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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS:
THE SECURITISATION OF THE SCHENGEN AREA

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Resumo

A livre circulação de pessoas, bens, serviços e capitais no Espaço Schengen é frequentemente retratada como um excelente exemplo de integração na União Europeia [UE]. É por meio destas quatro liberdades fundamentais, garantidas pelo Tratado de Maastricht, que o Acordo de Schengen é amplamente apreciado como uma das maiores conquistas da União (Wang, 2016). No entanto, desde 2014, o Espaço Schengen tem enfrentado novos desafios que conduzem a uma série de conflitos, principalmente devido à chegada do fluxo de migrantes ao continente europeu que gerou uma crise humanitária e política. Com esta crise, alguns governos europeus acabaram por restaurar as suas fronteiras de forma a retomar o controlo dos movimentos de pessoas nos seus territórios, anulando o princípio fundamental do Acordo de Schengen. Associados à crise migratória, sentimentos de medo e insegurança surgiram no espaço europeu, concomitantemente com o crescimento de discursos que justificam o restabelecimento das fronteiras e a suspensão da livre circulação de pessoas entre os membros da União Europeia. Estes desenvolvimentos levaram alguns observadores a questionar em que medida a União Europeia está a passar por um processo de securitização da crise migratória, visto que a questão é cada vez mais vista como uma ameaça que requer medidas excepcionalmente tratadas.

Esta dissertação procura responder a esta questão. A investigação enquadra-se na teoria da securitização da Escola de Copenhaga, centrando-se na análise dos discursos dos principais dirigentes políticos dos Estados-Membros da União Europeia desde 2015, sobre a crise do fluxo de migrantes e a necessidade de restauro das fronteiras, bem como a reacção da UE a estas acções e à crise. Ao avaliar se os actos de fala desses actores chave procuraram, e conseguiram, produzir percepções nas suas audiências sobre a ameaça potencial representada pela crise dos migrantes, torna-se possível discernir se de facto um processo de securitização do Espaço Schengen ocorreu. A dissertação foca-se especificamente nos estudos de caso da Itália, Hungria e Alemanha, e nas instituições políticas da UE, a fim de responder à pergunta de pesquisa: Em que medida os actos discursivos de alguns governos e da EU contribuíram para o desenvolvimento de um processo de securitização do Espaço Schengen?

A pesquisa permite abranger um conjunto de conclusões, nas quais, em relação aos países analisados, apenas a Hungria apresentou um processo de securitização sobre a temática, enquanto o discurso dominante dos demais países continua humanitário. A EU, e as suas instituições, também apresenta um discurso humanitário, no entanto, os seus métodos para lidar com a crise são claramente excepcionais e no domínio da segurança.

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Palavras-Chave: Securitização; Espaço Schengen; Crise dos Migrantes; Actos Discursivos

Abstract

The free movement of people, goods, services and capital in the Schengen Area is often portrayed as a prime example of European Union [EU] integration. It is through these four fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by the Maastricht Treaty, that the Schengen Agreement is widely appreciated as one of the Union's greatest achievements (Wang, 2016). However, since 2014, the Schengen Area has faced new challenges leading to a series of conflicts, mainly due to the arrival of the influx of migrants to the European continent which generated a humanitarian and political crisis. With this crisis, some European governments ended up restoring their borders in order to regain control over people's movements into their territories, thus nullifying the fundamental principle of the Schengen Agreement. Associated with the migrant crisis, feelings of fear and insecurity have arisen in the European space, concomitantly with the growth of speeches justifying the restoration of borders and the suspension of the free movement of people between members of the European Union. These developments have led some observers to ask to what extent the European Union is undergoing a process of securitisation of the migration crisis, as the issue becomes increasingly perceived as a threat that requires exceptionally measures to be address.

This dissertation seeks to answer this question. The investigation is framed by the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School, focusing on the analysis of the speech acts made by main political leaders of European Union Member States since 2015, regarding the migrant flow crisis and the need to reinstate borders, as well as the EU's reaction to these actions and to the crisis. By assessing whether the speech acts of these key actors sought to, and successfully managed to, produce perceptions in their audiences concerning the potential threat represented by the migrants' crisis, it becomes possible to discern whether indeed a process of securitisation of the Schengen Area has occurred. The dissertation focuses specifically on the case studies of Italy, Hungary and Germany, and of the political institutions of the EU, in order to answer the research question: To what extent have the speech acts of some governments and the EU contributed to the development of a securitisation process of the Schengen Area?

The research allows the embracement of a set of conclusions, in which regarding the countries analyzed, only Hungary has showed a securitisation process on the subject of the theme, while the dominant discourse of the other countries remains humanitarian.

The EU, and its instituitions, also presents a humanitarian discourse, however, its methods to deal with the crisis are clearly exceptional ando n the security field.

Keywords: Securitisation; Schengen Area; Migrant Crisis; Speech Acts

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Introduction

The free movement of people, goods, services and capital in the Schengen Area has become a great example of European Union [EU] integration. It is through these four fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Maastricht Treaty, that the Schengen Agreement is widely appreciated as one of the Union's greatest achievements (Wang, 2016). But since 2014, the Schengen Area has faced new challenges. As a consequence of conflicts in "Syria, Libya, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern and North African countries, millions of refugees have travelled to Europe, which has caused a great challenge to the Schengen Area" (Wang, 2016). The most recent migrant's flow crisis, started to be felt in 2015, and has had an impact on the European continent, as well as within the European Union (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012; Zaiotti, 2013).

In response to this migrant crisis in Europe, some Member States of the European Union belonging to the Schengen Area, such as Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, and Hungary have restored temporary controls at their borders. The reestablishment of border controls between countries is an aptitude that is provided by the Schengen Acquis if a serious threat is recognized to the internal security of a Member State. At the time of the crisis's peak, and even after the arrival of migrants has slowed down, at least five Schengen states (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway) still carried out checks at the internal borders of the Schengen Area (Wang, 2016).

Thus, with this crisis, some governments ended up restoring their borders again, in order to increase the feeling of national protection in their countries, thus nullifying the fundamental principle of the Schengen Agreement: the abolition of borders between European countries and the free movement of its citizens.

This humanitarian crisis ended up triggering another crisis, of a more political nature, involving the European countries and the European Union institutions, where the debate started to focus on the distribution and commitment of responsibilities and obligations to the problem of the constant migratory flows that pass through the members of the "Schengen regime", Europe's border control regime (Zaiotti, 2013).

The feelings of fear and insecurity generated by the recent crises that have arisen in the European space, as well as the growth of speeches justifying the need to restore borders and closing the free movement space between members of the European Union, has led to

the question of whether we are facing an eminent process of securitisation of the European space.

This process of securitisation occurs via speech acts carried out by representatives of the countries belonging to the Schengen Area that can be analysed to better understand both this trend and its impact on the Schengen Area and the EU. These speeches led to reactions from the EU, and its political institutions, in an attempt to avoid this securitisation process by this group of countries, preserving the European and Schengen projects. However, these reactions can also be analysed as themselves part of a process of securitisation by the Union, since they have been based "on the inevitability of increased border control, the necessity of cooperation with third countries, and the need of formulating immigration as a risk rather than as a threat to the security of Europe" (Benam, 2011).

According to Veljanovska (2012) the idea of certain members of the Union restoring control at their borders, in order to control massive entries into their territories, may make the European Union lose its character as a community of cooperation and free movement of people. In fact, according to Benam (2011) the European Union has been developing mechanisms and models for border management, intertwined with its common asylum and immigration policies, in order to counter this growing trend in relation to Schengen, which Avramopoulos (2016) considers to be "one of the greatest achievements of the European Union.

Thus, it will be important to assess whether or not a process of securitisation of the Schengen Area is taking place. This investigation will, therefore, have as it theoretical framework the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School, focusing on the analysis of the speech acts made by some Member States, which occurred since 2015, regarding the migrant flow crisis and the need to reinstate borders, as well as the EU's reaction to these actions and to the crisis.

Therefore, this theme leads us to question how the speeches of several countries, as well as the EU itself, can be part of a process of securitising the European area created by the Schengen Agreement. Thus, the research question informing this study is, To what extent have the speech acts of some governments and the EU contributed to the development of a securitisation process of the Schengen Area?

Consequently, the objective of this dissertation is to assess whether the current perceptions of external threats, such as the flow of refugees and migrants, to the so-called

European space have led to an increase in mistrust and discredit of the project created with the Schengen Agreement via a process of securitisation of the Schengen Area itself through the speeches and action of Member States or even the EU itself.

The main object of study on which this dissertation will focus on is, therefore, the Schengen Area and the speeches regarding its security issues, whether these are made from Member States with governments with more anti-migration expressions or more Europeanists, and from the European Union itself.

This way, we intend to understand how the Schengen Area has been conceptualized by the countries that are part of it, as well as by the EU, and the way that this conceptualization interacts with the perception of possible threats, internal or external, through the various types of speeches applied by them, such as the repositioning of internal borders between some Member States. Taking into account the events over the past decade in the European space, studying and understanding security issues in the European Union is fundamental. Therefore, the objectives of this work will be to analyze whether a securitisation process of the Schengen Area is actually taking place and with what implications. This analysis will try to assess whether, and if so, how the European area is going through a process of securitisation and potentially to measure the consequences for both the European Union and the Member States involved.

Regarding the theorical framework of this dissertation, the problematic will be studied via the theory of securitisation, in this version produced by the Copenhagen School.

The Copenhagen School introduced the concept of securitisation to characterize an extreme form of politicization of a given subject, which changes the way it is perceived and addressed (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998). According to Buzan *et al*. (1998) the process of securitisation occurs through what in language theory is called a speech act. It is through speech acts that "an intersubjective understanding that treats something as an existential threat" is established, which "allows the call for urgent and exceptional measures to be taken to deal with that same threat" (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Guzzini, 2015). This is the fundamental understanding of process of securitisation that will orientate this study's analysis of the securitisation of the Schengen Area through the analysis of the discursive acts of both the countries that have closed borders and of the EU itself.

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Regarding methodology, as is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1, this dissertation adopts descriptive, documentary and explanatory methods of analysis and data collected from reports, working papers, academic texts and official documents.

It is also necessary to define some parameters of analysis, that is, a geographical and temporal delimitation. Thus, for this dissertation, the Schengen Area constitutes the geographical delimitation, within which the main object of study can be found, which consists of the group of countries that have restored their internal borders and/or that have created speeches that legitimize the proper replacement of borders within the Schengen area. For this purpose, the cases of Italy, Hungary and Germany, being chosen because they can be considered as examples of countries of arrival, passage and destination of migrants respectively, as well as the political institutions of the European Union, the European Council and the institutional triangle (European Commission, Council of the European Union and European Parliament) will be considered as the case studies of this dissertation.

The chronical delimitation of the dissertation is the interval between the years of 2015, the year in which the so-called migrant crisis on the European continent began to be perceived, and 2019. Although the period of analysis is from the year 2015 onwards, it will be necessary for the investigation to describe the Schengen Area and its origins.

The question of securitisation in the European area has remained relevant in the current framework of international relations since the various 'crises' experienced in the last decades in Europe continue to raise several discussions about the action of the European institutions, the effectiveness of the Schengen Area and the free movement of goods and people or even the role and speeches made by Member States during these crises.

At the same time, it is also a relevant issue within the scope of the master's degree in International Relations - Peace, Security and Development Studies, as the study of this issue is not only important due to the high levels of insecurity and uncertainty that are experienced in the regional and international framework today, but it also becomes a relevant case study in terms of the peace and security studies, as well as being able to contribute to the current state of the art. The dissertation is divided into three chapters, in addition to the respective introduction and conclusion. The first chapter reviews the literature on the object of study and the concepts presented here, in this case the Schengen Area and the flow of migrants, as well as the theory of securitisation of the Copenhagen School. The methodology approach informing the dissertation is also discussed in this

chapter. Chapter 2 analyses the speeches made by representatives of the countries that during the period of the migrant crisis became more relevant in face of this problem, either by the positions taken by the main political forces or by the measures adopted by their governments. Through this analysis it will be possible to observe, verify and understand whether or not a process of securitisation in the Schengen Area was taking place through the speech acts of these Member States. For this aim, Italy, Hungary and Germany were chosen as case studies to analyze, as they stood out by being good exemplars of countries of arrival, passage and destination of migrants, correspondingly, in the European continent throughout the crisis. The third chapter focuses on the discourses exhibited by EU institutions in relation to the flow of migrants and the positions taken by Member States during this period of crisis. Through the speech acts of the main European institutions, it is possible to perceive the impact of the measures taken by the Member States as well as to assess the position taken by the EU in relation to issues related to migrants and security in the Schengen Area.

The main conclusions reached in this dissertation, through the analysis of the speeches of the Member States and the EU, were that the majority of the speeches presented are in themselves of a humanitarian nature. It was possible to observe this in the speeches of Germany and Italy as it has also become clear that in order for a securitisation process to take place it is necessary for the speech act to be fully accepted by the majority of the audiences, which in these countries did not happen, despite the growth of the far right, as is the case with the political figures of the AfD in Germany and the deputy prime ministers Matteo Salvini and Luigi Di Maio in Italy.

It was only possible to observe a securitisation process in Hungary since it was possible to verify that the audiance accepted the speeches and security measures of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

In relation to the discourses of the EU, the humanitarian narrative of the discourses of its institutions it is also noticeable. However, in their actions there is ambivalence as they applied security measures in relation to migration issues. This duality demonstrated the disconnection that the EU has with its audiences and that it does not required them to conduct securitising moves.

1. Review of the Literature: The Copenhagen School's securitisation theory regarding the Schengen Area and the Migrant's crisis

This chapter provides a review of the literature of on the topics of this dissertation, relating to Schengen Area, the 'migrant crisis' and the theory of securitisation. With the signing of the Schengen Agreement and later with its insertion in the legislative framework of the European Union, through the Treaty of Amsterdam, it was possible to gradually remove controls at internal borders of the European Union and to introduce freedom of movement for all nationals of the signatory countries, other EU countries and some non-EU countries (EUR-lex, no date a). This development, which can be considered as ambitious, has had a major impact on the Member States of this agreement, as well as on citizens throughout Europe. The freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and persons envisaged by the creation of the European Communities could then come into force as the abolition of borders between the Member States of the European Area made them a concrete reality.

Although its fame, for the past 35 years the Schengen Area has not been without its problems and has had several moments of crisis in its history. The most recent 'crisis' experienced by Schengen was the big affluence of migrants arriving on the European continent from 2011 onwards. Although the so called 'Arab Spring' began the migrants flow towards the European Union [EU], it was not until 2015 that the flows rose to numbers as high as the ones caused by World War II (Evrard, Nienaber, & Sommaribas, 2018). These movements from third countries into the external borders of the Union caused some turmoil within the Schengen members. The lack of a common answer from the European Union and its members, following terrorist's attacks in France and Belgium, and the rise of nationalism and far-right wing parties throughout Europe made this topic really sensible, but very important to discuss.

Some countries within the Schengen agreement started to reintroduce their border controls, beyond the time allowed by the Schengen acquis, closing their borders, as way to prevent the passage and potential spread of migrants through their territories. These procedures were made in way to regain some control and stability at national level (Wang, 2016).

According to Alkopher and Blanc (2016), in light of the latest events in the European space the immigration-related vulnerabilities began being perceived as a security

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problem as security issues have been raised in the face of this 'migrant crisis' driven by some countries identifying a potential threat by this flow. In light of our research question - To what extent have the speech acts of some governments and the EU contributed to the development of a securitisation process of the Schengen Area? - we will discuss the main relevant literature pertaining to the Schengen Area, to the migrant crisis, and to securitisation theory. This analysis has the objective of assessing whether a securitisation process of the Schengen Area is effectively taking place and with what implications for both the European Union and the Member States. The first section of this chapter presents a brief history of the Schengen Area and how its acquis has made its values available across the continent and the European institutions and how they have become central to the development of the guarantees and freedoms of European citizens. The second section, considers the literature on the phenomenon of the migrant crisis, a reality that began to be perceived on the European continent from 2015 onwards. This section reflects how this phenomenon applies to the problematic raised in this dissertation. By doing so it is possible to have a better understanding of this occurrence, as well as its involvement with the research theme. Lastly, a review of the literature on the Copenhagen School is carried out, so that the securitisation theory informing this research is analysed. By being the theoretical-practical framework of the investigation, the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School will be the basis of the study and analysis of discursive acts, both from Member States and the EU itself, in order to understand if a securitisation process is actually taking place in the Schengen Area.

1.1 – Schengen Area

In Europe there are several areas and borders from which notions can be formed about what can be considered the European area. These considerations include a set of examples that owe their existence and accomplishments to the European Union, such as the Eurozone and the EU's area of legislative influence, among others, as well as the Member States' own borders (Hayrynen, 2009). However, if on the one hand "the external borders of the European territory have been widely studied, with a specific focus on the analysis of the kind of sovereign power exercised (national or European) [on the other hand] only a few studies were devoted to the internal borders" (Groenendijk, 2002 *apud* Casella Colombeau, 2017 : 481) being today, the Schengen Area, a central program within the European Union and a key motive in security and border control studies (Wilson, 2012).

To Zaiotti (2011) and Meena (2019) the idea of a polarized world and a divided Europe was, during the Cold War, where the beginnings of the creation of a borderless Europe appeared and gradually came to fruition with the Schengen Agreement. For them, in the aftermath of the war there was a common consciousness that the ideal of territorial sovereignty had to be reimagined if countries wanted to experience a lasting peace on the continent. Furthermore, as Zaiotti (2011) implies, the reconstructions efforts after the war were met with the challenge of countries needing an immense number of workers that at that time was not possible for them to supply (see also: Meena, 2019). The idea of free of movement between countries had already been advanced, in the year 1984, at Fontainebleau's European Council, by Germany and France. Although this idea had been immediately put into practice with the signing of a bilateral agreement, the Saarbrücken Accord, between these two countries, it only became a reality after the countries of the Benelux Economic Union (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) expressed interest in participating in this project (Zaiotti, 2011). By 14 June 1985 the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, and the Kingdom's of Belgium and the Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg signed the Schengen Acquis (Wang, 2016). The Schengen Agreement, so-called and widely recognized for being signed in the small Luxemburgish village of Schengen near the joint border with France and Germany (Den Boer, 1997 *apud* Veljanovska, 2012) has had, in accordance with Veljanovska (2012) and Prokkola (2012), the aspiration to simplify the communication between the populations of neighbouring countries without the need of showing documentation at the borders. It also created a progressive process of harmonization and the abolition of borders between Member States of the European Community (Prokkola, 2012; Veljanovska, 2012).

However, as Siebold (2017; see also Casella Colombeau, 2017) (see also Casella Colombeau, 2017)states, the implementation of the Schengen Area, the name given to the planned area without regular border controls, that still guarantees the internal space and external borders, only started from 26 March 1995. Until that date neither the 1985 Agreement nor the Schengen Convention, signed in 1990, had yet entered into force (Siebold, 2017). In the line of thought of Wang (2016), by being signed multilaterally between states and independently of the European Communities, plus the lack of consensus between its Member States, made that the Schengen Agreement was viewed and considered as a political experiment by other Members in the EC, and remained, at that time, not part of the legal framework of the European Union (Siebold, 2017; Wang, 2016). However,

thanks to its attractiveness and since, from all perspectives (economic, political and cultural), its Member States were satisfied with their situation, new countries joined this project in the course of EU enlargements (Prokkola, 2012) which made the European integration an obvious consequence (Wang, 2016). By 1997, the Schengen Acquis was officially incorporated in the Union's legal framework (Siebold, 2017). The attractiveness of the Schengen Agreement comes, as seen by Meena (2019) and Wang (2016), from the aspect that, about the time of the signing of the agreement, the European Communities developed the Single European Act, in 1986, which, as part of the European project, signed in Luxembourg and The Hague, conferred to the European citizens the rights of mobility, work and service across the EU Member States. In this manner, Schengen and the Single European Act helped establish the internal market, on the basis of the idea that prosperity and peace could be achieved by allowing workers to find jobs abroad, students applying for exchange programs and people travelling to other countries (Wang, 2016 ; Meena, 2019).

It is important to bear in mind, however, that despite being part of European legislation, the Schengen Area and the European Union are not the same concept, because apart from the states that belongs to the two institutions, "not all European countries are involved or fully involved in this process" (Smith, 2011 *apud* Wang, 2016 : 2).

There are some EU Member States that have decided not to join the common area; there are non-EU Member States participating in the Schengen system (Siebold, 2017) as well as EU Member States that do not yet have the conditions to be integrated into the Schengen Area. At the time of writing, the Schengen Area covers, in its entirety, 26 countries of the European continent. 22 of these are Member States of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Sweden) together with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, which are not members of the EU. There are also 3 European microstates, Monaco, Vatican, and San Marino that can be considered as de facto belonging to the Schengen Area, because they do not have any border controls with the countries neighbouring them. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom [UK] are Member States of the European Union which are currently not part of the Schengen Area. However, all EU citizens have the right to free movement within the Union regardless of whether or not the country is part of the Schengen Area (European Commission, no date-a) (Wang, 2016). This being a vital right assured by the Union to its

citizens, it allows them to travel, work and live in any country of the EU without exceptional bureaucracies. The Schengen Acquis heightens this right to freedom of movement by granting the citizens the chance to cross internal borders between the Member States without border controls and checks (European Commission, no date-a).

As Wang (2016) affirm, the Schengen Acquis provide a set of rules so that the abolishment of the internal borders, and respectively the control at the external borders, would be put to work effectively. They cover several areas like a common set of rules for those crossing the external borders, as also a common standard on the documentation needed for traveling in Europe; the harmonization of entries and conditions of visas; improved cooperation between national polices and a more effective judicial cooperation. It has also applied the foundation and design of the Schengen Information System [SIS], a common information sharing system for border supervision, with the resolution to make Europe safer, which, in the absence of internal border checks, assists the authorities in maintaining its security (Wang, 2016) (European Commission, no date-b).

There is still a list of preconditions, according to Wang (2016), that are required and binding (to the new members), since the Schengen acquis incorporated the EU legal framework, to all the EU Member states that desire joining the Schengen Area. In these rules the Member States are responsible for controlling the external borders in support of other members as well for the distribution of regularized Schengen visas; preserve the level of security high-levelled, once the borders control are put to an end, by cooperating with law enforcement agencies in other states; associating and using the SIS; but most importantly, applying the set of rules mentioned before (Wang, 2016).

As mentioned above, Wang (2016) explains that the UK and Ireland have opted out, remaining outside the Schengen Area, thus maintaining control over their borders; however the newly integrated Member States, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Croatia have not yet met the conditions to obtain approval from Schengen Headquarters (Wang, 2016). However, several statements have been made, in recent years, backing the fastest admission of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia into the Schengen Area, in order to improve the European unity (Buttin, 2018; Jamieson, 2019; Sánchez Nicolás, 2019; Schwartz, 2018).

Some of the reasons that the author presents come from the fact that, despite these countries (with exception of Croatia) have been part of the EU for more than 10 years, they still present some doubts and worries to some of the other Member States. The case of Cyprus revolves around the conflicts with Greece and for close neighbouring Turkey. As

for Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia, for being nearby the Balkan countries, the concerns lie on migration, mainly after their accession, due to the reservations about their capacity to "police their own borders" (Wang, 2016).

The security dimension raises concerns inside the Schengen Area, because as Colombeau (2017) notes, at the European level the construction of this specific area of freedom of movement between several countries was complemented with measures, within the Schengen Convention, that were intended to compensate any security deficit that could be caused by the lifting of the internal borders between the Member States (Bigo, 1996 *apud* Casella Colombeau, 2017). For Hayrynen (2009) the security issues of the Schengen Area appear as the development of a sociopolitical transnational European identity. Its external border aids the process of "excluding the allegedly non-European Other" (Hayrynen, 2009), controlling and securing its inner self, since for the author the teleological (philosophic study of something's purpose) narrative of the Schengen external border falls between the notions of freedom and security against external menaces (Hayrynen, 2009).

As Meena (2019) argues, the perceptions of threats and dangers from international terrorism, crimes and migration have been augmented since the enlargements to the east, from 2004 onwards, which called, in the author opinion, for a reaction securing the protection of the EU citizens (Meena, 2019; see also: McCall, 2015). More recently, Meena (2019) stated that the policies taken by the EU in the Schengen border territories led to numerous crises, especially with the vast influx of migrants arriving into Europe's borders, which leads to the author presenting the idea that there is more tension in Schengen at the moment than in its thirty-year history as some Member States have instigated restoring their borders as an outcome from the intense increase of irregular migration to the continent (Johnson, 2017 *apud* Meena, 2019).

1 .2 – Migrant's crisis

Political unrest in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia has altered migration trends on the European continent, with the number of illegal detections on the EU's external border beginning to increase in 2011, when thousands of Tunisians began arriving in the Italian island of Lampedusa after the beginning of the 'Arab Spring' (Park, 2015). According to Nascimbene and Di Pascale (2011) and Del Sarto (2016), this movement was

caused by the uprisings in some Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa in which the popular revolt against the governmental and financial order prevailed as the common factor between them and triggered the fall of regimes and leaderships that were in power for numerous decades, such as the cases of Tunisia under the rule of Ben Ali and Ghaddafi's control over Libya. Although "the Arab Spring was met with optimism by many for a brighter political and social future in the region" (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2013), it's outcomes ended up putting pressure, on the one hand, on the asylum systems, and on the other hand, on national perceptions about migratory patterns (Del Sarto, 2016; Nascimbene & Di Pascale, 2011; Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2013).

The context for these uprisings, in Fischer's (2015) and Fijnaut's (2015) opinions, were based on Europe's economic failure on the Western Balkans and the war in Eastern Ukraine as well the commotions and civil wars in the Middle East and North Africa, rooting the crisis in Europe's own neighbourhood (Fijnaut, 2015; Fischer, 2015). To Milanovic (2015) the blame lies on the European Union and its numerous political slipups and mistakes committed in the past years that aggravated the crisis and created instability on its borders. To this author these mistakes include the overthrowing of Ghaddafi that sent Libya into chaos; the pressure over the Ukrainian government on the signing of the trade agreement and release of Yulia Timoshenko from prison which ended up in the overthrow of the Yanukovych government and later the Russian involvement and civil war; and also the disagreements over Greece which might create chaos within the Union and its borders (Milanovic, 2015).

However, the growing conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan continued to move hundreds of thousands of people from their homes every day (Crawley, Duvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016), while "deteriorating security and grinding poverty in Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan have also contributed to the flow of migrants" (Park, 2015).

According to (Crawley *et al.*, 2016) the decision for migrants to leave and move on came from the conflicts occurring in Europe's neighbouring countries, with many people experiencing conflict, oppression and human rights abuses, even in the countries to which they consequently have moved into before risking their lives trying to reach the European continent. For Crawley *et al.* (2016) the decisions for some migrants to leave their homes were also based on the activities of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria, but also felt in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen, and the constant kidnappings by State and non-State agencies in

Libya. This flow was, according to these authors, dominated with the focus on the "death-defying journeys across the Mediterranean, the smugglers facilitating irregular crossings and the hardships endured by refugees and migrants during the journey and on arrival" (Crawley *et al.*, 2016). Taken all these events together they were widely perceived as starting a 'crisis' in which the focus was the unguided and unruled movements into Europe, the political let-down in the Member States inability to respond collectively and for the lack of address by the international community in the demanding humanitarian needs of those arriving on Europe's borders.

In 2015, "the flow of refugees and others seeking irregular access to Europe increased dramatically" (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015). It is estimated that, in that year alone, about 1,011,712 people crossed the Mediterranean to Europe in search of security and a better life (Crawley *et al.*, 2016), reaching the borders of the European Union through irregular routes fleeing violence and conflict in their homes (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015). The International Organization for Migration [IOM] estimates that, in the first nine months of 2015 alone, more than 464,000 migrants crossed Europe by sea (Park, 2015).

Understanding the dynamics of migration to Europe and why some people prefer to risk their lives when crossing the Mediterranean remains a pressing concern (Crawley *et al.*, 2016). Traditionally, the majority of migrants seeking to enter Europe, through irregular routes, are male. However, in this flow of migrants it is possible to observe entire families traveling together, with cases in which they move with elderly relatives; with disabilities and also often with children (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015). In addition to the concern about the dangerous journeys these families undergo when crossing the Mediterranean, there is also the problem of smugglers who facilitate irregular and illegal crossings both in the travel process and in the arrival at the EU's external border *(Crawley et al.*, 2016).

Migrants and refugees arriving in Europe from Africa, the Middle East and South Asia present leaders and policymakers with a major challenge, being considered one of the largest since the debt crisis thus dominating European political debates and media coverage (Park, 2015; Crawley *et al.*, 2016). According to some authors, this crisis highlighted a structural problem in Europe, its demography (Fischer, 2015). The continent needs, more than ever, immigration to battle the decrease and ageing of Europe's population, nonetheless many are strongly opposed to this immigration, because it implies changes in

the social aspects of populations. This in itself proves to be a challenge because policymakers will have to explain to their populations that migrants should be seen as an opportunity and not as a threat, so it's possible for them to achieve economic prosperity and a high level of social security (Fischer, 2015).

According to Metcalfe-Hough (2015), at the same time as much of the criticism of Europe's managing the current crisis is defensible, the Union Member States face a number of genuine challenges, because the present situation is complex and puzzling either because the number of people moving, their diverse background and countries of origin and the nature of their means to entry, or because the countries that find themselves on the frontline, like Italy, Greece, Croatia and Hungary, were overwhelmed by the volume and speed of the influx to their asylum systems at a time when their wealth and resources were weak.

The nature of the contemporary global migration patterns and the complexity of identifying the people that need international protection also presents itself as challenging since the line between 'forced' and 'voluntary' international migration is progressively unclear. Migrants' motives frequently overlap between extreme poverty, escaping conflict or and environmental degradation, as well as the professed financial and educational opportunities in Europe. But the main challenge is the fact that European public opinion is divided in a way that affects government policies and makes it difficult to develop a coherent approach from all the EU members (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015). However, to Park (2015), Fischer (2015) and Bendixsen (2016), the changing political landscape, with concerns about Islamic terrorism that began to emerge on the continent, the growing feelings of xenophobia and racism allowed the rise of nationalists and right-wing parties, which have gained ground in many countries. It has become increasingly less clear whether the EU and/or its Member States are capable of implementing lasting asylum and immigration reforms. This inaction creates considerable risk for the EU itself, as it is difficult to believe that Member States can overcome the long-term challenges posed by large-scale migration on their own - particularly Italy and Greece, two of the most affected countries - yet many of the Member States reject a common European effort, a stance that also threatens to accelerate the erosion of solidarity in the Union, showing a trend of disintegration (Fischer, 2015; Park, 2015; Bendixsen, 2016).

The current asylum system in the European Union tries to harmonize the rules and conditions that apply to asylum seekers in all Member States of the Union; however, it is

up to Member States the central question regarding the number of exiles they admit. There is thus a big difference between the Member States and the Union in what concerns the regulation and the level of compliance with EU asylum directives. Even though the European Commission has put forward a set of proposals to improve joint migration policies and asylum, progress has been slow (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015). Fijnaut (2015) argues that in the complex reality of the European Union politics, it has become clear that it is not easy to commit the ideals of a common asylum system into intelligible policies. At the same time, the difficulties faced by the asylum system have shown that it is very difficult and time consuming to come to a settlement on all the aspects of these policies, between all the Member States. Nonetheless, there are some perceptible outcomes on the call for closer cooperation and mutual assistance between Member States. One of these is the establishment of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex), in 2004, with the task of establishing border control services throughout the external border of the Union. Another is the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, a programme designed to construct a 'Europe of asylum' in which controls at the external borders are more effective. It also, on the one hand, organizes legal migration by taking account the priorities and needs of each Member State as well their reception capacity while promoting the integration of migrants. On the other hand, it controls illegal immigration by returning them to their countries of origin or of transit (Fijnaut, 2015).

At the same time, there is a strong political and media narrative that suggests that in the event that people have been forced to leave their countries due to conflicts, persecutions and human rights violations, they should remain in the countries they reach first instead of making the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean to Europe (Kuschminder and Koser, 2016 *apud* Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). These debates led the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] as well as several other national, international and civil society organizations to strive to establish the differences between 'migrant' and 'refugee' (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018), however other media currents intend to use the term "refugee" instead of "migrant", which may harm the rights of those fleeing violence and conflicts (Malone, 2015 *apud* Crawley & Skleparis, 2018).

According to the United Nations [UN] a 'migrant' is defined as "an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate" (Metcalfe-Hough,

2015). This definition formally covers refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants. Regarding the definition of 'refugee', the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 states that this is an individual who "is unable or unwilling to return to his country of origin due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, belonging to a specific social group or political opinion" (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951)

As far as immigration is concerned, Crawley and Skleparisb (2018), Metcalfe-Hough (2015) and Park (2015) are clear that, the search for categorizing and differentiating 'refugee' and 'migrant' end up introducing the doubts about their legitimacy and their claims for protection, mainly during the 'migration crisis' which eventually has being used to explain and validate policies of exclusion and containment (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Metcalfe-Hough, 2015; Park, 2015). As Crawley and Skleparisb (2018) presents, some authors (e.g. Richmond 1993; Malkki 1995; Koser and Martin 2011; Zetter 2015) have criticized this distinction because it does not mirror the manner the migratory processes work in reality and they it does not take into account the different motives and incentives of the individuals, that can change status or at the same time fit in more than one category (Koser and Martin, 2011; Collyer and de Haas, 2012; Mainwaring and Brigden, 2016; (Koser and Martin, 2011; Collyer and de Haas, 2012; Mainwaring and Brigden, 2016 *apud* Crawley & Skleparis, 2018).

For Metcalfe-Hough (2015), the signing of the 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees and the respective 1967 Protocol allow refugees rights (work, education, accommodation and judicial system) and international protection by entering a country without penalty, however, there still is not at the present time a legal definition of migrant recognized universally. Metcalfe-Hough (2015) also refers that it is important to note that the "EU does not have a regional convention on refugees or a fully integrated common asylum or migration policy, though European human rights law does apply to the protection of all migrant" (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015).

Despite that, the author shows that the present-day EU asylum system tries to balance the conditions and rules for all the Member States that are being destined by asylum-seekers, although the number of seekers admitted is still a decision that lies on a national level, existing a lot of differentiation amongst the Member States on regulation and obedience to the EU Directives on asylum. Metcalfe-Hough (2015) and Park (2015) also categorize an asylum-seeker as a person fleeing persecution or conflict, on his/hers

own country, who seeks safety while waiting for the application of refugee status (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015; Park, 2015). This shows, as Park (Park, 2015) mention, in contrast with Metcalfe-Hough accusation on the lack of a legal common definition of 'migrant', that the term can be seen as an umbrella term for all three groups (Park, 2015).

Public opinion in Europe, highly divided, has continually tended to perceive any large-scale international migration as a threat, not only to the sovereignty of its national and regional borders as well as its economies and societies, strongly affecting government policies and, mainly, the prospects for integration of refugees and other migrants (Erlanger, 2015 *apud* Metcalfe-Hough, 2015). It is also on the Schengen Agreement, and its free movement area, that much attention and concern has fallen, since, in light of recent events regarding the flow of migrants, many questions have arisen. To Park (2015), the enormous pressure that the migrant movements without visas, which were mostly secondary, exerted before this circulation area not only shows clear violations of the Dublin Regulation, but it also has increased national and community security concerns. The Dublin Regulation is, conforming to Bendixsen (2016), the result of the signing of the Dublin Convention that, in 1990, established the principle and Member State's responsibilities in asylum application, and that was eventually elucidate in the Dublin II and Dublin III regulations. It was desired by the EU to evade requiring migrants moving from one country to another for applying for asylum (Bendixsen, 2016; Park, 2015). These immigration-related apprehensions are, in Alkopher and Blanc's (2016) point of view, a trigger to a security dilemma in a tightly united security community (SC) like Schengen, that is presented by the authors as an idyllic representation of a SC due to "its materialist characteristics (i.e., clearly defined area of highly integrated sovereign states enjoying free movement and unfortified borders) and ideational features (i.e., attachment to the European idea, sense of common identity, and mutual trust)" (Alkopher & Blanc, 2016), weakening it by damaging its trust and collective identity and encouraging states to unilateral defensive processes.

In response to this situation, some countries belonging to the Schengen Area have begun to reintroduce temporary controls on some of their shared borders with other Member States (Park, 2015). As stated by Fijnaut (2015) and also defended by Alkopher and Blanc (2016), according to the Schengen Agreement itself, such actions can only be taken consequently of a severe threat to public policy and/or to internal security (Fijnaut, 2015; Alkopher & Blanc, 2016). With the widespread immigration related fears and threat

perceptions, in what 'has become over the years a security-centred and security-driven initiative' (Zaiotti, 2011, see also Cornelisse 2014; Alkopher and Blanc, 2016), have ultimately disrupted the Schengen area. Following the 2015 migrant's crisis, this security dilemma exposed "that the concerns related to migration may be perceived as issues of securitisation since the flow of migrants and refugees has been perceived, by some countries, as a potential threat" (Alkopher & Blanc, 2016).

These reactions partaken by the EU and its Member States and the dissemination of fear regarding mass migration into the European continent are what can be conceived as security issues, and therefore it is necessary to analyse how securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School can inform a study on the potential securitisation of the Schengen Area.

1.3 – Copenhagen's School Securitisation Theory

It has become evident in recent years that in Europe, a connection has been established between the topics of migration, borders and security. In this context, Benam (2011) notes that the concepts of Europeanization and securitisation are useful to understand the construction of the European project. In this context, he notes that, "Copenhagen School's securitisation discussions provided a useful starting point to interpret the developments in Europe" (Benam, 2011 : 193). In the context of this dissertation, the Copenhagen School will be used to analyse whether the discursive acts from both the EU and its Member States, regarding the migrants' flow, are part of a securitisation process in the Schengen Area.

The School of Copenhagen is normally considered to be at the intersection of Strategic Studies with the Peace Studies. This meeting began, as part of the concerns to revive of the logic of security discourse, during the period of the end of the Cold War, giving rise to a new understanding (Wæver, 1993 *apud* Guzzini, 2015). The development of securitisation theory and its literature occurred after the end of the Cold war. In a period where all security-based questions began to appear, the Copenhagen School started distancing itself from the traditional security studies and their military nature, arguing that a more extensive depiction of security was needed.

For this description, authors like Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998), by trying to answer the question 'what is security?', argue that, although there is no common definition, security can be perceived as the survival from something that threatens its existence. To

Waever (1998) the act of declaring something as a security issue, whether it is a real or a perceived threat, it is securitisation (Waever, 1998).

Accordingly to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), security can be considered as a special issue in politics, since it is traditionally connected to emergency conditions which normally would grant a state the right to use every resource required to block any threat (Waever 1988, 1999b *apud* Buzan *et al*, 1998). Regarding security, Guzzini (2011) states that the different actors may and will interpret it in different ways, since, on the one hand, some claim that security is a neutral occurrence and that it should be perceived as an objective phenomenon and, on the other hand there were those who want to view it as something subjective above all, meaning that everything could be perceived as a threat if any of the actors alleged it as such (Guzzini, 2011).

Conventionally 'security' is considered as "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). Being about survival, traditional security studies where mainly associated with the military concerns as examples of security.

Therefore, to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), 'security' represents a self-referential practice in which a topic turns into a security issue, not because it necessarily exist a real threat but because it is portrayed as such. Consequently, the concept of securitisation, as well as its definition and principles, are based on the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with sufficient prominence to have substantial political effects. According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) the discourse that presents an issue as an existential threat, is not in itself securitisation, but rather what the authors call a securitising move. This move is negotiated and discussed between the actor that securitises namely the state or nation, and the audience. To be fully perceived as a securitisation process the issue must be accepted by an audience as such. Being in this way socially constructed, it always becomes a political choice to either securitise or to agree to a securitisation process (Buzan *et al.*, 1998).

Securitisation is not composed just by existential threats or the breaking the rules, "but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). Therefore is clear for Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) that for a successful process of securitisation to exist several steps must be followed, which are the portrayal of

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an existential threat; its acceptance by an audience; and a plan for emergency actions in response to the perceived threat.

As stated before, by classifying an issue as a security issue, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) argue, an actor can claim the need and/or right to treat it through extraordinary means because of the rhetorical structure of the securitisation process. This distinguishing aspect relies on the instinct of survival which prioritizes actions "because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998).

One of the key aspects of the process of securitisation is what in language theory is titled as a speech-act. According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) "a successful speech-act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech" (Bourdieu 1991 [1982]; Butler 1996a, b *apud* Buzan *et al.*, 1998 : 32).

According to the authors, by approaching security from a speech-act point of view, questions are raised related to the relationships between the securitising actors and those analysing the process, while both try to define and understand the security agenda. However, it is argued by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) that it is the actor and not the analyst who determinates if something is to be perceived as an existential threat, as its rare for an analyst to be able to oppose a security attempt by just saying "you are not really threatened, you only think so" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998 : 34). By approaching security through speech-acts it is needed to highlight the distinction between the three components that are entangled in the security analysis. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) present these elements as the following: the referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors. It is important to establish the distinction between referent objects and securitising actors, as it is the most difficult and important. Referent objects are usually presented as the something that has been threatened and are the ones who have the right to claim survival (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). Traditionally represented by the state and, at some extent the nation, the referent object is that which needs to be protected. Securitising actors are those who declare that something, namely another referent object, threatens the referent object that needs to be protected. Securitising actors, usually being players like political leaders, or governments carry out speech-acts identifying the threats to the referent object; therefore, it can be more complicated to identify a securitising actor than a referent object. Hence "security actors speak and act in the name of referent objects, and they generally see threats

as emanating from other referent objects" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998 : 43). On another level functional actors are those that influence the securitisation process, while being neither the referent object nor the securitising actor that acts in support of the referent object. In this category, actors such as the media, non-governmental organizations or academia can be included (Buzan *et al.*, 1998).

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) argue that there are social limits to what can be securitised or not. And although these limits can change, if one tries to exceed the process of securitisation, one will be faced with security dilemmas, or in the case of not securitising, it will be impossible to deal with the issue successfully (Buzan *et al.*, 1998).

As mention earlier, security means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors. This can make the securitisation process be ad hoc or institutionalized. For Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) presenting an issue as so urgent and important that it should be analysed apart from normal politics and prior to other issues, is what securitisation is (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). Regarding security, Guzzini (2011) states that the different actors can recognize that security can be observed by either a perspective of a neutral occurrence in which there exists a real threat (objectively) or/and by a perspective that presents a perceived threat meaning that everything could be perceived as a threat if any of the actors alleged it as such (subjectively) (Guzzini, 2015).

What Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) argue is that securitisation, must be understood as a fundamentally intersubjective process. This argument is presented because it becomes difficult to determine whether an issue is certainly a threat or is just perceived as one. The uncertainty can influence the reaction of how other actors will reply and judge the fairness of the security claim and its securitising process, since "what may seem a legitimate securitisation within a given political community may appear paranoid to those outside it" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998 : 30). It is also important to point out that nations and states have different considerations when it comes to defining a threat. Securitising an issue can have consequences to the nation or state because this process makes the actor function differently than it would normally, which can shape the interactions within the international system.

It is important for Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) that understanding securitisation and its process is fundamental to "knows who can 'do' security on what issue and under what conditions" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998 : 31), because this will allow manipulating

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the actions of the actors and thus restraining the security dilemmas. To Wæver, the securitisation of an issue should not be seen as positive. It should be perceived as a failure since it reveals incapacity to deal with problems through normal politics. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) believe that a securitisation theory can contribute to processes of 'desecuritisation' (Buzan *et al.*, 1998).

One final argument that the authors present is related to regional security and how actors and referent objects are tied to the discussion. The scenario left from the post-Cold War was in Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) opinions a world where there was a higher level of regionalization. In this situation, it has become clear that, there exist several securitising actors, such as nations and states or the EU, that are part of a regional groups of states (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). That is why through the examination of all the concepts and the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School it will be possible to, in the next chapters analyse the speech-acts of countries and governments of the Member States, and of the Union itself.

1.4 Methodology

In order to better investigate the theme of this dissertation it is necessary to establish, in greater detail, the methodology to be used in this process. Therefore, this chapter focuses on these aspects.

Regarding the methods of analysis this dissertation follows several approaches from which it becomes possible to study the proposed theme and its related topics. The ones selected for this purpose were the descriptive, documentary and explanatory methods. The descriptive research is a method that can be defined as "the method that describes the characteristics of the population or phenomenon studied" (QuestionPro, 2021a) focusing on the motives of the occurrence of the phenomenon, while not covering the reason for it to happen. This method can be characterized as a quantitative research method since it "attempts to collect quantifiable information for statistical analysis of the population sample" (QuestionPro, 2021a) its variables are not influenced and therefore their nature and behavior are not engage by the researchers; normally is considerate to be "a cross-sectional study where different sections belonging to the same group are studied" (QuestionPro, 2021a) and also the basis for additional investigation allowing the data to be collected and analyzed by means of different research methods. In order to comprehend the

research goals this method can be applied in several ways, however, for this investigation its best usage is the conduction of comparisons between the collected data and also the validation of "the research object's prevailing conditions and underlying patterns" (QuestionPro, 2021a).

Concerning the documentary method of research it can be described as "the research conducted through the use of official documents or personal documents as the source of information" (QuestionPro, 2021c) and "can help develop a hypothesis or prove or disprove an existing hypothesis" (QuestionPro, 2021c). It is also used to categorise, investigate, interpret and identify the limitations of physical sources, most commonly written documents, whether in the private or public domain (G. Payne & Payne, 2004). While this method presents several types of documents, this investigation resorts to the collection of data by the means of reports, working papers, academic texts and official documents.

The explanatory research method is described as the investigation of a phenomenon, when expected, which as "had not been studied before, or had not been well explained previously, [with the] intention (…) to provide details where a small amount of information exists" (QuestionPro, 2021b). With this method is possible to obtain a general idea of the research and use it as a tool through future issues, while aiming "to find the why and what for an object of study" (QuestionPro, 2021b). The explanatory method is characterized for permitting the increase understanding of a explicit issue which, despite not offering decisive results, allows for the finding of motives for why a phenomenon happens and for allowing researchers to "distinguish the causes why phenomena arise during the research process, and anticipate changes" and gain new insights into them (QuestionPro, 2021b).

Therefore, resorting to application of the descriptive, documentary and explanatory methods of analysis it is possible to interpreter the collected data for this investigation.

For the parameters of the analysis to be complete it is also necessary to present the delimitations that define the boundaries of the research and that allow it to be succinct and precise. For that reason, it is important to establish a geographical and temporal delimitation concerning the dissertation theme. Therefore, for this investigation, the geographic demarcation is, in line with the theme, the Schengen Area. In it is possible to identify the main objects of study, the European Union and its Member-States. In this group of countries, it is possible to observe those who have reinstated their internal borders or

that have formed speeches that legitimize the replacement of borders within the Schengen area.

Taking into account the amount of Member-States that compose the Schengen Area it becomes necessary to establish some cases of study in order to simplify the research. For that reason, the cases of Italy, Hungary and Germany were chosen because of the involvement of these countries during the migrant crisis and also because they are presented as possible examples of countries of arrival, passage and destination of migrants respectively.

Regarding the case of the European Union in order to observer its response to the crisis it becomes necessary to investigate the political institutions that compose the Union. Therefore, the European Union, the European Council and the institutional triangle (European Commission, Council of the European Union and European Parliament) will also be considered as case studies on this dissertation.

Concerning the chronical delimitation of the dissertation it is indispensable to establish a time interval in order for the research to have a focus regarding the object of study. And so, it is settled that, for this investigation, the period of time chosen would be the interval between the years of 2015, the year which the migrant crisis is considerate to begin to be perceived on the European continent, and 2019, since the effects of the crisis began to be less noticeable after this period of four years. Despise the period of analysis chosen beginning in the year of 2015 and continuing onwards, it is important to establish the base concepts necessary for the investigation.

Therefore, describing the Schengen Area and its origins as well as the starting point of the Migrant Crisis and the development of the theory of Securitisation by the Copenhagen School is a fundamental process which will take place in the following sections.

Conclusion

This first chapter is fundamental to the development of the research because in it are described the methodology and the concepts necessary to the analysis of the theme.

Throughout the chapter was possible to establish the base concepts of the Schengen Area, the migrant crisis and Copenhagen's School Securitisation Theory. As it become possible to establish that these three topics can be extremely related and intrinsically connected to each other.

Regarding the Schengen Area, in the first section, it was possible to establish it as the geographical delimitation of the research and therefore it was necessary to understand its creation and history. The Schengen Area by being an intended area devoid of fixed border controls that assure the internal space of the Union and its external borders become an important aspect in the European integration and one of the main attractive characteristics of the EU.

With the abolishment of the borders between Member States it was possible to implement the right of freedom of movement of people throughout the European area, inasmuch as the creation of the Schengen Acquis provided a set of rules which allowed for the abolishment of the internal borders to take place while ensuring that the control at the external borders would work successfully. The establishment of this Acquis had the objective of redress any security inadequacy that could be created with the dismantle of the internal borders of the EU.

Therefore, it is possible to recognise that the security dimension imposes concerns regarding the Schengen Area and its Members States. With the continued development of the Schengen Area the notions and judgments of threats from international crimes migration and terrorism have been amplified. These behaviors require a reaction in which is necessary to secure the safety of the EU citizens.

In the relation to the problematic of the research the second section of this chapter focus on the Migrant Crisis. Having being established the beginning of the flow of migrants into Europe in 2011, it was only from 2015 onwards that the crisis hit its peak and the numbers of people entering the Schengen Area rose to levels not seen before. The decisions that lead migrants to leave their countries are related to the facts that countless individuals undergo through conflicts, subjugations and abuses of their human rights. These events can even occur in the countries to where they have to move into before endangering their lives to reach the Europe. The decisions that lead some migrants to abandon their homes can also be based on terrorist activities perpetuated by the IS in the countries of the Middle East.

As previously established in the section above, this crisis has brought attention to some important issues in Europe like its decreasing demography or EU's lack of a common response to adverse situations. In the meantime, it has also become gradually less apparent whether the EU is competent to apply permanent asylum and immigration improvements

since the Member States don't have the facility to simply compel to the principles of a common asylum system and reach an agreement on all the aspects of these policies. This deficiency in a common response in solving the situation regarding the migrants entering the European continent led to some countries in the Schengen Area to reinstate, albeit temporarily, the controls of their borders with other Member States. According to the state of art, after the end of the migrant's crisis in 2015, it has become clear that in the European area, the security dilemma showed that the worries connected to migration can be observed as the beginning of a securitisation process since the flow of migrants has been recognised by some Member States as a probable threat.

As to the Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory, it regards the development of a security theory in which, as stated previously in this chapter; by considering a topic as security it is possible for an actor to declare the necessity and right to approach it through exceptional methods.

To the authors of this theory the process of securitisation occurs when the action of stating something as a security concern, whether there is a real threat or a perceived one (Wæver, 2016). However, one of the main, and fundamental, aspects of the process of securitisation is the speech-act. This allows for the actor perceiving the threat to communicate with their audience, creating a connection amongst those analysing the process and the securitising actors. It is necessary for the issue to be entirely observed by an audience as threat in order for a securitisation process to be accepted as such.

2. Case studies: Securitisation in the Schengen Area, the Member States cases

This second chapter presents and discusses the case studies of this dissertation as a way to assess whether a securitisation process related to the migration crises has been ongoing in the Schengen Area. In order to have a better perspective on the topic of securitisation and to learn if a securitisation process is actually taking place in the Schengen Area it is necessary to analyse the actions taken by the Member States and the speeches of their most influential politicians regarding the questions about the migration flows. Therefore, this chapter is divided into sections that examine each case study, through an analysis of the speeches presented by some political leaders of the Member States of the EU concerning the migrant's flow, starting in 2015.

The Member States presented as case studies in this chapter are Italy, Hungary and Germany. These countries were selected because they all appear as relevant actors in the scenario of crisis that arouse with the migrant's flow, as a result of their geographical position, political scenarios and general stance regarding the Migrant's flow, as they represent, respectively, the example of countries of arrival, passage and destination of migrants, as previously mentioned.

The first section, analyses the case of Italy, since it is one of the countries of arrival on the continent and it is also the Member-State that considerably dealt with the first contact with the migrant flows and the difficulties felt in the EU after 2011. These aspects can be considered important factors in the increase of nationalist speeches and actions in the country. The second section examines the case of Hungary. This country is well recognized as one of the countries of transit on the Balkan route which is one of the main routes of passage in the migration flow, as well as one of the Member States with predominantly nationalist feelings and policies against migrants. The last section considers the case of Germany. This country was chosen as a case study because of being the wealthiest country of the continent and the first choice by many migrants to live in and settle. Germany is also considered as one the Member States that hosted the majority of migrants since 2015. By being treated as a host country it is important to examine the speeches from their governments and political parties.

One of the main conclusions of this chapter is that, in all of the cases under study, some of the more important political figures sought to create speech acts that securitised

migration issues, like Matteo Salvini in Italy and the AfD in Germany. However, their success has been mixed and no coherent securitisation process has been possible to identify, given their respective audiences reception of these speech acts.

2.1 – Italy

This section is dedicated to analysing the speeches partaken by the most relevant political figures in the first case study, Italy; with the objective of understanding whether there is an attempt on their part to securitise the migrants' issue. Italy was chosen because, since the beginning of the increase of the migrant's flow on the European continent, it has been one of the countries' most affected by the effects of migration. The rise of populist movements and the far-right in Italy took advantage of the situation in the country to use migration as a means of broadcasting their political messages, exploiting a fragile political scenario. For this reason, the speeches and actions to be analysed in this first section are those made by the most prominent Italian political personalities relevant to this topic, such as the Prime Ministers Mateo Renzi (2014 – 2016 office), Paolo Gentiloni (2016 – 2018 office) and Giuseppe Conte (2018 – 2019, first office).

The speeches of the deputy Prime Ministers to the first Conte office, Matteo Salvini and Luigi di Maio, during the populist coalition that ruled from 2018 to 2019, will also be analysed so that it is possible to understand the narratives of the most relevant parties in the country during the period of time in examination.

Since the beginning of the massive number of migrants arriving in Italy the country has had a tumultuous political scenario. Throughout the considered time interval there were several governments ruling the country while facing the consequences of the flux of migrants into Italy's borders. Therefore, the various administrations' narratives and speeches have varied during the period of the migrant crisis.

Matteo Renzi's administration, the first to be analysed, was in office from 2014 until 2016. The period of his rule was the most affected by the migrant flow since it experienced the increase of the number of arrivals on European shores, especially those of Italy. His government also had to deal with the rise of populist movements and far-right parties, which became a challenge to the political scenario in the country by feeding on the migration concerns. For the Italian Prime Minister Renzi, the tightening of border controls

made by Italy's neighbours was opposing Rome to the rest of Europe (Euronews, 2015). Renzi declared that "Europe is a great house of values" (Euronews, 2015) and therefore he believed that migration should be a European problematic and that it should be solve together between the EU's members. However, if Europe decided to close its eyes to the situation and others nations consider it to be just an Italian problem, then, in Renzi's opinion, Italy was "in a position to face it" alone (Euronews, 2015).

Renzi believed that the European countries should not send their ships to rescue migrants in the Mediterranean Sea if their intentions were just to abandon them on Italy's shores (Euronews, 2015). Therefore, he requested for Europe to increase its help regarding the situation in the Mediterranean and to do more to stop the migration crisis. After several Member States suspended the quotas for taking in those looking for asylum, Renzi accused the other European countries of trying to overlook the crisis (BBC News, 2015a). Wanting the entire world to see what was happening in the country's shores, Renzi stated that the other countries could not state "out of sight, out of mind" (BBC News, 2015a), because the situation "should not be underestimated" (Agence France-Presse, 2015a).

Believing that "Europe's answer so far has not been good enough" (Agence France-Presse, 2015a) Renzi stated that Rome wanted "both a long-term solution and help from other countries now" (Agence France-Presse, 2015a).

The Italian Prime Minister had criticized the actions made by several Member States and the EU itself; however, he kept his Europeanist convictions. His statements also present a humanitarian tone when it came to the rescue and the conditions in which migrants were treated by other countries. The EU can be considerate as the audience of the Italian Prime Minister's speech acts regarding this topic.

For Renzi's government, the Dublin Convention was unfair as it left the country to deal with the thousands of migrants arriving to its shores (Agence France-Presse, 2015a). However, Renzi said that Italy would face the emergency, even without the EU's help if necessary, and save migrants (Agence France-Presse, 2015a; Redazione Altalex, 2015). Considering that solidarity between the Member States was fundamental to resolve the situation, Renzi said that, nonetheless, this solidarity could not be just by taking in migrants, according to the Dublin Convention rules, because that would be unfair to countries like Italy, but by having a proportional distribution among all countries (Agence

France-Presse, 2015a). He believed that there should be "solidarity for all or whoever pulls himself out will have no funds", threatening those who intended to abandon the protocol (la Repubblica, 2016).

Despite being against the Dublin Convention quotas because he found them unfair, Renzi's speeches continued to focus on solidarity and saving migrants which made migration issues not be perceived as a threat. Therefore, there is no evidence of an attempt at securitising the migration issue on these speeches. Renzi believed in Europe and in what the EU stands for. By stating that the migrant crisis would not be the end of the Union, he warned that "whoever deludes himself to stop it with a tweet or a post on Facebook lives in a parallel reality" (Redazione Altalex, 2015). In his opinion, humanity's history was shaped by migration flows and only fear could permit "the demagogic and sometimes racist superficiality to inhabit European politics with ever greater force" (Redazione Altalex, 2015). These growing sentiments of fear had begun to be influential in political elections, however, according to the Italian Prime Minister, they must be fought with courage and not "by chasing those who give themselves to pure demagogy every day" (Redazione Altalex, 2015). Here it is possible to continue to analyse the humanitarian discourse of the Prime Minister regarding migration. Renzi's narratives intended to fight against populisms rising in the country by defending the European values and migrants. Therefore, there are no evidences of a securitisation attempt on the part of the Italian Prime Minister.

Regarding the migrant crisis, Renzi said that Italy had not underestimated the migration issues but had overestimated them due to the efforts his government made fighting for migrants' safeguard and rights (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, 2019). Nevertheless, Italy should develop further actions in order to encourage migrants to stay in their home countries and improve their own economies (Balmer, 2017).

Renzi believed that Europe "faced an unprecedented situation due to mistakes made in the past, such as the bombing in Libya" (Rai News, 2016), and for that reason, in his opinion, "helping them in their home [was] a priority" (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, 2019) and investing in Africa was fundamental in order to end the crisis and to prevent other occurrences (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, 2019). After the fall of his government, while trying to gain more votes in the election, Renzi changed the lines of his speeches regarding migration issues. Critics have accused him of adopting the language of right-wing opponents less than a year before the national elections (Ellyatt, 2018). This change in Renzi's speeches started to place migration issues in the security field. He started to present

migration has an issue to be dealt far from the country's shores, keeping away the situation from the public, ensuring the safety of the population. This could be considered as at least a partial a shift towards a securitisation attempt on the migrant's issue on Renzi's part, but not a fully developed securitisation process given Renzi's loss of influence over Italian politics.

Following the end of Renzi's office, due to his resignation following an unsuccessful constitutional referendum, his former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paolo Gentiloni, was appointed by the Italian president Sergio Mattarella as the new Prime Minister. His government lasted from the end of 2016 until mid-2018. During this period of time the narrative of the Prime Minister speeches were also in line with a Europeanist sentiment, however Gentiloni, just like his antecedent, criticized the European action regarding the migrants' situation. For Gentiloni's government, Italy still considered that migration was the top priority in the European agenda, in spite of the decline in the number of arrivals in the country (Politi, 2017a).

Gentiloni believed that handling and containing the flows of migrants was and would "increasingly be a European and global challenge" (Askanews, 2017) and that Italy was still committed to its role regarding migration (Askanews, 2017). He considered that "Italy has done and will continue to do its part in rescuing and welcoming refugees" (Wibaux & Milasin, 2017). Nonetheless, this task would become difficult for the country to sustain by itself (Askanews, 2017). In these speeches, Gentiloni followed the narratives of his predecessor by appealing to the humanitarian and Europeanist position of Italy on the topic of migration, stating that the country would do everything in its power to solve the situation.

By affirming that "Italy [was] proud to be a good example on the issue of migrants" the Italian Prime Ministerconsidered that this was accomplished because the country had managed to not only reduce the amount of irregular arrivals of migrants in Italy but also the number of death in the Mediterranean Sea (Scherer, 2017).

However, Gentiloni believed that "too many Europeans have been living under the illusion that they could separate their destiny from the Mediterranean and from the crises originating from this region" (Seldin, 2017).

In relation to this position, Gentiloni warned that Rome, and its government, would "not accept lessons and still less threats" from neighbouring countries in regard to border security, especially amid tensions over the migrant crisis in Europe (Agence France-Presse, 2017a). He said that Italy was doing its duty and that they were expecting the whole of Europe to do the same alongside them (Agence France-Presse, 2017a).

This position taken by Gentiloni continues to emphasize his humanitarian discourse on the subject. Despite his criticisms of the EU and the Member States acting against what he believed to be the correct attitude, his narrative does not present any evidence of treating migration as a security issue. It is also possible to identify that the EU continued to be the audience of the new Italian Prime Minister.

Gentiloni cautioned that Europe needed immediate resolutions to the migrant situation and that the lack of success in acting towards this goal would destabilize the continent even more (Seldin, 2017). He said that the task that the European governments had on the continent was to stop human traffickers and smugglers and, above all, to handle the migration flows (Seldin, 2017). He also believed that Europe and the EU could emerge more consolidated and stronger from this emergency situation. However, for this to take effect, Europe should stop "pointing the finger at its neighbours" (Rai News, 2015) and turn "to a shared responsibility for all aspects of European migration policy" (Rai News, 2015). In his opinion, "the crisis and tensions [were] faster than the European response" (Rai News, 2015), which led the Prime Minister to state that there was a need for "more effective migration policies that combine the great humanitarian inclination to rescue and house people (…) and rigorous and effective repatriation policies" (Reuters, 2017). Rome wanted other EU Member States, on the one hand, to invest more money in order for the crisis to be tackled and, on the other hand, to also consent to the required redistribution of migrants across the Union (Politi, 2017a). Gentiloni stated that "the EU cannot give up on common solidarity" (Politi, 2017a). Gentiloni confronted the new policies in Europe that consisted on creating barriers and controls on borders (Redattore Sociale, 2016). He believed that if this trend continued, Italy would increasingly become a country of landing and arrivals and not a country of transit (Redattore Sociale, 2016). In his opinion, it had become necessary to "strengthen the policies of reception" (Redattore Sociale, 2016) because "if there is one issue on which Europe can have a very serious crisis, it is this of immigration and hospitality".

Regarding the creation of hotspots and the relocation of migrants, Gentiloni believe that, for Italy, these solutions "[were] not enough" (Rai News, 2015) to resolve the problems of migration " (Rai News, 2015).

Focusing on the EU's lack of solidarity between the Member States, Gentiloni wanted the Union to continue its humanitarian work by developing proper policies that would allow a better coordination in the reception and relocation of migrants in the continent. Therefore, the discourse of the Italian Prime Minister continues his humanitarian narrative, which, despite presenting Italy's weight dealing with the migrant flows, does not present them as security issues.

Gentiloni advised the other EU members to follow cooperative solutions. For the Italian Prime Minister these solutions passed through a better support to the Mediterranean region and Libya, as well as the creation of economic programs in the African continent (Wibaux & Milasin, 2017).

He stressed the need for the investment in Africa, which would contribute to the neighbouring continent's development, helping the African countries in dealing with the consequences of climate change, stabilizing conflict situations, like the one in Libya, and fighting human traffickers and smugglers (Askanews, 2017).

By believing that it was essential to stabilize Libya (Seldin, 2017), Gentiloni's government supported the creation of a mission team to be sent to the country in order to try to prevent the influx of migrants coming from that region. The Prime Minister said that the purpose of this mission was to assist Libya by reinforcing "their capacity to control their borders and national territory" (BBC News, 2015a).

Although this narrative in Gentiloni's speech continues to present humanitarian concerns, by defending the idea of wanting to create solutions to stabilize and develop the neighbouring continent it can be possible to recognize that some issues were placed on the security field, which could lead to the development of a securitisation process, since Gentiloni believed that the situation should be resolved far from the EU's borders, securing the safety of its populations. Still, it does not constitute a fully developed securitising move that attempts to convince Italian audiences that migration is a security problem. Regarding the growth of anti-European and anti-migration sentiments in the Italian political scenario, Gentiloni has stated that "we have always been convinced Europeans" (Politi, 2017a). He said that if there was someone that thought that the politics in the country would convert

into anti-European or populist and against an open society, that the facts would prove everyone wrong (Politi, 2017a). Rebuffing the narratives presented by populists, Gentiloni's speech acts can be perceived as Europeanists and humanitarian, despite his criticisms towards the inaction of the EU and his will to resolve the crisis away from the country's shores. Therefore, these speeches did not meet the required criteria by which it could be argued that a securitisation process regarding migration was undergoing in the country at the time.

After the general elections of March 2018 led to a hung parliament result (Sala, 2018) the anti-establishment party, Five Star Movement [M5S], led by Luigi Di Maio, and Matteo Salvini's right-wing party, Northern League, formed a coalition between the two parties (The Local Italy, 2018). Despite being an independent, Giuseppe Conte was proposed for the role of Prime Minister, by Di Maio and Salvini (Giuffrida, Kirchgaessner, & Henley, 2018), and later invited by president Mattarella to form a government (Breda, 2018). Conte's first cabinet became relevant to the political scenario in Europe because it was considered a "populist" government, the first on the continent (Manganaro, 2018). The views and narratives of its deputy Prime Ministers regarding the issues of migration were the main reason for this categorization.

Conte demanded that the EU should had put in practice solidarity between Member States on matters regarding migration. He stated that this solidarity had been "announced but not yet implemented" (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, 2019), which led the new Italian-Prime Minister to calling on the European leaders and of other nations to collaborate on developing "concrete initiatives" (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, 2019) and avoid the dangers of handling migration through "emergency management" task (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, 2019).

In these words, it becomes evident that Conte continued to present the EU as the audience of his speech acts. He stated that it had become clear that the management of the migrant flows arriving in Europe had been a failure (The Local Italy, 2018) because, in his opinion, the EU had allowed many of its Member States to close their borders (The Local Italy, 2018). He considered that this was a selfish action that ended up burdening the countries that form the external border of the Schengen Area, like Italy, by leaving them with the expenses and complications of the crisis instead of being shared (The Local Italy, 2018). By declaring that "whoever lands in Italy, lands in Europe" (Kingston & Waterfield,

2018) and that "Italy's coasts are Europe's coasts" (Kington & Waterfield, 2018), Conte believed that the reallocation of migrants and asylum seekers around the EU should have been obligatory (Agence France-Presse, 2018c); (The Local Italy, 2018)

Conte expressed that Italy would always defend migrants that arrive legally in the country and "who work and integrate themselves in [the] community while respecting the law and making a positive contribution to development" (The Local Italy, 2018). However, in order to guarantee this essential integration, Italy and the EU, besides fighting against human trafficking, should also reorganize and consolidate their reception systems as well as eradicate the diffusion of groups of organized crime (The Local Italy, 2018).

It is possible to analyze that the Prime Minister's speeches continue to reflect the same narrative of his predecessors. Conte believed that Italy was carrying out its humanitarian role in the crisis alone which made him criticize the other Member States of the EU. However, his Europeanist discourse allowed him to defend resolution for the emergency situation by appealing the EU to avoid the positioning of migration issues in the security sphere. Therefore, it is possible to declare that Conte's speech acts do not present the features of a process of securitisation.

Throughout the analysis of the speech acts of the three Prime Ministers there does not seem to be the existence of a securitisation process. Rather, it is possible to witness to the prevalence of humanitarian discourse, even if combined with inaction and incompetence on the part of the EU to respond to the situation, which cannot be considerate as the equivalent of securitisation. Despite Conte's speeches presenting a more humanitarian and pro-European narrative, his interventions ended up becoming overshadowed by Luigi Di Maio and Matteo Salvini. The deputy Prime Ministers demonstrated, throughout the period of the first Conte government, different views from the Italian Prime Minister, which became more relevant in the political scenario of Italy and the EU, because of their populist nature.

For Di Maio, migration had become a national security issue because the country could "no longer support these flows" (Linkiesta, 2020). By expressing this fear, he stated that the government would not allow the arrival of millions of migrants in the country as a result to the Libyan crisis situation (Sky TG24, 2019), which led to the prohibition of the

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landing, on the Italian shores, of rescue boats transporting migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. He specified that the 'closed ports' measures were only occasional, however "in the face of an intensification of the crisis [they] would not be enough" (Sky TG24, 2019). Although his rhetoric on migration was more restrained than that of the League, the leader of the M5S called the Non-governmental organizations [NGOs] rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean as a "sea-taxi service" that should be stopped immediately (Camilli, 2018; Ellyatt, 2018). By stating that he preferred to support the Italians, which in his opinion where in more need, "rather than resign himself to immigration", Di Maio believed that the decline in the Italian population's demographic could not be a motive to promote migration (il Post, 2018).

Di Maio's speeches can be perceived as a contrast to the discourses previously presented by Conte because the Minister of Economic Development, Labour and Social Policies openly stated that migration, in his opinion, should be treated as a security issue. He criticized the situation created in Italy by contesting the rescuing of migrants in the Mediterranean and by defending the closing of the Italian ports. This narrative and measures can be perceived as an attempt securitising the referent object of migration the part of the deputy Prime Minister.

However, despite these affirmations during the time of the first Conte government, it is important to note that Di Maio's discourse changed its tone after the beginning of Conte's second term in office in which he took over the place of the minister of foreign affairs. This could mean that eventually he abandoned the ideas of securitising the migration issues, mainly because the coalition with Salvini's party ended.

Regarding migration, the League's leader, Matteo Salvini, promised an assertive response to immigration, by means of slogans such as "let's help them at home" (Camilli, 2018) and "Italians first" (Camilli, 2018).

He said he related to the beliefs of the Hungarian president, Viktor Orbán, who had always opposed the obligatory quotas for the distribution of migrants throughout the EU's Member States (Camilli, 2018). Salvini declared that Italy could not turn out to be "Europe's refugee camp" and that there was a need from "common sense" to prevent this situation from becoming a reality (Agence France-Presse, 2018a, 2018b).

Accusing the Dublin protocol's regulation of unduly burdening external border Member States in the Mediterranean, Salvini argued that these directives were leading to "an obvious imbalance in management, numbers and costs" in the EU (Agence France-Presse, 2018b).

While saying that "the good times for [illegal migrants were] over" (Agence France-Presse, 2018b), he promised to cutback the numbers of arrivals and to increase the promptitude for expulsions (Agence France-Presse, 2018a).

The words of Salvini express disregard of the humanitarian causes of migration and it is possible to perceive that he believed that migration issues belonged in the sphere of security. This can be considered a starting point of a securitisation process, to the extent that his discourses increasingly sought to influence public's perception of migration and regard it as something to fear. Believing that "illegal immigration [was] a business" (Agence France-Presse, 2018b), Salvini stated that the situation had become an "emergency in the country" that it would induce "chaos, anger [and] social confrontation" in the population (Ellyatt, 2018). What Salvini called organized migration had, in his opinion, the objective of "replacing the Italian people with other people, Italian workers with other workers" (BBC News, 2019). Salvini stated that "the Italian ports [should] remain closed" (Butini, 2019; Sky TG24, 2019) and that while he was the Minister of the interior "anyone leaving Libya [could not] be considered a refugee" (Sky TG24, 2019).

Affirming that all those arriving to the country's ports were irregular migrants, Salvini argue that "if the EU [did] not intervene, no one [would come] down"(Butini, 2019; Nuti & Tripodi, 2018) of the boats and enter the country. Regarding the rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea, Salvini said that "it [was] better to spend money in the countries of origin (Agence France-Presse, 2018b), however "if there are NGOs that want to work for free, that's fine" (Agence France-Presse, 2018b; Butini, 2019). He changed his narrative regarding these rescues since previously he had titled them as "smugglers" (Agence France-Presse, 2018b) and blamed them of complying with human traffickers (Agence France-Presse, 2018b). Concerning the situation in Italy, Salvini recognized that the country was "ready to face any emergency" (Sky TG24, 2019). He also felted that the country was prepared since it was not experiencing "the hundreds of thousands of landings that Italians were accustomed to in past years" (Sky TG24, 2019).

Salvini's discourse regarding the migration situation in Italy can still be characterized as a precursor to a securitisation process by the ways in which the Minister of the Interior frequently presented the migration issues as a threat to Italy and its people. He feared that illegal migration, which he believed was being made through organized crime, was harming the country.

Another evidence of the beginning of a securitisation process was the closing of the Italian ports to the landing of rescue boats, made by the leader of the League, which was legitimized by the idea that the issue should not be dealt in the country because it was a threat to the safety of its population.

However, these positions were usually framed in Salivini's criticism of the EU's action during the crisis and of the Dublin protocol, which he thought that were unfair to Italy. Consequently, Salvini's partial securitisation of the migration issue was predominantly meant as a way to pressure greater cooperation on the EU's part, and not an attempt to turn migration into a security issue to be increasingly managed by the state. To an extent, the audience of his speeches was the EU also, and not only the Italian electors. Hence, it can be argued that only a partial securitisation move regarding migration was undergoing in Italy, and not a fully-fledged securitisation process.

In the case of Italy is possible to conclude that the most relevant political figures in the country, during the period of time in analysis, despite the majority of their discourses being presented as humanitarian, did in fact present some speech acts that would allow the creation of a securitisation process, like Salvini. However, they can only be considerate as precursors of this process since their main audience had become the EU itself, as a form of pressure on the European institutions, and not completely on its population. In both cases it is not possible to analyse a complete acceptance of these speech acts by the audience and, therefore, they cannot become a full securitisation process.

2.2 – Hungary

This section analyses of the case of Hungary. This Member-State was chosen between others countries participants of the Schengen Agreement because of its clear positions regarding migration and border control over the years as also because it has become one of the main countries of passage for migrants. The country's right-wing ruling party, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance, can be considered as one of Europe's most

conservative parties and one of the most Eurosceptic. Therefore, by analysing the party's leader, Viktor Orbán, it will be possible to understand its speeches and actions regarding migration issues throughout the recent years.

During the 'European migrant crisis', Hungary has always presented itself with a discourse against migration. In 2015, in spite of the implementation of the Dublin Regulation there was an increased influx of migrants trying to enter into the Schengen Area which led the country to take harsh political positions regarding what were considered as illegal entries. Claiming "that the EU was 'too slow to act'" (Bocskor, 2018; Nolan, 2015). With the aim of safeguarding the country's border security by avoiding the entrance of illegal immigrants by giving migrants the option of entering the country via the official checkpoints, Hungary began a process that placed it against European and International laws by means of the construction of fences alongside the border of Serbia, which were finished in September of 2015, and with works on the Croatian border, that started later that same year (BBC News, 2015c).

Already the idea of going against the Schengen Acquis in itself can be perceived as a securitisation move since the creation of physical borders between Member States of the Schengen Agreement was an action responding to the perception of a possible threat. In fact, the action taken by Hungary, and mainly its Prime Minister, of creating borders with the expressed aim of safeguarding the national security of the country can be perceived as a great example of a securitisation process occurring during this period because, as stated previously, when something becomes securitised, exceptional measures are allowed. The figure of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, became extremely prominent in the migration discussion not only in the Hungarian context but in the European as well. For Viktor Orbán "2015 was a difficult year for Europe (…) [and] for Hungary in particular [because] unidentified and unknown people in their millions emerged on the southern borders of Hungary and the European Union" (Orbán, 2016a). In the autumn of 2015, the Hungarian response to the migrant situation in the continent was explicit. By being a border country of the Schengen Area, Hungary's reaction consisted of controlling borders, identifying migrants, intercepting illegal movements and turning back those that were not deemed fit to enter the country (Orbán, 2016a). This strong response made by the Hungarian government was maintained throughout the period of time of the crisis in analysis, from 2015 until 2019, especially through the vocal narratives made by the Prime

Minister. For Viktor Orbán, the unregulated massive flux of migrants into Europe could be perceived as a threat that could have explosive consequences and at the same time the EU's response was misguided and insufficient (Traynor, 2015a). In his article to the Germany's Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper, Orbán claimed that Europe would find itself debilitated, while fighting a battle for its fate. However, he also called out "every European politician who holds out the promise of a better life to immigrants and encourages them to leave everything behind and risk their lives in setting out for Europe" as irresponsible and asked for the "acknowledge that the European Union's misguided immigration policy is responsible for this situation" (Traynor, 2015a).

Orbán added that "the razor-wire fence erected on Hungary's southern border with Serbia was essential to defending the Schengen zone's external borders" (Traynor, 2015a). The control of borders, which was argued to have become essential to defend the Schengen Area, also legitimized Orbán's denial "that the emergency was a refugee crisis"; rather describing it as "one of mass migration" (Traynor, 2015a). Expressing that "those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture" (Traynor, 2015a), Orbán was concerned that since most of the migrants were Muslims that the European identity which, according to him, is rooted in Christianity, would be threatened. This gave "no option but to defend [our] borders" (Traynor, 2015a). He also stated that "quotas were not the answer" and that they are "an invitation for those who want to come" (Traynor, 2015a). In Orbán's words it is possible to identify an attempt at a process of securitisation since Orbán protrays migrants as a threat in his speech acts and claims that the only solution to protecting Hungary, and Europe, was to defend their borders through extraordinary measures. He also presents concerns regarding their religion and the possible risk that it can have to European identity. Continuing his stance against the migration situation on the continent, Orbán started to describe those entering Europe "as looking like an army" (Agence France-Presse, 2015b). Stating that the phenomenon that was being faced was not a refugee crisis but "an uncontrolled and unregulated" migratory flow (Agence France-Presse, 2015b). By comparing the flux of migrants to an army Orbán was clearly seeking to convey the perception to the general public of a potential threat, installing fear amongst the population. This speech act can be perceived as the precursor of a process of securitisation. Nevertheless, for a securitisation process to exist, the act alone is not enough, but it needs to be accepted as such by the audience. The extraordinary measures taken by the Hungarian government to contain the migration flow, such as the building of

physical fences, appears to confirm that at least in part a securitisation process is occurring in Hungary.

Declaring that "just because we do not consider [migrants] as enemies, we must not act against ourselves" (Agence France-Presse, 2015b). In Orbán's view, Hungary thus had the moral responsibility of returning those migrant people back to their places of origin (Agence France-Presse, 2015b).

The Hungarian Prime Minister belief that "the continent [was] under threat of an ever-growing modern exodus" (Karnitschnig, 2015) continued to fuel the speech of the importance of protecting Hungary's borders since in his own words, "there is no point in discussing any other issue until the flood has been halted" (Karnitschnig, 2015). This alleged 'exodus' was, in Orbán's view, threatening "to undermine Europe's culture and way of life" (Karnitschnig, 2015). These beliefs started to lead to what has begun to be viewed as a dictatorial style of speech from Viktor Orbán part. An example of his increasing usage of far-right vocabulary, Orbán has established in his speeches the reference to "illegal aliens" instead of any kind of migrant category (Karnitschnig, 2015). Believing that Europe's culture was under threat and referring to migrants as aliens can be understood as a catalyst seeking to generate fear in the perceptions of the populations regarding migrants, and thus evidence of a clear securitisation move. Furthermore, Orbán's comments on religion also played the role in trying to trigger fear in the public's perception of migrants, when stating that people should not "forget that [those] who are coming here grew up in a different religion and represent a completely different culture", since "most are not Christian, but Muslim" (Karnitschnig, 2015).

Orbán blamed the crisis on what he said were the EU's "failed immigration policies" (Karnitschnig, 2015) as well as those in Europe who have said they would welcome migrants. As he said: "it is irresponsible for any European politician to give migrants hope of a better life and encourage to leave everything behind and risk their lives en route to Europe" (Karnitschnig, 2015). In Orbán's argument, the Muslim majority in the migrant population was a reason to fear those arriving at the Hungarian borders and to perceive them as a threat. In his interview to the German newspaper Bild, Viktor Orbán affirmed that Hungary would not see those entering the Schengen Area through Hungary's borders as migrants but as "Muslim invaders" (Pearson, 2018). It was his belief that the idea of welcoming "a large number of Muslims inevitably leads to parallel societies"

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(Pearson, 2018), because, according to Orbán, the European Christian based society and the Muslim society would never unite. In his own words, "multiculturalism is only an illusion" (Engel, 2015; Pearson, 2018)

This is a continuation on the narrative of the fear of Muslim migrants arriving in Europe. Building a description for migrants in this way can lead to the dissemination of fear of the different Other in the populations. By making the affirmation of 'Muslim invaders' Orbán is clearly trying to lead the audience into accepting the idea of a threat and thus a need to securitise the migration issue, which would allow the government to safeguard its population through extraordinary measures and the concentration of greater power.

In Orbán's opinion, Hungary "does not need a single migrant for the population to sustain itself or for the country to have a future" (Engel, 2015). For Orbán, "migration is poison" (Pearson, 2018), creating the idea and argument that "for us migration is not a solution but a problem". In the same interview to Bild, in 2016, Orbán also expressed that "we do not want to divide Europe, but rather protect our citizens. This means we do not want migrants to come to us" (Orbán, 2016b), because "If you take masses of non-registered immigrants from the Middle-East into your country you are importing terrorism, crime, anti-Semitism and homophobia" (Pearson, 2018; see also: Orbán, 2016b; About Hungary, 2016).

By making this statement Orbán is clearly declaring that migrants are a threat that must be stopped. By appealing to the social justice causes like anti-Semitism the fright against migrants can be spread even further in the public's opinion. According to Viktor Orbán there is a "clear link between illegal migrants coming to Europe and the spread of terrorism" (Engel, 2015; Pearson, 2018) as he stated in an interview in 2015, "(…) that all the terrorists are basically migrants" (Pearson, 2018). At the time of the first terrorist attacks in Europe, the Prime Minister continued to stress this idea that terrorists were intentionally taking advantage of mass migration into Europe to integrate amongst migrants (Engel, 2015; Pearson, 2018). The direct link between migrants and terrorism that Orbán makes is also a good example of the existence of the speech acts created by the Hungarian Prime Minister.

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In Orbán view, Hungary has always presented itself throughout history as a nation of inclusion. However, in his opinion, "those who come with the intent of re-shaping our country, who come in a violent way and against our will, always face resistance" (About Hungary, 2016a). According to the Hungarian Prime Minister "the future of the European Community is at stake" as "our common home, Europe, is not free because freedom starts with [being able to] speak the truth" (About Hungary, 2016a). He states this because of the growing criticism he faced by other EU partners for his opinions regarding mass migration as a threat, the connections he made between terrorism and the increase in crime and terrorism the suggestion that this was "not a coincidence, but a well-planned and managed action" (About Hungary, 2016a). He compared the situation lived in the European Union with "slow water that washes away the shores with permanent erosion" (About Hungary, 2016a) because even though migration is frequently presented as a humanitarian problem, nonetheless, in reality, "it is occupation of territory" (About Hungary, 2016b). To Orbán, Europeans were losing their "own territory" (About Hungary, 2016a). These comparisons are, once more, a good example of the speech acts made by Orbán while seeking the securitisation of migration.

With the affirmation "the time has come (…) to ring the alarms", Orbán claimed that "we call to unite (…) every Hungarian citizen and every nation [of Europe]" because "we must decide who we let in, and who we do not let in" (About Hungary, 2016a). It becomes clear that Orbán's main audience is the Hungarian population, which contrasts a bit with the Italian position that spoke mainly to the EU and its failure to support Italy. Nevertheless, it is important to know if the Hungarian population accepted Orban's speech acts, since for a securitising process to exist, it is fundamental that his audience accepts his speech acts and perceived the issue as a threat to the referent object, in this case, the Hungarian nation and identity.

According to Viktor Orbán, "we [need to] stop migrants at the border, we need to set up migrant or immigrant camps outside the European Union" (About Hungary, 2016b; Orbán, 2016d). Evidencing once again the securitising move by Orbán, he also noted that this tighter control of migration could "only be done with military security forces" (About Hungary, 2016b; Orbán, 2016d). This 'invitation to fight' against migrants in order to unify the public and even the proposal to create hotspots outside of the Schengen Area are clearly

measures that result from an attempted securitisation of migration presented through the speeches acts of the Prime Minister.

These measures were met with support from the majority of the Hungarian population, which allowed for Orbán to remain in power and to enforce them in the country. Therefore, it is possible to observe that there is indeed a securitisation process occurring in the country.

In Orbán's opinion, violence and terrorism "have become part of life in Western Europe" (About Hungary, 2016b; Orbán, 2016c) as an outcome of the movements of migrants in Europe. In his discourse, Orbán also perpetuated the idea that "not every country can be a member of the European Union; and not every person in the world should be able to become an EU citizen" (About Hungary, 2016b); About Hungary, 2016f). These public interventions show how Orbán differentiates and alienates migrants, seeking to create and perpetuate fear in his audience. Security can be undoubtedly presented as the main focus of Orbán's speeches. In his own words, "security is an issue which we cannot play games with" (About Hungary, 2016b). However, Europe's public security is currently being threatened by migrants because "they pose a threat to the public, and they bring terrorism upon us" (About Hungary, 2016b).

The aspects of security and threat to the public are the bases of Orbán's attempt at promoting a securitisation process around the issue of migration. This can also be seen when Orbán states that "basic principle is that it is always better to ensure that we cannot be harmed than to assume that others do not want to harm us" (About Hungary, 2016b). This statement itself can be considerate as a perfect example of the principal aspects of securitisation. We can underline that the main arguments in Orbán's speeches are the emphasis on European and national security, the link between migration and terrorism and the idea of losing the European values. The promotion of these ideas is his public interventions seek lead his audience to perceive migration as a threat and thus a security issue, making his goals the securitisation of migrations issues in order to gain more powers and control over Hungary's borders and population.

Therefore, it is possible to understand that indeed there appears to be an process of securitisation in Hungary, during this time period, concerning migration, since the speech acts of the Hungarian Prime Minister are clear and easy to identify and appear to be consent

to by the majority of their audience in ways that have permitted the government to implement extraordinary measures, such as the establishment of physical barriers on the border and tigher migration controls. The speeches of Orbán can be considered as the main influence in this process, since his presence in the political scene throughout the migration crisis had become quite prominent.

2.3 – Germany

The choice of Germany as a case study results from the fact that it is the biggest and most rich country in the EU, and thus the desired destiny for migrants to start a new life in Europe. In the case of Germany, the speeches and actions that are going to be analysed are those of the most prominent and relevant political figures at the time in this EU Member-State, with particular emphasis on the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. The rise of far-right movements in the country during this period is also an important factor to be analyzed in this investigation, hence the analysis of the political party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany), most commonly known as AfD.

Since the beginning of the migrant's flow, felt in more recent years in Europe, Germany's Chancellor presented a narrative of welcoming large numbers of people seeking shelter. The open-door policy made Germany become the second-largest destination in the world for migrants, after the United States of America, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (Sanders IV, 2019). This discourse of integrating migrants has become one of the main arguments of the German chancellor. However, in Merkel's view, the task of receiving the large amount of new arrivals is one that would take "time, strength and money" (BBC News, 2015e). Merkel was convinced that tackling "the huge task posed by the influx and integrating of so many people in the right way today, (…) will represent an opportunity for us tomorrow" (BBC News, 2015e). For the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, it was important that the German population, and Germany itself, do not allow themselves to be divided (BBC News, 2015e). She has urged Germans not to receive migrants "with coldness, or even hate in their hearts, and [not to] claim the right to be called German for themselves alone and seek to marginalise others" (BBC News, 2015e). Therefore, it is possible to identify that Merkel's speeches are directed to an explicit audience, the German population, or more specifically, the German voters.

This idea of integration and care for migrants that Merkel presents throughout the entire period of the migrant's crisis clearly avoids treating migration as a security issue and, as such, there is no evidence of an attempt to initiate a securitisation process around this issue on Merkel's part.

By defending that there should be an open-door policy, in Germany and in Europe (Oltermann, 2020) Merkel continued to present the integration of migrants as the solution to the situation in the EU. The insistence of this narrative by the German chancellor continues to show that there are no signs of a securitisation process since in her speeches the narrative of migration is never put in the sphere of fear or presented as a security issue.

Merkel insisted that a situation like the one endured in late summer of 2015 "can, should and must not be repeated" (Hasselbach, 2020). She ultimately ended up describing the year of 2015 as "an unbelievable year" (BBC News, 2015d) because of the feeling of experiencing "something that was far away from us [and] is now literally at our front door" (BBC News, 2015d). Even in the wake of the terrorist attack of 2016, which occurred at the Berlin Christmas market, Merkel defended her decision to suspend the Dublin protocol and let migrants move into the country, since she had call out Germans to counter the spread of hate in the country with humanity (Mohdin, 2017). Despite showing some concerns with the toughness of the troubling year of 2015, Merkel preserved the humanitarian theme in her speeches even after the terrorist attacks that occurred in Germany in the following year. Merkel famous phrase, "wir schaffen das" (Bathke, 2020; Oltermann, 2020), which can be translated to 'we can do it' or 'we will manage', would end up becoming one of the German government's mottos throughout the period of this crisis. This well-known phrase of the German chancellor comes to be as a response to the challenges presented to Germany by increasing migration. Presenting the idea that "Germany is a strong country" (BBC News, 2015b; Ofman, 2020; Oltermann, 2020), Merkel believed that the country and its people had already been able to accomplish so much that they were able to manage this situation as well (Ofman, 2020).

However, the growing right-wing party, AfD came to increasingly offer a counter-narrative that clearly sought a securitisation of the migration issue. Much of the AfD's speech was structured around the idea that, in fact "we do not want to manage this", and that Merkel was asking the German audience to cope with rising levels of crime, terrorism and public disorder (Nougayrède, 2015). Over the years, that sentiment seems to have

gained traction in the wider German population, as is evidence by the clear electoral rise of the AfD party, which, therefore, seems to indicate some success in this attempted securitisation process by the AfD's speech acts. Having presented, in their manifesto, the idea that "Islam is not a part of Germany" (Bellon, 2016), the AfD's narrative revolves completely around the fear of the "Islamification" of the country (Connolly, 2016; see also: MacGregor, 2019). These concerns can be perceived in the words of Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, an AfD Saxony-Anhalt state representative, who has stated that "Islam is foreign to us and for that reason it cannot invoke the principle of religious freedom to the same degree as Christianity" (Bellon, 2016). The party's manifesto also exhibited several ideas that supported the apprehension towards Islam and Muslims, for example by calling for the ban of the burqa and minarets in German territory (Bellon, 2016).

This presentation of Islam and Muslims as something to be feared can be characterized as a speech act seeking to securitise migration in Germany by spreading in the privileged AfD's audience, the German electorate, the fear of migrants and, consequently, their perception as a threat that needs to be dealt with as a security issue. The partial success of this securitising move can be observed by the party's considerable rise in polls and elections in the years during the crisis. However, despite a securitisation process being created, this could only be completed if the AfD would be able, on the basis of this growing power, to influence public policy on migration in a strong sense, something that has hitherto not happen in a significant way.

Despite the party's harsh position throughout the migrant crisis, Frauke Petry, the party's leader at the time, rejected the notion that the party was opposed to Germany welcoming migrants. However, by saying that "there is enough space for refugees in Germany but the problem is that we do not distinguish any more between migrants and asylum seekers", she has argued that the problem was that many of those arriving in the country were not truly in need (Connolly, 2016). The AfD also fed on the terrorist attacks and other calamities like the mass sexual assaults that occurred in Cologne during the New Year's Eve 2015/2016. Resorting to social media platforms several members of the party, like Beatrix von Storch, used these sporadic events to spread hate speeches against migration (Gedmin, 2019; Oltermann, 2020). She stated that there was an appeasement of "barbaric, Muslim, rapist hordes of men" (Gedmin, 2019; Oltermann, 2020) in the country and she even sought to promote a narrative that legitimized the shooting of those who were trying to enter the continent and the country without visa (Oltermann, 2020). These

controversial statements made by von Storch led to her facing accusations of violating the hate-speech laws of Germany (Gedmin, 2019). With this kind of speeches, the far-right party continues to perpetuate hate towards migrants and especially those of Muslim beliefs. This can be seen as a securitisation move via which the party seeks to kickstart a securitisation process around the issue of migration as a way to reinforce its own power potential and influence public policy on this issue.

For example, the AfD has called for the closing of EU's borders and the creation of holding camps outside of Germany's borders to accommodate the influx of migrants, calling for Germany to secure its borders and sovereignty. This process would prevent migrants from entering Germany and thus contribute to the party's goal, according to AfD's co-leader at the time Alice Weidel, of achieving "negative immigration to Germany" (MacGregor, 2019).

The far-right party has positioned itself against the EU and its stance regarding migration, calling out "Europe's policy on immigration [as] a danger to European civilization" (MacGregor, 2019). It has become clear that the AfD is in opposition to what the party called the absorption of millions of migrants, while the problems that, in their opinion, Germany was facing being ignored. By refusing the idea of sharing quotas between the European countries, because they wanted to decide for themselves who is allowed to enter in Germany, the party stated that there is no "human right to Europe" (MacGregor, 2019).

AfD's principal argument for the closing borders to migration was thus connected to the perception of a threat to Germany's national identity. The party's manifesto itself claimed that "Islam is a great threat to our state, our society and our values" (MacGregor, 2019). Von Storch stated that the party was not opposed to Muslims; however, the AfD does not want Germany to become a Muslim nation.

She said, "We do not want to accept that Islam is starting to have an impact on our social life, on our public life" (MacGregor, 2019), adding that the rising numbers of crime rates in the country were all seen within the groups of Muslim migrants (MacGregor, 2019).

The lack of a humanitarian theme in the party's speeches, as well as the continued spread of hate against migrants, are the main reasons why the AfD's discourse can be described as a speech act seeking the securitisation of migration. The ways that the party vilifies Islam and describes it as a threat to Germany and its national identity clearly seeks

to nurture feelings of fear and distrust of migrants in the German public. This serves as a platform of a securitisation process of migration that ultimately seeks to reinforce the party's electoral power and its influence over public policies. Judging by the rise in vote intentions and the more recent elections results, the AfD's securitisation attempt seems to have been at least partially successful. However, the AfD's securitisation attempt strongly contrasts with the overall positioning of Chancellor Merkel, who has repeatedly state that "there is a moral obligation to save people in need" (Nougayrède, 2015), and that the number of individuals willing on helping others, especially strangers, was far greater than those with prejudice against people from other countries (BBC News, 2015b). So far, the AfD has not been successful in influencing public policy, as the ruling party, led by Chacellor Merkel, continues to emphasise the "moral obligation to save people in need", viewing migrants as a solution to compensate problems that the European continent and the EU face, like the aging of its populations and high levels of unemployment. This need for migration could only be met if legal channels would be opened in honourable and sustainable ways and if the right resources would be dedicated to integration (Nougayrède, 2015). With this rhetoric Merkel continues to promote in her speeches the humanitarian theme and avoid a securitisation of the issue of migration.

Merkel confessed that Germany had made mistakes throughout the migrant crisis. She accentuated that the mistake was not the welcoming of migrants fleeing conflicts, but that Germany had not prepared for their arrival, mainly while civil conflicts had begun to arise through the north of Africa and the Middle East (Schumacher, 2020; Hasselbach, 2020). In Merkel's opinion, another mistake made "was not to have paid attention to create an environment where people can stay in their own country" (Hasselbach, 2020; Schumacher & Martyr, 2020). By stating this, Merkel expressed the need of preventing one more major humanitarian crisis and migrant influx (Hasselbach, 2020; Schumacher & Martyr, 2020). Calling for greater co-operation (BBC News, 2015b), she suggested that the leaders from the different regions of the globe needed to restart diplomacy and bilateral relations. However, according to the chancellor's opinion, in spite of the ever-growing globalization, we now inhabit in a world "where [the] lack of speech is more pronounced than during the Cold War" (Hasselbach, 2020; Schumacher & Martyr, 2020).

For the German chancellor, Europe as a whole need to improve the ways it deals with migrants and refugees arriving on the continent because "if Europe fails on the

question of refugees, then it will not be the Europe we wished for" (BBC News, 2015b). Therefore, in her view, the European countries should share between them the weight of welcoming migrants (BBC News, 2015b). Merkel said that the migration situation in Europe would end up being a bigger preoccupation in the European nations, even more than the euro crisis, because, the issue of asylum "could be the next major European project" (Nougayrède, 2015). On the one hand, in Merkel speeches, she presents the need for the EU to develop proper policies for the arrival and settlement of migrants. Hence, in spite of her urgency to ensure that Europe and the EU can be better prepared for the situation, it is not possible to identify a process of securitisation in her speech acts because, once again, her intentions are reflecting on a humanitarian perspective instead of focusing on fear and security issues.

Furthermore, despite the AfD efforts of placing the migration issues into the sphere of security considering them as threats to the German population, these acts alone cannot be considerate as a fully-fledged process of securitisation, since, according to what is presented by the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation, in order for this process to occur it is necessary for the audience to accept the speech acts in such a way that legitimizes extraordinary measures to deal with the threat. This cannot be considered the case since the far-right party, despite a rise in polls, hitherto does not have the power to influence public policy in a significant manner and make its speech acts accepted by the majority of its audience.

Conclusion

The analyses of the discourses of the most prominent political figures in the Member States chosen as cases of study allows the assessment of whether there is a securitisation process occurring in these countries concerning the influx of migrants in the period between 2015 and 2019. Taking into account the speech acts and discourses that were analysed in this chapter, it becomes possible to demonstrate what can be considered the position and response of these Member States to the migration flows and its related issues on the continent. In this chapter it is possible to observe that the discourse presented by these Member States, in its majority, differs between them, which makes their position regarding the topics of migration uneven and divergent from one-another.

Throughout the period of time established for this analysis it is possible to verify that the humanitarian theme is present in the speeches of the German chancellor and in all of the Italian Prime Ministers analysed, despite the situation in Italy being different from that of Germany.

Nevertheless, the same cannot be said about the Hungarian Prime Minister's narratives discourse. This appears as extremely anti-immigration due to the political convictions of his conservative party. Also, the rise of the far-right and populisms on the continent allowed for the dissemination of anti-European and anti-migration sentiments throughout the Member States, in which the German right-party AfD and the Italian deputy Prime Ministers Di Maio and Salvini took part. All of these political figures present a securitarian discourse, since in their speeches migration is declared as a security issue and is perceived by populations as a threat.

However, it is not possible to determinate a narrative that can be perceived as a securitisation process in all of the cases of study, since all the requirements to the creation of this process, according to the Copenhagen School theory, cannot be found throughout the analysis of the three cases.

Despite the speech acts presented by all the political figures analyzed, and the great contrast between the two types of speeches made, a securitisation process could only be found in the case of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whose securitising speech acts appear to have been accepted by his audience, legitimizing extraordinary measures taken by the state to contain the perceived threat of migration. Regarding the cases of Germany and Italy this process of securitisation does not appear to be taking part because, on the one hand, the principal political figures (the Italian Prime Ministers and the German Chancellor) of these countries do not engage in securitarian speech acts but instead they chose a humanitarian discourse and, on the other hand, because the parties that have speech acts regarding migrants like Germany's AfD and Matteo Salvini in Italy could only reach a part of their national audiences which prevents the securitisation process to occur.

Nevertheless, the Schengen Area's security does not depend only on its Member States but also on the supervision of the EU and its institutions. Therefore, it is also important to analyse their speeches and actions taken regarding the Migrant's flow into the continent. This analysis will be made in the following chapter.

3. Case studies: Securitisation in the Schengen Area, the European Union response

The fourth chapter of this dissertation considers the reactions of some of the European political institutions to the migrant crisis in order to verify if there are indications of a process of securitisation occurring in this context. In this chapter the political institutions that will be observed are the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, as well as the European Council.

According to Nugent (2010) and Silva (2013) the political institutions of the European Union are presented through a hierarchy in which at its top is the European Council. However, the core of the European system is constituted by three essential political institutions - the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union - commonly known as the Institutional Triangle (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013).

Following this hierarchy, the first to be analysed in this chapter is the European Council. This Council is regarded as the maximum organic entity of the Union as soon as it was elevated as an institution of full right with the Treaty of Lisbon after it came into force in 2009. Therefore, the first section analysis the speeches that the European Council made in relation to the migration crisis, through the timeline presented in this dissertation, as well as the speeches produced in regard to the actions taken by the three countries examined in the previous chapter, them being Italy, Hungary and Germany. The speeches of the President of the European Council will also be taken into account.

The second section of this chapter examines the EU Institutional Triangle by analysing each political institution and their speeches regarding the migrant crisis in conjunction also with their reactions to the behaviour partaken by the same three countries previously mentioned. This organic triple podium, composed by the Council of the European Union, European Commission and the European Parliament, holds the normative power and is the maker of legislative acts: it proposes, decides and executes or coordinates the decisions and supervises their implementation (Silva, 2013). The decision-making procedures are differentiated and the responsibilities of each of the three institutions are unevenly divided. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse each institution separately so that it is possible to perceive and better understand their speeches and reactions to the crisis.

On this section, the speeches off the presidents of the different institutions, Council, Commission and the European Parliament, will also be analysed. The speeches of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy regarding the same aspects are also analysed because, despite being a member of the European Commission it has a specific role in the external relations of the Union while conducting the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security Defence policy (EUR-Lex, no date b).

Before examining each institution's response to the migrant flow and then crisis it will be necessary, for a better and more accurate analysis, to comprehend and study these European institutions: their purpose, how they work and their mechanisms. Therefore, each section presents a brief characterization of all the European political institution chosen for this analysis.

It is relevant to remember that the methodology for this chapter will follow the same lines of the previous ones by using descriptive, documentary and explanatory methods, collecting data from reports, working papers, academic texts and official documents so it can be possible to apply the securitisation theory while analysing the speeches of these institutions regarding the migration crisis. The geographical and temporal delimitation will still be the same by focusing on the European zone that comprises the Schengen Area since 2015, year of the peak of the so-called crisis.

3.1 – European Council

As previously stated, to better analyse the actions and speeches of the political institutions of the EU it is necessary to understand how they are composed and how they work. Therefore, the first institution to be analysed, following the hierarchy presented, is the European Council. This political institution of the EU is responsible for defining the political guidelines and the priorities of the Union, and it has no legislative function. It is formed by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, the President of the European Council as well as by the President of the Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also has a participation in the European Council's works (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013).

It deliberates generally by consensus; however, the decision forms provided by the treaties, unanimity and qualified majority, can be used without prejudice. The European Council will normally meet twice a semester, nonetheless if it is indispensable there can be extraordinary or informal meetings throughout the year. It is also important to note that the creation of the position of the President of the European Council made it possible for the Council to have a stable presidency, while giving Europe an international face meaning that there was someone responsible for representing the Union. However, the creation of this institutional figure did not overthrow the rotating presidencies of the Council of the European Union (Silva, 2013).

During the period of time in analysis, the European Council was chaired by Donald Tusk. The former Polish prime minister was elected for his first term as President of the European Council in 2014, which lasted until 2017, when he was re-elected for a second term that ended in November 2019.

Exposing that the Union's "overriding priority [was] to prevent more people from dying at sea" and that the member states needed "to agree on very practical measures, in particular by strengthening search and rescue possibilities", he called and chaired emergency summits in order to prompted the European leaders to agree on swift and competent actions (Kingsley and Traynor, 2015). In relation to how the EU could respond to the great influx of migrant's, Tusk initially supported the quota plan created by the Commission, however he intended a greater target which would call for a "fair distribution of at least 100,000 refugees" (Peter, 2015). In his opinion, it was also fundamental that the reception centres should be created "closer to conflict areas outside Europe, where refugee camps already exist" which would allow for all asylum seekers to get to the EU (Peter, 2015).

Tusk continued to support the idea of a must needed global and community solidarity on the migrant crisis and the assistance on the EU's responsibility to mitigate migrants' current necessities as well as long-term ones (Reuters, 2016). These efforts were noticed prior to the signing of the EU-Turkey deal regarding a combined approach to the migrant crisis due to the presence of the President of the European Council in the country. There, Tusk suggest the possibility of the EU return migrants, especially those with economic motives, back into Turkey, after their landing in Europe, in an attempt to discourage the perilous movement of migrants through this route and the usage of smugglers (Gidda, 2016). He continued this narrative by alluring "all potential illegal

economic migrants" to "not come to Europe", because believing in smugglers, risking their lives and money "[would be] all for nothing" (BBC News, 2016b). Tusk also urged the member states to avoid the creation of unilateral actions to deal with the crisis since the EU was prepared to support financially the neighbouring countries like Syria and Iraq. This measure was taken in order "to expect a more intensive engagement from our partners as an absolute precondition to avoid a humanitarian disaster" (BBC News, 2016b).

The President of the European Council's statements became controversial by 2017 when a note on migration made by Tusk to the EU leaders indicated that the 2015 migration relocation quota system was "ineffective" and "highly divisive") and that it was a failure (Rankin, 2017a; Zalan, 2017). These declarations incited some institutional divisions and threaten the show of unity in the EU; nevertheless, Tusk blamed the disunions on "emotions which make it hard to find even a common language and rational arguments for this debate" (Rankin, 2017a).

Tusk alleged that "if there is no solution (…) on the issue of mandatory quotas, the president of the European council [would] present a way forward" in which "only member states are able to tackle the migration crisis effectively" (Rankin, 2017b). He believed that "the EU's role is to offer its full support in all possible ways to help member states handle the migration crisis" (Rankin, 2017b), however the EU does not have the legal possibility or the capacity to supplant the member states (Rankin, 2017b).

On the last years of his second and last term, the European council president declared that the stakes were still very high for the migrant crisis and that the time was short for action. By urging the member states to carry a more calculated notice at how to handle migration, Tusk stated that "a precondition for a genuine EU migration policy [was] that Europeans [should] effectively decide who enters European territory" (Banks, 2018). In his opinion the failure of accomplishing this objective would demonstrate the EU's fragility, "and above all, it could create the impression that Europe does not have an external border" (Banks, 2018).

The president of the European Council, Tusk, presented a humanitarian speech throughout his presidency, although some of his actions could be considerate as security measures.

Regarding the European Council in itself as an institution, throughout the timeline of the crisis has presented some efforts and speeches displaying its efforts in handling the migration securitisation processes. During the year of 2015, which is considerate as the

year where the peak of the crisis was reached, and as the beginning of the period of time in analysis, the European Council has had several meetings, some special and/or informal, focusing on tackling the situation. On these meetings several topics were discussed relating to migration topics; however, there was the need to select between them those that present the most relevant topics regarding the analysis of this dissertation concerning the existence of processes of securitisation applying to the questions raised by the migrants' flows. For this reason, the most common subjects chosen to be analysed were those related to migratory routes and third countries relationships (mostly Libya); the EU-Turkey deal; the Frontex and the Schengen Area and the EU's external borders.

On April 23rd, a special meeting of the European Council was held in which the EU heads of state and government decided to mobilise their energies to avoid more people from dying in the Mediterranean and to focus on the root origins of migration flows (European Council, 2015q). Their decision focused on a response that went through consolidating the EU's presence at sea; fighting against smugglers; averting the unlawful migratory flows and reinforcing EU solidarity and accountability. These became the four main points in the European Council response. The EU leaders also expressed the need for reinforcement of the Triton and Poseidon operations, by measurably, increasing their financial means in 2015 and 2016 (European Council, 2015q). On the 26th of June, the Council the EU leaders established a group of measures, based on the Commission's agenda for migration, that would cover fields such as the replacement, resettlement and return and readmission of migrants, as well as the cooperation with third countries (European Council, 2015f).

At the Informal meeting of heads of state or government on September 23 rd the EU leaders set a list of priorities for their action in order to better achieve the points and measures established up to that time. From this list the priorities ranged from countering the critical necessities of migrants and refugees through the support of international organizations and other countries, to supporting the Western Balkan countries in managing the migrant flows; concentrate on the root sources of illegal migration in the African countries; confronting the circumstances on the EU's external border, assist the Member States that are located on the front-line via the establishments of hotspots and guaranteeing the relocation and return of migrants. There was also a discussion on how to focus on and

deal with lasting migratory challenges as well as on the need for rehabilitated diplomatic efforts with countries like Libya and Syria (European Council, 2015i).

By the 15th of October the European Council meeting led to an agreement between the EU leaders in which a sequence of priorities was laid down. They have decided on cooperating with the countries of origin and transit, greeting the arrangement on an EU-Turkey cooperative strategy and the will to accomplish solid operative procedures at the meeting with the African leaders in the Valletta Summit; reinforcing the EU's external border with the inclusion of a cohesive border supervision that would overcome the mandate of the Frontex, as well as the addition of reinforcement guards in hotspot areas in Italy and Greece and the return and readmission of migrants by enhancing the aspects and performance of Frontex and improving these implementations according with the current legislations and agreements (European Commission, 2015).

As the EU heads of state or government met with the African leaders to debate migration matters, during the Valletta Summit on migration that took place on the 12th of November, an action strategy was settled upon that would focus on five areas that should be tackled with priority. This plan would: address the source of forced movements and illegal asymmetrical migration; organise and improve the promotion of legal migration routes; increase the safety of migrants; tackle the smuggling and exploitation of migrants, as well as the improvement assistance on the return, readmission and reintegration of migrants (European Council, 2015j). On that same day, an informal meeting of heads of state or government occurred. During this meeting, the most recent developments of the crisis were taken into account as the EU leaders discussed the speed up of the process of implementation of the measures that were agreed on the previous months of September and October. A major point on these discussions was the need for cooperation with Turkey. During the meeting the President of the European Council Donald Tusk echoed the need for the EU to recover the control of the Union's external borders and to adequately advance to the process of register migrants (European Council, 2015p).

The Meeting of the EU heads of state or government with Turkey occurred on the 29th of November. On this date the EU and Turkey embraced a cooperative strategic plan to tackle with the migrant flow that originated with the state of affairs in Syria. This plan expected the improvement of the Union and its Member States political and financial commitment as a way to restrain and control the migration flow coming through Turkey

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into the EU. The Union devoted to arrange for an initial €3 billion of supplementary resources that would aid Turkey improve the circumstances of migrants present in the country. This plan also would include and work on an amplified collaboration concerning migrants that do not need international security and would, to another extent, allow the completion of the process of liberalization of visa in the Schengen Area to the Turkish people (European Council, 2015o, 2015n).

On the last meeting of the European Council of 2015 taken on the 17th of December the EU leaders analysed the application of the resolutions that were taken during the previous meetings. They also agreed on improving and accelerating their actions on the setup of hotspots; the carrying out of the relocation and return resolutions; the administration of the EU's external border as well as the mutual aid with countries of origin and transit of the migrant flow. On this meeting the heads of state or government also asked for a promptly examination, by the Council, of the European Commission's suggestion on the reinforcement of the EU's external border that was issued on the 15th of December (European Council, 2015a).

Throughout these meetings it is possible to analyse that the speeches and ideas presented by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States are in line with the establishment of a humanitarian response from the EU to mitigate the impact of the migrants' flow into the continent while trying to resolve the situation. However, in light with the theme of this dissertation, when looking at these actions and processes presented on these meetings it is possible to verify that some of them can be perceived has attempts from the Heads of State or Government to securitise the question of migration. The efforts put into action in order to stop the migration flows and illegal routes in the countries of origin as well as the agreements with third/neighbouring countries, like Turkey, can be perceived as securitising moves from the EU leaders regarding this topic. It is also possible to perceive a security move in the efforts put in the EU's presence in the Mediterranean Sea by gifting Frontex with more powers and capacity in its missions. These actions made by the Heads of State or Government raise the possible conclusion that in fact it is not possible to observe a securitisation process, since this political institution does not present speech acts regarding migration as a security issues and because in order for it to happen it is needed for the audience of this institution to accept them as a threat.

On the 18th of February 2016's European Council the EU leaders decided that a European unanimity on the migration crisis was required as well on the application of the decisions engaged in the prior year. For this effect the heads of state or government focused on adopting measures that would build the unanimity expected. These measures should: induce an evolution on the execution of the EU-Turkey action plan; provide the humanitarian support to migrants and those in need; guarantee that the hotspots created are completely operational; implement the resolutions taken about relocations, returns and readmissions of migrants; increase the supervision of the external borders of the Union; and the restoration of the regular functioning of the Schengen area (European Council, 2016e).

On March 2016 the European Council held a couple of meetings with Turkey in order to reinforce their mutual aid on the migration crisis. On the 7th of March the EU leaders pushed for a quick and completed implementation of the EU-Turkey strategic plan (European Council, 2016h), while on March 18th the European Council further concentrated on the discussion of its approach to the migration crisis (European Council, 2016d). On that same day the EU and Turkish leaders encountered again, reaching an agreement that intended stopping the flow of migrants that would arrive in Europe mostly via irregular ways from Turkey. For this effect, they proposed to dismantle the business of smugglers (European Council, 2016a).

As it is possible to understand, in the following year, the line of thought and action of the European Council kept on following the humanitarian support to the migrants while focusing on security measures like the creation of hotspots preventing migrants to disperse throughout the Union's territory and the increase of supervision at the external borders. Despite these actions show an aversion, by the European Council, to the situation and try to resolve the migrant flow from outside the Union and by defending its borders, it is still not possible to identify a securitisation move, since there is a contrast between the European Council's humanitarian discourse and its security measures. It also becomes clearer the importance given to the agreement with Turkey, which will become one of the main actions from the EU leaders against the migrant's flow.

At the 23th of June's European Council the EU leaders called for additional action to contain the flow of migrants along the Central Mediterranean route that connected Libya to Italy. The call for action from the EU leaders concentrated on providing auxiliary preparation to the Libyan coast guards; a tight assistance with countries of origin and

transit. It was also stated by the EU leaders that the common asylum system was in need of reorganization (European Council, 2017b). Despite the presence of a humanitarian discourse in support of migrants throughout its meetings, it is possible to identify that this attempt, to create a series of mechanisms, like the measures that are taken and the agreements that are established with Turkey and Libya in order to keep the migrant threat at bay imply the application of security measures, however, according to the Copenhagen school in these conditions it is not possible to occur a securitisation process.

By October 19th the EU leaders settled on the terminus of the Central Mediterranean route, deciding on a stronger support to Italy's efforts on working with Libya. A pledge for the prolongation of the reform of the Dublin system at the summit of December was also made. The main objective was to aim for the EU head of state or government to reach a consensus during the first half of the next year (European Council, 2017a).

In 2017 the meetings that showed to be more relevant to be analysed were those that focus on the European Council's efforts to control and terminate the Central Mediterranean route which implied a firm connection with Libya. The decisions taken regarding the work with Libyan authorities as the actions adopted for that purpose display an attempt to create a series of mechanisms that maintain the migrant threat in the distance. In 2018, meeting during a two-day summit in Brussels on 28th and 29th of June, the EU leaders decided to improve their methods of fighting illegal migration and smugglers throughout all the migratory routes. It was also sustained by the EU leaders the creation of regional arrival platforms for those rescued by search and rescue teams at sea operations (European Council, 2018d). Also, on the 29th the EU Member States have agreed on a new funding of €3 billion for facilities receiving refugees and migrants in Turkey (European Council, 2018e). All these measures, regardless of their humanitarian value, can be identified as security actions; yet, as previously stated these are not sufficient for the creation of a securitisation process.

At the last summit of the year, on December 13th, the EU leaders, while still debating the migration issues, required for the development and implementation of the EU's policy for external migration. The heads of state or government also called for the concluding efforts for the negotiations regarding the Asylum Agency and the reformation of the EU asylum system. Concerning the internal policies of the Union, the European Commission invited the co-legislators for aiding on Frontex (European Council, 2018c).

By 2019, it was clear that "the EU must address internal and external challenges in an integrated manner" (European Council, 2019a). Therefore, on the 20th June's European Council the EU leaders request for a fully complete migration policy that would be mirrored on the strategic agenda for the 2019-2024 period (European Council, 2019a).

The years of 2018 and 2019 did not bring changes to the European Council and the EU leader's actions and speeches regarding migration, since the humanitarian speech continued present in what took respect to migrants and their living situation. However, the Council's decisions at the same time continue to assume a securitising character, considering that the European Council continued to create tools that would keep the migration risks brought by the migrant flow as far from its borders as possible. Therefore there are no evidences of the existence of a securitisation process occurring, according to the Copenhagen School criteria, since the contrast between the European Council actions and speeches do not allow it. This also demonstrates that the EU and its political institutions can take decisions without being tied to the need for a securitisation process to legitimize its security decisions.

3.2 – European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

According to Silva (2013) "The Commission is the body that promotes the Union's supranational interest" (Silva, 2013). On the five-year term that it is given, the Commission must complete its responsibilities objectively and independently. It carries out a variety of functions ranging from community policy; to implementation of the decisions adopted; execution of the budget and management of the programs; coordination and preparation of the annual and multi-annual programming; and representation of the Union externally, with the exception of the common foreign and security policy (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013).

Its current college is composed by 27 commissioners, one national member per Member-State, each one in charge of specific areas. The President of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [High Representative], one of the vice-presidents, are part of these commissioners. This political institution, as a college, is nominated by the European Council and has the obligation to report and answer to the European Parliament. It is also important to state that although the

similarity to a normal state administration, this political institution is not a European government (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013).

The role of President of the European Commission throughout the period of time of the migrant crisis was performed by the former Luxembourgish Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker. During his two-term office, from 2015 to 2019, he pushed for a major renovation of the EU immigration policies which should be composed by a common asylum and immigration policy (Traynor, 2015b). Stressing that the Schengen area would not be lost while he remained responsible for the commission's presidency, he believed it was necessary to establish a common management of EU border guards, the creation of legal passages where it would be possible to coordinate the arrivals of migrants into Europe, as well as the establishment of compulsory and long-lasting systems that would allow a fairly absorption of the influx of people across the Union (Traynor, 2015b).

Juncker complained that the member states' national governments were unsuccessful in reaching agreements on asylum procedures, which could lead to sanctions, stating that "today it is Europe that is sought as a place of refuge and exile. It is Europe today that represents a beacon of hope, a haven of stability in the eyes of women and men in the Middle East and in Africa" (Traynor, 2015b). For Juncker this idea should be "something to be proud of and not something to fear" (Traynor, 2015b).

While announcing that the commission was formulating polices that would allow the creation of legal channels and safe routes, he said that Europe had "the means to help those fleeing from war, terror and oppression" and that "migration must change from a problem to be tackled to a well-managed resource" (Traynor, 2015b).

Juncker continued his attempts on convincing the member states governments that the burden of migration should be shared evenly across the Union. However, he saw that the voluntary engagement did not work and, therefore, he swore to create a system which would allow a permanent redistribution throughout all member states. This quota system proposed by the president of the European Commission was centred on "the size of the population of a country, its gross domestic product, unemployment rate and the number of refugees already taken in" (Pop, 2015)

Describing borders as "the "worst invention ever produced by politicians" Juncker believed that "increasing border control is not how Europe should deal with the continuing challenge of the refugee crisis" (Payne, 2016). For him Europe should "show solidarity with refugees" and to "fight against nationalism" (Payne, 2016). The solidarity that Juncker

intended the member states to have with each other, regarding migrants, was also necessary to be shared with third countries, especially with the neighbouring countries of Africa. Creating funds for this purpose, Juncker announced "the launch of the EU External Investment Plan, a development initiative to encourage investment in Africa and the EU's immediate neighbours in an effort to (…) address some root causes of migration" (Abrahams, 2017).

By 2018, the EU's Commission president assured to strengthen the EU border in order to tackle migration. Juncker proposed the increase of the resources distributed to the EU external border and coastguard, which in his views, where necessary for the EU "to become a more sovereign actor on the world stage" (DW, 2018).

For Juncker, an improved European border would help the member states to implement policies concerning migration. Nevertheless, he warned that "Europe must remain a tolerant open continent. Europe will never become a fortress turning its back on the world, notably the part of the world which is suffering" (Tidey, 2018).

Junker's speeches were also in line with a humanitarian discourse; however, some of his actions also present themselves to be securitisation moves.

Regarding the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, during this period of time, it was occupied by Federica Mogherini, Italy's former Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

As the EU foreign affairs chief, Mogherini called for immediate actions on the topic of the flux of migrants arriving Europe, especially concerning the serious situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Believing that the EU and the member states "had no more excuses" she stated that "the main issue (…) [was] to build a common sense of European responsibility, knowing that there is no easy solution" (Traynor, Kirchgaessner, & Kingsley, 2015).

Urging the national governments to upkeep actions that would allow the protection of migrants in the Mediterranean, following several boat disasters at sea, Mogherini declared that it was "time for the European Union as such to tackle these tragedies without delay" (EURACTIV, 2015). She specified her believes in a statement where she said that "We need to save human lives all together, as all together we need to protect our borders and to fight the trafficking of human beings" (EURACTIV, 2015).

After the rise of internal conflicts between the member states regarding the flux of migrants arriving in the continent, the High Representative said that "we have to realize

that the blame game is not bringing any kind of positive results for any of us" (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 2015). Mogherini also stressed that the EU needed "to tackle the root causes of migration, such as the conflict in Syria, unrest in Afghanistan and parts of Africa, and failure to establish a government of national unity in Libya", while helping the influx of migrants arriving at the external border of the Union (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 2015).

In relation to the situation of member states reinstating border controls in order to halt migrants, while condemning the European unity, Mogherini believed that no one would want to calculate "the overall cost to each member nation if Schengen is suspended" (Nadeau, 2017). However, the "economic impact on a divided Europe (…) would surely cost more than what countries pay to resettle the refugees" (Nadeau, 2017)

Mogherini continued to believe that the member states should show unity and solidarity towards migrants, since in her opinion "the approach of 'we do not take them, you take them'" did not work (Abdulaal, 2018). This also implied the close partnership with neighbouring countries, especially those of North Africa (Abdulaal, 2018).

For the High Representative, the European Agenda on migration during these years was fundamental for the development of an EU external migration policy that did not exist. Mogherini credited the Union's work on this issue by stating that thru unity the EU was "saving lives and protecting those in need" while "fighting against [the]smuggling of migrants and trafficking [of] human beings" (European Commission, 2019). She believes that the period of the crisis demonstrated that the member states were not capable of facing the situation alone and that "it is only by working together, by joining forces that we can tackle these global challenges in an effective, human and sustainable way" (European Commission, 2019).

The High Representative's actions and speeches were also in line with the previous political figures and institutions, in which the narrative is presented as humanitarian, however the actions and measures to be taken are in the security field.

Facing the unparalleled influx of migrants during 2015 and 2016, with more than 1 million people arriving on the continent, the EU has had established a variety of procedures to handle the crisis. Through several means the European Commission settled on trying to find solutions to the crisis' causes while increasing the support to those needing humanitarian assistance inside and outside of the Union. For this purpose, the Commission made improvements in the Union's borders security by confronting migrant trafficking and

proposing safe and legal methods of entering the EU (European Comission, 2017). According to the Commission it is the EU's moral and legal responsibility to safeguard those in need, therefore it made the EU Member States accountable for scrutinising the asylum solicitations and deciding those that are suitable to obtain protection. This process compelled the national governments to ensure that those who do not present a valid request for protection would return to their countries of origin or to a third country they had crossed, by either voluntary decision or by using coercive procedures EU (European Comission, 2017).

The Commission also defined as the objective of continuous work the establishment of suitable child protection procedures, given the increasingly urgency of the issue relating to the escalation of the number of children migrating in the most recent years (European Comission, 2017).

The main complications faced by the Commission during this time were the massive pressure that some EU Member states felt on their resources when providing food, water and shelter to people, especially in the countries that were the place of first arrival in the EU, like Italy and Greece; as well as the decision of some EU countries belonging to the Schengen Area reintroducing controls on their borders with other Schengen states just to try to avoid the flow of migrants (European Comission, 2017). Having placed some of the highest common asylum standards in the world throughout the recent decades, the EU had to improve the European migration policy as the Commission executed, in May 2015, the suggested European Agenda on Migration (European Comission, 2017). This Agenda was the response to the flow of migrants from which the Commission proposed that the Union would assist the refugees and migrants outside of the EU by addressing the root causes of the irregular migration with origin and transit countries and resettle them in the EU; better manage the external borders by creating 'hotspots' in Greece and Italy, tripling the EU's presence at the Mediterranean sea dismantling trafficking networks and identifying and registering every arrival; and work inside the EU by relocating refuges to other Member States and simplifying and harmonizing the European asylum system (European Comission, 2017).

The Commission's discourse can be perceived as a humanitarian speech in its majority. However, when analysing some of the decisions taken throughout this timeline it is possible to consider some of them to be clear efforts to stop the migrants flow to Europe. The Commission take on handling the migration flow in its roots on third countries and the

increased protection of the external border, mainly in the Mediterranean, as well as the creation of hotspots, are evident security acts, even while the Commission, and therefore the EU, maintain their humanitarian discourses. Consequently, there are no evidences of a securitisation process, even though the measures taken by the EU address the migrant's issue as a security threat, since this political institution does not depend on an audience in order to put into action its speech acts.

Expressly wanting to achieve the goal of saving lives, the EU has tried to improve its capability to conduct operations in the Mediterranean to confront criminal networks. While engaging the origins of migration, the Commission shaped cooperation between the EU and some African countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) in order to help those countries to block the smuggling and trafficking of people while decreasing the transit flow throughout the Sahara (European Comission, 2017). The Commission also focused on the EU–Turkey Statement of March 2016 which aimed at the end of the unrestrained flow of migrants through the Aegean Sea into EU's territory. This agreement has led to a significant reduction of migrants travelling through Turkey. As an example of this, "from a high of 10 000 in a single day in October 2015, arrivals to Greece have averaged less than 74 a day since March 2016" (European Comission, 2017).

One other focus of the Commission to the migrants' flow was the efforts put into the EU's capability of returning the irregular migrants to their home country or to third neighbouring countries. All these actions and measures from the Commission can also be depicted as security measures, even if they are not accompanied by securitising speech acts and, consequently, of a securitisation process. From the operations in the Mediterranean, to the cooperation with the African countries and the focus on the EU-Turkey agreement, the EU has consistently adopted security measures to deal with the migrants' crisis while maintaining an overall humanitarian discourse about the issue (European Comission, 2017). This duality between the Commission's speeches and its actions it is also a clear contrast against the Member States, which need to resort to audiences in order to spread their speeches.

3.3 – Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union has a commanding and multifunctional power. As a legislator and partaker in the executive functions of the Union it delineates and

coordinates the policies of the EU Member States. It is also in control of some external relations by defining external security policies, planned by the European Council recommendations, and by completing agreements concerning the Union and other international entities, such as countries or international organizations (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013). However, the Council is primarily responsible for the legislative and budgetary role, in which jointly with the European Parliament and according with the European Commission proposals, it negotiates and adopts the European legislations and approves the EU budget. Composed by the ministers of each of the Member States, the Council, also known as Council of Ministers, meets with different formations according to policy areas (such as the Ecofin, Agriculture, etc.) (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013). Despite representing the governments of the Member States, it must consider the general interest of the Union. However, every so often this is not the case considering that the national interests and the electoral agenda commonly overlay the collective perception (Silva, 2013). The presidency of the Council of the European Union is, therefore, responsible for the well function of the Council. This presidency is a position held by a national government, which is rotated among three member states of the EU every six months, in what is known as presidency trio (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013).

Throughout 2015 to 2019, there were four presidency trios, however for the purpose of this investigation the focus falls on the seventh and eighth trio, due to the relevancy of the findings of this investigation. The first trio in analysis was composed by the Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta, which took place from January 2016 until June 2017. By the time of the beginning of these trio presidencies it had become "clear that the challenge of migration and refugees [would] remain high on the agenda" of the Council (Lundberg, 2016).

The Dutch presidency, with the aim of solving the crisis, was going to propose a plan that would return asylum seekers back into Turkey. They believed that it was fundamental to end the drastic situation in the Mediterranean. However, this idea was not well perceived by the Commission (BBC News, 2016a).

As Slovakia holded its first presidency ever, there was some pressure to ensure that the agenda would be fulfilled, especially following a more experienced country like the Netherlands (Lundberg, 2016). There were also some concerns regarding the re-elected Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico who had been known for his extremist views on migration. He had stated that "Islam has no place in Slovakia" since, in his opinion,

migrants were "changing the character of the country" (Robert & Gabrizova, 2016). However, Slovakia centred migration on its agenda for the Council presidency, with their foreign minister Miroslav Lajcak stating that "Slovakia [would] endeavour to play the part of an "honest broker", while the Prime Minister Fico said "that promoting sustainable migrant and asylum policies [would] be central to its term at the helm of the EU" (Banks, 2016).

Slovakia has been opposed to the obligatory plan that the Commission created for the redistribution of migrants across the member states. Therefore, the quotas system was not expected to appear prominently on their agenda since Lajcak assumed "that the mandatory quotas proposed by the European Commission as part of reform of the EU's asylum system [were] only one element of a very wide process and reform" (Banks, 2016). Nevertheless, Fico, changing his narrative, decided that he would like "to reach a compromise whenever possible" (Banks, 2016). This compromise was made via a document created by the Slovak presidency in which called "for 'effective solidarity' on migration issues" which allowed the member states to "choose how they want to help manage asylum seekers inflows and their claims" (Nielsen, 2016)

Malta's presidency was deeply focused on migration, which had stated that "complacency on migration was not an option anymore" (Kokoszczynski, 2016). The Maltese agenda focused on the security in the Mediterranean Sea, while confronting illegal immigration and prioritising the partnerships with neighbouring countries, in order to "improve [the] development and security in the countries of origin" (Kokoszczynski, 2016). This presidency was the catalyst to the creation of the Malta Declaration, which was signed at the Valletta Summit by the EU leaders. This declaration, focusing on the topic of the relationship with neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean, included the goal of increasing the assistance of migrants' voluntary returning to countries of origin as well as the decision to help training the Libyan coast guard (Politico, 2017). Malta's Prime Minister Joseph Muscat also wished to reproduce the deal made with Turkey with the countries in Northern Africa. In his words, these deals would help "breaking the business model of human traffickers" and aid member states on the frontline like Italy, which had already reached an agreement with Libya in order to stop illegal migration routes (Vincenti, 2017).

During this presidency trio the position taken by the three countries was common to all. They intended the safeguard of migrants while arranging methods and taking measures that would ensure the distance from the situation.

The second trio analysed correspond to the period of June 2017 until January 2018, when Estonia, Bulgaria and Austria held the presidency of the Council.

The Estonian presidency aimed to revive the quota system by presenting a compromise proposal which should allow a fair relocation of migrants to all the member states. This proposal would "reform a stalled programme to relocate asylum seekers around the bloc" by redesigning the Dublin Regulation (Agence France-Presse, 2017b). Estonia imagined "an early warning system" that would allow the Commission to warn the disproportionate increase of asylum applications in the member states (Agence France-Presse, 2017b). This recommendation would then depend of the financial and voluntary solidarity between the member states, as well as the EU executive. This plan would completely alter the reforms envisioned by the Commission (Agence France-Presse, 2017b).

Bulgaria's Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, acting as the president of the Council, stated that the EU needed to "toughen its stance on migration" (Dimitrov, 2018). Intervening in the debate on migration, Borissov said that "the EU must close its borders to those who do not use authorised checkpoints" (Dimitrov, 2018). He believed that the EU should compromise with "prevention, including the shutdown of all EU borders" and that "Everybody who wants to enter [the EU] should make it through a border checkpoint" like in other countries (Dimitrov, 2018). Borissov also warned that the EU would be more exposed to internal divisions if those migrants that did not intend integration were not relocated to their homes (Dimitrov, 2018).

Austria intended to impulse a more assertive migration policy during its Council presidency in order to have "a tough response to the political crisis over migration" (Peel & Politi, 2018). The Austrian presidency "underlined the fundamental weaknesses in the EU's external border" and proposed the "development of a new, better protection system under which no applications for asylum are filed on EU territory" (Peel & Politi, 2018). Austria's Chancellor Sebastian Kurz said "that the fight against illegal immigration would be Austria's priority" during its presidency (Dimitrov, 2018). Kurtz also accentuated that Austria would focus on border control because, in his opinion, "protecting the European people has to be our top priority" (Herszenhorn, Eder, & Barigazzi Jacopo, 2018). For that reason, be believed that it was necessary for the EU "to focus more on the safeguarding of our external borders as the prerequisite for a common border-free Europe" (Herszenhorn, Eder and Barigazzi, 2018).

Regarding this trio of the Council presidency, the narrative presented by the countries continued to follow a humanitarian narrative while still focusing on pursuing securitarian measures.

During the timeline observed on this dissertation the Council of the European Union, as an institution, has also presented some efforts in managing the migration crisis. Therefore, as a result, there were several different council meetings throughout this period of time, from which it was necessary to make a selection of those that present the most relevant topics for the analysis.

All through the year of 2015, the Council of the EU met several times. On May 18th, by following the instructions presented by the European Council it was established, by the Council of the European Union, the EU naval operation EUNAVFOR Med. This operation intended to disrupt the commercial model customary to smugglers and traffickers of people in the Mediterranean regions (European Council, 2015b). Meeting on the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 16th June, the EU home affairs ministers argued the diverse characteristics arising from the European agenda on migration suggested by the European Commission and their respective application.

From this proposal made by the Commission, several delegations welcomed the inclusive and transversal concerns to actively and immediately address the crisis as well as the measures to establish, in a continuing process, a proper European migration policy (European Council, 2015m).

On the 22nd of June, the Council of the EU launched the naval operation called EUNAVFOR Med (later known as Operation Sophia). The main focus of this operation was to intersect and to interrupt the smuggling and trafficking of human beings in the Mediterranean; however, the mission would be managed in successive stages. The first phase would consist on concentrating on the observation and reckoning of the smugglers and traffickers' chains and organisations (European Council, 2015c).

Meeting again in September, the Council decided on the 14th that the conditions to begging the second phase of the EUNAVFOR Med operation were met (European Council, 2015d).

Also, on that same day, the Justice and Home Affairs Council on migration adopted an exceptional and provisional system which allowed the relocation, of up to 40 000 persons requiring international protection, from Italy and Greece to other Member States.

The Presidency of the Council also elaborated a set of conclusions that settled the course of action to handle the migratory crisis (European Council, 2015l).

These measures created by the Council of the EU to ensure migrants' safety and protection in the Mediterranean Sea were based on a humanitarian discourse, demonstrating once again the absence of speech acts that actively seek to securitise the migrants' crises, while simultaneously adopting measures that consistently try to deal with migration far from the Union's borders. This ambivalence demonstrates that it is not possible for a securitisation process to be developed in the Council's take on the migrant crisis.

On the 28th of September, the Political and Security Committee decided that the phase 2 of EUNAVFOR Med would start as of 7 October 2015, thus allowing the conduction of boarding, search, seizure and diversion on high seas of suspicious vessels, within international law. This Committee also approved renaming the EUNAVFOR Med operation to "Sophia", honouring the baby born on board of a ship of this operation that had been given the same name (European Council, 2015e). On the 8th of October, the Home and Foreign affairs EU ministers met with their respective colleagues from the Western Balkans as well as from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This Eastern Mediterranean – Western Balkans route conference adopted a declaration that intended to improve the engagement amongst all the countries associated in this conference, expanding the solidarity between all partners while guaranteeing an organized administration of the refugee and migration flows and routes (European Council, 2015k).

On the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, held on the 26th of October, an exhaustive discussion on migration took place by the EU Ministers. This debate with a special focus on development cooperation made the Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed on strengthening the Member States collaboration with third countries so it would be possible to address the mutual challenges that the European continent and its surrounding countries were facing (European Council, 2015h). The meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council that took place on the 16th of November was set as a follow-up to the high-level conference on the Western Balkans route and the Valletta Summit on migration that took place on 11th and 12th of November. Here, Ministers greeted the negotiations made with the African partners in Valletta and the cooperation with Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey over the Western Balkans route (European Council, 2015g).

These meetings of the Council of the European Union appear to be broader in their topics, however, it is possible to analyse them according to the dissertation theme. 2015 being considered the peak of the so called 'migrant crisis' ended up being the year with the most meetings regarding migration. Overall, there was a great deal of concern on topics such as the relocation of migrants; the collaboration with third countries regarding the questions raised by the Western Balkan route and the creation of an operation in the Mediterranean Sea. These topics align with the ideas presented in the previous sections in which from a first perspective the position from the EU's institution is established from a humanitarian point of view, while being accompanied by strong measures to curtail the flow of migrants into the territory of the EU. So, while there is no clear attempt to securitise the migration issue in terms of the EU's speech acts, and thus we cannot talk about a securitisation process in this context, the EU still adopted securitising measures in its attempts to deal with the migrants' crisis, as evidenced by the creation of the EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia as a patrol of the Mediterranean Sea border of the EU or the agreement to strengths the relationships with third countries in order to contain migratory flows away from European borders. This clear contrast between humanitarian discourse and security measures interestingly, shows that the EU does not dependent on the legitimacy of electorates and, as such, does not need to securitise a question to answer it securely.

The first meeting of the Council regarding the topic of migration in 2016 took place on the 18th of January. On this date, the Foreign Affairs meeting of the Council determined that the essential elements to the EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia to be implemented on the High Seas UN Security Council Resolution 2240 had been achieved. This resolution would allow the operation Sophia that had its phase 2 undergoing since 7 October 2015, to reinforce its authority while managing the trafficking and smuggling of migrants from the coasts of Libya (European Union, 2016).

The Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of the 25th of February had the Ministers discussing the state of the migratory situation at the time, renewing the call for a conjoint European solution. Throughout this discussion the ministers focused on the measures already implemented and their progress, on the Western Balkans migrants' route and on the collaboration with Turkey. The Council's discussion also went through works on the plans for a European border and coast guard (European Council, 2016i).

On the 6th of April the Council's stance on the suggested guideline on the European border guard was approved by the Permanent Representatives Committee, commonly known as COREPER. The Council's presidency was set to put the negotiations into motion once the European Parliament assumed its position so it would eventually be possible to achieve a political settlement by the end of June 2016. It is important to note that the key purpose of the European border guard was that it would guarantee and apply the creation of combined border supervision at EU's external borders. This shared responsibility was meant to entail a European Border Guard Agency and the national entities in charge of border administration (European Council, 2016j).

By the 12th of May, the Council endorsed a recommendation regarding the Schengen internal border controls. This recommendation allowed the prolongation of the temporary internal border controls during exceptional conditions for the maximum period of six months on particular portions of the borders of Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden (European Council, 2016k).

On May 20th, the EU-Turkey declaration and the migration flows in the Mediterranean were the focus during the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting. Throughout the meeting the Home affairs ministers invited all the participants of this agreement to accelerate the resettlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey and the relocation of asylum seekers from Greece and Italy (European Council, 2016g). On the 10th June meeting the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers focused on the application of the EU-Turkey statement. The Council invited the joining states of this declaration to accelerate the relocation of Syrian refugees travelling from Turkey and of asylum seekers coming from Greece and Italy. On this Council meeting the decision to withhold Sweden's responsibilities concerning the relocation of persons entering EU space through Italy and Greece in need of global shelter for the duration of one year was also agreed (European Council, 2016f).

The COREPER meeting on the 22nd of June, in the name of the Council, made an agreement, with the European Parliament regarding the projected guidelines for the creation of a European border and coast guard. According to the text agreed by the two institutions this guard was to be comprised by the national authorities from the Schengen Member States in control of border supervision as well as the existing Frontex agency, however, its responsibilities should be extended(European Council, 2016b). The final

endorsement to this agency was made by Council on the 14th of September with Donald Tusk, the President of the Council, stating that "to save Schengen, we must regain control of our external borders" (European Council, 2016c).

On the 6th October, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency had its official launch. The inaugural event occurred at the Bulgarian external border with Turkey. Here, the Prime Minister of Slovakia and holder of the rotating Presidency of the Council, Robert Fico, declared that this agency was a perceptible result of the unity and shared commitment of the Member States, decided in the Bratislava roadmap. Fico also added that by "creating [this] new reality at our external borders (…) it will help [the Members-States] to get back to Schengen" (European Council, 2016l).

The chosen meetings, of 2016, show a pattern in the speeches and actions of this institution. Focusing on the Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean; the extension of the responsibilities of Frontex; the EU-Turkey agreement that would put an end to the Western Balkans route from Syria and on temporary border controls in some of the Member States of the Schengen Area, it is possible to realize that while the discourses and speech acts of the institution exhibit a humanitarian theme, the concrete measures that were adopted exhibit a tendency to deal with the migrants' crisis as a security threat. Hence, once again, despite a process of securitisation not being in evidence, security measures were being implemented at the EU level despite the clear humanitarian narrative implemented. This implies that the EU does not try to securitise the issue, but then again behaves as if the issue is a security threat, which shows the disconnection between the EU political institutions and the electorates.

The first meeting of 2017 took place on 7th February. Referring to the Schengen Area, the Council recommended the extension of the provisional internal border controls during extraordinary circumstances. This approval allowed Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden to prolong temporary controls at specific portions of their borders, not exceeding the three months indication (European Council, 2017c). Amid the meeting of May11th, the Council accepted a new brief extension of the border controls on these Member States giving them a limit of up to six months (European Council, 2017d).

On the 30th of June, it was confirmed that, relating to the creation of an Entry-Exit System, an agreement was made between the European Parliament and the Maltese presidency of the Council. The agreement consisted of both the proposals for the Entry-

Exit System and for the respective amendment to the Schengen Border Code regarding this system. The system in itself was set to register information of non-EU citizens passing through Schengen area's external borders. The regulation regarding the Entry-Exit System and the Schengen border code amendment were implemented by the Council on the 20th of November (European Council, 2017e).

On the 25th July, the Council decided to prolong, once more, the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia command until the 31st December 2018. This decision was made so that the several amendments to the operation's mandate that the Council also prepared could be put into practice. These amendments ranged from the setting of supervising instruments of trainees and new surveillance exercises in Libya to the improvement of the shared information on human trafficking between Member States, Frontex and Europol (European Council, 2017f).

From these meetings of 2017, a pattern continues to be possible to identify, characterized by humanitarian speeches on the part of the EU institutions regarding migrants which are, however, accompanied by strong security measures that try to reduce migration flows into Europe, which, according to the Copenhagen School theory does not allow the creation of a securitisation process.

Discussing the state of several migration issues, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs met on the 5th June. The first meeting of 2018 analysed the continuing efforts in diverse fields that included the assistance to both the EU agencies and the partners in the Western Balkans; the establishment of an ample funding to the EU Trust Fund for Africa; and the continuous esteem of the EU-Turkey statement (European Council, 2018f). On December 6th, the Council reached an agreement on a proposal concerning the European Border and Coast Guard, comprising the requirements related to cooperation with third countries. The proposed rules allowed Frontex to provide support to Member States in return operations and to increase its assistance to third countries further than the neighbouring countries (European Council, 2018b). On the 21st of December, the last meeting of the Council related to migration in 2018, the ministers decided to extend the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia's mandate up until the 31st March 2019 (European Council, 2018a).

On the 20th February 2019, the Council agreed its position on the regulation of the European Border and Coast Guard. The negotiations with the European Parliament started

with the Romanian Presidency of the Council. Frontex was strengthen and its mandate broadened so that it could back the Member States' actions on border security and cooperation with third countries (European Council, 2019e). Once more, the Mandate of the Operation Sophia was prolonged until the 31th of March 2020. The decision taken by the Council on the 29th September was made while taking into account that the distribution of the Operation's naval resources would continue temporarily adjourned (European Council, 2019b).

On October 8th, the Home affairs ministers debated the state of migration. Reviewing the migration situation in the EU, the Council analysed the state of the migratory routes into the continent, particularly focusing on the intensification of the arrivals in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Council also went through a declaration made by France, Germany, Italy and Malta on brief arrangements for arrivals and disembarkments (European Council, 2019d). One month later, the Council adopted a regulation regarding the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. With this new regulation Frontex was reinforced in equipment and staff. It has also seen its mandate broadened, so that it could support Member States on activities related to border supervision and assistance to third countries (European Council, 2019c).

Since 2018 until 2019 the number of meetings had a clear reduction when it comes to the topic of migration. Nevertheless, the meetings that were held with topics related to the theme of migration show that in those two years the speeches from the Council of the European Union remained identical and focusing on the same topics than in the years before, Frontex regulation and Operation Sophia extension and the partnerships with third countries, especially Turkey. The speeches presented by the Council of the European Union continued to show a humanitarian discourse, coupled with strong security actions and measures aimed at reducing migration flows into the EU. However, it is not possible to identify a securitisation process occurring due to the ambivalence of the EU's humanitarian discourse and security actions.

3.4 – European Parliament

The European Parliament is the institution that, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, "represents the peoples of the States gathered in the European Union" as "it is composed

of representatives of the citizens of the Union" (European Union, 2007: 19; see also: Silva, 2013). Since its deputies are elected directly and universally by European citizens, the EP is considerate as the only democratic supranational institution of the Union. However, the deputies are selected as Europeans and not as nationals, since they are grouped by political affinities and not by nationality, despite the election being made at national level and through the national parties. Furthermore, their vote is personal. The Treaty of Lisbon established the number of Members of the European Parliament [MEPs] at 750 (at most, excluding the president) with a minimum threshold of 6 seats and a maximum of 96 per member state (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013). The internal organization of this institution consists of the president of the European Parliament, 14 vice-presidents and by the elected MEPs. The EP's president has the role of representing the EP both outside and in interinstitutional relations of the Union, signing the annual budget once approved, and alongside the President of the Council, the legislative acts in the framework of the ordinary procedure. Through their influence MEPs actions can focus on all areas of the citizen's daily life such as the environment, consumer protection, free movement of workers, transport, but also education, culture, health, among others (such as immigration) (Nugent, 2010; Silva, 2013).

In its powers, the European Parliament has become the prominent institutional actor in the Community political system, despite the Commission still having the legislative initiative, not only occupying the first formal place amid the institutions of the EU in its treaties it also has a significant and consolidated legislative power, budgetary intervention and control capacity. In the legislative sphere, the Parliament pronounces itself by vetoing, approving, amending or rejecting the decisions of the European acts. Within the budgetary agenda, the Parliament has the power to approve, amend or reject the annual scheme and declares the budget approved, which is a power that it shares with the Council of the European Union. It still has the responsibility to control and verify the Union's expenses and, within the scope of this supervisory function, give discharge to the Commission for the execution of the budget (Silva, 2013).

The Parliament also exercises democratic control over: the European Commission by approving, supervising and dismissing the agency, it scrutinizes and enquiries its reports as well as invites and encourages the institution to submit legislative proposals; the Council of the European Union, inquiring and debating the program of the institution in addition to the reports the president has to submit on the beginning and ending of each semi-annual

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presidency; and on the European Council by having the opportunity to discuss with its President the report he required to present at the end of each meeting. These powers are, of course, further added to that of the endorsement of the President of the European Commission chosen, as well as, amongst other capacities, those that come from their ability for initiative in the revising the treaties (Silva, 2013).

Throughout the migrant crisis the European Parliament was presided by Martin Schulz, during his second term (2014 - 2017), and by Antonio Tajani (2017 -2019). Martin Schulz, while on his post, believed that the EU was at risk of deteriorating and falling apart due to the migrant crisis and therefore he decided to focus on alternatives to the situation. Regarding the option of the "removal of the free-movement Schengen zone" (Culbertson, 2015) in which walls and borders are predominant, Schulz stated that this scenario "would be disastrous because that kind of Europe has repeatedly led our continent into catastrophe" (Culbertson, 2015). Additionally, he said "that no country could single-handedly tackle challenges like migration" and that "this was only possible as unified EU" (Culbertson, 2015).

Asserting that "Europeans have both a moral and legal duty to take in refugees even as their numbers grow" (Tasch, 2015). Schulz continued to disapprove "the fact that many European countries re-instated border controls amid the unending flow of refugees and migrants entering the European Union" (Tasch, 2015). He believed that "closing borders inside of Europe was not a solution" because "Europe without Schengen would last one day, not longer" (Tasch, 2015). In order to complete the task of facing the migrant crisis, Schulz emphasized the need for the EU to give financial assistance to neighbouring third countries (Tasch, 2015).

While criticizing the "national egotism in its purest form" that the member states presented regarding the acceptance and relocation of migrants, Schulz blamed the disarray of the crisis on the "lack of European solidarity" (Reuters, 2015). As the European Parliament president, Schulz also told the European leaders that the crisis could only get a suitable response if "only a common migration and asylum policy" exist (Crisp, 2015). This would be obtainable thru the creation of a fair distribution system of migrants throughout the EU and the establishment of common asylum measures across member states (Crisp, 2015).

Schulz, during his second term as president of the EP, showed a slightly different posture regarding the other political figures analysed before, since he only presents a

humanitarian discourse throughout his time in office, defending the safeguard of the EU and above anything the safety of migrants.

Antonio Tajani as president of the European Parliament committed himself "to being neutral, serving all Europeans" (Cooper & Ariès, 2017). He has been known, just like his predecessor, for criticizing the "egoism of member states" while managing the migrant crisis, however the refuse of some countries in sheltering migrants become a grand challenge even within the Parliament due to MEP's support towards "EU action, and the member countries" (Cooper & Ariès, 2017). Regarding the topic of security, Tajani indicated that he was eager to support the establishment of a committee in the Parliament in order to allow the EU to focus more on fighting against terrorism. He also pledged to support new reforms to the SIS in order for the member states polices could better locate criminals on the Schengen Area (Cooper & Ariès, 2017).

Tajani believed "that Europe [underestimated] the size of the migration crisis" (Morgan, 2017). He warned that if action was not taken and the EU did not intervene, united, "with great determination in Africa, without committing the errors of the past" that in the future there would be millions of migrants advancing towards the EU (Politi, 2017b; see also Morgan, 2017).

Being certain that "Europe [was] running out of time to agree on a fairer and more efficient migration policy", Tajani warned the EU leaders that the disputes regarding the asylum policy were threatening the "European dream" (Galindo, 2018). In his opinion the EU needed to reform its migration policy in order to: guarantee "that those fleeing persecution and war" would be granted asylum; proceed with an even distribution of migrants across the Union while following an "automatic and compulsory" system; and to take a firm stance "against those who have no right to enter or stay in Europe" (Galindo, 2018).

He considered that any new approach to the unwillingness of member states to board the redistribution policy should "go hand in hand with plans to strengthen the bloc's external borders [in order] to address the drivers of mass migration from North Africa" (Galindo, 2018). To obtain this goal, in Tajani's opinion, it was necessary for the EU to invest in the closer of the Mediterranean route while increasing its cooperation with third countries.

Tajani also address that it was necessary for the EU to invest in its budget in order to create a "Marshall plan for Africa" so it would be possible "to tackle the root causes of

migration and (…) conclude readmission agreements with countries of origin" (Galindo, 2018). He also believed that it was required the development of "a short-term strategy that curtails (…) smuggling practices and ensures only those who are really entitled to protection safely reach Europe" (Galindo, 2018). Tajani stated that by being devoid of a reliable European strategy, every country would continue to act alone. However, he warned that the nationalisation of migration related policies would lead to the "the end of the Schengen Agreement and the European dream" (Galindo, 2018).

Tajani's posture regarding the topic of migration returned to the same sentiment felt by the other institutions, moving away from his predecessor position. Tajani despite presenting a humanitarian discourse throughout the year, also believed in the resolution of the crisis situation outside of Europe, while applying security actions.

Although the migration flows have decrease in the most recent years analysed in the timeline of this dissertation, the crisis has uncovered the flaws and weaknesses of the European asylum system. The Parliament sought to battle these circumstances by reforming EU asylum guidelines and reinforcing the controls at the EU's borders. Regarding the European immigration policy, by being a co-legislator, together with the Council, the EP contributes to the adoption of new laws relating to regular and irregular immigration. When it comes to the European asylum policy, the EP also co-legislates with the Council. The EU's response to the migration challenge is reflected in the several efforts made by the Parliament. The Parliament's position on the Dublin Regulation was that the Member States should reform it. The MEP's have required that efforts should be made to upgrade the Dublin Regulation by creating a fairer and more efficient asylum policy. These changes would imply a bigger cooperation between the Member States (European Parliament, 2017b, 2018a).

Regarding the EU border controls and management of the migratory flows, the MEP's voted for new plans to give the Frontex new powers. On these plans, the MEP'S endowed the Agency with a permanent body of ten thousand guards until 2027. Concerning the European Asylum Support Office [EASO], the MEP's approved the centralization of the European asylum application system. This proposal modified the EASO into the new EU'S Asylum Agency (European Parliament, 2017b).

While analysing the discourses of this political institution, it is possible to identify the actions and speeches of the MEPs throughout the timeline of the migrant crisis. Just

like the other political institutions of the EU, the Parliament's expressed positions reflect a humanitarian perspective. This observation can be made when analysing measures that the MEPs took, like the efforts to development the European asylum policy and the increase of the regulation of the Dublin Regulation (European Parliament, 2017b, 2018a).

The EU-Turkey deal as a plan to put an end to the irregular migration flows from Turkey into the EU was, according to the EP's president Martin Schulz, an essential collaboration for the good of refugees (European Parliament, 2016a, 2016b).

The EP approved a proposal from the Commission for the creation of an EU normalized travelling document, which also made the MEPs vote to reinforce the Schengen Information System [SIS] (European Parliament, 2017a, 2018c). In the EU's fight against the root causes of migration, the MEPs led the EU to adopt a long-term strategy. To this end, the MEPs support the EU program to mobilize 44 million euros in private investments in neighbouring countries and Africa (European Parliament, 2017a). The EP agreed as well to a plan that asked for the Commission to present new regulations that would allow the creation of a Humanitarian Visa granting those requiring international protection to solicit a visa in any embassy or consulate from the EU. This would allow migrants the right to be heard without risking their lives. The integration of migrants in the European continent was also a big concern to the MEPs which lead to the approval several resolutions to promote the inclusion of migrants (European Parliament, 2018b).

Stating that the institution and the EU as a whole could not permit that the situation felt in 2015 repeat itself again, the EP presented, throughout the period of time analysed, a humanitarian discourse, just like the other political institutions investigated. Nonetheless, the EP still supports EU measures that assumed a highly securitised character in their attempts to contain the migrants' flow into the EU space. This way, is possible to observe that the EP also presents a duality between its speeches and its actions.

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the speeches on the part of the European institutions in relation to the issues of the migration crisis in order to confirm whether in fact there was a securitisation process occurring. By analyzing the various institutions throughout the sections, it was possible to verify that all institutions present a constant discourse and in this way the position of the EU also becomes more uniform. It is possible to verify that, during the meetings and declarations presented in this chapter, in the case of the EU, there

is not a discourse of securitisation. Instead, the migration issue is discursively addressed from a humanitarian perspective; with the Union expressing the desire to establish a protective relationship with migrants. However, when analyzing the measures and actions taken by the EU's institutions, it is possible to note that the EU tends to treat issues related to the flow of migrants as security issues, actively attributing powers to border authorities and collaborating with third countries in an attempt to maintain migrants away from the European space. So, while there is not a securitisation process to the criteria of the Copenhagen School theory, there are extraordinary security measures being implemented by the institutions of the European Union while promoting a humanitarian narrative.

As previously stated, this aspect creates a dichotomy in the EU's response to the migrant crisis. However, at the same time it exposes this dichotomy of the EU's independency regarding the electorate, not needing the direct approval of the European citizenry for its measures as it would be necessary in the case of national governments, according to the Copenhagen School, in order to apply security measures. This also shows a contrast between the more bureaucratic type of organization of the EU, and that of its member states. proves to be a contrast to the case of member states, where the same does not take place

Final Conclusion

The focus of this dissertation relies on the research question: To what extent have the speech acts of some governments and the EU contributed to the development of a securitisation process of the Schengen Area? It was possible to arrive to some conclusions, by analysing the concepts of the Schengen Area and the Migrant Crisis, considering the conceptualization of the theory of securitisation, while examining some official documents, academic texts reports, working papers.

Regarding the concepts of the Schengen Area, the migrant crisis and the Copenhagen's School Securitisation Theory it was possible to establish the connection between them, as well as set the background for the investigation as they become the geographical and temporal delimitations and theoretical-practical framework of the investigation.

Being one of the most important aspects of the European integration, the creation of the Schengen Area allowed the abolishment of the borders between Member States, making possible the freedom of movement of people throughout Europe. The analysis of this concept is relevant because of the security issues that arise with the termination of border controls on the internal borders of the EU. The external border ends up functioning as the excluding factor of the Other, while securing the freedom and security against external threats. It was observed that during the time period under analysis the perception of threats was connected to international terrorism, crimes and migration, being the later the main motive for the tension surrounding Schengen, in the context of which some states chose to reinstate their borders.

The research of the problematic of the Migrant Crisis allowed the establishment of the temporal delimitation of the investigation. By perceiving the start of the crisis in the year of 2011, it was possible to understand that the events that lead to the situation were related to migrants escaping civil conflicts and abuses of their human rights. Reaching its peak in 2015, the numbers of migrants entering the European space rose to levels never experienced before. This crisis shed some light on relevant problems in Europe, like the deficiency in a common response from the EU to conflict situations. The lack of a common response in issues concerning migration was expressed in a particularly clear manner with the decision, by some Member States, to reinstate their borders inside of the Schengen Area.

The reliance on the theoretical-practical framework of the Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory was fundamental to better analyse the two chosen concepts. According to this theory, by considering any topic a security issue it becomes possible for a securitising actor, mostly countries or states, to present the right and the need to treat that topic through exceptional methods. In agreement with the Copenhagen School, the process of securitisation is developed when a a securitising actor, through a speech act, is successful in convincing an audience that a certain topic should be perceived as a threat, despite the fact of it really being a threat or not, and that there is a need for exceptional measures to deal with that topic. Hence, it is only when the issue is perceived by the audience as a threat, legitimizing exceptional measures implemented by the securitising actor, that it is possible to observe the development of a securitisation process.

On the subject of the first cases of study, the investigation focused on the speeches of the most prominent political figures in Italy, Hungary and Germany. The main goal of this chapter was to understand if there was a securitisation process in these Member States in relation to the migrants' crisis. The research focused on the several political figures of these countries, allowing taking into account their speech acts, discourses and actions. It was possible to observe that the narratives taken in each Member State, regarding their response to the migration flows, were different from one another.

Through the investigation of these study cases, it was possible to determinate that both Germany and Italy presented speeches with a humanitarian narrative. This observation was only regarding the German chancellor and also all the Italian Prime Ministers in the period under analysis, in spite of the situation in the two countries being different. These two countries were also witnesses of the rise of the far-right and populisms during this period, which permitted the dissemination of anti-European and anti-migration ideas through the Member States. In these specific cases, the investigation highlighted the German far-right party AfD and the Italian deputy Prime Ministers Di Maio and Salvini. These political figures, from both countries, presented security related narratives, considering that their speeches declared migration as a security issue and it was perceived by their audiences as a possible threat. Despite this fact, the analysis of these cases shows that it is not possible to determinate that a securitisation process occured in these two case studies since it is not possible to perceive all the necessary requirements, according to the Copenhagen School theory, for the development of this process. As it is known, it is necessary for the speech acts to be accepted by the audiences in order to create a

securitisation process; however, in the cases of Italy and Germany, the main political forces presented a humanitarian discourse and the parties that did not, such as the AfD in Germany and the League in Italy, simple do not have sufficient influence next to the majority of the national audience, which prevented the securitisation process

Despite the great distinction between the two types of speeches that are possible to analyse on these study cases, it was only possible to find a securitisation process occurring in the case of Hungary. The political figure of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, stands out due to his securitising speech acts which, according to the analysis of this study case, have been accepted by his audience. The strong support of the population to Viktor Orbán, allowed a process of legitimation of a set of exceptional measures, undertaken by the state, to control what was perceived as the threat of migration.

Concerning the analysis of the actions and speeches taken by the European institutions regarding the Migrant's flow into the continent, it was possible to conclude that the discourses that the institutions display are constant and stable, which benefits the EU's position as it becomes more uniform. During the analysis of these study cases it became apparent that in the case of the EU there is not a narrative of securitisation, but, as an alternative, migration is addressed through a humanitarian discourse point of view. However, when considering the measures and actions of the EU's institutions took throughout the crisis, it becomes clear that the EU treated the migration concerns as security issues. Therefore, while it is not possible, according to the Copenhagen School, to identify a securitisation process occuring at the level of EU institutions, it is important to note that the European Union is recurring to the implementation of exceptional security measures to deal with the migration crisis, while its institutions maintain a humanitarian narrative.

From these conclusions it is possible to evaluate once more the research question in order to understand in which way the speeches of some governments and the EU affect and/or contribute to the securitisation of the Schengen Area. With this analysis, it is possible to reiterate that in the case of the Member States under study only Hungary presented clear evidence that effectively a securitisation process occurred in relation to the migration crisis. This shows that the speeches can only affect and/or contribute to the securitisation process if there is an audience willing to accept the message. However, just like the case of the far-right in Germany and Italy it is also necessary to have enough power to control and access a larger audience.

Concerning the EU's speeches, this investigation proposes that a dichotomy is present, characterized by the fact that the EU institutions simultaneously present a humanitarian narrative concerning the migration crisis while, in practice, implement exceptional security measures to deal with that topic. Further research is required to investigate in depth the causes of such a dichotomy. But, tentatively, a hypothesis might be advanced according to which the increasingly bureaucratic character of the EU institutions, and their associated distance from the European citizens, to a certain degree automatize these institutions from the need to conduct a securitising process in order to legitimize their exceptional security measures. A situation that does not occur at the level of member states, where national governments depend on securitisation processes, via which national audiences accept of their securitising speech acts, in order to be capable of implementing exceptional security measures to deal with the migration crisis.

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