of humanity (Beger, 2004; Thoreson, 2011). Not surprisingly, images like “being against nature”, “acting like a monster” or “having sex like beasts” are deployed in political arenas by defenders of a natural, heteronormative conception of humanity toward those who do not follow conventional scripts.

A first paradoxical aspect is then rooted in the *human* part of *human rights*. Recognizing queer subjects as subjects of rights means recognizing their connection to practices which are entrenched in some kind of *other than human* scope: post-humanity, monstrosity, cyborgs (Haraway, 1991) or any other form of differentiation of the normative concept of what is a human being and what makes a life liveable are then a reaction, and a contraposition, to *that kind* of humanity featured in the human rights project. This evident contrast reveals humanity and its allocation as a questionable issue, which cannot be taken for granted nor expected to be significant everywhere and for everyone: the universal claim of “we are all humans” shows its cracks when confronted to those who deviate from standards.

3 Queer versus normal

A second paradox relates to an epistemological aspect: “human rights are about establishing particular normative boundaries; queer, if anything, is anti-normative” (Langlois, 2014: 3). Doubtlessly, the use of concepts and frameworks of human rights creates an inevitable connection to a normative aspect, even if critically posed: the tension for human rights “entails a veritable desire for the law” (De Genova, 2010: 117). Human rights were firstly conceived and defined within a heteronormative framework: a “heterosexual matrix” (Butler, 2000) in which the *established facts* were neo-liberal conceptions of privacy, marriage, gender, coupling, and natural family. Later, the concepts of *sexual orientation* and *gender identity* became normalized and flattened to a set of determined manifestations, fixed in a grid, an intelligible model of gender and heterosexual/homosexual binary division (Waites, 2009). In this backdrop, queer subjects do find themselves out of the picture — regardless of their will to be or not to be included in it.

A normalization process of this model develops together with the emergence of “particular epistemologies regarding sex, sexuality, and sexual subjectivity” (Thoreson, 2011: 16) that results from the inclusion of sexual rights in the global human rights project. With the aim to recognise and define subjects of protection, rules and definitions are created, ambiguities are erased in favour of clear identifications of who are the sexual subjects of rights. When sexual politics enter the world of human rights, a re-conceptualization of the whole institutional, legal and political framework that works to regulate and put rights into practice is needed. This also leads to the creation of “a normative standard, to which human beings are expected to identify with, assimilate to, support, engage with, or in the ‘marginal case’, react against” (Langlois, 2014).

The recognition of general sexual rights as human rights, thus/ therefore, is clearly “limited to those willing to define themselves

by these limited categories” (Kollman and Waites, 2009: 13). As a result, the framework is articulated in such a way that it limits certain claims in favour of others, expressed in a prescribed, fixed mode; also, it establishes how and who is able to access the status of “sexual Other” (Sabsay, 2013). When sexuality is reduced to a fixed set of modes, with no connection to other spheres of life or to the possibility of changing, blending, subverting these same modes, it becomes an ontological category. Furthermore: it also reproduces a model born in the Global North, culturally and historically connected to Western conceptions (Massad, 2007). The recognition of (relative) freedoms to specific fringes of the vast LGBT community has a price: subjects who do not conform to the model of the public lesbian, the monogamous gay, the FtM transsexual or the Western queer liberal, are silenced and forgotten. Again, queer experiences are left out of the picture and the Global North epistemological approach to sexuality is imposed as a universal model.

In search for a more inclusive concept, some have proposed using a broader definition of *sexual rights* instead of LGBT (Drucker, 2000; Altman, 2001; Saiz, 2004); others have advanced the possibility for transgender people or non-conforming queers to claim general *human rights* instead of specific rights connected to their identity (see Currah, Juang and Minter, 2006). These attempts actually seem inadequate in transforming the core process that produces the naturalized conception of sexual subjects: the basis of production of victims, subjects and bearers of rights needs to be contested and completely re-framed in order to create a significant change in the dominant discourse on human rights.

Queer subjects are then called to face a double challenge. On the one hand, the regulatory and normative apparatus of human rights, which universalises a specific epistemology of sexuality: a conception which states that “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” within a framework which excludes

some subjects from the political arena. On the other, the normalization trend of LGBT movements: while usurping the queer political agenda (Burke and Bernstein, 2014), they actively encourage the epistemology of mainstream human rights without questioning its founding principles. Queer subjects instead of being “on the right side of history” appear to be “on the wrong side of the empire” (Lind, 2014).

The normative/anti-normative paradox makes you wonder whether it is possible to contest the normative basis of human rights from queer perspectives without completely dismantling its foundations, in order to gain a deeper comprehension of the alignment between rights and recognition and to move from “being out of the picture” to being those “disturbing the nice picture” (Ahmed, 2006).

4 Queer versus nation-state

In a chapter in *American Homo: Community and Perversity*, Jeffrey Escoffier and Allan Bérubé photographed the emergence of a new generation of angry, critical and outrageous young people facing a great challenge: “to bring together people who have been made to feel perverse, queer, odd, outcast, different and deviant, and to affirm sameness by defining a common identity on the fringes” (1998: 203). This *different sameness* or *similar difference* was contained in the paradoxical expression of *queer nation*. They fought for a political promise: to queer nations from within, to dismantle sexual orientation and gender identity as a matter of the state and to contest politics of assimilation that did not question the heterocentric framework they were based on. What happened was actually quite the contrary: instead of queering the nation, nation-states seized specific queer issues and absorbed them into nationalist narratives (Sabsay, 2012). From *queer nation*, thus, two fronts controversially opened, particularly in the last decade. First, as nation-states hold a major power in the definition of citizenship

and in promoting assimilationist solutions to sexual subjects, queer politics are supposed to be *versus* nation. Secondly, the tension with the nation-state has brought about a tension *versus* LGBT rights when deployed as part of nationalist narratives, what Puar (2007) calls *homonationalism*.

Nation-states and their sovereignty are indeed one of the normative sites in which human rights are put into practice: in a neo-liberal context, they are the operative arm of global politics, where declarations take place, conventions become normative and laws set the standards of humanity.

So, if nation-states offer the practical framework for normative processes contained in the epistemological paradox of 'queer *versus* normal', they also function as a comfort zone that embraces, at least some, LGBT claims. Through a process of assimilation, "gay and lesbian rights are reconstituted as a type of reactionary (identity) politics of national and global consequences" (Eng *et al.*, 2005: 4).

As Wendy Brown underlines, human rights are deployed as a result of a discursive power construction, so they "almost always serve as a mitigation — but not a resolution — of subordinating powers" (2000: 231). In a global context, LGBT rights or a particular understanding of sexual rights are conceived as universal, natural and objective; in national contexts, they become particular, normative and exclusive. As a consequence, the aim to protect the *injured sexual Other* results from internal processes of political, historical, social factors, and specific sexual epistemologies are deployed as forms of control over bodies. Furthermore: in Western countries, where there has effectively been a major recognition of LGBT rights within national contexts, the so-called advancement in LGBT rights has been transformed into a modernity marker. This argument is used as a new form of Orientalism, in which modern countries celebrate sexual diversity within a self-narrative of freedom and claim the need to protect themselves and their citizens against the brutal countries that do not treat their women and

their homosexuals (Rao, 2014) well: the level of protection toward certain LGBT rights comes to define the capacity of nations to be aligned on the common progressive path toward ever-expanding freedom. Paradoxically, then, discourses on sexual citizenship become functional to liberal binary oppositions between we/they, modernity/underdevelopment, freedom/oppression.

Therefore, the inclusion of LGBT rights within the human rights system produced a distortion which resulted in strengthened national control over bodies and identities: encouraged by the promise of recognition, visibility and inclusion, many LGBT movements and organizations have happily crossed the comforting gate of national laws; in doing so, they actually sustained assimilationist national projects and ended up creating a form of *queer liberalism* (Eng *et al.*, 2005).

However, it appears misleading to consider the relationship between queer politics and nation-state just a matter of sexual rights: homonationalism, queer liberalism and assimilationist LGBT politics represent “a return of the colonial, or a return of the colonized” (Santos, 2007: 6), which affects queer subjects, *in primis*, but also citizens of the Global North and Global South.

Given these premises, it is definitely hard to see possibilities of debate on queer rights without a debate on the strict connection between the global human rights system and the sovereignty of nation-states. Queer claims function as a litmus paper demonstrating the contradictions between the alleged universality of human rights and the politics of inequalities, oppression and exclusion conveyed in the name of freedom. The concept of queer rights is meant to largely exceed the nation-state framework. This constitutes a political paradox: if rights are understood as means for the nation-states to engage into new practises of control and regulation of bodies and existences, there is much evidence that even *queer* and *rights* are words that produce an epistemological and political displacement, disorientation, puzzlement. It is exactly

in this destabilizing effect that we can find the fruitful power of the paradox. Bearing in mind they “might involve disorientation, without legislating disorientation as a politics” (Ahmed, 2006: 158), queer politics may today represent a radical counter-hegemonic perspective on human rights.

5 Dancing on paradox

The concept of *queer rights* has been discussed through its paradoxes, which then originates other contradictions and gives rise to historical, political and epistemological questions. Undoubtedly, then, it is not a sterile figuration: contradictory and awkward as it may seem, it actually makes room for further debate.

One of the issues that remain open for future development is the actual political viability of queer rights within a human rights framework: the paradoxes examined seem to suggest this viability as impossible. In this sense, the concept may represent a failure. But, if queer is also an art of failure — a joyful one (Halberstam, 2011) — then a debate on queer rights completely fulfils the expectation of revealing the unintelligible and incompatible while not defining rigid categories to seize it. It is then in the fractures, in the controversial interstices, in the shadowed corners of the debate that the most useful traces for a queer political path may be found.

Firstly, queer rights as a figuration function as trigger points that reveal the contradictions and inequalities embedded in the neoliberal understanding of human rights, showing how (neo)colonialism, nationalism, capitalism, patriarchy, homophobia work in a shared chain of creation of power inequalities. In this regards, to question the human rights system from a queer perspective means to take a counter-hegemonic positioning: a possible answer to the quest for concepts and instruments able to fight the abyssal lines without reproducing them (Santos, 2007).

Secondly, a debate on queer rights acquires more significance when it reaches a cross-disciplinary perspective: that is, queer rights should not be an issue only for queer scholars, nor, of course, should queer rights be seen as the only contribution from queer scholars on a critical approach to human rights. Both Weber (2014) and Langlois (2014), for example, question the apparent absence of queer theories in International Relations studies; as does Lind (2014), denouncing the heterosexual structure which still relegates queer approaches to an untrustworthy voice, as sexual politics had nothing to do with international politics. On the contrary, queer rights represent a fruitful paradox that may serve the purpose of expanding, deepening and exploring issues on human rights and, in general, the connections between transnational, national and local politics, politics of borders and intimacies.

Third, a queer approach to human rights may create connections to an intersectional understanding of social structures, where the focal issues are not single individual bearers of individual rights, but subjects that position themselves within a network of different rights at the same time and that change their positions according to the different power connected to those roles. Recent developments in queer studies presented interesting contributions about intersectionality as an epistemological standpoint (Eng *et al.*, 2005; Ahmed, 2006). In human rights discourse, it is often hard to grasp an intersectional view, basically because “it is rare to find the injuries of racism, sexism, homophobia, and poverty harboured in the same corners of the law” (W. Brown, 2000: 236). An intersectional perspective on queer rights may open interesting fields of research on what may be called *intersectional rights* or *rights of intersectional subjects*: the capability to understand subjects as bearers of multiple positionings and rights according to their own specificities (M. Brown, 2012).

Clearly enough, the debate I have presented so far may never result in a formulation of a set of queer rights like the right to

marriage, which has become a defined vessel for LGBT mainstream movements. On the contrary, queer rights have great potential as long as they serve the purpose of giving evidence to the forms of exclusion within the global human rights system. As a transitory tool, they are useful in order to understand the contemporary connections at a local, national and global level. As the terms *queer*, *human* and *rights* are to be deeply discussed and dismantled in their bias, their main advantage could be exactly their friability. In this sense, it is particularly pertinent/important/ to observe the work of activists and movements that have engaged in the challenge of queer politics starting from a local level and bringing it into transnational networks of collective, intersectional re-definition of spaces and issues on queer politics. These movements deal with queer claims both on a local and on a transnational level, proposing queer politics that engage with rights without reifying them. In this perspective, they represent examples of a possible connection between a theoretical debate on queer rights and a political practice emerging from it.

In conclusion, the paradoxical nature of queer rights urges us to dance on a floor which is constantly disrupted, but we need to recognize that the ruins left after the disruption do actually leave space for unexpected insights into the fractures as they never cease their action of moving toward each other in order to reinforce their oppositional tension. The acknowledgement that *human* and *rights* are as questionable as *queer*' creates a great potential. A queer perspective on human rights should indeed start to engage with the floating character of concepts that constitute reality: ultimately, to transform *human* variance into a noble practice.

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, Sara (2006), *Queer phenomenology: Orientations, objects, others*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822388074>
- Altman, Dennis (2001), *Global sex*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Doi:
- Balibar, Étienne (2002), *Politics and the other scene*. London: Verso.
- Beger, Nicole J. (2004), *Tensions in the struggle for sexual minority rights in Europe: que(e)rying political practices*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Brown, Michael (2012), “Gender and sexuality I: Intersectional anxieties”, *Progress in Human Geography*, 36(4), 541–550. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132511420973>
- Brown, Wendy (2000), “Suffering Rights as Paradoxes”, *Constellations*, 7(2), 208–229. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.00183>
- Burke, Mary C.; Bernstein, Mary (2014), “How the Right Usurped the Queer Agenda: Frame Co-optation in Political Discourse”, *Sociological Forum*, 29(4), 830–850. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12122>
- Butler, Judith (2000), *Antigone’s claim: Kinship between life and death*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Butler, Judith (2009), *Frames of war: when is life grievable?* London: Verso.
- Currah, Paisley, Juang, Richard M.; Minter, Shannon (2006), *Transgender rights*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- De Genova, Nicholas (2010), “The queer politics of migration: Reflections on ‘illegality’ and ‘incurability’”, *Studies in Social Justice*, 4(2), 101–126. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.26522/ssj.v4i2.997>

Douzinas, Costas (2007), "The Many Faces of Humanitarianism", *Parrhesia Journal*, 2, 1–28.

Drucker, Peter (2000), *Different rainbows*. London: Gay Men's Press.

Duggan, Lisa (2003), *The Twilight of Equality? The Attack on Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Eng, David L.; Halberstam, Judith; Esteban Muñoz, José (2005), "What's queer about queer studies now?" *Social Text*, 23(3–4), 84–85). Available at http://socialtext.dukejournals.org/content/23/3-4_84-85.toc

Escoffier, Jeffrey; Allan Berubè (1998), *American homo community and perversity*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Foucault, Michel (1976), *Histoire de la sexualité*. Paris: Gallimard.

Goldberg, Abbie E.; Allen, Katherine R. (2013), *LGBT-parent families: innovations in research and implications for practice*. New York: Springer. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4556-2>

Halberstam, Judith (1995), *Skin shows: gothic horror and the technology of monsters*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Halberstam, Judith (2011), *The queer art of failure*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822394358>

Halberstam, Judith (2012), *Gaga feminism: sex, gender, and the end of normal*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Haraway, Donna Jeanne (1991), *Simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature*. New York: Routledge.

Klesse Christian (2014), "Polyamory: Intimate practice, identity or sexual orientation?" *Sexualities*, 17(1–2), 81–99.

- Kollman, Kelly; Waites, Matthew (2009), "The global politics of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender human rights: an introduction", *Contemporary Politics*, 15(1), 1–17. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569770802674188>
- Langlois, Anthony J. (2014), "Tracing the threads: queer IR and Human Rights", Accessed on 16.12.2015, at <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/26/tracing-the-threads-queer-ir-and-human-rights/>
- Lind, Amy (2014), "'Out' in International Relations: Why Queer Visibility Matters", *International Studies Review*, 16(4), 601–604. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12184>
- Massad, Joseph Andoni (2007), *Desiring Arabs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McRuer, Robert (2006), *Crip theory cultural signs of queerness and disability*. New York: New York University Press.
- Mieli, Mario (1977), *Elementi di critica omosessuale*. Torino: G. Einaudi.
- Petchesky, Rosalind P. (2009), "The Language of 'Sexual Minorities' and the Politics of Identity: A Position Paper", *Reproductive Health Matters*, 17(33), 105–110. Doi: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0968-8080\(09\)33431-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0968-8080(09)33431-X)
- Puar, Jasbir K. (2007), *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390442>
- Rao, Rahul (2014), "Queer Questions", *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 16(2), 199–217. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2014.901817>
- Sabsay, Leticia (2012), "The Emergence of the Other Sexual Citizen: Orientalism and the Modernisation of Sexuality", *Citizenship Studies*, 16(5–6), 605–623. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2012.698484>

Sabsay, Leticia (2013), “Queering the Politics of Global Sexual Rights?” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 13(1), 80–90. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12019>

Saiz, Ignacio (2004), “Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation: A Decade of Development and Denial at the UN”, *Health and Human Rights*, 7(2), 48–80. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/4065348>

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2007), “Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges”, *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, 30(1), 45–89. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40241677>

Shock, Susy (2011), *Poemario Trans Pirado*. Buenos Aires: Nuevos Tiempos.

Thoreson, Ryan Richard (2011), “The Queer Paradox of LGBTI Human Rights”, *Inter Alia, a Journal of Queer Studies*, 6, 1–27.

Waites, Matthew (2009), “Critique of ‘sexual Orientation’ and ‘gender Identity’ in Human Rights Discourse: Global Queer Politics beyond the Yogyakarta Principles”, *Contemporary Politics*, 15(1), 137–156. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569770802709604>

Warner, Michael (1993), *Fear of a queer planet: queer politics and social theory*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Weber, Cynthia (2014), “Why Is There No Queer International Theory?” *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(1), 27–51. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066114524236>

Wilkinson, Cai; Langlois, Anthony J. (2014), “Special Issue: Not Such an International Human Rights Norm? Local Resistance to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights — Preliminary Comments”, *Journal of Human Rights*, 13(3), 249–255. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2014.931218>